Andrew J. Bacevich. Los Angeles Times, 03 December 2009.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich3-2009dec03,0,3209129.story
Excerpt:
So the war launched as a prequel to Iraq now becomes its sequel, with little of substance learned in the interim. To double down in Afghanistan is to ignore the unmistakable lesson of Bush’s thoroughly discredited “global war on terror”: Sending U.S. troops to fight interminable wars in distant countries does more to inflame than to extinguish the resentments giving rise to violent anti-Western jihadism
PA Consulting Group. Chart published by Richard Engel in his article “So what is the actual surge strategy?”, NBC News World Blog, 02 December 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HbIAFE
click on chart for expanded view
Editor’s Comment:
Richard Engel says this chart was made for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I prefer to think that it was drawn for a new magazine called Popular Chaos Illustrated and that the White House is a charter subscriber.
David Bromwich. Huffington Post, 02 December 2009.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/the-afghanistan-parenthes_b_377141.html
Excerpt:
… the president spoke as if Al Qaeda were the name of a distinct, finite, searchable entity that can be subdued by an intensification (lasting exactly 18 months) of American fighting in the country that was once its camp. As for the Taliban, whatever else they may be, they are native to Afghanistan. This cannot be said of Al Qaeda, but it cannot be said, either, of the soldiers, trainers, advisers, and contractors sent by the United States.
There is a misjudged air of precision in the idea of a renewed and extended war that closes at 18 months because that “benchmark” was settled in advance. How can anyone be sure that the scale of so entangling a mission, with so many pitfalls, will fit neatly into the shape of a year and a half?
as prepared for presentation at West Point, full text as provided by the White House to the Los Angles Times, 01 December 2009.
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/12/obama-speech-text-afghanistan.html
Christopher Hellman. National Priorities Project, 01 December 2009.
http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2009/12/01
Excerpt:
Prior to Fiscal Year 2010, combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been funded outside the normal Defense Department budget through “supplemental” spending bills. The Obama Administration pledged that it would end this practice after Fiscal Year 2009 and included, as part of its Fiscal Year 2010 budget request, a $130 billion request for “Overseas Contingency Operations,” the majority of which was dedicated to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
The Fiscal Year 2010 funding, which awaits final approval from Congress, does not include the funds that will be required to support any further increase in U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. Thus it is very likely that the White House will again resort to a supplemental spending bill to secure additional war funding in the coming year.
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 30 November 2009.
http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf
Excerpt:
The reasons behind the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and its lasting consequences are examined over three sections in this report. The first section traces bin Laden’s path from southern Afghanistan to the mountains of Tora Bora and lays out new and previous evidence that he was there. The second explores new information behind the decision not to launch an assault. The final section examines the military options that might have led to his capture or death at Tora Bora and the ongoing impact of the failure to bring him back ‘‘dead or alive.’’
Stephen M. Walt. ForeignPolicy.com, 30 November 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HRJEyM
Excerpt:
Yet if you really want to know “why they hate us,” … the fact remains that the United States has killed a very large number of Arab or Muslim individuals over the past three decades.
Editor’s Comment:
And no amount of “public diplomacy” or “American narrative” will win friends when the U.S. is responsible for killing sons and daughters of people in their home land. That is a basic piece of strategic wisdom!
Philip Giraldi. antiwar.com, 26 November 2009.
http://original.antiwar.com/giraldi/2009/11/25/the-cost-of-war/
Excerpt:
Why are these wars so expensive? It goes back to Napoleon: logistics. US bases in Iraq are supplied by a 344-mile road running north from huge depots in Kuwait and by another artery running south from Turkey, both of which require convoys of trucks with armed guards dramatically raising the costs of everything being brought in. It is similar in Afghanistan but worse.
International Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°96, 25 November 2009.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/B096-afghanistan-elections-and-the-crisis-of-governance.aspx
Excerpt:
The electoral fraud was a direct consequence of failure to build the capacity of government institutions. Since the 2004 presidential vote, the international community – UNAMA in particular – repeatedly turned a blind eye to the looming crisis of credibility rooted in an unsound process. The August vote laid bare disagreements between different international actors and within the new American administration, whose lack of clear policy in Kabul undermined their ability to press for necessary changes ahead of the elections. The polls severely damaged UNAMA’s ability to function effectively, weakening its internal morale and sharply eroding Afghan confidence in Kai Eide, the Special Representative of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (SRSG). The UN’s mission to bring stability to the country has been severely jeopardised. His effectiveness as head of mission will always remain in doubt. If UNAMA’s credibility is to be restored, Eide must step down.
Christi Parsons and Julian E. Barnes. Los Angeles Times, 23 November 2009.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-troop-costs23-2009nov23,0,3233273.story
Excerpt:
…in a memo early this month, obtained by The Times‘ Washington bureau, the Pentagon’s own comptroller produced an estimate that broke with the customary Defense formula and did include construction and equipment.
That memo said the yearly cost of a 40,000-troop increase would be $30 billion to $35 billion — at least $750,000 a person. An increase of 20,000 would cost $20 billion to $25 billion annually, it said — a per-soldier cost equal to or greater than the White House estimate.
Derrick Crowe. Return Good for Evil, 21 November 2009.
http://returngood.com/2009/11/21/an-interview-with-matthew-hoh/
Excerpt:
How many recruits do they [al-Qaida] get per year? A hundred? Two hundred? The Muslim population is over a billion. You’re talking about such a small fraction. It’s really associated with such a fringe movement that we have to attack using human intelligence and using law enforcement techniques. Army brigade combat teams do not affect al-Qaida. Having 60,00 troops in Afghanistan is not affecting al-Qaida. …[T]he destruction of al-Qaida should be our priority…but we need to go after that organization as it exists and not with ground combat troops in Afghanistan.
response by Michael Brenner to question posed by James Kitfield on National Journal Expert Blog, 19 November 2009.
http://security.nationaljournal.com/2009/11/are-american-muslims-a-threat.php#1393085
Excerpt:
…all it would take to restore sanity is some slight reflection on our dismal performance everywhere we have tried our hand at manipulation in the Greater Middle East since 9/11. We have been consistently arrogant, incompetent, corrupt – in all senses, callous to the pain inflicted on the natives and ourselves alike, and abject failures.
John Byrne. 70news.com, 18 November 2009.
http://www.70news.com/2009/11/18/gen-wesley-clark-calls-for-exit-from-afghanistan/
Excerpt:
You’ve got to “figure out where you’re going,” Clark told the House Armed Services subcommittee on oversight and investigations. “How do we get out of here? Because our presence long term there is not a good thing. We’re playing into the hands of people who don’t like foreigners in a country that’s not tolerant of diversity. And that’s not going to change.”
Editor’s Comment:
“If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.” ~ Lewis Carroll. (English Logician, Mathematician, Photographer and Novelist, especially remembered for Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 1832-1898)
Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 18 November 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/68174/army-data-shows-contraints-on-troop-increase-potential
Excerpt:
[Lawrence] Korb … said a more realistic troop increase for Afghanistan would be 10,000 soldiers until the drawdown of troops from Iraq “begins in earnest.” There are currently 120,000 U.S. troops remaining in Iraq, almost twice the total in Afghanistan, though Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, told Congress in September that he plans to reduce that total to around 50,000 by August 30, 2010. Alternatively, Korb said, Obama could speed up the pace of redeployment out of Iraq in order to relieve the stress on the force… But under current Pentagon policy, soldiers would still need to receive at least 12 months of recuperation time back in the U.S. before potential assignment in Afghanistan.
Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, 16 November 2009.
http://defensealt.org/Hc15bY
Editor’s Comment
Walt makes a fundamental strategic point. The Bush wars involved operational and grand strategic errors, so why institutionalize a shift in defense planning that in effect has the U.S. military prepare for more strategic errors by our leadership? Why not opt to correct the error? It is really an elemental point of strategy: Don’t compound error!
I understand how military professionals who have been ordered to take on foolish strategic missions might feel that counterinsurgency theory is an attractive way out of their tactical and operational dilemmas. But there is really no excuse for civilian leaders, including Sec Def Gates, chasing the mirage of COIN as if it were an answer for our current problems dealing with the consequences of a disastrous Bush national security strategy. Change the strategy and there will be no need for investments in COIN!
Christopher Drew. New York Times, 14 November 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/us/politics/15cost.html
Excerpt:
…even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.
Adam L. Silverman. Sic Semper Tyrannis, 12 November 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HHQ9VV
Excerpt:
Given the reality that the US faces in Afghanistan; the historic lack of functional centralized government, exceedingly high number of societal elements, many of which are geographically isolated or semi-isolated, the illegitimacy of the current Afghan government, and the fact that groups we are fighting are not all insurgents makes successfully reaching the COIN end state of tethering Afghan society back to the Afghan state very, very difficult. The debate on the use of COIN really needs to be focused in on this difficult set of Afghan circumstances and whether they allow any chance for a positive counterinsurgency outcome.
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