克里斯托弗普雷布尔和查尔斯骑士。 赫芬顿邮报 ，2012年1月20日。
http://defensealt.org/ysCbHQ
摘录：
平衡取决于你站在什么。 我们的物理安全方面，美国是幸运与大陆的和平与强大的敌人少。 我们的军队是最好的训练，最好的领导下，和世界上最好的装备。 它是不稳定的财务状况和我们的经济不景气，使我们容易以绊脚石。
不幸的是，新战略并不完全明白我们的优势，也没有完全解决我们的弱点。 在最后，它并没有达到艾森豪威尔的自诩的平衡。
__________________________________________________
国防部。 2012年01月05日。
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
斯蒂芬M ·沃尔特。 外交政策 ，01年12月，2011年。
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/01/a_bandwagon_for_offshore_balancing
摘录：
... ...离岸平衡是正确的策略，即使在我们的库房充分，提供的，没有同行竞争对手正在威胁占主导地位的关键战略地区。 即使在良好的时期，它是没有意义的，不必要的负担，或让山姆大叔的傲慢的愿望是“不可或缺的国家”在世界上几乎每一个角落的“搭便车”的盟国。 换句话说，离岸平衡不只是一个艰难时期的战略;它也是其中美国是强大的力量在世界上最好的策略，容易引发不必要的对立，而且容易被拖到陷入不必要的战争。
萨拉Sorcher 国家报“，2011年11月29日。
摘录：
奥巴马总统最近宣布的步骤，以加强与太平洋上的新焦点美国外交政策架构，包括计划部署2500名部队在基地澳大利亚所有的同时，坚持在美国国防开支的任何减少，不会再以牺牲在亚太地区的优先事项。 即使在华盛顿许多警惕的眼睛中国的迅速现代化的军事和扩大在太平洋的海军力量，39％的业内人士说，下一步的行动是美国的参与，同时避免任何与军事有关的步骤，以改善与北京的。
保G.特霍西尔。 有线电视新闻网 ，2011年11月23日。
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/23/opinion/thornhill-defense-cuts/index.html
摘录：
国家的领导，需要一个“B计划”这样一个英雄的假设 - 或希望 - 关于未来战争不大可能不会因疏忽而导致灾难的战略。 这是比它似乎更难。 B计划将允许更多的灵活性，以满足可能出问题的战略环境，而不仅仅是削减预算。
编辑点评：
B计划是保持一个良好的“战略储备”。 由于新保守主义想指出，美国在军事上花费仅占其国内生产总值的4.5％。 如果捏的新威胁，美国可以很容易地增加支出和从事其仍有相当大的工业和知识基础。 这个国家与重组战略面临的问题是缺乏政治意愿。 文职领导人都不愿问美国人民牺牲。 一个强大的国民警卫队和预备役部队不频繁部署滥用不必要的战争和社会的期望，在国家紧急状态下支付的附加税，是这个国家需要的战略准备，同时保持一个小站在平时队伍的基本面。 有了这样一个战略计划，美国可以配置的任何威胁。
马修莱泽曼。 彭博政府 ，2011年11月21日。
http://defensealt.org/veAUPs
保罗罗杰斯，2011年11月11 日开放民主。
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/israel-vs-iran-regional-blowback
摘录：
附近不可回避的现实是，伊朗将很快获得有限的核武库出对抗。 这是因为即使是有限的轰炸伊朗将创建一个新的动态，其中伊朗的攻击后地区的中心是，将有几个新的选项强加给它的对手的成本;和将自己的威慑全速。
凯尔西Hartigan， 民主阿森纳 ，2011年11月10日。
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2011/11/if-you-want-peace-stop-clamoring-for-war.html
摘录：
如果罗姆尼认为，他可以到白宫椭圆形办公室的华尔兹，举几个粗糙和强硬的讲话，突然，伊朗将国际原子能机构的核查人员敞开大门，以及，他追悔莫及。
好斗的言辞不会解决与伊朗的情况。 事实上，大多数专家都会告诉你，这使情况变得更糟。 军事行动的威胁，或者更糟的是，实际的军事行动，只会玩到伊朗的强硬派手中... ...如果美国的军事存在是要说服伊朗合作，我还以为它现在已经发生了。
卡尔Conetta。 PDA 简报备忘录52号 ，2011年10月25日。
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm52.pdf
摘录：
在五角大楼的基础预算自1998年以来的实质（46％）的急剧上升是大幅度的战略选择，而不是安全要求 ，本身由于。 它反映了拒绝订定优先次序以及一动，从传统的军事威慑，遏制和国防目标更加雄心勃勃的两端：威胁预防，公地的命令，和全球安全环境的改造。 美国的常规军事活动的地理范围也不断扩大。
姊妹篇： 五角大楼的新使命设置：卡尔Conetta 一个可持续的选择？ 更新和扩大的一个专责小组在美国，2011年8月的一个统一的安全预算（USB）的报告摘录 。http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/111024Pentagon-missions.pdf
查尔斯奈特。 国防部替代简报备忘录＃51，2011年10月25日的项目。
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm51.pdf
摘录：
...适度调整，美国的军事战略和全球性的姿态，在未来十年实施，能够可靠地提供的赤字减少储蓄从五角大楼的预算从每年73亿美元到118亿美元不等。
为了实现储蓄只需要不同的手段，以实现战略目标的应用程序。 这正是任何好的战略条件发生变化时，的。
W.安德鲁特里尔。 战略研究所，美国陆军战争学院，2011年8月2日。
杰夫雅各比。“波士顿环球报”，2011年6月22日。
摘录：
... ...拿出大国的责任重大，有时这些职责之一，是要消灭的怪物：霸杀错良民和蔑视文明的规则。 如果街道和城市需要治安，按理说，世界上没有太。 和当地罪犯一样茁壮成长时，警察看的其他方式，使罪犯在世界舞台上。
我们的世界需要一个警察。 大多数美国人是否喜欢与否，只有自己适合的工作不可缺少的国家是。
编辑点评：
四分之三的美国人反对美国当世界警察的角色，也许他们有关治安，杰夫-雅各比不理解的东西根本没有司法和法律指导机构监督的一个警察部队肯定是一个专制的公式。
雅各比永远不会赞同暴政，但被选出，只有10％的世界人民负责的白宫居住者的全球警察的业余爱好是一个决定是在全球舞台上的私刑。 考虑美国人将武器，如果中国或俄罗斯自己上台后，它是全球性的治安维持会。
对于美国领导人，所以很乐意担当这个角色只是推迟一天，当我们有能力的国际司法和警务机构。 如果我们的领导人试图想甚至到未来几年，它应该清楚他们的治安维持会的做法，不符合美国的利益。
[此评论的版本是作为一个读者来信，在“波士顿环球报”，2011年6月28日出版。]
桑德拉欧文。 国防大学 ，2011年6月10日。
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=441
摘录：
不仅有在五角大楼和军种将在未来做的奥巴马政府的内部分歧，但国会内的派别也将推动个人议程。 ，“奥基夫说：”在美国国会，你有535个人，他们每个人都认为他们负责。 “如果你没有一些基准测试工作展开了讨论，”五角大楼将失去控制会在今后的预算削减。
“奥基夫说，”如果没有战略框架，即会发生什么：这个过程需要超过。 他说，国防部领导人都应该有一个合理的战略框架，尽可能早，他们可以出售给国会。 “缺席，这是驾驶的列车，以满足数量的程序员和豆制品柜台。”
一个从国防部的连贯消息是“失踪，现在，”约翰说，CSIS的总裁和前国防部副部长哈姆雷，。
“我们真正想要的计划，作为国防部，这是20年的是什么？”他问。 “难道我们得到了这些战争和永争再次？ 我们有什么准备吗？“他补充说。 “，我认为，在未来6个月的工作。”
哈姆雷说，必须有阐明美军未来计划的一项紧迫的意义，因为越来越多的美国公众失去了看似无休止的战争和瘫痪在如何向前迈进的耐心，
查尔斯奈特。 国防部替代项目的注意，2011年5月12日。
Word是两个校长在2010年四年防务评估报告的生产将与负责生产的“根本”防务审查奥巴马总统下令在4月13日讲话的赤字。 他们是凯瑟琳希克斯 ，代理国防部副部长为战略和强制规划，是导致2010年四年防务评估报告作者大卫Ochmanek，副助理国防部长，为部队发展，谁为首的“分析和整合细胞”拉到一起分析方面，在过去的四年防务评估报告。
更新
防务新闻报道（2011年5月23日），“恭福克斯，成本评估和方案评价主任率领的任务和能力审查将由[和海军分析中心（CNA）];前总统米歇尔弗卢努瓦，国防部政策[和五角大楼官员负责在2010年的QDR]和海军上将 迈克尔马伦 ，参谋长联席会议主席。“
编辑点评：
把相同的人，谁负责产生新的审查在2010年审查，提出了一个明显的问题，我们应该期待什么的“新”或“基本”从这次审查是否。 当然，在过去的QDRs有没有在任何真正意义上的字的“根本”。
已成子文希克斯女士写入到新的审查将犯罪嫌疑人，“我们得到了相当多的权利，当我们做到了去年。 现在，当然，如果你愿意承担更大的安全风险，你可以削减一些作品的力量的姿态，但是这是一个政治决定... ...“
如果新的审查使得这样一个踌躇满志的演示将担任总统和民族不佳。 2010年四年防务评估报告没有做出任何真正的努力，在众多的上市，失败的一个战略发展的原则，这是建立在资源约束的实际路径的军事要求设置明确的优先事项。 新的基本审查，必须出示各种低风险的选项，可以实现各种资源的投资水平。 它的作者不应该允许简单地推入政治领域的安全隐患的问题。
奥巴马总统将智能的来源广泛征求思想，远远超出了五角大楼的战略，政策和力量规划人员达到。 如果一个根本的检讨是必要的，明智的做法是听取和审议的不同声音。
项目防御替代品，简报备忘录，2011年4月25日＃49。
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1104bm49.pdf
有很好的理由，欢迎一项策略性检讨，奥巴马总统承诺在4月13日。 近14年来，美国的国防政策一直遵循的“四年防务评估共识” - 一个公理和必要性，赢得四四年防务审查过程中，坚持国防规划者之间从1997年开始设置。 现在回想起来，这个共识已挥霍和散漫的军事行动主义综合征。 它喂了我们的军事采购系统的功能障碍，并帮助推动了五角大楼的基预算不可持续的高度。 当然，这是一个全新的开始时间。 但将提供所承诺的审查？
审查比它的目的是纠正的QDRs更加开放和关键呢？ 将它挖多深？ 它甚至会旨在“纠正吗？”还是会成为一个更窄的目的：一个统帅之间的修订交易，他的国防部长，军种参谋长来换取一个适度的预算增长的新的制约因素强有力的理由，一个堡垒，反对任何进一步削减。
总统的目的只为节省400亿美元超过12年 - 计划基预算支出约6.5％。 去年，总统的财政委员会和其他独立任务部队确定的两倍以上，节省了潜在的辩护的短短十几年的时间。 目前还不清楚，总统是否打算从五角大楼的预算中单独或从较大的“安全篮子”，其中包括国际事务，国土安全部和退伍军人事务中提取400亿美元。
此外，它是不鼓励，总统赞扬国防安全门“已保存的”400亿往年美元，当大部分的“储蓄”从来没有离开过五角大楼的库房，也削弱了政府的赤字。 国家现在需要的是在口语的实际国防开支下降意义上的“储蓄”。
一个严重的战略审查，应使在计划未来支出大大高于6.5％的回缩。 它应该做的不是限制未来的增长。 也许会的。 但我们应该认识到在开始，总统建议本身并没有足够实际需要进行一项策略性检讨。 是的，我们需要一个 - 但不是因为总统希望温和挫伤五角大楼增长。
是有意义的，这样的审查必须看储蓄远远超出400亿美元，甚至超出了财政委员会和其他任务部队提出。 当然，国防部长盖茨和马伦上将不同意。 他们已经将处于危险之中的国家和军种公开嘲笑为他们的消费上的任何重大的新的制约因素。 策略性检讨应比和解的让步，他们的关注，这是有倾向性。
我们可以得到需要的角度来看，在历史背景比较最近提交的预算和建议，通过PDA编写此表转换成年均五角大楼基预算的近期计划和建议，表示在2010美元。 它显示了总统的要求和建议，其中包括他最近的一次，将产生平均年度预算支出占据了窄带。 他们都是近亲。
即使更加雄心勃勃的可持续国防部专责小组的建议并不遥远。
总统的请求，并建议所有的生产平均每年的预算，实质，超过以往的支出，超过里根时代的消费水平，大大超过在整个冷战时期的平均消费。 （而且，值得注意的是，冷战年代的预算平均包括战争开支，而更近的平均数不的。）
我们应该很乐意接受审查的国防规划的机会，工作是值得的。 但是，我们需要，也不应该接受的想法，在温和的修订预算规划给予充分的理由打击“战略恐慌”按钮。
塞巴斯蒂安Sprenger写于2011年4月21日报道，QDR由詹姆斯马蒂斯将军（海军陆战队）和安德鲁马歇尔，净评估办公室主任，率领的红队提出在2009年的关注深度衰退的财政紧缩影响 ，在内部防御在四年防务评估报告为代表的军事计划。
红队的报告是不公开的。 当四年防务评估报告是在2010年初公布它不包括财政拮据的效果演示。
上周，多一点了一年多后，奥巴马总统要求国防部长盖茨找到额外的安全预算削减400亿美元12年期和呼吁的军事作用和任务的新的审查。
这种发展的影响将是2010年四年防务评估报告的更新，现在这将可能听取关于财政拮据的2009年红队的关注。
约书亚泰尔。“小规模战争报”，2011年4月12日。
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/732-thiel1.pdf
摘录：
机动战，其核心是一种机械的努力，以适应一个自上而下的层次结构的相应必要性。 相反，平叛是一个比较暧昧的环境，在它的复杂性和背景不同，它是战争的国际象棋比赛。 它是在各个地区不同，同时可以覆盖整个战争频谱。 因此，平叛是很难把一个保险杠贴纸上，商标作为口头禅，或出售给人口和他们的代表。 在2006年的联合国国（美国）公众的成败的伊拉克反叛乱战略的看法是围绕集结战斗在时间和空间电源的概念集中，经常叫的“”浪涌“一词，”该浪涌，“简明一个新的反叛乱战略周围时事文化在现代世界的声音咬成一个简单的和可量化的口号。 不幸的是，平叛是更复杂，比“添加更多，然后你赢了。”
吉安外邦人的意见 ：
约书亚说，在曲终：
“... ...在阿富汗，将在2011年的胜利者再次招徕比决定性的业务变化的2010-2011年的阿富汗增兵，而写的历史。”
什么样的证据，我的意思是确凿的证据（和超出什么人员浪涌召回的一部分），有一个“决定性的业务变化。” 多少“决定性”的运作变化可以有作战部队广泛分散在一个地区安全的使命，并以分散的方式运作？ 从2003年春季在伊拉克发生的业务框架。 答案是，没有一个决定性的变化中的业务框架。 哦，以确保有一些调整，在这里和几个更多的前哨，在这里和那里，但总的来说，它保持不变。
不幸的是，叙事已建成假定救世主命名彼得雷乌斯将军在船上，改造他的野战军业务和结合部队的增加是降低暴力的首要原因。 这是一种幻想。
然而，乡亲，特别是我们在那些血液泼洒在这些地方的军队，要相信会发生什么，或doesn't发生是因为我们和我们做什么或不办，或因救世主将军骑马到现场。
然而，在这个国家的外交政策精英们（以及许多军事领导人）喜欢这样的叙述，并希望它坚持，因为它放在了干预和国家建设做这些战争的力学的重视和批评，并从战略和政策，把他们到位。 由于在这些战争和冲突的成功仅仅是一种在地面上部队的正确数量与正确的战术与救世主一般的问题，那么他们可以赢得了一次又一次。
作为军队在阿富汗的高级将领认为“正确的输入的地方，终于在”也是如此，我们已经看到呼吁在利比亚在某些方面为沼泽。
但在伊拉克，这是不得不做其他更关键的条件，既不增加部队增兵的一部分（如约书亚有效地认为），也不是决定性的变化（因为他错误地断言）在业务框架，而不是降低暴力（安巴尔觉醒的传播，什叶派民兵独立下来，巴格达教派地区的物理分离）发生。
桑德拉欧文。 国防杂志 ，2010年11月22日。
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=255
摘录：
“国防部最大的弱点是它的财政预算策略：战略选择的情况下，”戈登说，亚当斯，美国大学教授撰写的多梅尼西里夫林建议，是由前参议院预算委员会主席皮特多梅尼西（RN.防御建议M.）在克林顿和白宫预算办公室主任，爱丽丝里夫林。
削减国防预算，不应该做大致相同，亚当斯说。 辛普森鲍尔斯的报告，这在许多大件武器计划和劳动人口减少的呼叫的目标，反应是可以预见的的。 每一个有针对性的方案或机构，被视为与美国联合部队司令部最近作出的情况下，这是对国家安全至关重要，而其支持者已经被调动起来的游说和宣传组。
亚当斯说，更聪明的办法将是奥巴马政府和国会同意一个大幅回落的军事战略。 “在这一天结束，它的有关政策，限制其冲动用在鲁莽的方式，它已经在过去的20年使用的军事决策者的，”他说。
2010年11月18日
亲爱的联席主席鲍尔斯和联合主席辛普森：
我们写信给你，在国家安全和国防经济学专家转达我们的意见，对委员会的工作，特别是负责削减军费开支的实现需要国家安全的影响。 在这方面，我们非常感谢您在2010年11月10日委员会的建议草案中采取的主动行动。 它开始了认真的反思，辩论和行动的必要过程。
香港经济的活力，是我们国家的实力的基石。 我们同意委员会的愿望，使我们的财务房子。 这样做不仅是一个经济问题。 减少国家债务，也是国家安全的当务之急。
迄今为止，奥巴马政府已豁免任何预算削减的国防部。 这是短视的，这使得它更难以完成任务，恢复我们的经济实力，这是我们的军事实力的基础。
作为全国劳动力的休息，以减少其债务负担，目前的计划，在未来十年的实质是提高了10％的基础国防部预算。 这将拿出近52％，在基地的军费开支的实质增长，自1998年以来的顶部。 （当战争成本的增加已经大得多：95％。）
我们对此表示赞赏国防部长盖茨的努力改革五角大楼的业务和收购的做法。 然而，即使他的改革，履行自己的承诺，目前的计划并没有转化成有助于解决我们的赤字问题的预算节约。 其明确的目的，是五角大楼内的其他用途的资金。 这是不够好。
特别批准，授予国防危及整个削减赤字的努力。 今天的国防开支构成超过55％的可自由支配的开支和联邦预算的23％。 豁免防御不仅破坏了财政责任的更广泛的呼叫，但也使得整体预算约束作为一个实际的经济和政治问题更难。
我们需要把这样的风险我们的经济力量。 今天，美国拥有广泛的全球军事优势的保证金。 国防预算所能承受的显着减少，而不会损害我们的基本安全。
我们认识到，更大的军事对手可能会上升到我们在未来面临。 但对这种可能性的最佳对冲警惕和充满活力的经济支持能够适应新的挑战，因为它们出现的军事。
我们可以实现更大范围的防务经济的今天，所有这一切，我们恳请您认真考虑在几个方面。 我们需要更现实的目标，我们为我们的军队，在我们对他们的使用国外的选择比较挑剔。 我们应侧重于核心的安全目标，并就这些当前和新兴的威胁我军最直接影响着我们。
我们还需要更明智地处理国际挑战时我们选择的安全工具。 我们的军队是一个独特的昂贵的资产，并没有其他文书，会做一些任务。 对于许多挑战，但是，军队是最具成本效益的选择。 今天，我们可以实现更高的效率没有减少我们的安全至关重要的，不可取的，不必要的军事任务和能力之间的更好的歧视。
有各种特定的选项，会产生储蓄，其中一些我们在下面说明。 然而，最重要的一点是坚定的承诺，以寻求通过重新评估我们的国防战略，我们在全球的姿态，和我们的生产和管理的军事力量手段的储蓄。
■自冷战结束后，我们要求我们的军事准备和进行更多类型的任务，在世界各地越来越多的地方。 五角大楼的任务列表现在包括不仅预防性战争，政权更迭，和国家建设，也含糊的努力，以“塑造战略环境”和干出现的威胁。 它是时间修剪这些任务和恢复自卫和威慑的重点。
■美国的战斗力大大超过任何常规的对手合理的组合。 只举一个例子，国防部长盖茨指出，美国海军今天的能力，为接下来的13海军的总和，其中大部分是由我们的盟国经营。 我们可以安全地保存我们的优势通过微调的电流余量。
■美国的永久平时的军事存在，在国外主要是冷战遗留下来的。 它可以减少而不损害美国或其盟国的基本安全。
■在伊拉克和阿富汗战争显示，军事实力的限制。 全球避免这些类型的操作，使我们能够回滚最近在我们的陆军和海军陆战队的规模增加。
■五角大楼的收购过程中多次失败，经常提供武器和设备后期，超过成本，并且比承诺的能力较差。 一些最昂贵的系统对应的威胁，至少突出的今天，不可能很快夺回突出。 在这种情况下，储蓄可以被安全地实现取消，推迟或减少采购或寻求成本更低的替代品。
■最近作出的努力，以改革国防部的财务管理和收购的做法必须得到加强。 同时，我们必须对预算纪律，修剪服务的裁员和精简命令，支持系统和基础设施。
沿着这些路线的改变，势必会引起争议。 预算削减是很不容易的事情 - 没有防御小于政府的任何区域。 然而，财政现实要求我们在军事强国之间的投资和参与我们真正的力量在于综合国力的基础上，以取得新的平衡。 如果我们愿意重新思考我们如何产生的军事力量，如何，为什么，我们把它使用的，我们可以实现节省国防安全。
此致
这封信反映的个别签署的意见。 机构是上市仅用于识别目的。 这封信是一个共同努力的结果， 该联盟 国防部替代的一种现实主义的外交政策和项目。
托马斯下午巴尼特2010年10月中国安全 。
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1010Barnett.pdf
摘录：
总之，结束了中国的搭便车的，按理说它更重要的是长期的全系统的稳定比继续阻止中国对台湾的军事入侵。 随着全球化的网络以迅猛的速度继续扩大，美国的能力发挥到系统中唯一的利维坦，自然大大降低。 这意味着，而中国对台湾的军事入侵的可能性逐年消散，美国的“帝国用尽”的可能性肯定超过它在短期内的战略重要性。
历史将判断美国战略家最严重的，如果我们的选择，引发地区军备竞赛的“访问”东亚排除以绘制到战略这个角落，扩展，而无需全球化无疑时代的合作，管理中国的能力美国最大的战略成就。 我不能故障的设计，以保持在的东亚洲平衡我们一个业务能力AirSea战概念“的游戏。”但我担心这将主要由默认和有些由“蓝色”的野心，成为战略意义上的美国严重缺席一个积极的政治和军事接触，努力平衡其在现代全球化时代最重要的双边关系的负面影响。
编辑点评：
巴尼特提醒我们准例如，当领导的军事能力可能是一个战略利益的损害。
丹尼尔Goure。 预 警博客 2010年9月03日，列克星敦研究所。
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/future-defense-budget-choices-require-clear-strategic-priorities
摘录：
美国无法承受和人民不会支付军事具有不确定性，可以做战斗。
需要做的不确定性的战斗的结果，重点放在军事上，可以覆盖所有基地和一切事情。 这不会是一个明智的战略资源，即使不受约束。 并非所有的威胁都是平等的。 也不是所有的利益同样重要。 最后，它有可能使合理的和合理的判断，对未来的安全环境将如何展开，并定义需求信号，将需要转移的战略优先事项。
在过去，当美国领导人拒绝做出选择，他们允许军事收缩对称切割每一个小程序或服务，。 这种方法是弄巧成拙。 它保持一个所谓的全频谱军事，但不断降低它的大小是没有意义的。
编辑点评：
从档案（3万亿美元后）的有关段落：
卡尔Conetta和查尔斯骑士。 具有不确定性的“决斗”，一九九八年二月。
http://www.comw.org/pda/bullyweb.html
有没有不确定性的逃避，但也有不确定性歇斯底里的救济。 它开始认识到不稳定的边界 - 就像在物理系统的动荡已明显发病点和参数。 一条河流的动荡，例如，对应的流量和河流的床和银行的轮廓。 它发生在补丁和不随机。 天气是一个混沌系统，抵御精确的长期预测，但允许有用的预测更广泛的趋势和限制。
尽管不确定性，概率问题的陈述。 他们表示重量的证据 - ，或是否有任何证据。 “非零概率的不确定性鹰派洪水的危险，通过他们的宽容测试部落我们的关注，但报警阈值降低，他们建立国防自给自足是不可能的标准：绝对和一定的军事安全。 鉴于有限的资源和竞争的结束，更不会有做战略智慧开始的优先次序-和优先事项，似乎有可能的，什么不要求严格注意。
世界可能少一些，不太稳定的今天比冷战时期，但它也涉及减少对美国的风险。 风险是相等的部分概率和实用 - 机会和利害关系。 随着全球超级大国争夺结束，美国在世界上最多样化的冲突的利害关系有所减少。 所以对美国利益的军事威胁的严重性。 This permits a sharper distinction between interests and compelling interests, turbulence and relevant turbulence, uncertainties and critical uncertainties. And this distinction will pay dividends whenever the country turns to consider large-scale military endeavors, commitments, and investments.
Among the visions that guide present policy, one is absent conspicuously: a world in which economic issues have displaced military ones as the central focus of global competitions and concerns. Failing to engage this prospect, the recent defense policy reviews are oblivious to the opportunity cost of military spending. And it is this lapse that gives license to their speculative methods and overweening goals.
The United States continues to invest more of its national product in defense than does its allies, more than the world average, and much more than its chief economic competitors. By disregarding the requirements and consequences of increased global economic competition, present policy makes an unacknowledged bet about the future: The Soviet Union is gone and no comparable military challenge to the West exists, except as distant possibility. Nonetheless, the American prospect depends as much as ever, if not more, on the specifically military aspects of strength. Of this much, the uncertainty hawks seem certain.
Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 19 August 2010.
http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf
摘录：
This pamphlet revises the conceptual and operating focus of the Army from major combat operations to that of operational adaptability employing full-spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty and complexity.
TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 describes how future Army forces conduct operations as part of the joint force to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies in the future operational environment. The pamphlet describes the employment of forces in the 2016-2028 timeframe and identifies capabilities required for future success to guide Army force development efforts.
Jason Sherman, Inside Defense , 26 July 2010.
A bipartisan independent review of the Obama administration's 20-year blueprint for the Defense Department calls for increasing the size of the Navy to a 346-ship fleet and increasing the US military's posture in the Western Pacific to counter China's growing influence in the region, according to a draft report of the Independent Quadrennial Defense Review Panel.
InsideDefense.com obtained a draft copy of the report titled “ The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century .”
The 20-member blue-ribbon panel — co-chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry and Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to President George W. Bush — also finds a significant increase in funding is needed to bolster capabilities necessary to counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense; and to deal with cyber threats.
The panel's report argues that a centerpiece of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review — a force-planning construct that downplayed the significance of preparing to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous major wars, a bedrock of defense planning since 1993, in order to prepare US forces to deal with a wider set of possible contingencies — is unreliable. Instead, the independent panel recommends the Pentagon adopt force levels required by analysis conducted 17 years ago.
The “panel recommends the force structure be sized, at a minimum, at the end strength outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review,” an assessment prepared by then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin, which Perry then worked to implement during his 1994 to 1997 term as secretary. “We further recommend the department's [weapon system] inventory be thoroughly recapitalized and modernized,” states the draft report.
Funding to pay for these capabilities, as well as to recapitalize equipment consumed in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will require resources beyond the $100 billion efficiency savings recently directed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, according to the report.
The “panel believes that substantial additional resources will be required to modernize the force. Although there is a cost to recapitalizing the military, there is also a price to be paid for not recapitalizing, one that in the long run would be much greater.”
Tasked by Congress — and composed of members appointed by lawmakers and Gates — the panel's report delves into nearly every dimension of the US military enterprise — from personnel policy to weapons acquisition to defense policy formulation — and offers an “explicit warning” about the shape of US weaponry after a nearly a decade of persistent conflict.
“The aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, and the growing stress on the force means that a train wreck is coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force structure,” states the draft report.
The draft document argues that the Pentagon's force-structure plans “will not provide sufficient capacity” to deal with a major domestic catastrophe while also conducting contingency operations abroad. The panel also asserts that the recently established US Cyber Command should be prepared to assist civilian authorities in defending this domain “beyond” the Defense Department's current role, to support civilian agencies.
The Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review did not include a force-planning construct that explicitly quantifies the number and type of contingencies for which the US military must prepare, removing a formula the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have relied on since the end of the Cold War to justify their force structures and their investment plans, an omission the independent panel laments.
The Pentagon's 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the first major assessment of the the US military's needs after the fall of the Berlin Wall, advanced a requirement to fight and win two major-theater wars nearly simultaneously, a construct that was incorporated in the 1997, 2001 and 2006 QDRs.
“The 2010 QDR, however, did not endorse any metric for determining the size and shape of US forces,” states the independent panel's draft report. Rather, it put diverse, overlapping scenarios, including long-duration stability operations and the defense of the homeland, on par with major regional conflicts when assessing the adequacy of US forces.”
The current size of US ground forces “is close enough to being correct,” according to the draft report.
In addition, the panel argues that the Army is “living off the capital accumulated” during the Reagan administration. “The useful life of that equipment is running out; and, as a result, the inventory is old and in need of recapitalization,” states the draft report, which calls for inventory replacement on a one-for-one basis “with an upward adjustment in the number of naval vessels and certain air and space assets.”
A larger Navy and Air Force, according to the panel, is needed to protect US interests in the Pacific region.
“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased,” states the draft report. “The United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region, to protect American lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and defend our allies in the region. A robust US force structure, one that is largely rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be essential.”
The panel advances recommendations to reform the structure and organization of both Congress and the executive branch in order to improve oversight of national security matters. The panel also advances suggestions for the Defense and State departments to shore up “institutional weaknesses of the existing security assistance programs and framework.”
Michael Hastings. Rolling Stone , 22 June 2010.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236
摘录：
When it comes to Afghanistan, history is not on McChrystal's side. The only foreign invader to have any success here was Genghis Khan – and he wasn't hampered by things like human rights, economic development and press scrutiny. The COIN doctrine, bizarrely, draws inspiration from some of the biggest Western military embarrassments in recent memory: France's nasty war in Algeria (lost in 1962) and the American misadventure in Vietnam (lost in 1975). McChrystal, like other advocates of COIN, readily acknowledges that counterinsurgency campaigns are inherently messy, expensive and easy to lose.
国会游客中心，2010年6月11日。
Report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force. 11 June 2010.
full report: http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1006SDTFreport.pdf
executive summary: http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/SDTFreportexsum.pdf
摘录：
Putting America's defense establishment on a more sustainable path may require curbing some of our commitments abroad, adopting more realistic military goals, or putting greater emphasis on more cost-effective instruments of power.
C-SPAN video of the report release briefing hosted by Rep. Barney Frank, US Capitol Visitors Center, 11 June 2010.
Photos of the report release briefing, US Capitol Visitors Center, 11 June 2010.
Report of the Afghanistan Study Group, June 2010.
http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/?page_id=27
摘录：
The bottom line is clear: Our vital interests in Afghanistan are limited and military victory is not the key to achieving them.
On the contrary, waging a lengthy counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan may well do more to aid Taliban recruiting than to dismantle the group, help spread conflict further into Pakistan, unify radical groups that might otherwise be quarreling amongst themselves, threaten the long-term health of the US economy, and prevent the US government from turning its full attention to other pressing problems.
Laura A. Hall. Budget Insight , 27 May 2010.
摘录：
On the military side, no clear prioritization of missions. As in the QDR, the NSS provides no priorities among military missions, but repeats a long shopping list that could drive force structure and budget expectations even higher than they are now.
The White House, May 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1005NSS.pdf
克里斯托弗福特。 Remarks presented to a side event at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New Paradigms Forum , Hudson Institute, 20 May 2010.
http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=250
摘录：
… as present-day disarmament debates shift from a focus specifically upon nuclear weaponry to a broader focus upon full-spectrum military asymmetry, the disarmament discourse is characterized by competition between two conceptual paradigms that are quite incompatible even when their respective adherents seem to agree upon the importance of nuclear disarmament.
Let's explore this a bit. Even as it seeks to pander to the conventional wisdom of the disarmament movement by attempting to purchase nonproliferation cooperation with concessions on disarmament, the Obama Administration seems to have embraced – as did the Bush Administration before it, though far less emphatically and flamboyantly – a vision of nuclear reductions and potential future disarmament profoundly at odds with much of the conceptual framework that underpins this conventional wisdom. Fundamentally, to the extent that there can be said to be a vision of disarmament progress prevalent among US policy making elites, it is one that assumes and values military asymmetries favoring the United States.
It is not merely that the Obama Administration sees the development of improved nuclear weapons production capabilities as being essential to American reductions, as part of a strategy of substituting potential weapons for actual ones as America's strategic “hedge” against future problems. It is in fact that non-nuclear US military advantages are embraced as a way to facilitate reducing, or perhaps even replacing, US reliance upon nuclear weapons: developing PGS or other technologies to supplant nuclear weapons in some missions previously thought to require them; improving BMD against proliferation threats; and relying upon robust conventional power-projection capabilities to maintain the solidity of trans-oceanic alliances that have traditionally relied in part upon forward-deployed US nuclear weapons. No one in today's White House would admit as much, of course, but this agenda – spelled out with some candor in the new 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) – owes as much to the doctrinal vision of President Bush's 2001 NPR as it does to the ideology of the nuclear abolition movement.
At issue is a real clash between conceptual paradigms about the nature of the global security environment and how best to maintain international peace and security within it. On the one hand, there is a paradigm that one might call “peer-group multilateralism.” It is an ethic of collective action among equals in which countries come together through multilateral (and preferably global and universal) institutions in order to address common challenges. This is a profoundly democratic vision, at least with respect to relations between countries. (Actual democracy for real populations of human beings is an entirely different question, alas.) In it, no one has any particular special privileges, and no one suffers “discrimination” except when misbehavior brings upon miscreants the wrath of the international community – expressed, of course, through formal and collective means. This multilateralist and quasi-democratic paradigm is reflected, for instance, in the consensus negotiation procedures of the CD, and in the one-country-one-vote formula of the UN General Assembly. Even where bodies are structured so as to permit slightly more effective decision-making through smaller size, these principles may yet be seen in provisions for rotating states through seats on the IAEA Board of Governors or in the non-permanent ranks of the UN Security Council.
In this paradigm, asymmetry of power is philosophically offensive. To prevent or undermine such asymmetry, majoritarian procedures – if not indeed consensus rules – are designed and expected to impede traditional “power politics” and to enable all to participate more or less equally in decision outcomes. Action against common threats is understood as a collective movement both expressing and predicated upon international solidarity, and upon all countries' shared and axiomatically coequal role in preserving peace and security. By the same token, action not pursued with such a collective or at least majoritarian imprimatur is improper action. In a sense, therefore, the multilateral process is felt to create outcome legitimacy.
On the other end of this conceptual continuum lies a paradigm that one might call the “predominant actor model.” By this account – the essential features of which are evident in the thinking of multiple US administrations, transcending party identification – multilateral institutions operating on the basis of formal equality among near-peers provide an important but sometimes an inadequate means of addressing challenges to international peace and security. It is not necessarily that such institutions fall always or entirely down on the job, but that they are ill-equipped to handle, on their own, the full panoply of international threats that might arise (eg, on account of collective action problems, the high capital costs and high returns to experience in global power-projection capabilities, or psycho-political dynamics of risk-aversion or anti-militarist fashion).
According to this second model, the security system needs a predominant actor capable of shouldering disproportionate burdens and leading the community's reaction to pressing challenges, and around whom serious systemic responses to some of the gravest challenges can crystallize – particularly, though not exclusively, where the employment of military force is at issue. In effect, this model presumes that international security is to some extent a public good that will be, in economic terms, under-produced, to the detriment of all, if a predominant actor does not sometimes take the reins. In contrast to “peer-group multilateralism,” outcome legitimacy is, in this model, basically process-exogenous, in that certain steps are assumed to be necessary for the preservation of global order and other critical values of the system, and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the strongest player stepping in to ensure that these steps are taken. (Indeed, if other actors seem unable to do what is needed, it would be wrong for the predominant power not to intervene.) Other states' actual consent to such initiative is desirable, but secondary; the key point is that what is needed actually gets done.
The United States tends to see itself as playing this predominant role, with its military power and capabilities underpinning the stability of the present global order and system of economic relations. Having inherited from Britain the baton of securing global sea lanes vital to international commerce – and having added to this a broad modern array of global security responsibilities, ranging from providing the power-projection “muscle” behind humanitarian intervention to fighting nuclear weapons proliferation, and from providing security reassurances to far-flung allies to countering access-denial strategies in outer space – Washington sees itself as having a vital role in the international system precisely on account of its disproportionate military power.
One model thus sees military asymmetry as profoundly subversive of global peace and security, and ultimately regards its erosion as being a requirement for the full success of nuclear disarmament. The other model regards a degree of asymmetry, at least in the right hands, as being essential to global order irrespective of whether or not nuclear weapons exist – and perhaps even especially valuable in preparing to confront the challenges of some hypothetical future in which major conflicts can no longer be “deterred” by nuclear weapons because such devices have been eliminated.
编辑点评：
This is an important challenge to the nuclear disarmament “community”.
Christopher Ford, a nonproliferation official in the second Bush administration, is a consistent critic of “universalism” in international affairs and of the what he considers to be “faux” democratic process in international security institutions and fora. Whatever the validity of his doubts in these regard, what must not be denied by disarmament advocates is the reality that the “predominant actors” in the US security establishment, both military and civilian, firmly believe that the US should be the predominant actor on the world stage and are therefore predisposed to share most of Christopher Ford's doubts (and perhaps allergy) about universalism and inter-national democratic practice.
More about these important issues later.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 06 April 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/2010NPR.pdf
as delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas Wednesday, 03 March 2010.
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1336
摘录：
I've come to three conclusions – three principles – about the proper use of modern military forces:
1) … military power should not – maybe cannot – be the last resort of the state. Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools to policymakers. We can, merely by our presence, help alter certain behavior. Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy. We can assist rapidly in disaster-relief efforts, as we did in the aftermath of Haiti's earthquake. We can help gather intelligence, support reconnaissance and provide security.
And we can do so on little or no notice. That ease of use is critical for deterrence. An expeditionary force that provides immediate, tangible effects. It is also vital when innocent lives are at risk. So yes, the military may be the best and sometimes the first tool; it should never be the only tool.
2) Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way.
3) Policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another. Some in the military no doubt would prefer political leadership that lays out a specific strategy and then gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the implementation to commanders in the field. But the experience of the last nine years tells us two things: A clear strategy for military operations is essential; and that strategy will have to change as those operations evolve. In other words, success in these types of wars is iterative; it is not decisive.
编辑点评：
Mullen's first principle is dangerous in the extreme. It is a sad reminder of the militarization of the American state. Mullen suffers from an inexplicable amnesia of the horrors of war in the 20th Century.
America will likely be paying a high price for decades to come in what comes around from the quick and easy resort to war in 2002-2003 by policy-makers enthralled with their military instrument. If war is not a last resort, then policy-makers are abject failures as leaders.
戈登亚当斯。“原子科学家公报 ”，2010年03月02日。
摘录：
... ...是在QDR和国防预算的核心假设，短期的任务是要永远持续下去，特别是反叛乱，反恐，稳定运行。 这一预测的情况下，似乎是基于的想法，伊拉克和阿富汗未来的美国军事行动的模型。 这里QDR和国防预算完全错过了点。 伊拉克和阿富汗战争的选择，旨在推翻一个政权，重建这些国家。 我们需要哪些其他国家入侵，并在将来重建？ 无论是四年防务评估报告，也没有预算提供任何答案，质疑这个前提背后的逻辑。
Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University – As Prepared for Delivery, 18 February 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-national-defense-university
摘录：
Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies.
Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong.
编辑点评：
When Vice President Biden speaks of plans to “further strengthen … preeminent conventional forces” with “capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield” and “conventional warheads with worldwide reach” he seeks to reassure his domestic audience that nuclear disarmament will not make America less secure. His words, however, do not reassure other nuclear powers or potential future nuclear powers such as Iran who will perceive these enhanced American conventional capabilities as strategic threats to their national security.
Biden surely understands that he is not really offering us a pathway to nuclear abolition. We will not get there if other nations are expected to relinquish their nuclear arsenals to face “undeniable” conventional power from the US
If Biden's speech truly represents the elaboration of the “President's Prague Agenda” it leaves us with a very big gap (conceptually and practically) between the near term goal Biden articulates (“We will work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”) and the longer term goal (“We are working both to stop [nuclear weapons] proliferation and eventually to eliminate them.”) which President Obama confirmed in Prague.
Steve Coll. The New Yorker , 15 February 2010.
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2010/02/strategic-withdrawal.html
摘录：
I have also heard it suggested, however, that the big and visible Helmand operation is being conceived as a sort of “demonstration project” of joint US and Afghan security and governance capabilities – that “clear, hold, and build” there will be constructed as a sort of theme park of revived counterinsurgency practice.
Whatever the durability of the current operation, the Helmand River Valley is not likely to be this war's decisive locus.
Steve Clemons. TPM Cafe , 13 February 2010.
http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/02/13/several_years_ago_i_met/
Lawrence J. Korb, Sean Duggan, and Laura Conley. Center for American Progress , 04 February 2010.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/qdr_fail_resource.html
摘录：
The QDR … does not prioritize the missions that the military must be prepared for. The document states that “successfully balancing [DOD's priorities] requires that the Department make hard choices on the level of resources required as well as accepting and managing risk in a way that favors success in today's wars,” yet it also notes that “US forces must be prepared to conduct a wide variety of missions under a range of different circumstances.” In other words, the QDR promises to make tradeoffs but asserts that DOD must be capable of confronting every contingency.
编辑点评：
按照钱。 The priorities are reflected in where the money goes. A few changes, per usual, at the margins. Mostly the same ol' same ol' division of spoils.
Office of the Secretary of Defense , 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002QDR2010.pdf
Bernard I. Finel. Armed Froces Journal International , February 2010.
http://www.afji.com/2010/02/4387134
摘录：
A fundamental challenge in devising a strategy for the use of American military power is that the world has literally never seen anything like it. The US today has military capabilities at least equal to the rest of the world combined. There is virtually no spot on the globe that could not be targeted by American forces, and at most a small handful of countries that could thwart a determined US effort at regime change — and some of those only by virtue of their possession of nuclear weapons.
American military capabilities are not a potential form of power, subject to use only following a lengthy mobilizing and requiring a long campaign to achieve significant goals. Instead, the US can destroy fixed locations in a matter of hours or at most days, and implement regime change in a matter of weeks or a few months.
Because this capability is so novel — dating only to the end of the Cold War — American strategists lack a clear framework to guide the utilization of this force. They have sought to match capabilities to conceptions of the use of force from a different era, one in which the Cold War made regime change unpalatable due to the risk of escalation and that tended to make localized setbacks appear as loses in a perceived zero-sum competition with the Soviets.
The reason, in other words, that the US didn't simply remove Fidel Castro from power was that after 1962, the international consequences seemed too high and the goal too risky. The reason American leaders felt compelled to engage in a lengthy counterinsurgency in Vietnam was the concern that a communist victory would have been a setback in the broader struggle. But imagine a world in which there were few or no international consequences to removing Castro from power, and imagine a world in which the commitment to Vietnam was strictly commensurate to the threat that the Vietnamese communists could pose to the US That is the change in context that has occurred over the past 20 years, and the US has not yet adapted.
编辑点评：
And so many in the US choose to ignore how this dominant military power motivates other nations to seek nuclear weaponry or hold tightly to those they have acquired already!
final version as published by InsideDefense.com on 30 January 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/100130qdr2010.pdf
Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo 46 , 26 January 2010.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/Assessing_the_2010_QDR.pdf
摘录：
Today's military is stressed by having nearly 25% of the full time military overseas, including 16% in overseas operations.
How does the QDR seek to reduce the stress of overseas stationing and deployment?
In recent years large counter-insurgency campaigns have demanded much of the military's attention and energy.
Is the QDR preparing for more of the same in the future? At what scale and frequency?
HDS Greenway. Boston Globe , 16 December 2009.
摘录：
The enemy, then as now, always rallied to the reliable call of “jihad'' against the infidel invaders no matter who they were. Of all the tribes, those of the Pashtuns were the most feared.
The motives for fighting in Afghanistan were fear, prestige, and retribution. The British feared Russian expansion, and always sought to put their man on the throne to do Britain's bidding. Retribution always followed military setbacks, and national prestige was used as the reason to fight on. British control over Afghanistan was thought necessary for the defense of India.
Russia followed the same scenario, fearing that if Afghanistan's pro-Communist government should fail, it would endanger Russia's Muslim regions.
The United States invaded Afghanistan out of fear of Al Qaeda, and retribution for 9/11. And today you often hear the national prestige argument that we cannot let the Holy Warriors believe they can defeat a second superpower. More and more, America's Afghan policy is tied into protecting the stability of Pakistan, once part of British India.
Nir Rosen. Boston Review , January/February 2010.
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR35.1/rosen.php
摘录：
Perhaps McChrystal's most crucial assumption—also endorsed by Obama—was that the failure to create a unified, centralized state in Afghanistan will lead to al Qaeda's return. This claim is widely contested. Al Qaeda is already ensconced in Pakistan, where it is better protected from the United States than it would be in Afghanistan. And the Taliban are not interested in global jihad.
Barry R McCaffrey. McCaffrey Associates, 05 December 2009. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0911McCaffrey.pdf
摘录：
Most Afghans are also dismayed at the injustice and corruption of the government (in particular the ANP) compared to the more disciplined and Islamic Taliban.
Twice in recent months we have seen battalion sized units of Taliban fighters conduct highly successful (not-withstanding catastrophic losses by the attacking insurgents) complex attacks employing surprise, reconnaissance, fire support, maneuver, and enormous courage in an attempt to over run isolated US units. This is not Iraq. These Taliban have a political objective to knock NATO out of the war —backed up by ferocious combat capabilities.
Stephen M. Walt. ForeignPolicy.com , 30 November 2009.
摘录：
Yet if you really want to know “why they hate us,” … the fact remains that the United States has killed a very large number of Arab or Muslim individuals over the past three decades.
编辑点评：
And no amount of “public diplomacy” or “American narrative” will win friends when the US is responsible for killing sons and daughters of people in their home land. That is a basic piece of strategic wisdom!
Adam L. Silverman. Sic Semper Tyrannis , 12 November 2009.
摘录：
Given the reality that the US faces in Afghanistan; the historic lack of functional centralized government, exceedingly high number of societal elements, many of which are geographically isolated or semi-isolated, the illegitimacy of the current Afghan government, and the fact that groups we are fighting are not all insurgents makes successfully reaching the COIN end state of tethering Afghan society back to the Afghan state very, very difficult. The debate on the use of COIN really needs to be focused in on this difficult set of Afghan circumstances and whether they allow any chance for a positive counterinsurgency outcome.
卡尔E.艾肯伯里。 Embassy of the USA, Kabul, 08 November 2009.
http://static1.firedoglake.com/37/files/2009/11/Winning-in-Afghanistan.pdf
卡尔W ·艾肯伯里。 在纽约时报发表的两条电缆创作到喀布尔的美国驻联合国大使给国务卿克林顿。 The first is dated 06 November 2009 and is entitled “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns”. 二是2009年11月09日题为“除了在阿富汗平叛展望”。
http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan
编辑点评：
Quibble: COIN is a tactic, not a strategy. 非狡辩：战争在战术层面上是很少的决定。
克里斯蒂娜汉塞尔和尼基塔Perfilyev 核不扩散审查 ，2009年11月。
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915796781&fulltext=713240928
摘录：
... ...如果中国军事专家决定，中国需要逃避导弹防御拦截器机动弹头的能力，他们可能需要测试重新设计的弹头。 It is not clear that the Obama administration, however, will be willing to back down on missile defense in order to obtain Chinese agreement on a CTBT. ，虽然没有全面禁止核试验条约“，走向裁军的进一步进展是不可能的;不会采取非核武器国家的核武器国家的承诺”不扩散核武器条约“第六条认真，和未来的军备竞赛的可能性（在很大程度上煽动担心美国的导弹防御系统和精确制导武器）是增加的。
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/PublicOpinionProject.pdf
Project website — http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/iigg/pop/
摘录：
Publics around the world—including in the United States—are strongly internationalist in orientation. They believe that global challenges are simply too complex and daunting to be addressed by unilateral or even regional means. In every country polled, most people support a global system based on the rule of law, international treaties, and robust multilateral institutions. They believe their own government is obliged to abide by international law, even when doing so is at odds with its perceived national interest. Large majorities, including among Americans, reject a hegemonic role for the United States, but do want the United States to participate in multilateral efforts to address international issues.
Gilles Dorronsoro. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/fixing_failed_strategy.pdf
摘录：
…the International Coalition, with its limited resources and diminishing popular support, should focus on its core interests: preventing the Taliban from retaking Afghan cities, avoiding the risk that al-Qaeda would try to reestablish sanctuaries there, pursue a more aggressive counterinsurgency strategy in the North, and reallocate its civilian aid resources to places where the insurgency is still weak.
Editor's Comment
Some would say that Pashtunistan is already a nation which can't yet fully establish itself as a state (although there is already considerable local governance, both Pashtun tribal and Taliban.) Presently Punjabi (Pakistani) and US/NATO military intervention prevent the establishment of a state.
Dorronsoro's Afghan war strategy would seem to be a step in moving the Pashtunistan national cause to within a decade or so of success. Of course, the cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad would have to fall under Pashtunistan governance eventually, even if Western forces resisted for some years.
Alissa J. Rubin. New York Times . 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/weekinreview/01RUBIN.html
Gian P. Gentile. New York Times , 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/opinion/31iht-edgentile.html?_r=1
摘录：
History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.
The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.
Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case.
Paul Rogers. Open Democracy , 29 October 2009. Hosted on the Commondreams website.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/11/03-6
摘录：
If there is a way ahead, it rests not on short-term calculations about troop numbers but on a larger reassessment by the Barack Obama administration of the entire US security posture in the middle east and southwest Asia. This will have to do more than crisis-manage the dire problems inherited from George W Bush; what is needed is no less than a move beyond military-led thinking to an integrated understanding of what security in the 21st century actually is.
Colin S. Gray. Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 28 October 2009.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=947
Michael T. Klare. Tom Dispatch , 26 October 2009.
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175131/michael_klare_the_great_superpower_meltdown
摘录：
How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma President Obama and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.
article references http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/global-trends-2025
David Isenberg. PRIO, 15 October 2009.
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1720057691/Isenberg Private Military Contractors PRIO Report-2009.pdf
Jon Ward. Washington Times , 15 October 2009.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/15/obama-weighs-more-than-afghan-troop-buildup//print/
Syed Saleem Shahzad. Asia Times , 15 October 2009.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html
Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman. Foreign Policy , 15 October 2009.
Daniel L. Davis. US Army (unofficial and unclassified), 14 October 2009. Hosted on the Sic Semper Tyrannis Website.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/files/go-deep-_14-oct-09_.pdf
摘录：
In 2009 Afghanistan today, conditions on the ground are nothing like that of Iraq of early 2007 and there is little reason to believe the tactical success achieved by the Iraq surge could be repeated today in Afghanistan. There is presently no successful “Sons of Iraq”- type operation that would remove large numbers of enemy fighters from the streets, valleys and mountains. No large segment of the insurgency has indicated any interest in establishing a ceasefire with allied forces. The insurgency in Afghanistan today is spread over hundreds of thousands of square miles of inhospitable terrain and even 40,000 additional fighters would likely be insufficient to militarily stem the tide.
James Vega. The Democratic Strategist , 12 October 2009.
http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/_memos/tds_SM_Vega_Afg.pdf
Galrahn. Information Dissemination , 03 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/misunderstanding-problem.html
摘录：
When I see the story saying “President Obama has reaffirmed a 4-decade-old secret understanding that has allowed Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to international inspections,” I read it as not only protecting Israel's right to have nuclear weapons, but Israel seeking assurances in writing that they have the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary… perhaps on a well protected nuclear facility.
After all, if Israel is willing to accept the risk of attacking Iran knowing full well a few conventional bombs could very easily cost the United States its strategic objectives in both Afghanistan and Iraq, efforts paid for with 8 years of American blood; Israel will make damn sure they destroy what they intend to in an attack on Iran. This whole issue is about whether Israel assesses that Iran will use nuclear weapons against Israel. If the defensive purpose of nuclear weapons is to defend a country from being attacked with nuclear weapons, and defending Israel from potential Iranian nuclear weapon use against Israel is the issue here, then I think Israel use of nuclear weapons must be considered as part of the calculus.
Disbelieve Israel would go nuclear all you want, but Israels short, modern history is one of Israel consistently taking enormous risks, both politically and militarily. It is the rule rather than the exception, something we should not forget; particularly considering that the new buried and concealed nuclear site everyone is discussing is in Qom – a Shi'a Islam holy city.
Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook. Joint Forces Quarterly , October 2009.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-55/4.pdf
Thomas G. Mahnken. Joint Forces Quarterly , 01 October 2009.
http://intelros.ru/pdf/jfq_55/2.pdf
Gian P. Gentile. Parameters , Autumn 2009.
http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/documents/gentile.pdf
摘录：
Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy.
编辑点评：
Agreed! COIN is a collection of tactics. What is missing in Afghanistan is a strategy with any credible chance of success … despite the lip-service to political solutions.
General Stanley McChrystal, Commander ISAF, speech on Afghanistan to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 01 October 2009.
http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=31537&type=full&servicetype=Attachment
Robert H. Scales. Armed Forces Journal , October 2009.
http://www.afji.com/2009/10/4266625
Frank G. Hoffman. Armed Forces Journal , October 2009.
http://www.afji.com/2009/10/4198658
Michael A. Cohen. Dissent , Fall 2009.
http://spi.typepad.com/files/arms-for-the-world.pdf
摘录：
… the defining characteristic of US foreign policy and national security policy in the post–cold-war era is the extent to which America's foreign policy agenda is being crafted and implemented by the military. …Whether it's waging the war on terror or the war on drugs; nation-building in post-conflict environments; development, democracy promotion, or diplomacy; fighting cyber-criminals or training foreign armies, the global face of the United States today is generally that of a soldier.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), DoD, 29 September 2009.
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/CPO/DSCA_StratPlan_2009-2014.pdf
Douglas MacGregor. Defense News , 28 September 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4296926&c=FEA&s=COM
Lewis Carroll. (English Logician, Mathematician, Photographer and Novelist, especially remembered for Alice's Adventures in Wonderland . 1832-1898)
白宫。 17 September 2009. Hosted on the Council on Foreign Relations website.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20225/fact_sheet_on_us_missile_defense_policy.html
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