Posts Tagged ‘Af-Pak’

Gen. Wesley Clark calls for exit from Afghanistan

John Byrne. 70news.com, 18 November 2009.
http://www.70news.com/2009/11/18/gen-wesley-clark-calls-for-exit-from-afghanistan/

Excerpt:

You’ve got to “figure out where you’re going,” Clark told the House Armed Services subcommittee on oversight and investigations. “How do we get out of here? Because our presence long term there is not a good thing. We’re playing into the hands of people who don’t like foreigners in a country that’s not tolerant of diversity. And that’s not going to change.”

Editor’s Comment:

“If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.” ~ Lewis Carroll. (English Logician, Mathematician, Photographer and Novelist, especially remembered for Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 1832-1898)

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Army Data Show Constraints on Troop Increase Potential: Escalation in Afghanistan Could Leave Few Brigades in Reserve

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 18 November 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/68174/army-data-shows-contraints-on-troop-increase-potential

Excerpt:

[Lawrence] Korb … said a more realistic troop increase for Afghanistan would be 10,000 soldiers until the drawdown of troops from Iraq “begins in earnest.” There are currently 120,000 U.S. troops remaining in Iraq, almost twice the total in Afghanistan, though Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, told Congress in September that he plans to reduce that total to around 50,000 by August 30, 2010. Alternatively, Korb said, Obama could speed up the pace of redeployment out of Iraq in order to relieve the stress on the force… But under current Pentagon policy, soldiers would still need to receive at least 12 months of recuperation time back in the U.S. before potential assignment in Afghanistan.

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Building on 2 blunders: the dubious case for counterinsurgency

Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, 16 November 2009.
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/16/building_on_2_blunders_the_dubious_case_for_counterinsurgency

Editor’s Comment

Walt makes a fundamental strategic point. The Bush wars involved operational and grand strategic errors, so why institutionalize a shift in defense planning that in effect has the U.S. military prepare for more strategic errors by our leadership? Why not opt to correct the error? It is really an elemental point of strategy: Don’t compound error!

I understand how military professionals who have been ordered to take on foolish strategic missions might feel that counterinsurgency theory is an attractive way out of their tactical and operational dilemmas. But there is really no excuse for civilian leaders, including Sec Def Gates, chasing the mirage of COIN as if it were an answer for our current problems dealing with the consequences of a disastrous Bush national security strategy. Change the strategy and there will be no need for investments in COIN!

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High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War

Christopher Drew. New York Times, 14 November 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/us/politics/15cost.html

Excerpt:

…even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.

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Conceptualizations of Insurgency and its Effects on the Counterinsurgency Policy Process

Adam L. Silverman. Sic Semper Tyrannis, 12 November 2009.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/11/conceptualizations-of-insurgency-and-its-effects-on-the-counterinsurgency-policy-process.html

Excerpt:

Given the reality that the US faces in Afghanistan; the historic lack of functional centralized government, exceedingly high number of societal elements, many of which are geographically isolated or semi-isolated, the illegitimacy of the current Afghan government, and the fact that groups we are fighting are not all insurgents makes successfully reaching the COIN end state of tethering Afghan society back to the Afghan state very, very difficult. The debate on the use of COIN really needs to be focused in on this difficult set of Afghan circumstances and whether they allow any chance for a positive counterinsurgency outcome.

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Inouye balks at war funding fix

David Rogers. Politico, 10 November 2009.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1109/29357.html

Excerpts:

Under almost all scenarios before Obama, billions more than the contingency funds requested in his 2010 budget will be needed…

Most estimates of how much more the Pentagon may need now run in the range of $30 billion to $40 billion.

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Winning in Afghanistan: A Message from Ambassador Eikenberry

Karl E. Eikenberry. Embassy of the U.S.A., Kabul, 08 November 2009.
http://static1.firedoglake.com/37/files/2009/11/Winning-in-Afghanistan.pdf

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Pull the plug on the Afghan surge

Charles Kupchan and Steven Simon. Financial Times, 03 November 2009.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e98cbae-c8c6-11de-8f9d-00144feabdc0.html

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Fixing a Failed Strategy in Afghanistan

Gilles Dorronsoro. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/fixing_failed_strategy.pdf

Excerpt:

…the International Coalition, with its limited resources and diminishing popular support, should focus on its core interests: preventing the Taliban from retaking Afghan cities, avoiding the risk that al-Qaeda would try to reestablish sanctuaries there, pursue a more aggressive counterinsurgency strategy in the North, and reallocate its civilian aid resources to places where the insurgency is still weak.

Editor’s Comment

Some would say that Pashtunistan is already a nation which can’t yet fully establish itself as a state (although there is already considerable local governance, both Pashtun tribal and Taliban.) Presently Punjabi (Pakistani) and US/NATO military intervention prevent the establishment of a state.

Dorronsoro’s Afghan war strategy would seem to be a step in moving the Pashtunistan national cause to within a decade or so of success. Of course, the cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad would have to fall under Pashtunistan governance eventually, even if Western forces resisted for some years.

Map of Pashtunistan

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Chimera of Victory

Gian P. Gentile. New York Times, 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/opinion/31iht-edgentile.html?_r=1

Excerpt:

History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.

The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.

Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case.

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Support Grows for Pursuit of Peace Deals With the Taliban

Yaroslav Trofimov. Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2009.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125686434305817635.html

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RAND Forum on U.S. Policy Afghanistan

C-Span.org, 29 October 2009.
http://www.c-span.org/Watch/Media/2009/10/29/Terr/A/24975/RAND+Forum+on+US+Policy+Afghanistan.aspx

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AfPak-Iraq: Wrong War, Wrong Thinking. The United States faces mounting problems in the three leading conflict-zones of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Paul Rogers. Open Democracy, 29 October 2009. Hosted on the Commondreams website.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/11/03-6

Excerpt:

If there is a way ahead, it rests not on short-term calculations about troop numbers but on a larger reassessment by the Barack Obama administration of the entire US security posture in the middle east and southwest Asia. This will have to do more than crisis-manage the dire problems inherited from George W Bush; what is needed is no less than a move beyond military-led thinking to an integrated understanding of what security in the 21st century actually is.

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False Dichotomy: We have more options in Afghanistan than Biddle lets on

Michael A. Cohen. The New Republic, 29 October 2009.
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/disputations-false-dichotomy

for Biddle article see: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/is-there-a-middle-way-biddl

Excerpt:

In poker terms, Biddle’s argument is the equivalent of betting all your chips on an inside straight draw. And then doing it again on the next hand.

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U.S. official resigns over Afghan war

Karen DeYoung. Washington Post, 27 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102603394.html

For the fulltext and a key excerpt from Matthew P. Hoh’s resignation letter see http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/resignation-letter-of-matthew-p-hoh.

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Welcome to 2025: American Preeminence Is Disappearing Fifteen Years Early

Michael T. Klare. Tom Dispatch, 26 October 2009.
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175131/michael_klare_the_great_superpower_meltdown

Excerpt:

How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma President Obama and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.

article references http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/global-trends-2025

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Afghan insurgency given new life by their enemies

Paul McGeough. The Age, 24 October 2009. from an address at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/afghan-insurgency-given-new-life-by-their-enemies-20091023-hd58.html

Excerpts:

Afghans do want governance – they want good governance. But they have been ripped off every time it’s been within their grasp. And the worst rip-off has been in the last eight years, because democracy and good governance were the gifts offered by the West – by governments that supposedly knew about these things.

In their refusal to back Kabul or the Coalition, Afghans are not saying yea or neigh on the Taliban in isolation – the call they make as they try to go about their daily existence, is on the credibility of the Taliban as compared with that of the Karzai government and the Coalition.

It’s too late for McChrystal to make protecting the most-threatened sections of the Afghan population the key objective, because both the Kabul Government and the coalition lack credibility in the eyes of the people. In the absence of any significant Afghan government presence, much beyond Kabul, it is American military and aid workers – and those from several other coalition countries – that are seen as the face of government and as keepers of the cash, of which there is not enough and which takes forever to translate into meaningful development.

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The Ethnic Split

Selig S. Harrison. The Nation, 21 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/harrison

Excerpt:

…to offset Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, replace the present “Af-Pak” strategy with a broader regional strategy that encourages India, Iran, Russia, China and Tajikistan–all of which oppose a Taliban takeover–to play a more active role in shaping Afghanistan’s economic and political future and in setting the terms for a gradual US-NATO withdrawal.

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High Cost, Low Odds

Stephen M. Walt. The Nation, 21 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/walt

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Is There a Middle Way?

Stephen Biddle. The New Republic, 20 October 2009.
http://www.tnr.com/print/article/world/there-middle-way

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The War Has Been Postponed

Harvey Sapolsky. Defense News, 19 October 2009.

Seven months ago, the U.S. military was being praised by many security specialists as finally having gotten it: It un­derstood that its future was coun­terinsurgency best practices, which means nation-build­ing under fire from insur­gents in the world’s tough­est neighbor­ hoods. Yes, it had taken a while, but the mili­tary’s top lead­ership had fi­nally seen the light. Future war would mean fighting insurgencies, and counterin­surgency was an intera­gency mili­ tary/civilian team effort requiring skills in building governments, putting in the national plumbing — lights, roads, sewers, schools — and protecting the citizens from insurgents while training the local military to conduct se­curity operations and to think and behave democratically.

U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus wrote the manual. All the big think tanks and study groups had called it. America needed to nation-build to fight terrorism. Defense Secre­tary Robert Gates had cut the pro­grams of the old thinkers who wanted Cold War-type systems in­stead of signing up for the new fight. The neo-cons had been ban­ished, but their democracy­spreading anti-al-Qaida strategy had melded nearly seamlessly with liberal internationalist doc­trine stating that terrorism was bred in the hopelessness of failed impoverished states.

Afghanistan was to be the test case. Iraq was the bad war, but Afghanistan was the good one. Our allies were there, NATO somehow being tricked into showing up. The United Nations was there. Humanitarian groups were there. Next door was a threatened Pakistan, the Muslim nation with nuclear weapons and an extremist presence. We had to get Afghanistan right.

The new administration was for it. The new security team was filled with advocates recruited from the think tanks and academia, people who had done the articles and con­ference volumes on the subject. Most of the correspondents cover­ing the war were on board. There was a consensus as much as con­sensus exists these days.

Nation-Builders Vanish

And today it all seems so long ago. There is hardly anyone be­yond the few neo-cons left stand­ing and some Republican com­mentators who is willing to en­dorse the military’s plan for the full nation-building deal. Counterinsur­gent advocates are silent. Liberal interventionists are silent. We hear only how corrupt the Afghan gov­ernment is and how backward Afghanistan is, as if this is news.

The Obama administration is supposedly mulling its options, ignoring the nation-building goals it was proclaiming for Afghanis­tan in March and still giving speeches about as late as August.

I think the U.S. health care de­bate did it. The Obama administra­tion is having a much harder fight to gain enactment of health-care reform than seemed likely in the spring. The big Democratic ma­jorities it has in Congress are ap­parently not big enough to get it done. The cost of reform is being questioned, especially after the se­ries of expensive bailouts for the nation’s banks, housing market and auto industry. War and domes­tic reform don’t mix well.

In the modern parade of Demo­cratic Party presidents, Franklin Roosevelt did reform first, then war; Harry Truman did war, not reform; Lyndon Johnson tried re­form and war simultaneously, and essentially lost both and a Demo­crat majority for a generation. Jimmy Carter did nothing, and President Bill Clinton tried but gave up on both reform and war.

I think President Obama is go­ing to downplay the war, not sur­rendering outright but finding a way to make the war less impor­tant politically than reform or less visible until reform is secure domestically. More troops per­haps, but deployed more slowly than requested. More aid for Afghanistan, but dependent upon the demonstration of the Afghan government’s own improvements. Most of the nation-builder advo­cates are loyal Democrats and will hold their tongues. The war, and certainly the application of the full counterinsurgency manu­al, has been postponed until health care reform is in place. ■

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Afghanistan Is Obama’s War Now

James Kitfield. National Journal, 17 October 2009.
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20091017_2858.php

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Obama weighs Afghan strategy, not just troop buildup

Jon Ward. Washington Times, 15 October 2009.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/15/obama-weighs-more-than-afghan-troop-buildup//print/

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Al-Qaeda’s guerrilla chief lays out strategy

Syed Saleem Shahzad. Asia Times, 15 October 2009.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html

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Don’t put all the security eggs in the al Qaeda basket

Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman. Foreign Policy, 15 October 2009.
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/15/why_the_us_shouldnt_put_all_its_security_eggs_in_the_al_qaeda_basket

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Go Big or Go Deep: An Analysis of Strategy Options on Afghanistan

Daniel L. Davis. U.S. Army (unofficial and unclassified), 14 October 2009. Hosted on the Sic Semper Tyrannis Website.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/files/go-deep-_14-oct-09_.pdf

Excerpt:
In 2009 Afghanistan today, conditions on the ground are nothing like that of Iraq of early 2007 and there is little reason to believe the tactical success achieved by the Iraq surge could be repeated today in Afghanistan. There is presently no successful “Sons of Iraq”- type operation that would remove large numbers of enemy fighters from the streets, valleys and mountains. No large segment of the insurgency has indicated any interest in establishing a ceasefire with allied forces. The insurgency in Afghanistan today is spread over hundreds of thousands of square miles of inhospitable terrain and even 40,000 additional fighters would likely be insufficient to militarily stem the tide.

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Kilcullen’s Long War

Tom Hayden. The Nation, 14 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091102/hayden/single

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Stanley McChrystal’s Long War

Dexter Filkens. New York Times Magazine, 14 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/magazine/18Afghanistan-t.html

Comment:

…our military leadership in Afghanistan acts, to judge by Filkins piece, as if winning were a hard but typical thing to do, if only things were done right this time. (By the way, if Filkins had written a piece similar in tone about LeBron James, it would be considered embarrassingly fawning. Why is it that our objective reporters for major newspapers regularly fall in love with their military subjects and cast them as stars? And why is such work never considered embarrassing?)
~ Tom Dispatch
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175130

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The key issue in Afghanistan isn’t the number of troops we send, it’s the mission that they’re given – and that’s why the military doctrine and strategy of “counterinsurgency” is totally inadequate as a guide

James Vega. The Democratic Strategist, 12 October 2009.
http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/_memos/tds_SM_Vega_Afg.pdf

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Afghanistan – the proxy war

Andrew J. Bacevich. Boston Globe, 11 October 2009.
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/10/11/afghanistan___the_proxy_war?mode=PF

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Afghanistan and Pakistan: The graveyard for U.S. foreign policy planning?

Gordon Adams. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 08 October 2009.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/gordon-adams/afghanistan-and-pakistan-the-graveyard-us-foreign-policy-plannin

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Five Myths on Afghanistan

Melvin A. Goodman. truthout, 08 October 2009.
http://www.truthout.org/10080910

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Civilian, Military Officials at Odds Over Resources Needed for Afghan Mission

Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Washington Post, 08 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100704088.html

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A War of Absurdity

Robert Scheer, truth dig. 06 October 2009.
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20091007_a_war_of_absurdity/

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General Stanley McChrystal, Commander ISAF, Speech on Afghanistan to IISS

General Stanley McChrystal, Commander ISAF, speech on Afghanistan to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 01 October 2009.
http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=31537&type=full&servicetype=Attachment

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Charts of Coalition Combat KIAs per Afghan Province 2006-2009

from flit, 29 September 2009.
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_09_29.html

The following charts show combat KIAs per province, starting in 2006. It indicates where the truly heavy fighting is, and where insurgents are making inroads.

KIA per province 2006

KIA per province 2006

Fighting has just started in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in earnest. Fatalities are observed throughout the west and eastern regions, while the north is immune. Konar, Nuristan, Uruzgan and Kabul provinces (the little comma-shaped one) are the next highest.

KIA per province 2007

KIA per province 2007

The first coalition KIAs in the north, around Mazar and Kunduz. Helmand gets worse, while Kandahar and Uruzgan stay about the same. The fighting in the east worsens as well in Nangarhar, Paktia and Paktika provinces.

KIA per province 2008

KIA per province 2008

Again, Helmand worsens. Kandahar and Uruzgan and Zabul stay about the same. Coalition casualties increase in all regions over the year before, but particularly in Konar and Kabul provinces. Ghazni and Wardak provinces also see increases in fatalities as attacks on and around Highway 1 between Kandahar and Kabul trend up.

KIA per province 2009 (first nine months)

KIA per province 2009 (first nine months)

Partial results for the first three-quarters of this year show where the fighting continues to intensify. (Keep in mind that some of these provinces will get pinker still.) Notably Wardak and Kabul provinces have become significantly more dangerous to Coalition forces this year, as well as Kunduz in the north. Kandahar has also had more combat KIAs this year than last (49 vs 46) so by the end of the year it will likely end up redder than before, as well. But Helmand, which has seen 129 fatalities this year, up from 76 the year before, is still well ahead of all the rest. Helmand’s growth in KIAs (as well as Kandahar’s and Zabul)’s are obviously somewhat due to increased Western resources being applied there (more targets) in successive years, but as the majority of these fatalities were due to IEDs, and thus insurgent-initiated, the difference in fatality figures between provinces is very much going to be a reflection of where insurgent strategic-level efforts are on the increase as well, rather than purely changes to coalition op tempo.

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Wars stretch Army and Marine Corps particularly thin

Katherine McIntire Peters. Government Executive, 28 September 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=43682&dcn=todaysnews

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Illusions of Victory

Douglas MacGregor. Defense News, 28 September 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4296926&c=FEA&s=COM

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America’s Last Counterinsurgent?

Robert Haddick. Small Wars Journal, 25 September 2009.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/print/this-week-at-war/

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Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond: a conversation with Gen. Petraeus

David Petraeus and Bernard Trainor. Marine Corps University, 23 September 2009.
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/COIN%20Symposium%20Documents/Transcript%20-%20GEN%20Petraeus.pdf

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U.S. Policy Toward Afghanistan

Stephen Biddle. Council on Foreign Relations interview, 23 September 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20283/us_policy_toward_afghanistan.html

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After Afghanistan Briefings, Unease Prevails

John M. Donnelly. Congressional Quarterly Today, 16 September 2009.
http://votersforpeace.us/press/index.php?itemid=2908

The Obama administration’s draft metrics for Afghanistan and Pakistan

as obtained by Foreign Policy, 16 September 2009.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan?page=full

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Letter to President Obama Regarding Afghanistan

Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 14 September 2009.
http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2009/09/letter_to_presi.php

Escaping the “Graveyard of Empires”: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan

Malou Innocent and Ted Galen Carpenter. Cato Institute, 14 September 2009.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

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Resignation Letter of Matthew P. Hoh as Senior Civilian Representative for the U.S. Government in Zabul Province Afghanistan

Matthew P. Hoh. 10 September 2009. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute Website.
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/HohResignationLetter.pdf

Excerpt:

The Pashtun insurgency, which is composed of multiple, seemingly infinite, local groups, is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions and religion by internal and external enemies. The U.S. and NATO presence and operations in Pashtun valleys and villages, as well as Afghan army and police units that are led and composed of non-Pashtun soldiers and police, provide an occupation force against which the insurgency is justified. In both the RC East and South, I have observed the the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.

Reader Comment:

I am now an old man. In the 60/70s I served under John P Vann in Vietnam for a total of over 2 years. I have read Mr Hoh´s letter with great interest. It reminds me of the integrity, compassion and patriotism that Mr Vann displayed, in words and deeds over and again. There was nobody even close, except Ron Ziegler and General Krulak on a good day. Time and pride wore him down, nobody can in the end escape the green machine. For Mr Vann it worked on his vanity until he became Mr B52. And if it could wear down Mr Vann, nobody is safe. I do hope that Mr Hoh gets listened to, that he is supported and that we get out of a war in Afghanistan that we do want to win and that we do not presently have the courage to get out of. ~ Ola Kristofersson

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Conservatives back Obama on Afghanistan

Ben Smith. Politico, 04 September 2009.
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0909/Conservatives_back_Obama_on_Afghanistan.html

The Limits Of Force

Chuck Hagel. The Washington Post, 03 September 2009. Posted on the Atlantic Council Website.
http://acus.org/new_atlanticist/limits-force

Fact Sheet: Quick Facts About U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan

Christopher Hellman. National Priorities Project, 02 September 2009.
http://www.nationalpriorities.org/2009/09/02/quick-facts-US-military-operations-Afghanistan

The Broken “Hinge” in McChrystal’s Paper

W. Patrick Lang. Sic Semper Tyrannis, 02 September 2009.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/09/the-broken-hinge-in-mcchrystals-paper.html

Assessment of US Strategy in Afghanistan

Ravi Rikjye. Intelligence, 29 August 2009.
http://int-history.blogspot.com/2009/08/my-friend-ravi-rikhyes-assessment-of-us.html

The Road Home From Afghanistan: Why a flexible timetable to withdraw U.S. troops will best advance our national security interests

Russ Feingold. Wall Street Journal, 28 August 2009.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203706604574376872733294910.html

McChrystal Defines The Mission

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 26 August 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/08/26/mcchrystal-defines-the-mission/

Some Thoughts on Obama’s Speech

Patrick Porter. Kings of War, 20 August 2009.
http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/08/20/some-thoughts-on-obamas-speech/

Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan and Pakistan, August 2009

Barack Obama. Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention at the Phoenix Convention Center, 17 August 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20038/obamas_speech_on_afghanistan_and_pakistan_august_2009.html

Outside Intervention in Internal Wars

Donald M. Snow. New Atlanticist Policy and Analysis Blog, 13 August 2009.
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/outside-intervention-internal-wars

United States Government Integrated Civilian – Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanisitan

Karl W. Eikenberry and Stanley A. McChrystal. Embassy of the U.S.A. Kabul and U.S. Forces Afghanistan. 10 August 2009 (printable .pdf file). Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute Website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf

Media Conference Call: Stephen Biddle on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan

Presider: Gideon Rose, Managing Editor, Foreign Affairs, 30 July 2009.

Afghan Fight Needs COIN Plus: Cordesman

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 30 July 2009.

excerpt:

Reversing the downward slide in Afghanistan will require lots more U.S. troops and a “very substantial” increase in spending. The Afghan security forces must be doubled in size, corruption at all levels of the Afghan government must be addressed, somehow a way must be found to increase NATO participation and then there is the problem of Pakistan, for which nobody really seems to have any answers.

From Iraq to Afghanistan, US Wars Not Going According to Plan

William Pfaff. Tribune Media Services, 24 July 2009.

Global Poll Finds Widespread Belief that Afghans Want NATO Forces Out

WorldPublicOpion.org. 23 July 2009.

from WorldPublicOpinion.org 23 July 2009

from WorldPublicOpinion.org 23 July 2009

Editor’s comment: It is striking that almost 80% of Pakistanis want NATO and the US out of Afghanistan. This is evidence that they do not view the US/NATO counter-terror, counterinsurgency and stabilization campaign in Afghanistan as a likely solution to their troubles in Pakistan, but rather as a cause of those troubles.

This is empirical evidence that US strategists should consider. Perhaps military intervention into a foreign country is a significant contributing factor to unrest and instability in that country and the region? How often do we hear of US national strategists seriously considering that factor in their strategic planning?

COIN Meets Reality in Hindu Kush

Kelley B. Vlahos. Anti-War.com. 21 July 2009.

Lessons of Vietnam applicable to today

Joseph L. Galloway. McClatchy Newspapers, 16 July 2009.

The Irresistible Illusion

Rory Stewart. The London Review of Books, 09 July 2009.

Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues

Amy Belasco, Congressional Research Service, 2 July 2009 (printable .pdf file).

Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch

Michael Cohen of Democracy Arsenal has an ongoing series of informative posts called “Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch”. You can access this series through the list of his posts.

Index on War in Pakistan, May 2009

Sarah Meyer. Index Research, 01 June 2009.
http://indexresearch.blogspot.com/2009/06/index-on-war-in-pakistan-may-2009.html

Pakistan’s Missing Peace

Graham Usher. The Nation, 20 May 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090608/usher

Excerpt:

There is a hole at the heart of Af-Pak. It’s called peace between Pakistan and India. And no amount of aid, “decided shifts” or apocalyptic warnings will fill it.

GHTime Code(s): 39c01 

The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11

Amy Belasco, Congressional Research Service, 15 May 2009. Posted on the Federation of American Scientists Website.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf

War Report: documents and articles about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

Archives of 14,000 documents and articles on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan compiled by the Project on Defense Alternatives. This site has been archived as of 31 March 2009.
http://www.comw.org/warreport/

GHTime Code(s): 4dfa7 

Sustainable Security in Afghanistan: Crafting an Efective and Responsible Strategy for the Forgotten Front

Lawrence Korb, Caroline Wadhams, Colin Cookman, and Sean Duggan. Center for American Progress, March 2009. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan

The White House, March 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf

GHTime Code(s): 74654 

The Myth of an Afghan Counterinsurgency Strategy

Derrick Crowe. Daily Kos, 12-17 January 2009.
Part 1: http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/1/13/683402/-The-Myth-of-an-Afghan-Counterinsurgency-Strategy
Part 2: http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/1/15/684255/-The-Myth-of-an-Afghan-Counterinsurgency-Strategy,-Part-II
Part 3: http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/1/17/685455/-The-Myth-of-an-Afghan-Counterinsurgency-Strategy,-Part-III

GHTime Code(s): c89fd 

Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People

Ruth Rennie, Sudhindra Sharma, Pawan Sen. The Asia Foundation, 2009.
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2009.pdf

GHTime Code(s): 6dde9 

Index Research: The Pentagon and Oil

Sarah Meyer. Index Research, 24 July 2008.
http://indexresearch.blogspot.com/2008/07/index-research-pentagon-and-oil.html