Josh Rogin. Foreign Policy, 15 February 2012.
The Pentagon’s new budget request moves $3 billion of military pay and benefits out of the base budget into the war budget in an accounting maneuver experts and congressional staffers say is meant to get around legally mandated budget caps…
Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis. Armed Forces Journal, February 2012.
I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 division-level “experiment” that turned out to be far more setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a “digital division” with fewer troops and more gear could be far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration firsthand, and it didn’t take long to realize there was little substance to the claims. Virtually no legitimate experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the language of scientific experimentation and presented in glowing press releases and public statements, intended to persuade Congress to fund the Army’s preference.
…when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start.
Robert Haddick. Small Wars Journal, 29 November 2011.
Andrew Tilghman. Defense News, 12 October 2011.
Panetta said the Army should expect reserve-component troops to be a vital part of the future force.
“As we draw down from these wars, we need to keep the Guard and the Reserve operational and gaining experience. This is the best investment we’ve made over the past 10 years,” he said. “We need to continue to be able to maintain that as a valuable asset because the reserve force has a special role to play as a force that gives the nation strategic depth in the event of crisis, access to unique civilian skill sets that can be useful in modern conflicts and as the Army’s bridge to a broader civilian population.”
Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 19 August 2010.
This pamphlet revises the conceptual and operating focus of the Army from major combat operations to that of operational adaptability employing full-spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty and complexity.
TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 describes how future Army forces conduct operations as part of the joint force to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies in the future operational environment. The pamphlet describes the employment of forces in the 2016-2028 timeframe and identifies capabilities required for future success to guide Army force development efforts.
Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 18 November 2009.
[Lawrence] Korb … said a more realistic troop increase for Afghanistan would be 10,000 soldiers until the drawdown of troops from Iraq “begins in earnest.” There are currently 120,000 U.S. troops remaining in Iraq, almost twice the total in Afghanistan, though Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, told Congress in September that he plans to reduce that total to around 50,000 by August 30, 2010. Alternatively, Korb said, Obama could speed up the pace of redeployment out of Iraq in order to relieve the stress on the force… But under current Pentagon policy, soldiers would still need to receive at least 12 months of recuperation time back in the U.S. before potential assignment in Afghanistan.
Megan Scully. Government Executive, 09 October 2009.
Gina Cavallaro and Kris Osborn. Defense News, 01 Oct 2009.
Gian P. Gentile. Parameters, Autumn 2009.
Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy.
Agreed! COIN is a collection of tactics. What is missing in Afghanistan is a strategy with any credible chance of success … despite the lip-service to political solutions.
Katherine McIntire Peters. Government Executive, 28 September 2009.
Afghanistan Research Reachback Center White Paper, TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System, United States Army, September 2009.
Though tribe is a factor in Pashtun society, it is neither the only source of Pashtun identity nor the only foundation of Pashtun social organization. Traditions of shared kinship have formed the narrative foundations for Pashtun tribal organization, and historical forces have reinforced these structures. However, both in the past and where kin-based social structures still exist among Pashtuns, other social forms routinely arise and trump the importance of tribe and tribal organization. Rivalry between close male relatives, the formation of factions within kin groups, and the dynamics of patronage make Pashtun social structures far more complex than if they followed the classical anthropological definition of “tribe.”
Colin Clark. DoDBuzz, 04 August 2009.
Colin Clark. DoDBuzz.com, 24 July 2009.