Seth G. Jones. RAND, 27 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/HzvPUo
Excerpt:
By early 2012, there were approximately 432,000 counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan – approximately 90,000 U.S. soldiers, 30,000 NATO soldiers, 300,000 Afghan National Security Forces, and 12,000 Afghan Local Police. In addition, the United States spent over $100 billion per year and deployed a range of sophisticated platforms and systems. The Taliban, on the other hand, deployed between 20,000 and 40,000 forces (a ratio of nearly 11 to 1 in favor of counterinsurgents) and had revenues of $100-$200 million per year (a ratio of 500 to 1 in favor of counterinsurgents).
Frank G. Hoffman. Armed Forces Journal, October 2009.
http://www.afji.com/2009/10/4198658
Anthony H. Cordesman & Erin K. Fitzgerald. CSIS, 27 August 2009 (Working Draft)
http://csis.org/files/publication/090809_qdrahc_revised.pdf
Excerpt:
… the legacy of interrelated problems raises serious questions as to whether the next QDR will be more meaningful than its predecessors in creating a strategy that actually shapes US forces, procurements, and readiness. The 2010 QDR has the potential to be the next step in the reform process and to institutionalize the reforms Gates initiated with his budget cuts.
It is unclear the extent to which it will realize its potential, given the scale needed to make meaningful decisions, create an affordable force posture, fund credible levels of manpower, fully restructure DOD’s failed procurement plans, and deal with the real world cost and impact of the two ongoing wars.
The search for answers is being structured around the concept of “hybrid warfare,” which requires the broadest possible range of force capabilities and flexibilities across the spectrum of operations. Hybrid warfare may be an intellectual improvement over the emphasis on conventional warfighting in past reviews, but so far the concept is so loosely defined, that it does not provide clear criteria for decision-making. Service efforts to define it have so far been little more that shopping lists for every possible contingency mixed with buzzwords that appear to have meaning only as long as they are no examined in any detail. In practice, any concept that effectively justifies anything ends in justifying absolutely nothing.
Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 30 July 2009.
excerpt:
Reversing the downward slide in Afghanistan will require lots more U.S. troops and a “very substantial” increase in spending. The Afghan security forces must be doubled in size, corruption at all levels of the Afghan government must be addressed, somehow a way must be found to increase NATO participation and then there is the problem of Pakistan, for which nobody really seems to have any answers.
Kenneth Payne, Kings of War site, 16 May 2009.
Frank G. Hoffman. Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2009.
http://bsu.ase.ro/oldbsu/anexe/lectures2010/SF240.pdf
Pat Porter, Kings of War site, 28 March 2009.
Stephen D. Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman. Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, Army War College, 25 September 2008. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).
Frank G. Hoffman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).
Lutz Unterseher, Project on Defense Alternatives Guest Publication, Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, November 2007.
Margaret S. Bond, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2007. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).
Frank G. Hoffman, Foreign Policy Research Institute E-notes, 24 August 2006
Frank G. Hoffman, Orbis, Summer 2006. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).
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