Posts Tagged ‘Intervention’

Why they hate us?: How many Muslims has the U.S. killed in the past 30 years?

Stephen M. Walt., 30 November 2009.


Yet if you really want to know “why they hate us,” … the fact remains that the United States has killed a very large number of Arab or Muslim individuals over the past three decades.

Editor’s Comment:

And no amount of “public diplomacy” or “American narrative” will win friends when the U.S. is responsible for killing sons and daughters of people in their home land. That is a basic piece of strategic wisdom!

Are American Muslims A Threat?

response by Michael Brenner to question posed by James Kitfield on National Journal Expert Blog, 19 November 2009.


…all it would take to restore sanity is some slight reflection on our dismal performance everywhere we have tried our hand at manipulation in the Greater Middle East since 9/11. We have been consistently arrogant, incompetent, corrupt – in all senses, callous to the pain inflicted on the natives and ourselves alike, and abject failures.

Conceptualizations of Insurgency and its Effects on the Counterinsurgency Policy Process

Adam L. Silverman. Sic Semper Tyrannis, 12 November 2009.


Given the reality that the US faces in Afghanistan; the historic lack of functional centralized government, exceedingly high number of societal elements, many of which are geographically isolated or semi-isolated, the illegitimacy of the current Afghan government, and the fact that groups we are fighting are not all insurgents makes successfully reaching the COIN end state of tethering Afghan society back to the Afghan state very, very difficult. The debate on the use of COIN really needs to be focused in on this difficult set of Afghan circumstances and whether they allow any chance for a positive counterinsurgency outcome.

Full Spectrum Dominance and COIN

Dave Anderson. News Hoggers, 06 November 2009.


COIN does not decrease the chance of future interventions; it instead probably increases the chance of future interventions and invasions as it is a “solution” that is “proven to work” as long as not too many questions are raised about either what “working” means or the initial rosy scenario assumptions that are made to sell the invasion.

From Iraq, Lessons for the Next War

Alissa J. Rubin. New York Times. 31 October 2009.

Chimera of Victory

Gian P. Gentile. New York Times, 31 October 2009.


History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.

The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.

Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case.

Kilcullen’s Long War

Tom Hayden. The Nation, 14 October 2009.

A New Grand Bargain: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Defense Planning

Thomas G. Mahnken. Joint Forces Quarterly, 01 October 2009.