Publications

Beyond pleasant lunches – How independent research and new ideas played a role in ending the Cold War: A retrospective on the years 1987-1989

by Charles Knight, 05 July 2026.  First published as a guest post at Van Jackson‘s Un-Diplomatic, ➪ full-text of PDA version: PDF

Gorbachev & Shevardnadze

This retrospective focuses on the work of one researcher/thinker from West Germany, Lutz Unterseher.  It follows the migration from West to East of his thinking and writing (and that of a network he organized) to Mikhail Gorbachev’s key foreign policy advisers.  Once there, this work likely played a role in shaping the particulars of one of the Soviet leader’s most consequential foreign policy decisions.

The story is told less for its historical value than for its value to all who work on the construction of new ideas.

  • In what circumstances do new ideas get noticed and made use of by powerful persons and institutions?
  • What types and levels of idea development are most likely to gain the attention of national leaders who tend to be relentlessly pragmatic?
  • What did the author of this retrospective learn while writing this article?

Remembering Congressman Barney Frank

Carl Conetta & Charles Knight, 22 May 2026

The Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) is saddened to learn of the passing on 19 May 2026 of former US House Rep. Barney Frank of Massachusetts – a brilliant and effective progressive voice in Congress for 32 years. Among his many accomplishments, Frank sought ways to better secure America at a lower cost and with less resort to force.

PDA worked with Rep. Frank most notably on the Sustainable Defense Task Force in 2010. Frank led the effort to ensure that debt-related budget cuts would be drawn 50% from the Pentagon budget in a safe and constructive manner. Characteristically, he reached across the aisle to build a bipartisan effort that included former Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) as a co-sponsor. We are honored to have supported him in this effort. The Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force can be found here: Debt, Deficits, and Defense: A Way Forward

The Future of the Tank

By Lutz Unterseher, guest publication, February 2026.  ➪ see full-text: HTML |  PDF

Renault M FT_17 tank (circa 1937)
 
In this paper, Unterseher surveys the evolution of anti-tank warfare—from artillery, mines, infantry weapons, and guided missiles to drones, precision munitions, and networked reconnaissance—and shows how modern defenses increasingly exploit top attack, long range, and coordinated fire. It then traces the tank’s history from World War I through the Cold War, emphasizing how armored forces repeatedly adapted to countermeasures and doctrinal change. The author concludes that large independent tank formations are less survivable today, especially under ubiquitous drone surveillance and precision fires, but tanks still matter when integrated into an overall defensive structure. The likely future is a battlefield with greater emphasis on networked defenses employing agile engineering, lighter forces, precise artillery, drones, and fewer tanks as time goes by.

The Ukraine War Prospect: How Peace Plans Might Work and Why They Will Fail

Carl Conetta, 12 January 2026 – Full text⇒ HTML – PDF

During 2025, multiple contending Ukraine peace and cease-fire proposals were put forward by the Trump administration and America’s European partners. This article examines how the leading official proposals fell short. And it presents two simpler proposals better aligned with battlefield realities. The article also explores the evolution of public opinion in the US, Ukraine, Russia, and Western Europe on the war.

The Russia-Ukraine war has been a disaster – not only for the two principal combatants, who together have suffered 300,000 deaths, but for the entire world. This fact drives the imperative to end this conflict forthwith via negotiated compromise. Yet, as the article shows, none of the official proposals embrace this imperative. Instead, all exhibit efforts to win advantage for one side or the other. They are instances of diplo-fare – war by means of diplomacy. As such, their aim may be rejection, not agreement, with an eye toward painting one’s opponent as intransigent and, in this way, build support for continuing the fight – or, in the case of President Trump’s preference, establish a pretext for US withdrawal.

The simplest proposals may be the most practicable, but these must reflect current battlefield realities rather than attempting to “correct” or “re-balance” them. This principle guides the independent cease-fire options suggested in this article. Otherwise, the article explores the possibility that Europe’s so-called Coalition of the Willing will respond to any serious fracture of Kyiv’s effort – a distinct possibility – by establishing a new nuclearized Europe-vs-Russia “central front” inside Ukraine. (With an Appendix summarizing the official November and December peace proposal texts.)

Variables of War

By Lutz Unterseher, guest publication, 01 January 2026.  ➪ see full-text:  PDF

This essay argues that wars do not result from immutable human nature but from political motives, cultural dispositions, and calculations of military opportunity.  Wars are, therefore, preventable. The essay presents a succinct causal model of war’s outbreak. ​

The formal causal argument:

  • War’s outbreak is treated as the dependent variable; the independent variable is a mix of expansionist or preventive motives and a supportive war culture that glorifies offensive action and soldierly virtues (the “cult of the offensive”).​

  • Because such motives and cultures often do not lead to war, a further “sufficient condition” is posited: leaders must judge that a rapid victory is feasible, casualties acceptable, and domestic opposition manageable, typically by identifying structural vulnerabilities or “open flanks” in the opponent’s posture.​

  • This feasibility variable is an intermediate link between motives/culture and war and is filtered through perceptions often distorted by ideology, institutional dysfunction, or poor intelligence.​

Empirical illustrations of opportunity and miscalculation:

  • Drawing on John Mearsheimer’s study of deterrence failure, the text notes that conventional deterrence often fails when states concentrate on offensive or counteroffensive preparations and neglect robust territorial defense, thereby offering exploitable weak points.​

  • The German offensive through the Ardennes in 1940 exemplifies this: France’s incomplete Maginot Line and the misdeployment of its most modern forces created an open flank that German armored units exploited, enabling a rapid breakthrough.​​​

Policy lesson: defense posture and gendered perceptions:

  • The author’s policy inference is that states should avoid inviting attack by concentrating forces for offensives and instead establish “defensive control of space”: dispersed, resilient, terrain‑using dispositions that leave no open flanks and sap an intruder’s speed and momentum, an idea linked to Confidence‑Building Defense concepts.​

  • Such structurally deterrent postures may be undervalued because of the gendered coding of offense as active and initiative‑rich masculinity, versus the coding of defense as inactive and passive femininity, leading offensive‑minded and sexist elites to discount the real capacity of defensive systems to frustrate attacks.​

“European Army”: A Thought Experiment

➪ see full post: PDF

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication (English translation), February 2025.

In nine concise pages, German military analyst Lutz Unterseher provides the strategic orientation, operational modalities, force allocations, institutional framework, overall personnel requirements for active duty and reserves, command organization, and armament composition of an integrated European Union armed force.  He then provides a budget for the component parts.  The total annual cost is €170 billion, 1% of EU nations’ GDP.

Unterseher concludes:

It is hardly accidental that the European Union was chosen as the political framework for this force model. Above all, that is because, given Trump-era U.S. policy, NATO in its Atlantic-partnership sense no longer exists. 

Whether a self-confident “Euro-NATO” can emerge under American pressure and attempts to sow division remains highly questionable. It does, however, seem wise to “carry over” NATO’s infrastructure and communication networks into the authentically European armed forces wherever possible.

see also: European Armed Forces of Tomorrow: A New Perspective, (printable PDF version) (HTML version) (Leicht gekuerzte deutschsprachige Fassung der Studie) by Lutz Unterseher. English version. PDA Guest Publication, 20 October 2003.

 

Tanks and Companions: a critical appraisal

➪ see full post: PDF

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA Guest Publication, LIT, Berlin, (English translation), 2025.

tanks and companions

From the author’s introduction:

This volume presents a collection of essays on the history and more recent developments of the battle tank and other armored platforms. In general, these contributions adopt a critical tone and occasionally resort to unvarnished sarcasm—after all, the aim is to keep a measured distance from what are ultimately instruments of killing—rather than to slip into the enthusiasm of an aficionado. Nevertheless, readers will find ample factual information and exploration of relevant contexts throughout.

The collection comprises essays published between 2000 and 2023. Some have been shortened or revised but are not fully updated, remaining true to the time of their initial publication. Because these are essay-style pieces, extensive scholarly apparatus has been dispensed with.

Ukraine: Options for a Confidence-Building Defense

by Lutz Unterseher, PDA guest publication, Berlin, LIT Publishing,  March 2024.  ➪ download (free) book: PDF

PDA is pleased to offer Lutz Unterseher’s book Ukraine: Options for a Confidence-Building Defense in English for the first time.

International politics looks grim for Ukraine — The country has lost the U.S. as its primary war sponsor.

Ukraine must discover and adopt new means to secure itself quickly.

This book offers a military security option for Ukraine that “helps people to help themselves.”

Untersher continues,

It is about self-sustaining, emphatically defensive military protection: without integration into a military alliance and suitable as a possible building block of an all-European security system.

For more about this book, see https://comw.org/pda/ukraine-a-future-with-a-self-sustaining-defense/

For a sketch of an all-European military security system see:  “European Army”: A Thought Experiment

 

Lift the Sanctions: The Principal Danger in Syria Today is Instability

Carl Conetta, 22 January 2025. Full text ⇒ HTML – PDF

The most critical international security goal regarding Syria today is the country’s stabilization – and that requires immediate and substantial aid and sanction relief. The question on which recognition of the new government should most hinge is whether it can achieve sovereign authority in the country and do so without the type of human rights abuses or cross-border militancy that pose a threat to regional peace. Given the urgency of stabilizing the country, the new government provisionally meets this criteria. Should it change course and pose a threat to regional peace, the international community can adjust policy accordingly.

Two outstanding challenges to sovereignty and legitimacy are the presence of foreign troops – Israeli, Turkish, and US – and the status of Kurdish areas. Especially acute is the triangular relationship among Damascus, Ankara, and Syria’s Kurdish community, which is among the issues addressed in this viewpoint. As for foreign troops: 15,000-20,000 currently occupy the country. Affirming Syrian sovereignty entails expeditiously withdrawing all those forces not explicitly invited by the new government.

A related concern is the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Syria, including the 40,000+ cadre, family members, and displaced persons interned in camps run by the Kurdish authorities. Going forward, the task of managing and combating IS remnants on Syrian territory should fall to Damascus, acting together with Kurdish and foreign partners as it sees fit. The threat that IS affiliates and aspirants pose to the United States and the broader international community have been and are most effectively addressed through measure of homeland security and law enforcement. Securing the US homeland does not require the ongoing deployment of US troops in Syria, which would inadvertently undermine the legitimacy of the new government

A Significant Change in Russian Doctrine on Nuclear Weapon Use

Carl Conetta, 26 Sept 2024. Full text ⇒ HTML

Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.

Putin verbatim: Ukraine’s Use of NATO Deep Strike Missiles Would Put West at War with Russia

14 Sept 2024. Full Text = HTML

Pres. Putin says that Ukraine’s use of Western long-range high-precision weapons to strike deep inside Russia would require Western satellite guidance and personnel support to “assign flight missions to these missile systems.” Thus, as he sees it, the West would be directly involved in such strikes, and this would put “NATO countries… at war with Russia.” Contains full official statement.

Why the Biden Cease-fire Proposal Will Not End the Gaza War Despite UN Approval

Carl Conetta, 12 June 2024. Full text ⇒ HTML

The proposal that the Biden administration attributes to Israel does not promise an end to the war, much less Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. While claiming to support the proposal, Prime Minister Netanyahu also asserts that “we have maintained the goals of the war, first of them the destruction of Hamas.” Is this consistent with the proposal? It is. How?

Brinkmanship and Nuclear Threat in the Ukraine War

Carl Conetta, 31 May 2023. Full text ⇒ HTML – PDF

Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.

Catastrophe: The Global Cost of the Ukraine War

Carl Conetta, 02 May 2023. see article ⇒ HTML or PDF

The war has been a disaster for Ukraine, but also a calamity for the world. This brief article provides a concise overview of the war’s profound global effects, beginning with the combatants’ cost in lives and treasure. Beyond this it assesses the war’s impact on global trade and economy; energy and food price inflation and their effects on poverty, hunger, and mortality; the redirection of humanitarian and official development assistance; the total sum of aid to the Ukrainian war effort, and the estimated cost of postwar reconstruction and recovery. Also examined is the war’s effect on global defense spending. The article also provides copious citations to support further inquiry.

Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

The probability of Russian nuclear use related to the Ukraine war is rising – but why?  Neither Washington nor Brussels fully apprehend the risk.

by Carl Conetta, 02 Feb 2023 – Full report: HTML or PDF  Summary: HTML or PDF

This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War

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by Charles Knight, 17 October 2022

The Ukraine War presents a more dangerous nuclear risk than the Cuban Missile Crisis and demands more careful rationality and restraint by Russia and the US. Can we Iskender nuclear capable missiledepend on that rationality and restraint? Probably not.

However, there are some things that the US and NATO can do to reduce the probability that Moscow will opt to use nuclear weaponry. This article lists those steps.

The article also explains why any remaining “stable mutual deterrence” between the US and Russia is presently extremely fragile. It concludes:

The US/NATO war effort in Ukraine must remain deliberately limited. Beyond that, we must resist the usual war fevers (beset with visions of victory over evil) that take nations toward total war.

Did NATO expansion prompt the Russian attack on Ukraine?

The short answer is “no” – but there is more to the issue than that. A closer look at the road to war illuminates paths to a negotiated end

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by Carl Conetta, 10 June 2022

 

With no end in sight, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an unfolding catastrophe for Ukraine, the region, and the world. Besides increasing battlefield death and destruction, the war and how it is being fought promise global economic recession, severe food crisis, a surging flow of refugees, pandemic revival, and a transnational flood of illicit military weapons and munitions.

This essay looks at the policies that shaped the contention leading to war, and that increased the likelihood of conflict. It looks at the effects of NATO expansion and military activism, the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, the disposition of Crimea, the rebellions in Ukraine’s east, the Minsk process, Putin’s revisionism, Russia’s security concerns, and how the USA and Europe responded to the intensifying friction between Moscow and Kyiv. Through closely examining the policies conditioning the conflict, this analysis aims to identify potential “exit ramps” for all involved.

Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses

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by Carl Conetta, updated 02 April 2022

How do the two sides in the Russia-Ukraine conflict compare in terms of personnel and equipment losses?  These seemingly objective measures are subject to an intensive propaganda war. This brief analysis examines multiple sources of data to find that the combatants are actually not far apart in the percentage of equipment attrition they have suffered. And Russian personnel fatalities are likely in the range of 3,500 (April 2). Contrary to the messaging of the two sides, both would seem able to sustain combat for a considerable time longer. Unfortunately, as Russian forces have transitioned to a heavier, more firepower-dominant mode of warfare, Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure are suffering more death and destruction. While this might argue for increased emphasis on war containment and diplomatic efforts, the most evocative messaging on the western side emphasizes Russian miscalculation and fumbling, Ukraine’s adept resistance, and the promise of war termination via increased investment in the war.

And so now… It’s war?

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by Carl Conetta, 21 Feb 2022

The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. The short essay examines them both, asking how did we get here? It concludes with the question: Is it harder to live with autonomy for the Ukrainian rebel areas than it is to face regional war?

Putin’s Next, Best Move – The Logic and Limits of Russian Action on Ukraine

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Carl Conetta, 14 Feb 2022

Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. A full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine seems unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed in the essay.

Resolving the Ukraine Crisis

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by Carl Conetta, 26 Jan 2022


The basic elements of a solution to the Ukraine crisis are ready at hand – and have been since Feb 2015. These are the provisions of the Minsk II Protocol. This Reset Defense blog post reviews the impediments to Minsk II implementation and suggests a way forward. The key to progress is cooperation among the outside powers supporting the Ukraine contestants (i.e., Kyivv government and rebels). These benefactors must make their material support contingent on the near-term implementation of Minsk II. Another key element missing from the current agreement is the provision for a substantial peacekeeping and monitoring force to oversee the demilitarization of the area, temporarily control its external and internal borders, and secure an election.

 

To End America’s Longest War the US-Korea Alliance Must Change

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by Charles Knight, initially published by the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, 22 December 2021.

This article reports on South Korean President Moon’s latest peace initiative, which has achieved an agreement “in principle” by the U.S., North Korea, China, and South Korea to negotiate an “end-of-war declaration.”  Recently, the U.S. appeared to have modified its nuclear disarmament approach, accepting that “step by step” is the realistic way to proceed.  A few article excerpts:

A step-by-step approach requires give and take, [implying] that the U.S. might ultimately have to settle for some tempering of the North’s nuclear arsenal rather than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID.)

…a strategy of waiting patiently for sanctions to force Pyongyang’s capitulation…overlooks how existentially critical nuclear weaponry has become in North Korea’s strategic calculus. Without an adequate national security alternative, Pyongyang will most likely choose to suffer indefinitely under the economic pain of sanctions, however severe.

Alliances cannot and do not last forever. To endure from one era to another, they must adapt and change. If Washington returns to old habits of leveraging its hegemonic will to control affairs on the Korean Peninsula, it may reap the unintended consequence of hastening the end of the alliance.

Afghanistan: What Just Happened? What Comes Next?

Can the United States escape the vortex of its 20-year war?

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by Carl Conetta, 09 Sept 2021.

This article assesses the calamitous end of America’s 20-year war and the effort of US interventionists to use public distress about the airport chaos to blunt and distract from an adequate appraisal of the war that produced it.

The war was defined from the start by an impossible mission shrouded in misinformation. Intelligence agencies failed to give useful intelligence over a span of not just 4 months, but 20 years. And the article asks, Can we escape the political and strategic dynamics that produce and sustain such wars?

It concludes by examining how some Western powers are now looking to continue the conflict via other means. Against this, the author proposes a stability-oriented approach that would energetically explore areas of possible US-Taliban cooperation, a new positive context in which areas of difference might be productively addressed.

Afghanistan: The Fog at the End of the Tunnel

 

see full-text: HTML or PDF   

by Carl Conetta, 19 June 2021

What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan?

The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors were also used to explain why the date may be moved back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why.

An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage.

What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.

They made a desolation and called it “A Good War”

 

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By Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 04 February 2021.

This article (with extensive bibliography) surveys, at the 20-year mark, the consequences of the US regime change, occupation, and nation-building exercise in Afghanistan. Drawing on US DOD and congressional research agency reports, media investigations, and NGO analyses it anchors the broad public impression of full-spectrum failure. It reviews the human and financial costs of the war, the failures of reconstruction, and the ongoing dysfunction of Afghan governance.

America’s debacle in Afghanistan, which echoes the Soviet failure during the 1980s, indicates that nations are not the type of thing that can be built according to a foreign blueprint, and especially not at the point of a gun. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to prevail. Indeed, their very presence is provocative, especially given differences in language, religion, and culture.

Why is withdrawal so difficult? The article concludes that domestic political and institutional considerations are more important than any strategic rationale or cost-benefit analysis. Once committed, no political or military leader, nor the Pentagon cares to own responsibility for failure. And hubris generates an endless succession of imagined “new paths” to success. But as success proves forever elusive, so does withdrawal. In a perverse sense, it is persistent failure that keeps America mired for decades in this and other desultory wars.

Principles for Building Confidence and Stability into National Defenses and International Security – toward sufficient, affordable, robust, and reliable defense postures

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by Charles Knight and Carl Conetta, 01 February 2021 (revised 15 March 2022.)  

Adapted from Carl Conetta, Charles Knight, and Lutz Unterseher, “Building Confidence into the Security of Southern Africa,” PDA Briefing Report #7. Commonwealth Institute, 1996.

balanced & stable

By bringing military structures into line with defensive political goals, the non-provocation standard facilitates the emergence of trusting, cooperative, peaceful political relations among nations. In contrast, any doctrine and force posture oriented to project power into other countries is provocative — unless reliably restrained by political and organizational structures.

Michèle Flournoy reveals why US troops may stay in Afghanistan – indefinitely

by Carl Conetta, Reset Defense Blog, 3 December 2020

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“Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan,” USIP panel w/ Michèle Flournoy & Stephen Hadley. 18 Feb 2020

Commentary on “Ending Our Endless War in Afghanistan: Washington Perspectives on a US-Taliban Agreement” – A US Institute of Peace panel w/ Michèle Flournoy and Stephen Hadley, February 18, 2020

Korea versus Korea: Conventional Military Balance and the Path to Disarmament

by Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher, Lit Verlag, Munster, Germany, April 2020.

➪ full book PDF 

Chapter: “A Path to Reductions of Conventional Forces on the Korean Peninsula” by Charles Knight.

➪ read full English text:  PDF    or   ➪ Korean auto-translation (DeepL)

korea vs korea cover

Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship.   ~ Knight

Die Konfrontation auf der Halbinsel, mit offensivir Oreintierung und Bereitschaft zur Praemption, impliziert Stabilitatsrisiken. Diese werden noch erhoht durch Entwicklung und Einfuhrung prazier ballistischer Raketen, welche die Illusion nahren, den Gegner im Konfilktfall ‘enthaupten’ zu konnen.   ~ Unterseher

Why Security Guarantees Are the Key to Solving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

by Henri Féron and Charles Knight, The National Interest, 27 June 2019.  ➪ PDF   ➪ HTML

NK women march

[To begin a process of reciprocal iterative conventional forces reductions] South Korea might announce that it would put into reserve status a few thousand of its Marines and then look for a reciprocating move by the North. It is not important that the move is of like kind. It could consist, say, in the standing down of a class of missiles or artillery. The point is that the move should signal something of value which can then be read to encourage another move by the other side.

Sustainable Defense: More Security, Less Spending

Final Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force of The Center for International Policy, June 2019. ➪ full report  PDF

Carl Conetta contributed analysis of the economic and climate change challenges, details of the threat assessment, the strategy, and the calculation of savings from recommended changes to force structure.

The United States must partner with other nations in addressing challenges like climate change, epidemics of disease, nuclear proliferation, and human rights and humanitarian crises. None of these challenges are best dealt with by military force. Rather, they will depend on building non-military capacities for diplomacy, economic assistance, and scientific and cultural cooperation and exchange which have been allowed to languish in an era in which the military has been treated as the primary tool of U.S. security policy.