PROJECT ON DEFENSE ALTERNATIVES RESEARCH MONOGRAPH 4
1 OCTOBER 1995

Vital Force

A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for the Creation of a UN Legion

Carl Conetta
Charles Knight

COMMONWEALTH INSTITUTE, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

VITAL FORCE:
A PROPOSAL FOR THE OVERHAUL OF THE UN PEACE OPERATIONS SYSTEM AND FOR THE CREATION OF A UN LEGION

Table of Contents

Figures

Tables

VITAL FORCE:
A PROPOSAL FOR THE OVERHAUL OF THE UN PEACE OPERATIONS SYSTEM AND FOR THE CREATION OF A UN LEGION

Preface

As the United Nations Security Council has found cause to expand the frequency and scope of peace operations in the post-Cold War era, long dormant ideas have reemerged for creating a UN military command, organizing a system of reliable standby forces, and establishing a standing UN military force. These ideas have also quickly encountered skepticism.

At the Project on Defense Alternatives we noted a disturbing aspect of the ensuing debate. The political issue of whether UN member states could forge the collective will necessary for clear and decisive action had become interlaced and confused with a set of questions about the facilities the United Nations would need to become a more effective instrument. We set as our task in this study to define the requirements for successful UN peace operations and to articulate the necessary components of institutional renovation and reform. In this way, we hoped to illuminate the reasons for past failure and the requirements for future success.

We conceived this study in 1992. Since then the political fortunes of the UN have taken a hard turn. Severe problems encountered in operations in Somalia and Bosnia have led to a crisis of confidence. In this light, a comprehensive statement of requirements for new era peace operations is needed more than ever, to remind the world community -- from individual citizens to great power leaders -- of what action is required if peace operations are to proceed in a responsible manner. We remain hopeful that nations will come to appreciate their stake in multinational peace operations and other cooperative security efforts. The alternative scenario -- which entails increased uncertainty, insecurity, and, possibly, the reemergence of hostile power blocks -- is one the world cannot afford.

We were assisted by many people in the development and production of this report. Sean Meyer and Todd Perry carried out numerous interviews and collected key documents. Alan Bloomgarden and Sheila Walsh helped with the creation of charts and tables. Stuart Johnson, Bjørn Møller, and Jonathan Dean read our manuscript and offered many helpful suggestions. Steve Lily-Weber proofread the final draft. We are especially grateful to Lutz Unterseher, for his review of this study and for his continuing contributions to PDA's work, and to the Ploughshares Fund and Samuel Rubin Foundation, who provided essential support

Finally, we dedicate this report to the courageous men and women who have served and who will serve in the future in multinational peace operations. As historian John Keegan has suggested, they represent a new vision of how strength can facilitate peace.

Carl Conetta and Charles Knight
September 1995

VITAL FORCE:
A PROPOSAL FOR THE OVERHAUL OF THE UN PEACE OPERATIONS SYSTEM AND FOR THE CREATION OF A UN LEGION

Executive Summary

Virtually every aspect of United Nations peace operations has been criticized in the wake of the increasing demands put on the existing apparatus for such operations and the difficulties encountered in the field. Concern has focused especially on problems affecting the authorization, planning, and execution of peace operations:

- Security Council mandates have been insufficiently clear regarding military objectives, means, and limits; they often imply objectives that cannot be achieved given the operational limits set by the mandate. Furthermore, the Security Council has too often altered objectives in the course of operations.

- The UN Secretariat has at times underestimated the force or logistic needs of the operations it fields. In general, planning has trailed, not led operations.

- The process of defining, planning, assembling, fielding, and supporting UN peace operations has suffered at every point from a lack of information that is sufficiently detailed, reliable, and timely.

- Seldom have UN field operations been able to achieve a unity of effort, much less a synergy, among their various subcomponents.

- UN operations are notoriously slow to fully deploy, although the fault for this belongs mostly to participating member states, not the Secretariat,

- Once underway, some UN field operations -- especially the larger, more complex ones -- have suffered from inflexibility or an inability to adapt to changing conditions.

A number of proposals have been put forward in recent years for the development of a more capable UN peace operations system. Although these proposals differ in their assumptions, especially about what changes are practicable, there is some significant convergence on several initiatives that should have a place in any program of reform. The reform and reconstruction platform put forward here builds on many of these points of

consensus; however, it does not seek to accommodate itself to the *immediate* political impediments to reform. Rather, it takes a longer-term view in which the prospects for progress are more favorable. This approach reflects not so much assertive optimism but rather recognition of the need to attend to geostrategic *requirements* in the design of a development program, shielded from the confusing and discordant noise of current politics. The resulting alternative offers a criterion of sufficiency and serves as a reference point for reform. Without such a criterion it is impossible to differentiate problems that are inherent in the conduct of multinational peace operations and those problems that arise due to tractable political constraints

The essential components of the UN reform and development program described herein are:

- The formation of a Military Advisory and Cooperation Council as an adjunct to the Security Council;

- The formation of a multinational Field Communication and Liaison Corps to serve as a modular command, control, and communication framework for multinational operations;

- The development of a UN staff structure in the Secretariat that is sufficiently large, articulated, and integrated to be able to plan and manage joint and combined efforts across the full spectrum of peace operations; and,

- The formation and development of a permanent UN standing force *comprising four brigades* and a field support structure to complement and augment member-state contributions to peace operations.

This program addresses several key questions: *First*, in what types of operations should the United Nations involve itself, and how? *Second*, what types of new leadership and management bodies does the United Nations need in order to successfully execute these operations? And, *finally*, what arrangements for providing the United Nations with military assets are necessary to substantially improve the success probability of its operations?

The UN involves itself in three general types of operations involving military units: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and full-fledged defensive wars or wars of “counter-aggression." For purposes of the proposal, peacekeeping and peace enforcement (which may involve some intermittent combat) are treated as subsets of “peace operations.” Defensive wars are set apart as distinct from peace operations because of their special requirements, although they may, like the Gulf and Korean wars, be conducted formally under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN charter as "peace enforcement actions."

With regard to multinational operations, the reform program distinguishes between those *directed* by the United Nations and those *authorized but not directed* by the United Nations. The former are coordinated and managed at the highest level through the offices of the UN Secretariat. The latter are managed by a member state, an independent coalition of member states, or a regional alliance.

The program reflects the view that the UN Secretariat should develop a competence to provide initial planning, continuing support, and operational guidance for *the full spectmm of peace operations* -- that is, both peacekeeping and peace enforcement (which in our lexicon excludes full-fledged wars). Based on the experience of the last seven years we take as an initial statement of need an effective capability to plan, manage, and conduct between eight and fifteen peace operations simultaneously, involving a‘ global total of between 20,000 and 120,000 troops, and including some meaningful capacity for rapid deployment. In the case of UN--authorized defensive wars, the program assumes that the United Nations will delegate all operational responsibility to regional organizations or to member states.

The program envisions giving the Security Council access to military assets in three ways: through (i) *ad hoc* assignment of national units for specific operations which is the *status quo,* (ii) a system of “standby units” held by member states but, to varying degrees, answerable to the Security Council’s call, and (iii) a standing UN legion composed of UN personnel and administered by a department of the Secretariat. The proposal assumes that all or any of the three means may be used to assemble a force for *UN-directed* operations.

The proposed UN legion should not be viewed as a means for supplanting traditional peacekeeping forces in the conduct of operations for which they are suited. Nor is the proposal meant to obviate the provision of peace operations forces by UN member states, on either a standby or *ad hoc* basis. Indeed, in the foreseeable future member states will remain the source for most UN peace-keeping units. In this light, the legion’s role appears as complementary, focusing especially on the requirements for rapid deployment and for additional peace enforcement assets.

A High-level Military Advisory and Cooperation Body

In order to assist the Security Council in the development of precise and appropriate mandates for peace operations we propose the establishment of a Military Advisory and Cooperation Council (MACC). The body would also help the Security Council to interpret

developments in the field and assess alternative courses of action should events require it. This body need not be a new legal entity; the functions and organization described here could infuse a revived Military Staff Committee (MSC).

All permanent members of the Security Council (SC) would have a full seat on the MACC/MSC with non-permanent SC members at least allowed to send observers. The Security Council should also grant full seats on the MACC/MSC to those nations who are routinely contributing military personnel and services to UN peace operations.

The MACC/MSC would maintain a *Coalition Operations Section to* assist the Security Council in monitoring UN-authorized operations conducted by member states acting outside the institutional framework of the Secretariat. The Coalition Operations Section would form a task force early in the development phase of a UN mandate for an authorized coalition action. This task force would attach small teams of officers to the lead country's central headquarters and the coalition's field headquarters. These teams would assist coalition planning staff in accurately interpreting the mandate and would serve as the coalition command staff's conduit back to the MACC and Security Council.

The MACC/MSC would also serve as a "facilitator" of security cooperation by the member states. This function comprises several discrete tasks: assisting UN member states and the proposed UN Department of Peace Operations in the development of joint doctrine and in the design of joint exercises; developing and monitoring "quality and compatibility standards" for earmarked member-state military units; facilitating multinational force communication and liaison in the field by supporting the development of structures for this express purpose.

To perform these diverse tasks, the MACC/MSC would maintain three additional subordinate units:

an Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training,

an Office of Force Assessment and Interoperability, and

a Field Communication and Liaison Corps.

The Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training would organize *multinational working groups* to develop joint doctrine covering various areas and issues in military science -- especially those pertaining to peace operations; it would coordinate a *multinational staff college* for mid-level officers with the aim of inculcating multinational doctrine on peace operations, increasing military-to-military contacts, and increasing cross-cultural awareness of differences *in* doctrine; it would form joint exercise *advisory/observer groups* to assist member states and the proposed UN Department of Peace Operations in planning joint

exercises and deriving "lessons learned;" it would also form *training support groups to* develop manuals, courses, and training regimes covering areas of MACC/MSC doctrinal consensus, especially regarding peace operations.

The *Office of Force Assessment and Interoperability* would serve to codify and monitor standards covering equipment, readiness, and training for those units that member states may contribute to UN peace operations. It would also maintain a *multinational asset database*, providing details on the quantity, quality, character, and capability of those units that member states might be willing to deploy for UN peace operations.

Finally, the *Field Communication and Liaison* Corps would provide a modular “central nervous system” for wider multinational military cooperation among member states and the United Nations. The Corps would mainly comprise "provisional" standby units of UN member-state militaries who may participate in UN peace operations. Its aim would be to facilitate field communication and liaison down to the company level (groups of 100-200 troops) among disparate national contingents. The field liaison system would have two principal elements: first, a commercial communications network able to handle radio and cable traffic, both voice and digital, and with some capacity for secure transmission; second, command liaison teams who are expert in the use of the network, fluent in one or two command languages, and practiced in cooperation among themselves.

In the proposed system, every nation contributing to a UN peace operation would attach communication and liaison teams to their contingent. The teams would serve to horizontally link cooperating, interdependent, or physically adjacent units of different national origin at various levels. They would also link vertically. Their role would be to facilitate communication and coordination across barriers of language and military culture. The size of the teams would correspond to the size (and complexity) of the units that incorporate them. Teams of three or four persons would be adequate for companies and battalions, teams of seven or eight for brigades, and teams of twelve or more for divisions or division-size forces.

These teams would be the only member-state units *required* by the proposed system to be in a formal “standby status” -- and even then only in a provisional way: the units would be required to deploy only in the case of their nation’s participating in a multinational UN operation, and only in a quantity that corresponds to the size of their national contingent.

Proposed Renovation of Secretariat Structures

Commensurate with maintaining and expanding the UN's practice of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, our proposal renames the Department of Peacekeeping Operations *the Department of Peace Operations (DPO).* A reformed UN Department of Peace Operations would have several main components:

- an Office of Budget and Management;
- an Office of Information and Research;
- a Joint and Combined Operations Division (JCOD);
- a Uniformed Service Division; and
- a Civilian Services Division.

Each of the three proposed divisions would report to its own Assistant Undersecretary. These deputies would, in turn, report to the Undersecretary for Peace Operations, as would the Office of Budget and Management and the Office of Information and Research.

The Office of Information and Research would maintain a research staff divided into regional sections, a field investigation unit, and a 24-hour situation room.

The Joint and Combined Operations Division would serve as the "home base" headquarters for *all UN-directed* peace operations. It provides the institutional site for staff task forces combining personnel from both UN services and from the services of member states participating in UN-directed operations, as each operation warrants.

The JCOD would divide into two offices: the Office of Field Operations, which would also serve as a planning unit, and the Office of Field Support. These offices would serve to draw together and coordinate officials from the planning, logistics, and operations units within the UN's Uniformed and Civilian Services and from comparable units of member-state militaries participating in UN operations.

The Office of Field Operations would, like the Office of Information and Research, divide into regional sections. Under these sections would be teams responsible for individual, ongoing operations who would link to their counterparts in the Office of Information and Research. This linkage could take a physical as well as organizational form in the constitution of "operational desks" for each operation. For each operation undertaken through the UN system, a staff task force would form that cuts across the offices of Field Support, Field Operations, and Information and Research.

The Uniformed Service Division and the *Civilian Services Division* would administer the development and maintenance of UN field assets. The Uniformed Service Division would have two subordinate "commands": Support Command and Forces Command. The Civilian Services Division would have four subordinate services: Civil Affairs, Electoral Support, Constabulary Service, and Observer and Mediation Service. Both Civilian and Uniformed Services would have their own offices of Logistics and offices of Plans and Operations.

Each of the services would command field personnel who are full-time employees of the United Nations. In their design, the two service divisions resemble the agencies of UN member states that might contribute assets to a UN operation with one critical distinction: the assets of the UN service divisions are permanently at the disposal of the Security Council for use in peace operations. They have no other competing function or orientation.

A UN Legion for the New Era

Among the current impediments to conducting effective peace operations, none is easier to see and harder to comprehend than the failure of UN member states to fulfill their pledges of support to mandated operations in an adequate and timely fashion, Member states have routinely failed to meet the levels of need estimated by the Secretariat. This failure has involved both the quantity and quality of pledged tactical and support troops. Qualitative shortfalls in deployed units have involved issues of appropriate skills and training, discipline, compatibility with the field force as a whole, and equipment and supplies on hand.

A review of recent UN operations makes clear the operational significance of these failures, especially the problem of timeliness in the initial deployment of troops and the problems of overall force size, quality, and capability. Failing to deploy a field force soon after a mandate and operational plan have taken shape will unhinge even the best planning and contribute to a divergence between political mandate and operational reality. Arranging for standby national units has been proposed as one solution to this problem, but such a system by itself or in combination with *ad hoc* provisioning, could not close the existing gap between requirements and capability, Pulling together a multinational assemblage of military units on an *ad hoc* basis takes time -- which is inimical to rapid deployment. A degree of uncertainty regarding overall force quality is unavoidable with a rapidly assembled UN force; this adds to operational risk, which is already considerable for early entry forces. *If the goal is a truly rapid, multilateral capability to deploy for peace operations, there is no good substitute for a UN standing force.*

The UN should develop a peace operations legion that can meet rapid deployment requirements and that can add a highly-skilled, well-equipped, cohesive, and reliable complement of troops to three or four multinational peace operations simultaneously. In all cases the UN contribution should be sufficiently large to have a determinate effect on the conduct of operations. In one or two of these simultaneous operations the UN legion should be prepared and able to play a leading or "backbone" role. Based on an analysis of the 1988-1995 high-tide period for peace operations, we calculate that a UN capability to deploy and continuously maintain 15,000 troops in the field could meet these goals. Had such a UN capability existed during the period 1988-1995 it would have substantially facilitated the achievement of UN mandated goals in Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

In order to ensure operational effectiveness in situations of potential combat, *the tactical units of the field force should closely resemble typical "middle weight" military units in their equipment and capabilities.* These criteria should be applied with reference to a prototypical "worst case" threat *for peace operations* -- which means a military or paramilitary opposition employing, at best, mid-level technology and exhibiting low- to mid-levels of organization and professionalism.

Among the basic requirements for the more difficult and dangerous types of peace operations are dedicated anti-armor assets, substantial indirect fire assets, and combat engineer capabilities. Generally speaking, the capacity of the UN field force to defend itself will rest heavily on the baseline resilience, combat capability, and mobility of its tactical units -- which should be at least as good or better on average than that of the belligerents' units -- and on the *clear superiority* of its C3I facilities theater-wide. Overall, the field force's margin of superiority will usually derive from its better training, discipline, leadership, intelligence, and communication,

In the proposed system, the military field units of the UN standing force would reside in two commands: Support Command and Forces Command. In addition, the legion would have base, general staff, and central support elements. Forces Command would comprise approximately 22,625 officers and troops; Support Command, about 15,775 officers and troops. The base, general staff, and central support elements would add approximately 5,350 personnel. Thus, the proposed UN standing military would comprise approximately 43,750 personnel in all. Of this total, 32,650 would be "deployable," allowing the legion to field up to 16,350 troops continuously, including some service support personnel for non-Legion civilian and military units. The proposed UN legion would constitute a military establishment somewhat larger than Denmark's or Norway's, but smaller than Portugal's or Singapore's. It would be approximately 2.5 percent as large as the present US military.

The tactical field units of the UN Forces Command would include:

4	Brigade headquarters,
5	Motorized Infantry battalions,
4	Light Mechanized Infantry battalions,
3	Light Cavalry squadrons,
2	Light Armored Cavalry squadrons,
6	Self-propelled Mortar batteries,
3	Light 155-mm Artillery batteries (towed),
4	Light Mechanized Antitank companies,
6	Combat Engineer companies,
6	Air Defense batteries,
2	Armed Scout Helicopter squadrons (18 aircraft each),
1	Troop Transport Helicopter squadron (24 aircraft),
4	Signal companies,
4	Field Intelligence companies,
4	Military Police companies,
6	Reconnaissance and Surveillance platoons,
12	Field Security sections, and
#	Field Communication and Liaison teams (400 personnel, aggregate).

The concept of "modularization" informs the legion's design. It is organized under four large brigade headquarters and with a quantity of units consistent with four brigades. Nevertheless, the units would only occasionally deploy in brigade-size packages. Instead, the legion would deploy multifunctional force packages ranging in size from 500 to 15,000 troops, as the situation demanded.

Ground combat force mobility would be based on modern variants of wheeled vehicles ranging from lightly armored personnel carriers to tanks in the armored cavalry. In peace operations where local consent is uncertain, the capacity to quickly redeploy and extract UN forces will substantially reduce their vulnerability and help keep the operation from falling hostage in a political-strategic sense. Hence all infantry have some organic means of mobility -- none are simple foot infantry.

Cavalry units are present in the design in a much higher proportion than would be expected for a typical mobile force of this size. These units are equipped to fulfill the function of lightly armored strike forces. In addition, there are dedicated antiarmor units optimized for defensive operations against hostile tank forces.

A variety of *combat support elements* complements the primary units. To permit maximum flexibility, these are mostly of company (or battery) size or can deploy as such. We

include in the force design *armed scout helicopter squadrons* which can serve to provide troops with light fire support, in addition to performing their primary, scout role. Equipping the helicopters of one of these squadrons with antiarmor missiles would allow it to assume a secondary antiarmor role as well. There is also a troop transport helicopter squadron providing a optional mode of transport to some of the motorized infantry units. Similarly, several antitank companies, light cavalry companies, and artillery batteries could train for air mobility.

The design includes a relatively high number of special intelligence and engineering assets and more artillery than has been the practice in peace operations forces. This weighting serves to enhance the capacity for protection and agile defense. Salvo-firing mortar units provide an efficient means of concentrating firepower in defensive operations. *Reconnaissance and Surveillance platoons*, which are equipped with remotely piloted vehicles, augment the tactical intelligence gathering capacity of the force. The *Field Communication and Liaison teams* provide a flexible means of facilitating either the incorporation of UN units into a member state's field force or inclusion of member-state units in a force led by a UN field headquarters. Also noteworthy are the legion's dozen *Field Security* sections. These are small, two-vehicle units designed for escort duty and site protection.

Service support units of the Support Command provide field support in several areas of need: transportation, field supply, maintenance and repair, medical services, and general services (such as postal, commissary, and kitchen). The goal guiding the design is a field structure able to sustain an operational force of 24,000 persons (UN and non-UN) -- roughly comparable to two US divisions -- and also *assist* in the support of up to 5,000 civilian operatives.

Capacity for rapid deployment missions

A typical rapid-deployment task force might include a light mechanized infantry battalion, one self-propelled mortar battery, and one light cavalry troop (company). Personnel for such a task force would initially number approximately 1,200 troops, including some headquarters and general field support personnel. Deploying this hypothetical task force would require less than 100 C-141 transport aicraft sorties. Given a "fleet" of 18 C-141s (and double crews), the task force could confidently deploy to a site 5000 miles from its base within six days.

Bases, personnel, and central staff organization

The United Nations would lease in perpetuity from member states three or four basing sites, which would be chosen to facilitate global reach. The tactical and support field units would co-locate at the legion's bases along with the central logistics depots, medical facilities, and some training facilities. Each base would also host one or two of the field brigade headquarters. Central logistics would include large storage depots, vehicle parks, and repair facilities. The central medical staff would attach to hospitals near the home bases and would also run base clinics and health programs, oversee special medical training, and facilitate the acquisition and delivery of medical logistics.

All personnel would be volunteers recruited through a UN program operating in cooperation with member-state recruitment systems. Field officers would be recruited through this system as well, drawing on those leaving national service. Officers could also rise through the ranks of the legion. Some central staff positions could be filled by officers seconded from member-state militaries or serving a tour of duty under the full command of the UN legion chief of staff. The UN legion would maintain its own small corps of training personnel, although the legion should also draw substantially on the training programs and assets of member states. The legion's training program could also dovetail closely with that of the UN Military Advisory and Cooperation Committee.

The *Central Staff* would include the Assistant Undersecretary for Uniformed Services who would directly oversee an Office of Budget and Management and the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff would oversee five offices: Personnel and Administration, Development and Acquisition, Doctrine and Training, Plans and Operations, and Logistics. Attached to the Office of Doctrine and Training would be the Training Corps.

The Chief of Staff would exercise direct authority over the central staff offices, the bases, and, through two Vice-Chiefs of Staff, over the Forces and Support Commands. Brigade commanders, who are the equivalent of US warfighting commanders, would assume command of units in the field. When in the field their immediate superior would either be the Secretary-General or a designated Special Representative of the Security Council.

Estimated Cost of the Legion

The cost of maintaining the proposed legion, *once it is fully developed,* would be less than $2.6 billion per year (1995 USD). Additional, incremental costs associated with field operations would not exceed an average of $900 million per year, assuming full utilization of the force: 15,000 troops in the field continuously. Hence, given full utilization, the total

average annual costs for the legion would equal less than $3.5 billion -- that is, less than 0.5 percent of global defense expenditures.

***

A deployable UN field force of the proposed size and type would have given the world community a capacity to increase peace operation deployments by nearly 25 percent in the recent peak year of 1994. It would have allowed adequate rapid deployment in all of the major operations of the 1988-1995 period and it would have contributed to the most demanding of those operations a well-trained, well-equipped, cohesive "backbone" force designed specifically to meet the challenges of multinational peace operations.

Under current practice, individual member state preferences put idiosyncratic limits on unity of command, operational resources, and the quality of forces available to the UN. No amount of change to UN procedures and structures by itself can overcome the deficit and confusion caused by these policies. Member states must make a collective decision to address the problems of peace operations in a committed manner. Our proposal serves to illustrate a practical way forward to a more effective UN -- a way available when the political will emerges.

Glossary

(proposed structures are *italicized)*

AGL Automatic Grenade Launcher
APC Armored Personnel Carrier
ARV Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle
ATGM Anti-Tank Guided Missile
AUSG Assistant Under Secretary General
bde. brigade
BSC Battalion-level Support Companies
btn. battalion
C3 Command, Control and communications
C3I Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
CJSTF Combined Joint Staff Task Force
COSCOM Corps Support Command
CS3 Company-level Service Support Section
DJDT Department of Joint Doctrine and Training
DOD US Department of Defense
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO Department of Peace Operations
FCLC Field Communication and Liaison Corps
FLB Field Logistics Base
GAO US Government Accounting Office

interoperability -- the ability of two or more national forces to exchange services and to operate effectively together

ISB Intermediate Support Battalion
JCC Joint Coordination Cell
JCOD Joint and Combined Operations Division
LAV Light Armored Vehicle
LAW Light Antiarmor Weapon
LMG Light Machine Gun
LOC Lines of Communication
MACC Military Advisory and Cooperation Council
MG Machine Gun
MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MPOD Military Planning & Operations Division
MSC Military Staff Committee
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMDT Office of Multilateral Doctrine and Training
ONUMOZ Mozambique UN operation
P5 Permanent Five Members of the Security Council of the UN
PDD Presidential Decision Directive (US)
ROE Rules of Engagement
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

seconded -- status of a military officer assigned to serve temporarily under foreign command

SLAV Small Light Armored Vehicle
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
sqd. squadron
STF Staff Task Force
UNAMIR Rwanda UN operation
UNITAF UN/US Somalia operation
UNMIH Haiti UN operation
UNOSOM Somalia UN operation
UNPROFOR UN Operation in former Yugoslavia
UNTAC Cambodia UN operation
UNTAG Namibia UN operation
USAF United States Air Force
USG Under Secretary General
USIP United States Institute of Peace
USMC United States Marine Corps

VITAL FORCE:
A PROPOSAL FOR THE OVERHAUL OF THE UN PEACE OPERATIONS SYSTEM AND FOR THE CREATION OF A UN LEGION

1. The Parameters of Reform

We must be guided not by precedents alone, however wise these may be, but by the needs of the future and by the shape and content we wish to give it...

Boutros Boutros-Ghali[1]

In contemplating structural reform of the UN peace operations process, analysts and political leaders have criticized virtually every aspect of existing institutional procedures and arrangements.[2] Concern has focused especially on several problems or problem areas affecting the authorization, planning, and execution of peace operations:*

- Poorly developed or articulated Security Council mandates,
- Deficiencies in operational planning,
- Information shortfalls,
- Lack of "cohesion" in the organization and conduct of field operations, and
- Problems of operational responsiveness and flexibility in the field.

Briefly reviewing each of these in turn:

Security Council mandates: The problems in this area are of several types: (i) Security Council mandates are often insufficiently clear regarding military objectives, means, and

* The term "peace operations" is problematic in a way that "peacekeeping" is not. We follow current US policy in using "peace operations" to refer both to traditional peacekeeping and to peace enforcement operations *short of war*. This usage implies that there is a grey area between war and peacekeeping -- between a state of concerted combat and one of ceasefire or truce. We address some of the underlying issues in *Section* 6 of this report, and conclude that the terms "peace enforcement" and "peace operations" can too easily connote nonviolent operations or operations in a peaceful environment. A more accurate term, such as "conflict limitation operations," would better serve public discussion. However, the aim of this report is not to join the semantic debate. The official American convention, while not pervasive, is widespread. We adopt it provisionally in order to facilitate communication of our main points.

limits; (ii) even when clear the mandates sometimes lack "military sense" -- that is, they imply objectives that cannot be achieved by military means, or by the means made available, or within the operational limits set by the mandate; and (iii) the mandates are not stable over time -- that is, the Security Council has a tendency to alter objectives in the course of operations.[3]

Operational Planning: The UN Secretariat has at times underestimated the force or logistic needs of the operations it fields. Arrangements for procuring supplies from commercial sources have often proved inadequate -- either in terms of meeting time schedules or in terms of procuring supplies of requisite quality. In general, planning has trailed, not led operations, seeking to fix critical problems as they turn up.[4]

Information: The process of defining, planning, assembling, fielding, and supporting UN peace operations has suffered at every point from a lack of information that is sufficiently detailed, reliable, and timely. Information shortfalls pertain to conditions in the theaters of proposed operation, assessment of threat, quality and quantity of assets available to the United Nations, and monitoring of operations once underway.[5]

Operational cohesion: Seldom have UN field operations been able to achieve a unity of effort, much less a synergy, among their various subcomponents. Indeed, in some cases, the different parts of an operation have seemed to work dangerously at odds with each other. In part, this problem derives from the resistance to unified command of participating national contingents. In part it reflects difficulties with interoperability, especially in the area of communication equipment, communication protocols, and command idioms. Also relevant is the fact that different national contingents are likely to embrace different methods of operation and are likely to deploy without having developed any strong consensus on the details of an operation.[6]

Operational responsiveness and flexibility: UN operations are notoriously slow to deploy fully, although the fault for this belongs mostly to participating member states, not the Secretariat. Once underway, some UN field operations -- especially the larger, more complex ones -- have suffered from inflexibility or an inability to adapt to changing conditions.[7]

1.1 The Broader Context of Reform Efforts

The roster of problems reviewed above is now well-known and has inspired many proposals for staff reform -- several of which we examine in some detail below. However, any serious and useful program of reform must begin by ascertaining what portion of existing problems can be addressed through institutional intervention alone -- that is, through reform of UN administrative structures and procedures. UN offices operate within tight constraints, formal and *de facto,* set by the member states -- and especially by the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), the larger regional powers, and the wealthier member states. These constraints also limit what can be accomplished through institutional reform. Especially relevant are national policies governing three issues: *unity of command, the resourcing of UN peacekeeping structures and operations,* and *the United Nation's access to military assets* (which is a subset of the resourcing problem). To appreciate the effect of member-state policies in these areas we need also recognize that multilateral operations are inherently more complex and difficult than unilateral ones -- especially if conducted on an *ad hoc* basis -- and thus require a greater concentration of effort and investment of resources to ensure integration and synergy among subcomponents.[8]

Unity of command

Weak unity of command poses problems that no amount of good staff work can alleviate. Indeed, a lack of unity can render central planning irrelevant or, even worse, transform it into a source of false expectations. What good is a plan if only *some* force elements will carry it out? Generally speaking, a well-articulated force is more flexible and adaptable than a uniform one. However, outside the context of an overarching and unifying command structure, force articulation is likely to give rise to a disabling degree of friction. Rather than increasing a commander's capacity to manage uncertainty, it adds to the uncertainty that a commander must manage. In the past these problems were contained by strictly delineating individual tasks and areas of responsibility for each national contingent. Although this lent to operational rigidity -- identified above as a problem area -- it also eased the friction among national contingents. In the faster paced and more volatile contingencies typical of the

present era, however, this "solution" is entirely untenable. In new era operations, there is no good substitute for unity of command.*

Member states are not presently considering the delegation of complete command authority over any portion of their armed forces. Instead, today's debate focuses on the issue of delegating "operational control." A Congressional Research Service report distinguishes the two concepts in this way:

> In [US Department of Defense] terminology, "command" includes the authority to use resources and to plan for, organize, direct, coordinate, and control, military forces to accomplish assigned missions, as well as responsibility for their health, welfare, morale, and discipline. . . . "Operational control" is a temporary authority to organize forces and to employ them in tasks necessary to accomplish a given mission. . . . [A] foreign officer with operational control over US forces cannot separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization.[9]

There is, however, another level of authority falling between "full command" and "operational control": *operational command.* Operational command over a unit gives a commander the authority during an operation to assign specific missions to that unit or to parts of it, *Operational control*, by contrast, does not give a commander the authority to alter a unit's basic mission within the operation as defined through the unit's national chain of command. Hence, to use an analogy, a carpenter given control over a "claw hammer" (which has one part of its head designed to remove nails) may not employ it to drive nails if the hammer's owner has set its mission to be "the removal of nails." This limit pertains even should the operation's mandate include "nail driving" activities. Hence, depending on the limitations that come with a unit, the utility of *control* can be very circumscribed, especially in rapidly evolving circumstances. As Roger H. Palin argues in a recent article,

---

* Careful observers concede that it was a failure of command unity and intelligence cooperation, not poor leadership by a non-US commander, that produced the tragic series of events during the UNOSOM II operation in 1993. Moreover, regarding US command unity problems in that operation, Col. Kenneth Allard writes, "[T]here should be no mistaking the fact that the greatest obstacles to unity of command during UNOSOM II were imposed by the United States on itself." Col. Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p 60. Also, see Mats R Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* (Spring 1994), pp 39-42.

> Ideally, an international commander would be granted operational command of assigned forces, which would authorize him to assign and reassign missions to the national formations best suited to the overall requirements of the operation. However, while this might not be unusual within an alliance where mutual trust and confidence can be developed over years, it is rarely granted in a coalition; here the state of command transferred is more likely to be tactical control. The international commander's authority is limited to employment of the national units for the specific mission. In these circumstances the nations retain the right of veto, which clearly inhibits the commander's operational freedom.[10]

Of course, the limits implicit in the military concept of "operational control" can serve as a guarantee that tools are used in accord with agreed-upon parameters -- that is, in accord with the operation's mandate. Conversely, these limits can be set so tightly as to constrain a commander's ability to adapt to changing circumstances. On balance, granting a commander operational control over national contingents may suffice in many circumstances to ensure force cohesion, flexibility, and synergy -- providing that (i) the delegated control authority reflects the needs of the mandate and covers the extent of the operation and (ii) other, complementary steps have been taken on a routine basis to improve the interface among the national military staffs cooperating in peace operations.

A nation's leaders may resist relinquishing even operational control over their military units, however, because these are universally viewed as vital national assets. While nations may forgive their political leaders mistakes in the handling of national armed forces, they are far less forgiving of mistakes (or even casualties) incurred under a foreign authority. And, in such cases, blame adheres principally to the delegating authority. Hence, potential domestic political repercussions can inhibit the delegation of authority. Reviewing the American experience in the Somalia operations, Col. Kenneth Allard of the US Institute for National Strategic Studies notes that,

> The larger the peace operation, and the greater likelihood of combat, the less likely it is that the United States will agree to surrender operational control of its forces to a UN commander. Participation of US forces in operations likely to involve combat could be conducted under the operational control of the United States, an *ad hoc* coalition, or a competent regional security organization such as NATO.[11]

This well-informed and influential view suggests there is little hope of achieving the "ideal" arrangement postulated by Roger Palin, whereby an international commander assumes

operational command of national units participating in a UN-directed operation. However, another US officer sees a way forward toward command unity under UN auspices: "American willingness to commit US forces under UN command is also likely to hinge on the competency of the UN infrastructure set up to support a UN force."[12] The practical and political risks of giving foreign commanders operational control over national units can be reduced in several ways:

- National leaders can make a concerted effort to inform their citizens of the abiding national interest in *specifically cooperative* approaches to ensuring the peace. As long as cooperative endeavor is viewed solely as a burdensharing device, entrusting international commanders with command or even control of national forces may not seem worth the risk

- The special, practical risks inherent in joint operations can be reduced by improving the basis and infrastructure for cooperative endeavor. To offer two examples: If commanders coming from different countries are all trained to a common, minimum set of standards for leading peace operations, concerns about foreign command should recede along with the risks. Similarly, risks would abate if commanders operated within the context of a stable and reliable "joint staff system."

- National contributions to the development of the UN peace operations system must not be of the financial and material type alone. People are key. By increasing the routine interface of their military establishments and the UN system, governments can enhance the national appreciation of a collective enterprise -- thus making the UN system, in fact and appearance, less of a "them" and more of an "us."

The resourcing of UN peace operations

The UN peace operations system is today like a volunteer fire department in which all of the firefighting assets are privately owned, and no assurance exists that volunteers will deploy to fires on time or with all of their necessary equipment in tow. The fire department's office is seriously understaffed; its communication system is frayed, and its maps of the fire district are outdated and incomplete. It would be remarkable should such an institution attain any level of success. In fact, however, the UN peacekeeping system has produced about an equal

number of successes, partial successes, and peaceful stalemates during its forty-seven year tenure -- and only a few outright failures.* Nonetheless, the tasks put before the system today are many times as demanding -- qualitatively and quantitatively -- as those of the Cold War period. The notion that a series of low-cost or *ad hoc* reforms could bring this system up to "new era" requirements should be greeted with skepticism. Reconstruction and expansion of the infrastructure, not just reform, are needed. The issue of resource requirements and constraints divides into several parts:

- Fixed investments,
- General support for mandated field operations, and
- The special issue of how to make force elements available to the United Nations, which combines aspects of the other two issues.

Reviewing each of these in turn:

Fixed Investments: The present "crisis" of peacekeeping has coincided with a dramatic increase in the number and size of UN peace operations. The development of the UN staff, communication and information systems, and programs to improve the conduct of peace operations has not kept pace with increased demand Extrapolating from the practice of the leading military nations, we might expect that a UN headquarters responsible for more than a dozen peace operations and 70,000 troops in the field would have at least 700 or 800 military headquarters staff personnel -- this assuming that the nations contributing to the operations provide for most of the lift, logistic support, and field staff. However, the 1994 reforms provide for only 300 staff positions within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and this is a substantial improvement over staffing prior to 1994. Also essential to command and control of *ad hoc* multinational operations are some provisions for both vertical and horizontal interface among participating units -- a Command, Control,

* Lt Gen Barry R McCaffrey, director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the US Joint Staff and a US ground division commander during the Gulf War, offers an assessment of the UN's record that contrasts notably with the negativism of many American accounts: "While the United Nations hasn't proved a panacea (especially in Bosnia), it has had remarkable successes: in Namibia, it literally built a new nation; in El Salvador, it ended a decade of brutal civil war and is rebuilding a society based on the rule of law rather than the power of the miliary elite; in Cambodia, it negotiated the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, conducted the first fair elections in over two decades, and provided an opportunity for a stable, peaceful society." McCaffrey, US Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations" in, Dennis J Quinn, ed., *Peace Support Operations and the US Military* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1994).

Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) "nervous system" capable of linking contingents with each other, their field headquarters, and the UN HQ in New York.

The lack of such a C3I system and of a staff of sufficient size contributes, directly or indirectly, to all of the problems outlined earlier. The success of institutional and structural reform efforts will depend upon the extent to which UN member states are willing to rectify these shortages through an intensive investment program and an increase in the system's annual baseline budget.

Support for UN Field Operations: In the past, member states have routinely been unreliable in fulfilling their pledges of support for field operations. Or, they have failed to give support in a timely fashion.[13] Likewise, the payments of annual and incremental financial assessments are often late and short. As Adam Roberts writes, "Peacekeeping is in a continuous state of financial crisis."[14] These conditions befuddle operational planning in ways that no amount of staff or C3I restructuring can rectify.* In addition, they impede operational effectiveness and responsiveness, and they contribute to readiness differentials in the field, thus increasing operational risks and reinforcing a "go it alone" attitude among national contingents.

At minimum, in order to stabilize support for the UN system there must be (i) a renewed commitment from member states to meet their financial obligations fully and on time, and (ii) simplification of the UN's method of collecting incremental peacekeeping assessments. But these measures are not sufficient to ensure that even a substantially reformed UN peace operations system can rise to meet today's challenges. UN staff and peacekeepers need a "resource buffer" if they are to be capable of responding quickly and adequately to rapidly changing circumstances. The system needs to maintain substantial stockpiles of basic necessities for personnel and equipment in the field: fuel, oil, temporary shelters, clean water, water purification and electrical generating equipment, rations, and medical supplies sufficient to supply for two months a light mechanized (or "middle-weight") force of 6,000-10,000 troops. The system also needs to build up to and then maintain a contingency fund able to support six months of operations at present levels. These steps would put many of the system's problems within reach of a solution through further institutional reform.

---

* How external resource problems affect even good planning is suggested by Major-General Indar Jit Rikhye (ret), who cites the example of the UN's preparing for ten years to conduct the UN operation in Namibia. Six weeks prior to the deployment date the budget for the operation was cut in half, thus sending planners back to their drawing boards at the eleventh hour. Rikhye, "UN Institutional Reform and Effective Peacekeeping Operations," in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Implications for the US Military* (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, May 1993), p 22.

Force Structure: Standing, Standby, or Status Quo? The issues of command unity and resourcing of the UN system converge in the question of what type of forces the United Nations will be able to draw on. Presently, the UN must rely on member-state units of uncertain quality, compatibility, availability, or responsiveness to central control. In all but the simplest, most prosaic operations, these factors of uncertainty subvert efforts at detailed operational and logistical planning. Moreover, they make the "rapid deployment" of peace operations forces virtually impossible. One result -- often mistakenly ascribed to weaknesses in strategic leadership -- is that operations may not get underway until their mandates have begun to obsolesce and the consensus supporting them has begun to shift or weaken.*

UN access to a standing force would significantly mitigate the challenges facing the UN peace operations system. Such a force could deploy quickly and operate without problem under unified command and control tied unambiguously to the Security Council and Secretariat. Its capabilities and readiness level would be transparent to UN authorities and could be adjusted as required; likewise, its logistical requirements would be clear. Used as an early entry force, or as a solid core around which to build a larger multinational farce, or to reinforce an operation in crisis, standing units would add to the UN system a vital element of reliability, flexibility, and responsiveness.†

Access to standby units is the next best option. Although issues of command and control would persist, a system of standby units -- anchored in binding agreements and a monitoring regime -- would give UN planners a force of relatively knowable quantity, quality, and

---

* As Ambassador Jonathan Dean points out: "It takes from three to six months to gather together the personnel and initial financial support for a UN peacekeeping operation. By that time, conflict has often intensified so that efforts to deal with it require major military force, which is either not forthcoming at all or managed in such a cautious way that it remains without serious effect." *See* Dean, "Peacekeeping and US National Security," 6 December 1994 draft of article appearing in *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (March/April 1995). The experience of UNOSOM I provides an instance: UN officials report that by the time the initial 500 person UNOSOM I peacekeeping force had deployed, months late, the field situation had deteriorated to the point that the operation required 3,000 troops to accomplish its mandate. On the UNOSOM I experience, see Government Accounting Office, *UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions,* Chapter 3, "Limits on UN Capacity to Plan, Logistically Support, and Deploy Peacekeeping Operations," (Washington DC: GAO, December 1993), p 41.

† Sir Brian Urquhart, one of the pioneers of UN peacekeeping and a leading advocate of a standing UN force, argues that "the possibility of the UN intervening convincingly at an early stage in a crisis would almost certainly provide, in the longer term, for a large reduction in the complication and expense that belated intervention almost invariably entails. The delay in intervening in Somalia, for example, certainly created a much larger disaster, which in turn necessitated a much larger international response." Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force," *New York Review of Books,* 10 June 1993, p 4.

availability with which to work. This arrangement would not provide a true rapid deployment capability, nor would it resolve the special problems of managing logistics for a multinational coalition. Nonetheless, the improvement in these areas over the *status quo* would be substantial. Moreover, such a system would give efforts to improve force compatibility and mining standards a finite and reliable set of units on which to focus.

The future composition of UN peace operations could rest on a combination of the three ways of providing forces: the status quo *(ad hoc* provisioning), member-state standby units, and UN standing units. *Sections 3* through *7* of this report examine this option as a feasible means of meeting the strategic and operational requirements of peace operations.

****

The next section reviews recent UN reform proposals and efforts. As argued above, the various proposals to reform the UN peace operations staff, command structure, and C3I infrastructure rest on assumptions, explicit and implicit, about the issues of command unity, resources, and force structure. For this reason it is difficult to compare the different reform platforms or simply pick and choose among their constituent parts. Nonetheless, much of the work done to date can be reformulated to serve in a longer-term development program *oriented primarily toward meeting minimum strategic requirements,* rather than toward immediate political limits, as is presently the case. *Section 2* begins a synthesis of reform concepts that we hope will prompt a reevaluation of both the promise and the requirements of multinational peace operations in the new era.

2. Review of Selected UN Staff Reform Proposals

Propelled by the inadequacy of United Nations staffing arrangements for the expanded peacekeeping missions of the 1990s, the United Nations announced in May 1994 a reorganization of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).* The key feature of this reorganization is the division of the department into two major sections: (i) the Office of Planning and Support and (ii) the Office of Operations, each headed by a new assistant secretary general.

The Office of Planning and Support is divided into a Planning Division and a Field Administration and Logistics Division. The Planning Division is headed by a military flag officer who is dual-hatted as Deputy Military Advisor to the Undersecretary. Its main mission is to be a planning service, but it also houses civilian police, de-mining, and training units. The Field Administration and Logistics Division manages financial, logistical, and personnel requirements of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The Office of Operations is divided into three regional sections to which the individual country missions report It also has a special electoral unit to help organize and monitor

---

* Early peacekeeping operations developed in an *ad hoc* manner under the direction of the Secretary General's office. In UN Headquarters in New York, two different bureaucratic chains were used: (i) political direction flowed through the Office for Special Political Affairs to the particular field commander; and (ii) administration and provisioning were provided through the Field Operations Division. These two lines of command were joined in the field headquarters where the mission Chief of Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer both reported to the Field Commander. Nevertheless, the Field Commander had no direct authority over the provisioning flowing through the Field Operations Division in New York. This reflected the fact that much of the provisioning of peacekeeping was dependent on voluntary contributions of member nations, so in essence field commanders had to get along with what they were offered.

The creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in 1992 was an effort to bring the political direction and provisioning of peacekeeping into greater alignment, The DPKO was headed by an Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping and an Assistant Under-Secretary. It had three regional divisions which oversaw specific country operations; it incorporated the field operations division which covered tasks ranging from logistics to personnel arrangements to mission planning; a military advisor and staff was attached; and more recently, a situation center was added.

elections. Under the new arrangement, each country mission will be assigned at least one military officer, but continue to be headed by a civilian. Directly reporting in the new arrangement to the Undersecretary for Peacekeeping are an executive office, a Policy and Analysis Unit, the Situation Center, and the Military Advisor (who also reports to the Secretary-General).[15]

Several of the following reform proposals predate these recent UN reforms; hence, some of the suggested measures or their equivalents have already found their way onto an agenda for implementation. However, we examine these proposals in all their key parts because they often form integrated programs whose intended aims cannot be appreciated through a partial review.

2.1 US Institute for Peace Study Group Reform Proposal

An international study group constituted in 1992 by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) identified a variety of goals to guide the development of a more effective UN staff.[16] These goals pertain to several key problem areas: (i) mandate development, (ii) planning and management of operations, (iii) communication and coordination among the various authorities, offices, and agents involved in peacekeeping, and (iv) the provision of information vital to planning and management.

> *Mandate development:* The USIP study group suggested the formation of a UN military staff to advise the Secretariat on the military requirements associated with a proposed operation. Key to this function would be the identification of a strategy that would ensure the achievement of political objectives, as determined by the Security Council, within given resource constraints. The strategy would inform the development of a sensible mandate and of a clear statement of operational limits and rules of engagement.
>
> *Planning and management of operations:* The proposed staff or subsections of it (ie, task forces or field headquarters) should be able to effectively plan and manage all aspects of field operations with special attention to previous shortfalls in the areas of deployment, support, and field communications and logistics.

Communication and coordination: Special efforts at coordination and communication should focus on linking (i) the centers of political and military authority, (ii) the field command and UN headquarters, and (iii) the various aspects of field operations: military, political, and humanitarian.

Scope of intelligence activities: Intelligence efforts should focus on providing UN political and military authorities with early warning of potential crises, detailed information on developing crises, and very timely and precise information on the progress of field operations.

The USIP study group report suggests that the proposed military section of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have several key elements:

- an Operations Center,
- a Military Advisor to the Secretary-General,
- planning and intelligence staffs, and
- *ad hoc* task forces that would assume direct responsibility for planning individual operations.

The *Operations Center* would serve the information needs of all the UN departments and offices involved in "planning, monitoring, and communicating with field operations" and in the "ongoing collection and processing of information."[17]

The *planning staff* would gather under its authority much of the peacekeeping planning and management functions previously distributed among different UN departments. Noting that "the diffusion of responsibility over all the various components critical to peacekeeping. . . makes effective management extremely difficult," the study group advises that "issues organically related to the functioning of the peacekeeping activity, such as personnel, logistics, and support functions, be moved to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)."[18]

According to the study group's recommendations, responsibility for planning specific operations would pass to a *staff task force* early in the planning process. This task force could draw additional personnel from the national armed forces participating in the operation. The designated field commander and field staff personnel would begin participating in the task force at the earliest possible opportunity -- although the task force itself would remain alongside the operations center and military advisory staff in New York. Once force

deployment and operations were underway, the task force would provide the critical interface between UN political authorities and the field commander and staff. The task force would also link closely to UN political and humanitarian departments involved in the operation.[19] However, military command authority -- within the limits set by multinational coalition operations -- would rest with the field commander, *not* the New York-based task force.

The USIP study group proposals imply some limits on the UN's institutional influence over peace operations: Although the UN staff would retain within its purview the development of mandates for the full spectrum of peace operations, regional organizations or lead countries would act as subcontractors for peace *enforcement* operations, bearing principal responsibility for their planning, management, and conduct. The USIP proposals would also limit the UN's institutional influence in "traditional" peacekeeping operations in several ways. First, most of the DPKO's regular military section staff would comprise *seconded* military officers. Second, the staff task forces, which bear principal responsibility for designing peacekeeping operations and managing their support, would come together on an *ad hoc* basis, drawing on the military staffs of nations participating in the action. The responsibilities of the regular military section staff, including organic and seconded personnel, would be limited largely to:

- providing the Secretariat with routine strategic intelligence;
- keeping an inventory of member-state peacekeeping assets and monitoring their quality;
- setting long-term goals and coordinating efforts to improve the peacekeeping capabilities of the UN community;
- assisting the Security Council and Secretariat in the development of mandates; and,
- facilitating communication between political and military authorities, and among military and civilian offices.

Even this rather modest roster of tasks and functions would, in the study group's view, require that the UN's peace operations headquarters be "robustly rebuilt." In considering how best to manage the more complex peace operations -- such as UNTAC, UNOSOM, and UNPROFOR -- until the necessary UN reforms are complete, the study group examines the option of "removing managerial control from the Secretariat structure in New York and transferring most of the duties to the field representative, who would then be given broad latitude to operate with better responsiveness to conditions on the ground."[20] The inspiration for this proposal is the "viceroy system" utilized by colonial powers "prior to the age of rapid,

secure communications -- a bygone age that resembles the level of Command, Control and Communications (C3) capabilities in the UN's New York headquarters."[21]

Under the viceroy system, substantial authority over the military, political, and civil aspects of an operation would devolve to the UN's designated field representative. The report notes that a viceroy system in its fullest expression would imply "the absence of a coherent, sovereign authority in the territory in which the United Nations has chosen to intervene." Hence, the report sees the system as most appropriate for two types of contingencies: those involving "newly liberated colonies where sovereign authority is still taking shape" and those involving "failed states." In the study group's assessment, these two types will encompass many of the contingencies requiring a UN response in the new era.[22]

The report also develops a rationale for using this approach as more than just a stopgap measure: Combined with the "lead nation" concept, whereby a single member state assumes predominant responsibility for an operation, the viceroy system could strengthen command unity and facilitate coordination among a field operation's many parts. The report concludes that this combination "could alleviate many of the problems peacekeepers now face and many of the reservations the US military may have in taking part in peacekeeping operations."[23]

2.2 Proposals by John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra

In several articles and studies John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra have drawn attention to a disturbing dynamic evident in recent peace operations: the responsiveness, cohesion, and stamina of UN field forces have tended to degrade in response to field conditions that require forces to have just these qualities.[24] More than simply reflecting the greater complexity, size, and volatility of recent contingencies, this dynamic also derives from a defective approach to conducting and supporting field operations. In assessing these flaws and suggesting corrective measures, the authors work outward from the vantage point of the field commander, noting that it is in the field headquarters that "all the tensions and fracture lines of a fundamentally flawed instrument converge." Mackinlay identifies several "drag factors" that impede the effectiveness of UN field commanders:

- fluctuating and unclear political demands emanating from UN headquarters in New York,
- insufficient control over necessary force support assets,
- the relative autonomy of individual national contingents, and

- poor coordination among the military and nonmilitary elements of UN field operations.

Regarding the relationship between the field commander and the UN political center, Mackinlay suggests that "a political/military buffer is needed in New York to separate and, if necessary, translate raw, sometimes highly politicized statements generated by international debate from operational policy."[25] In his view, a revived Military Staff Committee (MSC) could serve this function by complementing and informing the political "give-and-take" of Security Council debate with negotiation and debate among national military authorities.

Lack of adequate logistical support for UN operations is a common complaint. Mackinlay locates part of the problem in the institutional separation of logistics and peacekeeping functions in the field -- the former often falling entirely under the authority of the Chief Administrative Officer. Mackinlay argues that the UN has failed to understand that "logistics ... at the operational level are a [peacekeeping] support function."[26]

Another commonly cited difficulty is that of achieving a unity of effort in the field among different national contingents, who may individually remain oriented toward their national command authorities. This was troublesome enough in the traditional peacekeeping operations of the Cold War period -- most of which were less complex and volatile than today's efforts. Given the increased level of threat and instability characteristic of recent contingencies, the relative autonomy of national contingents can have deadly consequences. And as Mackinlay points out, "the reluctance of countries to delegate authority over their national contingents rises in direct proportion to the threat."[27] This hamstrings the field commander's ability to quickly adapt to changing circumstances. "The bottom line," Mackinlay concludes, is that "the UN's capability to respond effectively decreases" as field conditions grow more demanding and dangerous.[28]

Exacerbating "unity of command" problems is the increasing reliance on "offshore forces," which may fall entirely outside the field commander's authority even though they may carry the responsibility for vital functions, ranging from intelligence to air support to force extraction. Mackinlay concludes that "a major operational decision by the UN can be reversed by a more coherently established coalition or by nations that individually provide the offshore element of the force. In this way, nations exercise their idiosyncratic control regularly and sometimes with breathtaking disregard for the fragility and overall cohesion of the force."[29]

Finally, Mackinlay draws attention to problems of coordination among the diplomatic, military, humanitarian, and civil components of UN operations. Although these agents may all operate in the field under UN auspices, their individual "chains of command" may converge only in distant offices or not at all. Nevertheless, these agents are heavily dependent on each other for their success, and sometimes even for their survival. But lacking good coordination, their "synergy" may be of a negative sort, as they place unanticipated demands and limitations on each other. In Mackinlay's view,

> Coordination across the elements of the force would be easier if UN structure and procedures existed for that purpose. However, so far in every force the staff has had to improvise agreements and *ad hoc* meetings to bring together the strands of different activities into a single strategy with a common purpose. The plan thus achieved is then reinterpreted at a lower level in each district by a similarly convened group representing the essential elements of the force.[30]

Mackinlay concludes that "if a multifunctional force is to succeed, as opposed to simply survive in a reactive manner, the commanders must be able to plan for success and exercise the leadership necessary to organize the variously motivated elements towards achieving the same long-term objective."[31] To address these requirements, Mackinlay proposes the development of (i) a *UN staff corps*, which would ensure better prepared leadership, and (ii) a *joint coordination cell* in the field, which would serve to draw together the various aspects of UN activity at a level close to the action.[32]

UN Staff Corps: The UN's recent practice in complex operations has been to borrow a staff element from a participating member state that would serve for the duration as a field headquarters or at least provide an initial headquarters nucleus. In some cases, such as UNTAC, the staff nucleus, which was Australian, could not build-out fast enough or sufficiently and was, thus, overwhelmed. In other cases -- such as UNPROFOR and UNITAF (in which NATO and the US Marine Corps, respectively, provided headquarters elements) -- the field staff was more robust and stable, but this came at the expense of a smooth and adequate integration of those national contingents and civilian agencies that lacked a prior relationship with the headquarters agent.

Mackinlay's proposed staff corps would serve to improve planning and serve as a basis for field headquarters that are inclusive, cohesive, and well-integrated with the UN system as a whole. Complementing a regular, standing staff in New York (which would include both UN personnel and seconded officers) would be a stand-by reserve of seconded officers. Reserve staff would shadow the regulars and, when the need arose, provide the nucleus of a field

headquarters. Prior to the Security Council issuing a mandate for an operation, this staff group would be part of a task force responsible for reconnoitering the field and assisting in mandate development and operational planning. Once national contingents for the operation have been chosen, the staff group would brief and cooperate with the field commanders. Prior to deployment of the main force, this group would establish a headquarters nucleus in the field.

Clearly, Mackinlay's proposed approach would improve the continuity of staff and planning, and it would facilitate coordination between New York and the field. Moreover, because the regular and, especially, reserve staff would comprise seconded officers, some basis would exist for facilitating the interface of the field staff and national contingents. Of course, to realize this benefit, the national composition of the field headquarters nucleus would have to mirror that of the field force.

Joint Coordination Cell (JCC): This proposal seeks to concentrate in a field center or "cell" the coordination efforts of the various agencies -- diplomatic, military, civil, and humanitarian -- participating in an operation. Coordination would occur closer to the action and, thus, would better reflect and be more responsive to developments on the ground. "The purpose of the cell," writes Mackinlay, "is to create a focus of information and facility exchange which can also be used for coordination."

> By creating a Joint Coordination Cell at the highest level, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General can assist the work of the agencies and NGOs, and by doing so exercise an unstated, but nevertheless effective coordinating influence on all their activities. The cell must be established at the highest level and under the direct authority of the Special Representative.[33]

This approach would work best if political, civil, and humanitarian bureaus and organizations could adopt something like the military organizational principle of investing a local executive with predominate authority over the details of a field operation. A Joint Coordination Cell could then influence all aspects of the field operation quickly and in some detail -- within the general parameters set by central authorities.

2.3 The "Chapter VII Committee" Proposal

In a 1993 report and proposal, Jim Whitman and Ian Bartholomew of Cambridge University's Global Security Program address the problem of ensuring the political legitimacy of United Nations military operations? The authors believe it is essential for reasons of both political legitimacy and military effectiveness that the United Nations put some institutional distance between the Secretariat and peace enforcement operations, while strengthening the organization's overall political control of such operations when they occur under UN authorization.

> [G]enuine legitimacy . . . derives not only from satisfying established legal and moral precepts and achieving a sufficient international consensus, but also from the utilization of clearly-defined lines of political control and accountability that demonstrably transcend national interest.[35]

Whitman and Bartholomew argue for erecting institutional barriers between the use of restraining military force in traditional peacekeeping and the use of coercive military force typical of a Chapter VII operation. They state that "... such delineation is necessary if traditional peacekeeping is not to become a debased currency."[36]

> [A]s the practice of peacekeeping extends in terms of scale, complexity, and military risk, resort by the United Nations to coercive measures whose military effectiveness [ie, military effect or success] is not plainly matched by their political legitimacy also threatens to undermine the consensual and impartial nature of traditional peacekeeping, potentially diminishing its future utility as an instrument of conflict resolution.[37]

In order to achieve institutional delineation, they construct parallel structures for the two types of operations. They advocate keeping the peacekeeping structure in its current form. However, to ensure stronger UN guidance for coercive enforcement operations they propose creation of a Chapter VII Committee serving under the Secretary-General. In the authors' view, this arrangement would preserve the accountability of the Secretary-General to the Security Council while permitting a delegation of responsibility for the direction of coercive military operations. In this way the Secretary-General can "remain fully engaged without the need to relinquish the impartiality that his position uniquely confers and demands."[38]

The proposed committee would function mainly at the military strategic level, and it would comprise senior military staff representatives from the fifteen member nations on the Security Council.* The main task of this body would be to assist the Security Council in framing "Chapter VII resolutions that properly balance a desired political outcome with the military means required (and available) to achieve it."[39] The Chapter VII Committee would provide the missing link in the chain of command between the political authority in the Security Council and the United Nations field operations. This, they believe, will achieve what is "a structural necessity for all democratically-controlled national military commands, namely the alignment of authority with accountability."[40]

Central to the authors' proposal is the contention that the conduct of UN military enforcement operations should and will be delegated to coalitions of "military competent states" or regional collective security organizations, such as NATO. They believe that "operational inflexibility and continuous cost" argue against the creation of standing or standby United Nations forces. Conversely, reliance on forces contributed by member states increases the need for a responsive and competent UN command and support structure; otherwise nations will not put their forces at risk.[41]

Because they do not foresee the United Nations having its own military forces, they do not believe that a *formal military command structure* need be attached to the Chapter VII Committee. Although the Security Council would be expected to appoint an operational field commander for each mission, full command would remain with the nations contributing contingents. Nevertheless, they propose the creation of an International Military Support Staff to serve the Chapter VII Committee. Among the suggested tasks of this support staff are: monitoring the status of national forces available to United Nations operations; collection and analysis of operational intelligence; contingency planning; development of standard operating procedures (SOPs); logistical, financial, and administrative coordination of operations; and the development of a core training curriculum. For the longer term, Whitman and Bartholomew propose that the Chapter VII Committee and its staff could serve as the "foundation for a fully professional permanent United Nations military staff."[42]

* It is conceivable that the already existent, but inactive, Military Staff Committee (MSC) could fulfill many of the same functions as the proposed Chapter VII Committee. However, the authors argue that the MSC is politically "anachronistic" without charter reform because its core membership is restricted to the Permanent Five on the Security Council with no assured role for the other ten Council members. Considering this chartered constraint, they do not believe the MSC will be revived.

2.4 "Sword and Olive Branch" Proposal

During 1993 and early 1994, a group of US military officers attending the National Security Program of Harvard University's JFK School of Government drafted a report proposing "a rigorous, comprehensive, and professional system for integrating military force considerations in the direction, planning, and implementation of peacekeeping and peace enforcement."[43] The report, *The Sword and the Olive Branch: Military Advice for United Nations Peacekeeping*, reviews the recent experience of UN peace operations and identifies a number of key problems, which include the institution's

- inability to anticipate the need for military force,
- failure to articulate the military conditions necessary to achieve political goals,
- failure to identify achievable military objectives,
- lack of a planning capability that can match military means and ends,
- failure to articulate clear success/failure criteria,
- failure to articulate appropriate rules of engagement (ROE), and
- lack of adequate feedback mechanisms to ensure operational adjustment.[44]

The report concentrates on designing military advisory structures for those missions that have been called "aggressive," "forceful," "enhanced," or "non-traditional" peacekeeping.* The authors state:

> At the root of the United Nations's failure in recent operations is the incompatibility between the increased use of enforcement actions in non-traditional peacekeeping and the command and control arrangements that evolved during the traditional peacekeeping of the Cold War era.[45]

The authors believe that non-traditional peacekeeping requires articulation of political goals, military objectives, and "means-ends matches that are the hallmark of successful national

* In the authors' view, such missions include preventive deployment, internal conflict resolution, implementation of comprehensive political/military settlements, protection of humanitarian relief efforts in conditions of continuing conflict, assistance in the reestablishment of state authority, enforcement of ceasefires between regular forces, and guaranteeing or denying rights of passage.

government planning."[46] As they see it, the successful conduct of *traditional* peacekeeping operations has not required the United Nations to create new military conditions in the field as a prerequisite for the achievement of political goals. Instead, the United Nations has relied on standard operating procedures (SOPs) and restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) that were thought helpful in resolving conflicts. However, in recent years, as the Security Council has passed more assertive and ambitious resolutions, "the United Nations has been experiencing a growing means-ends mismatch for its operations . . . reliance on ROE *in lieu* of operational guidance has caused uneven and confusing execution in the field."[47]*

The principal elements of the *Sword and Olive Branch* proposal, some of which anticipated the UN reforms now underway, are

- Revitalization of the MSC as a military advisory and liaison body,
- Provision of the Secretary-General with a full-time military advisor,
- Creation of a separate Military Planning and Operations Division within the DPKO,
- Conversion of the situation center into a fully staffed operations center, and
- Relocation of the Field Operations Divisions to the DPKO as a fully empowered logistics and acquisition office.

The proposed reforms of UN military planning would begin with revitalization of the MSC, which the 1994 reorganization of peacekeeping failed to address. The authors believe that an active MSC is needed to provide strategic direction to the Security Council. "As long as the MSC remains defunct, critics will point to this fact as an indication of lack of commitment to UN peacekeeping."[48]

A revitalized MSC would advise the Security Council on the use of force and serve as the highest military advisory body in the United Nations, with responsibility and authority to impart technical advice to lower-echelon political-military staffs. The nature of the MSC

* For example, the authors cite the American and Pakistani experiences in Somalia. In this case, the two contingents "applied the same ROE in significantly different ways, precipitating a major dispute between the two forces, and underscoring a significant difference in how a UN resolution was enforced within Mogadishu." Lt Co1 Dennis Dimengo, Lt Col David Fagan, Cmdr Jan Gaudio, Cmdr. Dennis Sande, Lt. Cmdr. Charles Zingler, *The Sword and the Olive Branch: Military Advice for United Nations Peacekeeping,* National Security Program Policy Analysis Paper, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Cambridge: Kennedy School, forthcoming 1995), p 23.

remains consultative, therefore the authority to assign command and control to military forces would remain with the Security Council.

Addressing the concerns raised by Whitman and Bartholomew, the authors also propose the *ad hoc* expansion of the MSC beyond the P5 by inviting the participation of member nations that contribute forces to particular United Nations operations. They would also consider representation by nonpermanent members of the Security Council.

> An MSC with membership drawn from all force-contributing nations could take the lead in the development and publication of a United Nations peacekeeping doctrine that sets forth fundamental principles guiding the direction of strategic actions. Standard operating procedures, which now center more on how to operate in the United Nations environment than on combat, could be elaborated to help integrate United Nations forces. Once developed, the MSC would ensure that the doctrine was continually evaluated for effectiveness and application.[49]

Training would remain primarily a national responsibility, but it would be structured to conform to United Nations standards. The MSC would act to coordinate staff training in multinational venues.

The reforms of 1994 moved many of the planning functions previously shouldered by the Military Advisor's office to a new planning division. The head of this new office is a flag officer who is "dual-hatted" as Deputy Military Advisor. The authors believe that this reform, while improving on previous conditions, still pulls the military advisors in too many directions. They propose instead that the Military Advisor and his deputy be dedicated to the counsel of the Secretary-General and the MSC. The officer who serves as Chief of the Planning Division should be the chief military advisor to the Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping. Both the offices of the Military Advisor and the Chief of the Planning Division should be sufficiently staffed to fulfill their responsibilities. The authors advocate that the Military Advisor serve as the link between the MSC and the Planning Division.

Regarding the responsibilities of the planning staff, *The Sword and the Olive Branch* states that it should

> be responsible for ensuring that operational plans match the strategic direction received from the Secretary-General through the under secretary. It is here that military considerations should be incorporated in the planning for force, equipment, logistics, and budgetary requirements. The military planning staff

> would be responsible for developing detailed contingency plans, doctrine, and training requirements. SOPs and ROE would be established by this staff. The military planning staff serves the critical function of ensuring that military objectives match the political goals they are intended to achieve, and that those military objectives are clearly articulated to the UN field commander.[50]

The Sword and the Olive Branch calls for the addition to the DPKO of a full-fledged operations center. This would serve as the United Nation's node for "political and military direction as well as intelligence and current operational information."[51] The authors believe that a true operations center is necessary for effective command and control of United Nations operations. With a professionally staffed information cell within an operations center, the United Nations would have multiple sources of information, allowing it to better appreciate where facts end and the political bias of information providers begins.*

2.5 The "Blue Helmet" Proposal

In 1993 a group of US officers, also at the National Security Program of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, authored a report entitled *A Blue Helmet Combat Force,* advocating creation of a standby force for United Nations peace enforcement missions.[52] Although the UN Charter provides for the designation of standby forces in Article 43, the authors argue that one reason this provision has never been implemented is nations' reluctance to commit forces permanently to the United Nations. Commenting on the *Agenda for Peace,* the authors state, "The major objections to Boutros-Ghali's proposed standing force were in reaction to his call for the creation of Article 43 agreements."[53] Instead of invoking Article 43, however, the *Blue Helmet* report proposes that the UN community can embrace the spirit of Chapter 43 through the less formal mechanism of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).

The authors also contend that if the United Nations is to exercise more effective control over the enforcement operations that member states conduct in its name, it must incorporate a new office or body capable of providing strategic direction to these operations. As an alternative to the invigoration of the Military Staff Committee, which the authors view as politically

---

* Opportunities for preventative action would be enhanced. "The United Nations would be able to frame issues and situations in its own aggregative security interests and be better prepared to discuss appropriate actions." *ibid,* p 59.

problematic, *Blue Helmet* proposes adding a Council of Ambassadors between the Security Council and the Military Advisor. This, however, would not be a substitute for the MSC, because its main function would be to provide political direction. To further improve the military direction of enforcement operations, the authors support the proposal put forward by General Indar Jit Rikhye for a United Nations general military staff that would report to the Military Advisor.[54]

The *Blue Helmet* report proposes that a Standby Force be based on the model of US corps. It would comprise approximately 55,000 troops, which the authors assert is the smallest operational Corps that can sustain combat operations. The Corps headquarters would have 3,000 personnel, including command, signal, and military police elements. The Corps support command (COSCOM) would have 12,000 troops, including transportation, fuel, medical, quartermaster, and maintenance elements. Combat units in the Corps would include a Mechanized Division of 15,000 troops, a Motorized Division of 10,000, an Airborne Division of 10,000, and an Armored Cavalry Regiment of 5,000. Force multiplier units could be added as required.

The Corps would have integrated command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) capabilities, reliable logistics, common training, and the capacity to coordinate with United Nations planning and administration staff. The report recommends that the force be airlift capable and sufficiently ready to deploy personnel on 72 hours notice.

Composition of the Corps would include no more than five national forces with at least one from a nation not serving on the Security Council. However, the need for a rapid, global deployment capability limits the lead role to the permanent members of the Security Council. According to the authors:

> One permanent member of the Security Council would be responsible, on a rotating basis of two to four years, for providing the Corps HQ, the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) and the Mechanized Infantry Division.[55]

Moreover, force cohesion dictates that the state providing the Corps HQ also provide the Support Command. This does not mean that other nations could not provide some specialized support units, either to meet unique national demands or because of unique national capabilities. Generally, the authors suggest that non-permanent Security Council members or other members of the General Assembly provide the less technical units as needed and available.

In the proposed standby force, the Corps Headquarters would include the force commander and an integrated combat staff. To facilitate interoperability the headquarters staff would include senior level liaison officers from the other national forces. The authors point to experience with NATO as "a strong testimonial that diligent staff work can solve interoperability issues.[56] They point out that:

> According to US and NATO doctrine, a Corps headquarters is responsible for providing command and control capabilities to subordinate units. This procedure would alleviate possible disconnects caused by the multinational makeup of the subordinate units in Corps.[57]

The Corps Headquarters would also provide subordinate national units with the communications equipment necessary for efficient interoperability. Further:

> Standards for tactical procedures, status reporting, resupply procedures, and orders would be governed by the Corps' tactical standard operating procedure, which is habitually issued to newly attached units on their arrival in the corps.[58]

The standby force does not have air and naval components, but this does not preclude their use in certain situations. The authors believe that air and naval capabilities will likely be made available when required, and therefore, Corps staff must be trained and capable of integrating air and naval elements.* For models of possible naval and air components the authors recommend looking at NATO's combined Standing Naval Forces (Atlantic and Mediterranean) and the USAF's "composite" and "intervention" air wings.

2.6 Summary and Guidelines

As noted earlier, comparison of comprehensive proposals for the development of the UN peace operations system is complicated by differences in assumptions regarding what changes

* In general, training is viewed as key to fielding an effective multinational Corps. The report makes several specific recommendations for training. It proposes reliance on the US Battlefield Command Training Program, which utilizes a simulation program involving successive levels of command down to the battalion. This program would help certify commanders' ability to coordinate and synchronize operations. The report also suggests that the Corps publish a task list to help ensure uniform adherence to military fundamentals.

are practicable in the areas of command structure, command unity, and the provision of resources (including armed forces). Notably, proposals differ on the pivotal question of how the UN Secretariat should handle the task of peace enforcement -- if at all. Nonetheless, among the proposals there is some significant convergence on several initiatives that should have a place in any program of reform:

- Create a high-level body of military expertise representative of Security Council member's military establishments to provide better military-strategic direction for UN peace operations.

- Improve UN oversight of UN-authorized operations led by member states or member-state coalitions.

- Enlarge and develop the military planning, intelligence, and management staff active within the UN system -- either within the existing Secretariat structure or under a new high-level, representative military committee.

- Bring the field support functions more fully into the military planning and management process and, thus, ensure the integrity and coherence of the process in all its aspects: planning, operations, and support.

- Improve the capacity of the New York staff center to give adequate, individual attention to each field operation through the development of a task force approach, which for each operation would unite responsible staff across relevant offices, and a well-articulated operations center.

- To ensure realistic planning, make provisions for a staff presence in the field early in the planning process and prior to the deployment of a full field headquarters.

- Improve the integration of the different elements of field operations -- military and civilian, and individual national contingents -- in the field through the development of liaison bodies, such as John Mackinlay's proposed Joint Coordination Cell.

- Improve the reliability of the system by which the UN accesses its member states' military staff and assets -- if not by a system of standby forces, then by a system of standby or reserve staff and memoranda of understanding governing the use of other military assets.

- Institutionalize a process by which UN member states can improve the compatibility of their armed forces for purposes of multinational peace operations. This process should focus especially on the development of joint and combined doctrine and on the interoperability of communications equipment.

Building on these points of consensus or near consensus, we will suggest in the next sections of this report a program of UN reform and development that has both a longer time line and a more ambitious endpoint than the proposals reviewed earlier. The proposal offered in the next section departs in some important respects from the political framework shared by most of the proposals we have reviewed so far. However, we hope that the consensus points recounted above can serve as a bridge, allowing those committed to UN development to pursue near-term reform in light of a longer-term program of development that fully addresses the strategic and operational requirements of new era peace operations.

3. A Proposal for the Comprehensive Renovation of the UN Peace Operations System

Many recent UN reform proposals reflect an acute sensitivity to the current political constraints on UN development and, thus, defer consideration of more ambitious development options -- such as a fully articulated UN general staff or a standing UN military. The reform and reconstruction platform put forward here rests on a longer-term view of the prospects for progress -- one less resigned to immediate political impediments.* Such a view has value in that it permits fuller attention to geostrategic *requirements* in the design of a development program. The resulting alternative serves shorter-term reform efforts in two ways: first, it provides them with a reference point and goalpost; second, it constitutes a criterion of sufficiency that can help analysts and national leaders identify the real sources of difficulty in UN peace operations. Without such a criterion it is virtually impossible to differentiate

* In our assessment, the present limits to UN development derive substantially from singular circumstances in Washington DC, where a uniquely conservative political trend has set the tone for elite consideration of UN reform. However, the range of opinion between the White House and the US congressional leadership regarding UN development is skewed to the right of US popular opinion -- and this circumstance presents an opportunity for positive leadership. Opinion polls indicate that US citizens, although critical of the UN's past performance, are willing to do much more (and probably spend much more) to transform the institution than official Washington is presently willing to contemplate. (Regarding foreign intervention generally, Americans are far more inclined than their present leadership to get involved and then "stay the course" *despite casualties* in military efforts that they consider worthwhile.) Polls in the other leading OECD countries -- Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and France -- similarly show strong support for an active United Nations, one able to apply military power to enforce peace in the world's troubled regions. Also encouraging is the fact that official policy in three of the P5 countries and in most of the OECD states is more friendly to substantial UN development than is current US policy.

On trends in public opinion, see Randolph Ryan, "Is the US public bolder than its leaders?", *Boston Sunday Globe, 23* July 1995, Focus Section, p 68; Steven Kull "Misreading the Public Mind," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* March/April 1995; and, "Four Nation Poll Shows Support for UN Peace Efforts," *New York Times, 2* April 1994. For overviews of the recent evolution of US policy on peace operations, see Mark Lowenthal, "Peacekeeping and US Foreign Policy: Implementing PDD-25," Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 7 December 1994; Mats R Berdal, "Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* (Spring 1994); and, Mark Lowenthal, "Peacekeeping in Future US Foreign Policy," Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 21 March 1994.

problems that are inherent in the conduct of multinational peace operations and those problems that arise due to potentially tractable political constraints on multilateralism.

One rough indicator of gross requirements for multinational peace operations is the number, frequency, size, and scope of such operations in the post-Cold War period -- 1988 to the present. Hence, we take as an initial statement of need an effective capability to plan, manage, and conduct between eight and 15 peace operations simultaneously, involving a global total of between 50,000 and 120,000 troops, and including some capacity for rapid deployment. Commensurate with this requirement and the reform goals summarized at the end of *Section* 2, the essential features of our proposed UN reform and development program are:

- The formation of a Military Advisory and Cooperation Council (MACC) as an adjunct to the Security Council. This body, representative of high-level national military opinion, would serve to (i) advise the Security Council on military matters, (ii) improve Security Council oversight of those UN-authorized operations conducted by member states outside of the institutional framework of the Secretariat, and (iii) facilitate the expansion of military cooperation among UN member states. This body need not be a new legal entity; the existing UN Military Staff Committee could incorporate the functions and organization of the proposed MACC.

- The formation of a multinational Field Communication and Liaison Corps to serve as a "central nervous system" to facilitate multilateral military operations of all types, including defensive wars. This Corps would be under the auspices of the MACC and would comprise small standby contingents from selected member states.

- The development of a UN peace operations staff structure in the Secretariat that is sufficiently large, articulated, and integrated to be able to plan and manage (at the strategic level) joint and combined efforts across the full range of peace operations -- that is, including peace enforcement, but short of war.

- The strengthening of arrangements between the United Nations and its member states for the provision of national units for UN peace operations; and the creation of a better foundation generally for multinational military cooperation in UN-authorized actions.

- The formation and development of a UN standing force and field support structure *to complement and augment member-state contributions* to peace operations -- especially those requiring rapid deployment or involving a high risk of combat. This force and support structure should be sufficiently large to (i) meet rapid deployment needs and (ii) substantially improve the reliability, responsiveness, coherence, and robustness of forces deployed for peace operations.

Figure 1. Principal elements of the proposed UN development program



The institutional components of this program are depicted in *Figure 1*. A near analogue to the proposed Military Advisory and Cooperation Council is NATO's Military Committee. By contrast, the military staff proposed to form *within* the Secretariat is given a role resembling NATO's Supreme Headquarters. The proposed UN Civilian and Uniformed Services resemble individual national services. Of course, the analogies to NATO are approximate only. Among the points of differences:

- The proposed UN structures would not constitute an alliance;
- Their scope would be global, not regional;
- The Secretariat staff structures would involve operations combining civilian and military components; and,

- The Secretariat would incorporate structures analogous to combined (or multinational) headquarters as well as structures analogous to national services.

3.1 Guideline Assumptions of the Reform Program

As a whole the program addresses several key questions: first, In what types of operations should the United Nations involve itself, and how? Second, what types of new leadership and management bodies does the United Nations need in order to successfully execute these operations? And, third, what arrangements for providing the United Nations with military assets are necessary to improve substantially the success probability of its operations?

The program assumes three general types of operations involving military units: peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and full-fledged "defensive wars" or "wars of counter-aggression."* For purposes of the proposal, peacekeeping and peace enforcement (which may involve some intermittent combat) are considered distinct subsets or types of "peace operations." By contrast, full-fledged defensive wars are set apart from peace operations of either type because of their special requirements, even though they may, like the Gulf and Korean wars, be conducted under the formal authority of Chapter VII of the UN charter as "peace enforcement actions."

With regard to multinational operations, the reform program distinguishes between those *directed* by the United Nations and those *authorized but not directed* by the United Nations. The former are coordinated and managed at the highest level through the offices of the UN DPO Joint and Combined Operations Divisions. The latter are managed by a member state, an independent coalition of member states, or a regional alliance.

The program reflects the view that the UN Secretariat should develop a competence to provide initial planning, continuing support, and operational guidance for *the full spectrum*

---

* In this formulation we accept *provisionally* the distinctions that US policy makes among traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement (short of war), and war. *Section 6* examines in greater detail some of the doctrinal and definitional issues associated with these distinctions. For now, we can define these referentially: Desert Shield/Storm exemplifies a war fought under UN auspices, which we call "defensive war"; the operations in Somalia and in the territory of the former-Yugoslavia exemplify peace *enforcement*, which may involve UN units in some combat action short of full-fledged war; operations to monitor ceasefires in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai exemplify traditional peacekeeping. For the official US view of the peace operations spectrum, see US Army, *FM 100-23 Peace Operations*, final draft, (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, September 1994).

of peace operations -- that is, both peacekeeping and peace enforcement (short of war). The program assumes that the United Nations will delegate all operational responsibility for UN-authorized defensive wars to regional organizations or to member states.

The proposal also assumes that the management of *some* UN peace operations will be delegated to regional organizations or member states. These will be very large peace operations -- for instance, those involving more than 100,000 troops -- and operations of any size slated to commence at a time when the proposed UN staff is already overburdened by other, ongoing operations. Relevant to both UN-directed and UN-authorized operations, the proposed high-level military leadership body -- the MACC -- will assist the Security Council in providing strategic guidance.

The program envisions giving the Security Council access to military assets in three ways: through (i) ad hoc assignment of *national units* for specific operations (which is the *status quo*), (ii) a system of "standby units" held by member states but, to varying degrees, answerable to the Security Council's call, and (iii) a standing UN legion composed of UN personnel and administered by a department of the Secretariat. The proposed legion is not intended to supplant national contributions to peace operations, but rather to supplement them. The legion will have special relevance for those contingencies requiring the rapid deployment of UN units or having a high risk of combat. Its relevance to most cases of "traditional" peacekeeping, distinguished by a robust ceasefire and low probability of combat, will be limited; current arrangements adequately address the needs for traditional peacekeepers.

3.2 Distinguishing Features of the Program

The proposed development program includes two elements setting it clearly apart from the proposals reviewed in *Section 2:* the Multinational Liaison and Communication Corps and a standing UN Legion -- both of which involve giving the United Nations field units of its own. The addition of these elements thoroughly transforms staff and institutional requirements -- as will become clear in *Sections 4* and *5*. The addition also transforms, in our view, the promise of reform, constituting the difference between a peace operations system that can meet current requirements and those that would still fall short.

Also differentiating the present proposal from some of those reviewed earlier is the guideline assumption that the UN community should enhance the Secretariat's capacity to direct and conduct *peace enforcement operations* rather than delegating the conduct of all or most

operations of this type to member states, member-state coalitions, or regional organizations. Notably, several of the proposals examined earlier seek to create new institutional structures that insulate the Secretariat and peace enforcement from each other. Efforts to curtail the Secretariat's role in peace enforcement reflect two types of concern: (i) those about the ability of the Secretariat to direct such operations successfully and (ii) those about potential damage to the Secretariat's status as an impartial agency should it undertake to direct coercive operations of any form.

Addressing the second of these concerns first: our approach reflects the view that the authority and legitimacy of the Secretariat derives not from a position of pure impartiality *vis a vis* the acts of member states, but rather from a commitment to the principles of international law and the UN Charter that transcends any exclusive national or regional interest. The Secretariat *demonstrates its impartiality by conforming to these precepts and holding all member states equal before them.* It can also demonstrate its impartiality *vis a vis* its members by never targeting individual nations *per se as* "outlaws" or "enemies of civilization," but rather by proscribing certain, discrete behaviors. Especially relevant to coercive operations, the principles upon which legitimacy rests hold that the resort to force, even when justified, should be an act of last resort. The precipitous, indiscriminate, or disproportionate use of force is disallowed, even should the resort to force itself be in the service of the highest ends.

Far from threatening the legitimacy of the United Nations, providing it with an organic capacity to direct and even conduct peace enforcement operations *may be critical to preserving the legitimacy of "peace enforcement operations" as an international practice.* This, because only a handful of nations today have the capacity to lead and conduct UN-*authorized* operations. The success of peace enforcement operations depends uniquely on the leverage provided by legitimacy, which in turn depends on precluding even the appearance of the practice becoming an instrument of narrow national, alliance, or regional interests. This is not to say that UN-authorized operations have no place -- for some contingencies, such as reversing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there is no alternative in sight to delegating responsibility to a member state or member-state coalition. *But the delegation of authority should not come to dominate the practice of peace enforcement.* For these reasons we see the present inadequacies of the United Nations with regard to the conduct of peace enforcement operations as an invitation for reform, not as a reason for retreat.

3.3 Strategic Benefits of the Program

The proposed reforms aim to enhance the scope, effectiveness, legitimacy, and flexibility of multilateral peace operations. As stated above, the proposal views the long-term legitimacy of peace operations as dependent on their being multilateral in character and, more specifically, on their being managed, to the greatest extent feasible, by official UN bodies. Issues of effectiveness and legitimacy in peace operations will be addressed throughout subsequent sections of this report, which present the proposed UN development program in detail. One benefit of the reform program that is best appreciated in overview, however, is *the strategic flexibility* it would add to the practice of peace operations.

The program would enhance strategic flexibility in several ways:

> *First*, the high-level military advisory body, the MACC, would act to improve Security Council oversight of *delegated operations* -- thus, reinforcing their legitimacy and allowing the practice of delegating authority to continue.
>
> *Second*, the proposed Communication and Liaison Corps, UN military staff, and UN legion would greatly increase the capacity of groups of medium-sized and smaller states to form effective coalitions for *peace enforcement operations.*
>
> *Third*, the UN military staff and UN legion would give the Security Council the option of conducting some peace operations with minimal reliance on member-state armed forces. Generally, the constitution of even a relatively small UN military staff and legion would lighten the burden that any one group of member states would be asked to bear at any particular time.

***

Section 4 of this report presents in detail the proposal for a Military Advisory and Cooperation Council and for a multinational Field Communication and Liaison Corps. *Section 5* examines the proposed enhancements to the Secretariat's offices for managing peace operations. *Section 6* analyzes the requirements for a UN legion. *Section 7* describes a model UN legion consistent with these requirements.

4. A New Multinational Military Advisory Body and Field Liaison Structure

4.1 Military Advisory and Cooperation Council

The proposed Military Advisory and Cooperation Council (MACC) would, as noted above, perform three functions: first, it would act as a military advisory body to the Security Council; second, it would enhance the liaison between the Security Council and member-state coalitions undertaking UN-authorized action; and third, it would help develop a better basis for effective security cooperation among UN member states.* The first, advisory function of the MACC would involve assisting the Security Council in the development of mandates for all UN military operations. The advisory function would also involve the MACC in helping the Security Council to interpret developments in the field and assess alternative courses of action should events require it. To perform these missions the MACC would need a staff of approximately 850 full-time military and civilian personnel -- some seconded from member-state institutions, others coming from within the UN structure. In addition it would draw on 1,200 "standby personnel" from member states to serve in a multinational Field Communication and Liaison Corps, as described below. *(Figure 2* depicts the basic elements of the proposed Council.) Although some of the functions proposed for the MACC differ substantially from those originally envisioned for a UN Military Staff Committee, a revived MSC could absorb the role here ascribed to the MACC; as noted earlier, a new legal entity is not required by this proposal.

4.1.1 MACC Leadership Body

At the highest level the MACC would have *a leadership or executive body* comprising, nominally, the top military officers of UN member states participating in the MACC.

* The functions given to this committee follow closely the "Chapter VII Committee" proposal advanced by Whitman and Bartholomew, although the present proposal envisions a different division of labor between member-state coalitions, the military committee or council, and the DPKO. Our proposal also envisions the Council assuming several of the functions given to the "military section staff" in the USIP report and to the Military Staff Committee in *The Sword and Olive Branch* report.

(Actually, representatives of these national commanders would serve on the Council in a day-to-day capacity.) All permanent members of the Security Council (SC) would have a full seat on the MACC; non-permanent SC members would be allowed to at least send observers to the MACC Leadership Body. The Security Council would be empowered to (and should) also grant full seats on the MACC to those nations who have and are routinely contributing military personnel and services to UN peace operations.* Nations willing to establish standby units comprising at least 500 troops and meeting UN training, equipment, and readiness criteria could also apply to the SC for a seat on the MACC. Finally, the Chief of Staff of the proposed UN standing force would have a permanent seat on the MACC.

Figure 2. Principal elements of the proposed Military Advisory and Cooperation Council



• *The Sword and Olive Branch* report, reviewed in *Section 2*, similarly proposes extending Military Staff Committee membership rights to non-Security Council states based on regular contributions to peace operations. Dimengo, *et al, The Sword and the Olive Branch*, p 50.

The MACC's Leadership Body would have a small administrative staff comprising seconded military and UN civilian personnel whose function would be to facilitate the work of the MACC and its liaison with the Security Council and Secretary-General. The MACC Leadership Body and its staff might consist of 100 military personnel and civilians. The Leadership Body should also appoint an Administrative Director to oversee the operations of the MACC as a whole.

4.1.2 MACC Coalition Operations Section

The MACC Leadership Body would maintain a *Coalition Operations Section* to assist the Security Council in monitoring UN-authorized operations conducted by member states acting outside the institutional framework of the Secretariat. The development of such a body recognizes the fact that independent member-state coalitions will likely remain for some time the only practicable means of conducting very large-scale military campaigns (100,000+ troops) -- especially those requiring operational-level offensive operations. The proposed MACC Coalition Operations Section would not lead such coalitions, nor even provide substantial staff support. Instead, it would act to keep the Security Council better and more regularly informed about operational options and developments in the field than was the case during the Gulf War.

The Coalition Operations Section would form a task force early in the development phase of a UN mandate for an authorized coalition action. This task force would attach small teams of officers to the lead country's central headquarters and the coalition's field headquarters. They would assist coalition planning staff in accurately interpreting the mandate and would serve as the coalition command staff's conduit back to the MACC and Security Council. At UN Headquarters, the regular staff of the Coalition Operations Section would link the task force to the MACC Leadership Body, the Security Council, and the situation room in the proposed UN Department of Peace Operations.

4.1.3 Security cooperation development offices

While the advisory and coalition monitoring functions of the MACC would orient it toward the Security Council, its function as a "facilitator" of security cooperation would orient it toward the member states. This function comprises several discrete tasks:

- The MACC assists UN member states and the proposed UN Department of Peace Operations in the development of joint doctrine and in the design of joint exercises.
- The MACC develops and monitors "quality and compatibility standards" for member state military units earmarked for participation in UN operations.
- The MACC facilitates multinational force communication and liaison in the field by supporting the development of structures for this express purpose.

To perform these diverse tasks, the MACC would maintain three additional subordinate units:

- an Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training,
- an Office of Force Assessment and Interoperability, and
- a Field Communication and Liaison Corps.

MACC Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training

In the area of doctrinal development, the Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training (OMDT) would lead or coordinate a number of initiatives. Among these:

- It would organize *working groups* to develop multinational doctrine covering various areas and issues in military science -- especially those pertaining to peace operations.

These working groups would contribute to doctrinal statements by the MACC, which could serve as voluntary development guidelines for member-state militaries.* Although the aim of these efforts is the development of a useful consensus on doctrine, they can also serve the worthwhile purpose of recognizing and clarifying points of continuing divergence or disagreement. As the history of NATO attests, multinational doctrine can "build around" areas of disagreement -- once recognized -- thus facilitating effective cooperation despite some differences in tactical or even operational doctrine.

* The Whitman and Bartholomew proposal and *the Sword and Olive Branch* report likewise suggest that a high-level military advisory body play a leading role in facilitating a doctrinal convergence. The USIP study group gives this function to its proposed DPKO "military section staff." *See Section 2.*

- The Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training would coordinate a *multinational staff college* for mid-level officers with the aim of inculcating multinational doctrine on peace operations, increasing military-to-military contacts, and increasing cross-cultural awareness of differences in doctrine.

This "college" would not exist at any one site or provide a full-battery of independent courses. Instead, the MACC would coordinate with member-state militaries who would host the "college" on a rotating basis at their national service academies. The OMDT staff, host nation officers, and visiting officers would teach the courses. In addition, the OMDT staff would lead an integrative seminar. A typical term might last six months and involve 20-25 officers from six countries. This cohort could spend three months at each of two host nation academies -- selected to ensure a varied experience. Assuming overlapping terms, eight such cohorts could pass through the system each year -- a total of 160-200 mid-level officers.

- The Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training would also host regular mid-level conferences and high-level seminars on coalition doctrine for peace operations at the UN's New York headquarters.

- Finally, the office would serve as a clearinghouse and resource center for information and commentary on coalition and peace operations doctrine.

The Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training would also facilitate the development and conduct of training regimes to support multinational cooperation in peace operations. Activities in this area could include:

- The formation of joint exercise *advisory/observer groups* to assist member states and the proposed UN Department of Peace Operations in planning joint exercises and deriving "lessons learned."

Although the Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training would not itself lead such exercises, it could propose useful designs, assist in planning, and ensure that the lessons learned were disseminated among member-state military establishments. Office activities related to training would also include:

- The formation of *training support groups* to develop manuals, courses, and training regimes covering areas of MACC doctrinal consensus, especially regarding peace operations.

The support groups would also serve as a resource for member-state military establishments seeking to incorporate training for UN and multinational peace operations into their services' training regimes. Nations willing to sign agreements designating some of their armed forces units as "standby" -- that is, "on call" for UN use -- and to meet force quality and compatible standards would receive special staff and unit training assistance.

To adequately perform the functions outlined above, the MACC Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training would need a staff of 200 military and civilian personnel, at least. However, as many as 120 of these could be seconded officers and enlisted personnel.

MACC Office of Force Assessment and Interoperability

This office would serve to codify and monitor standards covering equipment, readiness, and training for those units that member states may contribute to UN peace operations. These standards would apply to national units (i) covered by formal Article 43 "standby" agreements or (ii) covered by memoranda of understanding, or (iii) simply "earmarked" for possible UN use. The standards could also provide criteria for choosing among national units made available on an *ad hoc* basis.

The Office of Force Assessment and Interoperability would maintain a *multinational asset database*, providing details on the quantity, quality, character, and capability of those units that member states might be willing to deploy for UN peace operations.

This office would develop training standards in association with the Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training. It would also establish an *interoperability working group* and a *readiness working group* to devise interoperability and readiness standards. The challenge for the interoperability working group would be to focus interoperability efforts on critical technologies and to devise a development program that reflects an optimal tradeoff between effectiveness and practicability. The readiness group would include in its focus the problem of member-state units deploying with less than their standard complement of equipment or insufficient supplies to support them for 60 days in the field.

In addition to setting goals and standards and maintaining a database, the Office would conduct "force assessment" visits in the field. It should be able to deploy several teams of experts for such visits year-round. To perform its various functions, the Office would need

a staff of at least 150 military and civilian personnel. (*Table 1,* at the end of this Section, summarizes the personnel requirements of the proposed MACC.)

4.2 Field Communication and Liaison Corps

The Field Communication and Liaison Corps (FCLC) would provide a modular "central nervous system" for multinational military cooperation among member states and the United Nations. It would mainly comprise provisional standby units of those UN member-state militaries who participate in UN peace operations. Its aim would be to facilitate field communication and liaison among disparate national contingents down to the company level (groups of 100-200 troops). The field system would have two principal elements: first, a commercial communications network able to handle radio and cable traffic, both voice and digital, and with some capacity for secure transmission; second, command liaison teams who are expert in the use of the network, fluent in one or two command languages, and practiced in cooperation among themselves.* (*Figure 3* depicts the elements of the FCLC.)

In the proposed system, every nation contributing to a UN peace operation would attach communication and liaison teams to their contingent. The teams would serve to horizontally link cooperating, interdependent, or physically adjacent units of different national origin at various levels: company, battalion, brigade, and division. They would also link vertically. Their role would be to facilitate communication and coordination across barriers of language and military culture. Hence, familiarity with important differences in doctrinal concepts, command protocols, and operational and tactical lexicons would be a requirement for team members. The size of the teams would correspond to the size (and complexity) of the units that incorporate them. Teams of three or four persons would be adequate for companies and

* The fundamental design concept for the proposed Field Communication and Liaison Corps derives from US Army experience during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. During the initial phase of Operation Desert Shield/Storm, US Central Command (CENTCOM) developed liaison links with their coalition partners at various levels of command, *not* simply between the top headquarters of the different national contingents. This facilitated coordination down the line and was especially important in reducing the risks of friction (and fratricide) at the tactical levels. During the Cold War, NATO routinely utilized liaison teams for similar purposes, especially along the borders of national corps areas. In retrospect one Army analyst described the system employed during the Gulf War as a "transfer case or gear reduction mechanism between US Central Command and the coalition member nations command structures." For a good overview of the system, *see* Lt Co1 Mark B Yates, "Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm," *Military Review* (October 1993), pp 46-52; also, see Wayne A Silkett, "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters* (Summer 1993).

battalions, teams of seven or eight for brigades, and teams of twelve or more for divisions or division-size forces.

Figure 3. Principal elements of proposed Field Communication and Liaison Corps



These teams would be the only member-state units *required* by the proposed system to be in a formal "standby status" -- and even then only in a provisional way: the units would be required to deploy only in the case of their nation's participating in a multinational UN operation, and only in a quantity that corresponds to the size of their national contingent. The teams would also be required to participate in a UN-managed training and readiness regime. Prospective team members would have to meet language, technical, and other skills standards before qualifying for liaison service. During UN training courses and exercises the units would be considered seconded to the United Nations. Finally, teams' nations of origin would be required to equip them to exact UN standards as far as mission-critical equipment is concerned. (For poorer nations, some development support should be made available. Also, as a burdensharing measure, groups of nations or regional organizations could maintain joint teams that are able to serve with units from several different nations.)

The Communication and Liaison Corps in action

The example of a hypothetical UN operation involving cooperation among five nations can serve to illustrate how the proposed Corps would function. This example assumes that one nation takes a leading role in the operation and provides a full brigade and a field headquarters. The other four nations provide a battalion each.

In this example, planners from the FCLC would meet with staff from the five nations to assess liaison requirements. Should the plan be to form a second brigade composed of the four independent battalions, liaison teams would attach themselves to all four battalion headquarters and the majority of subordinate companies. The liaison teams would then link horizontally and vertically. Liaison teams would link support units in a similar fashion, although not to the same detail. Assuming that one of the four nations provides a brigade headquarters, a larger liaison team would attach to this unit as well. Liaison teams would also augment the lead nation's brigade headquarters and the overarching field headquarters.

The battalions and companies of the lead nation's brigade would selectively attach liaison teams as would its support units depending on the predicted extent of their interaction with foreign units. Finally, a Communication and Liaison Management Unit would attach to the field headquarters. This unit, composed of full-time UN personnel, would serve to (i) ensure the smooth integration and functioning of the communication system overall, (ii) respond to the special support requirements of the liaison teams, and (iii) augment the communication/liaison system as needed, drawing on teams held in reserve.

This hypothetical case might require a total deployment of 35 company and battalion teams (including reserves), three brigade and field headquarters teams, and the management unit -- perhaps 180 personnel, all told. This company-sized unit could substantially boost the integration and synergy of a diverse, l0,000-person force. The Communication and Liaison Corps concept could support other coalition configurations as well -- for instance, (i) small coalitions without a clear lead country and (ii) coalitions in which the proposed UN Department of Peace Operations and its associated field units takes the role of "lead country." Moreover, the concept would also permit different national contingents to join more closely than suggested in the above example -- for instance, to form a multinational *battalion.*

Communication and Liaison Corp development goals

A feasible development goal for the proposed Corps would be a global inventory of 250 teams incorporating 1,200 personnel (including replacements). These personnel would be officers and technical specialists provided by member-state militaries on a standby basis. In addition, the Corps should have at least a dozen field management units comprising another 200 officers and troops, who should be assigned full-time to the service.

The Corps would also require staff for central administration, planning and development tasks, training, monitoring, and general administrative support. These functions could be handled by another 200 people -- assuming that the Corps draws some support from other elements of the MACC system. Organizationally, these personnel would be allocated to a central Corp staff and among three subordinate offices: FCLC Office of Development and Acquisition, FCLC Office of Training and Exercises, and FCLC Office of Unit Assessment.

All told, the Corps would have a total strength of 1,200 standby personnel and 400 full-time personnel. A Field Communication and Liaison Corps of this size would be seven times as large as the contingent used in the earlier example, which involved a field force of two brigades. However, the total potential field capacity of the full Corps cannot be easily extrapolated from this example. Different coalition configurations would require distinctly different ratios of liaison and regular personnel. Among the eventualities that could reduce the need for liaison teams would be (i) the participation of a "lead country" willing to contribute a large portion of the field force, (ii) the involvement of several alliance partners who have already worked out interoperability problems, and (iii) the involvement of several nations whose armed forces use the same command language or similar communication equipment and/or basic doctrine.* (*Table 1* summarizes the personnel requirements of the proposed FCLC.)

* For practical purposes there are five "military-linguistic groups," each of which includes a large majority of officers from at least a half-dozen nations and usually more: English, Russian, French, Spanish, and Arabic. Although national military doctrines vary widely in their particulars, there are only four or five "proto-doctrines": American, British, Russian, French, and Chinese (which in several ways resembles the Russian). Equipment varies widely; however, with regard to communication equipment, several international "families" dominate the field. Independent of current UN needs, NATO countries and the former members of the defunct Warsaw Pact have been addressing the issue of communication equipment interface for decades. Many other nations consume equipment from one of these two groups or produce indigenous substitutes with an eye toward exporting to these groups or to the customers of these groups.

Table 1. Proposed Military Advisory and Cooperation Council: Offices and Staff

	Staff Size	Staff Type *(a)*	Staff Status *(b)*
MACC Leadership/Executive Body			
Council members and their personal staff	50	MIL	National
Office of the Administrative Director	10	CIV/MIL	UN/SCND
MACC administrative staff	40	CIV/MIL	UN/SCND
MACC Coalition Operations section *(c)*	(50)	MIL	SCND
MACC Office of Multinational Doctrine and Training	200	MIL/CIV	SCND/UN
MACC Office of Force Assessment and Interoperability	150	MIL/CIV	SCND/UN
Field Communication and Liaison Corps (FCLC)			
Office of the Director	40	CIV/MIL	UN/SCND
Office of Development and Acquisition	35	MIL/CIV	SCND/UN
Office of Training and Exercises	55	MIL/CIV	SCND/UN
Office of Unit Assessment	70	MIL/CIV	SCND/UN
field Management Units	200	MIL	UN/SCND
Communication and Liaison Teams	1,200	MIL	Standby
MACC TOTAL (including all FCLC)	2,100		
National	(50)		
UN Civilian Employee	(250)		
SCND Military (long-term)	(550)		
SCND Military (short-term)	(50)		
National Standby	(1,200)		

Notes: *(a)* Staff Type: MIL = Military, CIV = Civilian; *(b)* Staff Status: UN = Full-time UN personnel, SCND = Seconded member-state military; *(c)* this section is an *ad hoc* body that draws staff from other offices as needed.

5. A Renovated Department of Peace Operations with Civilian and Uniformed Field Services

The MACC and associated bodies proposed in the preceding section are geared primarily toward improving the capacity of UN member states for cooperative efforts and toward enhancing the capacity of the UN Security Council as a multilateral body to give direction to these efforts. The proposed reform of Secretariat bodies, by contrast, aims to improve the basis for *collective or global* action under UN direction. This complementary step recognizes that the delegation of peace operations to *ad hoc* member-state coalitions leaves such operations too dependent on the initiative of a handful of nations and too vulnerable to charges of "hegemonism." Increasing the capacity of the Secretariat to plan, direct, and even conduct a full spectrum of peace operations (as mandated by the Security Council) will (i) help ensure that the instruments needed to enact mandates are available even when the major powers are unable or unwilling to play a leading role "on the ground" and (ii) mitigate the influence of individual national interest on peace operations -- an influence that, in the case of *delegated* operations, can only be managed remotely (by the proposed MACC).

Commensurate with maintaining and expanding the UN's practice of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, our proposal renames the DPKO *the Department of Peace Operations (DPO).* A reformed Department of Peace Operations would have several main components:

- Office of Budget and Management
- Office of Information and Research
- Joint and Combined Operations Division (JCOD)
- Uniformed Service Division
- Civilian Services Division

Each of the three proposed divisions would report to its own Assistant Undersecretary. These deputies would, in turn, report to the Undersecretary for Peace Operations, as would the Office of Budget and Management and the Office of Information and Research. (These two offices report directly to the USG for Peace Operations in order to insulate the intelligence and budgeting functions from the bureaucratic interests of the larger divisions.) The *Office of Information and Research* would maintain a research staff divided into regional sections, a field investigation unit, and a 24-hour situation room. This office would require a *regular*

staff of at least 150 personnel, some seconded from member-state military establishments. Member states could expand this staff by assigning additional personnel as operations require. The Office of Budget and Management should have a staff of at least 50 personnel, with some assigned from government agencies of the larger UN dues-contributing nations.

Figure 4. Principal elements of proposed Department of Peace Operations



The Uniformed Service Division and the Civilian Services Division would oversee the development and maintenance of UN field assets. (The Uniformed Service Division, in particular, would have administrative command over the proposed UN legion.) The Joint and Combined Operations Divisions would serve as the "home base" headquarters for all *UN-directed* peace operations. It provides the institutional site for staff task forces combining personnel from both UN services and from the services of member states participating in UN-directed operations, as each operation warrants. (The essential components of the proposed Department of Peace Operations are depicted in *Figure 4.)*

5.1 Joint and Combined Operations Division (JCOD)

The JCOD would divide into two offices: the Office of Field Operations, which would also serve as a planning unit, and the Office of Field Support. These offices would draw together and coordinate officials from the planning, logistics, and operations units of the UN Uniformed and Civilian Services and from comparable units of member-state militaries participating in UN operations. As noted above, these offices and their parent division are the site for all joint and combined planning, operations, and support conducted under the direction of the Secretary-General. (The components of the JCOD are depicted in *Figure 5.)*

Figure 5. Principal elements of proposed Joint and Combined Operations Division (JCOD), showing links to Office of Information and Research.



The Office of Field Operations would, like the Office of Information and Research, divide into regional sections. Under these sections would be teams responsible for individual, ongoing operations that would link to their counterparts in the Office of Information and Research. This linkage could take a physical as well as organizational form in the constitution of "operational desks" for each operation.* For each operation undertaken through the UN system, a staff task force would form that cuts across the offices of Support and Operations.†

Notably, this proposal differs from recent official UN reforms in grouping the planning and operations functions in one office and the support function in another, and in placing all three functions under the authority of a single Assistant USG.‡ By contrast, the recent UN reforms group planning and support together in one office and operations in another, each with its own Assistant USG. In our view, this reorganization 'improves on the previous arrangement by bringing planning, operations, and support closer together institutionally, but still reflects a somewhat bureaucratic approach to peace operations.

Once the strategic goals and means of an operation have been defined through the mandate development process, *operational needs should lead all staff work.* The planning function aims to predict operational conditions and map operational moves prior to the actual onset of operations. Once operations get underway, planners look several days and longer into the future (more or less, &pending on the expected pace of operations). The operations function itself seeks to shape and respond to events as they unfold over a shorter timeframe, mapping moves and countermoves. Thus, the planning and operations functions occupy different places on the same continuum -- a time continuum -- *that is oriented toward achieving operational objectives.*

The support function should inform and follow the planning and operations functions. Of course, it is time sensitive too, and involves both planning and management activities. However, fundamentally, the support function orients towards a distinctive, *subsidiary* challenge: supplying field forces with what they need to achieve their objectives. Of course,

* This suggestion borrows from the proposal for a "operations center" made by the authors of *The Sword and Olive Branch,* p 57. An operations center figures in several other reform programs as well, including that put forward by the USIP study group. See *The Professionalization of Peace Keeping,* p 42.

† The idea of developing operation-specific task forces is explored below. This is another common feature of reform programs. See *The Professionalization of Peace Keeping,* p 43.

‡ This proposal parallels that put forward in *The Sword and the Olive Branch.* Dimengo, *et al,* p 56.

planning and operations staff should be made fully aware of material and logistical limits, and they should respect these limits in their work The most critical part of this precept, however, *should be met at the strategic level through the development of sensible mandates:* the United Nations should not undertake operations that are clearly beyond its means.

Linking plans and support staff functions more closely with each other than with operations, as the United Nations does, may appear to be another good way of addressing the "means-ends mismatch" problem. Actually, it sets the stage for new difficulties: First, the concerns of support staff may come to exert *too much* influence on planning. Achieving a true balance between ends and means on the operational level depends on the *creative tension* between the perspective of operations, which tells the support staff "what must be done," and the perspective of support, which wrestles with material limits. In the most effective military establishments, the perspective of operations motivates a "can do" attitude in the support staff, who argue to revise the operational plan *only* if it leads them up against truly intractable logistical problems. Combining the planning function more closely with support than with operations threatens to short-circuit this productive dynamic.

A second consequence of putting distance between planning and operations is that planning may begin to lose touch with immediate operational realities, which are the primary concern of the operations staff. Finally, by having planning and support staff answer to one Assistant USG and operations staff to another, any impasse between the two will require an appeal to a higher, and bureaucratically distant, officer -- the USG for Peace Operations.

In order to avoid these problems we (i) group the planning and operations staff functions in one office, which can then coordinate closely with the proposed Office of Field Support through an operation-specific task force, and (ii) place the proposed Office of (planning and) Field Operations and the Office of Field Support together in the Joint and Combined Operations Division under a single Assistant Undersecretary.

The office of the Assistant USG for Field Operations should comprise approximately 50 personnel; the Office of Field Operations, approximately 200 regular staff; and the Office of Field Support, approximately 300 regular staff. The latter two offices would expand in size as staff from other agencies (including the UN Civilian and Uniformed Services) join operation-specific task forces, which will reside in the JCOD. The permanent staff of these offices can be divided between civilian employees of the United Nations, personnel assigned from the two proposed UN services, and personnel seconded from member-state armed forces and agencies. *(Table 2* summarizes the personnel requirements of the proposed JCOD.)

Table 2. Proposed Offices and Staff of USG for Peace Operations and AUSG for Field Operations

	Staff Size	Staff Type *(a)*	Staff Status *(b)*
Undersecretary for Peace Operations			
Office of the USG	50	CIV	UN
Office of Budget and Management	50	CIV	UN/SCND
Office of Information and Research	++ 150 *(c)*	CIV/MIL	UN/SCND
Subtotal	++ 250		
Assistant Undersecretary for Field Operations			
Office of the AUSG	50	CIV/MIL	UN/SCND
Joint and Combined Operations Division (JCOD)			
Office of Field Operations	++ 200	CIV/MIL	UN/SCND
Office of Field Support	++ 300	CIV/MIL	UN/SCND
Subtotal	++ 550		

Notes: (a) Staff Type: MIL = Military, CIV = Civilian; *(b)* Staff Status: UN = Full-time UN personnel, SCND = Seconded member-state military
(c) + implies that the staff for these offices grows on an *ad hoc* basis as events require.

5.2 Uniformed and Civilian Services

The *Uniformed Service Division* and *Civilian Services Division* are the functional equivalents of administrative commands, overseeing the training, equipping, and maintenance of military units (in the case of the Uniformed Service) and civilian units and field managers (in the case of Civilian Services). Although the two service divisions are independent of each other -- in fact, answering to different Assistant Undersecretaries -- they would regularly communicate and coordinate their development initiatives. (*Figure 6* depicts the essential components and organizational relations of the two proposed divisions.)

The Civilian Services Division would have four subordinate services: Civil Affairs, Electoral Support, Constabulary Service, and Observer and Mediation Service.* The Uniformed Service Division would have two subordinate "commands": Support Command and Forces Command. (The field units of the Uniformed Service Division are described below in *Section 7.)* In their design the two service divisions resemble the agencies of UN member states that

* Some of these units would have numerous field personnel; all of them would have enough personnel to plan and manage the use of large numbers of contracted or assigned personnel in the field. The proposed civilian Observer and Mediation Service mirrors a suggestion made by Amb Jonathan Dean. *See* Dean, "A Stronger UN Strengthens America."

Figure 6. Principal elements of proposed Civilian and Uniformed Services Divisions



might contribute assets to a UN operation. Of course, there is one critical distinction: the assets of the UN service divisions are permanently at the disposal of the Security Council for use in peace operations. They have no other competing function or orientation.

A Chief of Staff would be the head administrative officer for all UN Uniformed Service's offices and commands; two vice-chiefs of staff would exercise immediate administrative authority over the two subordinate commands: Forces and Support. Overseeing the Civilian Services Division would be a Director of Civilian Services -- in effect, a civilian chief of staff for the Assistant Undersecretary of Civilian Services.

Both the UN Civilian and UN Uniformed Services would have their own offices of Logistics and offices of Plans and Operations. These would not, however, independently lead or direct field operations. Instead, they would assign personnel to the operation-specific, joint and combined task forces formed within the JCOD. The home-base staff of the Civilian and Uniformed Services would also serve to reinforce the work of the JCOD task forces -- much as a member-state military might supplement the work of a combined staff with the efforts of staff located in home institutions. Finally, the two services' offices would routinely prepare contingency plans, direct exercises, and contribute to the development of their respective services.

Other of the Services' offices would be dedicated specifically to force development, maintenance, and administration -- and these have no counterpart at the joint and combined level. For the Civilian Services Division the purely administrative offices include: Personnel and Administration, Development and Acquisition, and Methods and Standards. The Uniformed Service Division would have identical offices, although an Office of Doctrine and Training would correspond to the Office of Methods and Standards on the civilian side.

The staff of the UN Uniformed and Civilian Services Divisions are full-time UN personnel. The staff offices of the Uniformed Service Division -- Plans and Operations, Logistics, Development and Acquisition, Personnel and Administration, and Doctrine and Training -- would incorporate approximately 1,100 personnel. In addition, a training corps of 600 personnel would attach to the Office of Doctrine and Training. The Chief and Vice-Chiefs of staff would add personal staff. *(Table 3* summarizes the personnel requirements of the proposed Uniformed Service Division.)

The staff offices of the Civilian Services Division would have fewer personnel -- perhaps 500 in all -- and each of the four civilian services would add 50 executive staff. The Director of Civilian Services would add a small personal staff of 20 people. Finally, the two Assistant Undersecretaries who oversee the two division would also each have a personal staff and their own small offices of Budget and Management -- altogether adding about 75 personnel to the staff roster. *(Table 4* summarizes the personnel requirements of the proposed Civilian Services Division.)

Table 3. Proposed Uniformed Services Division: Offices and Staff Personnel *(a)*

	Staff Size	Staff Type *(b)*	Staff Status *(c)*
Assistant Undersecretary for Uniformed Service Office of the AUSG	20	CIV/MIL	UN
Office of Budget and Management	20	CIV	UN
Uniformed Service Division Office of the Chief of Staff Office of Logistics Office of Plans and Operations Office of Personnel and Administration Office Development and Acquisition Office of Doctrine and Training	50 1,100	MIL MIL	UN UN
Training Corps	600	MIL	UN
Forces Command Office of the Vice-Chief of Staff Forces Command Central Staff	25 150	MIL MIL	UN UN
Support Command Office of the Vice-Chief of Staff Support Command Central Staff	25 150	MIL MIL	UN UN
Subtotal	2,140		

Notes: (a) Staff only. Does not include field personnel, base personnel, or central support personnel; *(b)* Staff Type: MIL = Military , CIV = Civilian
(c) Staff Status: UN = Full-time UN personnel, SCND = Seconded member-state military

Command relationships within the Uniformed Service Division

Serving directly under the AUSG for the Uniformed Service Division, a Chief of Staff would be the head administrative officer for all of the Uniformed Service Division's offices and command, except the AUSG's office and the Office of Budget and Management. Serving under the Chief of Staff, two Vice-Chiefs of Staff would exercise immediate administrative authority over the two commands: Forces and Support. The chain of administrative authority would next flow to base and facilities commanders and to the commanders of the individual battalions, squadrons, companies, and batteries housed at the various facilities and bases.

There would also be four field headquarters -- each comprising a field commander, small command staff, and large headquarters company -- co-located with the smaller units. The field commanders would not routinely exercise administrative authority over subordinate units other than their own staff and associated headquarters companies. However, they would

Table 4. Proposed Civilian Services Division: Offices and Staff Personnel

	Staff Size	Staff Type *(a)*	Staff Status *(b)*
Assistant Undersecretary for Civilian Services			
Office of the AUSG	20	CIV	UN
Office of Budget and Management	15	CIV	UN
Civilian Services Division			
Director of Civilian Services	20	CIV	UN
office of Logistics			
Office of Plans and Operations			
Office of Personnel and Administration			
Office of Development and Acquisition			
Office of Methods and Standards	500	CIV	UN/SCND
Civilian Services staff offices			
Civil Affairs staff			
Electoral Support staff			
Constabulary Service staff			
Observer and Mediation Service staff	200	CIV	UN/SCND
Subtotal	755		

Notes: (a) Staff Type: MIL = Military, CIV = Civilian; *(b)* Staff Status: UN Full-time UN personnel, SCND = Seconded member-state military

assume command of units during exercises and operations, and would in these circumstances answer directly to a political or military authority designated by the Security Council -- routinely, the UN Secretary-General. *(Section 7* provides greater detail on the command organization and relationships of the proposed legion.)

5.3 Field operations: essential structures and processes

The process for planning and executing field operations would rely on staff task forces that cut across various departments and draw together personnel from civilian and military agencies both inside and outside the United Nations proper. As noted earlier, the site of this convergence is the DPO's Joint and Combined Operations Division, which would provide task force coordinators, support personnel, and facilities.

While the division of the DPO into a variety of offices, divisions, and services reflects the diversity of routine functions, the operation-specific task forces serve to link these functions together for the purposes of the individual operations. In a sense, much of the larger, permanent structure is reconstituted on a smaller, *ad hoc* basis for each operation. This

approach ensures that each operation receives consistent and undivided attention from a staff subset that is well-articulated and closely connected to the larger Offices of Field Support, Field Operations, and Information and Research.

From receipt of a mandate to formation of a staff task force

The planning and execution process would begin with the Secretary-General's receipt of a mandate. This would pass through the Undersecretary for Peace Operations to the Assistant USG for Field Operations, who would order the formation of a *Staff Task Force (STF)* linking information, planning, operations, and support (or logistics) staff from the relevant offices in the divisions of Joint and Combined Operations, Civilian Services, Uniformed Service, and Office of Information and Research. If the proposed operation is a multinational one, as will usually be the case, relevant staff from participating member states are added. *(Figure 7* depicts the organization of the proposed Staff Task Forces and their constituent parts.)

Before the STF begins its work in earnest, however, both the Secretary-General and the Under-secretary for Peace Operations would check the Security Council mandate for "political-military consistency" -- an essential quality if the mandate is to serve as a basis for rational planning and action. In this effort they would seek the counsel of their personal military advisors. The Secretary-General and the Undersecretary for Peace Operations would note potential problems and concerns, directing the JCOD permanent staff to comment on these immediately. If these staff concur that a serious problem of internal consistency exists, the mandate must be returned to the Security Council for "clarification."

Presumably, this type of delay should not often occur if the Military Advisory and Cooperation Council, as outlined earlier, is working properly to ensure that Security Council mandates make military sense. At any rate, even before the Security Council has finalized a mandate, the Secretary-General should order the JCOD offices to form provisional staff nuclei for a task force. The Office of Information and Research should have already formed a "crisis watch" by the time the Security Council feels compelled to react to a developing situation.

Once a Security Council mandate is "cleared," the planning and execution process begins in earnest. Having received a clear mandate, the Assistant Undersecretary for Field Operations would finalize formation of the operation-specific STF, ensuring that its composition reflects the particular needs of the proposed operation. In finalizing the task force the Assistant

Undersecretary would ask a series of questions, for example: Does the mandate require the deployment of military units and, if so, what type? Does enactment of the mandate require troop contributions by member states? Which member states, if any, have volunteered troops? Does the mandate require forms of action other than peacekeeping or peace enforcement -- for instance, constabulary support or election monitoring?

Figure 7. Formation of operation-specific Staff Task Force (STF) with Field Section.



The essential core of all STFs would be the designated staff nuclei of three offices: the Office of Information and Research, the JCOD Office of Field Support, and the JCOD Office of Field Operations. With finalization of the STF, these nuclei are "filled out" to form STF sections. Each section -- information, plans and operations, and support -- would incorporate representatives from counterpart offices in those member-state militaries and UN services participating in the operation. In this way, each section becomes a "joint and combined" effort in its own area of responsibility, and the STF as a whole becomes the body linking these together to form the overall "home base" staff for the operation. The task force section in the JCOD Office of Field Operations would situate itself under one of the Office's regional divisions and it would link to a mirror image site in the Office of Information and Research.

Each STF would be led by a staff official, drawn from either the UN staff or the staff of a participating member state. Depending on the size, complexity, and geographical scope of an operation, the STF might involve 50 to 120 civilian and military personnel (officers and enlisted) from the UN system and participating member-state offices.

The majority of staff personnel working on an operation would come from the member state and UN military services, where much of the detailed work would occur. The principal function of the regular JCOD staff would be to lead, integrate, and coordinate planning, support, and operations among all the individual services participating in the operation. The principal function of the STF is to integrate the three "moments" of staff work -- planning, operations, and support -- across all forces contributing to an operation, and to ensure an adequate information base for these efforts (through the Office of Information and Research.)

Preparations for deploying to the field

As soon as the Staff Task Force is formed, it would detach a section and send it to the theater of proposed operations.* This *field section* might comprise 10 to 25 officers, enlisted personnel, and civilians -- depending on the size, complexity, and geographical scope of the planned operation. The Field Section would serve to enrich the flow of information to New York, provide a reality check for planning concepts, offer suggestions based on a close and

* We borrow this concept from John Mackinlay, who most recently set it forth in a 1994 article. Another proponent is General Sir Peter Inge, who has suggested that the UN develop a "general staff'" able to deploy a section "into the field to form a nervous system within the staff [of national contingents] there." General Sir Peter Inge, "UN Operations in a Changing Security Environment," *International Defense Review* (May 1993). Also, see Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces," pp 166-168.

timely survey of the field, assess special support needs, and constitute a foundation on which to deploy a full Field Staff later.

When the STF has made the transition from its planning to its operations phase, preparations for force deployment should have been finalized. Presumably, by this point in the planning and execution process, a field commander and chief administrative officer for the operation would have been chosen by the Secretary-General (in consultation with the Security Council) from either inside or outside the UN institutional structure.

The first order of business for the STF once it enters its operations phase is to facilitate the implementation of a force packaging and deployment plan. How this would proceed is most clear with regard to units from the UN Uniformed Service. The Staff Task Force is already linked by design to the plans and operations office of the Uniformed Service where detailed plans for UN military force packaging and deployment are executed under the authority of the Uniformed Service Chief of Staff.

The chain of command for UN military force packaging and deployment flows from the Chief of Staff to the Vice-Chiefs of Staff overseeing the Support Command and the Forces Command, and then to the base and unit commanders. Once units have been delivered to the field, command over them passes to the Field Commander, who reports directly to a designated political authority.

Packaging and deployment for UN Civilian Services follows a somewhat similar process under the authority of a Director of Civilian Services. However, because many of the assets for civilian services will not reside within the UN system (but are instead contracted or contributed services), the responses to UN orders and coordination efforts may be more sluggish and less precise. At any rate, the Civilian Services' Office for Plans and Operations, which contributes and links to the STF, is the coordinating point for these various civilian efforts.

Force packaging and deployment efforts for member-state military units participating in the operation fall outside the UN system proper. However, they should correspond closely to the direction given by the STF, which includes staff from the participating national militaries.

Force packaging and deployment can be "fast-tracked" if the STF devises and submits a brief, provisional plan very early in its planning phase. This would focus on identifying and dispatching to the field critical and core military and civilian units. Devising a "quick pack" of forces in a crunch would be facilitated greatly by routine exercises and contingency

planning. Although revisions might be needed later, a provisional plan for deploying units could be enacted days before the STF has completed its planning work.

Field Headquarters and Joint Coordination Cell

A true field headquarters would deploy before the main force, incorporating elements of the already deployed Field Section of the STF, which ensures a strong linkage between the Field Headquarters and UN headquarters in New York. In the case of UN military forces, modular field headquarters units would exist ready for use within both the Support and Forces commands. In the case of a joint UN-member state operation or of a multinational military operation not involving UN forces, a member-state military might deploy the main elements of the military field headquarters.

The military and civilian elements of an operation are likely to field separate headquarters. (Something akin to field HQ units could exist within the UN Civilian Services.) However, given the presence in the field of relatively independent NGOs (such as the International Red Cross), it would be difficult to create a degree of cohesion on the civilian side comparable to that on the military side. This adds to the problem of military-civilian coordination so astutely analyzed by John Mackinlay.[59] As noted earlier, Mackinlay's solution is to create a Joint Coordination Cell in the field that would serve to meld the efforts of all civilian and military agencies and ensure good communication among them.

Mackinlay's proposed Joint Coordination Cell (JCC) can be easily incorporated into the arrangements proposed here: the field section that the STF dispatches prior to actual force deployments could serve as the basis for a Joint Coordination Cell. A JCC would not only serve to ameliorate friction before it grows serious, but also facilitate a more robust and responsive cooperation among civilian and military elements down to the level of day-to-day details.

Leading the military elements of an operation would be the Field Commander. Leading the civilian units would be the Chief Administrative officer (CAO). In the proposed design, the CAO would not govern the provision of field support for military units -- although the converse may occur. (The next section addresses support arrangements in more detail.)

There are various relationships possible between the CAO and the military Field Commander. In rare cases, one person may even hold both positions. However, several guidelines should

be followed scrupulously: first, the Field Commander should always be a serving military officer. The possibilities of sudden, deadly, and irreversible error in the military realm are too great to give military field command to someone not experienced and current in the lexicon, methods, and technical qualities of the field force.

Investing a military commander with responsibility over civilian activities is less problematic in operations in which the military aspect clearly predominates. In other cases, however, there is good reason to keep immediate oversight of military and civilian aspects separate. Peace operations are essentially political-military affairs. It is best not to resolve by *organizational fiat* the unavoidable tension between political and military requirements at the tactical (or day-to-day) level. Instead, both aspects should be allowed full expression before a higher political authority, who decides the shifting balance between them based on the political-strategic imperatives that define the operation overall. This argues for maintaining in most cases the trilogy of a Field Commander and CAO of equal "rank" reporting to a Special Representative of either the Secretary-General or Security Council.*

This approach helps ensure that both military and civilian efforts are given adequate play. It also addresses the need to resolve the tensions between these efforts *as quickly as possible* by converging the civilian and military chains of command *as directly as possible* on a common, higher political authority. This approach does not rule out giving either the military or civilian headquarters limited authority to restrict the other's initiatives during some phases of the operation or in some areas of the theater.

Sustaining the Field Force

Support for UN field operations would be undertaken by several, closely cooperating offices. In all cases, support activities are coordinated at the highest level by the appropriate STF section based in the JCOD Office of Field Support. Belonging to this section would be

***** In an interesting discussion of the relationship between civilian and military authority in the field, William Durch and Barry Blechman observe: "Unlike traditional peacekeeping, where the Force Commander or Chief Military Observer is the top operational officer and the mission is primarily military, the more complex missions have more specifically political objectives and have much larger civilian operational components.... For that reason, they are headed by a civilian Special Representative, to whom all subordinate heads of mission components, civilian and military report." Durch and Blechman, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order* (Washington DC: Stimson Center, 1992), pp 75-77.

representatives of the member state and UN civilian and military contingents participating in the operation. This section would link directly to support offices in the field.

The field military command would control its own support structure, which should be capable of providing all the services that the field force needs. In the case of the UN Uniformed Service, the Support Command provides most field support services. Civilian organizations may build a parallel support structure by contracting for services from private companies, or they may rely directly on the military support structure. These, then, would coordinate through the Field JCC.

Field support units, military or civilian, can make requests for supplies through the JCC to the STF section in the New York JCOD Office of Field Support. The Office of Field Support is responsible for organizing the flow of supplies into the sustainment pipeline, which it governs up to the point of delivery in the field.

6. A UN Standing Force: Requirements and Design Guidelines

Since the years 1991-1992, when the current debate on reform and expansion of peace operations began, there have been a variety of proposals for the creation of a UN field force -- several of these simply revisiting much earlier suggestions. As one recent analysis points out, "The first UN Secretary-General, Norway's Trygve Lie, proposed a UN guard of 5,000 … [although] its creation was blocked by the cold war."[60] The cold war is now over, but such proposals are still received as unwelcome guests at the discussion table -- perhaps because the idea of a UN legion runs against the logic of "realism," which still holds sway over national political discourse.[61] But this logic is neither all pervasive nor irrevocable. In fact, our international system has been undergoing a profound process of integration, in fits and starts, since the 1940s.

What opportunities for progress the shifting play of national politics may open in the next few decades is highly uncertain. The task we set for ourselves in this section is to develop a force design based primarily on some determination of present requirements. An appreciation of political constraints helps set the boundaries of this design effort. However, our judgement of constraints looks to a historical period -- the next two decades -- not to prevailing, official political sentiments, and certainly not to those prevailing in any one capital. As stated in the previous section, our design effort aims to set a goalpost for longer-term reform efforts and to establish a yardstick by which we can measure the adequacy of near-term official reforms.

In this section we review several proposals for providing the United Nations with a standing military force. We then examine the issue of strategic and operational requirements as a preface to presenting the specifics of a new and comprehensive proposal for a UN legion.

6.1 Recent Proposals for UN Standby and Standing Military Units

Perhaps best known of the recent proposals for a UN military is Sir Brian Urquhart's 1993 suggestion that the United Nations form a 5,000-person light infantry force, which would serve principally in a rapid or initial deployment role.[62] Other proposals have been forthcoming as well, and some offer greater detail or suggest more ambitious goals:

James Meachum, former military editor of the *Economist,* envisions a reinforced infantry brigade for the United Nations comprising three infantry battalions, one engineer battalion, one helicopter battalion (or regiment), and one signals battalion.[63] Meacham sees the brigade serving either as (i) a rapid deployment force to be withdrawn when member-state follow-on forces arrive, or as (ii) a nucleus for a coalition effort, or even as (iii) a force carrying sole responsibility for an operation from beginning to end. Because of its potential role as a nucleus, he provides the proposed brigade with larger helicopter, engineer, and signals units than is common for forces of this size.

Meacham sees the UN brigade relying on the logistics infrastructure of a host country, which might also provide for its lift needs. Another option is a division of labor among UN member states with one providing base support and others providing lift support The host country might also assume responsibility for basic training, while the brigade would make arrangements for specialized training. Service would be open to all with no country quotas -- as in the French Foreign Legion -- and the period of service would be 3-5 years. Officers would either rise through the ranks or be seconded to the force by UN member states.

Lukas Haynes and Timothy Stanley have proposed a 5,000 person UN "fire brigade," which could expand to a strength of 10,000 after an initial period of testing and development.[64] Designed to operate in low-intensity, low-technology combat environments, the proposed force would have a primary mission of armed humanitarian relief. However, it could also undertake (especially in its more developed form) preventive deployments, missions to protect or rescue UN personnel, enforcement of economic sanctions, enforcement or policing of formal peace agreements, and the protection of small, unarmed states from externally-based low intensity threats. Finally, the authors envision the proposed force serving eventually as a "nucleus and command center to which other UN peacekeeping units could be attached as states would make them available" -- an option that might enable the smaller and less capable military powers to play a bigger role in peace operations.[65]

The initial force proposed by Haynes and Stanley would comprise three, large, self-sustaining battalions. Although "trucks, jeeps, and armored personnel carriers would be the primary vehicles," these would be augmented by "a few air transportable light tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns."[66] The authors also see each battalion incorporating some observation aircraft and helicopters, armed and unarmed.

Haynes and Stanley suggest that military personnel active in UN member-state militaries be eligible for service on a volunteer basis; recruitment would occur through national military establishments. These volunteers would not be assigned or attached to the United Nations in the fashion of seconded personnel, but would instead serve for their tour as military

analogues of "international civil servants." The authors suggest that no more than five percent of the brigade's personnel come from any one country and no more than 20-25 percent from any one region. Initially the authors see the force based in a single host country. "Later on, if the experimental phase succeeds enough to warrant expansion, it would be desirable to have elements of the force dispersed close to likely operating areas in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East" -- utilizing the surplus base facilities of member states.[67]

Another version of the UN "fire brigade" was suggested by the *Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands* in 1994 in response to the slow response of the UN to the developing crisis in Rwanda. A working group of the Netherlands' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense later conducted a preliminary study into the modalities of such a UN Rapid Deployment Brigade.[68] They propose a light infantry brigade with a immediately deployable strength of 2-5,000. It would be motorized and partly equipped with APCs for protection. The primary missions of the brigade would be rapid deployment for crisis prevention and humanitarian intervention. Operations would be of short duration and the brigade would usually serve only as the advance party for a larger international peacekeeping force.

Former US ambassador *Jonathan Dean* has proposed a UN readiness force "to head off or extinguish conflict in the crucial early stages."[69] Personnel would be trained "from the bottom up" with leading officers nominated by the Secretary-General and confirmed by the Security Council. He sees the force as possessing its own air transport and permanent bases. For the near-term, he suggests that the United Nations commission NATO to administer -- but not necessarily command -- the brigades in Europe. Eventually, the United Nations "would have to create a professional command structure of its own with a planning staff, intelligence, logistics, and communications to enable the UN commander to exercise full control. "[70]

Retired US Army Colonel *Timothy Thomas* envisions a corps-size force or legion, which he describes as small, elite, mobile, and professional.[71] Also part of the force would be tactical aviation and logistics assets. Thomas sees his proposed force "dispersed globally as independent brigades, stationed in cantonments provided by host governments *in lieu* of UN dues."[72] Normally, a corps would have at minimum 55,000 personnel, and usually many more -- although Thomas does not specify troop numbers.

6.2 Force Design Criteria

These proposals and others rely on a variety of criteria for setting the size and contours of a force. For several proposals -- especially those involving smaller forces -- near-term *political feasibility* is the lead criteria, although by proposing a UN standing military of any size authors are already taking a stand on the margins of official debate. Included as a political criteria is an estimate of the level of resources that member states would be willing to allocate to UN development and support.

A second set of criteria might be called *design viability.* This involves meeting minimum size and balance requirements for a self-sustaining or independent force. National military designers usually build ground force units around core maneuver elements -- for instance, infantry and armor battalions. They then add a varied mix of secondary maneuver and combat support elements -- for instance, a smaller number of cavalry and helicopter squadrons, and artillery, air defense, engineer, and intelligence battalions or companies. Strategic and operational flexibility depend on being able to mix a larger number of several types of core elements with various combinations of smaller secondary and support elements. For very small forces, however, it is difficult and costly to sustain an adequate variety of "force modules." One reason for this is that the central support requirements for a handful of artillery, armor, or. helicopter assets, for instance, is not proportionally smaller than the requirements for, say, a battalion each of these assets. It is also difficult to maintain a training and regimental base for a very small, varied force. For this reason, several of the proposals for a very small UN military seek to attach it closely to a host country or countries.

A third set of criteria for developing a military force have to do with *strategic and operational requirements,* which address the question: What quantity and type of military forces are needed to accomplish world community goals? Nations normally begin their own processes of military planning by consulting such criteria. Strategic requirements are usually expressed in terms of a net assessment that reflects a consideration of interests, goals, allies, assets, and threats. A statement of operational requirements reflects consideration of comparative doctrines, technological limits, combat dynamics, and environmental variables in likely theaters of operation.

All of the proposals reviewed pay at least some attention to operational requirements in addressing the special demands that peace operations put on military forces. All also address strategic requirements, at least implicitly, by arguing the necessity of giving the United Nations some military capability. Few, however, attempt to *derive force size* from an assessment of net requirements -- instead arguing for a particular size principally from the

perspective of political constraints and design viability. Among the articles reviewed, Ambassador Dean's argues most directly and forcibly from a perspective of strategic need -- and his estimate of quantitative requirements is, in our view, approximately correct. The estimate offered by Colonel Thomas, whose work pays more attention to operational requirements, is consistent with Dean's. This is not to imply that the force size estimates offered by Urquhart, Meacham, and Haynes and Stanley stand in contradistinction to Dean's, Thomas', or our own -- but rather, that their goals differ in emphasizing criteria of political feasibility and design viability.

****

The following sections present an abbreviated form of net assessment as a basis for setting force size requirements, and then proceed through an analysis of operational requirements to a new proposal for a standing UN military. The essentials of a strategic assessment -- issues of general interest, goals, and threat -- have been argued eloquently in Ambassador Dean's contributions to the debate and in Boutros-Ghali's original call to action, *An Agenda for Peace.*[73] The next section carries this assessment forward toward a quantitative statement of need by analyzing the shortfalls in recent peace operation deployments.

6.3 Assessment of Requirements for Peace Operations

Among the current impediments to conducting effective peace operations none is easier to see and harder to comprehend than the failure of UN member states to fulfill their pledges of support to mandated operations in an adequate and timely fashion. A brief review of several recent UN operations makes clear the operational significance of these failures and suggests the extent of their role in the present "crisis of peacekeeping":

Somalia: Contributing to the ineffectiveness of UNOSOM I, which involved sending a 500-soldier Pakistani battalion to Somalia, was a long delay in deployment. A report by the US Government Accounting Office quotes one UN official as concluding that by the time UNOSOM I got underway in October 1992, the field situation had deteriorated to a point where no less than 3,000 troops were needed to simply stabilize it. Two months later President Bush ordered the dispatch of 28,000 troops with an expanded but short-term mission as part of a follow-on US-led operation, UNITAF. From a peak all-nation strength

of 35,000 troops in January 1993, the force in Somalia quickly began to dwindle. When the operation passed back to UN command (as UNOSOM II) in May 1993, troop levels had dropped to 16,000 -- 12,000 below the newly authorized strength. By August, force strength had crept back upward slowly to a level of 20,000 troops when the Secretary-General warned that lack of troops and necessary equipment was emboldening local opponents of the operation. He called on member states to not only fill out the authorized strength, but to also add a brigade to the authorized total. Following the US Ranger debacle in October 1993, the United States added 5,000 troops to its efforts in the area as part of a plan of phased withdrawal.

Cambodia: In the Cambodia operation (UNTAC), late deployment of troops, problems with their quality, and logistics shortfalls scuttled plans to disarm the warring factions before elections. Twelve infantry battalions had been supposed to deploy by June -- already five months after the mandate had been finalized. Only five made it into the field by that deadline. Six weeks later -- a month after disarmament had been scheduled to begin -- all units were deployed, but problems of support and quality continued to bedevil portions of the force[74] Complicating the planning and execution of the operation from the start had been the large number of participating nations -- 32 in all. Despite the commendable willingness of member states to sign up for the operation, the Secretary-General had found it necessary to reopen negotiations with member states for troop contributions as late as April -- one month before deployment was scheduled to commence -- in order to achieve a total force of acceptable quality and linguistic mix.

The Balkans: In 1993, when the Security Council was contemplating the establishment of protected areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a NATO study estimated that 25,000-40,000 troops would be needed to establish and secure five safe havens. The Force Commander estimated that UNPROFOR overall required 34,000 troops in addition to those already authorized -- about 12,000 at the time -- to "obtain deterrence through strength" throughout the area of operations, including the planned safe havens. However, the Secretary-General and Security Council instead chose a "light option" -- 7,600 additional troops. Authorized in May 1993, the new troops still had not arrived in strength by the end of the year. In late 1994, UN troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina responsible for the maintenance of the safe havens still had a total strength that was less than the lower-end estimate of requirements calculated by NATO in 1993. As of January 1995, the total strength of UNPROFOR on the ground was approximately 41,000 (including support troops) -- still about 6,000 short of the Force Commander's estimate of required troops *circa* 1993 and 10,000 short of authorized strength.

Rwanda: In 1994 the United States refused to sign-off for a major UN redeployment to Rwanda until the 5,500 troops mandated for the operation were fully committed and the

United Nations made arrangements to pay for a handful of armored vehicles pledged by the United States. However, holding the operation hostage did not effectively stimulate the other member states to assemble an appropriate multilateral force -- no precipitous, *ad hoc* measure could. In the case of UNAMIR, the result was an unconscionable delay in deployment, resulting in great loss of life and deterioration of field conditions. This was mitigated only by a stopgap measure -- French unilateral intervention. However, France's prior interest in Rwanda was both partisan and manifest, leading simultaneously to limits on France's authorized role and the aggravation of one of the parties to the conflict -- a combination that does not constitute a general recipe for success in peace operations. France utilized 2,500 lightly armed troops for its "Operation Turquoise" -- 1,500 of these deployed outside Rwanda. French troops in Rwanda were drawn from the 11th Paratroop Division and supported by two helicopter gunship squadrons. By comparison, the Tutsi-dominated Patriotic Front, which perceived the French intervention as friendly to the rival Hutus, had approximately 20,000 troops equipped with mortars and self-propelled guns.

Many other and more detailed examples of troop and asset shortfalls are available, among them the deplorable delay in providing the UN operation in Mozambique with vital transportation assets to monitor the ceasefire there and assist in the demobilization of warring factions. There is also the example of the UN operation in Namibia (UNTAG), where ten years of preparation was undone when the operation's budget was cut in half six weeks before scheduled deployment. As Major General Indar Jit Rikhye (ret.) notes in a 1993 article, "Not surprisingly, [UNTAG] faced a critical situation when fighting among the feuding parties broke out anew on D-day when they finally opened the mission."[75] There, as in Rwanda, the UN was forced to call on an interested party -- South Africa -- to enforce the mandate.

Although partial, this accounting should suffice to establish that many of the problems experienced in UN operations reflect something more than failures in the formulation of mandates or in the planning of operations. In translating our review of systemic shortfalls in the provisioning of UN operations into a statement of net requirements, it is helpful to consider two problems separately: (i) the problem of timeliness in the initial deployment of troops and (ii) the problems of overall force size, quality, and capability.

Rapid Deployment Requirements

Regarding the need for a UN rapid deployment capability, Colonel Karl Farris, director of the US Army's Peacekeeping Institute, writes:

> There should be as little time lapse as possible between the end of the negotiation phase of a peacekeeping mission and implementation of the agreement.... Each day of delay between signature and implementation will cause greater difficulties on the ground. One criticism of UNTAC was that it arrived too late. There was a six month gap between signature of the Paris accord and the complete deployment of the Military Component.[76]

Colonel Farris concludes that the need for rapid deployment may constitute "the one real argument for establishing a standing UN military force." Although we believe that there are other good reasons for taking this step, the argument based on the need for rapid deployment is especially strong for two reasons: First, failing to deploy a field force as soon after a mandate and operational plan have taken shape can unhinge even the best planning and contribute to a divergence between political mandate and operational reality. Second, the next best option for achieving a rapid deployment capability -- a standby force comprising member-state units -- is not nearly as good.

Many of the problems that impede present efforts to effectively employ *ad hoc* multinational forces would not be resolved by establishing a system of standby units. Pulling together a multinational assemblage of military units on an *ad hoc* basis takes time -- which is inimical to rapid deployment.[77] A greater degree of uncertainty regarding overall force quality is unavoidable with a rapidly assembled UN force. This adds to operational risk, which for early entry forces is already considerable. Of course, there is the option of "working out the kinks" in the field, after deployment. But this too is inconsistent with the goals of rapid deployment. One recent review of efforts to strengthen standby agreements notes:

> The United Nations has a standby force agreement with almost 50 member states, including the United States, each having pledged to make military forces or equipment available for future peace operations. Most potential contributors, however, reserve the right to reject such calls by the Security Council and almost all did so during the Rwanda crisis. One diplomat has characterized the standby force approach as comparable to "a traveller's check with only one signature."[78]

As noted earlier, it was the failure of a standby mechanism during the Rwanda crisis that prompted the Netherlands to explore the possibility of creating a standing UN "fire brigade." Speaking before the General Assembly in September 1994, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Hans van Mierlo, reflected on a UN official's assessment that a single mechanized brigade deployed to Rwanda during the crisis might have averted the great tragedy there.

> If the deployment of a brigade could have prevented the indiscriminate slaughter of many hundreds of thousands, what then prevented us from doing so? Let us face it: the reason was that under the circumstances no government was prepared to risk the lives of its citizens. . . . If member states are not in a position to provide the necessary personnel, will it then not become unavoidable for us to consider the establishment of a full-time, professional, at all times available and rapidly deployable UN Brigade for this purpose: a UN Legion at the disposal of the Security Council?[79]

The third best option for achieving a rapid deployment capability is to establish a protocol for authorizing a single member state or alliance of member states to assume this responsibility on an operation-by-operation basis. However, there are only a few states or alliances today capable of effectively assuming this role; routine reliance on these states, if they would bear it, would violate the criterion of multilateralism -- which should be met in every operation, lest legitimacy suffer. Certainly, this criterion should not be routinely violated.*

If the goal is a truly rapid, multilateral capability to deploy for peace operations, there is no good substitute for a UN standing force. What size force would be needed to meet minimum current requirements? A review of UN deployments in the recent, peak years of activity (1988-1994) reveals that medium-sized, large, and very large deployments (l,000-plus, 4,000-plus, and 10,000-plus troops) taken together have occurred with an average frequency of approximately one every six months. During 1988-1995 there were two particularly demanding periods: March-April 1992, when UNPROFOR, UNOSOM I, and UNTAC began, and September-October 1993, when UNMIH and UNAMIR began.

***** The *Blue Helmet* proposal, reviewed in *Section 2,* does not deal adequately with this problem. It foresees rotating lead responsibility for a UN standby corps among permanent members of the Security Council. Not only would this result in three virtually allied Western nations carrying sharing responsibility among themselves 60 percent of the time and two regional hegemons sharing it the rest, but it would also result in sharp fluctuations in deployment capability as the "baton" passed among the United States, Germany, Russia, Great Britain, China, and France. Dennehy, *et al, A Blue Helmet Combat Force,* p 24.

Reviewing the first set of these five operations: Some of the member-state efforts at timely deployment succeeded -- although in each case partial shortfalls impeded operational success. Filling the initial gaps in mandated strength for the first set with a UN standing force would have required deployments of less than 5,000 for UNPROFOR, more than 5,000 for UNTAC, and 500 for UNOSOM I. However, UNOSOM I would have required an additional deployment of 1,000 or more troops before the end of the initial deployment period for the UN rapid deployment force -- which we assume to be up to 7.5 months in each case.

The effect of the hypothetical UN force deployments would have been greater than the numbers suggest. In the case of the multi-state military deployments, UNPROFOR and UNTAC, the deployments would have fulfilled one-third of the authorized troop strength with a well-equipped, well-trained, and unified force -- in effect, constituting an early-deploying and firm backbone for the operations. Involvement of a UN force would have also allowed a redistribution of early deployment burdens among member states, so that fewer agents would have had to attempt multiple deployments during a short time period. In the case of the UNTAC, UNPROFOR, and UNOSOM operations, seven UN member states contributed to more than one of them. Five of these nations were *major* contributors to at least one of these operations; three nations were major contributors to two.

Presuming, as our hypothetical case does, a UN capability to deploy and maintain up to 11,500 troops in the field simultaneously, the requirements for the second peak period -- Fall 1993 -- could also have been met, and easily. So could the major requirements that fell between the two peak periods -- principally the deployment for the United Nations operation in Mozambique. For each of the three relevant operations -- ONUMOZ, UNMIH, UNAMIR -- between 2,500 and 3,500 troops could have met the rapid deployment requirements.

A calculation of total troop requirements, however, must take into account the fact that troops cannot be kept in the field indefinitely, moving among operations. This constraint on troop utilization pushes total requirements above the 11,500 troop level. Specifically, had a UN command deployed 11,500 troops for the initial phases of UNPROFOR, UNOSOM I, and UNTAC, it could not have then drawn on this same troop pool eight months later for all the troops needed to begin the Mozambique operation. This points to the need to make provisions for troop and unit rotation, which we address in later sections.

Quantitative Requirements: Fitting the Force to the Need

Although much criticism has focused on the UN's process of mandate development for a failure to pair mandates with credible statements of military requirements, the recent record of UN field operations does not unambiguously support this charge. *To confidently ascribe the difficulties experienced in UN operations to an understatement of need, member states would have had to first adequately meet the levels of need estimated by the Secretariat -- which they have routinely failed to do.* This failure has involved both the quantity and quality of pledged tactical and support troops (as well as the timeliness of their delivery, as addressed in the previous section.)

In several cases, however, the Secretariat and Security Council clearly chose to ignore or only belatedly follow informed military advice in adjusting the requirements associated with UN mandates. The most egregious example regards the 1993 estimates of requirements for achieving immediate UN goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina offered by both NATO and the UNPROFOR commander. In June 1994, the UN field force protecting safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina was still 6,000-8,000 troops short of the lower-end NATO estimate of requirements -- a shortfall of 25-33 percent. Qualitative shortfalls in deployed units have involved issues of appropriate skills and training, discipline, compatibility with the field force as a whole, and equipment and supplies on hand.

As a first-order development goal, the UN could seek to field a legion that, in addition to meeting the rapid deployment requirements suggested above, could also have *minimally covered the shortfalls in member-state contributions to operations during the baseline period 1988-1995.* Of course, this requirement would be partly covered by any force capable of meeting the rapid deployment requirements suggested above.

A UN legion able to maintain 15,000 troops in the field continuously could have filled the manifest gaps in recent peace operation deployments. This, assuming that aggregate number of troops deployed would vary year-to-year between 10,000 and 20,000. *Table 5* illustrates how this force could have been deployed during the peak-demand years 1992-1994 to meet both initial (rapid) and continuous deployment goals.

As noted earlier, being able to maintain an average of 15,000 troops in the field continuously requires a larger base of *deployable* troops. In order to translate the statement of quantitative operational requirements into a statement about total unit and troop requirements, we employ a troop and unit rotation concept that reflects the constraints on keeping troops and units in

the field. The proposed model sets these limits as *six months* per year for troops (after their initial training period) and *7.5 months* per year for organizational units and their equipment.

Table 5. Hypothetical Deployment of Proposed UN Legion, 1992-1994

	1992		1993		1994	
	Jan-June	July-Dec	Jan-June	July-Dec	Jan-June	July-Dec
UNPROFOR	5000	3000	3000	3000/7000 *(a)*	9000	9000
UNTAC	5000	3000	3000	3000/0 *(a)*		
Somalia Operations		1500	3000	6000	6000	6000
ONUMOZ			2500	1000	1000	1000
UNMIH				1500	500	500
UNAMIR			1500	1500	1500	1500
TOTAL	**10,000**	**7,500**	**13,000**	**17,000**	**18,000**	**18,000**

Notes: (a) During this six-month period the UNPROFOR force grows as UN troops complete their mission in Cambodia.

If units can be deployed for only 7.5 months per year on average, then the quantitative operational requirement -- a force of 15,000 troops continuously deployed -- must be multiplied by a factor of 1.6 to derive total unit requirements: a force comprising 24,000 basic personnel slots. Assuming that this number includes organic service support slots, the required total force is equivalent in size to about *four reinforced brigades.* However, a further adjustment is needed because the constraints on keeping troops in the field are tighter than those on units. These two constraints can be aligned by augmenting units with "rotation" or replacement troops equal in number to 25 percent of the units' basic personnel requirements. Thus, applying the troop rotation constant (25 percent) to the basic personnel requirement for the force as a whole (24,000 troops) yields a total troop requirement of 30,000. The suggested proportion of replacement slots would also provide an adequate buffer against a yearly attrition rate of two or three percent.*

* In practice units would not routinely experience years during which they are in the field for 7.5 months and at home for 4.5 months. Just as periods of peak demand will alternate with periods of modest demand, shorter-term deployments will alternate with longer-term ones. In any given *six year period,* for instance, a typical unit might deploy four times: say, for periods of 12,10,9, and 14 months. Enough time would remain in the six year period for these units to spend an average of 6.75 months at home between each deployment -- or 27 months total over six years. This conforms with the constraint set above: an average of 4.5 months per year at home. Moreover, reliance on troop rotation concept, as proposed, would

(continued...)

****

The period 1988-1995 provides as good a guide to the frequency, size, and intensity of new era peace contingencies as we are likely to have. In terms of meeting the field requirements of individual peace operations, the proposed force size reflects an upward revision of the estimates that informed the existing mandates. However, the promise of the force to meet *objective* requirements in the field rests on the likely synergetic interaction of several features, which we can best appreciate by reflecting on what the proposed force could have contributed to recent peace operations:

> *First,* the proposed force would have given the world community a capacity to increase peace operation deployments by nearly 25 percent in the recent peak year of 1994.
>
> *Second,* it would have allowed adequate rapid deployment in all the major operations of the 1988-1995 period.
>
> *Third,* it would have contributed to the most demanding of those operations a well-trained, well-equipped, cohesive "backbone" force designed specifically to meet the challenges of multinational peace operations.
>
> *Fourth,* because of its character as a supranational or global asset, it would have permitted a reduction in the number of states contributing to each individual operation, which is as much a function of political as military needs. Reducing the number of players in an operation reduces complexity and friction, obviously. Reducing the political requirement for multiple players would also allow those few member states who act as UN "work horses" to focus their contributions on one or two operations at most -- thus improving efficiency and mitigating the challenge of sustainment.

---

*(...continued)
allow every soldier to spend six months a year, on average, at home base. Extrapolating from the example to cover the entire force: if every unit of the force were asked to deploy for 45 (overlapping) months out of every six years, the average annual deployment would be 15,000 troops.

6.4 Unit Structure and Mix: Operational Requirements

Implicit in the assertion that the proposed UN force would contribute more to the success of peace operations than indicated by its size is the assumption that *its character* would be better adapted to the unique needs of these operations than would most of today's peace operations forces. But what *type of force* is best suited to new era peace operations?

Answering this question requires a closer look at the nature of peace operations, the military missions associated with them, and the functions that military units will be called on to perform in the course of fulfilling these missions. Peace operations are essentially political-military affairs. For the military units involved this implies two things: first, they may be asked to perform a variety of essentially nonmilitary activities or activities ancillary to their military functions -- for instance, humanitarian relief, mediation, and policing. Second, they will be asked to perform routine military functions in non-traditional ways -- ways consistent with a strategic logic different than that governing war.

For the purposes of force design we largely set aside the first of these implications; Specialized training, not force design, is the principal way of ensuring that peace operations forces can fulfill the special nonmilitary functions that may be assigned to them. Generally speaking, there is no reason that civilian functions should not be fulfilled by civilian agencies; militarizing these functions is often inefficient and inappropriate politically. However, there are several areas in which military units can efficiently do double duty: engineering, communications, and the provision of some service support to civilian units and local government agencies. A dedicated peace operations force should incorporate more capability in each of these areas than its own tactical units may require.

6.4.1 The Logic of Peace Operations: Implications for Force Design

A starting point for determining the special military requirements imposed by peace operations is the question, What is the defining logic of such operations that differentiates them and war? A recent US Army manual on peace operations sees the following distinction:

> In war, consent is not an issue of concern for the military commander. In peace operations, however, the level of consent determines fundamentals of the operation.[80]

Characteristically, peace operations involve (i) an action program or mandate to which the principal parties to a conflict consent, *at least partially*, and (ii) intervention by an agent not involved in the conflict that acts to monitor, facilitate, supervise, and/or enforce implementation of the action program -- in some cases because local consent to the program is insufficiently robust or self-sustaining. Robust or not, consent serves as the lever that enables the world community and its representative field force to achieve goals that would be unattainable otherwise, except at prohibitive cost.*

Wars, by contrast, tend toward becoming bilateral affairs in which each side pursues the destruction of the other's military capability -- at least to the extent that the achievement of political goals requires it. Thus, the defeat, destruction, or incapacitation of some relevant portion of an opponent's military power is viewed as a necessary enabling condition for a program of political action. Wars could be said to have two moments: one military, the other political. Although the military moment should always serve and conform to the political, it is also distinct: Within a vector set by politics, it has its own immediate goal and measure of success, which is military victory. Comparing peace enforcement operations to war, a US Army Infantry School white paper usefully notes that,

> Settlement, not victory, is the goal of all peace enforcement operations. The measure of success will always be political, not military.[81]

This view, of course, does not preclude the use of force by UN field units, however, as the US field manual notes, "When force must be used, its purpose is to protect life or compel, not to destroy unnecessarily; the conflict, not the belligerent parties, is the enemy."[82]

---

* Analyzing the subcomponents and permutations of "consent" is central to discussions of peace operations doctrine, generally, and to efforts to distinguish peacekeeping and peace enforcement, in particular. John Mackinlay and Chopra suggest a spectrum of consent based on how the belligerents, the local populace, and the UN force regard each other and the mandate. The British Army manual usefully distinguishes between consent on the operational and tactical levels -- or, "consent for" and "consent within" an operation. The latter (tactical) is often unstable, sometimes requiring the application of force to achieve mandated objectives. However, maintaining consent on the operational level enables the tactical use of force. Another important variable in the consent equation is the degree of international consensus supporting a mandate.

For analysis of these issues, see US Army, *Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations*, Section 1, pp 14-16; *British Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping*, third draft, Headquarters Doctrine and Training, 1994, Section 2, pp 5-18; the British manual's principal author, Charles Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," *Survival* (Autumn 1994); Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces"; Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," *in Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead*, McNair Paper No. 25; and, Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations."

This precept calls to mind the role of police, as it is conceived ideally. Consider the hypothetical example of police officers acting to quell an altercation. Depending on how the disputants respond to an order to desist, the officers may have to physically restrain, disarm, or even injure one or both. These acts do not, in themselves, make the officers a party to the dispute, even if events require them to focus their restraining power primarily on one of the disputants.* Nor does it make the disputants "police enemies," whose capacity to resist must be broken utterly or whose cooperation is not desired and sought. Indeed, police interventions typically involve a mix of cajoling, warning, and force -- *albeit* with the threat of greater force (or trouble) held obviously in reserve.

Regarding peace operations, the least challenging scenario is one in which the parties to a conflict are mutually committed to ending hostilities and enacting a settlement, but remain suspicious of each other or worry that the close proximity of their fighting forces will spark an unwanted engagement. In this case, an outside agent may act to embody or facilitate the already existing consensus of the parties -- a circumstance that typifies simple or "traditional" peacekeeping operations. Here the analog for the outside force is a referee or mediator, not a police officer. In these cases, the deployment of "traditional" blue helmets -- armed lightly and only for self-protection -- will suffice.

More difficult are situations in which local political and military leaders exert only incomplete control over their combatant forces, or situations in which military and paramilitary forces are partially independent of central political control. The most demanding situations are those in which one or more of the warring parties have not yet completely resigned themselves to seeking their ends through peaceful means, and those characterized by a general breakdown

* The analogy of peace operations and police functions needs qualification. A field force with a peace enforcement mission may strive for the ideal status of a "policing agent" *(albeit* with a limited mandate), and yet never attain it. It is quite possible for an intervention force to act evenhandedly in the pursuit of a mandated goal -- say, disarmament of a population -- and, nonetheless, earn the reputation of being partisan. This, because its mandated activity -- general disarmament, in this example -- may serve to level a playing field that otherwise favors one side in a conflict. As Kenneth Allard points out, "In societies where peacekeeping may be needed, the distribution of arms reflects internal power structures that can be expected to fight to maintain their position." In such cases, Allard asserts, "there should be no mistaking the fact that the troops given this mission have been committed to combat." Police, by contrast, are asked to enforce laws that are supported, usually, by a strong social consensus, and they operate within a context of pervasive supporting institutions -- a context notably absent in most peace operations contingencies. For this reason the goals and the implementation of a mandate must take into account both local and international consensus, and must be sensitive to *the marginal utility of each control step taken.* With regard to the Somalia operation, Allard contrasts disarming the population *in general* and "simply controlling or confiscating the arms [that] may overtly threaten the peacekeeping force," which he sees as a "qualitatively different" in terms of practicability. Allard, *Somalia Operations,* pp 61-66 and 89-91.

in public order. In these cases, the main impetus for a peace operation may come from the broader community of states, who see a serious threat to regional peace or to humanitarian standards in the conflict or in its effects.*

When momentum for the peace program originates outside the affected area, local consent may be uneven and grudging, perhaps resting partially on external inducements, sanctions, or the threat of sanctions. Indeed, in some cases combatants may agree to negotiate a program of conflict management, limitation, or resolution simply because doing so is the sole alternative they have to a more vigorous form of outside intervention. Where local consent is variegated and unstable, the peace operations force must be prepared to operate in an environment of potential hostility, which warring factions or groups may direct at each other, at the mandated action program and its representatives, or both.

If consent is the lever arm of peace operations, the fulcrum is the capability of the field force to protect itself and deter a descent into a general state of violence.† *The field force combines this lever and fulcrum into a synergetic system through a doctrine that prescribes a defensive military stance and the discrete use of force at minimum necessary* levels.‡

---

* Many observers have noted that in such situations there may be little "peace" to keep or enforce. This is a good argument for retiring the terms "peace enforcement" and "peace operations," which may convey false impressions about the nature of these operations. In fact, what they involve is conflict management, limitation, and resolution -- most often attempted without the *full* cooperation of all the parties to the conflict.

† In describing consent as a "lever arm" we mean that it and its subsequent modalities -- such as, persuasion, mediation, and negotiation -- are the means by which the work of the operation gets done. In suggesting that the military capabilities of the UN field force constitute a necessary *fulcrum*, we recognize that the degree of local consent is actually limited. *Ideally*, the field force will serve in such circumstances as a compelling presence whose potential for combat will not have 'to be brought to bear. On the relationship between local consent and the use of force, *see* Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping"; and, John Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping."

‡ In the eventuality of combat between UN and local belligerent units, the roles of lever and fulcrum are reversed *on the tactical level:* the UN unit's military capability becomes a lever with which a recalcitrant belligerent unit is "moved." Of course, a resort to force on the part of UN units can disturb the consensual basis of an entire operation. If the peace operation *as such* is to proceed, then the UN's tactical use of force must rest firmly on the fulcrum of a broader popular consent to the peace operation. This particular combination of consent and force will not work if the UN operation has failed to keep straight and cultivate the more generally appropriate relationship between consent and force: generally, consent and its modalities -- persuasion, mediation, etc. -- are the lever; military capability, the fulcrum. As Charles Dobbie writes, "[A] strong consensual peacekeeping framework at the operational level marginalizes opposition and facilitates the use of *minimum necessary force.*" Dobbie, "A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping," p 145.

The "lever arm and fulcrum" system will not function if the fulcrum -- that is, the field force -- cannot protect itself or lacks sufficient strength to plausibly deter attacks. For this reason, *the tactical units of the field force -- in this case, battalions and companies -- should closely resemble typical "middle weight" military units in their equipment and capabilities.* This criteria should be applied with reference to a prototypical "worst case" threat *for these types of conflict* -- which means a military or paramilitary opposition employing, at best, mid-level technology and exhibiting low- to mid-levels of organization and professionalism.

The implication of the preceding discussion is that a UN legion will distinguish itself from a typical middle-weight force, such as the French *Force d' Action Rapide*, at the tactical and small-unit levels not by its equipment or combat capability as much as by its tactics and techniques *of first resort* -- presence, communication, persuasion, mediation, and negotiation, which imply special training and a high level of discipline and professionalism. On the theater level, however, the force would appear clearly different from one designed for warfighting. Peace operations do not encompass operational-level offensives. Nor should a peace operation field force be expected to erect a robust defense against protracted and intensive theater-wide military assault. Consequently, the capabilities associated with such missions are notably absent. In the instance of a large-scale offensive, these would include substantial reserves of heavy armor, deep-strike combat aircraft, and a preponderance of self-propelled long-range artillery under armor.

6.4.2 Peace Operations Mission Taxonomy and Field Functions

A review of typical peace operations missions will help us identify the structural characteristics of a suitable field force. Of special interest among these missions are the following:[83]

- Preventive deployment to forestall violence between communities or states;
- Monitoring or supervision of a tense situation, stalemate, ceasefire, or settlement;
- Establishment, monitoring, or supervision of cantonment areas, demilitarized zones, or buffer zones between warring parties -- which may involve interposition by the field force;
- Support, supervision, or implementation of a process of disarming and demobilizing of the warring factions;
- Protection and support of humanitarian assistance efforts;

- Noncombatant evacuation under threat;
- Establishment of protective zones;
- Protection and support of national reconstruction and reconciliation efforts -- including the conduct of elections;
- Assistance in the maintenance and restoration of general civil order, and
- Enforcement of sanctions.

Several of these missions would require the field force to undertake the subsidiary missions of guarantee and denial of movement.

This mission taxonomy provides a guide for deciding the structure and mix of field units for the proposed force. Missing from this list are those peace enforcement missions that clearly involve full-fledged war: for instance, theater-wide counter-offensive campaigns. As noted above, the proposed legion is not designed to undertake this type of campaign. (It is also worth noting that some of the missions listed above would not routinely require a force more capable than traditional "blue helmet" peacekeepers. *In cases where lightly armed peacekeepers are both available and judged able to safely enact a UN mandate, the proposed legion should not be used in their place.)*

The proposed legion is geared toward contingencies in which the threat of armed resistance is real and present. Beyond this, its specific structures conform to the "field functions" implied in the mission taxonomy. In this analysis, "functions" are routine activities that field units may have to undertake in the course of performing a mission. Identifying these functions is an intermediate step in designing a force structure that is suited to the achievement of mission objectives. With regard to the mission taxonomy presented above, relevant field functions include (i) observing, monitoring, and patrolling, (ii) protection, (iii) control, and (iv) defense. *Observing* and *monitoring* are functions that are often best suited to specialized reconnaissance and surveillance units -- cavalry. However, some forms of observing and monitoring imply static observation sites -- which can be staffed by infantry. *Patrolling in detail* -- that is, on foot -- can also count as a form of observing and monitoring and, it is a task for infantry.

Protection

Protection activities are also emphasized in the mission list. These may be usefully divided into several categories: protection of sites, protection of areas, and protection of UN-supported activities. *Protection of sites* -- such as government buildings or communication facilities -- can depend largely on infantry in a static mode. *Protection of areas* can range from regular patrolling (as a means of maintaining order and supporting site protection) to full-blown area defense. The latter encompasses the defense of protected areas (for instance, safe havens and force lodgements) against concerted raids or even massed assault. (Defense of protected areas is addressed separately below.) Area patrolling can involve either cavalry or dismounted infantry -- depending on geographical scope, terrain, and threat.

Protection of UN-supported activities -- such as electoral activities, humanitarian relief, or the conveyance of people or goods -- poses special problems. It often implies *protection on-the-move* through hostile or uncontrolled areas. Even when the protected activities are more-or-less stationary, they may be intermittent and scattered throughout a country, occurring both in areas that are closely controlled by the UN force and areas that are not. Protection of convoys requires cavalry -- not only in a guard role, but also in a screening role. The guard role involves providing protection up close; the screening role, forward reconnaissance and the spoiling of ambushes. Protection of activities that are relatively stationary -- for instance, food distribution from fixed sites -- may permit reliance on infantry. Nevertheless, should these protected activities be scattered and intermittent, operational mobility will be key.

Control

The peace operations mission taxonomy also implies a number of control functions for the field force. These efforts may involve requiring belligerents, the local populace, or both to behave in some prescribed fashion or to abstain from some proscribed behaviors. Control functions include, for instance, movement control or denial, area policing in support of civil order, interposition, search and seizure activities, or cantonment of belligerent forces and stockpiling of their weapons. These functions, unlike those in the *protection* category, require the field force to assume a proactive stance and interact with belligerents or potential belligerents in ways that might incur resistance or a violent response -- even assuming strict even-handedness and a high level of discretion and professionalism on the part of UN units.

The types of units required for control functions will depend, of course, on the specific control functions that an operation involves and the extent to which the belligerent parties consent to control. It will also depend on the tactical situation: the task of supporting law and order in a well-defined and limited area -- say, a city -- is much easier if well-organized belligerent groups are already effectively excluded from the area or have been co-opted into the policing function. Also, control functions are generally less challenging if they occur amid a high-density of friendly forces. This, because units can reinforce each other more easily, if necessary, under conditions of high force density. Some missions and functions, however, will require the field force to deploy relatively small or even very small packets across a large area* Examples are (i) general movement control, which may require numerous, small checkpoints, (ii) the detailed disarming or supervision of warring parties, and (iii) the occupation for deterrent or "buffering" purposes of numerous, contested sites.

Because control activities are proactive and, in some cases, intrusive, they test the limits of local consent. The amount of leverage tactical units bring to such activities will depend on their resilience and fighting power. Resilience requires *inter alia* various means of passive self-protection -- armoring, defensive field preparations, and the wise choice of deployment sites -- some of which are not relevant in wide-ranging control activities. Regarding fighting power: tactical units *on average* should have at minimum a manifest capability to stalemate most units of comparable size that may oppose them. A margin of superiority is gained through unit cohesion, leadership, and skill and, at the operational level, through superior intelligence and command and control.

The criterion of adequacy is met fully if units are likely to produce a *deterrent effect* -- that is, if their *manifest* combat capability can dampen belligerents' eagerness for a fight. This capability must be clear on the tactical level -- if not in every contact between the UN force and the belligerent, which would be infeasible, then in most contact between units of company-size or larger.† The desired deterrent effect cannot derive solely or primarily from "rapid reaction units" held in reserve on the operational-level or distributed throughout the field force. This, because in peace operations the challenge to deterrence too often *originates*

---

* During the Somalia operations the US 10th Mountain Division's light cavalry squadron played a key role. After action reports noted that squadron operations "were characterized by extended communication distances, the need to cover large areas of responsibility, and continuous operations." Lawrence Vowels and Maj. Jeffrey Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," *Armor* (September-October 1994), p 28.

†Of course, providing UN field forces with better protection and increased capability is not sufficient by itself to enhance their deterrent effect. Rules of Engagement are important, too. Any new capabilities will be tested by some belligerent, sooner rather than later. If the force enters the field governed by overly restrictive Rules of Engagement, local belligerents will soon expose its apparent strength as hollow.

suddenly and on the small-unit level, reflecting the poor discipline and weak command structure of belligerent "armies." To have any hope of deterring violence, field force units must be attuned to the perspective and calculus of lower-level belligerent commanders, who often act semi-autonomously.

Paying attention to the combat capability of UN field units should not imply that they will very often resort to arms in fulfilling their control functions. They are (or should be) oriented doctrinally to operate within a context of consent, which they work to preserve and reinforce through a discrete application of minimum necessary force. Providing these units with a deterrent capability down to the tactical level is meant to allow them to simultaneously *fulfill* their missions and *avoid* actual fighting. Consider the hypothetical example of a UN unit given the task of supervising the disarmament of a belligerent unit that is reluctant to comply despite the agreement of its higher-level political leaders: The UN unit might next choose to develop the situation by delaying or even blocking the egress of the recalcitrant unit while contacting higher authorities. Although this action is nonviolent, there is no doubt that it could elicit a violent response.

In other situations, the best course might be to permit some temporary "leakage" in the control regime -- for instance, by permitting a belligerent unit to pass a check point -- while striving to catch the leak farther down the line, perhaps through the *political* intervention of higher authorities. Sometimes the local balance of forces may compel a UN unit simply to step aside. Clearly, a UN infantry team staffing a transportation checkpoint could not contain a heavily-armed company-size unit that was determined to pass. Nonetheless, designing UN units to be strong on average for their size is worthwhile. The survival of the team in the preceding example might depend on it -- as might its capacity to *delay* the transgressor and communicate the problem to higher authorities in a timely way.

Field commanders cannot afford in any case to be sanguine about leakage in control regimes because the precedent will inspire repetition, thus increasing the likelihood of major confrontation. In sum, tactical weakness increases not only the dependence on operational reserves -- that is, quick reaction forces -- but also increases the likelihood that rapid reaction forces will *have to be* called into action, which is an eventuality that can put at risk the consensual basis for an entire operation.

Our analysis of control functions suggests that UN tactical field units should have higher average levels of protection, mobility, and firepower than can be achieved by pure infantry forces. Of course, in many situations foot infantry are indispensable. Operations in enclosed terrain require them; so do some tactics, such as house-to-house searches and intensive foot patrols. However, because peace operations tend to be low-force-density affairs and often

require scattered deployments, the ability to quickly withdraw or redeploy infantry is essential. Thus, all infantry should be motorized, at least. In other words, troop transport should be organic to all tactical units.

Defensive Operations

Our overview of functional requirements concludes with an examination of defensive operations *per se.* The most demanding of potential defensive operations involve (i) protection of specified areas under chronic attack by well-equipped belligerent units and (ii) withdrawal or redeployment of the UN force while under concerted attack Among the basic requirements for such operations are dedicated anti-armor assets, substantial artillery assets, and combat engineer capability (which is essential to countermobility operations and the construction of field fortifications).* Generally speaking, the capacity of the UN force to defend itself will rest on (i) the baseline resilience, combat capability, and mobility of its tactical units -- which should be at least as good or better on average than that of the belligerents' units and (ii) the *clear superiority* of its theater C3I facilities. In a net assessment, the field force's margin of superiority derives principally from its better training, discipline, leadership, intelligence, and communication.

Both types of defensive operations mentioned above require that key weapons of the defense be mobile -- although mobility of artillery fire can substitute partially for mobility of units. The second type of operation -- a fighting withdrawal -- imposes high mobility requirements on all force elements. None must be left waiting due to lack of dedicated transport. A shortfall in this regard will not only extract a price at the moment of crisis: It can exert a drag on an operation from beginning to end as commanders seek to compensate for the vulnerability of the force. In such cases, UN units might be able to avoid becoming literal hostages, but only by allowing an entire operation to fall hostage in a political-strategic sense.

A fighting withdrawal requires high-mobility screening and covering units able to fight from successive positions and effectively delay and disrupt an attacker. Defense of safe havens may also require forward screens, although the bulk of "deeper" defensive actions are

*Fixed-wing air power can also contribute significantly to defensive operations, of course. In cases where the aggressor has a capable air force, defensive air power may be essential. Nevertheless, we do not now propose the development of UN fixed-wing combat air units because (i) adding any significant complement of these would greatly increase cost and force complexity, and (ii) the reluctance of UN members to support man&ted operations is focused presently on ground power contributions, not air power.

conducted by artillery and helicopter units. Tactical counter-attacks are an essential element of any defense. In the case of peace operations forces, these actions would be limited mostly to short, sharp engagements under artillery cover and with the immediate goal of *convincing an attacking force to disengage.* The purpose of such actions could be to rescue a friendly unit in crisis or relieve pressure on a safe haven perimeter.

The UN field force might also resort to smaller-scale counterattacks while performing its protection and control functions. Usually the aim would be to compel an attacker to desist, not to completely destroy the attacking units. In some cases, however, both the political freedom and tactical necessity to press a counterattack will exist. An example is counter-battery fire aimed at a belligerent's artillery that has been shelling a protected area.

Peace operations of the sort we have in mind for the proposed UN force would not include theater-wide or operational-level offensives or counter-offensives -- such as Desert Storm. Thus, although the field force needs, for the reasons outlined above, some counter-attack or "shock" capability, this capability would constitute a relatively small portion of the force. In our view, the most efficient way of providing this capability is by folding it into cavalry units, thus producing "light armored cavalry." Limits on offensive action also imply a reduced requirement for long-range, self-propelled artillery -- reduced, that is, relative to the numbers employed routinely in modern warfare.*

* A force equipped to perform the functions outlined above in situations involving belligerents of middling capability would also have considerable offensive capability against smaller, lower quality forces. In rare cases the Legion might use this power in a concerted fashion. An example is a contingency in which a belligerent with limited capability and no popular base undertakes to routinely violate a mandate that is widely supporterted by both the local populace and other belligerents This example assumes that a *very substantial local majority* views the belligerent in question as a "criminal" or mercenary element, and that *no significant portion* of the population views the belligerent as representing their interests. In such a case the UN force might act to disarm and disband the belligerent, and do so without upsetting the essential consensual basis of the operation. It is important to recognize, however, that political leaders have a limited capacity to make such determinations in a disinterested fashion. Hence, whenever the UN force targets a belligerent for this type of action, it is entering upon dangerous ground Lest there be confusion: the effort to capture General Aideed during UNOSOM II *does not* meet the criteria set out above.

6.5 Summary of Force Structure Design Guidelines

Summarizing the clearest and most important of the design guidelines suggested by the preceding analysis, a UN peace operations field force should:

- Have tactical units with higher levels of protection and firepower than is common for modem light forces;
- Comprise units that are mechanized or motorized; in the case of motorized units, transportation assets must reside at the battalion level or below;
- Possess a higher proportion of cavalry units than is common for modem forces of comparable size; A sizable portion of these assets should be equipped to fulfill the function of a small, lightly armored strike force;*
- Possess dedicated antiarmor units employing vehicle-mounted anti-tank missiles to compensate for a relative paucity of tanks;
- Possess a higher proportion of special intelligence and engineering assets than is common for a modem force of comparable size;
- Possess more artillery than has been common for peace operations forces, but much less artillery of the *self-propelled armored variety* than is common for modem mechanized forces;
- Require few *attack helicopter* assets -- but more helicopters of the armed scout and antitank variety than has been common in recent peace operations.

Also relevant to force design is the requirement for rapid deployment. This, too, pushes US toward a middle-weight force.[84] Other aspects of peace operations reinforce this option and especially favor a design based on wheeled, not tracked vehicles.† The next section of this report applies these guidelines in suggesting a force design that also meets the quantitative requirement set out earlier: a capability to maintain a force of 15,000 troops in the field continuously, drawing on a base of approximately 30,000 deployable troops.

---

* As noted earlier, a *light* cavalry squadron played an important role in US operations in Somalia, which fully tested the units operational mobility and flexibility. Such units cannot, however, also play the role of light "shock" or attack units. For this role a somewhat heavier type of unit is required -- one with some capability against armor. Even with regard to the pure light cavalry role -- essentially reconnaissance, screening, and convoy duty -- the Somalia experience suggests that current US units are too lightly armed and too lightly supported: "Somalia indicates . . . that division light cavalry squadrons need to be more robust and self-sustaining." Vowels and Witsken, "Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry," p 30.

† The reasons for favoring wheeled vehicles are explored in *Appendix 1.*

7. A UN Legion for the New Era

In the proposed system, UN military field units -- the standing force -- would reside in two commands: Support Command and Forces Command In addition, the legion would have base, general staff, and central support elements. Forces Command would comprise 22,625 officers and troops; Support Command, 15,775 officers and troops. The base, general staff, training, and central support elements would add approximately 5,350 personnel. Thus, the proposed UN standing military would comprise 43,750 personnel in all. Of these, 32,650 would be "deployable," allowing the legion to field up to 16,350 troops continuously. (The 11,100 non-deployable personnel would include base and central support elements, general staff, trainers, and trainees.) The proposed UN legion would constitute a military establishment somewhat larger than Denmark's and Norway's, but smaller than Portugal's and Singapore's. It would be approximately 2.5 percent as large as the present US military.

7.1 Units of the Forces Command

At the heart of the proposed UN standing force would be motorized and light mechanized infantry battalions and light mechanized and light armored cavalry squadrons. A variety of other combat units, mostly of company size, would complement these.

Units of the Proposed UN Forces Command

4 Brigade headquarters
5 Motorized Infantry battalions
4 Light Mechanized Infantry battalions
3 Light Cavalry squadrons
2 Light Armored Cavalry squadrons
6 Self-propelled Mortar batteries
3 light 155-mm Artillery batteries (towed)
4 Light Mechanized Antitank companies
6 Combat Engineer companies

6 Air Defense batteries
2 Armed Scout Helicopter squadrons (18 aircraft each)
1 Troop Transport Helicopter squadron (24 aircraft)
4 Signal companies
4 Field Intelligence companies
4 Military Police companies
6 Reconnaissance and Surveillance platoons (3 RPVs each)
12 Field Security sections
multinational Field Communication and Liaison teams (400 personnel, aggregate)

Filling the primary personnel slots for these units would require 15,400 tactical troops and 3,000 support troops (organic to the tactical units).* (The tactical troops would belong to Forces Command; the support troops, to Support Command.) Also, associated with these primary tactical and support "slots" would be approximately 4,600 rotation or replacement slots. (There would be additional personnel supporting the field force, but they would not be organic to the tactical units. *Section 7.2* gives additional details on field logistics arrangements.)

The force has four, large brigade headquarters. These should have sufficient staff (say, 200 personnel) to permit them to function as field headquarters for an operation commanding four or five maneuver battalions -- that is, the equivalent of one-half division. *Thus, the full set of UN brigade headquarters would have the capacity to command fifty percent more units than the United Nations would actually possess under this plan.* The brigade headquarters should also be designed with a capability to lend "staff modules" to UN battalion and even company headquarters so that these might be reinforced and operated independently in the field.

The concept of "modularization" informs the legion's design. Although the quantity of units in the aggregate force is consistent with four brigades, the units would only occasionally deploy in brigade-size packages. The proposed legion would have the capability of deploying

* Our use here of the term "tacticalt" is idiosyncratic. Tactical personnel in this usage are comparable to those personnel in regular armies who serve in combat and combat support roles as opposed to service support roles. We avoid the term "combat" because it suggests that these units and their personnel have warfighting as their primary purpose. For clarity it is also worth noting that in common usage "combat support" refers to units involved directly in combat activities but in roles supporting the action of what we have called "core" or maneuver units. Hence, artillery, engineer, air defense, military police, and signal units, for example, are combat support units. Service support units, by contrast, do not fight; instead, they sustain and maintain those units who do. In this proposal we call the latter elements, simply, support units.

multifunctional force packages ranging in size from 500 to 15,000 troops. And, as noted above, the legion's field headquarters would have the capacity to command and partially support another 9,000 or so troops of a UN member state participating in a legion-led operation. Of course, the legion's units also could deploy as part of a field force commanded by a UN member state, member-state coalition, or regional organization. Such deployments could involve a multifunctional UN military contingent or smaller tactical and logistical units in support of member-state continents. *More so than any member-state military,* the UN legion would be oriented toward working within multinational arrangements.

In the proposed design the *primary tactical units* are infantry battalions (motorized and mechanized) and cavalry squadrons (light and light armored). All would be based on wheeled vehicles. The light armored cavalry squadrons would incorporate 33 light, wheeled tanks each. As suggested earlier, all infantry have some organic means of mobility -- none are simple foot infantry. Also in line with the earlier discussion, cavalry units are present in a much higher proportion than would be expected for a typical mobile force of this size.*

A variety of *combat support elements* complements the primary units. To permit maximum flexibility, these are mostly of company (or battery) size or can deploy as such. Among these, four light mechanized antitank (missile) companies supplement the antiarmor capability that the light armored cavalry brings to the force.

The *armed scout helicopter squadrons* can also serve to provide troops with light fire support, in addition to performing their primary scout role. Equipping the aircraft of one of these squadrons with antiarmor missiles would allow it to assume a secondary antiarmor role as well. The troop transport helicopter squadron would incorporate 24 helicopters, each with a load capacity of 18-plus tons. Some of the motorized infantry units could also train to rely on this mode of transport Similarly, several antitank companies, light cavalry companies, and artillery batteries could train for air mobility.†

* During the final years of the cold war the practice of US NATO Fifth and Seventh Corps was to balance infantry and armored battalions with divisional and corps-level cavalry squadrons on a 4:l basis. By contrast, cavalry units constitute almost 36 percent of the maneuver units of the proposed UN legion.

†The proposal to configure some artillery units for a degree of air mobility derives from a concept developed by Lutz Unterseher. See Unterseher, Carl Conetta, and Charles Knight, *Confidence-building Defense: A Comprehensive Approach to Security and Stability in the New Era* (Cambridge, USA: Commonwealth Institute, 1994), pp 19-24.

Two unusual elements are the *Reconnaissance and Surveillance platoons,* which are equipped with remotely piloted vehicles, and *the Field Communication and Liaison teams.* The first augments the tactical intelligence gathering capacity of the force. The second provides the means of linking UN units closely with the units of member-state armies. Liaison teams will facilitate cooperation and permit either incorporation of UN units into a member state's field force or inclusion of member-state units in a force led by a UN field headquarters. Also noteworthy *are the* legion's dozen *Field Security* sections. These are small, two-vehicle units designed for escort duty and site protection. They can operate and even deploy independently of larger units, although their mission capabilities are strictly limited.

Tables 6 and *7* present aggregate equipment holdings for the proposed legion. Detail on the structure, composition, and equipping of battalions and companies appears in *Appendix 1.*

Table 6. UN Legion Inventory of Major Weapons

Vehicle-mounted weapons	
105-mm tank guns	66
30-mm automatic cannon	186
Anti-tank guided missiles	175
106-mm recoilless rifles	30
81.mm mortar	75
120-mm four-tube mortar system	36
155-mm howitzer, towed	18
Air defense cannon system	36
Air defense missile system	36
Heavy or medium machine guns	621

Dismounted weapons	
tight machine guns	360
Light antiarmor missile launchers	768
60-mm mortar	30
Automatic grenade launchers	120
Portable surface-to-air missile launchers	84

Table 7. UN Legion inventory of Tactical Unit Vehicles *(a)*

Principal Vehicles	
Light tank	66
Special weapon vehicles	108
LAV, Light Armored Vehicle (12-18 ton)	806
ARV, Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (7-8 ton)	135
SLAV, Small tight Armored Vehicle (3-4 ton)	468
Ultra-light vehicle	54
Motorcycles	191
Other tactical ground vehicles (b)	1146

Tactical Helicopters	
Armed Scout Helicopters	36
Heavy Tactical Transport Helicopters (c)	24

Notes: (a) Includes all vehicles organic to tactical units; *(b)* Includes service support vehicles organic to tactical units; *(c)* Excludes 24 utility helicopters assigned to Support Command

Capacity for rapid deployment missions

A typical rapid-deployment task force might include a light mechanized infantry battalion, one self-propelled mortar battery, and one light cavalry troop (company). Personnel for such a task force would initially number approximately 1,200 troops, including some headquarters and general field support personnel. The initial deployment would involve about 160 vehicles, including support vehicles organic to tactical units. Among the deployed assets would be six 120-mm "salvo mortar" vehicles, 17 armored reconnaissance vehicles mounting 30-mm automatic cannon, and 28 LAVs mounting either 30-mm cannon, anti-tank missiles, or 81-mm mortars. Another 50 LAVs and SLAVs would mount machine guns.

Deploying this hypothetical task force would require less than 100 C-141 transport aircraft sorties. Given a "fleet" of 18 C-141s (and double crews), the task force could confidently deploy within six days to a site 5,000 miles from its base. Within another three days most of its field support organization (described below) could be in the theater as well.

7.2 UN Support Command and Field Logistics System

The UN Support Command comprises units that can provide field support in several areas of need: transportation, field supply, maintenance and repair, medical services, and general services (such as postal, commissary, and kitchen). The goal guiding the design presented here is a field logistics structure able to *continuously* sustain a field force comprising both UN and non-UN units that is slightly larger in size than a US Light Division, and also assist in the support of as many as 5,000 civilian operatives.

In most cases, civilian field units (eg, civil affairs, election monitoring, or constabulary units) should continue to rely on private contractors for most of their support needs. However, in situations characterized by high levels of political instability or persistent threats of violence, military units may be able to provide support more quickly and reliably. Also, where military and political (or civilian) operations combine, reliance on a single support structure can reduce friction. Usually in cases where civilian and military units share a support structure, the structure should be a military one. Otherwise, the vulnerability of commercial service providers will exert a potentially catastrophic drag on military responsiveness. Exceptions can be made for some components of the support structure located in secure rear areas and for operations in which the civilian component clearly predominates and the possibility of combat action -- even of a brief, tactical sort -- is low.

The proposed structure divides field support into three levels, moving inward from the points of communication (ie, airfields and shipping ports): (i) field logistics base, (ii) intermediate support units, and (iii) tactical level units. Tactical level units would be organic to the combat-capable battalions and companies of the field force. (However, the assets and personnel of these support units are included in the totals for the support command) Smaller operations could forego the intermediate level of support, dividing its functions among higher and lower units. Civilian field units participating in an operation could gain support easily from the structure by plugging-in at the level of the field logistics base or intermediate support units. At both these levels, supply stocks would exist, allowing for flexibility in meeting the needs of field units.

In the theater a Field Logistics Headquarters would be attached to the overall Field Headquarters and representatives of the logistics headquarters would participate in the Joint Coordination Cell, which includes representatives from all national contingents and civilian field agencies. Supply and logistics needs pass to the joint and combined Staff Task Force in New York -- or, more specifically, to the STF section in the proposed JCOD Office of

Field Support. This office would have the responsibility for coordinating the delivery of supplies to ports in the theater, where the Field Logistics Headquarters would assume control.

In Western military practice it is not unusual to provide a field force with logistics personnel in a ratio of one person for every two in forward tactical (or combat-capable) units. Although the typical pace of peace operations might lead one to expect a less generous allotment, the proposed support structure *exceeds* this standard ratio. This is because the Support Command is designed to provide field logistics support not only for the units of the UN Forces Command, but also for some civilian units and member-state military contingents -- thus lending greater capability, cohesion, and responsiveness to a wider range of UN operations.

The aggregate programmed strength of the support units organic to the tactical units of the UN Legion would be 3,000 personnel. The aggregate programmed strength of those field support units *serving the legion's tactical units but not organic to them* would be 6,000 personnel. These 6,000 would serve in the Field Logistics Bases and Headquarters and in the Intemediate Support Battalions. The Support Command would dedicate an additional 1,700 personnel slots to the support of non-UN units or contingents, military or civilian. These, too, would serve in Field Logistics Bases and Intermediate Support Battalions.

Associated with the 10,700 primary personnel slots just recounted would be 2,700 rotation or replacement slots. Finally, there would be 2,200 trainees and 175 central staff personnel. Thus, the personnel total for the Support Command would be 15,775 troops. The vehicle holdings of the support command would be,

24	medium utility helicopters (in addition to the troop transport helicopters held by Forces Command),
1,400	dry cargo trucks (of various load-bearing capacities),
240	tankers (fuel and water),
950	repair and recovery vehicles of all types, and
240	ambulances.

Approximately 1,000 of these vehicles are included in the Table 7 vehicle count because they are organic to the tactical units of the legion. *Appendix 2* provides greater detail on the organization and functioning of the proposed Support Command

7.3 Other Elements of the UN Uniformed Service

In addition to the units of the Forces and Support commands, the Uniformed Service would have several' other organizational elements:

- Central staff,
- Training corps,
- Central logistics organization,
- Bases and base support staff,
- Base medical staff,

Central Staff: This would include the Assistant Undersecretary for Uniformed Services, the Chief of Staff, and their personal staff. The AUSG would directly oversee an Office of Budget and Management. The Chief of Staff would oversee five offices: Personnel and Administration, Development and Acquisition, Doctrine and Training, Plans and Operations, and Logistics. Attached to the Office of Doctrine and Training would be the Training Corps.

Central Logistics and Medical Staff: Central Logistics would include large storage depots, vehicle parks, and repair facilities located on the legion's bases. The Central Medical Staff would attach to hospitals near the home bases that are capable of providing good care for combat casualties. This staff would also run base clinics and health programs, oversee special medical training, and facilitate the acquisition and delivery of medical logistics.

Bases: The United Nations would lease three or four basing sites in perpetuity from member states other than the permanent members of the Security Council -- a limit that Haynes and Stanley suggest for reasons of political acceptability.[85] Within this limit, the sites would be chosen to facilitate global reach. The tactical and support field units would colocate at the legion's bases along with the central logistics depots, medical facilities, and some training facilities. Each base would also host one or two of the field brigade headquarters. Base commanders would have a small personal staff and would each command several hundred base support personnel.

7.4 Personnel, Recruitment, and Training

Unit and Troop Rotation Scheme

For purposes of associating personnel numbers with structural units (battalions, companies, etc.) we need also distinguish between *primary unit-assigned personnel slots* and *rotation or replacement slots.* Every deployable unit of the field force, whether of a tactical type or support, has assigned to it replacement or rotation slots equal to 25 percent of its primary personnel requirement. This arrangement allows the units and their equipment to remain in the field for longer periods than their personnel, thus easing lift requirements and permitting both a more consistent field presence and a fuller utilization of unit equipment. There are limits to this type of arrangement and these have to do with (i) maintaining unit cohesion, (ii) ensuring a close training and working relationship between a unit's people and the machines they operate, and (iii) allotting sufficient time for the reconditioning of equipment. These factors preclude a full "double-teaming" of smaller units.

Primary unit-authorized personnel slots for the field force, both tactical and support components, would be 26,100 personnel. To these are added 6,550 rotation or replacement slots. Together these constitute the sum of deployable troops: 32,650. With a base of 32,000 deployable military personnel the United Nations could field 16,000 troops continuously, asking none to serve in the field more than six months per year on average. Employing the rotation concept (and assuming an annual casualty/disability rate of three percent), *units* could stay in the field 7.5 months per year, on average. This also means that the United Nations could occasionally ask units to serve for longer periods in the field or could occasionally maintain a larger proportion of the force in the field -- perhaps as many as 20,000 troops for one 12-month period every three years.

Total Personnel: Deployable and Non-deployable

The total complement of deployable personnel rests on a base of 5,700 non-deployable troops serving in central staff, central logistics, training, and base and medical support functions. An additional 5,400 nondeployable troops would be trainees. Adding deployable and nondeployable personnel gives a grand total for the UN legion of 43,750 personnel. *Table 8* (located at the end of this chapter) lists all major organizational elements of the proposed Uniformed Service and their associated personnel levels.

Recruitment and Training

All personnel should be volunteers recruited through a UN program operating in cooperation with member-state recruitment systems. Field officers would be recruited through this system as well, drawing at first mainly on those leaving national service. Officers could also rise through the ranks of the legion. As noted above, the UN legion would maintain its own small corps of training personne1, although the legion should also draw substantially on the training programs and assets of member states, as several analysts have proposed.[86] The legion's training program could also dovetail closely with that of the UN Military Advisory and Cooperation Committee outlined in *Section 4.*

7.5 Command Structure and Relationships

As discussed in *Section 5,* the legion's Chief of Staff would serve under a Deputy Undersecretary-General for the Uniformed Service, who would also oversee an Office of Budget and Management. The Chief of Staff would exercise direct authority over the central staff offices, the bases, and, through two Vice-Chiefs of Staff, the Forces and Support Commands. Although brigade headquarters would colocate at the legion's bases with the other field units, the brigade commander would not exercise administrative command over the bases or these units. Instead, separate base commanders would *control and coordinate* the activities of all units residing at their bases and would command the base support elements as well. The brigade commanders, who are the equivalent of US warfighting commanders, would assume command of units in the field. When in the field their immediate superior would either be the Secretary-General or a designated Special Representative of the Security Council. *When not deployed in a field operation,* actual command authority over tactical and support units would trace back from the units' immediate commanders to the appropriate Vice-Chief of Staff, Support or Forces command, who would delegate control to the base commanders.

These organizational and command arrangements (i) ensure that the brigade commanders and their immediate staff remain focused on operational issues, (ii) allow units of various types from different administrative commands to co-locate, live, and work together without friction. While the two commands, Support and Forces, would each retain principal responsibility for the development and readiness of their constituent elements, the authority of the base commanders would ensure that the activities of these elements are well-coordinated while they are "at base."

Two additional organizational networks would interpolate the UN Uniformed Service. The UN's operational commanders -- that is, brigade commanders -- would, together with the Chief of Staff (and perhaps Vice-Chiefs of Staff), form a small "Uniformed Service Oversight Board" to review the development and quality of the force from a perspective strongly representative of the operational chiefs.

The second network would be a loose form of regimental organization linking all commanders of similar units -- for instance, Motorized Infantry Battalions or Military Police Companies -- with each other and with appropriate sections of the general staff. The Chief of Staff would appoint one of the commanders of each of type of unit to serve as a Regimental Director for that type. Duties would include representing the needs of the "regiment" to the general staff and tracking the development and quality of the regiment. (Commensurate with these increased duties, there should be an increment in the size of the personal staff of unit commanders serving as Regimental Directors.) Within the general staff, the Office of Doctrine and Training and the Office of Development and Acquisition, for instance, might each have sections addressing the needs of the Motorized Infantry and sections addressing the needs of Military Police. The two networks would be brought together in a Uniformed Service Council, including the Chief and Vice-Chiefs of Staff, Brigade Commanders, and Regimental Directors -- approximately 30 officers in all.

7.6 Estimated Cost of the Legion

A precise calculation of the costs of developing, maintaining, and using the proposed legion is outside the scope of this report. However, a rough estimate is possible based on standard force costing models, which in several studies have been used to calculate the cost of notional UN standing units.[87] Unfortunately, the existing studies focus on notional forces that are much smaller, less varied, and less capable than the proposed one. Several base their estimates on the US Army's costing model, but this model reflects a design philosophy that emphasizes large-scale offensive action and denies a meaningful role for "middle weight" forces. Nonetheless, these studies and the Army's model can serve as general reference points for a process of rough estimation. The example of the German, British, and, especially, French ground forces are also relevant.

In our estimate, the cost of maintaining the proposed legion, *once it fully developed*, would be less than $2.6 billion per year (1995 USD). This estimate amortizes replacement costs for major equipment over 12-15 years and for facilities over 30 years. Approximately 25 percent

of the total annual cost would be for procurement and construction. Additional, incremental costs associated with field operations would not exceed an average of $900 million per year, assuming full utilization of the force: 15,000 troops in the field continuously. Hence, given full utilization, the total average annual costs for the legion would equal less than $3.5 billion -- that is, less than 0.5 percent of global defense expenditures.

During the legion's development phase the magnitude and structure of costs would be substantially different than during its post-development years. Notably, procurement and construction costs would concentrate in the legion's first years. However, several factors would mitigate the initial burden: first, the UN would not attempt to build a legion all at once, but rather brigade-by-brigade over a period of perhaps eight or ten years. Hence, the legion and its associated financial burden would phase-in gradually during this period. Second, the initial period of concentrated procurement and construction would be followed by a period of reduced procurement and construction because the legion's more expensive assets, including physical plant, would have service lives longer than ten years. As the differences in the service lives of the legion's assets asserted themselves, procurement and construction costs would spread more evenly across a period of 20 (or more) years; Hence, the initial bow wave effect would lessen.

The final factor mitigating start-up costs would be a one-time opportunity to purchase good assets second-hand as many of the world's armed forces reduce their size and decommission some of their military bases. (We exclude this factor, however, from our estimate of costs.)

A reasonable higher-range estimate of expenditures for procurement, construction, personnel, operations, and maintenance during the development phase (first ten years) is $2 billion per year *on average.* (Buying second-hand from member states could lower the annual expenditure during the first decade to $1.75 billion.) However, the mission capability of the planned force during this period would average less than 50 percent: no units would be available during the first year; all units would be available by year ten.

Throughout its second decade the legion would be available for use in its entirety. As a consequence of this, however, average annual baseline costs would be approximately $2.25 billion per year. During the second half of the second decade annual costs would rise again as the procurement holiday ended. Annual baseline costs should eventually stabilize around $2.6 billion. Incremental costs throughout these two decades would be a function of mission capable and force utilization rates, with an upper limit of approximately $900 million annually -- as noted above.

Table 8. Proposed UN Uniformed Service: Staff and Field Personnel

	Staff Size		Staff Type *(a)*	staff status *(b)*
Assistant Undersecretary for Uniformed Service				
Office of the AUSG	20		CIV/MIL	UN
Office of Budget and Management	20		CIV	UN
Subtotal		40		
Uniformed Service Division				
Office of the Chief of Staff	50		MIL	UN
Office of Logistics				
Office of Plans and Operations				
Office of Personnel and Administration				
Office Development and Acquisition				
Office of Doctrine and Training	1,100		MIL	UN
Subtotal		1,150		
Training Corps	600	600	MIL	UN
Forces Command Staff				
Office of the Vice-Chief of Staff	25		MIL	UN
Forces Command Central Staff	150		MIL	UN
Subtotal		175		
Forces Command Field Units				
Primary Personnel slots *(c)*	15,400		MIL	UN
Rotation/Replacement Personnel slots	3,850		MIL	UN
Trainees	3,200		MIL	UN
Subtotal		22,450		
Support Command Staff				
Office of the Vice-Chief of Staff	25		MIL	UN
Support Command Central Staff	150		MIL	UN
Subtotal		175		
Support Command Field Units				
Primary Personnel slots	10,700		MIL	UN
Rotation/Replacement Personnel slots	2,700		MIL	UN
Trainees	2,200		MIL	UN
Subtotal		15,600		
Other elements				
Base Command Staff	400		MIL	UN
Base Support Staff	1,600		MIL/CIV	UN
Base Medical Staff	400		MIL/CIV	UN
Central Logistics facilities	1,200		MIL/CIV	UN
Subtotal		3,600		
Uniformed Service Total		43,790 *(d)*		

Notes:= (a) Staff Type: MIL = Military, CIV = Civilian; (b) Staff Status: UN = Full-time UN personnel, SCND = Seconded militay
(c) Does not include support personnel organic to tactical units; (d) Includes 40 staff serving directly under the Assistant USG for Uniformed Service. These are not formally part of the UN legion.

Appendix 1. UN Forces Command: Organization and Equipment of Select Units

This section summarizes the organization and holdings of key tactical elements of the proposed UN legion. Included in this review are:

- Motorized Infantry Battalions
- Light Mechanized Infantry Battalions
- Light Cavalry Squadrons
- Light Armored Cavalry Squadrons
- Air Defense Companies
- Light Mechanized Antitank Companies
- Combat Engineer Companies
- Salvo Mortar Batteries
- Field Artillery Batteries

A1.1 Tactical Vehicles

The legion is built around a variety of armored wheeled vehicles of four types: a light tank, a multi-purpose light armored vehicle, an armored reconnaissance vehicle, and a small light armored vehicle. The force also employs ultra-light four-wheeled vehicles and motorcycles in tactical roles. Finally, there are several "special weapon" vehicles -- such as air defense vehicles -- and trucks for troop transport.

- The *Light Tank* should be wheeled and able to mount a 105-mm gun. It will not need the capability to fire accurately on the move because it will be used in the role of a tank destroyer and fire support tank. However, the need for good armor protection dictates a vehicle weight of 25-27 tons (US).

- The *Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)* will be used in a variety of roles -- as an Armored Personnel Carrier, Command Vehicle, and heavy reconnaissance vehicle -- and should *as a class* be able to mount a variety of weapon systems,

including 20-mm to 35-mm automatic cannon, heavy and medium anti-tank guided missiles, heavy and medium machine guns, and automatic grenade launchers. Although wheeled, the need for good armor protection and the capacity to carry 10-12 troops dictate a weight in the 12-18 ton range. On the lighter end of this range, detachable add-on armor would be necessary to ensure good protection. Although this is not the most efficient approach to armoring in terms of the trade-off between vehicle weight, interior space, and level of protection, there is one very good reason to go the "modular armor" route: a 12-ton vehicle, such as the US Light Armored Vehicle, will fit into a significantly greater proportion of available long-range cargo aircraft types than will the premier 18-ton vehicle, the German *Fuchs.*

- The wheeled *Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle (ARV)* will mostly serve in light cavalry units as the carrier of heavier weapons, which in this case are 30-mm automatic cannon and ATGMs. Although the crew would be small -- three or four soldiers -- and thus allow for a smaller carriage than the LAV -- armor protection should be in the upper range for this type of vehicle, as should the power train and suspension. These factors together probably dictate a weight in the seven- or eight-ton range.

- The *Small Light Armored Vehicle (SLAV)* is most prominent in light cavalry units as a lighter complement to the ARV, in motorized infantry units as a command and machine gun vehicle, and in a variety of tactical support units. Although it, like the ARV, would have a crew of three or four soldiers, it would carry lighter weapons (machine guns, mostly) and rely for protection more on its speed and smaller profile than on its armor. Nonetheless, it should be better armored than the American jeep substitute -- the High-mobility, Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle -- because it will be expected to perform in some platoons as the core combat vehicle.* These factors dictate a weight in the three- or four-ton range.

***** The US Army and other users of the HMMWVs are taking steps to improve protection through kits of add-on armor. Those deployed to Somalia had some protection from composite armor made of aramid-fiber laminates, but this proved insufficient. Although many lighter vehicles may require some armor enhancements in order to serve safely in today's peace operations, add-ons are inefficient and the HMMWV starts out at the low end of the protection scale. RM Ogorkiewicz, "Armouring Vehicles for Peacekeeping," *International Defense Review* (February 1994), pp 34-35.

- The ultra-light vehicle serves solely in a fast reconnaissance role in light cavalry divisions. Its primary attributes should be small size, high speed, and great agility in difficult terrain. Although mounting a medium machine gun, it should not be considered a fighting vehicle *per se.* As such, a small unarmored jeep could fill this role.

The decision to base the force on wheeled vehicles reflects several considerations:*

- Wheeled vehicles are lighter; thus, they facilitate strategic mobility. Also, their logistical requirements are relatively modest. This, plus high road speeds make for good operational mobility.

- Modern wheeled vehicles can efficiently mount all the weapon types essentially to peace operations -- including howitzers with six inch barrels and direct fire guns up to 105 millimeters.

- On roads and in cities wheeled vehicles provide unparalleled speed and agility without damaging roadbeds. If modem and well-designed, wheeled vehicles can also met the need for off-road mobility in peace operations, which is less than in combat operations.

- Heavy, tracked vehicles are too destructive of the physical environment. Where local consent is key to operational success, but by no means assured, the routine operations of the field force must cause as little damage as possible. This can be viewed as an extension of the "minimum necessary force" principle.

- Wheeled vehicles compensate for their relative deficiency in armor protection through their speed and agility. In operations where large-scale offensives are precluded and the "clash of armor" is not central, but where long-range and

***** This technology choice reflects the analyses of German defense expert, Lutz Unterseher. For his views, see Unterseher, *Military Stability and European Security -- Ten Years from Now*, PDA Research Monograph 2 (Cambridge, USA: Commonwealth Institute, 1993), Appendix D; and, Unterseher, Conetta, and Knight, *Confidence-building Defense: A Comprehensive Approach to Security and Stability in the New Era*, pp. 79-80. For additional perspectives, see Enrico Po, "Light Armoured Vehicles: Headed Where?," *Military Technology* (August 1993); Eanna Timoney, Wheeled vehicles unfairly criticized," *International Defense Review* (March 1993), letters to the editor, pp 237-238; and, Francis Tusa, "Light Armored Vehicles Outpacing the Big Guys," *Armed Forces Journal International* (October 1990), pp 61-62.

quick redeployment in the field is key, middle weight forces based on wheeled vehicles offer an optimizing trade-off between direct protection and mobility. Nonetheless, for the heavier portions of the field force, developers should choose those wheeled vehicles with the best armor protection available.

A1.2 Tactical Units

Motorized Infantry battalions

The motorized infantry battalions would be built primarily around trucks and Small Light Armored Vehicles (SLAVs) for personnel transport: approximately 45 trucks and 20 SLAVs would move the battalions' 650 combat troops, their personal packs, and weapons. Three armored reconnaissance vehicles mounting 30-mm guns and three LAVs mounting 81-mortars would lend fire support Another LAV would serve as a battalion command vehicle. 115 support personnel would be organic to the battalion and its core companies, and these troops would add 18 support vehicles to the battalion's total.

The battalion would have a simple structure: a headquarters and three companies. Each company would have four platoons and an expansible headquarters section to permit independent deployment of a single company. Although the four-platoon company is an unusual design, it reflects the wide span of control and influence that companies' may have to assume in peace operations. Companies gain extra flexibility from this additional articulation, but it requires stronger leadership on the company level. *(Figure 8* depicts the unit organization of the proposed motorized infantry battalions.)

Core platoons would have no vehicle-mounted weapons. However, for dismounted use, each would be equipped with three Light Anti-armor Weapons (LAWs), three Light Machine Guns (LMGs), and one Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL). The headquarters platoon of each company would add two SLAV-mounted heavy or medium machine guns, two SLAV-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles, two 60-mm mortars, and two portable SAM launchers. In addition, each headquarters platoon would have two motorcycles. (The motorcycles could be carried by SLAVs on protected brackets.)

The battalion headquarters would hold the battalion's only vehicle-mounted weapons "under armor": three ARVs armed with 30-mm automatic cannon. These would constitute a "heavy weapons" section. The headquarters would also incorporate a mortar platoon: three 81-mm

mortars on LAVs. Finally, the headquarters would possess two SLAVs mounting heavy or medium machine guns, two SLAVs mounting medium ATGMs, one unarmed SLAVs, one unarmed command LAV, and two motorcycles.

Motorized Infantry battalion, holdings and personnel:

3 30-mm cannon on 7-ton armored, wheeled reconnaissance vehicles
2 medium ATGMs on SLAVs
6 106-mm recoilless rifles on SLAVs
3 81-mm mortars on LAVs
8 heavy or medium machine guns on SLAVs
36 Light Machine Guns (LMGs), unmounted
36 Light Anti-armor Weapons (LAWs), unmounted
6 60mm mortars, unmounted
12 Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGLs), unmounted
6 portable SAM launchers, unmounted
1 command LAV, unarmed
4 SLAVs, unarmed
8 motorcycles
45 5-ton trucks for troop transport
18 additional vehicles for support and equipment transport

Combat personnel: 650
Support personnel: 115

Light Mechanized Infantry battalions

The light mechanized infantry battalions would be built around 70 LAVs equipped with a mix of heavy or medium ATGMs, 30-mm cannon, heavy or medium machine guns, and 81-mm mortars. Each battalion would also have five weapon-bearing and one unarmed SLAVs.

As in the case of the motorized infantry battalions, there would be three companies, each with four platoons, and an expansible headquarters. Battalion combat strength would be 680 officers and enlisted personnel. In addition, 135 support personnel would be organic to the battalion and its core companies. *(Figure 9* depicts the unit organization of the light mechanized infantry battalions.)

The core platoons would each possess four LAVs -- one mounting a 30-mm automatic cannon and three mounting heavy or medium machine guns. (A mounted automatic grenade launcher could substitute for one of the mounted machine guns.) For dismounted use, each platoon would also be equipped with three light ATGMs, three light machine guns, and one automatic grenade launcher. Each company headquarters would have three LAVs and one SLAV. One of the LAVs would mount a heavy or medium machine gun and two would mount a heavy or medium ATGM. The SLAV would mount a machine gun and carry a scout motorcycle on a protected rear bracket. For dismounted use the company headquarters would possess two portable SAM launchers.

The *battalion* headquarters would have six LAVs mounting ATGMs, 30-mm automatic cannon, and machine guns, and two SLAVs mounting machine guns. Unarmed headquarter vehicles would include one LAV and one SLAV. Attached to the headquarters would be two mortar platoons, together adding six 81-mm mortars on six LAVs. Organic support personnel would control 30 non-armored vehicles.

Light Mechanized Infantry battalion, holdings and personnel:

14 30-mm cannon on LAVs
41 heavy or medium machine guns on LAVs
(some of these LAVs could substitute grenade launchers)
8 heavy or medium ATGMS on LAVs
6 81-mm mortars on LAVs
5 medium or heavy machine guns on SLAVs
36 portable ATGM launchers
12 automatic grenade launchers, unmounted
36 light machine guns, unmounted
6 portable SAM launchers
1 command LAV, unarmed
1 SLAV, unarmed
4 motorcycles
30 additional vehicles for support and equipment transport

Combat personnel: 680
support personnel: 135

Figure 8. Motorized Infantry Battalion



Figure 9. Light Mechanized Infantry



Figure 10. Light Cavalry



Figure 11. Light Armored Cavalry



Light Cavalry squadrons

The light cavalry squadrons (battalions) would be built around armored vehicles in the five- to seven-ton weight class and a smaller complement of ultra-light vehicles -- motorcycles and fast, unarmored jeeps. The battalion would deploy three core companies based on the heavier vehicles, one fast reconnaissance company based on the ultra-lights, and a headquarters. The battalion would comprise approximately 360 officers and enlisted personnel in combat and command units and another 100 personnel in service support roles. *(Figure 10* depicts the unit organization of the light cavalry squadrons.)

Each core company would have four, four-vehicle platoons. Two would be built around SLAVs mounting machine guns; one would be built around ARVs mounting 30-mm automatic cannon; the fourth would be built around ARVs mounting ATGMs. The platoons of the core companies would operate in teams or task forces of four, six, or eight vehicles, allowing for various combinations of mounted machine guns, automatic cannon, and ATGMs.

Each core company's headquarters would add an ARV with a 30-mm cannon, an ARV with an ATGM, two SLAVs mounting machine guns, and two motorcycles. For dismounted protection the company headquarters would have two portable light anti-armor weapons and two portable SAMs. Another 12 light anti-armor weapons would be distributed among the company's platoons for dismounted use.

The ultra-light company would have four platoons, each with four vehicles, mounting medium machine guns. This company's headquarters section would add two more ultra-lights -- one mounting a machine guns, the other unarmed. Each platoon and the company HQ section would carry one light anti-armor weapon per vehicle for dismounted use.

The battalion headquarters would field a "weapons platoon" comprising four ARVs -- two with ATGMs and two with 30-mm cannon. It would also control two mortar units, each with three 81-mm mortars on LAVs. Finally, the headquarters would have two LAVs (one unarmed, the other with a machine gun) and four SLAVs (one unarmed, three with machine guns.) For dismounted use, the headquarters would possess four light anti-armor weapons.

Light Cavalry squadron, holdings and personnel:

17 30-mm cannon on ARVs
17 heavy or medium ATGM on ARVs
33 medium or heavy machine guns on SLAVs

17 medium machine guns on ultra-light vehicles
1 medium or heavy machine gun on a LAV
6 81-mm mortars on LAVs
1 command LAV, unarmed
1 SLAV, unarmed
1 ultra-light vehicle, unarmed
9 motorcycles, unarmed
64 light antiarmor weapons, unmounted
6 portable SAM launchers
18 additional vehicles for support and equipment transport

Combat personnel: 360
Support personnel: 100

Light Armored Cavalry squadrons

The light armored cavalry squadrons (battalions) resemble the light cavalry in organization: three core companies and one special company. Each of the companies has four platoons. Unlike the light cavalry, however, the light armored cavalry is built around much heavier platforms: LAVs and a wheeled light tank-destroyer (25-plus tons). The combat and command personnel complement would be approximately 680 troops. In addition, 140 support personnel would be organic to the battalion and its core companies, adding 35 vehicles. *(Figure 11* depicts the unit organization of the light armored cavalry squadrons.)

Regarding the core companies: three of their four platoons will field LAV-variants, mounting machine guns, 30-mm cannon, and ATGMs. Each of the three platoons will "specialize" in one of these weapon systems. The fourth platoon will field a light tank. In addition, the two platoons based on either machine gun or automatic cannon vehicles will each carry three light anti-armor weapons, three light machine guns, and one automatic grenade launcher for dismounted protection. As is the case with the light cavalry, the core platoons of the light armored squadron will operate in teams or task forces of four, six, or eight vehicles, allowing for mission-specific combinations of weapon systems.

The company headquarters would possess one tank, two LAVs, one SLAV, and one motorcycle. The two LAVs would mount an ATGM and 30-mm cannon, respectively. The SLAV would mount a machine gun. Attached to each company headquarters would be a

mortar section with two 81-mm mortars on LAVs. For dismounted protection the headquarters would have two light anti-armor weapons and two portable SAM launchers.

The "special" company in the case of the Light Armored Cavalry squadrons would be a light tank unit and have four platoons, each with four vehicles. The company headquarters would add another light tank and an ATGM-equipped LAV.

Finally, the battalion headquarters would field one light tank, nine LAVs, three SLAVs, and one motorcycle. Three of the LAVs would comprise a mortar platoon, carrying three 81-mm mortars. One LAV would serve as a command vehicle and be unarmed. The remaining five LAVs would mount one ATGM, two 30-mm cannon, and two machine guns. Two of the SLAVs would mount machine *guns;* the third would be unarmed. For dismounted protection, battalion headquarters troops would have four light antiarmor weapons.

Light Answered Cavalry squadron, holdings and personnel:

33 105-mm medium-pressure guns on 18-ton wheeled armored vehicles
17 heavy or medium ATGMS on LAVs
17 30-mm automatic cannon on LAVs
14 heavy or medium machine guns on LAVs
5 heavy or medium machine guns on SLAVs
9 81-mm mortars on LAVs
1 command LAV, unarmed
1 SLAV, unarmed
4 motorcycles
18 light machine guns, unmounted
28 light ATGM launchers, unmounted
6 portable SAMs
35 additional vehicles for support and equipment transport

Combat personnel: 680
Support personnel: 140

Select independent companies and batteries

Air defense companies would each field six 35-mm or 40-mm air defense cannon vehicles (armored, wheeled) and six SAM vehicles (armored, wheeled). For self-protection these would also incorporate four LAVs, each mounting a heavy or medium machine gun and carrying for dismounted use a light anti-armor weapon. To carry headquarters troops and electronic support equipment each company would add five unarmed APCs and one unarmed SLAV, Approximately 120 officers and enlisted personnel would constitute each company' s combat cohort. Another 30 personnel and six vehicles would provide support

Light Mechanized anti-tank companies would each field 12 LAVs equipped with heavy, multiple tube, anti-tank guided-missile launchers. These companies would also each incorporate four other armed APCs, mounting heavy or medium machine guns. The headquarters section would add one unarmed APC and one unarmed SLAV. Approximately 110 officers and enlisted personnel would constitute each company. Another 30 personnel and four vehicles would provide support.

Combat engineer companies would possess 15 special vehicles for heavy excavation, construction, bridging, mine laying, and mine clearing. In addition, for self-protection each company would possess four armed LAVs -- two mounting machine guns, two mounting 30-mm cannon, Unarmed vehicles would include two SLAVs, two motorcycles, and another four LAVs. Each company would have 200 officers and enlisted personnel. Another 30 personnel and ten vehicles would provide general support.

Mounted "salvo mortar" batteries would each possess six mortar vehicles -- either trucks or "special built" versions of the LAV. Each vehicle would carry a four-tube 120-mm auto-loading mortar system that would be lowered to the ground pneumatically from the rear of the vehicle bed for firing. For self-protection each battery would incorporate two LAVs mounting heavy or medium machine guns and, for dismounted use, four light antiarmor weapons. Each battery would also field six artillery support vehicles, two unarmed LAVs, and two unarmed SLAVs. In the field the batteries could divide into two sections of three mortar vehicles each. Combat personnel would total 115 officers and troops. Another 30 personnel and six vehicles would provide general support

Field artillery batteries would each include six 155-mm light, towed guns. These guns should be able to maneuver under their own power over short distances. Twelve 5-ton trucks, four LAVs, and two SLAVs would serve to tow the guns, act as artillery support vehicles, or provide protection. For purposes of unit security, two of the LAVs would mount

a heavy or medium machine gun. As in the case of the mortar batteries, each battery would have for dismounted use four light anti-armor weapons. In the field the batteries could divide into two sections of three howitzers each. Combat personnel would total 115 officers and troops. Another 30 personnel and another six vehicles would provide general support.

A1.3 Tables of Equipment

Table 9. Weapon Holdings of Selected UN Legion Battalions

	Motorized Infantry	Lt Mechanized Infantry	Light Cavalry	Lt Armored Cavalry
Number of Units in Force	5	4	3	2
Vehicle-mounted weapons *(per unit)*				
105-mm gun				33
30-mm automatic cannon	3	14	17	17
ATGM (Heavy or medium)	2	8	17	17
106-mm recoilless rifle	6			
81-mm mortar	3	6	6	9
Heavy or medium Machine Gun (MG)	8	46	51	19
Dismounted weapons				
LMG, Light Machine Gun	36	36		18
LAW, Light Antiarmor Weapon	36	36	64	28
60-mm mortar	6			
AGL, Automatic grenade launcher	12	12		6
SAM, portable Surface-to-Air Missile	6	6	6	6

Table 10. Vehicles of Selected UN Legion Battalions

	Motorized Infantry	Lt Mechanized Infantry	Light Cavalry	Lt Armored Cavalry
Number of Units in Force	5	4	3	2
Light Tanks				33
LAV, Light Armored Vehicle	4	70	8	58
ARV, Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle	3		34	
SLAV, Small Light Armored Vehicle	20	6	34	6
Uitra-light vehicle			18	
Motorcycle	8	4	9	4
Other vehicles (a)	66	30	18	35

Notes: (a) Unarmored vehicles including service support organic to units

Table 11. Weapons and Vehicles of Selected UN Legion Tactical Units

	Air Defense company	Antitank company	Mortar company	Field Artillery battery	Combat Engineer company
Number of Units in Force	6	4	6	3	6
Vehicle-mounted weapons *(per unit)*					
Air defense cannon system	6				
Air defense missile system	6				
ATGM (heavy or medium)		12			
120-mm mortar system, four barrel			6		
Light field howitzer, 155-mm				6	
30-mm automatic cannon					2
MG (heavy or medium)	4	4	2	2	2
Dismounted weapons					
LAW	4		4	4	4
Principal Vehicles					
Special weapon vehicles	12		6		
LAV	9	17	4	4	8
SLAV	1	1	2	2	2
Motorcycles					2
Other vehicles (non-armored)	6	4	12	18	25

Key: MG = Machine Gun; ATGM = Anti-tank Guided Missile; LAW = Light Anti-armor Weapon; LAV = Light Armored Vehicle SLAV = Small Light Armored Vehicle; SAM = Surface-to-Air Missile.

Table 12. Weapons and Vehicles of Selected UN Legion Tactical Units

	Military Police company	Signal Company	Field Intelligence company	Brigade Field HQ	Recce & Surveillance platoon	Field Security Section
Number of Units in Force	4	4	4	4	6	12
Vehicle-mounted weapons						
30-mm automatic cannon			*			1
MG (heavy or medium)	12	4	4	8	1	1
Dismounted weapons						
LAW		4	4	8	2	2
Principal Vehicles						
LAV	6	8	8	12	1	
ARV						1
SLAV	12	8	8	12	4	1
Motorcycle	8	4	4	6		1
Other vehicles (non-armored)	6	8	8	12	3	

Key: MG = Machine Gun; LAW = tight Anti-armor Weapon; SAM = Surface-to-Air Missile; LAV = Light Armored Vehicle; ARV = Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle; SLAV = Small Light Armored Vehicle.

Table 13. Weapons and Vehicles of Selected UN Legion Tactical Units

	Armed scout Helicopter squadron	Tactical Transport Helicopter squadron
Number of Units in Force	2	1
Helicopters	18	24
Ground Vehicle weapons		
30-mm automatic cannon	2	2
MG (heavy or medium)	2	2
Dismounted weapons		
LAW	4	4
Principle Ground Vehicles		
LAV	6	6
ARV	2	2
Small lightly armored vehicle	4	4
Other vehicles	30	30

Key: MG = Machine Gun; LAW = Light Anti-armor Weapon; SAM = Surface-to-Air Missile; LAV = Light Armored Vehicle; ARV = Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle.

Appendix 2. UN Field Support Organization, Personnel, and Equipment

The proposed design derives from common Western military practice, which tends to ensure a consistent flow of supplies and services from field bases to smaller tactical units throughout the duration of a campaign. In assessing the specific application proposed here, however, several special features of peace operations should be kept in mind:

- Although recent UN operations have been more challenging than those of the Cold War period, neither their pace nor volatility is as great as that of mid- and high-intensity combat operations. Short, sharp engagements may occur occasionally, but a capability to sustain protracted, theater-scope combat does not serve here as a planning objective.

- Peace operations are often quite small -- at times involving as few as 500 troops. Whereas typical military planning for combat operations often proceeds from the carp level -- 55,000 or more troops -- peace operations have seldom involved more than a division's worth of troops. However, small size does not free a field force from complex support needs. Indeed, small operations pose special problems for the &livery of services -- problems defined by the finite capacity to scale down complex support units to efficiently fit the needs of very small field forces.

- In peace operations, line units of a given size may receive responsibility for an area that seems unusually large by the standards applied in typical combat operations. Also, units may occasionally serve in relative isolation from each other and their base areas. A broad, continuous, and intensive area of control stretching from the rear to front lines, such as that established during the Gulf War, does not typify these operations.

The architecture of the proposed UN field support systems corresponds to the special characteristics of peace operations outlined above. Among the system's distinctive features:

- The system comprises support units or "nodes" at several levels in the field. Some support units are organic to larger tactical units, others serve a cluster

of tactical units without being attached to any one. Comparing the proposed system to typical field support organizations, it has more levels than would be expected for field forces of the proposed size. The articulation of the system allows greater responsiveness to the needs of individual tactical units, and also gives these tactical units greater freedom.

- Although modeled on Western field logistics systems, the proposed system shifts comparable support structures to lower levels of organization. Thus the types of structures commonly associated with ground force divisions appear in this model *in a scaled-down version* at the battalion level.

- The system has a modular structure, allowing those support elements not organic to tactical units to subdivide so that the system can reproduce itself in a scaled-down version. Moreover, it is designed to allow two of the proposed four levels of organization to combine into a single level. Thus, the system architecture allows for the provision of responsive and sophisticated support to relatively small field forces.

- Another relevant design goal for the proposed support system is a capacity to serve a field force somewhat larger than the UN legion and to extend support to some civilian units as well.

The proposed field support concept identifies four levels of service support: company-level, battalion-level, intermediate, and logistics base. These levels cross-cut five major categories of service support: supply, transportation, maintenance and repair, medical, and general.

A2.1 Organizational Levels of Field Support

Company-level Service Support Section (CS3)

Every company and battery of the UN force -- whether independent or a part of a battalion -- incorporates a service support section with specialists in all the service categories except “general.” However, at this level of organization the supply and transportation functions are minimally demanding; they comprise distribution management, inventory, and the

communication of support requests. Hence, most of the section's service personnel are focused on immediate maintenance and medical needs. The CS3 comprises 10-18 people.

Battalion-level Support Company

Each of the UN's field battalions and squadrons -- which include Motorized Infantry, Light Mechanized Infantry, Light Mechanized Cavalry, Light Armored Cavalry, and Armed Helicopter Scout units -- has associated with it a Battalion-level Support Company (BSC) of 60 to 80 people. The BSC comprise three small platoons or sections -- transportation and supply, medical, maintenance -- as well as a small headquarters section. The BSC coordinates closely with the CS3 units associated with the battalion's subordinate companies. In the event that one of these companies deploys as an independent unit, personnel from the BSC can either augment the CS3 of the deploying company or augment the BSC of another field unit that has agreed to provide field support for the detached company.

Although the Battalion Support Company resembles the company support units in several of its parts, it also has unique functions and characteristics. Because the unit serves a larger number of people, its medical support platoon (or section) can efficiently incorporate a greater degree of medical specialization. Moreover, because its location would be more secure and somewhat more static than that of company headquarters, it can offer a more supportive holding area for casualties. The medical platoon should include two or three dedicated field ambulances for retrieving and then evacuating the seriously injured Unlike the company support units, the battalion unit would also store some larger replacement parts for vehicles, provide some general services -- like mail distribution -- and possess a contingent of supply trucks for moving material to the companies. In general, the battalion support unit is a reception point and temporary holding area for goods arriving from higher support echelons.

Both the battalion and company support units remain with and service their "home" battalion or company even when it is not operationally deployed. In the case of the independent companies and batteries of the UN force -- artillery, air defense, engineering, and anti-tank -- a home-based BSC provides additional routine support for each category of unit When these companies or batteries deploy, personnel from their home-based BSC detach and deploy with them -- either augmenting their CS3s or augmenting a deployed BSC that has agreed to service the deploying company or battery in the field.

Intermediate Support Battalion (ISB)

In the flow of goods and services the ISB stands midway between the support units that are organic to tactical units and the Field Logistics Base, which is located at the point of communication -- airfields and ports -- with the home bases. The ISB is designed to serve a force equivalent in size to a brigade (2,000-4,000 troops) and, consequently, is itself much larger than the organic support units -- the BSCs and CS3s. Unlike the tactical support units, it is *essentially* static. (It should locate in a relatively stable area with the aim of remaining there safely for at least several months and usually longer.)

The ISB comprises 400-600 officers and enlisted personnel in five core companies -- supply, transport, medical, maintenance, general service -- and a headquarters company. The relatively large size and stability of the ISB defines its distinctive features:

- Its transportation and supply functions are performed by separate companies. It maintains a field storage depot with supplies and spare parts sufficient to support its client units' needs for two weeks in the case of most dry goods and one week in the case of fuel and ammunition. It also maintains a transport vehicle park

- Its maintenance facilities can perform most repairs short of complete engine and drive train overhauls for all ground vehicles of the UN force. The ISB also possesses a contingent of recovery vehicles -- tow "trucks" and transporters.

- Its medical facilities can support "emergency room" functions and emergency combat surgery procedures. Its medical staff manage routine health and inoculation programs for its client units.

- The ISB maintains a prepared and relatively secure helicopter landing site and keeps several transport helicopters on hand.

The ISB would also be the "lowest" unit designed to undertake routine support functions for civilian units and to closely integrate support units from cooperating non-UN field contingents.

Field Logistics Base (FLB)

The Field Logistics Base (FLB) co-locates with the field command for logistics in the communication zone -- that is, at the terminal point for sea and air lines of communication. It would be designed to manage and act as a foundation for an entire UN field operation of up to ten or twelve line or "core" battalions, including those of member-state contingents. The FLB would comprise approximately 1,200-1,800 officers and enlisted personnel. The main components of the field logistics base would be:

- Field Logistics Headquarters with subunits for supply, transportation, medical, maintenance, and general services;
- Control points for both air and sea lines of communication;
- Storage depots for dry goods, fuel, and ammunition;
- A park for supply trucks and a site for supply helicopters;
- Secure and protected equipment parks for the temporary storage of equipment in transit to forward units;
- A large maintenance center capable of all repair functions including overhauls and equipment modification;
- A well-equipped hospital with 200-300 beds;
- A full complement of general services including post office, cafeteria, and rest and relaxation facilities; and
- A company-size team for the management and maintenance of field logistics communications and information.

Vehicle Allotment

The proposed support system would make use of a wide variety of vehicles, all wheeled: 2.5-, 5-, and 10-ton supply trucks, fuel and water tanker trucks, recovery vehicles, ambulances, postal jeeps, and mobile repair stations. Perhaps seventy percent of these would normally reside at the level of the ISBs and the FLB; the remainder in the Battalion-level Support Companies. However, the general requirement for a field force of any size can best be appreciated if we count vehicles on a *per company* basis -- *this for purposes of calculation only*. For each tactical company deployed the logistics structure would require 12 trucks (of various load-bearing capacities), 2 tankers, 8 repair and recovery vehicles, and 2 ambulances.

A2.2 Functioning of the Proposed Field Logistics System

It would be the responsibility of the proposed UN JCOD Office of Field Support -- or, more specifically, the support section of the appropriate Staff Task Force -- to ensure the flow of supplies into a theater of operations. Once supplies arrive in a theater, their delivery becomes the responsibility of the Field Logistics Headquarters. Needs would be continuously assessed by the Headquarters and communicated to the STF. In turn, the STF would manage acquisition and strategic transport through its links with the larger JCOD Office of Field Support *(Sections 5.1* and *5.3* describe the organization and functioning of central support staff.)

Turning to the issue of managing logistics in the theater: the concepts driving the proposed system are "continuous resupply" and "mixed push-pull distribution." Although tactical units are expected to deploy to the field with some provisions already in hand, logisticians should plan to quickly establish their system and plug tactical units into it. Simply put, "continuous resupply" means that tactical units remain in the field while goods and services circulate to them.

The proposed logistics system would push standard resupply loads forward from the Field Logistics Base to the Intermediate Supply Battalion, rather than wait for requests to "pull" specific supplies forward. "Standard loads" would be defined in accordance with the number and type of units supported by the ISB and the pace of operations during each resupply cycle. The capacity of the ISB to hold and store some supplies provides a margin of safety during transitions from low- to higher-paced operations. During such a transition the FLB would surge supplies forward to rectify any draw-down of the ISB stores.

A simple "push" distribution relationship between ISBs and battalion-level support units is unrealistic, however. This, for several reasons: The basic tactical units are quite small relative to those used in standard military operations. Not only is their holding capacity limited, but their needs may fluctuate substantially during a typical supply cycle *independently of changes in the tactical situation.* A simple vehicle accident, for instance, could suddenly and temporarily drive their repair and medical needs far above routine requirements. A division-size tactical organization could easily and responsively absorb this rise in requirements using its organic assets. In the case of the types of field forces we are proposing, however, the ISB must be prepared to assume this role.

A second reason to modify the "push" distribution system involves the pace and intensity of peace operations, which could vary markedly and repeatedly over periods of two or three days -- swinging back and forth between calm and turbulence *independent of the UN*

commander's initiative. A "push" distribution system might try to contend with such a situation by alternating "high-intensity" and "low-intensity" supply loads. More than likely, however, the system would not be able to accurately or uniformly match the cycling -- thus producing a supply situation in the tactical units that fluctuates between shortage and overload. A more responsive and calibrated relationship is needed between the ISB and the units it supports.

On a routine basis the proposed Intermediate Support Battalion would push only food and water forward in standard lots. The ISB would stock its own field depots with supplies in accordance with assumptions about daily usage rates in the tactical units it serves. Moreover, it could prepare standard minimum lots for delivery down the line. (The standard minimum would differ according to an assessment of operational tempo.) However, the supplies actually loaded and delivered to tactical units would await a daily needs statement. This need not and should not be a precise inventory of need, but rather a request for some percentage of the standard minimum. As long as the battalion-level support company seeks to keep several days' worth of critical supplies on hand, and replenishment is possible within 24 hours, boom/bust cycles should be avoidable.

Tailoring the Field Logistics System to Specific Operations

The system proposed above (comprising a Field Logistics Base with 1,200-1,800 personnel, two or more Intermediate Support Battalions with 400-600 personnel each, and battalion- and company-level support units) is configured for operations involving between five and twelve reinforced battalions -- that is, between 3,500 and 12,000 "combat" personnel. Larger operations might require the expansion and then bifurcation of some units of the Field Logistics Base or deployment of two FLBs. In the more likely event of the UN conducting operations below the five battalion threshold, the system can be scaled-down in two ways:

- The subordinate units of the Field Logistics Base and the Intermediate Support Battalion could be easily divided in half, so that the FLB deploys with a strength comparable to a battalion (800 personnel) and the Intermediate Support Battalions &ploy with a strength roughly comparable to large companies (250 personnel). An FLB and two ISBs of this proportion would be well-tailored to support an operation conducted by three battalions and several independent companies -- a total of perhaps 2,500 "combat" personnel.

Smaller operations (involving 500-1,500 combat personnel) could be efficiently supported by collapsing the functions of the ISB into a further reduced Field Logistics Base. In this case, individual platoon-size elements (actually, small "task forces" combining sections from FLBs and ISBs) would assume responsibility for supply, transport, medical services, maintenance, and general services. The headquarters would be similarly sized, but other components -- control teams for ports and airfields, and logistics communication maintenance teams -- would be even smaller. The total logistics workforce not organic to tactical units might in this way be reduced to 300-350 officers and enlisted personnel. However, with a complement this small the general services available to personnel would be minimal, the medical services would not include an independent general hospital, and in-theater equipment overhaul or major modification would be impossible.

A2.3 Proposed UN Logistics Units in Aggregate

The proposed UN Support Command would incorporate enough battalion- and company-sized units to constitute two Field Logistics Bases and six Intermediate Support Battalions. Through a process of unit fission and fusion, as described above, this structure could support as many as three or four field operations simultaneously (depending, of course, on their size and complexity.) For purposes of training and exercises the Support Command also encompasses the organic service support assets of the UN's tactical units -- the Company-level Service Support Sections (CS3s) and the Battalion-level Support Companies (BSCs). In aggregate the proposed UN Support Command would include:

2 Field Logistics Base HQs
2 Supply Base Battalions (includes LOC and depot control teams)
2 Ground Transport Battalions (150 trucks each, including water and fuel)
2 Utility Helicopter Squadrons (24 helicopters, each)
2 Maintenance Base Battalions
2 Medical Base Battalions
2 General Services Battalions

6 Intermediate Support Battalion HQs
6 Supply Companies

6 Transport Companies
6 Medical Companies
6 Maintenance Companies
6 General Services Companies

35 Battalion-level Support Companies (BSC)
100 Company-level Service Support Sections (CS3)

The aggregate programmed strength of the support units not organic to tactical units would be 7,700 personnel. The aggregate programmed strength of the support units organic to tactical units would be 3,000 personnel. To allow for training, replacements, and rotation, another 4,900 personnel serve with the Support Command. These personnel perform home-base maintenance duties when their units deploy. Finally, the Support Command Headquarters staff adds 175 officers and soldiers to constitute a total of 15,775.

The vehicle holdings of the support command would be,

24 medium utility helicopters (in addition to the troop transport helicopters held by Forces Command),
1,400 dry cargo trucks (of various load-bearing capacities),
240 tankers (fuel and water),
950 repair and recovery vehicles of all types, and
240 ambulances.

Notes

1. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping,* report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992).

2. Among the most important and influential analyses of peace operations are:

- John Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces," *Survival* (Autumn 1994);
- Adam Roberts, "Crisis in Peacekeeping," *Survival* (Autumn 1994);
- Gene M Lyons, "A New Collective Security: The United Nations and International Peace," *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1994);
- William H Lewis, ed, *Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead,* McNair Paper 25 (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, November 1993);
- Thomas G Weiss, New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace, *Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1993);
- Roberts, "The UN and International Security," *Survival* (Summer 1993), pp 3-30;
- David Wurmser and Nancy Bearg Dyke, *The Professionalization of Peace Keeping,* United States Institute of Peace Study Group Report, eds, Robert B Oakley, Indar Jit Rikhye, and Kenneth M Jensen (Washington DC: USIP, 1993);
- Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 1992);
- William J Durch and Barry M Blechman, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order* (Washington DC: Henry L Stimson Center, 1992);
- Richard Connaughton, *Military Intervention in the 1990s: A New Logic of War* (London: Routledge, 1992); and,

  Lt Col Dennis Dimengo, Lt Col David Fagan, Cmdr Jan Gaudio, Cmdr Dennis Sande, Lt Cmdr Charles Zingler, *The Sword and the Olive Branch: Military Advice for United Nations Peacekeeping,* National Security Program Policy Analysis Paper, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Cambridge: JFK School, 1995).

3. For a more detailed accounting of these problems, see John S Bremmer, "The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping -- a Canadian Perspective," *International Defense Review* (1995 annual), p 116; Richard Connaughton, "Giving the UN power to keep the peace," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (27 January 1994), p 28; Lt Co1 Timothy L Thomas (US Army, retired), "The UN's Vietnam?," *Military Review,* (February 1994); Roberts, "Crisis in Peacekeeping," pp 93-120; and, Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security," pp 3-30.

4. For a comprehensive review of planning problems related to UN operations in Cambodia and Somalia, see US Government Accounting Office, *UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions,* Chapter 3, "Limits on UN Capacity to Plan, Logistically Support, and Deploy Peacekeeping Operations," (Washington DC: GAO, December 1993). Also, *see* Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping," *International Affairs* (July 1993).

5. For a review of some of these difficulties,- *see* Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping," *Survival* (Autumn 1994); US GAO, *UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions;* and, Wurmser and Bearg Dyke, *The Professionalization of Peace Keeping.*

6. US GAO, *UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions,* Chapter 4, "Limits on UN Field Coordination and Authority"; and, Roberts, "The Crisis in Peacekeeping," pp 112-113.

7. For a trenchant examination of problems in operational flexibility, see Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces," pp 16-163; and, Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generatio Multinational Operations," pp 120-122.

8. For an analysis of the difficulties inherent to *ad hoc* coalition operations *see* Roger H. Palin *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects,* IISS Adelphi Paper 294 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995); and, John Heidenrich, *Why US Conservatives Should Support a UN Legion,* Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph 3 (Cambridge: Commonwealth Institute, 1995), pp 12-17. For an analysis focusing specifically on the Somalia experience, *see* Col Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995).

9. Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping: Issues of US Military Involvement,* Congressional Research Service Issue Brief (Washington DC: CRS, January 1995), p 10. For perspectives on current and past US policy regarding delegation of authority over US armed forces, *see* "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), the White House, Washington DC, May 1994; and, Edward F. Bruner, "US Forces and Multinational Commands: Precedents and Criteria," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 93-436 F, 21 April 1993.

10. Palin, *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects,* p 18.

11. Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned,* p 5.

12. Capt Gregory Harper (USN), "Creating a UN Peace Enforcement Force," *Fletcher Forum* (Winter/Spring 1994), p 52.

13. Boutros-Ghali reviews some of these shortcomings *in An Agenda for Peace.* The US GAO report cited earlier, *UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions*, also analyzes the impact on operations of member states failing to adequately fulfill their pledges of support.

14. Roberts, "The Crisis in Peacekeeping," p 117.

15. For summaries of the 1994 reorganization of the DPKO, *see* Pamela Reed, J. Matthew Vaccaro, and William Durch, *Handbook on United Nations Peace Operations,* Stimson Center Handbook 3 (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), pp 7-9; "Composition and Organization of UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Military Technology* (December 1994), pp 68-69; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping," *Military Technology* (December 1994), pp 70-82; and, Dimengo, *et al*, *The Sword and the Olive Branch,* epilogue, pp 73-79.

16. Wurmser and Bearg Dyke, *The Professionalization of Peace Keeping.*

17. *ibid,* p 42.

18. *ibid*, p 44.

19. *ibid*, p 43.

20. *ibid*, p 45

21. *ibid*, p 45.

22. *ibid,* pp 45-46.

23. *ibid*, p 45.

24. Articles reviewed include John Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces"; Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," in William H Lewis, ed., *Peacekeeping: The Way Ahead,* McNair Paper No. 25 (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1993); and Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations."

25. Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces," p 161.

26. *ibid*, p 161.

27. *ibid*, p 161.

28. *ibid*, p 163.

29. *ibid*, p 163.

30. Mackinlay, "Problems for US Forces in Operations Beyond Peacekeeping," p 35.

31. Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces," p 161.

32. *ibid,* p 166.

33. *ibid,* p 168.

34. Jim Whitman and Ian Bartholomew, *The Chapter VII Committee - A Policy Proposal: Military Means for Political Ends - Effective Control of UN Military Enforcement,* Global Security Program, Cambridge University, August 1993.

35. *ibid,* p 6.

36. *ibid,* p 18.

37. *ibid,* p 21.

38. *ibid,* p 31.

39. *ibid,* p 24.

40. *ibid,* p 26.

41. *ibid,* p 20.

42. *ibid,* p 26.

43. Dimengo, *et al, The Sword and the Olive Branch: Military Advice for United Nations Peacekeeping,* p 2.

44. *ibid,* p 3.

45. *ibid,* p 19.

46. *ibid,* p 21.

47. *ibid,* p 22.

48. *ibid,* p 26.

49. *ibid,* p 50.

50. *ibid,* p 56.

51. *ibid,* p 57.

52. Edward J Dennehy, *et al, A Blue Helmet Combat Force,* National Security Program Policy Analysis Paper 93-01, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Cambridge: Kennedy School, 1993).

53. *ibid,* p 14.

54. Indar Jit Rikhye, *Strengthening UN Peacekeeping: New Challenges and Proposals* (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace, May 1992), p 48.

55. Dennehy, *et al, A Blue Helmet Combat Force,* p 24.

56. *ibid,* p 19.

57. *ibid,* p 24.

58. *ibid,* p 19.

59. Mackinlay, "Improving Multinational Forces," p 168.

60. Lukas Haynes and Timothy W Stanley, "To Create a United Nations Fire Brigade," *Comparative Strategy* (Volume 14, Number l), p 9.

61. For an excellent summary of recent standing force proposals and the response to them, see Heidenrich, *Why US Conservatives Should Support a UN Legion,* pp 20-35.

62. Sir Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Militatary Force," *New York Review of Books,* 10 June 1993, p 4.

63. James Meacham, "From peacekeeping to peacemaking: The United Nations faces a changing role," *International Defense Review* (March 1992).

64. Haynes and Stanley, "To Create a United Nations Fire Brigade," p 7.

65. *ibid,* p 12.

66. *ibid,* p 14.

67. *ibid,* p 14.

68. Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, "A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade -- A Preliminary Study," January 1995.

69. Jonathan Dean, "Peacekeeping and US National Security," draft, p 12.

70. *ibid,* Appendix, p 3.

71. Lt Colonel Timothy L Thomas (ret.), "The UN's Vietnam?", *Military Review* (February 1994).

72. *ibid,* p 55.

73. For other analyses of the US strategic interests in peace operations, see Heidenrich, *Why Conservatives Should Support a UN Legion;* and, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1995: US Security Challenges in Transition* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), Chapter 13, "Peace Operations."

74. For a thorough review of the operation, see Michael Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate,* International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). Also, *see* GAO, *UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions.*

75. Major General Indar Jit Rikhye (ret), "UN Institutional Reform and Effective Peacekeeping Operations," in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping: Implications for the US Military* (Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, May 1993), p 22.

76. Co1 Karl Farris, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, A Success," *Parameters* (Spring 1994), p 48.

77. On the problems inherent in reliance on *ad hoc* multinational arrangements, see Heidenrich, *Why US Conservatives Should Support a UN Legion,* pp 12-17; and Palin, *Multinational Military Forces.*

78. Wlliam H Lewis, "Peace Operations: Is a Standing Force Needed?", *Strategic Forum* (Number 27, April 1995).

79. Public affairs announcement, "Netherlands' Non-paper on a UN Rapid Deployment Brigade," Netherlands' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, January 1995.

80. US Army, *FM 100-23 Peace Operations,* final draft, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, September 1994), Section 1, p 14.

81. "The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion," US Army Infantry School White Paper *in, Operations Other Than War: Peace Enforcement* (Fort Benning, Georgia: USAIS, 1993), p 6.

82. *US Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations,* p vi.

83. Mission taxonomies for peace operations can be found in US Army, *Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations; British Army Field Manual: Wider Peacekeeping,* third draft, Headquarters Doctrine and Training, 1994; Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping," *International Affairs,* (July 1993), pp 451-464; Mackinlay and Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," pp 116-118; and, Commander Martha Bills, USN, *et al, Options for US Military Support to the United Nations* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992).

84. For a thorough analysis of the value of "middle-weight" forces in a variety of contingencies, *see* Michael J Mazarr, *Light Forces and the Future of US Military Strategy* (Washington DC:

Brassey's USA, 1990). For more recent works with a specific focus on the trade-off between strategic mobility and combat capability, *see* Capt Allen Tiffany, "Proposed Rapidly Deployable, Tactically Mobile, Motorized Infantry Brigade," *Military Review* (February 1994), pp 74-77; Colonel Peter Herrly, "The Army's Light Divisions: Where Next?", *Military Review* (January 1994); and, David Segal, "Whatever Happened to Rapid Deployment," *Armed Forces Journal International* (March 1991), pp 39-40.

85. Haynes and Stanley, "To Create a United Nations Fire Brigade," p 14.

86. *See* Meacham, "From peacekeeping to peacemaking"; and, Haynes and Stanley, "To Create a United Nations Fire Brigade."

87. An overview of the standard cost model used by the US Army can be found in a publication of its Cost and Economic Analysis Center, *An Introduction to the Force Cost Model.* Recent efforts to cost notional UN forces include, Dr Jean Krasno, "A United Nations Rapid Deployment Permanent Force: Cost Analysis," report for the United Nations Studies Program of Yale University; and, Michael Burchett and Bernie Bean, "Costing a Notional UN Peace Force," CALIBRE Systems, Inc., Falls Church, Virginia.

Project on Defense Alternatives
Commonwealth Institute
186 Hampshire Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Telephone: 617/547-4474
Fax: 617/868-1267