Gian P. Gentile. World Affairs, Summer 2008.

Fabius Maximus, 04 March 2008.
http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2008/03/04/stratfor-iraq-goals/

Excerpt:

Five years after the invasion most Americans do not understand why we are there, which Stratfor clearly saw even before the first airstrikes. We planned to occupy Iraq and build bases from which to project power throughout the Middle East.

Barry Posen. The American Interest online, Nov-Dec 2007.
http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331

Excerpt:

Iraq should therefore be seen not as a singular debacle, but as a harbinger of costs to come. There is enough capacity and motivation out in the world to increase significantly the costs of any U.S. effort to manage global politics directly. Public support for this policy may wane before profligacy so diminishes U.S. power that it becomes unsustainable.

Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, David Ochmanek, David A. Shlapak, Alan J. Vick. RAND, 2007.
Full report: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG499.pdf
Summary: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG499.sum.pdf

George Packer. The New Yorker, 18 December 2006.
http://defensealt.org/Hedk9F

Excerpt:

In 2004, Kilcullen’s writings and lectures brought him to the attention of an official working for Paul Wolfowitz, then the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Wolfowitz asked him to help write the section on “irregular warfare” in the Pentagon’s “Quadrennial Defense Review,” a statement of department policy and priorities, which was published earlier this year. Under the leadership of Donald Rumsfeld, who resigned in November, the Pentagon had embraced a narrow “shock-and-awe” approach to war-fighting, emphasizing technology, long-range firepower, and spectacular displays of force. The new document declared that activities such as “long-duration unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and military support for stabilization and reconstruction efforts” needed to become a more important component of the war on terror. Kilcullen was partly responsible for the inclusion of the phrase “the long war,” which has become the preferred term among many military officers to describe the current conflict. In the end, the Rumsfeld Pentagon was unwilling to make the cuts in expensive weapons systems that would have allowed it to create new combat units and other resources necessary for a proper counterinsurgency strategy.

Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt. New York Times, 20 April 2003.
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/20/world/nation-war-strategic-shift-pentagon-expects-long-term-access-key-iraq-bases.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print

Excerpts:

Regardless of how quickly the Americans reverse the buildup of the last several months, it is plain that since Sept. 11, 2001, there has been a concerted diplomatic and military effort to win permission for United States forces to operate from the formerly Communist nations of Eastern Europe, across the Mediterranean, throughout the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, and across Central Asia, from the periphery of Russia to Pakistan’s ports on the Indian Ocean.

It is a swath of Western influence not seen for generations.

In Afghanistan and in Iraq, the American military will do all it can to minimize the size of its forces, and there will probably never be an announcement of permanent stationing of troops.

Permanent access is all that is required, not permanent basing, officials say.