克里斯托弗·普雷布尔和查尔斯·奈特。 赫芬顿邮报 ，20于2012年1月。
http://defensealt.org/ysCbHQ

摘录：

平衡取决于你站在什么。 与我们的人身安全方面，美国与大陆的和平与一个强大的敌人，缺乏得天独厚。 我们的军队是最好的训练，最好的主导，和世界上最好的装备。 这是我们的不稳定的财政和我们的经济不景气，使我们脆弱到绊。

不幸的是，新战略并不完全理解我们的优势，也没有完全解决我们的弱点。 最后，它并没有实现艾森豪威尔的吹嘘平衡。

__________________________________________________

保G。特霍西尔CNN，2011年11月23日。
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/23/opinion/thornhill-defense-cuts/index.html

摘录：

国家的领导需要一个B计划，使英雄的假设 - 或希望 - 关于未来战争的可能性不大，不会因疏忽而导致的战略灾难。 这是比它似乎更难。 B计划将允许更多的灵活性，以满足什么可以去的战略环境中的错误，而不是仅仅使预算削减。

编辑点评：

B计划是保持良好的战略储备。“ 作为新保守派想指出美国花在军事上其国内生产总值只有4.5％。 如果捏新的威胁，美国可以很容易地增加开支和从事其仍有相当大的工业和知识基础。 这个国家与重组战略面临的问题是缺乏政治意愿。 文职领导人的厌恶问美国人民的牺牲。 一个强大的国民警卫队和预备役部队，不滥用不必要的战争和社会的期望，在国家紧急时期支付附加税的频繁部署了这个国家，同时保持小立平时力战略需要准备的基础。 有了这样一个战略计划，美国可以置备的任何威胁。

伊桑·波拉克， 经济政策研究所的博客 ，2011年9月20日。 http://www.epi.org/blog/militaristic-foreign-policy-saves-money/

奥巴马总统的财政计划的持续批评之一是它重要的战争为节省开支减少。 基本上，国会预算办公室的计算部分，以最近期的战争补充（技术上称为海外应急行动，或OCO挂单）和假设，通胀将每年花费在可预见的地平线量调整其国防基线。 这就增加了超过10年约为1.73万亿。 主席的建议，但是，只包括在OCO挂单支出为1.1万亿美元左右，节省了超过10年的653亿美元，。

然而，一些批评，声称这些储蓄不能算，因为CBO的OCO挂单基线本身是不现实的，因此，储蓄是“真实”。例如，作为一个负责任的联邦预算案（CRFB）委员会认为，这些储蓄计数是1 “的预算花招” ，总统使用到“夸大了他的积蓄。”根据这个批判，另一个为OCO挂单支出基线应该是使用，无论是总统的预算要求或CBO的缩编政策选项，这将降低基准和使几乎不可能生成减少战争开支预算节余。

所有应有的尊重到CRFB和其他的批评，但这种批评是愚蠢的。 CBO的OCO挂单基线是“不现实的”，而布什总统的外交政策延长到永远积极的入侵为中心的做法，它代表成本。 谢天谢地，奥巴马总统是在试图改变美国的外交政策，制订了从伊拉克和阿富汗的部队和走向多边，耐心，外交，最重要的，更便宜的方法的过程中。 此外，财政计划的建议上限OCO挂单的开支，从而确保实现这些节约。

奥巴马总统的外交政策的做法，成本低于布什总统的钱，预算前景应该反映这些储蓄。

编辑点评：

它必须是一个多么糟糕的事情进步，环保产业，现在庆祝发送到转移注意从实际的预算削减，特别是，进一步削减财政战斗，以保护五角大楼的烟雾从奥巴马政府的大粉扑的迹象。 伊桑·波拉克曾OMB的，所以他一定会理解到CBO的基线预测，根据现行法律建立会计信息失真。 世界上没有一个人（包括那些在CBO的准备基线）认为，OCO挂单的支出将继续资助在伊拉克和阿富汗的战争，作为2011年的同一水平。 这就是为什么在CBO并“画下来的政策选择” - 估计可能OCO挂单成本。 这后者的运动是不是“傻”，也没有这样的估计是考虑预算削减计划的基础上提出的建议。

波拉克先生必须也知道，奥巴马总统向国会提交2012财年预算包含只有50亿美元每年为OCO挂单未来几年。 这是什么？ $ 118亿美元，永远或50亿美元永远？ 你不能两者兼得。

CBO的下拉选项平局肯定是更好的预算（和赤字
减少）规划，无论是不现实的“占位”（
是根本不负责任的预算）或CBO的基线神器
永远的$ 118亿美元。

如果奥巴马总统希望宣布一项计划，以节省有意义
金额从OCO挂单，他将需要更迅速从阿富汗撤回宣布......但没有人真正相信他离开
阿富汗在2014年。 因此，这是所有的烟雾和镜子和进步应该对此感到可怕，没有庆祝。

它是虚伪，声称CBO的基线OCO挂单是某种布什的责任。 这仅仅是一个CBO的如何做其基线的方法神器。

美国总统奥巴马一直负责为近三年来，并没有带来所有的部队从伊拉克几乎已开始在阿富汗的一场平局。 的118亿美元目前每年OCO挂单是他的责任作为是的预测，提出十几年和然后声称从消费储蓄假的尼斯“$ 653亿美元超过十年......。”如果他是真的愿意以结束在阿富汗的战争很快他也许能减少一半，OCO挂单，并提供从未来战争的成本减少$ 325亿美元的赤字削减。

，直到今年在国会预算纠葛，迫使他的手
继续喂高基预算，五角大楼每年。 没有任何证据，奥巴马总统的外交政策“的方式来... []更便宜”......还不如慷慨提供了五角大楼的关注。

我们必须立足上雾里看花进步的政策。 这样
政治在长远来说，我们只伤害。

另一本预算噱头的批判，可以发现： http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/gordon-adams/2369/how-about-those-defense-savings 。

___________________________________________________________

杰夫·雅各比。 波士顿环球报“，2011年6月22日。

摘录：

来与大国很大的责任，有时这些职责之一是摧毁怪物：霸谁受害无辜，蔑视文明的规则。 如果需要警务街区和城市，按理说世界不太多。 正如当地歹徒兴旺时，警察寻找其他的方式，这样做罪犯在世界舞台上。

我们的世界需要一个警察。 和大多数美国人是否喜欢还是不喜欢，只是他们的不可或缺的国家适合的工作。

编辑点评：

当四分之三的美国人反对美国世界警察的角色，也许他们了解警务工作，杰夫·雅各比没有根本的东西。 一个没有警察部队由司法机关的监督和指导机构的法律无疑是一个专制的公式 。

雅各比暴政永远不会赞同，但业余爱好是谁当选，只有10％的世界人民负责的白宫居住者的全球警察，是一个决定，是在全球舞台上的私刑。 考虑美国人的武器，如果中国或俄罗斯自己上台后，它是全球性的治安维持会。

美国领导人如此高高兴兴地拿起这只会拖延一天，当我们有能力的国际司法和警务机构的作用。 如果我们的领导人试图想即使到未来几年应该很清楚他们的治安维持会的做法，不符合美国的利益。

[此评论的版本，以 波士顿环球报“ 编辑的信中，2011年6月28日公布。

五角大楼的幻影节省：$ 330B索赔程序再现侵蚀
马库斯Weisgerber 防务新闻 ，2011年5月16日。
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2011/05/pentagons-phantom-savings-330b-claim.html

摘录：

该款项为330亿美元]近40％将直接回到美国的军事计划，复制取消，目前还不清楚，另外10％的都来了，据防务新闻分析和几位分析师。

......许多军事服务的能力要求留在地方。 超过130亿美元的书籍，或将很快跟进或替代方案，。 在2010年取消的计划，至少有五个已被重新启动，或在规划阶段重新开始。

编辑点评：

当奥巴马总统处理国家，约4月13日的联邦赤字，他说，“在过去的两年中，国防部长盖茨已经勇敢地采取了浪费性支出，节省$ 400亿元，在当前和未来的支出。 我相信我们能够做到这一点。“我们看着对方的军事预算分析家说，”咦，我们没有错过什么吗？“我们没有发现任何显著削减五角大楼的开支，减少联邦可以计入赤字。 总统在哪里得到那么大的数字？

当然，我们已经注意到，当国防部长盖茨宣布美元预算削减78亿美元，为2012五年防御计划。 我们注意到，美国国防部的预算仍然会继续增长，这些削减一些比较软（依赖于对未来通货膨胀率的假设），将在年出最节省。 （见： 五角大楼抗削减赤字 ）

我们注意到，国防部长盖茨在2009年取消了若干方案。 但我们也注意到，许多人取消节目假定储蓄大幅减少（见戈登·亚当斯，被他人取代的国防预算！仍然需要得到它的权利 ）

在总统讲话后几天我们评价如何有是多少真正的储蓄比总统归因局长盖茨的“勇敢”的努力。 我指出了 ，$ 68一月亿$ 78储蓄亿美元已被消耗时，2012的战争费用出现在2月公布的财政预算案中，更换小占位符号码。

本杰明·弗里德曼指出 ，“目前的'储蓄'完全由消费，五角大楼重新规划和保管，以及未来”储蓄“来减少计划开支的增长，而不是减少实际开支。”

卡尔Conetta审查这些应该回去削减到2009年的历史和比较连续奥巴马预算，2010年到2012年，发现没有“也许”国防部推算出年减少233亿美元以上。

“有关的4000亿美元的无疑问的独立分析师的集体怀疑达到国防部新闻 ，的领导国防工业，每周，其中马库斯Weisgerber试图证明局局长盖茨”$ 330储蓄亿索赔的2009计划取消编辑的注意。 当国防部官员拒绝请求给一个图防务新闻使用理由预算文件，国防部官员的公开声明，每年收购报告和政府问责办公室“的计划，由计划击穿，估计工程计划的成本。 对于不是书本分类及远的长期计划-但考虑到国防部的预测-认为坦克和分析师的预期被使用“的Weisgerber文章的标题，” 五角大楼的幽灵储蓄 “，总结了防务新闻 ”结果“的努力来证明国防部长盖茨索赔的储蓄。

查尔斯·奈特。 对国防替代的项目指出 ，2011年5月12日。

Word是两个生产2010年四年防务评估报告中的校长，将负责生产的“基本”国防检讨总统奥巴马下令在4月13日讲话的赤字。 他们是为部队战略和规划，副国防部副部长凯瑟琳·希克斯 ，谁是牵头的2010年四年防务评估报告的作者和大卫Ochmanek，副助理国防部长，为部队发展，谁为首的“分析和细胞融合”拉到一起分析方面，在过去的四年防务评估报告。

更新

防务新闻 “的任务和能力审查将恭 ，成本评估和方案评价[和前海军分析中心（CNA）主席主任福克斯领导的米歇尔·弗卢努瓦 ，国防部的报告（2011年5月23日）政策[和五角大楼官员在2010年四年防务评估报告的负责;和海军上将 参谋长联席会议主席迈克尔·马伦 。“

编辑点评：

把相同的人，谁做了2010年在负责产生新的审查审查，提出了一个明显的问题，我们是否应该期待什么多“新”或“基本”从这次审查。 当然，在过去的QDR已经没有任何真正意义上的字是“根本”。

希克斯女士写入到新的审查的损失分将是一个犯罪嫌疑人，“我们得到了相当多的权利，当我们去年做了。 现在，当然，如果你愿意承担更大的安全风险，你可以减少一些作品的力量姿势，但是这是一个政治决定......“

如果新的审查，使这样的如意介绍，它将为总统和国家不佳。 2010年四年防务评估报告并没有做出任何真正的努力，设置明确的优先次序，在众多的上市，没有一个战略发展的原则，这是一个实际的路径内设置资源限制的军事要求。 新的基本审查，必须出示各种低风险的选项，可以实现各种资源的投资水平。 它的作者不应简单地推入政治领域的安全隐患的问题。

奥巴马总统将智能征求想法，从各种来源，远远超出了五角大楼的战略，政策和力量规划人员达到。 如果需要一个基本的审查，这是明智的听取和考虑不同的声音。

编者的评论

2011年4月13日（修订和更新，2011年4月16日）

在4月奥巴马总统的第13届“赤字的讲话”，他说：

正如我们必须找到更多的储蓄，在国内计划，我们必须在防守做相同的。 在过去的两年中，国防部长盖茨已经勇敢地采取上浪费的开支，节省$ 400亿元，在当前和未来的支出。 我相信我们能够做到这一点了。

什么可能做到这一点再次“是什么意思？

实际上有助于从预计的五角大楼预算削减赤字400亿美元？

这就要求五角大楼参加，并动用400亿美元少。 总统奥巴马在五角大楼储蓄减少赤字 400亿美元，第一是指，相信可以重复，以确定多大的实际贡献 ，但它是非常困难的。

让我们快速浏览一下在400亿美元，第一通过时间落后的组件。

国防部长盖茨今年1月宣布在五年内削减78亿美元。 二月，当总统的2012财年预算中出现，但是这方面削减赤字70亿美元蒸发。 消耗680亿美元的2011财年预计的50亿美元的占位符特殊的海外应急行动（战争）的预算由2012财年118亿美元的预算真正OCO挂单取代。 另外$ 2亿元的储蓄似乎只是消失在五年预算预测，也许是因为那些讨厌的“舍入误差”，鼠疫五角大楼的预算。

国防部长盖茨在2010年宣布，在“效率”的节约100亿美元。 他当时很直率，说，他在五角大楼保持所有的积蓄支付的其他要求。 因此，我们不能合理计入削减赤字，并相信总统没有指望那些向已保存的400亿美元。

使叶片约在五角大楼节省322亿美元，白宫需要交代。

2011年2月于17日在参议院军事委员会作证前，国防部长盖茨说：

...在过去两年国防奥巴马总统提交的预算，我们已经削减或取消的困扰或多余的程序，如果完成，将有成本超过$ 330亿美元。

连接这对奥巴马总统的讲话防务新闻 报道 （2011年4月13日）：

在$ 400已保存亿美元中，3300亿美元是应该来自盖茨的削减武器计划 - 例如取消陆军未来作战系统计划和空军的下一代轰炸机，这两个盖茨在2010年的预算中终止。 然而，这两个方案都被替换：陆军正在开发的地面作战车辆，空军轰炸机计划已经推出了大幅回落。

“应该”和“但是”是在前款的关键词。 是真正的节约，在任何有意义的方式有助于削减赤字的计划取消，会导致五角大楼预算恒瑞下降...，并不能取代其他一些开支。

戈登·亚当斯的史汀生中心的评估在2010年11月5篇文章这样可节省3300亿美元的索赔：

盖茨没有削减来自国防3300亿美元。 当他宣​​布的硬件削减，他说，估计出一年可节约330亿美元，但他没有从预计的国防预算削减镍;他希望，因为他已经明确表示，用于其他投资的储蓄，没有给他们回纳税人。 ，这个数字太大了，无论如何，因为他终止了F-22和C-17运输机时，既不是其中之一，在长期的预算（他一直试图让这两项计划在到达正常死亡，按照计划，和国会保持的方式获得。）更是太大，因为他的储蓄数字没有出来，他提出了同样的任务，如更换与终止的未来作战系统（FCS）车辆，另类投资净新军汽车研发计划。 所以，在一个非数字的大乱哄哄的，但没有国防这里的一大截。

五角大楼或行政管理和预算局迄今还没有产生任何这些所谓的储蓄从国防部长盖茨的计划取消，这表明是哪里来的恒瑞会计。 同时，这将是明智的大幅低估其价值时，考虑整体的联邦开支。

我们知道的是， 五角大楼的预算继续上升 ，尽管“储蓄”。五角大楼和政府可能会说，五角大楼的预算将增长得更快，如果国防部长盖茨没有那些“勇敢”的削减计划。 有可能。 但是，“本来，”简直是不相同的实际贡献来削减赤字，这需要真正削减五角大楼的预算恒瑞。

在切割的五角大楼预算的背线方面，当我们删除在战争费用，期待已久的减少，我们可以算只是$ 8亿美元，国防部长盖茨已经给了通过FY16赤字的五个一年防御计划减少（FYDP）。

展望十多年有更多的储蓄在总统的预测。 我的同事的卡尔Conetta发现$ 164亿美元减少重叠的四个“出年”五角大楼的开支（FY17-20）比较时，总统的2011财年和2012财年提交的预算。

我们可以推测，这是我们实现国防部长盖茨储蓄$ 330亿美元，但它只是猜测...

到目前为止，还没有一个政府已经表现出足够的细节，五角大楼将减少联邦赤字，尽管舍入误差做出贡献什么。

编者的评论

有至少很多理由认为，真正削减国防开支的显著将难以实现，为有有理由怀疑，会被发现，或大幅削减福利支出会发生显着的收入增长。 “政治现实”全国财政责任和改革委员会将考虑所有的选项确实是艰巨的。 如果有快捷，方便和明显的决定将有会有没有必要委员会。

政治现实，改变部分时间，因为底层的现实，最终改变政治计算。 国防开支的情况下是这样。 经过超过10年的快速增长有可能是一些裁员，特别是2015年，在这十年中。

最近预测，高科技工业协会科技美国基金会在国防部恒瑞预测2011至20年这十年国防开支的可能路径。

美国高科技的预测是真正在基地五角大楼预算削减9％或45亿美元 （不包括海外应急行动战争补充资金）在2015年相对于2011年的零基预算（美元，2011年）。

当考虑到五角大楼的首选预算路径这十年，至少有1％的实际年增长率，美国技术预测削减国防开支，由2015年的16％。

美国的高科技海外应急行动（OCO挂单）在10年战争补充开支的预测也是重要的考虑因素。 自2010财年（奥巴马总统的第一个预算）已经OCO挂单战争补充国防部的预算为2012-FY15每年50亿美元。OCO挂单战争补充在2011财年预算为1.59亿美元。

虽然在实际OCO挂单战争补充可能下降，在2012的军事作战在阿富汗剩余升高的需求，这是不可能的OCO挂单战争补充将来到下来，甚至$ 50亿美元，让仅$ 109亿美元在2012。 高科技美国预测OCO挂单$ 122战争支出2012亿美元。

这些预算不足可能OCO挂单战争补充成本可能超出政府预计这些国家的债务，应算作。

美国高科技的预测是122亿美元，2012财年，在2013财年的$ 102亿美元，69 FY14亿美元，并在FY15的57亿美元，为OCO挂单补充。 加起来超过五年防卫计划预算为150亿元 ......一个国家的债务除了未编入预算。

联邦预算达到“基本平衡”FY15为目标年，预测OCO挂单战争补充将增加70亿美元的财政责任和改革还面临着全国委员会试图在这一年来平衡预算的问题。

亚当研究赫伯特空军部队杂志 ，十一月，2010。
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/November％202010/1110edit.aspx

摘录：

不明智的呼吁削减五角大楼的预算遵循可预见的潮汐。 没有可信的分析策略或要求，评论家们再次宣布国防开支失控。

编辑点评：

In his editorial Security Isn't Cheap Adam J. Herbert cites the work of the Sustainable Defense Task Force as a case in point of critics of Pentagon spending recommending cuts “without credible analysis of strategy or requirements.” As a member of the task force I differ over the credibility of our analysis. But let me speak to where I agree with Mr. Herbert:

• “Security is not cheap.” In fact it is extremely expensive. When the country is hit with a financial disaster we owe it to the country and our military to reexamine our national security strategy and make sure priorities are clear and that our military investments are cost-effective. In the last twelve years of Pentagon budgets the planning has proceeded as though there is no resource constraint. Unfortunately, that is true of the last QDR as well. Those days are clearly over – Secretary Gates has said as much.

•“训练有素，装备精良，职业军人是不便宜。 如果国家希望它成本更低，国家将可能要问少做。“没错。 Since the end of the Cold War the US military has steadily advanced its global reach and engagement. Missions have proliferated, including many that should be done by civilians in the State Department and other agencies. Significant numbers of US troops still remain in Europe, even though there is no military threat to Europe that allies can't handle. The most important take-away lesson from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that long low-intensity land wars are not cost-effective uses of US military power and should be avoided whenever possible. Hopefully we can all agree there should never again be such a “war of choice.”

• “There are certainly ways to reduce defense spending…” Yes, and one that will save around $45 billion in Air Force modernization accounts is available in a choice about how to modernize the fighter fleet. The Air Force has decided to replace its aging F-16s with just about the most expensive new fighter one can dream up, the F-35. In today's fiscal environment either the Air Force will end up with a lot fewer of these planes than planned, or they will choose to get ahead of the budget crunch and modernize with new block versions of the still best of class F-16s and limit the buy of F-35s this decade to a few squadrons for high-intensity air-superiority missions. If serious air competition emerges a decade from now we can then roll out production of F-35s (or perhaps a less costly follow-on to the F-16), planes presumably much improved with ten years or more of further fighter technology development.

Michael Krepon. Arms Control Wonk , 08 April 2010.
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2690/treaty-signings

摘录：

Despite claims to the contrary, New START does not inhibit the growth of US conventional power projection capabilities that, unlike nuclear weapons, are militarily useful on battlefields. Nor will New START impede ballistic missile defense programs…

编辑点评：
… and that is why, despite the rhetoric of the moment, this treaty doesn't do much to advance us toward the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons. Unbounded conventional military power and missile defenses for Western rich nations are not compatible with the establishment of a global international security regime sufficiently reliable to support the abolition of nuclear weapons.

For more on this problem see my comments on Vice President Biden's speech at the National Defense University, 18 February 2010.

as delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas Wednesday, 03 March 2010.
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1336

摘录：

I've come to three conclusions – three principles – about the proper use of modern military forces:

1) … military power should not – maybe cannot – be the last resort of the state. Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools to policymakers. We can, merely by our presence, help alter certain behavior. Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy. We can assist rapidly in disaster-relief efforts, as we did in the aftermath of Haiti's earthquake. We can help gather intelligence, support reconnaissance and provide security.

And we can do so on little or no notice. That ease of use is critical for deterrence. An expeditionary force that provides immediate, tangible effects. It is also vital when innocent lives are at risk. So yes, the military may be the best and sometimes the first tool; it should never be the only tool.

2) Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way.

3）政策和战略应该不断奋斗与另一个。 有些人宁愿在军事毫无疑问，勾画出一个特定的策略，然后得到的出路，留下的平衡，以实现在现场指挥员的政治领导。 但在过去9年的经验告诉我们两件事：一个明确的战略是必要的军事行动;这一战略将不得不改变，因为这些业务的发展。 换句话说，在这些类型的战争中的成功是迭代的，它是不是决定性的。

编辑点评：

马伦的第一个原则是在极端危险的。 它是美国国家军事化的悲催。 马伦遭受莫名其妙的失忆症，在20世纪战争的恐怖。

美国很可能会付出高昂的代价，为几十年来在什么恶有恶报快速和容易的度假胜地，在2002-2003年的战争与他们的军事仪器如醉如痴的决策者。 如果战争是不到万不得已，那么决策者领导人赤贫的失败。

由卡尔Conetta和查尔斯·奈特。 国防部新闻 ，2010年2月21日。

在过去的十年中，美国国防部自朝鲜战争以来一直享有在其预算空前上升。 与奥巴马总统的2011财年预算请求，这是近100％的实质从冷战后低。 但一些观察家认为，这样的消费水平可以继续安装国债。 所以这是明智的，现在想想储蓄选项。

一开始是问，是什么驱使预算这么高？ 显然，战争是答案的一部分。 但是，他们占为今天的支出只有20％。 他们是最有可能为节约目标。

它是更加富有成效，以反映在过去的努力在国防改革的缺点。 我们可以做的更好？ 这也是值得我们思考，在后冷战时期，它已经明显散漫有关部队现代化建设的实践。

冷战结束后提出了一个独特的机会 - 以及舱单需要 - 我们的防御姿态的结构性改革。 20世纪90年代的力量减少必然冒着效率下降，由于规模影响支持活动和设备购置的经济损失。 这些问题的标准解决方案是重组作为一个变得越来越小，在降低复杂性匹配的大小减少 - 国防部没有，在大多数情况下，按照这种做法。

虽然较小，国防部和服务基本上保留甚至增加其复杂性。 举例来说，今天有50个主要的命令，要么一步到位的服务水平高于或低于 - 没有太大的区别在冷战期间。

在我们最近的一项研究预算的趋势 ，我们确定了显著的变化已在20世纪90年代提出的十几个领域。 这些涉及服务的角色和使命，巩固各种支持和培训职能，联合recentering预算和收购计划。

此外，国防部的采办，后勤和财务管理制度改革的需要已明显很长很长的时间。 然而，只有两个改革举措 - 竞争力的采购和关闭军事基地 - 被追捕产生显著，每年可节省远远不够，这些都没有达到超过4％的国防预算。

也有希望在90年代中期，“军事革命”可能导致新的效率。 通过战场意识的提高，改善物流，提高防区外精确攻击的能力，并在网络内和跨服务的单位，我们将获得更多的价位。

在一些地区，如精确攻击能力大大增加。 剧院物流也得到了改善。 但无处已经在信息技术革命导致清单，并大幅节省。 而不是取代，传统的功能和平台，新技术大多只是补充他们。

网络中心战的发展前景，可能会减少冗余能力的需要。 但向服务共享一个共同的神经系统方面的进展一直缓慢，主要涉及的特种作战部队和精确对地攻击。 一般来说，网络中心能力存在作为贫血覆盖，以服务为中心的传统结构和资产。

国防部和服务都面临着多大的压力，在过去十年中，以节约或改造。 购置设备，这也是显而易见的。

近几十年来，我们可以看出三个不同的收购工作的趋势。 首先，有旧的程序，来自冷战时期具有相当大的体制势头。 第二，有反映新的信息技术革命潜力的方案。 最后，还有一些，如近期大规模购买煤矿抗伏击保护车辆，相对应的新的使命要求，自适应方案。

在一个理想的世界，必须适应新的任务和情况，将利用新技术革命潜力，改写或取代旧的程序。 但这种情况并未发生。

太在现代化建设中资金2.5万亿美元，自1990年以来，延续大约1990年的现状。 转型收购多限于生产的补充，如“捕食者”无人驾驶飞机，遗留阿森纳。 和自适应收购很大程度上推迟到外地经验被迫一阵特设六年前开始努力。

The Pentagon's central authorities have done too little, too late to compel the integration of modernization efforts along adaptive lines. Legacy, transformational and adaptive modernization have lurched forward together, but poorly integrated and competing for resources. And yet, even though modernization spending now surpasses that of the Reagan era, no one is happy with the result.

For 10 years, Congress and the White House have been permissive when it comes to defense spending; this has undercut any impetus for reform and prioritization. Obama's decision to further boost the defense budget suggests that this dysfunction will persist for a while, but this, too, is a bubble that will burst. Preparing for that eventuality means revisiting options for structural reform and getting clearer on our strategic priorities.

Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University – As Prepared for Delivery, 18 February 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-national-defense-university

摘录：

Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies.

Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong.

编辑点评：

When Vice President Biden speaks of plans to “further strengthen … preeminent conventional forces” with “capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield” and “conventional warheads with worldwide reach” he seeks to reassure his domestic audience that nuclear disarmament will not make America less secure. His words, however, do not reassure other nuclear powers or potential future nuclear powers such as Iran who will perceive these enhanced American conventional capabilities as strategic threats to their national security.

Biden surely understands that he is not really offering us a pathway to nuclear abolition. We will not get there if other nations are expected to relinquish their nuclear arsenals to face “undeniable” conventional power from the US

If Biden's speech truly represents the elaboration of the “President's Prague Agenda” it leaves us with a very big gap (conceptually and practically) between the near term goal Biden articulates (“We will work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”) and the longer term goal (“We are working both to stop [nuclear weapons] proliferation and eventually to eliminate them.”) which President Obama confirmed in Prague.

Barry Blechman. New York Times , 18 February 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19blechman.html

摘录：

Here's how a global nuclear disarmament treaty could work. First, it would spell out a decades-long schedule for the verified destruction of all weapons, materials and facilities. Those possessing the largest arsenals — the United States and Russia — would make deep cuts first. Those with smaller arsenals would join at specified dates and levels. To ensure that no state gained an advantage, the treaty would incorporate “rest stops”: if a state refused to comply with a scheduled measure, other nations' reductions would be suspended until the violation was corrected. This dynamic would generate momentum, but also ensure that if the effort collapsed, the signatories would be no less secure than before.

编辑点评：
There is something missing in this measured disarmament scheme which invalidates it as a path to full nuclear disarmament. Blechman makes an erroneous assumption shared by too many nuclear disarmament advocates. He assumes that nuclear weapons are a class of weapons that can be dealt with in isolation from the problems of international security and insecurity. Nuclear weapons cannot be separated strategically from the context of the conventional military power they supplement.

Note the following phrase in the above excerpt from Blechman: “To ensure that no state gained an advantage…” His prescription applies only to nuclear weapons and presumes no adjustments to conventional military power. In those conditions some states stand to gain considerable advantage from nuclear disarmament.

Imagine the case of Russia in Blechman's staged draw down of nuclear forces with the US As Russia approaches zero nuclear weapons they become more and more vulnerable to superior US conventional military power.

Without parallel and compensatory reductions and adjustments in conventional forces and strong political assurances weaker nations such as Russia will never agree to give up all their nuclear weapons.

Careful schemes of balanced nuclear weapons disarmament of the type that Blechman argues for cannot by themselves get us to zero nuclear weapons. Compensating for the national insecurities arising from imbalances in conventional military power must be part of any formula for full nuclear disarmament. We need to work toward an international security regime that delivers the reassurance of fifty years without international aggression and military intervention. After that period of peace nuclear nations might be ready to go to zero.

Greg Mello. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 10 February 2010.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox
Greg Mello is the executive director and co-founder of the Los Alamos Study Group .

______________

Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama gave a speech that many have interpreted as a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.

Now, however, the White House is requesting one of the larger increases in warhead spending history. If its request is fully funded, warhead spending would rise 10 percent in a single year, with further increases promised for the future. Los Alamos National Laboratory, the biggest target of the Obama largesse, would see a 22 percent budget increase, its largest since 1944. In particular, funding for a new plutonium “pit” factory complex there would more than double, signaling a commitment to produce new nuclear weapons a decade hence.

So how is the president's budget compatible with his disarmament vision?

The answer is simple: There is no evidence that Obama has, or ever had, any such vision. He said nothing to that effect in Prague. There, he merely spoke of his commitment “to seek . 。 。 a world without nuclear weapons,” a vague aspiration and hardly a novel one at that level of abstraction. He said that in the meantime the United States “will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”

Since nuclear weapons don't, and won't ever, “deter any adversary,” this too was highly aspirational, if not futile. The vain search for an “effective” arsenal that can deter “any” adversary requires unending innovation and continuous real investment, including investment in the extended deterrent to which Obama referred. The promise of such investments, and not disarmament, was the operative message in Prague as far as the US stockpile was concerned. In fact, proposed new investments in extended deterrence were already being packaged for Congress when Obama spoke.

To fulfill his supposed “disarmament vision,” Obama offered just two approaches in Prague, both indefinite. First, he spoke vaguely of reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” It's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean. Most likely it refers to official discourse–what officials say about nuclear doctrine–as opposed to actual facts on the ground. Second, Obama promised to negotiate “a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] with the Russians.” As far as nuclear disarmament went in the speech, that was it.

Of course, Obama also said his administration would promptly pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an action not yet taken and one entirely unrelated to US disarmament. The rest of the speech was devoted to various nonproliferation initiatives that his administration planned to seek.

On July 8, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced their Joint Understanding, committing their respective countries to somewhere between 500 to 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,500 to 1,675 deployed strategic warheads, very modest goals to be achieved a full seven years after the treaty entered into force. Total arsenal numbers wouldn't change, so strategic warheads could be taken from deployment and placed in a reserve–de-alerted, in effect. The treaty wouldn't affect nonstrategic warheads. It wouldn't require dismantlement. As Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists has explained, the delivery vehicle limits require little, if any, change from US and Russian expected deployments.

Ironically, it's possible that the retirement PDF of 4,000 or more US warheads under the Moscow Treaty and other retirements ordered by George W. Bush may exceed anything Obama does in terms of disarmament. As for the stockpile and weapons complex, Bush's aspirations were far more hawkish than Congress ultimately allowed. Real budgets for warheads fell during his last three years in office. Now, with the Democrats controlling the executive branch and both houses of Congress, congressional restraint is notable by its absence. What Obama mainly seems to be “disarming” is congressional resistance to variations of some of the same proposals Bush found it difficult to authorize and fund.

Last May Obama sent his first budget to Congress, calling for flat warhead spending. At that time, the administration was still displaying a measured approach toward replacement and expansion of warhead capabilities.

That said, in last year's budget the White House did acquiesce to a Pentagon demand to request funding for a major upgrade to four B61 nuclear bomb variants–one of which had just completed a 20-year-plus life-extension program. Just one day before that budget was released a grand nuclear strategy review previously requested by the armed services committees was unveiled. It was chaired by William Perry, a member of the governing board of the corporation that manages Los Alamos, and recurrent Cold War fixture James Schlesinger. [Full disclosure: Perry is also a member of the Bulletin's Board of Sponsors.]

The report's recommendations for increased spending and weapons development quickly began to serve as a rallying point for defense hawks–surely the point of the exercise. Overall, it was largely a conclusory pastiche of recycled Cold War notions, entirely lacking in analysis and often factually wrong. But neither the White House nor leading congressional Democrats offered any public resistance or rebuttal to its conclusions.

More largely, opposition to nuclear restraint within the administration quickly emerged from its usual redoubts at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Pentagon, STRATCOM, and interested players in both parties in Congress. Plus, Obama left key Bush appointees in place at NNSA while the Pentagon added some familiar faces from the Clinton administration, leaving serious questions about the ability of the White House to develop an independent understanding of the issues, let alone present one to Congress.

Either way, potential treaty ratification is surely a major factor in White House thinking. Senate Republicans, as expected, are demanding significant nuclear investments prior to considering ratification of any START follow-on treaty. Democratic hawks, especially powerful ones with pork-barrel interests at stake such as New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman, also must be satisfied in the ratification process. All in all this makes the latest Obama budget request a kind of “preemptive surrender” to nuclear hawks. So whether or not the president has a disarmament “vision” is irrelevant. What is important are the policy commitments embodied in the budget request and whether Congress will endorse them.

Investments on the scale requested should be flatly unacceptable to all of us. The country and the world face truly apocalyptic security challenges from climate change and looming shortages of transportation fuels. Our economy is very weak and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The proposed increases in nuclear weapons spending, embedded as they are in an overall military budget bigger than any since the 1940s, should be a clarion call for renewed political commitment in service of the fundamental values that uphold this, or any, society.

Those values are now gravely threatened–not least by a White House uncertain about, or unwilling or unable to fight for, what is right.

编辑点评：

Mello does a good job of explaining why there will be little progress toward nuclear abolition during the Obama administration. Further he makes a good case that the current administration seems to be headed towards feeding the nuclear weapons complex to a greater degree than Bush was able. Who'd of thought!

But Mello misses on a couple points. One is that he dismisses too quickly the nuclear abolition aspiration Obama stated in Prague. Those few words may have little affect on policy, but they do mark a return to the rhetoric of all atomic age administrations up until George W. Bush markedly abandoned such aspirations. What is the value of that rhetoric? Mostly it gives credence to those who organize around abolition — something of value, but not much.

Secondly, Mello states that when Obama spoke of…

…reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” it's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean.

Actually, this statement of Obama's refers to something quite specific and important. The US has been advancing for several decades to an unprecedented level of conventional force dominance over all other nations (see Bernard I. Finel on strategic meaning of US conventional military power). At this point the US can anticipate gaining even more strategic advantage if it can convince other nations to join in disposing of nuclear weaponry (for an official statement of this strategic formula see Vice President Biden's speech at the National Defense University on 18 February 2010.) This is indeed quite an aspiration!

This connection of conventional dominance to nuclear dominance brings me to the other shortcoming of Mello's article. Nuclear abolition will be impossible without a significant restructuring of the international (in-)security system. Why would Russia or China eschew nuclear weapons or N. Korea and Iran abandon efforts to obtain them while these nations remain utterly vulnerable to US conventional strike?

Leaders of popular efforts for nuclear disarmament almost never acknowledge this strategic problem. That's a disservice to their cause, because it leaves a major obstacle to disarmament in place with no plan (or even awareness of the need for a plan) to remove it.

The eventuality of an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons will require the US to first draw down its conventional military power. And concurrent to a deep draw down of US conventional military power there must be a build up of international structures which can take up more and more of the responsibility for global security.

Such a transfer of power and responsibility will probably happen someday , but we are certainly not presently on that path. That is one more “change” that Obama is not pursuing, not even aspirationally.

Greg Mello responds to the editor's comments:

I think your comments are excellent. Let me begin with the second one, with which I wholly agree. Our work here at the [Los Alamos] Study Group has emphasized nuclear weapons issues in part because of our geographic, and hence political, locus adjacent to the two largest nuclear weapons laboratories.

The barrier to nuclear disarmament posed by military policies and investments that express an aspiration for “full spectrum dominance” on a global scale is almost certainly insuperable. Nuclear disarmament is only consistent with a quite different conception of national security than we now have and with a quite different economic structure internally as well. The good news — and I think we have to make it good where it may not appear so at first glance, since we have no other choice — is that our empire is failing.

Your first point, which relates to the symbolic value of Obama's disarmament statements, is also sound, but here I think that symbolic value is greatly outweighed by the passivity and compliance which his statements have engendered in civil society. The actors and forces which could and should be forcefully working for disarmament have been themselves disarmed by what amounts to propaganda.

Hypocrisy may be the homage paid to the ideal by the real, but it is not leadership, it is not honest, and it will not produce anything of value in this case. At the moment, it is allowing the nuclear weapons establishment to do what it could not accomplish previously: increase production capacity and provide greater, not lesser, endorsement of nuclear weapons in all their aspects, both materially and symbolically.

Obama's disarmament aspiration, so called, is a faint echo compared to the full-throated endorsement of nuclear weapons it is enabling.

Lawrence J. Korb, Sean Duggan, and Laura Conley. Center for American Progress , 04 February 2010.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/qdr_fail_resource.html

摘录：

The QDR … does not prioritize the missions that the military must be prepared for. The document states that “successfully balancing [DOD's priorities] requires that the Department make hard choices on the level of resources required as well as accepting and managing risk in a way that favors success in today's wars,” yet it also notes that “US forces must be prepared to conduct a wide variety of missions under a range of different circumstances.” In other words, the QDR promises to make tradeoffs but asserts that DOD must be capable of confronting every contingency.

编辑点评：

Follow the money. The priorities are reflected in where the money goes. A few changes, per usual, at the margins. Mostly the same ol' same ol' division of spoils.

Tony Capaccio. Business Week , 07 January 2010.

摘录：

One recent study agreed with a similar one from a year earlier that predicted a 2 1/2 year delay in development beyond the current target of October 2014 and an added cost of $16.5 billion. The new estimate recommended the Pentagon add $314 million to the five-year plan to beef up testing. Gates did so.

编辑点评：

With Afghan war costs rising and political pressure to reign in the federal deficit mounting Gates needs to reduce the year to year Pentagon procurement budget for big ticket items. Postponing and stringing out the acquisition of major platform buys (such as a new fighter aircraft like the F-35) is one way to get some of those savings without having to take on the much harder political task of canceling programs or cutting structure. Unfortunately such an approach usually makes an acquisition program more costly when production efficiencies of scale are lost as fewer units are manufactured each year over a longer period.

This article says, “More than $2.8 billion that was budgeted earlier to buy the military's next-generation fighter would instead be used to continue its development.” So it may seem that this decision simply shifts spending from production to development accounts with neutral effect on the Pentagon topline. However the article doesn't adequately address whether Gates may have been facing increased development costs overlapping ambitious production schedules which would have cost much more in the next five years than had been previously planned. This decision delays the onset of large production costs to the years after 2014.

The Navy has indicated it will need to buy more F/A-18s if the F-35 doesn't appear when it had previously been promised. But the Navy's requirement assumes there are no carrier cuts (and associated Naval combat wing cuts) in this period. If there are, it will make those F/A-18s redundant.

And what if five years from now drones are proving themselves to be the combat craft of the future at the very time the F-35 is meant to start appearing in operational units in significant numbers? Maybe then the buy of the next generation manned fighter plane can be in the range of 1200 units instead of the 2400 units in the current plan. Then we could realize real savings in this acquisition program. (for some options on future fighter buys and program savings see: David Axe, “Congressional Budget Office's Plans to Save the Air Force” , War is Boring , 18 May 2009.)

If five years from now drones play a more central role in air combat power and there are fewer carriers in the fleet the decision to slow the F-35 acquisition program down will prove to be a very practical one.

Loren B. Thompson. Lexington Institute, 14 December 2009.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/budget-moves-buoy-defense-industry

摘录：

First, even before President Obama decided to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, the administration had already decided to spend more on overseas contingencies in 2011 that the $130 billion it planned to spend in 2010. Second, Jason Sherman of insidedefense.com reported this month that the White House will support increasing the regular defense budget (not including overseas contingencies) by $14 billion above what was planned for 2011, meaning it will rise from the $542 billion forecast in May to $556 billion. Third, Vago Muradian of Defense News reported this weekend that total increases above the May plan for the regular defense budget across the 2011-2015 spending period will reach $100 billion.

编辑点评：

Looks as if the Obama administration's plan to reduce Federal expenditures on war (contingency) operations and to hold increases in the base Pentagon budget to dollar inflation have come unraveled at less than a year into the budgeting plan and the administration. It is a shame, because it is so unnecessary.

Stephen M. Walt. ForeignPolicy.com , 30 November 2009.

摘录：

Yet if you really want to know “why they hate us,” … the fact remains that the United States has killed a very large number of Arab or Muslim individuals over the past three decades.

编辑点评：

And no amount of “public diplomacy” or “American narrative” will win friends when the US is responsible for killing sons and daughters of people in their home land. That is a basic piece of strategic wisdom!

斯蒂芬·M·沃尔特。 外交政策 ，2009年11月16日。

编者的评论

Walt makes a fundamental strategic point. The Bush wars involved operational and grand strategic errors, so why institutionalize a shift in defense planning that in effect has the US military prepare for more strategic errors by our leadership? Why not opt to correct the error? It is really an elemental point of strategy: Don't compound error!

I understand how military professionals who have been ordered to take on foolish strategic missions might feel that counterinsurgency theory is an attractive way out of their tactical and operational dilemmas. But there is really no excuse for civilian leaders, including Sec Def Gates, chasing the mirage of COIN as if it were an answer for our current problems dealing with the consequences of a disastrous Bush national security strategy. Change the strategy and there will be no need for investments in COIN!

Karl W. Eikenberry. The The New York Times has published two cables authored by the US Ambassador to Kabul addressed to Secretary of State Clinton. The first is dated 06 November 2009 and is entitled “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns”. The second is dated 09 November 2009 and is entitled “Looking Beyond Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”.
http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan

编辑点评：

Quibble: COIN is a tactic, not a strategy. Non-quibble: Wars are rarely decided at the tactical level.

Gilles Dorronsoro. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/fixing_failed_strategy.pdf

摘录：

…the International Coalition, with its limited resources and diminishing popular support, should focus on its core interests: preventing the Taliban from retaking Afghan cities, avoiding the risk that al-Qaeda would try to reestablish sanctuaries there, pursue a more aggressive counterinsurgency strategy in the North, and reallocate its civilian aid resources to places where the insurgency is still weak.

Editor's Comment

Some would say that Pashtunistan is already a nation which can't yet fully establish itself as a state (although there is already considerable local governance, both Pashtun tribal and Taliban.) Presently Punjabi (Pakistani) and US/NATO military intervention prevent the establishment of a state.

Dorronsoro's Afghan war strategy would seem to be a step in moving the Pashtunistan national cause to within a decade or so of success. Of course, the cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad would have to fall under Pashtunistan governance eventually, even if Western forces resisted for some years.

Christopher M. Lehman. Boston Globe , 14 October 2009.

编辑点评：
It has been several decades since simply counting the numbers of weapon systems or platforms has been anything like a reliable measure of military power. In a modern military effective power is achieved by the combination of well-trained men and women, advanced communications, agile allocation of forces, precision controls and, of course, good weapon systems and appropriate platforms for this complex package.

Christopher Lehman's op-ed in defense of the eleven carrier fleet ( Boston Globe 14 October 2009) fails to mention, let alone assess, any of these crucial aspects of the modern Navy. Nor does he mention the numerous expeditionary strike groups, surface action groups, and missile-armed submarines that also project American power around the globe. And he does not mention that a term of preference in today's Navy is “network-centric.”

Although the number of platforms (ships) in today's Navy is considerably fewer than during the Cold War, the firepower on today's collection of ships has more than doubled, and is still growing. And that is only a starting place for measuring the effective power of the Navy. Reducing the size of the carrier fleet by one or two flattops is not a high risk proposition for the national security of the United States.

参考文献：

http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/osd-considers-nine-carrier-fleet
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/navy_network.htm

Reader Comment from a letter to the Boston Globe:

是不是不适当的全球发布OPED主张建造航母时，笔者在一家咨询公司，代表诺斯罗普·格鲁门公司，该公司负责载体建设工程？ 在克里斯托弗·雷曼的10月14 OPED，“保持航母舰队漂浮，全球也没有打扰到披露笔者的的位置他的争论，这将有帮助读者评估雷曼兄弟公司的信誉（或缺乏之）金融股权作为冷静的分析。

雷曼不立足于军事或战略理由，他的案件，在一开始就承认，“美国并不需要航母来对付其他国家。相反，他断言，运营商是宝贵的电源投影机美国使用的影响危机“不释放一个单一的武器。换句话说，运营商可能实际上没有做太多的军事，他们让我们觉得我们塑造的结果。 Proponents of building more carriers can then cite such shaping, which is impossible to prove or disprove, as evidence that we need more carriers.

雷曼兄弟还指出，运营商都作为“美国的良好意愿的杠杆”和其他许多国家，包括一些人认为美国未来潜在的对手正在建立。 关于第一点，人道主义任务是没有足够的理由建立$ 11亿美元的花费其大部分时间漂浮在海洋中的每舰携带者。 Other ships are more practical. 承运人是一种战争武器，并尝试别的帧的参数是虚伪的。 关于第二点，雷曼意味着，因为其他国家建立运营商，美国应建立，太多。 “Keeping up with the Joneses'' is the antithesis of strategic thinking, particularly when the United States already maintains such a large advantage in military capability.

– Travis Sharp, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC

Michael Lind. Salon , 13 October 2009.
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/10/13/nuclear_weapons/index.html

编辑点评：
Even if the nuclear abolition movement grows in power and is able to convince the governments of the US, France, and Great Britain to move toward abolishing their nuclear weaponry, there is little chance that other great powers such as Russia, China, and India will follow suit — not as long as any of those powers can imagine a conventional war against the US (or against other countries with powerful conventional forces.) Unfortunately, there is no way to separate the problems of nuclear weaponry from the problems of international power politics and war. You can work hard to deny the connection in your mind, but in the end denial won't help the cause of making the world safer. If there is to be really deep nuclear disarmament it must be in concert with conventional disarmament and new agency for international security.

Gian P. Gentile. Parameters , Autumn 2009.
http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/documents/gentile.pdf

摘录：

Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy.

编辑点评：

同意！ COIN is a collection of tactics. What is missing in Afghanistan is a strategy with any credible chance of success … despite the lip-service to political solutions.

麦肯齐Eaglen和吉姆人才。 武装部队杂志2009年10月。
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4262271

编辑评论发射到其在军事部门更是投资的论战致电（40 +％，在过去十年中真正增长的五角大楼基础预算的顶部）之前Eaglen和人才有效地指出了，在即将到来的QDR是，在正式意义上说，根据过去的布什政府的国家安全战略，现在3岁。

Logically, if the QDR is to serve as an expression of how military planning, program and posture align with national security and defense strategy, then our current schedule for the production of these documents is seriously out of sync with political cycles . It is reasonable to expect that an incoming administration, such as Obama's, might require eighteen months to review and craft a revision of the National Security Strategy.

从经修订的国家安全战略，在2011年6月衍生文件的时间表可能出现（白宫）：

National Defense Strategy (SecDef's office) – January 2012
国家军事战略（参谋长联席会议） - 2012年6月
“四年防务审查（SecDef办公室） - 2012年6月

Note the logic of this sequencing: The White House sets any considered changes in the broad strategy (the National Security Strategy) eighteen months after coming into office. 然后国防部长领导的国防战略决定，并宣布6个月后精炼的过程。 参谋长联席会议有6个月，以完善其国家军事战略文件，这是作为美国国防部的“四年防务审查同月（所有一起把防御的战略，规划/姿势和预算。）

Justin Kelly and Michael James Brennan. Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 16 September 2009.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=939

摘录：

Recent western military exploits in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East
Timor, all represent, if not strategic failure, at least failures of strategy. The question we need to ask
ourselves is whether this weakness is endemic or at least partially a result of our own theoretical failings by
allowing operational art to escape from any reasonable delimitation and, by so doing, subvert the role of
strategy and hide the need for a strategic art?

编辑点评：

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, there emerged in this country a revisionist narrative of “meddling” by civilian leaders such as Johnson and McNamara which had “prevented” the military from winning the war. Although this narrative was almost entirely counter factual, it has had enough resonance in a nation deeply troubled by the war's outcome that subsequent civilian leadership has opted to effectively “hand-off” wars to their generals and step back from responsibility for key strategic decisions.

Generals are, for the most part, skilled operational practitioners, but only sometimes do they have well-developed strategic skills or wisdom. As the authors point out, handing-off responsibility for strategic decisions to the generals is an error in the practice of grand strategy… and we should not be surprised with how often our subsequent wars have gone badly.

My hope is that President Obama will read this essay before making his decision about what to do next in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Antonie Boessenkool. Defense News , 03 August 2009.

excerpt:

“They must, they absolutely must, enter the fleet on time and on budget,” [Adm. Gary Roughead, chief of naval operations] said, standing before a green-painted F-35C at Lockheed Martin's assembly plant here. “If we don't get this airplane on time, we're going to realize a gap in the number of airplanes we take to sea.” Roughead said the Navy may extend the service life of its older F/A-18 models as it waits.

Editor's comment:

The Navy could relax its delivery schedule for the new fighter by five years or so if it downsizes its carrier fleet (without sacrificing strategic power projection) as recommended by the Project on Defense Alternatives . This would free up newer F/A-18s to replace older ones in the Navy's remaining active air fleet.

See also: “No Navy Fighter Gap: PAE” — http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/05/05/no-navy-fighter-gap/

by Charles Knight

去年秋天，我参加了一个题为“分析工具，为下一步的四年防务评估报告”，由资深分析师曾几的QDR工作研讨会在麻省理工学院。 The QDR is an every-four-years Pentagon study mandated by Congress and meant to review how closely the defense posture and its supporting budget fits with the national strategy. 研讨会的主持人，花了一个小时，详细分析方法上的“结构力”和政策的研究提供QDR审查过程的基础上的那些工作。 这一进程正在进行准备在今年的第四个四年防务评估报告在2010年初发布。

After the presentation a former member of the National Security Council who happened to be seated to my right turned to me and said, “[The QDR] seems like a fraud.”

最近众议院军事空中和地面部队小组委员会主席，众议员尼尔·阿伯克龙比（D），简称为“公关噱头”QDR和“公关运动”（如由马乔香炉报道， 五角大楼内部 ，众议员阿伯克龙比，2009年6月18日）。接着提供较精确的阐述，他说，“这是所有的雷鸟东西，繁荣和所有。”

我不能肯定前国家安全委员会成员或众议员阿伯克龙比意味着他们的“四年防务评估报告的刻画。 但是，在随后所有四个的QDR相当密切，我可以使他们得到什么的猜测。

Congress has intended that through the QDR the Pentagon will make a serious attempt to reconcile the national defense strategy to the defense posture of the services and from that presumed point of congruence reconcile it to the defense budget. Policy analysts frequently complain that strategy, posture and budget are dangerously out of whack. 如果QDR过程中解决了这个问题，然后做了分析和政策走向和解的真正进步所需要的工作，那么我们就可以判断这是符合其既定的目的。 如果它在一份公开文件，使用修辞为了掩盖目的和手段的脱节和延续之前的姿势和预算的方向蓬勃发展的结果，那么它是“欺诈”或类似的东西“公关运动。

开展2010年四年防务评估报告的过程给了我们一个很好的机会，无论是真正的和解或公关运动，以寻找证据。 几件证据：

[本网站将采取有关问题的“四年防务评估报告是否是”欺诈“，”公关特技“，或真诚的努力调和的姿态与战略预算？出现什么其他证据说明， 我邀请您的意见和观点这个重要的问题。

Jon Soucy. American Forces Press Service, 29 July 2009.

Editor's comment: The Project on Defense Alternatives has recommended that the USAF reduce its tactical combat fleet by two wing equivalents. This reduction would allow for a considerable number of tactical aircraft to move over the the Air National Guard thus improving its fleet age composition. If the Air Guard still needs to replace old F-16s in the period 2015-2025 it should do so by a staged buy of the latest block F-16 C/D. Transition to the Joint Strike Fighter could begin in the 2020s.

WorldPublicOpion.org. 23 July 2009.

from WorldPublicOpinion.org 23 July 2009

Editor's comment: It is striking that almost 80% of Pakistanis want NATO and the US out of Afghanistan. This is evidence that they do not view the US/NATO counter-terror, counterinsurgency and stabilization campaign in Afghanistan as a likely solution to their troubles in Pakistan, but rather as a cause of those troubles .

This is empirical evidence that US strategists should consider. Perhaps military intervention into a foreign country is a significant contributing factor to unrest and instability in that country and the region? How often do we hear of US national strategists seriously considering that factor in their strategic planning?

查尔斯·奈特，卡尔Conetta，詹姆斯·麦戈文。 民兵媒体 ，2009年1月1日起。

摘录：

Any adjustment in national security planning is bound to be controversial – and it should be. But we can no longer afford to shy away from that controversy. Our current circumstance demands that we enter into a broad and deep discussion about national strategic priorities, including security priorities. 这必然需要寻找窗帘后面的盾牌从更严重的审议的国防预算。

查尔斯·奈特。 Project on Defense Alternatives Commentary , July 2007.

摘录：

It is my best guess that we won't see an Army/Marine Corps invasion of Iran or Pakistan or North Korea. If the 'new center' in Washington was seriously considering interventions abroad that might require deploying up to 3 million troops, they would need to start providing basic training to a significant portion of Americans between the ages of 18 and 28 — and that, of course, means conscription .

CE (Chuck) Myers, Jr. Proceedings , November, 1995.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/95myers.pdf

摘录：

[the defense] community has again embarked upon an expensive design and construction exercise focused on 'form,' which historically breeds powerful technology-business coalitions and political constituencies that become virtually unstoppable.

Editor's comment:

The JAST became the JSF and Myers was right about the rest.