Posts Tagged ‘QDR’

Assessing the 2010 QDR: a guide to key issues

Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo 46, 26 January 2010.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/Assessing_the_2010_QDR.pdf

Excerpt:

Today’s military is stressed by having nearly 25% of the full time military overseas, including 16% in overseas operations.

How does the QDR seek to reduce the stress of overseas stationing and deployment?

In recent years large counter-insurgency campaigns have demanded much of the military’s attention and energy.

Is the QDR preparing for more of the same in the future? At what scale and frequency?

December 3rd Draft of the 2010 QDR

“pre-decisional” draft dated 03 December 2010 and published by InsideDefense.com on 27 January 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/draftQDR2010.pdf

Draft QDR: DoD Alters Force Planning Construct

John T. Bennett. Defense News, 27 January 2010.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4473825&c=AME&s=TOP

Excerpt:

The new force-shaping model was derived from what the draft report calls the Pentagon’s four defense strategy priorities: “prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the force.” Sources say the priorities are known within the QDR process as “the Four Ps.”

The planning framework is designed to prepare U.S. forces to, according to the review, carry out “a broad, plausible range of several overlapping operations to prevent and deter conflict and, if necessary, to defend the United States, its allies and partners, selected critical infrastructure, and other national interests.”

Draft Pentagon review calls for “hard choices”

Reuters, 21 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60K6QK20100121

Pentagon budget seeks to kill 7 arms programs

Reuters, 20 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60K07I20100121

Excerpt:

The documents, labeled as “draft” and “pre-decisional,” showed continued strong funding for shipbuilding, fighter and electronic warfare aircraft and other weapons programs. They also pointed to continued effort to beef up intelligence programs, unmanned systems, cyber security, and enhanced efforts to counter biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Obama wants extra $33 billion for wars now, atop record $708 billion sought for 2011

Anne Flaherty and Anne Gearan. Los Angeles Times, 13 January 2010.
http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=81277532

Excerpt:

The administration’s Quadrennial Defense Review, the main articulation of U.S. military doctrine, is due to Congress on Feb. 1. Top military commanders were briefed on the document at the Pentagon on Monday and Tuesday. They also received a preview of the administration’s budget plans through 2015.

The four-year review outlines six key mission areas and spells out capabilities and goals the Pentagon wants to develop. The pilotless drones used for surveillance and attack missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan are a priority, with the goals of speeding up the purchase of new Reaper drones and expanding Predator and Reaper drone flights through 2013.

Winslow T. Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information has written a commentary on this report entitled “Just What We Need: More Pentagon Spending” for the Huffington Post, 13 January 2010.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winslow-t-wheeler/just-what-we-need-more-pe_b_422297.html

Gates Picks Perry For QDR Panel

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 14 December 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/12/14/gates-picks-perry-for-qdr-panel/

Excerpt:

Rep. Ike Skelton, chair­man of the House Armed Services Committee, announced his selec­tions for the QDR panel today. Skelton named one of the Army’s most inno­v­a­tive thinkers, retired gen­eral Robert Scales, and for­mer Air Force his­to­rian Richard Kohn to the inde­pen­dent panel on the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Rep. Buck McKeon, rank­ing mem­ber of the HASC, announced his picks for the QDR panel last week: Jim Talent, the Missouri Republican who served in the House and Senate until 2006 and Eric Edelman, for­mer under­sec­re­tary of defense for pol­icy from 2005 until January 2009.

2 GOP Defense Veterans Named to QDR Panel

Rick Maze. Defense News, 10 December 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4414781&c=AME&s=TOP

Excerpt:

The former lawmaker is Jim Talent, a Missouri Republican who served in the House and Senate until he lost a 2006 re-election bid. He was an adviser to the presidential campaign of former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney.

The former Bush administration official picked by McKeon is Eric Edelman, who, as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2005 until January 2009, had responsibilities in areas including bilateral relations, war planning, missile defense and special forces issues.

Can the Government Commission National Security and Budgetary Reform?

Jordan Tama. Budget Insight, 01 December 2009.

Excerpt:

In particular, the [QDR Independent] panel was created at the behest of leaders of the congressional armed services committees with the goal of providing a counterweight to the QDR, which is run entirely by the Defense Department. The independent panel’s legislative mandate is to “conduct an assessment of the assumptions, strategy, findings, and risks in the report of the Secretary of Defense on the 2009 QDR, with particular attention paid to the risks described in that report.”

This focus on risks reveals the principal motivation of the armed services committees in establishing the panel: to highlight the dangers of reducing or stabilizing the defense budget. Pentagon officials have said that, for initial planning purposes, the QDR should assume that the base defense budget will be essentially flat for the next five years, when accounting for inflation. Given that budgetary framework, the QDR will probably propose cuts to major defense programs. Many members of the armed services committees—regardless of party affiliation—are likely to oppose some of these proposed cuts. The committees’ hope is that the independent panel will bolster opposition to such cuts by calling them risky.

QDR Panel Stalls, Loses Warner

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 17 November 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/17/qdr-panel-stalls-loses-warner/

Excerpt:

House-Senate conferees added eight members to the QDR panel that will be picked by congressional defense committee leaders and it looks as if Warner was uncomfortable with the additions… Mackenzie Eaglen at the conservative Heritage Institute led the push for a panel to keep its eye on the QDR — the law establishing the QDR requires such a panel but it has sometimes been ignored in the past.

Building on 2 blunders: the dubious case for counterinsurgency

Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, 16 November 2009.
http://defensealt.org/Hc15bY

Editor’s Comment

Walt makes a fundamental strategic point. The Bush wars involved operational and grand strategic errors, so why institutionalize a shift in defense planning that in effect has the U.S. military prepare for more strategic errors by our leadership? Why not opt to correct the error? It is really an elemental point of strategy: Don’t compound error!

I understand how military professionals who have been ordered to take on foolish strategic missions might feel that counterinsurgency theory is an attractive way out of their tactical and operational dilemmas. But there is really no excuse for civilian leaders, including Sec Def Gates, chasing the mirage of COIN as if it were an answer for our current problems dealing with the consequences of a disastrous Bush national security strategy. Change the strategy and there will be no need for investments in COIN!

Industrial Policy Debate: Should The Pentagon Pick Winners and Losers?

Sandra I. Erwin. National Defense Magazine, November 2009.
http://defensealt.org/Hc1DyN

Excerpt:

Acquisition and R&D accounts now make up 34 percent of the defense base budget. Assuming a flat budget and growth in personnel a bit above inflation, modernization accounts 10 years from now will be down to 25 percent of the budget, according to TechAmerica estimates.

Unless the Defense Department decides to reduce the size of the force, procurement spending will continue to be squeezed, says budget analyst Steve Daggett, of the Congressional Research Service. He estimates that the average service member costs 45 percent more — including salary and benefits after adjusting for inflation — than in 2000.

Industry analyst Jim McAleese, of McAleese & Associates, says he is certain that the Obama administration has effectively flat-lined defense spending for the foreseeable future. But many major decisions have yet to be made regarding how money will be allocated within a flat budget.

“I would caution you to really pay attention to Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ vision,” McAleese says in an interview with Federal News Radio. “I believe he is fundamentally using the QDR [quadrennial defense review] to put the finishing touches on his legacy. Gates wants to “optimize” the Army for long-duration counterinsurgencies, he says. “The priority in the Army will be investing in a world-class quality combat force, that is well-supported, and that the soldiers’ families are well-supported.” The upshot is that many of the expensive weapons systems that the services have been accustomed to buying will no longer be affordable.

The Cost of Current Defense Plans: An Analysis of Budget Issues

Statement of Stephen Daggett, Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets, Congressional Research Service, before the House Committee on the Budget, 14 October 2009.
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg53004/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg53004.pdf

One common criticism of the “capabilities based” analysis of the 2001 and 2006 QDRs, even as they
helped to broaden awareness of the range of threats, is that the analytical framework did not help much in
allocating resources away from some areas and into others. Leaving aside whether such criticism is fair,
the current Administration has emphasized the need to analyze specific threats in order to establish
priorities. The question that follows is, how boldly will the current QDR address the potential need for
major changes in forces in view of its assessment of new challenges?

Keeping the aircraft carrier fleet afloat

Christopher M. Lehman. Boston Globe, 14 October 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HcpOCe

Editor’s Comment:
It has been several decades since simply counting the numbers of weapon systems or platforms has been anything like a reliable measure of military power. In a modern military effective power is achieved by the combination of well-trained men and women, advanced communications, agile allocation of forces, precision controls and, of course, good weapon systems and appropriate platforms for this complex package.

Christopher Lehman’s op-ed in defense of the eleven carrier fleet (Boston Globe 14 October 2009) fails to mention, let alone assess, any of these crucial aspects of the modern Navy. Nor does he mention the numerous expeditionary strike groups, surface action groups, and missile-armed submarines that also project American power around the globe. And he does not mention that a term of preference in today’s Navy is “network-centric.”

Although the number of platforms (ships) in today’s Navy is considerably fewer than during the Cold War, the firepower on today’s collection of ships has more than doubled, and is still growing. And that is only a starting place for measuring the effective power of the Navy. Reducing the size of the carrier fleet by one or two flattops is not a high risk proposition for the national security of the United States.

References:

Reader Comment from a letter to the Boston Globe:

Isn’t it inappropriate for the Globe to publish an oped advocating the construction of aircraft carriers when the author works at a consulting firm that represents Northrop Grumman, the company responsible for carrier construction? In Christopher Lehman’s Oct. 14 oped, “Keeping the aircraft carrier fleet afloat,’’ the Globe did not bother to disclose the author’s financial stake in the position he was arguing, which would have helped readers evaluate Lehman’s credibility (or lack thereof) as a dispassionate analyst.

Lehman doesn’t base his case on military or strategic grounds, conceding at the very beginning that “the United States does not need aircraft carriers to counter those of other countries.’’ Instead, he asserts that carriers are valuable as power projectors that the United States uses to affect crises “without releasing a single weapon.’’ In other words, while carriers might not actually do much militarily, they make us feel like we’re shaping outcomes. Proponents of building more carriers can then cite such shaping, which is impossible to prove or disprove, as evidence that we need more carriers.

Lehman also points out that carriers both act as “levers of American good will’’ and are being built by many other countries, including some considered potential future adversaries of the United States. On the first point, humanitarian missions are not sufficient justification to build $11-billion-per-ship carriers that spend most of their time floating around in the middle of the ocean. Other ships are more practical. A carrier is a weapon of war, and arguments that try to frame it as anything else are disingenuous. On the second point, Lehman implies that because other countries build carriers, the United States should build them, too. “Keeping up with the Joneses’’ is the antithesis of strategic thinking, particularly when the United States already maintains such a large advantage in military capability.

– Travis Sharp, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Washington, D.C.

Possible Savings from Decreasing the Aircraft Carrier Battle Fleet

Stephen Abott. Budget Insight, 08 October 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HaIeCV

For background and an assessment of the carrier “requirement” see http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/osd-considers-nine-carrier-fleet

Congressional Conference Agreement calls for 8 congressionally appointed members of the QDR Independent Panel

Inside Defense reports on 08 October 2009 that the Congressional Conference Agreement provides for Congress to appoint eight members to the mandated QDR Independent Panel (see panel charter). This will bring the total number of panelists to twenty.

A New Grand Bargain: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Defense Planning

Thomas G. Mahnken. Joint Forces Quarterly, 01 October 2009.
http://intelros.ru/pdf/jfq_55/2.pdf

A clear and present danger: QDR must recognize need for two-war construct

Mackenzie Eaglen and Jim Talent. Armed Forces Journal, October 2009.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4262271

Editor’s Comment: Before launching into their polemic calling for even more investments in the military sector (on top of 40+% real growth in the last decade for the Pentagon base budget) Eaglen and Talent usefully point out that the forthcoming QDR is, in a formal sense, based on the last Bush administration National Security Strategy, now three years old.

Logically, if the QDR is to serve as an expression of how military planning, program and posture align with national security and defense strategy, then our current schedule for the production of these documents is seriously out of sync with political cycles. It is reasonable to expect that an incoming administration, such as Obama’s, might require eighteen months to review and craft a revision of the National Security Strategy.

Starting with a revised National Security Strategy (The White House) appearing in June 2011 a schedule for the derivative documents might then be:

National Defense Strategy (SecDef’s office) – January 2012
National Military Strategy (Joint Chiefs) – June 2012
Quadrennial Defense Review (SecDef’s office) – June 2012

Note the logic of this sequencing: The White House sets any considered changes in the broad strategy (the National Security Strategy) eighteen months after coming into office. The Secretary of Defense then leads the process of determining and announcing six months later refinements to the National Defense Strategy. The Joint Chiefs have six additional months to refine their National Military Strategy document which is published the same month as the DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (which puts the strategy, defense planning/posture and budget all together.)