核辩论
由编辑于02-03-2010
前言
辩论开始时，格雷格·梅洛的洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室研究小组写了2010年2月10日评论“原子科学家公报 。 我在此网站上张贴了他的解说，并写了一篇回应。 然后，我邀请的各种核裁军的努力和在核问题专家回应梅洛骑士交换的领导者。
在所有已经有十贡献者辩论，因为这涉及到很多重要的穴位，同意和不同意（请参见下面的列表）。 这是一个专家，活动家，以及更广泛的公民之间需要继续讨论。
此页面上按时间顺序我已编译的反应，他们的个人可通过页面顶部的标签，或按顺序在每个部分的底部导航按钮。
我添加了一个选择的其他相关帖子（标签：增补）结束时本汇编 - 单独的标签。
我鼓励你添加语音这场辩论，你应该移动这样做。 我会在这里发布任何信息，周到和尊重的观点。 使用本网站的接触形式提交你的作品。
编辑查尔斯·奈特
供款辩论时间顺序 -每个使用标签页面顶部的导航
格雷格·梅洛原来的解说，洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室的研究小组，在“原子科学家公报
查尔斯·奈特 ，替代性的国防项目，回应了梅洛评论
格雷格·梅洛查尔斯·奈特的意见作出回应
马丁·塞恩 ，美国因斯布鲁克，回应和在www.armscontrol.at阐述对梅洛的原解说
比尔·哈同 ，新美国基金会军火与安全倡议，回应了的梅洛骑士交换
保罗·英格拉姆 ，BASIC，梅洛骑士交换
乔纳森Granoff，全球安全研究所，回应了的梅洛骑士交换
托德精细 ，全球零，回应了的梅洛骑士交换
约翰萨克斯 ，一个宜居的世界理事会，回应了梅洛在原子科学家公报
Robert G. Gard , Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, responded to Mello in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Greg Mello responded to Isaacs and Gard in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Robert G. Gard and John Isaacs responded to Greg Mello in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Matthew Hoey , Military Space Transparency Project, responded to the Mello-Knight exchange
The Obama disarmament paradox
Greg Mello. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 10 February 2010.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox Greg Mello is the executive director and co-founder of the Los Alamos Study Group .
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Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama gave a speech that many have interpreted as a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.
Now, however, the White House is requesting one of the larger increases in warhead spending history. If its request is fully funded, warhead spending would rise 10 percent in a single year, with further increases promised for the future. Los Alamos National Laboratory, the biggest target of the Obama largesse, would see a 22 percent budget increase, its largest since 1944. In particular, funding for a new plutonium “pit” factory complex there would more than double, signaling a commitment to produce new nuclear weapons a decade hence.
So how is the president's budget compatible with his disarmament vision?
The answer is simple: There is no evidence that Obama has, or ever had, any such vision. He said nothing to that effect in Prague. There, he merely spoke of his commitment “to seek . 。 。 a world without nuclear weapons,” a vague aspiration and hardly a novel one at that level of abstraction. He said that in the meantime the United States “will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”
Since nuclear weapons don't, and won't ever, “deter any adversary,” this too was highly aspirational, if not futile. The vain search for an “effective” arsenal that can deter “any” adversary requires unending innovation and continuous real investment, including investment in the extended deterrent to which Obama referred. The promise of such investments, and not disarmament, was the operative message in Prague as far as the US stockpile was concerned. In fact, proposed new investments in extended deterrence were already being packaged for Congress when Obama spoke.
To fulfill his supposed “disarmament vision,” Obama offered just two approaches in Prague, both indefinite. First, he spoke vaguely of reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” It's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean. Most likely it refers to official discourse–what officials say about nuclear doctrine–as opposed to actual facts on the ground. Second, Obama promised to negotiate “a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] with the Russians.” As far as nuclear disarmament went in the speech, that was it.
Of course, Obama also said his administration would promptly pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an action not yet taken and one entirely unrelated to US disarmament. The rest of the speech was devoted to various nonproliferation initiatives that his administration planned to seek.
在7月8日，奥巴马和俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫宣布了他们的共同谅解，承诺各自国家战略运载工具介于500至1,100和1,500至1,675部署的战略核弹头，非常温和的目标得以实现，整整七年条约签订后生效。 共有库号将不会变更，使战略弹头可以从部署，并放置在一个预定可以有效。 条约不会影响非战略性核弹头。 它不会需要拆除。 正如在美国科学家联合会的汉斯·克里斯滕森解释，运载工具限制要求很少，即使有，从美国和俄罗斯的预期部署。
具有讽刺意味的是，它可能是退休PDF 4,000或以上根据莫斯科条约“及其他退休，由乔治·W·布什下令美国核弹头可能超过任何奥巴马在裁军方面。 至于储备和武器复杂，布什的愿望是远远比国会最终允许更加强硬。 真正的预算弹头在他过去三年在办公室下跌。 现在，行政部门和国会两院的民主党控制国会的约束是其缺席的情况下显着。 奥巴马主要似乎是“解除”是国会的阻力变化，一些相同的建议，布什发现很难授权和资助。
去年五月奥巴马派他的首份财政预算案向国会呼吁平面弹头支出。 当时，政府当局仍在朝着更换弹头的能力和扩展显示的测量方法。
这就是说，在去年的财政预算案白宫默认五角大楼的需求，要求资金的重大升级到B61核炸弹变种，其中一个刚刚完成了20岁以上的寿命延长方案。 该预算前一天发布了隆重的核战略审查军种委员会先前请求揭幕。 主席威廉·佩里，管理洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室，经常冷战夹具施莱辛格公司的管理委员会的成员。 [全文披露：佩里还对保荐人的公告董事会的成员。]
该报告的建议，增加开支和武器发展很快开始担任的聚集点国防鹰派肯定点的运动。 总体而言，它在很大程度上是一个结论性的拼贴再生冷战概念，完全缺乏分析，往往与事实不符。 但无论是白宫还是领先的民主党国会议员提供任何公共性或反驳其结论。
更主要的是，反对派在政府内部的核克制迅速摆脱其一贯的堡垒国家核安全管理局（NNSA），五角大楼战略司令部，有兴趣的玩家在国会两党。 此外，奥巴马左键布什任命的，而五角大楼在国家核安全局增加了一些熟悉的面孔从克林顿政府白宫的能力开发一个独立的问题的理解，留下了严重的问题，更别说现在的国会。
无论哪种方式，潜在的条约批准在白宫的思维肯定是一个主要因素。 参议院共和党人，如预期，所要求的重大核投资前考虑批准任何START后续条约。 民主党鹰派，尤其是强大的猪肉桶权益，在股权如New墨西哥参议员杰夫宾加曼的，也必须满足在批准过程中。 这所有的一切让奥巴马最新预算要求的一种“先发制人投降”核鹰派。 因此，不论总统有“远见”的裁军是无关紧要的。 什么是重要的是体现在预算请求和国会是否会赞同他们的政策承诺。
要求上规模的投资，应该是我们所有的人断然不能接受的。 全国乃至世界面临真正的世界末日的安全挑战，从气候变化和若隐若现的运输燃料短缺。 我们的经济非常薄弱，在可预见的将来仍将如此。 建议增加核武器支出，嵌入式因为他们在整体军事预算比自1940年以来，应该是一个号角，或任何社会服务的基本价值观，秉承这一新的政治承诺。
现在，这些价值观是严重威胁至少白宫的不确定，或不愿或无力争取，什么是正确的。
查尔斯·奈特的意见梅洛
梅洛做了很好的工作，解释为什么会出现在奥巴马政府废除核武器的进展不大。 此外，他也是一个不错的情况下，目前政府似乎要攻向喂养核武器的复杂程度大于布什能够。 谁愿意的思想！
但梅洛错过一对夫妇点。 其中之一是，他驳斥得太快奥巴马在布拉格表示废除核武器的愿望。 这几句话可能没有什么政策上的影响，但他们做标记返回到所有原子时代管理部门的花言巧语，直到乔治·W·布什明显摒弃了这样的愿望。 该说辞的价值是什么？ 主要是它提供了可信到那些谁废除周围组织 - 有价值的东西，但数量不多。
其次，梅洛指出，当奥巴马谈到了...
减少“我们的核武器在国家安全战略中的作用”，这是很不明朗，可能实际上意味着，即使这可能意味着什么。
其实，这种说法指奥巴马的相当具体，重要的东西。 美国几十年来一直在推进到一个前所未有的水平，常规力量优势超过所有其他国家（见伯纳德一FINEL美国常规军力的战略意义）。 此时美国可以预期会获得更具战略性的优势，如果它可以说服其他国家来参加处置核武器（这一战略公式的官方声明见拜登副总统于2010年2月18日在国防大学演讲 。）这的确是一个相当愿望！
此连接核霸主地位的传统优势，使我到梅洛的文章的其他缺点。 废除核武器国际（内）的安全系统没有重大重组将是不可能的。 为什么会避开俄罗斯或中国核武器或北朝鲜和伊朗放弃努力获得，而这些国家仍然完全受到美国常规打击？
流行的核裁军努力的领导几乎从来没有承认这一战略问题。 这是一个对不起自己的事业，因为它留下的一大障碍裁军问题的地方（甚至是意识计划的需要）来删除它没有计划。
不测一项协议，以废除核武器将要求美国先画了常规军事力量。 和并发深抽奖美国常规军力的，必须有一个建立的国际机构，它们可能占据了越来越多的全球安全责任。
这种转让的权力和责任，将可能发生的一天 ，但我们肯定不是目前这条道路上。 这是一个“变”，奥巴马没有追求的，甚至没有aspirationally的。
格雷格·梅洛响应查尔斯·奈特的意见
我觉得您的意见是非常优秀的。 让我开始第二个，我完全同意。 我们这里的工作[洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室研究小组强调核武器问题的部分原因是因为我们的地理，因此，政治，座位相邻的两个最大的核武器实验室。
为“全谱优势”，表达一种美好的愿望，在全球范围内的军事政策和投资所带来的核裁军的障碍，几乎可以肯定是不可逾越的。 核裁军是一个完全不同的国家安全概念比我们现在有一个完全不同的经济结构内部以及一致。 好消息 - 我认为我们要它好，它可能不会出现这样乍一看，因为我们没有其他的选择 - 是我们的帝国失败。
你的第一点，涉及到符号价值奥巴马的裁军报表的，也是健全的，但在这里，我认为象征性价值大大超过他的陈述中造成民间社会的被动和遵守。 可以而且应该被强制裁军工作已经自己的演员和部队缴械宣传。
虚伪的可能是真正的理想的敬意，但它不是领导，是不老实，在这种情况下，也不会产生任何有价值的东西。 此刻，它允许核武器编制做什么，它不能完成以前：提高生产能力，并提供更大，而不是较小，代言核武器所有方面的重大象征。
奥巴马的裁军愿望，所以被称为是一个微弱的回声，相比代言核武器使全喉。
（第二）奥巴马裁军悖论
马丁·塞恩。www.armscontrol.at，2010年2月10日。
http://www.armscontrol.at/?p=758
马丁·塞恩是一个国际安全讲师在大学，因斯布鲁克（奥地利）。 他的研究重点是对核扩散和反扩散，以及弹道导弹防御。
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格雷格·梅洛有一个社论版在网络上页原子科学家公报 “中，他认为，增加的资金用于核武器的联邦预算中请求奥巴马总统指出，一个没有核武器的世界的目标相矛盾。 现在，这里是我对自己的第二奥巴马裁军悖论：
读通过国防部的BMD审查报告的一天，两件事情引起了我的眼睛：
第一：合作，与俄罗斯联邦，该报告指出，“政府将继续限制美国弹道导弹防御拒绝任何谈判。”（第34页）这听起来像在上一节中，会有粗糙的岁月俄罗斯政治和军事精英的进一步进攻减少已多次联系进一步削减导弹防御协议（如果有共同的“俄罗斯到撤防反正”，参数记住，你应该删除由Pavel Podvig的博客，让自己信服的相反）
其次，更有趣：该报告还指出，美国需要把重点放在开发和部署
...都重定位和可扩展性的导弹防御系统。 重新定位的资产可飙升至一个地区在危机时刻，提供更多的功能，危害较大的威胁空袭大小。 此功能也将让导弹防御系统被带到承担地区相对迅速。 可扩展的资产可以集成到现有的区域架构。 （第27页）
此外，美国国防部打算
......发展'搞远程技术不仅包括发射远程传感器轨道数据也将上行数据的能力比“宙斯盾”雷达的其他资产。 这将允许，搞的威胁导弹拦截器，在更大的范围内。“（第22页）
在同一页上的插图显示了基于前瞻性的X-波段雷达和空基传感器提供的信息神盾舰。
好吧，现在这里是一个简短的通道2000年院长Wilkening的阿德菲纸 “弹道导弹防御和战略稳定”：
只有当上一线拦截器在飞行中的指导范围超出了他们的跟踪和火控雷达是THAAD或门牌[海军全战区]美国提供了大量的报道。 例如，如果早期获得准确的轨道数据在洲际导弹的轨迹由如升级位于在美国以外的或低SBIRS预警雷达传感器，这条轨道数据连通拦截器，在飞行中 ，然后假设THAAD的对洲际导弹的足迹增加一个圆圈，直径约1100公里。 这意味着10-12网站可以覆盖美国大陆。 在这些情况下，将需要三至四个门牌脚印。 目前，无论是THAAD也不门牌正在设计中，除了从他们的地面或海基雷达的接受跟踪飞行中的数据。 但是，如果SBIRS低部署，俄罗斯规划者担心最坏的打算可能会相信，上线的战区导弹防御系统拦截在飞行中使用它的轨道数据，可以引导作为一个未来的美国国家导弹防御系统的一部分，特别是如果在飞行中拦截器通信系统部署的系统。 [重点]
总的来说，这是很难想象，俄罗斯或中国愿意大大减少他们的进攻性武库，如果美国保留提高国土防空能力，通过重新定位和/或连接战区导弹防御系统与远程传感器。
比尔·哈同响应梅洛骑士交换
威廉·哈同是新美国基金会的武器和安全倡议主任。 他回答骑士梅洛交换意见，就核裁军和奥巴马政府 2010年2月15日。
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奥巴马的愿望超越了只是他在布拉格表。 他是在谈判一项新的核军备竞赛之中
削减条约与俄罗斯，一个可能的后续寻求进一步削减;他致力于追求批准“全面禁止核试验条约”和条约禁止生产制造炸弹的材料公开
（切断“禁止生产核武器用裂变材料条约”）;他举办了核安全峰会的国家分数工作计划，以确保或销毁“松散的核武器”和制造炸弹的材料，以及他主持的会议上，联合国安理会（第一美国总统这样做）强化裁军承诺，许多关键球员。
发生一些变化，美国常规部队（与俄罗斯和新的核安全的措施，例如新的削减）无重大重组。
一切外，将首先需要实质性的变化，查尔斯建议，不仅是在美国常规力量和姿势，但在南亚（印度和巴基斯坦），中东（以色列，伊朗和主机相关问题的区域政治安全动态，其中包括以色列 - 巴勒斯坦setttlement）。 提高消费对复杂的核武器，如当前的行动需要得到扭转。
许多这些因素很少或没有充分讨论许多 - 但不是全部 - “为零的倡导者。”
所以，我想我同意许多点由查尔斯和格雷格，但我不准备放弃核政策和姿势的一些显着变化的前景。 我的感觉是，我们应该鼓掌奥巴马的承诺，然后按住他，以他的话，而不是假定的进步是不可能的。
保罗·英格拉姆回应梅洛骑士交换
保罗·英格拉姆是英美安全信息理事会（BASIC）的执行董事。 他回答梅洛骑士交换意见，就核裁军和奥巴马政府 2010年2月15日。
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大家都知道，在这个艰难的世界的现实主义者核政治，它不支付是天真的。 什么是较少承认的是，全球性威胁的世界，也可以是同样危险的打一个极端的游戏零信任。
因此，我们必须去通过这个陌生和困难的世界，导航常数和一系列复杂的考虑计算，根据证据和以往的经验判断，我们可以相信什么，我们不能。 去尽可能多，对于我们这些试图影响决策者尽可能在外交政策决策的官员。
我一直惊讶的军事战略规划者的挑战时，是多么的幼稚的政治家出现。 所以，我说出这是一个例子，它显示，奥巴马总统真的想取得进展（不一定是在裁军，但可以肯定的防扩散），而即使在这里他得到的小路去落马 。
或者是他的战略正在发挥出充分认识。 梅洛先生是否认为他被欺骗性的布拉格讲话中，或只是有点可爱？
无论如何，目前的计划的资助，梅洛先生的亮点将肯定实现任何防扩散愿望，在即将举行的“不扩散核武器条约”非常困难，政府加强。 他们当然不似乎与裁军的承诺是一致的。
我衷心希望我是错的，并期待着听到一些的人在本届政府中的人，我非常尊敬的，如国家戈特莫勒大使赖斯和助理秘书长。
格雷格·梅洛响应乔纳森Granoff的
在你的其他有趣的地方，你提出这个问题：“梅洛先生认为他[奥巴马]被欺骗性的布拉格讲话中，或只是有点可爱吗？”我会说既不。 替代的承诺或承诺的愿望是一种修辞手段，所以一般不会出现这些问题。 两个扬声器和观众的期望某种仪式承认我们共同的心声。 这些愿望和我们的实际做法之间的差距是相当尴尬的，观众的许多成员正在寻找某种幻想两者之间的桥梁。 他们不想坏消息，他们希望“的希望。”
不知怎的，我们已经从“我会在每一个锅放鸡”到“我将寻求把一只鸡在每一个锅。”有问责制的第二个配方，这可能是在承包国家的前景的时候特别有用 - 在收缩，增加核军费我批评起着核心的象征作用。 我们的希望大于现实，为它们服务。 我们和我们的捐助者和支持者，希望圣诞老人。
托德精细响应梅洛骑士交换
托德精细组织和发展了全球零核运动为消除核武器的世界安全研究所担任项目官员。 他目前正致力于建立伊朗在普林斯顿大学的数据门户。 他回答骑士梅洛交换意见，就核裁军和奥巴马政府 2010年2月18日。
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奥巴马总统的极其慷慨的预算要求为核的武器实验室煮了酝酿已久的焦虑有关的具体政策的影响，他经常表示“视觉”“没有核武器的一个世界。”对齐在墙上突出的系列专栏文章日报，奥巴马重复这个热切愿望始终贯穿竞选总统，并在他的诺贝尔和平奖接受提名的演讲和2009年4月在布拉格发表讲话政策。
由于在实践中，这一愿景的野心，当然，现在明显严重前任罗纳德·里根在其成就的兴趣，这并不奇怪，长时间的倡导者们预期的政策建议，将明确地朝着这个方向努力。 然而，这些的预算数字信号整体回归。 他们将进一步制度化发展的新武器，将使重组对其他功能的实验室更加困难。
向倡导者的失败开始在修辞的根。 尽管欢迎信誉，他们都给予了反核的原因，社论版的作者 - 萨姆·纳恩，亨利·基辛格，乔治·舒尔茨，威廉·佩里 - 考虑其他国家如何看待我们的武器实验室的规模和活动的负担。 在2007年，美国反核游说者和活动家狂热地工作以阻止资金的可靠替代弹头（RRW）在国会与此同时，基辛格转发舒尔茨和胡佛研究员西德尼·德雷尔分析参议员皮特·多梅尼西配套投资该计划。 虽然纳恩宣布，他反对RRW，他示意他接受在实验室资金大规模增加，在四人的第三华尔街日报社论版，2010年1月19日。 不同于以往的专栏文章，这是别人的赞同，并踊跃大张旗鼓记者，这其中似乎临床设计给自己的声誉祝福即将到来的预算数字。
首席核谈判代表里根总统的领导下，最大坎珀尔曼，声称他最初促使乔治·舒尔茨返回淘汰的问题，也提出了一个大胆的路径为零，利用在联合国的多边进程。 事实上，阐述外交政策精英们之间的分歧，全球零核运动发起了一些与会者的不满，极端专注于短期的“台阶”，而不是明确的实用性舒尔茨为首的胡佛研究所（Hoover Institution）会议实现最终的目标。 之后，全球零核本身的政策方案已经透露即时多边化战略武器控制过程和别人谁建议美俄协议，长达数十年的系列扩展到多边进程的倡导者之间的分裂。
这些杂七杂八的部门之间的精英脱颖而出，在5月“不扩散核武器条约”审议大会的其他国家测试美国新发现的承诺裁军条约的既定目标。 鉴于涉及伊朗和朝鲜奥巴马在世界舞台上的活力和缩短窗口，如果总统不能激励他人采取他的“远见”，并努力消除具体解决目前的危机，他可能会错过一个独特的机会。 如果会议日期尚未批准“全面禁试条约”，尽管有其局限性，这是象征性的，这些预算请求就可能摧毁美国的信誉。 如格雷格·梅洛的逻辑表示，其他国家是不可能要遵循对条约开始规模留下深刻的印象，和那里是不是还没有任何迹象表明，的姿态检讨语言“的作用，”核武器将是该重大的实际影响。
为了缓和这些关切和真诚再犯的视野，也有一些政策建议，奥巴马政府可能会进入审查会议倡导：
1。 A funded international program that would initiate cooperative research into verification technologies and enforcement strategies that would be required in a world of “global zero.”
2。 The initiation of an international audit of all existing nuclear weapons and material.
3。 Sponsorship of initial discussions on a timeline for negotiations and targets involved in the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
However, as Charles Knight mentioned with respect to international concerns about the United States' superiority in conventional weapons, these actions would only be a start. Given the terrifying overall budget projections and the abject failure of our military contracting and procurement processes, the United States needs to reformulate its entire defense posture and budget. In order to convince states like Russia and China to approach low numbers of nuclear weapons, it might even be necessary to consider multilateral treaty restrictions on general conventional forces and on specific advanced weapons systems like Prompt Global Strike. If the elimination aspiration is sincere, then these concerns are unavoidable and should be seriously studied and contemplated.
Max Kampelman, the symbolic initiator of the present return to abolitionism, has spoken powerfully of what real leadership by an American president, especially when morally confident and unabashed, can accomplish. President Obama's rhetoric on the elimination of nuclear weapons apparently inspired some enough to award him the Nobel Peace Prize; if he is sincere, he owes it to the younger generation to present a clear path to elimination, if not in his lifetime, then in ours.
The Obama disarmament paradox: A rebuttal
John Isaacs and Robert G. Gard, Jr. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 24 February 2010.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox-rebuttal
John Isaacs : The executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Isaacs represents the center's sister organization, Council for a Livable World, on Capitol Hill. His expertise is in how Congress works, especially when it pertains to national security issues such as nuclear weapons and missile defense. Previously, he served as a legislative assistant on foreign affairs to former New York Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz.
Robert G. Gard Jr. : A consultant on international security and education, Gard is the chair of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation's Board of Directors. He also is a member of the Bulletin's Science and Security Board. Previously, he served as president of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and as director of the Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. During a military career that spanned three decades, he was an assistant to the secretary of defense and president of the National Defense University.
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Greg Mello's recent Bulletin article “ The Obama Disarmament Paradox ” distorts the Obama administration's nuclear agenda by making unjustified assumptions that discredit President Barack Obama's historic commitment to seek a nuclear-weapon-free world. Obama has committed to such a goal several times–both before and after his election in November 2008. But Mello calls that a “vague aspiration” rather than a commitment. Yet the evidence he provides to support his assertion isn't persuasive.
In fact, the president has advocated for numerous initiatives in a comprehensive nonproliferation program. These include winning UN Security Council endorsement for a nuclear-weapon-free world; negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia, which Obama considers an interim agreement toward further reductions; preparing a Nuclear Posture Review consistent with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy; pledging to secure all loose nuclear materials over a four-year period; and taking an active role at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.
As President Obama stated during his seminal Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is a long-term goal that might not be achievable in his lifetime, but that doesn't minimize the necessity of taking interim steps to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.
Mello sees Obama's requested increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget for stockpile stewardship and the construction of new facilities at the nuclear laboratories as a commitment to the production of new nuclear weapons. Yet the administration has made clear that there are no such plans underfoot; the 2011 budget request states unequivocally that “new weapons systems will not be built.” As such, the president's requested increase in nuclear expenditures should be viewed in the context of seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further nuclear weapon reductions.
较大，有没有一个无核武器的世界的愿景之间的不一致，并确保安全，安全，可靠的核威慑力量在过渡时期，包括翻新老化的系统，提供实验室设施，以取代其恶化物理植物，并保持必要的专业知识，科学家们在实验室提供。 也没有这样的威慑需要“永无休止的创新，”梅洛索赔。 我们目前的核武器库存，通过广泛的测试验证，是绰绰有余，以防止使用核武器对付美国，我们的军队在国外，和我们的盟友，提供足够的资源，致力于储备管理计划。
梅洛也似乎忘了，追求一个无核武器的世界，既是国家法律和国际法，美国已批准“不扩散核武器条约”的承诺，包括寻求核裁军。 更何况，该条约具有重要的现实空调组件：非核武器国家合作，“不扩散核武器条约”的核武器国家履行第六条规定的义务，走向全面的核裁军条约。
因此，一个无核武器的世界“愿景”是必不可少的，作为“各种防扩散倡议”在奥巴马的计划，以减少危险的威胁到我们的国家安全，例如，核扩散和恐怖主义的上下文。
不仅是著名的约翰·F·肯尼迪总统1963年6月进行核试验禁令在美国大学演讲，其言论，但其后续通过肯尼迪的话导致地上核试验的结束。 虽然它是合法的，是关于如何成功的奥巴马将在实施他的裁军议程持怀疑态度，让我们希望梅洛和其他人会迫不及待地想看到后续进展如何，才判断他过于严厉。 别的将是不公平的。
格雷格·梅洛响应约翰萨克斯和罗伯特·加尔：
一个“承诺”一个目标，一个喇叭说，他在他的一生中可能无法实现（更不用说在他的管理，只有有密切关系期间）是定义在最好的一种美好的愿望。 如果说，“承诺”是没有具体而明确的，它是模糊的。 这是奥巴马的几句话，在布拉格（自）有关裁军问题的。 一直没有明显的行动。
我很感兴趣 - 我们的行动和政府的 - 而不是“希望”。
您只需在您的回复，重申当局在这些问题上的主题。
If you look over what you wrote, you will see that you freely conflate disarmament with nonproliferation issues and initiatives. You're not alone; many people do. I suppose that's the idea. These are quite different things, obviously. Preventing others from acquiring a nuclear deterrent has precious little to do with getting rid of my own. I nowhere argue against sound, just, and legal measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.
I think you err significantly when you say “the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world is both national and international law.” It is the achievement, not the pursuit, of this goal that is a binding legal requirement, unanimously confirmed by the International Court of Justice. Attempting to substitute an alleged aspiration (and that ominously vague), for achievement is a big step down from logic and law, a grave political disservice. This is all the more true when this alleged aspiration comes from the very temporary leader of the world's largest and most aggressive military power, and is then followed by a very large increase in nuclear weapons spending.
I never said that a nuclear deterrent required “unending innovation.” I suspect we agree that the reverse is true. What I said was quite different: that the “deterrence of any adversary” to which Obama referred was unachievable, and therefore its pursuit implied unending innovation. I think investment itself, together with an ideology of technical “progress” – often expressed through fads like the quest for greater device “surety” – creates the hope that a “credible” nuclear deterrent, a deterrent that is relevant to “any” adversary as well as one that is “safe” and “secure,” can someday finally be achieved. Nuclear weapons will never be safe, secure, and they will never deter “any” adversary.
There's many reasons why our leaders engage in this kind of crazy talk, and none of them are pretty.
Disarmament aside, the warhead complex, especially at the physics labs, is riddled with waste and unnecessary programs and missions, which help drive down morale and scientific quality. I and many others believe the complex is grossly over-funded (by at least 40%) for the mission of maintaining the present arsenal indefinitely. Much smaller arsenals, right on down to zero, would be quite desirable from every perspective, and cheaper. The US arsenal can be unilaterally reduced to much lower levels without any loss of US “security.”
If Obama wants to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security, and expects anybody to believe him, he must actually do so. Instead, building thousands of significantly upgraded bombs (a process already underway) with new requests to develop and produce more kinds of upgraded bombs, and the factories to make them, isn't disarmament at all. It's the modernization of everything for the long run – warheads, delivery systems, factories, everything.
Robert Gard and John Isaacs continue the exchange:
It's gratifying to learn that Greg Mello agrees with us on the desirability of both sound measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and a “much smaller” US nuclear arsenal. For our part, we agree with him that the increase in funds programmed for the nuclear laboratories is excessive, although we don't see any inconsistency between ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile and reducing its size.
First, massive resources are at stake. With a cooperative security policy, the United States could cut the annual military budget… A peace dividend on this order is exactly what we need to revitalize the economy and meet the backlog of needs in housing, health, education, environment and economic infrastructure.
Second, the cooperative approach to security is prerequisite to stopping the global proliferation of armaments and arms industries. The prospect of proliferation has become the single greatest military threat to this country and to the world…
Third, the choice by the major industrial nations either to perpetuate a US-dominated international security system or to develop a more cooperative system will have far-reaching political ramifications at home and abroad… here in America, the change would help reverse the nasty mixture of cynicism, violence, and racism that has increasingly pervaded our society since the first Reagan Administration made increases in military spending at the price of national debt and deep cuts in domestic programs.
Last but not least, a cooperative approach to security is likely to be far more effective than the traditional approach in reducing the incidence and scale of war. Despite these enormous stakes, Congress and the Administration have, until recently, refused even to consider substantial cuts in post-Cold war defense spending, much less seize the unprecedented opportunity to develop a cooperative security system. [Randall Forsberg, "Defense Cuts and Cooperative Security in the Post-Cold War World", Boston Review , May 1992]
Should President Obama choose to accept this torch I believe that we can achieve the goals outlined in Prague within our lifetime.
Following are a number of posts relevant to this debate. They serve as reference, furthering the discussion.
Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic
Barack Obama. remarks, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic , 05 April 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/
摘录：
… as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.”
… the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.
Nuclear weapons debate takes new form
James Carroll. Boston Globe , 15 June 2009 .
摘录：
Prague was arguably the most important presidential speech in decades. Again, what made that resounding call for a new “form of the forms of thought” about nuclear weapons, was the president's starting point – an acknowledgment of special American culpability. “As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act.”
Odds Against Nuclear Disarmament
Charles V. Peña. antiwar.com , 29 July 2009.
http://original.antiwar.com/pena/2009/07/28/nuclear-disarmament/
摘录：
…a country can be a party to the NPT but decide that abiding by the treaty is no longer in its best interests and withdraw, which is exactly what North Korea chose to do in January 2003, claiming, “A dangerous situation where our nation's sovereignty and our state's security are being seriously violated is prevailing on the Korean Peninsula due to the US vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK.” Given that North Korea had been named a member of the axis of evil a year earlier and the United States was on the verge of invading Iraq (a non-nuclear power), it's perfectly understandable that the regime in Pyongyang might believe it was in the DPRK's “supreme interests” to no longer formally agree to be a nonnuclear power, ie, a pushover for regime change.
The NPT is not a universal treaty. There are 193 countries in the world, but not all of them are signatories to the NPT. The result is the so-called “D3 problem,” or the de facto nuclear states: India, Pakistan, and Israel. These countries were never part of the NPT regime and were thus able to develop nuclear weapons, because they are under no obligation to abide by the NPT. And it's not lost on the rest of the world – particularly the Muslim world – that the United States doesn't hold Israel to the same standard as Iran. Indeed, like previous presidents, Obama refuses to even acknowledge that Israel is a nuclear power.
…the NPT does not exist in a vacuum. It's impossible to ignore US foreign policy, particularly a proclivity for military intervention supported by Democrats and Republicans alike. Since the end of the Cold War marked by the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States has engaged in nine major military operations, but only one of those – Operation Enduring Freedom – was unambiguously in response to a direct threat to the United States. This is a powerful incentive for countries such as Iran and North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons as the only reliable deterrent against US invasion. As long as the United States continues to have an interventionist foreign policy (and the Obama administration has not overseen a sea change in US foreign policy), it will be next to impossible to prevent proliferation.
Together Toward Nuclear Zero: Understanding Chinese and Russian Security Concerns
Cristina Hansell and Nikita Perfilyev. The Nonproliferation Review , November 2009.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915796781&fulltext=713240928
摘录：
…if Chinese military experts decide that China needs the capability of a maneuvering warhead to evade missile defense interceptors, they may need to test the redesigned warheads. It is not clear that the Obama administration, however, will be willing to back down on missile defense in order to obtain Chinese agreement on a CTBT. 不过，如果没有“全面禁止核试验条约”，进一步裁军进展的可能性不大，“不扩散核武器条约”第六条规定的核武器国家承诺将不会被认真对待，由非核武器国家，未来的军备竞赛的可能性（策动在很大程度上是由担心美国的导弹防御系统和精确制导武器）增加。
A Roadmap for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons
Jared Gassen and Bill Wickersham. book chapter, November 2009.
Barry Blechman. New York Times , 18 February 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19blechman.html
摘录：
Here's how a global nuclear disarmament treaty could work. First, it would spell out a decades-long schedule for the verified destruction of all weapons, materials and facilities. Those possessing the largest arsenals — the United States and Russia — would make deep cuts first. Those with smaller arsenals would join at specified dates and levels. To ensure that no state gained an advantage, the treaty would incorporate “rest stops”: if a state refused to comply with a scheduled measure, other nations' reductions would be suspended until the violation was corrected. This dynamic would generate momentum, but also ensure that if the effort collapsed, the signatories would be no less secure than before.
Charles Knight responds to Barry Blechman
There is something missing in this measured disarmament scheme which invalidates it as a path to full nuclear disarmament. Blechman makes an erroneous assumption shared by too many nuclear disarmament advocates. He assumes that nuclear weapons are a class of weapons that can be dealt with in isolation from the problems of international security and insecurity. Nuclear weapons cannot be separated strategically from the context of the conventional military power they supplement.
Note the following phrase in the above excerpt from Blechman: “To ensure that no state gained an advantage…” His prescription applies only to nuclear weapons and presumes no adjustments to conventional military power. In those conditions some states stand to gain considerable advantage from nuclear disarmament.
Imagine the case of Russia in Blechman's staged draw down of nuclear forces with the US As Russia approaches zero nuclear weapons they become more and more vulnerable to superior US conventional military power.
Without parallel and compensatory reductions and adjustments in conventional forces and strong political assurances weaker nations such as Russia will never agree to give up all their nuclear weapons.
Careful schemes of balanced nuclear weapons disarmament of the type that Blechman argues for cannot by themselves get us to zero nuclear weapons. Compensating for the national insecurities arising from imbalances in conventional military power must be part of any formula for full nuclear disarmament. We need to work toward an international security regime that delivers the reassurance gained of at least fifty years without international aggression and military intervention. After that period of consistent international peace, nuclear nations may be ready to go to zero. This is the only path with any real chance of getting there.
Implementing the President's Prague Agenda: Vice President Biden's Speech at the National Defense University
Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University – As Prepared for Delivery, 18 February 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-national-defense-university
摘录：
Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies.
Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong.
Charles Knight comments on the Biden speech
When Vice President Biden speaks of plans to “further strengthen … preeminent conventional forces” with “capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield” and “conventional warheads with worldwide reach” he seeks to reassure his domestic audience that nuclear disarmament will not make America less secure.
His words, however, do not reassure other nuclear powers or potential future nuclear powers such as Iran who will perceive these enhanced American conventional capabilities as strategic threats to their national security.
Biden surely understands that he is not really offering us a pathway to nuclear abolition. We will not get there if other nations are expected to relinquish their nuclear arsenals to face “undeniable” conventional power from the US
If Biden's speech truly represents the elaboration of the “President's Prague Agenda” it leaves us with a very big gap (conceptually and practically) between the near term goal Biden articulates (“We will work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”) and the longer term goal (“We are working both to stop [nuclear weapons] proliferation and eventually to eliminate them.”) which President Obama confirmed in Prague.
Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century
Matt Eckel. Foreign Policy Watch , 01 March 2010.
http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/nuclear-weapons-in-twenty-first-century.html
摘录：
Though American leaders try not to say it out loud too often, one of the reasons Iran's nuclear program is unsettling to Washington is that it constrains the ability of the United States to topple the Iranian regime by force, should push come to shove. As a global hegemon, having the ability to wave our conventional military around and implicitly threaten recalcitrant middle powers with conquest is something America likes to be able to do. It's much harder if the recalcitrant middle power in question can credibly threaten to take out a couple of allied capital cities. Israel's nuclear program was originally founded on this logic, as was that of France.
Debate: Waiting for Obama's Policy on Nukes
Christopher A. Ford. AOL News , 05 March 2010.
http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-waiting-for-obamas-policy-on-nukes/19385644
摘录：
… but remarkably, for all his nuclear posing, no one knows what Obama's nuclear weapons policy actually is. So far, his administration has done little of real import. Obama seeks a modest new arms-reduction treaty with Russia but contemplates cuts that would not have been too shocking from the Bush administration — which, in fact, actually began these negotiations in 2006. The administration also wants to reattempt ratification of the nuclear test ban defeated in the Senate in 1999, although the treaty's Senate prospects are dimming. As a result, at this point Obama's “transformative” arms-control agenda looks like President Bill Clinton's from the mid-1990s.
Debate: On the Right Nuclear Weapons Track
Will Marshall. AOL News , 05 March 2010.
http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-on-the-right-nuclear-weapons-track/19385662
摘录：
Obama reasons that, by holding up its end of the bargain, the United States can strengthen global nonproliferation norms and intensify pressure on Tehran and other regimes that may be thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons. And as White House officials have stressed, the nuclear “zero option” is a policy aspiration, not something anyone believes is achievable anytime soon.
致命的电流走向核武器
James Carroll. Boston Globe , 15 March 2010. Hosted on the CommonDreams website.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/03/15-5
Think of Niagara Falls. Think of the onrushing current as the river pours itself toward the massive cascade. Imagine a lone swimmer a hundred yards or so upstream, desperately stroking against the current to keep from being swept over the precipice. That swimmer is President Obama, the river is the world, and the falls is the threat of unchecked nuclear weapons.
Henry James used the image of Niagara to describe the rush into World War I: “. 。 .the tide that bore us along.” Hannah Arendt defined the wars of the 20th century as events “cascading like a Niagara Falls of history.” Jonathan Schell used Niagara as an organizing metaphor for his indispensable critique of war, “The Unconquerable World.”
But now the image has entered the lexicon of strategic experts who warn of a coming “cascade of proliferation,” one nation following another into the deadly chasm of nuclear weapons unless present nuclear powers find a way to reverse the current. The main burden is on Russia and the United States, which together possess the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons, but President Obama deliberately made himself central to the challenge when he said in Prague, “I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”
Now the Niagara current is taking him the other way. Here are the landmarks that define the swimmer's momentum.
■ The US-Russia Treaty. Negotiators in Geneva are late in reaching agreement on a nuclear arms treaty to replace START, which expired last December. Obama is threading a needle, having to meet Russian requirements (for example, on missile defense) while anticipating Republican objections in the US Senate (for example, on missile defense). Warning: Bill Clinton was humiliated when the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999. Republicans' recalcitrance on health care is peanuts compared to the damage their rejection of a new START treaty would do.
■ The Nuclear Posture Review, the Congress-mandated report on how the administration defines nuclear needs today. This, too, is overdue, probably because the White House has been pushing back against the Pentagon on numerous issues. Are nukes for deterrence only? Will the United States renounce first use? Having stopped the Bush-era program to build a new nuclear weapon, will Obama allow further research and development? What nations will be named as potential nuclear threats? Warning: The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review was Clinton's Pentagon Waterloo. It affirmed the Cold War status quo, killing serious arms reduction until now.
■ Although usually considered apart, the broader US defense posture has turned into a key motivator for other nations to go nuclear. The current Pentagon budget ($5 trillion for 2010-2017) is so far beyond any other country, and the conventional military capacity it buys is so dominant, as to reinforce the nuclear option abroad as the sole protection against potential US attack. This is new.
■ In April, a world leaders nuclear summit will be held in Washington, but both nuclear haves and have-nots will be taking positions based on the US-Russia Treaty (and its prospects for ratification) and the Nuclear Posture Review. Warning: if China sees US missile defense as potentially aimed its way, a new nuclear arms race is on.
■ In May, the signatories to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty will hold their eighth regular review session in New York. Since the nations that agreed to forego nuclear weapons did so on the condition that the nuclear nations work steadily toward abolition, the key question will be whether Obama has in fact begun to deliver on his declared intention. If not, get ready for the cascade.
In truth, the current rushing toward Niagara cannot be resisted. Not seven nuclear nations, therefore, but 17, or, ultimately, 70. But beware an analysis like this. The falls are an analogy, not a fact. Obama warned of such fatalism, calling it in Prague, “a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.” Therefore, reject the analogy. Obama is not a lone swimmer, but a voice of all humanity. The nuclear future is not pre-determined. Human choices are being made right now to define it anew.
