Arkiv för 'Kommentar' Kategori

Sanning, lögn och Afghanistan: Hur militära ledare har svikit oss

Överstelöjtnant Daniel L. Davis. Armed Forces Journal, februari 2012.
http://defensealt.org/zjV1gq

Utdrag:

Jag stötte förste nivå tvetydighet under 1997 division-nivå "experiment" som visade sig vara mycket mer setpiece än experiment. Under middagen på Fort Hood, Texas, utbildning och Läran Command ledare berättade för mig att Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) hade visat att en "digital division" med färre trupper och mer redskap kan vara mycket effektivare än dagens divisioner. Nästa dag, konstaterade vårt kongressens personal delegation demonstrationen firsthand, och det tog inte lång tid att inse att det fanns lite substans till kraven. Praktiskt taget ingen legitim experimenterande faktiskt genomfördes. Alla parametrar var noga skript. Alla händelser hade en förutbestämd sekvens och resultat. Den AWE var helt enkelt en dyr show, avfattad på det språk som vetenskapliga experiment och presenteras i glödande pressmeddelanden och offentliga uttalanden, som är avsedda att övertala kongressen att finansiera armén önskemål.

... När man har att besluta om att fortsätta ett krig, ändra målen eller att stänga en kampanj som inte kan vinnas på ett acceptabelt pris, våra äldre ledare har en skyldighet att berätta för kongressen och amerikanska människor osminkade sanningen och låta folket bestämma vad tillvägagångssätt att välja. Det är själva kärnan i civil kontroll över militären. Det amerikanska folket förtjänar bättre än vad de har fått från sina höga uniformerade ledare under de senaste antal år. Bara talar sanning skulle vara en bra början.

Att återfå vår balans: Pentagons nya militära strategin tar ett litet steg

Christopher Preble och Charles Knight. Huffington Post den 20 januari 2012.
http://defensealt.org/ysCbHQ

Utdrag:

Balans beror på vad du står på. När det gäller vår fysiska säkerhet, är USA välsignade med kontinental fred och en brist på mäktiga fiender. Vår militära är den mest utbildade, bäst-ledda, och bäst utrustade i världen. Det är våra instabila ekonomi och vår tröga ekonomi som gör oss sårbara för snubbla.

Tyvärr, inte den nya strategin inte helt uppskattar våra styrkor, inte heller det helt upp våra svagheter. I slutändan uppnår det inte Eisenhowers prisade balans.

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Binda Inte alla Det är uppsprucken vara

DefenseTracker.com den 18 januari 2012.
http://defensetracker.com/web/?p=1681

Utdrag:

En del av "Doomsday Mechanism" hysteri som sprids av försvarsministern Panetta och hans kamrat i budgeten krig, Cong. Buck McKeon, har varit automatik av den linjära-the-skivor nedskärningar som sekvestrera skulle ålägga försvarsbudgeten i januari nästa år, i den troliga händelse att lame duck kongressen och dess efterföljare nästa år kommer både vara lika dysfunktionellt som kan röd och blå maskar vi har nu. (Den andra delen av hysteri är "skräcken" att återvända till 2007 års nivåer, av oädel budget försvarsutgifterna.)

Det verkar som om presidenten har lagfästa rätt att ändra sekvestrera mekanismen, men inte mängden som krävs nedskärningar.

Inget behov för alla dessa Nukes

Philip Taubman. New York Times, 08 januari 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/reducing-the-nuclear-arsenal.html

Utdrag:

Om presidenten skjuter tillbaka mot försvararna av den gamla ordningen på Pentagon och andra redutter av den nukleära prästerskapet, kan han behålla amerikansk säkerhet samtidigt som USA en mer trovärdig ledare på en av dagens viktigaste frågor - som innehåller spridning av kärnvapen vapen. Som en kedja rökare be andra att ge upp cigaretter, låter USA, med sin uppsvälld arsenal, hycklande när det sätter press på andra länder att skära vapen och sluta producera bomber kvalitet höganrikat uran ...

Relaterade:

Defense översyn av strategin för sidan Nuclear Debatt

Är Leon Panetta rätt man att försvarsministern?

Winslow Wheeler. TIME Battleland den 13 december 2011.

Utdrag:

Utan införandet av kriget utgifterna, DOD basen budget under "Doomsday Mechanism" är inte längre vid eller nära sin post världskriget högt, men det är inte heller nära någon av de historiskt låga nivåer. I själva verket är det ungefär $ 38000000000 över årliga utgifter under det kalla kriget ...

En tåget för offshore balansering?

Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, 01 december 2011.
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/01/a_bandwagon_for_offshore_balancing~~V

Utdrag:

... Offshore balansering är rätt strategi, även när våra kassakistor är fulla, förutsatt att inga peer konkurrenter hotar att dominera strategiska områden. Även under goda tider, är det ingen mening med att ta på sig onödiga bördor eller att tillåta allierade till åka snålskjuts på Uncle Sams hubristic önskan att vara "nödvändig nation" i nästan varje hörn av världen. Med andra ord är offshore balanseringen inte bara en strategi för hårda tider, det är också det bästa tillgängliga strategin i en värld där USA är den starkaste kraften, benägen att utlösa onödiga motsättningar och sårbara för att dras in i onödiga krig.

Insiders: US ska börja "Pivot" till Asien genom diplomati, inte militär steg

Sara Sorcher. National Journal den 29 november 2011.

Utdrag:

President Obama tillkännagav nyligen åtgärder för att stärka arkitekturen av en amerikansk utrikespolitik med ny fokus på Stilla havet, bland annat planer på att distribuera 2.500 soldater till en bas i Australien-hela tiden insisterar på att de minskningar i USA försvarsutgifterna inte kommer på bekostnad prioriteringar i Asien-Stillahavsområdet. Även när många i Washington försiktigt ögonen Kina snabbt har modernisera militären och expandera marina närvaro i Stilla havet, sade 39 procent av Insiders nästa steg är att förbättra amerikanska engagemang Peking och samtidigt undvika en militär-relaterade steg.

Historien visar risk för godtyckliga försvar nedskärningar

Paula G. Thornhill. CNN, 23 november 2011.
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/23/opinion/thornhill-defense-cuts/index.html

Utdrag:

Landets ledning behöver en plan B så att en heroisk antagande - eller hopp - om det är osannolikt att framtida krig inte oavsiktligt leder till strategisk katastrof. Det är svårare än det verkar. Plan B skulle ge mer flexibilitet att uppfylla vad som kan gå fel i den strategiska miljön snarare än att bara göra budgetnedskärningar.

Redaktörens kommentar:

Plan B är att upprätthålla en bra "strategisk reserv." Som neokonservativa vill påpeka USA satsar endast 4,5% av sin BNP på militären. Om nya hot nypa, kan USA ramp lätt spendera och engagera dess fortfarande betydande industri-och kunskapsbas. Problemet här landet står inför med en upplösning strategi är brist på politisk vilja. Civila ledare avskyr att be det amerikanska folket att offra. En robust National Guard och reserv kraft som inte missbrukas med täta driftsättningar till onödiga krig och en samhällelig förväntan att betala ett skattetillägg i tider av nationell kris är grunderna av vad detta land behöver strategiskt beredda samtidigt som en liten styrka stående fredstid . Med en sådan strategisk plan USA kan väl avsättas för varje hot.

En 1% lösning ger Pentagon Strategiska val

Matthew Leatherman. Bloomberg regeringen den 21 november 2011.
http://defensealt.org/veAUPs

En sparsam flotta till Rescue

Michael E. O'Hanlon. New York Times den 14 november 2011.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1114_defense_budget_ohanlon.aspx

Utdrag:

Genom att hålla ett fartyg utomlands för ett par år och har två besättningar aktie som fartyget samt en skolskepp hemma, kunde marinen förbättra sin utplacering effektiviteten med upp till 40 procent per fartyg åstadkomma med ca tre och en halv fartyg vilka i genomsnitt har kanske krävs fem. Fokusera på marinens stora yta stridande, kryssare och jagare, kan denna strategi att teoretiskt ca 60 fartyg (med något mindre än hälften av dem placeras i utlandet i taget) för att hålla den globala närvaro som marinen säger att det behöver, snarare än 94 fartyg det för närvarande bedriver.

Gen Odierno Breaks Koden om varför vapen kostar så mycket

Loren B. Thompson. Lexington Institute, 11 november 2011.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/gen-odierno-breaks-the-code-on-why-weapons-cost-so-much?a=1&c=1171

Utdrag:

Gen Odierno i november 2 kommentarer tyder på att han inser det inte bara entreprenörer som driver upp kostnaden för programmen. De merkostnader ofta bakas i början av den barocka krav på att förvärvet systemet ställer på utvecklare. Dessa kräver resultat i långa schema förseningar, dyra enhetskostnader och vapen funktioner som inte kan uppfylla de förväntningar appropriators. Ännu viktigare, saktar de leverans av bättre bekämpa system warfighters.

Israel vs Iran: regionala bakslag

Paul Rogers. Öppen demokrati, 11 november 2011.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/israel-vs-iran-regional-blowback

Utdrag:

Den nästan oundvikliga verklighet är att av konfrontation Iran kommer snart att få en begränsad kärnvapenarsenal. Detta beror på att även en begränsad bombning av Iran kommer att skapa en ny dynamik där Iran är i centrum för efter attacken regionen, kommer att ha flera nya alternativ att införa kostnader för sina motståndare, och kommer att gå full tilt för sin egen avskräckande.

Om du vill ha fred, Stopp clamoring för War

Kelsey Hartigan. Demokrati Arsenal den 10 november 2011.
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2011/11/if-you-want-peace-stop-clamoring-for-war.html

Utdrag:

Om Romney tror att han kan vals i Ovala rummet, ge några grova och hårda tal och plötsligt Iran kommer att öppna sina dörrar för IAEA: s inspektörer, ja, han är i för ett brutalt uppvaknande.

Krigförande retoriken kommer inte att lösa situationen med Iran. I själva verket kommer de flesta experter säga att det kommer att göra det värre. Hot om militära åtgärder, eller ännu värre, faktisk militära åtgärder, endast att spela i händerna på Irans hårdföra ... Om en amerikansk militär närvaro skulle övertyga Iran att samarbeta, skulle jag ha trott att det skulle ha hänt vid det här laget.

10 Faktorer som kan leda till krig med Iran

Brian Phillips. AntiWar.com den 9 november 2011.
http://original.antiwar.com/bphillips/2011/11/08/10-factors-that-may-lead-to-war-with-iran/~~V

Funderar du på att Trimma försvarsbudgeten? Börja med QDR.

Abu Muqawama. Center for New American Security, 13 oktober 2011.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/10/looking-trim-defense-budget-start-qdr.html

Utdrag:

Gårdagens tillkännagivande att försvarsdepartementet kommer att bilda en "Strategiska val Group" för att fastställa prioriteringar och risker inför $ 450.000.000.000 i potentiella nedskärningar i budgeten är det senaste exemplet på värdelöshet Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Ett strategiskt dokument nödvändigtvis identifiera risker och prioriteringar, men eftersom QDR inte heller har försvarsdepartementet att etablera en helt ny arbetsgrupp för att göra just det.

Se också: Är QDR "ett PR-trick" eller ett ärligt försök att förena hållning och budget med strategi?

Avsluta vår militaristiska utrikespolitik sparar pengar

Ethan Pollack, The Economic Policy Institute Blog den 20 september 2011. http://www.epi.org/blog/militaristic-foreign-policy-saves-money/

En av de ihållande kritik av president Obamas finanspolitiska plan är att den räknar minskningar krig utgifter som besparingar. I grund och botten, beräknar Congressional Budget Office sitt försvar baslinjen delvis genom att ta den senaste kriget kompletterande (tekniskt kallas utomeuropeiska Contingency Operations, eller OCO) och under förutsättning att upp-justerat för inflation-kommer användas varje år under överskådlig horisonten. Detta uppgår till ca $ 1730000000000 över 10 år. Presidenten förslag, men innehåller endast $ 653.000.000.000 i OCO utgifter över 10 år, en besparing på cirka 1,1 biljoner.

Vissa kritiker, dock hävdar att dessa besparingar inte kan räknas eftersom CBO OCO baslinjen i sig är inte realistiskt, därför besparingar är inte "riktigt." Till exempel, hävdar kommittén för en ansvarsfull Federal Budget (CRFB) som räknar dessa besparingar är en "budget gimmick" som presidenten använder för att "blåsa sina besparingar." Enligt denna kritik, en annan grund för OCO utgifterna bör användas, antingen presidentens budget begäran eller CBO: s kreditutnyttjandet alternativ-som skulle sänka baslinjen och göra det praktiskt taget omöjligt att generera budgetbesparingar från att minska krig utgifter.

All respekt för CRFB och andra kritiker, men kritiken är löjlig. CBO OCO baseline inte är "orealistiskt"-snarare representerar den kostnader för president Bushs aggressiva invasion-centrerade syn på utrikespolitiken utvidgas till evighet. President Obama är, tack och lov, i färd med att försöka förändra USA: s inställning till utrikespolitik, dra ner trupperna från Irak och Afghanistan och gå mot en mer multilateral, tålmodig, diplomatisk, och viktigast av allt, billigare tillvägagångssätt. Vidare föreslår den finanspolitiska planen att begränsa OCO utgifterna, och därigenom se till dessa besparingar realiseras.

President Obamas syn på utrikespolitiken kostar mindre pengar än president Bushs, och budgeten utsikterna bör avspegla dessa besparingar.

Redaktörens kommentar:

Det måste vara ett tecken på hur illa det är för progressiva att EPI nu firar en stor puff av rök från Obama-administrationen skickade att avleda uppmärksamheten från verkliga budget minskningar och i synnerhet för att skydda Pentagon från ytterligare nedskärningar i de offentliga finanserna striderna . Ethan Pollack har arbetat för OMB, så han säkert förstår redovisningen distorsion inbyggd i CBO baslinjen prognoserna baserade på gällande lag. Inte en enda person i världen (även på CBO som förbereder baslinjen) anser att OCO utgifterna kommer att fortsätta att finansiera krigen i Irak och Afghanistan på samma nivå som 2011. Det är därför CBO har ett "dra ner alternativ" - för att uppskatta troliga OCO kostnader. Sistnämnda motion är inte "dumma", eller de förslag som sådana skattningar ligga till grund för att överväga planer budget minska.

Mr Pollack måste också veta att president Obamas FY12 budgetförslag till kongressen finns endast $ 50 miljarder år för OCO för kommande år. Vilket är det? $ 118.000.000.000 evigt eller $ 50000000000 evigt? Du kan inte ha både och.

CBO: s oavgjort ner alternativ är säkert bättre för budgeten (och underskott
reduktion) planering som antingen orealistiska "platshållare" (som
är helt enkelt oansvarigt budgetering) eller CBO baslinjen artefakt av
$ 118.000.000.000 evigt.

Om president Obama vill att tillkännage en plan för att rädda meningsfulla
belopp från OCO han skulle behöva för att meddela snabbare uttag från Afghanistan ... men då ingen egentligen tror att han lämnar
Afghanistan 2014. Så allt detta är rök och speglar ... och progressiva borde känna hemskt om det, inte fira.

Det är oärligt att påstå att det CBO: s baslinje OCO är något en Bush ansvar. Det är helt enkelt ett metodologiskt resultat av hur CBO gör sitt baslinjen.

President Obama har varit ansvarig för nästan tre år och har inte medfört alla trupper hem från Irak och har knappast börjat oavgjort i Afghanistan. Innevarande år OCO på $ 118.000.000.000 är hans ansvar som är falsk-het att projicera den framåt tio år och sedan hävda besparingar från att spendera "$ 653.000.000.000 ... över tio år." Om han verkligen var beredd att avsluta kriget i Afghanistan snart han skulle kunna skära den OCO i hälften och erbjuder $ 325.000.000.000 från minskade framtida krig kostnaderna till att minska underskottet.

Och tills årets budget virrvarr i kongressen tvingades handen han
har fortsatt att mata Pentagon med högre och högre bas budgetar varje år. Det finns inga bevis för att president Obamas "inställning till utrikespolitik ... [är] billigare" ... inte så långt som generositet erbjuds upp till Pentagon berörs.

Vi får inte bygga progressiv politik på rök och speglar. Sådan
politiken skadar oss bara på lång sikt.

En annan kritik av denna budget gimmick kan hittas på: http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/gordon-adams/2369/how-about-those-defense-savings .

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DOD: s $ 64B Fråga: "Var är det $ 64B?"

Matthew Leatherman. Viljan och plånbok, 26 juli 2011.
http://thewillandthewallet.squarespace.com/blog/2011/7/26/dods-64b-question-where-is-that-64b.html

Utdrag:

"CBO har länge sagt att DoD underskattningar programkostnaderna inklusive senast sin rapport om de långsiktiga följderna av 2012 kommande år Defense Program. Denna studie drog slutsatsen att "skillnaden mellan CBO projektion och DOD: s beräkningar för FYDP är ca 2%, eller ca $ 64 miljarder under fem år." "

Panetta måste kämpa fyra krig: Afghanistan, Irak, Libyen, avfall

redaktionella. Boston Globe, 30 juni 2011.

När Leon Panetta tar rodret vid försvarsdepartementet i morgon, kommer han att ställas inför svåra val om den amerikanska militära insatser i Afghanistan, Irak och Libyen. Men en lika trycka på - och potentiellt ännu mer svårlöst - problem är Pentagons budget och utgifter. Utgående sekreterare Robert Gates var bra på läpparnas bekännelse till behovet av att kontrollera utgifterna, han noterade nyligen att "Förenta staterna bör spendera så mycket som behövs på nationell försvaret, men inte ett öre mer'' Men institutionens baslinjen budget har ökat. varje år sedan Gates tog över - från 450.000.000.000 $ till mer än $ 550.000.000.000 fyra år senare. Bara i år har Pentagon söker en 3,4-procentig ökning från 2010 års budget.

Det är inte bara krig, de utgör mindre än 30 procent av Pentagons enorma budget begäran. I samband med andra offentliga utgifterna, är Pentagon en Behemoth. För varje $ 100 av de offentliga diskretionära utgifter, går över $ 30 till icke-krig försvarsutgifterna. Omfattningen är överväldigande, behovet av mer än styckevis styckningsdelar av misslyckade system är brådskande.

Gates hävdade nyligen att Pentagon redan cut $ 300 miljarder men matte föreslår något annat. Dessa pengar kom från program som redan är planerade att avslutas. Besparingarna var helt enkelt sättas i andra militära prioriteringar. Efter att ha konstaterat att marinens 11 bärare stridsgrupper var överdrivna, vägrade Gates att eliminera en enda.

Panetta kommer att behöva ta en mer disciplinerad och systematisk titta på budgeten. Det råder ingen brist på råd från inflytelserika tankesmedjor och oberoende studier, även förra årets rapport för hållbar Defense Task Force , sammankallade en tvåparti grupp genom att representanten Barney Frank. Deras rekommendationer skulle klippa $ 960.000.000.000 mellan 2011 och 2020, om bara Pentagon skulle agera på dem.

Minska antalet utplacerade kärnvapen med hälften - till 1000 stridsspetsar - är förenligt med en nedsatt betoning på kärnvapenkrig och ansträngningarna för vapenkontroll förespråkar. Detta steg ensamt skulle spara över 100 miljarder dollar över 10 år. Minska konventionella styrkor i 50.000, som fortfarande skulle lämna 100,000 personal som utstationeras i Europa och Asien, är mer realistisk kraft struktur. Avbryta några system som varken är kostnadseffektivt eller väsentligt skulle spara mer. MV-22 Osprey och expeditions Stridsfordon är lång på problem, och ont om kapacitet. Dessutom Congressional Budget Office och Government Accountability Office båda har föreslagit förändringar för att stödja insatser, såsom underhåll, leverans och infrastruktur, som skulle spara $ 100 miljarder under nästa årtionde.

Allt detta kan ske utan att äventyra den nationella säkerheten. Panetta måste trycka tillbaka de politiska krafter som hävdar alla nedskärningar gör nationen utsatta för olika fiender. Underskottet är en mycket större säkerhetsrisk.

Tyvärr förblir Pentagon den största federala byrå som helt enkelt inte kan passera en oberoende revisor test; när de utsätts för de normala bokföring förfaranden, det kan inte med någon exakthet, spår utgifterna, bedrägeri, avfall eller redundans. Det har gett sig själv en September 2017 tidsfrist för revision "beredskap.'' Det är inte snart nog. Panetta, som, som tidigare chef för Office of Management and Budget, har ett rykte som en sträng kämpe för budgetdisciplin. Han måste få Pentagon hus i ordning på dag ett.

Robert Gates 'besvikelse arvet

Melvin Goodman. Baltimore Sun, 29 juni 2011.

Utdrag:

I hans senaste föreläsningar, varnade Mr Gates mot någon frysning av försvarsutgifterna, vilket Mr Panetta att ta itu med vapensystem och militära uppdrag att USA inte längre har råd. Som tidigare chef för Office of Management and Budget, förstår Mr Panetta antagligen att Förenta staterna, med mindre än 25 procent av världens ekonomiska resultat och mer än 50 procent av världens militärutgifter, kommer att behöva minska vissa vapen och uppdrag. Försvarsanslagen har ökat mer än 50 procent under de senaste 10 åren och överstiger nu takten i utgifterna för kalla kriget, inklusive krigen i Korea och Vietnam samt fredstid uppbyggnaden av president Ronald Reagan.

En omprövning av nuvarande trupp distributioner skall omfatta tiotusentals trupper i Europa och Asien mer än sex decennier efter utgången av andra världskriget, hundratals baser och anläggningar över hela världen, och det alltför stora vilja att projicera makt i områden som Irak, Afghanistan och Libyen, där vitala nationella intressen inte står på spel.

Afghanistan: till besparingar, göra en Riktiga Indragning

William Hartung. Huffington Post den 28 juni 2011.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/afghanistan-for-real-savi_b_886241.html

Utdrag:

Det kommer inte att vara storskaliga besparingar från avvecklingen av kriget i Afghanistan tills nästan alla amerikanska styrkor dras tillbaka. Även då det fortfarande sannolikt att löpande kostnader för utbildning, utrustning och eventuellt även betala afghanska säkerhetsstyrkor, vilket kan kosta upp till 10 miljarder dollar eller mer per år om nuvarande priser bibehålls. Men den största delen av $ 120.000.000.000 per år nu spenderas på kriget kommer att frigöras för andra ändamål: att minska underskottet, eller offentliga investeringar, eller någon kombination av de två.

Ett slut på den afghanska och Irak krig kan också öppna vägen för en mer omfattande offentlig debatt om Pentagons $ 550.000.000.000 plus årliga underlaget budget - en summa över fyra gånger så stor som vad vi spenderar på krigen. Politiskt gör verkliga nedskärningar i Pentagon utgifter under en tid av krig är en tuff sälja, även med tanke på vår nuvarande budgeten situation. Men ett slut på krigen i kombination med trycket från underskottet skulle kunna leda till verkliga nedskärningar i Pentagon bas budget också, speciellt om vi antar en ny strategi som forswears stora krig ockupation eller stor skala uppror kampanjer av det slag som vår nation har fört i Irak och Afghanistan. Om vi ​​skär kriget utgifter och föra Pentagons större budget i linje med verkligheten, då vi kommer att prata riktiga pengar.

Världens bästa polis

Jeff Jacoby. Boston Globe, 22 juni 2011.

Utdrag:

... Med stor kraft kommer stort ansvar, och ibland en av dessa ansvarsområden är att förstöra monster: att ta ner tyranner som victimize de oskyldiga och nonchalera reglerna för civilisationen. Om stadsdelar och städer behöver polisarbete, står det att resonera om i världen gör också. Och precis som lokala brottslingar trivs när polisen tittar åt andra hållet, så gör brottslingar på världsscenen.

Vår värld behöver en polis. Och om de flesta amerikaner vill det eller inte, bara deras oumbärliga nationen passar för jobbet.

Redaktörens kommentar:

När tre fjärdedelar av amerikanerna avvisar en roll av global polis för USA kanske de förstår något väsentligt om övervakning som Jeff Jacoby inte. En polisstyrka utan tillsyn av ett rättsväsende och en vägledande regelverk är säkert en formel för tyranni.

Jacoby skulle aldrig stödja tyranni, men hobby att vara globala poliser från Vita huset passagerare som väljs av och ansvariga inför endast 10% av världens befolkning är ett beslut att vara en vigilante på den globala scenen. Tänk på att amerikaner skulle vara upp med vapen om Kina eller Ryssland tog på sig att vara globala medborgargarde.

För ledarna i USA till så gärna att ta upp denna roll endast tjänar till att fördröja den dag då vi har som kan internationella rättsliga och polisiära institutioner. Om våra ledare försöker att tänka ännu några år in i framtiden bör det vara klart för dem att utövandet av vigilantism inte tjänar amerikanska intressen.

[En version av denna kommentar publicerades som en insändare i Boston Globe, 28 juni 2011.]

Unobligated Vågar i FY12 National Defense Authorization Bill

Winslow Wheeler. Gäst Inlägg den 24 maj 2011.

The National Defense Authorization lagförslag, HR 1540, kommer att diskuteras av representanthuset den här veckan. Räkningen är arbetet produkten av huset försvarsutskott (HASC), ordförande kongressledamoten Buck McKeon, R. - Kalifornien.

Drift och underhåll avsnitt (avdelning XLIII) i lagförslaget är en av dess största och viktigaste. "O & M" handlar om stöd, logistik, underhåll, utbildning och mycket annat som behövs för att våra väpnade styrkor för att fungera effektivt. $ 170.800.000.000 begärde av president Obama, den kommitté ökade det genom $ 361.000.000 för att $ 171.100.000.000. Men för att komma dit kommittén tog några omvägar.

Stänkte i hela O & M-titel HASC till olika öronmärks (ett litet exempel: $ 4,0 miljoner för "system Simulering Utbildning för armén" [p 430 av utskottets betänkande.]). Alla dessa kom till mycket mer än $ 361.000.000 nätet lägga till räkningen. Kommittén och dess personal var tvungen att hitta förskjutningar att betala för dessa öronmärka godsaker och andra tillägg.

Under tidigare år har HASC (och senatens försvarsutskott och underkommittéerna Defense både parlamentet och senaten Anslag kommittéer) som anges konstiga klingande minskningar av O & M delar av sina räkningar - ". Unobligated balanser" Dessa bör vara tekniska förändringar för pengar anslås tidigare för att de olika militära tjänster för olika program, de blir "unobligated" när de planerade utgifterna inte inträffar, och de förmodligen blir tillgängliga kompensationer för nya utgifter, eller - om kommittén skulle vara mer tillmötesgående för skattebetalarna - tillbaka till statskassan.

Till exempel, på sid. 432 i HASC kommitténs rapport, tabellerna för armén O & M visar en minskning av $ 384.600.000 märkt "Army unobligated balanser uppskattning." Detta belopp råkar vara 1,1% av presidentens begäran om totalt Army O & M ($ 34735000000).

Marinen avsnittet om O & M i HASC propositionen visar en $ 435.900.000 avdrag för "Navy unobligated balanser uppskattning." Av någon underlig anledning, beräknar detta belopp även till 1,1% av presidentens begäran om Navy O & M ($ 39365000000).

Stranger jämn Marine Corps O & M avdrag för unobligated saldon som också 1,1% ($ 66.000.000 i en $ 5,960 miljarder begäran).

Samma sak för Air Force, samma 1,1% ($ 400.800.000 från $ 36195000000 begäran).

Ingen av dessa diskuteras eller förklaras i texten i utskottets betänkande, den enda "förklaring" vi får är att de är "Army [eller marinen eller flygvapnet, etc.] unobligated balanser uppskattning."

Att alla dessa "beräkningar", som bör vara teknisk till sin natur, kommer 1,1% stinker av spel i systemet. Två relevanta frågor: Vem gjorde det? Och Varför?

Först ifrågasätter jag allvarligt om dessa praktiskt liknande uppskattningar har faktiskt kommit från de militära myndigheterna. Detta skulle kräva en ganska märklig (och skenbara) mängd samordning av dem alla att alla kommer till 1,1% av deras respektive O & M budgetäskanden.

För det andra, varför finns det inga "unobligated balanser" i upphandlingen och FoU-avdelningar, som är tungt med den typ av utgifter som kan hamna "unobligated"?

Tredje är varför inte dessa pengar återförs till statskassan, varifrån den kom och nu hör om det verkligen pengarna inte längre behövs av försvarsdepartementet?

Det finns många andra frågor, men förhoppningsvis du får min drift. De förskjuter HASC tog, kallade dem "unobligated balanser," är ingenting annat än över styrelsens whacks på en av de mest betydelse kontona i DOD budget - den som gör en välutbildad och stöds militär. Varför HASC gör detta över nedskärningar, och varför de gör det i O & M?

Det finns några andra "unobligated balans" frågor i propositionen. Försvaret breda delen av O & M har också en $ 456.800.000 hit från en begäran från $ 30,940 miljarder. Detta kommer att 1,47%. Varför tar den del som stöder specialstyrkor och andra en större proportionell hit än de andra militära tjänster?

Dessutom tar Defense hälsoprogrammet en $ 225.000.000 hit som är "förklarade" som en "Gao uppskattning", men ingen GAO analys eller annan förklaring erbjuds.

Den militära personalen budget som betalar militära löner tar en $ 693.000.000 hit från en $ 142.828.000.000 begäran (0,48%). Jag hittade ingen förklaring.

Slutligen tillåter avsnitt 2107 sekreteraren av armén för att använda $ 115 miljoner tidigare "unobligated" utgifter för att finansiera en anläggning vattenrening vid Fort Irwin Kalifornien. Kanske huset representant från Fort Irwin området kan förklara hur allt detta fungerar och hur han eller hon fått för att finansiera vissa utgifter i stadsdelen från dessa allestädes närvarande medel.

Enligt min bedömning skulle HASC, som är laddat med tillsynen av DOD, använda lite tillsyn sig.

Den amerikanska Defense Budget: Get Real, Pentagon

Defense News redaktionellt den 16 maj 2011.
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2011/05/us-defense-budget-get-real-pentagon.html~~V

Utdrag:

Det finns ett gammalt Washington säger att inga pengar är mindre verklig än ut-års pengar. Detta innebär att allt som är bortom den omedelbara utgifterna räkningen är rent fiktiv.

Krav kontroll är en populär metod för att begränsa kostnaderna för nya vapen, men det är lika viktigt att kontrollera det växande antalet uppdrag.

Det första steget bör vara att se till att roller-och-uppdrag granskning sorterade efter Obama snedstreck onödiga och kostsamma uppsägningar i kapacitet.

För det andra måste Pentagon undvika att göra vad den gjorde - porträttera mjuka nummer som hårda de som gör lite annat än utsättas för kritik.

Slutligen, för att göra kloka nedskärningar måste Pentagon förbättra sitt interna finansiella hanteringsprocesser att sätta fingret på vad det är utgifterna och hur. Utan hårda data, är det svårt att komma med hårda besparingar.

Desperately Seeking Gates 400 miljarder dollar besparingar

Carl Conetta. Projekt om Defense Alternatives Notera den 30 april 2011.

Varför är våra försvarsutgifter så högt och uppenbarligen utan kontroll? Massor av färg har spillts behandlar denna fråga, inklusive min egen korta, Pentagons Runaway budget .

Andy Bacevich kan få närmare de viktigaste politiska dynamiken i Varför militärutgifter Remains Untouchable .

Det finns inget bättre exempel på dysfunktionella politiska dynamiken som styr Pentagon budget än president Obamas påstående (April 13, 2011) av påståendet att försvarsministern Gates har "redan frälsta" nationen $ 400.000.000.000 i försvarsutgifterna. Och det finns ingen bättre illustration av fattigdom vårt samtal om detta ämne än det faktum att kravet går i stort sett oemotsagda.

De flesta av de $ 400 miljarder i tidigare DoD "besparingar" som president Obama har bidragit till sekreterare Gates är inte "besparingar" i vanlig bemärkelse. De visar inte upp som minskningar av DoD budget planerar från ett år till nästa, som visas nedan. I bästa fall representerar de DoD marginellt anpassa sina program och strävan att marginellt hantera ökande kostnader tillväxt.

Rough analogi: Efter att ha sagt att det skulle ge en "fullastad" Cadillac för ett visst pris X, och efter att ha upptäckt att detta beräknade priset är helt orealistiskt, tillbaka en bilhandlare trimmar några av de funktioner och levererar något mindre för full utlovade priset . De flesta konsumenter skulle kalla detta en GYP, inte en besparing.

Alternativet skulle vara för DoD för att ytterligare stärka efterföljande budgetäskanden till fullo spegla kostnader tillväxt, och låt kongressen och den verkställande ompröva vad de ville köpa. Jag antar att man kan säga att DoD har "sparat" dessa myndigheter från huvudvärk att göra detta beslut. Helt konfrontera en realistisk prissättning av nuvarande program kan leda till en djupgående omprövning av vårt försvar hållning och moderniseringen. Men det är för mycket att tänka på.

Nu ska vi försöka hitta dem $ 400.000.000.000 i "besparingar" ....

Den $ 400 miljarder

1. Mycket av de $ 400 miljarder som sekreterare Gates påstås ha räddat härrör från hans April 2009 tillkännagivandet av programmet nedskärningar. Gates hävdar att de system och program som han skar under 2009 skulle så småningom kosta mer än $ 300 miljarder. Men åtminstone en del av detta var omedelbart omprogrammeras, vilket innebär: DoD använde besparingarna för att köpa andra saker.

April 2009 Gates Defense Budget rekommendation Statement

2. I augusti 2010 och januari 2011 redogjorde sekreteraren Gates extra "nedskärningar" och "besparingar" på totalt $ 178.000.000.000. Av detta var $ 100.000.000.000 omedelbart omprogrammeras att köpa andra saker eller täcka övriga kostnader. De återstående $ 78000000000 skulle frigöras från Pentagon bana att betala ner underskottet. I augusti 2010 uttalande finner vi Gates hävdade att hans tidigare 2009 arbete som redan har sparat mer än $ 300 miljarder.

Augusti 2010 Gates uttalande om avdelning Efficiencies initiativet

Jan 2011 Gates uttalande om Institutionen Budget och Efficiencies

PDA sammanfattande tabell Re: $ 178.000.000.000

3. Hur mycket (om någon) av den tidigare var "mer än $ 300 miljarderna" i besparingar ges samma över för att minska underskottet? Man tittar på de faktiska budgetplaner, vad vi ser? Den första $ 300.000.000.000 tillkännagavs i april 2009 och det kan rimligen har visat upp som skillnaden mellan den sista Bush budget plan (FY09) och den första Obama budgeten plan (FY10).

Jämförelse mellan dessa två budgetplanerna är lätt för åren 2010-2013:
- Bush FY09 planerade totala utgifterna för 2010-2013 = 2155 miljarder
- Obama FY10 planerade totala utgifterna för 2010-2013 = 2183 miljarder

En ökning är inte en minskning, därför: inga besparingar uppenbara inom en snar åren.

4. Obamas nästa budget plan (FY11) förutser en betydande ökning jämfört med hans första. Så inga besparingar uppenbara där heller.

5. Endast i nästa plan - den FY12 planen - ser vi en minskning av de planerade utgifterna mellan FY12 och FY11 planer. Under de nio år som överlappar mellan FY11 och FY12 planer ser vi en minskning med cirka $ 233.000.000.000.

Men FY12 planen följer Gates "andra tillkännagivandet av nedskärningar och besparingar (sammanfattas i # 2 ovan). Så, åtminstone härrör $ 78000000000 från detta och inte tidigare nedskärningar. Det är när vi jämför FY12 planen med FY11 planen för åren 2012-2016 finns det en minskning i planerad utgifterna $ 76000000000. Fortfarande ingen tydlig påverkan från april 2009 "nedskärningar", dock.

6. Tja, som nämnts ovan, är den totala skillnaden mellan FY11 och FY12 plan för åren 2012-2020 $ 233.000.000.000. 233 minus 78 = 155. Denna ytterligare planering avvecklingen av $ 155.000.000.000 visar upp för åren efter 2016. Så kanske vi har hittat minst $ 155.000.000.000 den tidigare förmodade cut? Kanske det tog bara 2 år att registrera sig? Kanske.

"Kanske" eftersom Obama FY12 budget rullar tillbaka planerade utgifterna nästan exakt till de nivåer som föreskrivs i Obamas FY10 budget ... är den budget som var större än den slutliga Bush budgeten och att vara budget som inte visade någon påverkan från Gates April 2009 erbjudande. För att uttrycka det på ett annat sätt: Obamas FY12 budget bara rullar tillbaka framtida utgifter plan han produceras i FY11 till den nivå han hade föreslogs i FY10. Den FY12 Planen försvinner helt enkelt föreslagna ökningen av FY11.

7. Den andra möjliga (troliga) läsning av allt detta är att: (i) Ingen av de ursprungliga $ 300.000.000.000 "frälst" någonsin lämnade Pentagon,
(Ii) $ 78000000000 att Gates erbjöd sig att minska underskottet är den enda "besparingar" riktigt specificerade hittills faktiskt visa upp som en minskning av de planerade utgifterna, och (iii) Den andra $ 155.000.000.000 att FY12 planen subtraherar från FY11 Planen innebär ännu ospecificerade nedskärningar och verkningsgrader.

Obama: "sparar $ 400.000.000.000" "igen"?

Redaktörens kommentar

13 April 2011 (reviderad och uppdaterad 16 april 2011)

I president Obamas 13 april "underskott tal", säger han:

Precis som vi måste hitta fler besparingar i inhemska program, måste vi göra samma sak i försvaret. Under de senaste två åren har sekreterare Gates tagit modigt på slösaktiga utgifter, vilket sparar $ 400.000.000.000 i nuvarande och framtida utgifter. Jag tror att vi kan göra det igen.

Vad kan "göra det igen" betyder?

Faktiskt bidrar $ 400.000.000.000 från planerade Pentagon budgetar till att minska underskottet?

Det skulle kräva att Pentagon att ta in och spendera $ 400.000.000.000 mindre. Men det är mycket svårt att identifiera mycket faktiska bidrag till att minska underskottet i den första $ 400.000.000.000 i Pentagon besparing president Obama hänvisar till och tror kan upprepas.

Låt oss ta en snabb titt på komponenterna i den första $ 400.000.000.000 att gå bakåt i tiden.

Den gångna januari sekreterare Gates tillkännagav $ 78000000000 i nedskärningar under fem år. I februari när presidentens FY12 budget verkade allt annat än $ 70000000000 i detta avseende att minska underskottet avdunstat. $ 68000000000 konsumerades av de särskilda utomeuropeiska Contingency Operations (krig) budgetera som FY11 planerade platshållaren på $ 50 miljarder ersättas med FY12 verkliga OCO budget $ 118.000.000.000. Ytterligare 2 miljarder dollar i besparingarna verkar har helt enkelt försvunnit i de fem prognoser per år budget, kanske på grund av de där irriterande "avrundningsfel" som plågar Pentagon budgetar.

Under 2010 Sekreterare Gates meddelade 100 miljarder dollar i "effektivitet" besparingar. Han var ganska rättframma på tiden, säger att han höll alla besparingar inom Pentagon att betala för andra krav. Så vi kan inte rätta räknas som mot minskningen av underskottet, och förmodligen presidenten inte räknas som mot de $ 400 miljarder som har sparats.

Så som lämnar ca $ 322.000.000.000 i Pentagon besparingar Vita huset behöver stå för.

I vittnesmål inför senatens försvarsutskott den 17 februari 2011 Sekreterare Gates sade:

... Under de senaste två försvarsbudgeten som lagts fram av president Obama, har vi förkortas eller annulleras oroliga eller överskott program som skulle ha kostat mer än $ 330.000.000.000 om man ser till färdigställande.

Ansluter denna till president Obamas News tal Defense rapporter (13 april 2011) att:

Of the $400 billion already saved, $330 billion is supposed to come from Gates' cuts to weapons programs – for example the cancellation of the Army's Future Combat Systems program and the Air Force's Next-Generation Bomber, both of which Gates terminated in the 2010 budget. However, those two programs have been replaced: The Army is developing the Ground Combat Vehicle, and the Air Force has launched a scaled-back bomber program.

“Supposed” and “However” are the key words in the preceding paragraph. To be real savings that contribute in any meaningful way to deficit reduction the the program cancellations would have to lead to a declining Pentagon budget topline… and not be replaced by some other expenditure.

Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center assesses the $330 billion savings claim in a 5 November 2010 post this way:

Gates has not cut $330 billion from defense. When he announced hardware cuts, he said the out-year savings were estimated at $330 billion, but he didn't cut a nickel from the projected defense budgets; he wants, as he has clearly said, to use those savings for other investments, not give them back to the taxpayer. And the figure is way too big, anyway, because he terminated the F-22 and the C-17 cargo plane when neither one of them was in the long-term budget (he has been trying to let both programs arrive at a normal death, as planned, and Congress keeps getting in the way.) It is even more too big because his savings figure did not net out the alternative investments he proposed for the same missions, like replacing the terminated Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicle with a new Army vehicle R&D program. So a big kerfuffle over a non-number, but no big cut in defense here.

To date the Pentagon or OMB have not produced any accounting of these supposed savings from Secretary Gates' program cancellations which indicate where they come out of the topline. Meanwhile it would be wise to substantially discount their value when thinking about overall Federal spending.

What we know for sure is that Pentagon budgets continue to rise despite the “savings.” The Pentagon and the Administration might argue that the Pentagon budget would have grown faster if Secretary Gates had not made those “courageous” program cuts. Möjligen. But that “would have been” is simply not the same as actually contributing to deficit reduction which requires real cuts in the topline of the Pentagon budget.

In terms of cutting the topline of the Pentagon budget, when we remove the long-awaited reductions in war costs, we can count just $8 billion that Secretary Gates has given up to deficit reduction in the five year defense plan (FYDP) through FY16.

Looking out ten years there are more savings in the President's projections. My colleague Carl Conetta finds $164 billion less Pentagon spending in the overlapping four “out years” (FY17-20) when comparing the President's FY11 and Fy12 budget submissions.

We might speculate that this is where we realize some of Secretary Gates' $330 billion in savings, but it would be only speculation…

So far no one in the Administration has demonstrated in sufficient detail how the Pentagon will contribute much of anything toward reducing the Federal deficit, rounding errors notwithstanding.

Experter Brev om försvarsutgifterna till den nationella kommissionen för Ekonomiskt ansvarstagande och reformistiska

American Flag header

18 November 2010

Dear Co-chairman Bowles and Co-chairman Simpson:

We are writing to you as experts in national security and defense economics to convey our views on the national security implications of the Commission's work and especially the need for achieving responsible reductions in military spending. In this regard, we appreciate the initiative you have taken in your 10 November 2010 draft proposal to the Commission. It begins a necessary process of serious reflection, debate, and action.

The vitality of our economy is the cornerstone of our nation's strength. We share the Commission's desire to bring our financial house into order. Doing so is not merely a question of economics. Reducing the national debt is also a national security imperative.

To date, the Obama administration has exempted the Defense Department from any budget reductions. This is short-sighted: It makes it more difficult to accomplish the task of restoring our economic strength, which is the underpinning of our military power.

As the rest of the nation labors to reduce its debt burden, the current plan is to boost the base DOD budget by 10 percent in real terms over the next decade. This would come on top of the nearly 52 percent real increase in base military spending since 1998. (When war costs are included the increase has been much greater: 95 percent.)

We appreciate Secretary Gates' efforts to reform the Pentagon's business and acquisition practices. However, even if his reforms fulfill their promise, the current plan does not translate them into budgetary savings that contribute to solving our deficit problem. Their explicit aim is to free funds for other uses inside the Pentagon. This is not good enough.

Granting defense a special dispensation puts at risk the entire deficit reduction effort. Defense spending today constitutes over 55 percent of discretionary spending and 23 percent of the federal budget. An exemption for defense not only undermines the broader call for fiscal responsibility, but also makes overall budget restraint much harder as a practical economic and political matter.

We need not put our economic power at risk in this way. Today the United States possesses a wide margin of global military superiority. The defense budget can bear significant reduction without compromising our essential security.

We recognize that larger military adversaries may rise to face us in the future. But the best hedge against this possibility is vigilance and a vibrant economy supporting a military able to adapt to new challenges as they emerge.

We can achieve greater defense economy today in several ways, all of which we urge you to consider seriously. We need to be more realistic in the goals we set for our armed forces and more selective in our choices regarding their use abroad. We should focus our military on core security goals and on those current and emerging threats that most directly affect us.

We also need to be more judicious in our choice of security instruments when dealing with international challenges. Our armed forces are a uniquely expensive asset and for some tasks no other instrument will do. For many challenges, however, the military is not the most cost-effective choice. We can achieve greater efficiency today without diminishing our security by better discriminating between vital, desirable, and unnecessary military missions and capabilities.

There is a variety of specific options that would produce savings, some of which we describe below. The important point, however, is a firm commitment to seek savings through a reassessment of our defense strategy, our global posture, and our means of producing and managing military power.

■ Since the end of the Cold War, we have required our military to prepare for and conduct more types of missions in more places around the world. The Pentagon's task list now includes not only preventive war, regime change, and nation building, but also vague efforts to “shape the strategic environment” and stem the emergence of threats. It is time to prune some of these missions and restore an emphasis on defense and deterrence.

■ US combat power dramatically exceeds that of any plausible combination of conventional adversaries. To cite just one example, Secretary Gates has observed that the US Navy is today as capable as the next 13 navies combined, most of which are operated by our allies. We can safely save by trimming our current margin of superiority.

■ America's permanent peacetime military presence abroad is largely a legacy of the Cold War. It can be reduced without undermining the essential security of the United States or its allies.

■ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the limits of military power. Avoiding these types of operation globally would allow us to roll back the recent increase in the size of our Army and Marine Corps.

■ The Pentagon's acquisition process has repeatedly failed, routinely delivering weapons and equipment late, over cost, and less capable than promised. Some of the most expensive systems correspond to threats that are least prominent today and unlikely to regain prominence soon. In these cases, savings can be safely realized by cancelling, delaying, or reducing procurement or by seeking less costly alternatives.

■ Recent efforts to reform Defense Department financial management and acquisition practices must be strengthened. And we must impose budget discipline to trim service redundancies and streamline command, support systems, and infrastructure.

Change along these lines is bound to be controversial. Budget reductions are never easy – no less for defense than in any area of government. However, fiscal realities call on us to strike a new balance between investing in military power and attending to the fundamentals of national strength on which our true power rests. We can achieve safe savings in defense if we are willing to rethink how we produce military power and how, why, and where we put it to use.

Med vänliga hälsningar,

  • Gordon Adams, American University and Stimson Center
  • Robert Art, Brandeis University
  • Deborah Avant, UC Irvine
  • Andrew Bacevich, Boston University
  • Richard Betts, Columbia University
  • Linda Bilmes, Kennedy School, Harvard University
  • Steven Clemons, New America Foundation
  • Joshua Cohen, Stanford University and co-editor, Boston Review
  • Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives
  • Owen R. Cote Jr., Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Michael Desch, University of Notre Dame
  • Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University
  • Benjamin H. Friedman, Cato Institute
  • Lt. Gen. (USA, Ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
  • David Gold, Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School
  • William Hartung, Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation
  • David Hendrickson, Colorado College
  • Michael Intriligator, UCLA and Milken Institute
  • Robert Jervis, Columbia University
  • Sean Kay, Ohio Wesleyan University
  • Elizabeth Kier, University of Washington
  • Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives
  • Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress
  • Peter Krogh, Georgetown University
  • Richard Ned Lebow, Dartmouth College
  • Walter LaFeber, Cornell University
  • Överste (USA, Ret.) Douglas Macgregor
  • Scott McConnell, redaktör-at-large, The American Conservative
  • John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
  • Steven E. Miller, Harvard University och redaktör och chefredaktör, International Security
  • Steven Metz, nationell säkerhet analytiker och författare
  • Janne Nolan, American Security Project
  • Robert Paarlberg, Wellesley College och Harvard University
  • Paul Pillar, Georgetown University
  • Barry Posen, säkerhet Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Christopher Preble, Cato Institute
  • Daryl Press, Dartmouth College
  • Jeffrey Record, försvarspolitik analytiker och författare
  • David Rieff, författare
  • Thomas Schelling, University of Maryland
  • Jack Snyder, Columbia University
  • J. Ann Tickner, University of Southern California
  • Robert Tucker, Johns Hopkins University
  • Stephen Van Evera, säkerhet Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Stephen Walt, Harvard University
  • Kenneth Waltz, Columbia University
  • Cindy Williams, säkerhet Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Daniel Wirls, UC Santa Cruz
    • Detta brev speglar yttrandena från de enskilda undertecknarna. Institutioner anges för identifiering endast. Brevet är resultatet av en gemensam insats från koalitionen för en realistisk utrikespolitik och projektet för försvar alternativ .

      Hur kommer den nationella kommissionen för Ekonomiskt ansvarstagande och reformistiska balansera budgeten 2015?

      Redaktörens kommentar

      Det finns minst lika många skäl att tro att betydande faktiska minskningar försvarsutgifterna kommer att bli svårt att uppnå, eftersom det finns skäl att tvivla på att betydande intäktsökningar ska hittas eller att betydande minskningar av rätt utgifterna kommer att hända. "Politiska realiteter" är verkligen skrämmande för något av alternativen den nationella kommissionen för Ekonomiskt ansvarstagande och reformistiska kommer att överväga. Om det fanns snabba, enkla och självklara beslut som skall hade det inte skulle finnas något behov för kommissionen.

      Politiska realiteter förändras över tiden delvis på grund underliggande realiteter småningom byter politisk beräkning. Så är fallet med försvarsutgifterna. Efter mer än ett decennium av snabb tillväxt är det sannolikt att vara någon nedskärningar i mitten av detta årtionde, särskilt 2015.

      Den troliga väg försvarsutgifterna detta årtionde nyligen prognostiseras av högteknologiska branschorganisationen Tech America Foundation i deras DoD Topline Prognos 2011-2020.

      Tech USA: s prognos är för en verklig minskning av basen Pentagon budgeten (exklusive Overseas Contingency Operation kriget extra finansiering) på 9% eller $ 45 miljarder kronor (USD 2011) under 2015 jämfört med 2011 basen budgeten.

      När du tar hänsyn till Pentagons föredragna budget väg detta årtionde på minst 1% reala årliga tillväxt, förutspår Tech America en minskning av försvarsutgifterna med 2015 16%.

      Tech USA: s prognos för Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) Krig kompletterande utgifter under decenniet är också viktigt att tänka på. Eftersom FY10 (president Obamas första budget) har det varit en OCO krig kompletterande DoD budgetposten för FY12-FY15 $ 50 miljarder per år. OCO Kriget kompletterande i FY11 budget är $ 159.000.000.000.

      Även om den faktiska OCO kriget extra kan komma i FY12 med de militära operativa kraven i Afghanistan övriga förhöjt är det inte troligt att OCO kriget kompletterande kommer ner med $ 50 miljarder att inte tala $ 109.000.000.000 i FY12. Tech America prognoser OCO krig utgifterna för $ 122 miljarder FY12.

      Dessa sannolika under-budgeterade OCO krig extra kostnader skall räknas som sannolika tillägg till den nationella skulden utöver dem som redan beräknas av regeringen.

      Tech USA: s prognos är att OCO kompletterande vara $ 122 miljarder FY12, $ 102 miljarder FY13, $ 69 miljarder FY14 och $ 57 miljarder FY15. Det blir upp till $ 150 miljarder mer än vad som budgeteras i det femåriga Defense plan ... en FN-budgeterade Utöver statsskulden.

      För målåret av den federala budgeten når "primära balans" i FY15, kommer prognosen OCO kriget kompletterande lägga till $ 7 miljarder problemet att den nationella kommissionen för Ekonomiskt ansvarstagande och ansikten Reform i ett försök att balansera budgeten under det året.

      Säkerhet är inte billigt

      Adam J. Hebert. Air Force Magazine, november 2010.
      http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/November% 202010/1110edit.aspx

      Utdrag:

      ... Dåligt med rådgivning samtal för att minska Pentagon budgetuppföljning så förutsägbart som tidvattnet. Utan trovärdig analys av strategi eller krav, kritiker en gång förklara försvarsutgifter är utom kontroll.

      Redaktörens kommentar:

      In his editorial Security Isn't Cheap Adam J. Herbert cites the work of the Sustainable Defense Task Force as a case in point of critics of Pentagon spending recommending cuts “without credible analysis of strategy or requirements.” As a member of the task force I differ over the credibility of our analysis. But let me speak to where I agree with Mr. Herbert:

      • “Security is not cheap.” In fact it is extremely expensive. When the country is hit with a financial disaster we owe it to the country and our military to reexamine our national security strategy and make sure priorities are clear and that our military investments are cost-effective. In the last twelve years of Pentagon budgets the planning has proceeded as though there is no resource constraint. Unfortunately, that is true of the last QDR as well. Those days are clearly over – Secretary Gates has said as much.

      • “A well-trained, well-equipped, professional military is not cheap. If the nation wants it to cost less, the nation will probably have to ask it to do less.” Exactly. Since the end of the Cold War the US military has steadily advanced its global reach and engagement. Missions have proliferated, including many that should be done by civilians in the State Department and other agencies. Significant numbers of US troops still remain in Europe, even though there is no military threat to Europe that allies can't handle. The most important take-away lesson from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that long low-intensity land wars are not cost-effective uses of US military power and should be avoided whenever possible. Hopefully we can all agree there should never again be such a “war of choice.”

      • “There are certainly ways to reduce defense spending…” Yes, and one that will save around $45 billion in Air Force modernization accounts is available in a choice about how to modernize the fighter fleet. The Air Force has decided to replace its aging F-16s with just about the most expensive new fighter one can dream up, the F-35. In today's fiscal environment either the Air Force will end up with a lot fewer of these planes than planned, or they will choose to get ahead of the budget crunch and modernize with new block versions of the still best of class F-16s and limit the buy of F-35s this decade to a few squadrons for high-intensity air-superiority missions. If serious air competition emerges a decade from now we can then roll out production of F-35s (or perhaps a less costly follow-on to the F-16), planes presumably much improved with ten years or more of further fighter technology development.

      Framtida försvaret budgetval kräver tydliga strategiska prioriteringar

      Daniel Goure. Tidig varning blogg, Lexington Institute, 03 september 2010.
      http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/future-defense-budget-choices-require-clear-strategic-priorities

      Utdrag:

      The United States cannot afford and the people will not pay for a military that can do battle with uncertainty.

      As a consequence of the need to do battle with uncertainty, emphasis was placed on a military that can cover all bases and do all things. This would not be a wise strategy even if resources were unconstrained. Not all threats are equal. Nor are all interests equally important. Finally, it is possible to make reasoned and reasonable judgments regarding how the future security environment will unfold and define a set of demand signals that would require shifting strategic priorities.

      In the past, when US leaders refused to make choices they allowed the military to shrink symmetrically, by cutting every program or service a little. That approach is self-defeating. It makes no sense to keep a so-called full spectrum military but continually reduce it in size.

      Redaktörens kommentar:

      Relevant passages from the archives ($3 trillion later):

      Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. “Dueling with Uncertainty”, February 1998.
      http://www.comw.org/pda/bullyweb.html

      There is no escape from uncertainty, but there is relief from uncertainty hysteria. It begins with recognizing that instability has boundaries — just as turbulence in physical systems has discernible onset points and parameters. The turbulence of a river, for instance, corresponds to flow and to the contours of the river's bed and banks. It occurs in patches and not randomly. The weather also is a chaotic system that resists precise long-range forecasting, but allows useful prediction of broader trends and limits.

      Despite uncertainty, statements of probability matter. They indicate the weight of evidence — or whether there is any evidence at all. The uncertainty hawks would flood our concern with a horde of dangers that pass their permissive test of “non-zero probability.” However, by lowering the threshold of alarm, they establish an impossible standard of defense sufficiency: absolute and certain military security. Given finite resources and competing ends, something less will have to do. Strategic wisdom begins with the setting of priorities — and priorities demand strict attention to what appears likely and what does not.

      The world may be less certain and less stable today than during the Cold War, but it also involves less risk for America. Risk is equal parts probability and utility — chances and stakes. With the end of global superpower contention, America's stakes in most of the world's varied conflicts has diminished. So has the magnitude of the military threats to American interests. This permits a sharper distinction between interests and compelling interests, turbulence and relevant turbulence, uncertainties and critical uncertainties. And this distinction will pay dividends whenever the country turns to consider large-scale military endeavors, commitments, and investments.

      Among the visions that guide present policy, one is absent conspicuously: a world in which economic issues have displaced military ones as the central focus of global competitions and concerns. Failing to engage this prospect, the recent defense policy reviews are oblivious to the opportunity cost of military spending. And it is this lapse that gives license to their speculative methods and overweening goals.

      The United States continues to invest more of its national product in defense than does its allies, more than the world average, and much more than its chief economic competitors. By disregarding the requirements and consequences of increased global economic competition, present policy makes an unacknowledged bet about the future: The Soviet Union is gone and no comparable military challenge to the West exists, except as distant possibility. Nonetheless, the American prospect depends as much as ever, if not more, on the specifically military aspects of strength. Of this much, the uncertainty hawks seem certain.

      Carl Conetta speaks on strategic value of getting the nation's financial house in order

      Capitol Visitors Center den 11 juni 2010.

      Obama's National Security Strategy: How Will It Be Managed?

      Laura A. Hall. Budget Insight , 27 May 2010.

      Utdrag:

      On the military side, no clear prioritization of missions. As in the QDR, the NSS provides no priorities among military missions, but repeats a long shopping list that could drive force structure and budget expectations even higher than they are now.

      Tomorrow's Disarmament Debates

      Christopher Ford. Remarks presented to a side event at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New Paradigms Forum , Hudson Institute, 20 May 2010.
      http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=250

      Utdrag:

      … as present-day disarmament debates shift from a focus specifically upon nuclear weaponry to a broader focus upon full-spectrum military asymmetry, the disarmament discourse is characterized by competition between two conceptual paradigms that are quite incompatible even when their respective adherents seem to agree upon the importance of nuclear disarmament.

      Let's explore this a bit. Even as it seeks to pander to the conventional wisdom of the disarmament movement by attempting to purchase nonproliferation cooperation with concessions on disarmament, the Obama Administration seems to have embraced – as did the Bush Administration before it, though far less emphatically and flamboyantly – a vision of nuclear reductions and potential future disarmament profoundly at odds with much of the conceptual framework that underpins this conventional wisdom. Fundamentally, to the extent that there can be said to be a vision of disarmament progress prevalent among US policy making elites, it is one that assumes and values military asymmetries favoring the United States.

      It is not merely that the Obama Administration sees the development of improved nuclear weapons production capabilities as being essential to American reductions, as part of a strategy of substituting potential weapons for actual ones as America's strategic “hedge” against future problems. It is in fact that non-nuclear US military advantages are embraced as a way to facilitate reducing, or perhaps even replacing, US reliance upon nuclear weapons: developing PGS or other technologies to supplant nuclear weapons in some missions previously thought to require them; improving BMD against proliferation threats; and relying upon robust conventional power-projection capabilities to maintain the solidity of trans-oceanic alliances that have traditionally relied in part upon forward-deployed US nuclear weapons. No one in today's White House would admit as much, of course, but this agenda – spelled out with some candor in the new 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) – owes as much to the doctrinal vision of President Bush's 2001 NPR as it does to the ideology of the nuclear abolition movement.

      At issue is a real clash between conceptual paradigms about the nature of the global security environment and how best to maintain international peace and security within it. On the one hand, there is a paradigm that one might call “peer-group multilateralism.” It is an ethic of collective action among equals in which countries come together through multilateral (and preferably global and universal) institutions in order to address common challenges. This is a profoundly democratic vision, at least with respect to relations between countries. (Actual democracy for real populations of human beings is an entirely different question, alas.) In it, no one has any particular special privileges, and no one suffers “discrimination” except when misbehavior brings upon miscreants the wrath of the international community – expressed, of course, through formal and collective means. This multilateralist and quasi-democratic paradigm is reflected, for instance, in the consensus negotiation procedures of the CD, and in the one-country-one-vote formula of the UN General Assembly. Even where bodies are structured so as to permit slightly more effective decision-making through smaller size, these principles may yet be seen in provisions for rotating states through seats on the IAEA Board of Governors or in the non-permanent ranks of the UN Security Council.

      In this paradigm, asymmetry of power is philosophically offensive. To prevent or undermine such asymmetry, majoritarian procedures – if not indeed consensus rules – are designed and expected to impede traditional “power politics” and to enable all to participate more or less equally in decision outcomes. Action against common threats is understood as a collective movement both expressing and predicated upon international solidarity, and upon all countries' shared and axiomatically coequal role in preserving peace and security. By the same token, action not pursued with such a collective or at least majoritarian imprimatur is improper action. In a sense, therefore, the multilateral process is felt to create outcome legitimacy.

      On the other end of this conceptual continuum lies a paradigm that one might call the “predominant actor model.” By this account – the essential features of which are evident in the thinking of multiple US administrations, transcending party identification – multilateral institutions operating on the basis of formal equality among near-peers provide an important but sometimes an inadequate means of addressing challenges to international peace and security. It is not necessarily that such institutions fall always or entirely down on the job, but that they are ill-equipped to handle, on their own, the full panoply of international threats that might arise (eg, on account of collective action problems, the high capital costs and high returns to experience in global power-projection capabilities, or psycho-political dynamics of risk-aversion or anti-militarist fashion).

      According to this second model, the security system needs a predominant actor capable of shouldering disproportionate burdens and leading the community's reaction to pressing challenges, and around whom serious systemic responses to some of the gravest challenges can crystallize – particularly, though not exclusively, where the employment of military force is at issue. In effect, this model presumes that international security is to some extent a public good that will be, in economic terms, under-produced, to the detriment of all, if a predominant actor does not sometimes take the reins. In contrast to “peer-group multilateralism,” outcome legitimacy is, in this model, basically process-exogenous, in that certain steps are assumed to be necessary for the preservation of global order and other critical values of the system, and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the strongest player stepping in to ensure that these steps are taken. (Indeed, if other actors seem unable to do what is needed, it would be wrong for the predominant power not to intervene.) Other states' actual consent to such initiative is desirable, but secondary; the key point is that what is needed actually gets done.

      The United States tends to see itself as playing this predominant role, with its military power and capabilities underpinning the stability of the present global order and system of economic relations. Having inherited from Britain the baton of securing global sea lanes vital to international commerce – and having added to this a broad modern array of global security responsibilities, ranging from providing the power-projection “muscle” behind humanitarian intervention to fighting nuclear weapons proliferation, and from providing security reassurances to far-flung allies to countering access-denial strategies in outer space – Washington sees itself as having a vital role in the international system precisely on account of its disproportionate military power.

      One model thus sees military asymmetry as profoundly subversive of global peace and security, and ultimately regards its erosion as being a requirement for the full success of nuclear disarmament. The other model regards a degree of asymmetry, at least in the right hands, as being essential to global order irrespective of whether or not nuclear weapons exist – and perhaps even especially valuable in preparing to confront the challenges of some hypothetical future in which major conflicts can no longer be “deterred” by nuclear weapons because such devices have been eliminated.

      Redaktörens kommentar:

      This is an important challenge to the nuclear disarmament “community”.

      Christopher Ford, a nonproliferation official in the second Bush administration, is a consistent critic of “universalism” in international affairs and of the what he considers to be “faux” democratic process in international security institutions and fora. Whatever the validity of his doubts in these regard, what must not be denied by disarmament advocates is the reality that the “predominant actors” in the US security establishment, both military and civilian, firmly believe that the US should be the predominant actor on the world stage and are therefore predisposed to share most of Christopher Ford's doubts (and perhaps allergy) about universalism and inter-national democratic practice.

      More about these important issues later.

      Treaty Signings

      Michael Krepon. Arms Control Wonk , 08 April 2010.
      http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2690/treaty-signings

      Utdrag:

      Despite claims to the contrary, New START does not inhibit the growth of US conventional power projection capabilities that, unlike nuclear weapons, are militarily useful on battlefields. Nor will New START impede ballistic missile defense programs…

      Redaktörens kommentar:
      … and that is why, despite the rhetoric of the moment, this treaty doesn't do much to advance us toward the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons. Unbounded conventional military power and missile defenses for Western rich nations are not compatible with the establishment of a global international security regime sufficiently reliable to support the abolition of nuclear weapons.

      For more on this problem see my comments on Vice President Biden's speech at the National Defense University, 18 February 2010.

      Den dödliga Aktuell Mot kärnvapen

      James Carroll. Boston Globe, 15 mars 2010. Som finns på CommonDreams hemsida.
      http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/03/15-5

      Utdrag:

      … experts who warn of a coming “cascade of proliferation,” one nation following another into the deadly chasm of nuclear weapons unless present nuclear powers find a way to reverse the current. Den huvudsakliga bördan är Ryssland och USA, som tillsammans besitter en stor majoritet av världens kärnvapen, men president Obama medvetet gjort sig central för utmaningen när han sade i Prag: "Jag tydligt och med övertygelse USA: s engagemang att söka freden och säkerheten i en värld utan kärnvapen. "

      Även vanligtvis vara isär, har den bredare amerikanska försvaret hållning förvandlats till en viktig drivkraft för andra nationer att gå kärnkraft. The current Pentagon budget ($5 trillion for 2010-2017) is so far beyond any other country, and the conventional military capacity it buys is so dominant, as to reinforce the nuclear option abroad as the sole protection against potential US attack.

      Kan DOD Mät resursallokering för sina strategiska uppdrag?

      Travis Sharp. Nukes av Hazard, 05 mars 2010.
      http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/3/5/162522/3909

      Utdrag:

      It would help the Pentagon, the Congress, defense experts, and the American public if DOD published an analytically defensible record of its spending by strategic mission.

      Redaktörens kommentar:
      Ja, verkligen.

      Debate: On the Right Nuclear Weapons Track

      Kommer Marshall. AOL News, 05 mars 2010.
      http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-on-the-right-nuclear-weapons-track/19385662

      Utdrag:

      Obama skäl att genom att hålla upp sin del av överenskommelsen, kan USA stärka det globala icke-spridning normer och öka trycket på Teheran och andra regimer som kan tänka skaffa kärnvapen. Och som Vita huset tjänstemän har betonat, den nukleära "nollalternativet" är en politisk strävan, inte något någon tror är möjligt inom en snar framtid.

      Debatt: Väntar på Obamas politik på Nukes

      Christopher A. Ford. AOL News, 05 mars 2010.
      http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-waiting-for-obamas-policy-on-nukes/19385644

      Utdrag:

      ... Men anmärkningsvärt, för alla hans kärnkraft posering, ingen vet vad Obama kärnvapenprogram policy egentligen är. Hittills har hans administration inte gjort mycket av verklig betydelse. Obama söker en blygsam nytt vapen-fördraget om minskning med Ryssland, men överväger nedskärningar som inte skulle ha varit för chockerande från Bush-administrationen - som i själva verket faktiskt började dessa förhandlingar under 2006. Förvaltningen vill också åter försöka ratificering av provstopp besegrade i senaten 1999, trots att fördragets senaten utsikterna ljusreglering. Som ett resultat på denna punkt Obamas "omvälvande" vapen-control agendan ser ut som president Bill Clinton från mitten av 1990-talet.

      Framåt Observer: QDR är en ganska nedslående rapport

      George C. Wilson. Government Executive , 05 March 2010.
      http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=44743&sid=61

      Utdrag:

      Jag tillbringade månader i 1997 går bakom kulisserna på Pentagon och kongressen att ta reda på om alla Wheeling och hantera som gick in i skrivandet av QDR det året. "Jag hade stora förhoppningar på QDR" general Ronald Fogleman, tidigare Air Force Chief of Staff, till mig. "Enligt min åsikt, för att QDR bli en framgång där skulle vara något ganska betydande justering av de [beväpnade] tjänster."

      But Fogleman said his hopes for meaningful reform were dashed when the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. John Shalikashvili, sent a two-star general to Fogleman's office to deliver this message: “The chairman would like to have the QDR turn out to be as close to the status quo as we can make this thing work. His message is: 'We don't need any Billy Mitchells,'” the general said, referring to Army Brig. Gen Billy Mitchell, som revolutionerade användningen av flygstridskrafter genom att visa i 1923 hur bombplan kunde sjunka Navy krigsfartyg.

      Obama Nuclear Weapons Policy – a debate with ten voices and thirteen parts

      a compilation, Defense Strategy Review Page , 03 March 2010 .
      http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate~~V

      Utdrag:

      Denna debatt inleddes när Greg Mello i Los Alamos Study Group skrev ett 10 feb 2010 kommentaren för Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Jag postat sin kommentar på denna webbplats och skrev ett svar. Jag bjöd sedan en rad ledare för kärnvapennedrustning insatser och specialister i kärntekniska frågor att svara på den Mello-Knight utbyte.

      In all there have been ten contributors to this debate which touches on many important points of agreement and disagreement. Detta är en diskussion som måste fortsätta bland experter, aktivister, och den bredare medborgarna.

      Obama kärnkraftspolitik Debatt Deltagare hittills:

      Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group
      Charles Knight, projektledare på Defense alternativ
      Martin Senn, U. of Innsbruck
      Bill Hartung, vapen-och Security Initiative, New America Foundation
      Paul Ingram, BASIC
      Jonathan Granoff, Global Security Institute
      Todd Fine, Global Zero
      John Isaacs, rådet för en Liveable värld
      Robert G. Gard, Centrum för vapenkontroll och icke-spridning
      Matthew Hoey, Military Space Transparency Project

      Pentagons Runaway budget

      Carl Conetta. Foreign Policy in Focus, 03 mars 2010.
      http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_pentagons_runaway_budget

      Utdrag:

      Efter kollapsen av sovjetmakten, som USA: s ledare mer ambitiösa mål för den amerikanska militären, trots sin mindre storlek. Detta innebar att kräva att försvarsmakten att upprätthålla och förlänga deras fortsatta globala närvaro, förbättra deras beredskap och snabbhet, ökar verksamheten fredstid engagemang, och förbereder att genomföra fler typer av uppdrag snabbt och på fler områden. Nyligen amerikanska strategin har tittat förbi de traditionella målen för försvar och avskräckande, i syfte att använda militär makt för att verkligen förhindra uppkomsten av hot och "forma" den internationella miljön. Amerikanska försvaret planerare förhöjda också vikten av mindre och hypotetiskt hot, vilket kräver militären att förbereda sig för många fler lägre sannolikhet oförutsedda utgifter.

      Assessing the QDR and 2011 defense budget

      Gordon Adams. Bulletin Atomic Forskare, 02 mars 2010.

      Utdrag:

      ... Det är en central förutsättning i QDR och försvar budget som kortsiktiga uppdrag kommer att vara för evigt, i synnerhet counterinsurgency, kontraterrorism och verksamheten stabilitet. The case for this projection seems to be based on the idea that Iraq and Afghanistan are the model for future US military operations. Here the QDR and defense budget miss the point completely. Irak och Afghanistan var krig i valet, som avser att störta en regim och bygga dessa länder. Vilka andra länder kommer vi att behöva invadera och bygga i framtiden? Neither the QDR nor the budget provides any answers, calling into question the logic behind this premise.

      Matthew Hoey svarar på Mello-Knight utbyte av

      Matthew Hoey är grundare av militära Space Öppenhet Project (MSTP) och en tidigare högt uppsatt forskarassistent vid Institutet för försvars-och nedrustningspolitik studier (IDDS) där han specialiserat sig på prognoser utvecklingen i missilförsvar och militära rymdteknik. Han svarade den 02 mars 2010 på Mello-Knight diskussion om kärnvapennedrustning och Obama-administrationen.
      ________________

      President Obama's hopes to begin the long march toward a nuclear free future are not limited to just words, though I understand how some may believe this to be the case. Upon closer examination, the President is taking the critical first steps in an effort to go beyond his address at Prague. Presidenten är i färd med att förhandla fram ett nytt fördrag vapenkontroll med ryssarna, och det är mycket troligt att han kommer att driva ännu djupare nedskärningar i framtiden. Han har också gjort ansträngningar för att utöka och stärka fullständiga provstoppsavtalet. Where are the results? Varför har vi inte sett handling? När kommer det nukleära hotet börjar avta, även om det händer aldrig så lite?

      This is a very informative thread, and I have enjoyed reading all of the entries. Vad Charles [Knight] har inlett här tjänar som ett exempel på hur om vi utnyttja alla de otaliga argument framför oss, vi är säkra på att måla en mer nyanserad bild av vägen till samförstånd och samarbete. Detsamma kunde inte vara sannare när det gäller våra inhemska politiska och internationella diplomatiska klimat också. Parter i alla hörn har legitima tvister och problem, och tills det är fullt upp i en modig och aggressiv nytt mode är det min övertygelse att vår satsning mot noll aldrig kommer att få i växeln. Här är mina tankar om hur vi kan få flytta.

      Ett steg vore att både amerikanska och ryska försvarsindustrin gradvis omvandlas till kommersiella industrier - i den globala ekonomin skulle vara långsam att börja, men så småningom skulle skörda enorma fördelar. Such a transition would even free university students from the confines of military contractors as a leading option for employment, ensuring that this generation of young people would not be bound to the archaic practices of the military industrial complex. De dominoeffekter på kooperativet försvaret skulle vara enorma. Eftersom det är våra övergripande militära resurser redan oöverträffad. Sådana minskningar i militära utgifter och efterföljande återinvesteringar i ny teknik skulle i själva verket inte minskar vår strategiska dominans, eftersom kooperativet försvaret skulle minska förflyttningen motdrag dynamik som länge har underminerat nedrustningsarbetet. Sedan ta hänsyn till kooperativ försvar och främjande av varandras säkerhet, skulle vår ömsesidiga ekonomiska potential att förbättras ytterligare, vilket stärker vår internationella förhållande till en oöverträffad nivå.

      This would not be a cooperative security agreement limited to just sharing military and launch data; such a partnership would also extend into a shared strategic defense. I denna tid där kriget mot terrorismen och hotet från extremism är i fokus för nationer som USA och Ryssland någonsin poserade med internt säkerhetshot och intrång av radikaler som inte skulle tveka att använda en kärnvapen i en stor City-här är helt enkelt vettigt.

      Strävan efter missilförsvar att skydda sig mot inkommande hot är den enskilt största hindret för framsteg - det är lynch stift, och under parollen minska de nationella säkerhetshot det gör ingenting mer än att öka dem. Det är en dåre jaktstart. Om USA skulle dra sig tillbaka från sina BMD ambitioner i samklang med initieringen av kooperativa försvar diskussioner verkliga framsteg mot att minska hotet om en missilattack mot USA kunde börja. Detta skulle också bidra till att motivera USA och Ryssland för att hitta en gemensam grund när det gäller Iran under denna berusande tid. With the world's two military superpowers acting as enhanced security and economic partners, it is more likely that this leadership by example would take hold and could spur the beginning of a global trend over the long run.

      Utgifterna har länge varit ohämmat i kärnkraftverk och de nationella laboratorier. Detta är ett ständigt återkommande fenomen, effekten av orubbliga fläsk fat utgifter och lobbying av valda tjänstemän i maskopi med försvarsindustrin för att ta hem jobb till sina hemtrakter. Detta kan inte ångras utan katastrofala resultat. Den amerikanska ekonomin är beroende av försvaret dollarn och måste avvänjas från det gradvis. Detta skulle komma i form av en övergång från utveckling av destruktiva teknik och bidra till utvecklingen av välgörande teknik, till exempel alternativa energilösningar och ny teknik som skulle öka utforskning av rymden. Alltför många som arbetar amerikanska familjer förlita sig på försvarsbudgeten och det nukleära dollar. Om enighet om nedrustningsansträngningarna är att förlänga över gångarna i kongressen och senaten, måste detta förstås och respekteras. Om inte, står vi inför divisioner och ett förslösat möjlighet som inte kan presentera sig igen.

      Once such a transition takes place, a type of economic vacuum effect could commence where free markets, capitalism and innovation driven by new technology could lift the US and Russian economies out of the mud that is the threat of nuclear annihilation. This vacuum effect was not possible in years past, and is actually enabled by the current economic crises and the need for new industries that would contribute to economic recovery and job creation. Det kräver inte mer mod, eftergifter eller klarhet att föra en värld utan kärnvapen genom sådana vägar än vad som behövs för att klamra sig fast vapen som kan och kommer en dag döda miljoner.

      When placed side-by-side, exchanges and the resulting debates regarding the increase in the nuclear complex budget versus the White House's current policy positions beg for such a solution. Faktum är att om en sådan lösning inleds försiktigt med noggrann genomgång av behoven hos alla parter, kan det rippel i hela ekonomin bidra till att lösa våra största globala utmaningar. Detta kan ske samtidigt som successivt utvinna mer och mer amerikanska och ryska forskare från den kärntekniska prylar branschen och kanalisera deras enorma individuella och kollektiva talanger i en mer välmående riktning.

      Barack Obama och Dmitrij Medvedev har modet och klarhet att förstå och uttrycka sin vilja att diskutera en värld utan kärnvapen. Utvecklingen kommer att kräva en orubbliga engagemang för mod i ansiktet av försvarsindustrin och tydlighet se att tusentals ryska och amerikaner är beroende av dessa branscher och kommer att behöva jobb som ger möjlighet att försörja sina familjer. Cooperative defense will lead to the beginning of a transition from massive defense spending to productive civilian investment that stands to benefit all.

      Erbjuder eftergifter och placering samarbete försvaret på bordet medan du visar vägen framåt i ett bredare sammanhang ska få igång diskussionen i en riktning som blir ord till ytterligare åtgärder. Så länge som USA vägrar att ge upp missilförsvaret i Östeuropa kommer vi att ligga kvar på en stillastående.

      Det var Dr Randall Forsberg som öppnade mig för att detta sätt att tänka. Hon lärde mig hur samarbete i säkerhetsfrågor skulle kunna användas som ett verktyg för fred. Hennes ord som följer, skriven 1992, ring idag med en förnyad gripande:

      Slutet på det kalla kriget utgör en vändpunkt för rollen av militär kraft i internationella frågor. Vid denna unika ögonblick i historien, världens största militärutgifterna och armar producenter har en unik möjlighet att gå från konfrontation till samarbete. Förenta staterna, Europeiska nationer, Japan och republikerna i fd Sovjetunionen kan nu byta ut sina traditionella säkerhetslösningar politik, som bygger på avskräckning och ensidiga åtgärder med kooperativa politik som bygger på minst avskräckning, icke-offensiv försvar, icke-spridning och multilaterala fredsbevarande.

      Det finns fyra viktiga skäl att göra denna förändring, och göra det snabbt:

      Först massiva resurser står på spel. With a cooperative security policy, the United States could cut the annual military budget… A peace dividend on this order is exactly what we need to revitalize the economy and meet the backlog of needs in housing, health, education, environment and economic infrastructure.

      För det andra är samarbetsvilliga inställning till säkerhet förutsättning för att stoppa den globala spridningen av vapen och vapen industrier. The prospect of proliferation has become the single greatest military threat to this country and to the world…

      Third, the choice by the major industrial nations either to perpetuate a US-dominated international security system or to develop a more cooperative system will have far-reaching political ramifications at home and abroad… here in America, the change would help reverse the nasty mixture of cynicism, violence, and racism that has increasingly pervaded our society since the first Reagan Administration made increases in military spending at the price of national debt and deep cuts in domestic programs.

      Sist men inte minst är ett samarbete synsätt på säkerhet sannolikt vara långt mer effektiv än den traditionella metoden för att minska förekomsten och omfattningen av krig. Trots dessa enorma insatser, har kongressen och administrationen, tills nyligen, vägrade att ens överväga att kraftiga nedskärningar i efter det kalla kriget försvarsanslag, än mindre ta en oöverträffad möjlighet att utveckla ett samarbete säkerhetssystem. [Randall Forsberg, "försvar Styckningsdelar samt samarbetet i säkerhetsfrågor i Post-kalla kriget", Boston Review, maj 1992]

      Should President Obama choose to accept this torch I believe that we can achieve the goals outlined in Prague within our lifetime.

      Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century

      Matt Eckel. Foreign Policy Watch , 01 March 2010.
      http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/nuclear-weapons-in-twenty-first-century.html

      Utdrag:

      Även amerikanska ledarna försöker att inte säga det högt för ofta, är en av anledningarna Irans nukleära program oroande att Washington är att det begränsar möjligheten för USA att störta den iranska regimen med våld, tryck skulle komma att skjuta. As a global hegemon, having the ability to wave our conventional military around and implicitly threaten recalcitrant middle powers with conquest is something America likes to be able to do. Det är mycket svårare om motsträviga mitten makten i fråga kan trovärdigt hota med att ta ut ett par allierade huvudstäder. Israel's nuclear program was originally founded on this logic, as was that of France.

      In Lean Times, Military Spending Still Gets a Pass

      Mark Thompson. Time Magazine , 24 February 2010.
      http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1967353,00.html

      Utdrag:

      Let's repeat that: even without a superpower rival like the Soviet Union — with its arsenals of nuclear weapons, fleets of tanks and armadas of warships, all manned by 10-foot-tall Red Army troops — the US is now spending more preparing for war against, well, who knows, than we spent readying to fight Moscow. And the Obama Administration has made it clear that defense spending is going to continue to increase, even as fiscal pressures — for bailouts, health care, infrastructure — inexorably mount.

      As far as the eye can see, US taxpayers will be spending one-third more to maintain the US military than their parents and grandparents paid for the nation's Cold War force.

      The Obama disarmament paradox: A rebuttal

      John Isaacs and Robert G. Gard, Jr. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 24 February 2010.
      http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox-rebuttal

      John Isaacs : The executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Isaacs represents the center's sister organization, Council for a Livable World, on Capitol Hill. His expertise is in how Congress works, especially when it pertains to national security issues such as nuclear weapons and missile defense. Previously, he served as a legislative assistant on foreign affairs to former New York Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz.

      Robert G. Gard Jr. : A consultant on international security and education, Gard is the chair of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation's Board of Directors. He also is a member of the Bulletin's Science and Security Board. Previously, he served as president of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and as director of the Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. During a military career that spanned three decades, he was an assistant to the secretary of defense and president of the National Defense University.

      ______________

      Greg Mello's recent Bulletin article “ The Obama Disarmament Paradox ” distorts the Obama administration's nuclear agenda by making unjustified assumptions that discredit President Barack Obama's historic commitment to seek a nuclear-weapon-free world. Obama has committed to such a goal several times–both before and after his election in November 2008. But Mello calls that a “vague aspiration” rather than a commitment. Yet the evidence he provides to support his assertion isn't persuasive.

      In fact, the president has advocated for numerous initiatives in a comprehensive nonproliferation program. These include winning UN Security Council endorsement for a nuclear-weapon-free world; negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia, which Obama considers an interim agreement toward further reductions; preparing a Nuclear Posture Review consistent with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy; pledging to secure all loose nuclear materials over a four-year period; and taking an active role at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

      As President Obama stated during his seminal Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is a long-term goal that might not be achievable in his lifetime, but that doesn't minimize the necessity of taking interim steps to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.

      Mello sees Obama's requested increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget for stockpile stewardship and the construction of new facilities at the nuclear laboratories as a commitment to the production of new nuclear weapons. Yet the administration has made clear that there are no such plans underfoot; the 2011 budget request states unequivocally that “new weapons systems will not be built.” As such, the president's requested increase in nuclear expenditures should be viewed in the context of seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further nuclear weapon reductions.

      More largely, there is nothing inconsistent between a vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world and ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent in the interim, including refurbishment of aging systems, providing the labs with facilities to replace their deteriorating physical plants, and maintaining the essential expertise that the scientists at the labs provide. Nor does such a deterrent require “unending innovation,” as Mello claims. Our current nuclear weapons inventory, validated by extensive testing, is more than adequate to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, our troops abroad, and our allies, provided sufficient resources are dedicated to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

      Mello also seems to forget that the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world is both national and international law; the NPT, which the United States has ratified, includes a commitment to seek nuclear disarmament. Not to mention that the treaty has an important practical component: Its non-nuclear weapon states have conditioned treaty cooperation on the NPT's nuclear weapon states fulfilling their obligations under Article VI to move toward full nuclear disarmament.

      Thus, the “vision” of a nuclear-weapon-free world is essential as context for “the various nonproliferation initiatives” in Obama's plan to reduce dangerous threats to our national security–eg, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

      President John F. Kennedy's June 1963 nuclear test ban speech at American University is famous not only for its rhetoric but also for its follow-through: Kennedy's words led to the end of aboveground nuclear testing. While it is legitimate to be skeptical about how successful Obama will be in implementing his disarmament agenda, let's hope Mello and others will wait to see how the follow-through progresses before they judge him too harshly. Anything else would be unfair.
      ____________

      Greg Mello responds to John Isaacs and Robert Gard:

      A “commitment” to a goal that a speaker says he may not achieve in his lifetime (let alone in his administration, the only germane period) is by definition an aspiration at best. If that “commitment” isn't concrete and specific it is vague. Such were Obama's very few words in Prague (and since) pertaining to disarmament. There have been no significant actions.
      I am interested in action — ours and the government's — not “hope.”

      In your reply, you simply reiterate the Administration's themes on these points.

      If you look over what you wrote, you will see that you freely conflate disarmament with nonproliferation issues and initiatives. You're not alone; many people do. I suppose that's the idea. These are quite different things, obviously. Preventing others from acquiring a nuclear deterrent has precious little to do with getting rid of my own. I nowhere argue against sound, just, and legal measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.

      I think you err significantly when you say “the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world is both national and international law.” It is the achievement, not the pursuit, of this goal that is a binding legal requirement, unanimously confirmed by the International Court of Justice. Attempting to substitute an alleged aspiration (and that ominously vague), for achievement is a big step down from logic and law, a grave political disservice. This is all the more true when this alleged aspiration comes from the very temporary leader of the world's largest and most aggressive military power, and is then followed by a very large increase in nuclear weapons spending.

      I never said that a nuclear deterrent required “unending innovation.” I suspect we agree that the reverse is true. What I said was quite different: that the “deterrence of any adversary” to which Obama referred was unachievable, and therefore its pursuit implied unending innovation. I think investment itself, together with an ideology of technical “progress” – often expressed through fads like the quest for greater device “surety” – creates the hope that a “credible” nuclear deterrent, a deterrent that is relevant to “any” adversary as well as one that is “safe” and “secure,” can someday finally be achieved. Nuclear weapons will never be safe, secure, and they will never deter “any” adversary.

      There's many reasons why our leaders engage in this kind of crazy talk, and none of them are pretty.

      Disarmament aside, the warhead complex, especially at the physics labs, is riddled with waste and unnecessary programs and missions, which help drive down morale and scientific quality. I and many others believe the complex is grossly over-funded (by at least 40%) for the mission of maintaining the present arsenal indefinitely. Much smaller arsenals, right on down to zero, would be quite desirable from every perspective, and cheaper. The US arsenal can be unilaterally reduced to much lower levels without any loss of US “security.”

      If Obama wants to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security, and expects anybody to believe him, he must actually do so. Instead, building thousands of significantly upgraded bombs (a process already underway) with new requests to develop and produce more kinds of upgraded bombs, and the factories to make them, isn't disarmament at all. It's the modernization of everything for the long run – warheads, delivery systems, factories, everything.

      ______________

      Robert Gard and John Isaacs continue the exchange:

      It's gratifying to learn that Greg Mello agrees with us on the desirability of both sound measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and a “much smaller” US nuclear arsenal. For our part, we agree with him that the increase in funds programmed for the nuclear laboratories is excessive, although we don't see any inconsistency between ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile and reducing its size.

      We may have a basic disagreement regarding deterrence. It's not clear whether Mello's quote of deterring “any adversary” includes non-state actors or only nation states. If he is referring to nation states only, we believe even extended deterrence can be accomplished without “unending innovation” and with a smaller stockpile. If his definition includes non-state actors bent on terrorism, no amount of innovation or real investment can deter them from using a nuclear weapon should they acquire one.

      We certainly concede the point that most measures designed to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation wouldn't qualify as disarmament, but they may facilitate reductions in nuclear stockpiles, which would qualify as disarmament.

      Finally, let's return to the basic issue of President Obama's commitment to seeking, as a goal, a nuclear-weapon-free world. Even if it is an “aspiration,” that doesn't reduce its importance. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” And although Mello might not consider the action “significant,” Obama did chair a UN Security Council meeting with other heads of state that resulted in a resolution affirming the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Additionally, to meet our obligation under Article VI, Obama has stated his intent to follow up the new START treaty with negotiations involving all of the nuclear powers to reduce stockpiles of weapons.

      Coming full circle, these actions taken are essential to obtain the cooperation of the non-nuclear weapons states in measures to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation, which both we and Mello favor.

      for deflecting any scrutiny of the military budget

      Get Serious About Reform: Budget Challenges Will Force Hard Choices

      by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. Defense News , 21 February 2010.

      During the past decade, the US Defense Department has enjoyed a rise in its budget unprecedented since the Korean War. With President Barack Obama's fiscal 2011 budget request, it is up nearly 100 percent in real terms from its post-Cold War low. But few observers believe that this level of spending can continue in light of the mounting national debt. So it is wise to think now about options for savings.

      A way to begin is to ask, what has driven budgets so high? Obviously, the wars are part of the answer. But they account for only 20 percent of today's expenditures. And they are the least likely targets for economizing.

      It is more fruitful to reflect on the shortcomings in past efforts at defense reform. Can we do it better? It is also worth thinking about the practice of force modernization during the post-Cold War period, which has been distinctly undisciplined.

      The end of the Cold War presented a unique opportunity – as well as a manifest need – for the structural reform of our defense posture. The force reductions of the 1990s necessarily risked decreased efficiency, due to the loss of economies of scale affecting support activities and equipment acquisition. The standard solution to such problems is to restructure as one gets smaller, matching reductions in size with a reduction in complexity – a practice the DoD did not, for the most part, follow.

      Although smaller, DoD and the services have largely retained or even increased their complexity. For instance, there are today 50 major commands either one step above or below the service level – not much different from during the Cold War.

      In our recent study of budget trends , we identify a dozen areas where significant changes had been proposed in the 1990s. These involved service roles and missions, consolidation of various support and training functions, and recentering budget and acquisition planning at the joint level.

      In addition, the need to reform DoD's acquisition, logistics and financial management systems has been evident for a long, long time. However, only two reform initiatives – competitive sourcing and military base closures – were pursued far enough to yield significant annual savings, and these have not amounted to more than 4 percent of the defense budget.

      There also was hope in the mid-1990s that a “revolution in military affairs” might lead to new efficiencies. We would reap more bang for the buck by means of increased battlefield awareness, improved logistics, increased capacities for standoff precision attack, and the networking of units within and across services.

      In some areas, such as precision attack, capability has dramatically increased. Theater logistics also have improved. But nowhere has the revolution in information technology led to manifest and substantial savings. Rather than supplant-ing legacy capabilities and platforms, the new technology has mostly just supplemented them.

      In prospect, the evolution of net-centric warfare might reduce the need for redundant capabilities. But progress toward the services sharing a common nervous system has been slow and mostly involved special operations units and precision ground attack. Generally, net-centric capabilities exist as an anemic overlay to traditional service-centric structures and assets.

      DoD and the services have faced little pressure to economize or transform during the past decade. This is also evident in equipment acquisition.

      We can discern three distinct acquisition trends at work in recent decades. First, there are legacy programs that came forward from the Cold War period with considerable institutional momentum. Second, there are programs reflecting the revolutionary potential of new information technologies. Finally, there are adaptive programs, such as the recent mass purchase of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, that correspond to new mission requirements.

      In an ideal world, the imperative to adapt to new missions and circumstances would draw on the revolutionary potential of new technologies to rewrite or supplant legacy programs. But this has not happened.

      Too much of the $2.5 trillion in modernization funding since 1990 perpetuated the status quo circa 1990. Transformational acquisition was mostly restricted to producing supplements, such as Predator drones, to the legacy arsenal. And adaptive acquisition was largely delayed until field experiences forced a flurry of ad hoc efforts beginning six years ago.

      The Pentagon's central authorities have done too little, too late to compel the integration of modernization efforts along adaptive lines. Legacy, transformational and adaptive modernization have lurched forward together, but poorly integrated and competing for resources. And yet, even though modernization spending now surpasses that of the Reagan era, no one is happy with the result.

      For 10 years, Congress and the White House have been permissive when it comes to defense spending; this has undercut any impetus for reform and prioritization. Obama's decision to further boost the defense budget suggests that this dysfunction will persist for a while, but this, too, is a bubble that will burst. Preparing for that eventuality means revisiting options for structural reform and getting clearer on our strategic priorities.

      Todd Fine responds to the Mello-Knight exchange

      Todd Fine organized and developed the Global Zero campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons as a program officer at the World Security Institute. He is currently working to establish the Iran Data Portal at Princeton University. He responded on 18 February 2010 to the Knight-Mello exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration.

      ___________________

      Fine:

      President Obama's exceedingly generous budget request for the nuclear weapons labs has boiled long-simmering anxieties about the concrete policy impact of his frequently expressed “vision” for “a world without nuclear weapons.” Aligning with the prominent series of op-eds in The Wall Street Journal, Obama repeated this earnest aspiration consistently throughout the campaign for the presidency, and in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech and April 2009 policy speech in Prague.

      Given the ambition of this vision in practical terms, and, of course, the now apparent serious interest in its achievement by predecessor Ronald Reagan, it is not surprising that long-time advocates have expected policy proposals that would explicitly move in this direction. Yet, these budgeting numbers signal an overall regression. They will further institutionalize the development of new weapons and will make restructuring the labs toward other functions more difficult.

      The failure to assure advocates began at the rhetoric's root. Despite the welcome credibility they have given the anti-nuclear cause, the op-ed authors – George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and William Perry – had a burden to consider how other countries perceive the size and activities of our weapons laboratories. At the same time in 2007 that American anti-nuclear lobbyists and activists were feverishly working to block funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) in Congress, Kissinger forwarded an analysis by Shultz and Hoover fellow Sidney Drell to Sen. Pete Domenici supporting investments in the program. And although Nunn declared that he was opposed to the RRW, he signaled his acceptance for large-scale increases in lab funding in the foursome's third op-ed in The Wall Street Journal on January 19, 2010. Unlike the previous op-eds, which were enthusiastically endorsed by others and received with much fanfare by the press, this one seemed clinically designed to give their reputational blessing to the upcoming budget numbers.

      Chief nuclear negotiator under President Reagan, Max Kampelman, who has claimed that he originally prompted George Shultz to return to the question of elimination, has advocated a bold path to zero using multilateral processes in the United Nations. Indeed, outlining the divisions among the foreign policy elite, the Global Zero campaign was initiated by a number of attendees of the Shultz-led Hoover Institution meetings who were dissatisfied with the extreme focus on short-term “steps” instead of the explicit practicalities of achieving the ultimate goal. And following that, the policy program of Global Zero itself has revealed a split between the advocates of immediate multilateralization of the strategic arms control process and others who propose that a decades-long series of US-Russia agreements expand into a multilateral process.

      These assorted divisions among the elite may come to the fore at the May NPT Review Conference as other nations test the United States' new-found commitment to the treaty's stated objective of disarmament. Given the current crises involving Iran and North Korea and the shortening window of Obama's dynamism on the world stage, if the President fails to inspire others to adopt his “vision” and work toward elimination concretely, he may miss a singular opportunity. If CTBT, which is symbolic despite its limitations, is not ratified by the conference date, these budget requests alone may devastate US credibility. And as Greg Mello's logic indicates, other nations are unlikely to be impressed with the scale of the START follow-on treaty, and there are not yet any indications that the posture review language on “the role” of nuclear weapons will be that momentous in terms of practical implications.

      In order to blunt these concerns and sincerely recommit to the vision, there are a number of policy proposals the Obama administration could potentially advocate going into the review conference:

        1. A funded international program that would initiate cooperative research into verification technologies and enforcement strategies that would be required in a world of “global zero.”

        2. The initiation of an international audit of all existing nuclear weapons and material.

        3. Sponsorship of initial discussions on a timeline for negotiations and targets involved in the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

      However, as Charles Knight mentioned with respect to international concerns about the United States' superiority in conventional weapons, these actions would only be a start. Given the terrifying overall budget projections and the abject failure of our military contracting and procurement processes, the United States needs to reformulate its entire defense posture and budget. In order to convince states like Russia and China to approach low numbers of nuclear weapons, it might even be necessary to consider multilateral treaty restrictions on general conventional forces and on specific advanced weapons systems like Prompt Global Strike. If the elimination aspiration is sincere, then these concerns are unavoidable and should be seriously studied and contemplated.

      Max Kampelman, the symbolic initiator of the present return to abolitionism, has spoken powerfully of what real leadership by an American president, especially when morally confident and unabashed, can accomplish. President Obama's rhetoric on the elimination of nuclear weapons apparently inspired some enough to award him the Nobel Peace Prize; if he is sincere, he owes it to the younger generation to present a clear path to elimination, if not in his lifetime, then in ours.

      Stop at Start

      Barry Blechman. New York Times , 18 February 2010.
      http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19blechman.html

      Utdrag:

      Here's how a global nuclear disarmament treaty could work. First, it would spell out a decades-long schedule for the verified destruction of all weapons, materials and facilities. Those possessing the largest arsenals — the United States and Russia — would make deep cuts first. Those with smaller arsenals would join at specified dates and levels. To ensure that no state gained an advantage, the treaty would incorporate “rest stops”: if a state refused to comply with a scheduled measure, other nations' reductions would be suspended until the violation was corrected. This dynamic would generate momentum, but also ensure that if the effort collapsed, the signatories would be no less secure than before.

      Redaktörens kommentar:
      There is something missing in this measured disarmament scheme which invalidates it as a path to full nuclear disarmament. Blechman makes an erroneous assumption shared by too many nuclear disarmament advocates. He assumes that nuclear weapons are a class of weapons that can be dealt with in isolation from the problems of international security and insecurity. Nuclear weapons cannot be separated strategically from the context of the conventional military power they supplement.

      Note the following phrase in the above excerpt from Blechman: “To ensure that no state gained an advantage…” His prescription applies only to nuclear weapons and presumes no adjustments to conventional military power. In those conditions some states stand to gain considerable advantage from nuclear disarmament.

      Imagine the case of Russia in Blechman's staged draw down of nuclear forces with the US As Russia approaches zero nuclear weapons they become more and more vulnerable to superior US conventional military power.

      Without parallel and compensatory reductions and adjustments in conventional forces and strong political assurances weaker nations such as Russia will never agree to give up all their nuclear weapons.

      Careful schemes of balanced nuclear weapons disarmament of the type that Blechman argues for cannot by themselves get us to zero nuclear weapons. Compensating for the national insecurities arising from imbalances in conventional military power must be part of any formula for full nuclear disarmament. We need to work toward an international security regime that delivers the reassurance of fifty years without international aggression and military intervention. After that period of peace nuclear nations might be ready to go to zero.

      Obama's Nuclear Decision Day

      Joe Cirincione. Huffington Post , 17 February 2010.
      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/obamas-nuclear-decision-d_b_465223.html

      Utdrag:

      … democracy does not apply to nuclear weapons policy. It never has. No nation has ever had a vote on whether to go nuclear. These decisions are made in secret. They don't have to be.

      Jonathan Granoff responds to the Mello-Knight exchange

      Jonathan Granoff is president of the Global Security Institute . He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .
      Jonathan Granoff is the author of Memo to Obama: Nuclear Weapons , which appeared in Tikkun Magazine , January-February 2009.

      __________________

      Jonathan Granoff:

      Was President Obama outplayed by DOD and DOE? They have posed a very clever analysis. If progress is to be had on nonproliferation, such as support for a test ban, then modernization and the ability to strengthen the capacity to improve the arsenal seems to be the cost. Does this still allows them to say that the modernization “might require testing someday?” This will be an enormous benefit for those who want to stop the test ban. Will it not be like the Clinton administration's deal with Stockpile Stewardship where he thought funding it would generate their support for the test ban but did not gain the full out support of DOE?

      I am consistently surprised by how naive politicians appear when challenged by strategic military planners. So, I state this as an example where it appears that President Obama really wants to make progress (not necessarily on disarmament, but certainly on nonproliferation) and even here he is getting cul de sacked .

      Or, is he fully aware of the strategy being played out. Does Mr. Mello think he was being deceptive in the Prague speech, or just a bit cute?

      Regardless, the current programs being funded that Mr. Mello highlights will certainly make achieving any strengthening of the nonproliferation aspirations of the Administration at the upcoming NPT very difficult. They certainly do not seem to be consistent with a commitment to disarmament.

      I sincerely hope I am wrong and look forward to hearing from some of the people in the current Administration whom I respect very much, such as Ambassador Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Gottemoeller.

      Greg Mello responds to Jonathan Granoff:

      Among your other interesting points, you raise this question: “Does Mr. Mello think he [Obama] was being deceptive in the Prague speech, or just a bit cute?” I would say neither. The substitution of an aspiration for a commitment or promise is a rhetorical device so normal these questions don't arise. Both the speaker and the audience expect some sort of ritual acknowledgment of our common aspirations. The gap between those aspirations and our actual practice is fairly embarrassing; many members of the audience are looking for some sort of fantasy bridge between the two. They don't want bad news, they want “hope.”

      Somehow we have gone from “I will put a chicken in every pot” to “I will seek to put a chicken in every pot.” There is less accountability in the second formulation, which may be especially helpful in a time of contracting national prospects — in which contraction, the increased nuclear military spending I am criticizing plays a central symbolic role. Our hopes are greater than the realities available to service them. We, and our donors and supporters, want Santa Claus.

      Paul Ingram responds to Mello-Knight exchange

      Paul Ingram is the executive director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) . He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .

      Ingram:

      Everyone knows that in this tough world of realist nuclear politics it does not pay to be naïve. What is less frequently recognised is that in a world of global threat it can be equally dangerous to play an extreme game of zero trust.

      So we have to go through this strange and difficult world navigating a constant and complex series of considered calculations, making judgments based upon evidence and previous experience, what we can trust and what we cannot. That goes as much for those of us trying to influence decision-makers as much as for officials making decisions over foreign policy.

      So when a President gets up and makes a speech that contains within it commitments to a world free of nuclear weapons, proposing a number of initiatives, and looking forward to concrete commitments in the near term, it pays to be hopeful, but not gullible. And we have the first test of this hope in the very near future when the President comes to publish a version of his long awaited Nuclear Posture Review.

      Let me say at the outset that I am not intimately familiar with the inner workings of the Obama Adminsitration's game plan, with the NPR, the START follow-on negotiations, these investments. I don't like these investments in the infrastructure [weapons complex] any more than Greg. I think they are a waste of US taxpayer's resources, and America and the world would be better off without them, with existing budgets devoted to further winding down the infrastructure, clean-up and the like.

      But there remain several reasons for treating Obama's nuclear diplomacy, and these investments, seriously:

      1) It is a new departure. Now, bask in that fact, but I agree with Greg, this is hardly a cause for great celebration.

      2) There are no obvious electoral benefits in this for Obama beyond the concrete international results that pertain. Few Americans will vote differently on this, unless President Obama actually delivers upon this agenda and appears come the next election as a President that delivers on the international scene. In actual fact, if the agenda were a cynical one, he will more likely end up seen as a President big on promises and weak on delivery – whether he is genuine or not, this is a likely and very depressing outcome.

      3) The view that is being taken by the Administration over the need for this level of extra investment may be misguided, but it does hold a certain level of internal consistency. Let's be honest, few things in politics are pure and simple, black and white. Even the JASON report, when pointing out that the warheads were in good shape, said that the infrastructure itself was under severe strain through lack of investment and the challenge of attracting talent into the profession. The belief that we need to reduce slowly and multilaterally whilst maintaining a nuclear force well into the future may be frustrating to many of us, and highlight the fact that we still live in a world where governments have not yet understood the need for more radical shifts in their postures, but it does not contradict the vision. And let's be clear here, commitment to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, whilst only the first step, is an important one nevertheless. And if you were based in France, you'd know what a big step it was.

      4) Perhaps most important, the Obama Administration, and we ourselves, need to consider strategically how we can realistically bring the majority of Americans, Russians, and God knows, the Indians, Pakistanis and Israelis along with us (everyone these days focuses on the Iranians but trust me, they are easy in comparison). It is not effective simply to state positions and push through initiatives against majority opposition, even when you are the most powerful man in the world. You still have to convince Congress, the Americans people, and then colleagues abroad, in a huge complex web of inter-relationships that are not conducive to rational debate, let alone instruction. It takes gentle engagement, openness to others' perspectives, appreciation of diversity, team work and many other cooperative skills beyond policy work to build the process necessary for disarmament. And that takes building confidence. And that probably requires the sort of investment we are witnessing today.

      Bill Hartung responds to Mello-Knight exchange

      William D. Hartung is Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation. He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .

      ______________

      Hartung:

      Obama's aspirations go beyond just his statement at Prague. He is in the midst of negotiating a new nuclear arms
      reduction treaty with Russia, with a possible follow-on seeking deeper cuts; he has committed himself publicly to pursuing ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a treaty banning the production of bomb-making materials
      (the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty); he is hosting a nuclear security summit of scores of nations to work on plans to secure or destroy “loose nukes” and bomb-making materials; and he hosted a meeting of the UN Security Council (the first US president to do so) to reinforce disarmament pledges of numerous key players.

      Some of these changes can occur without major restructuring of US conventional forces (new reductions with Russia and new nuclear security measures, for example).

      Everything beyond that will require substantial changes first, as Charles suggests, not only in US conventional forces and posture but in regional politics in security dynamics in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Middle East (Israel, Iran, and host of related questions, including an Israeli-Palestinian setttlement). And current actions such as boosting spending on the nuclear weapons complex need to be reversed.

      Many of these factors are rarely or not fully discussed by many — but not all — of the advocates of “getting to zero.”

      So, I guess I agree with many of the points made by Charles and Greg, but I'm not ready to give up on the prospect of some significant changes in nuclear policies and postures. My sense is that we should applaud Obama's commitments and then hold him to his word, not presume that progress is impossible.

      If You Could See America Through China's Eyes

      Steve Clemons. TPM Cafe , 13 February 2010.
      http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/02/13/several_years_ago_i_met/

      Obamas nedrustning paradoxen

      Greg Mello. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 10 February 2010.
      http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox
      Greg Mello is the executive director and co-founder of the Los Alamos Study Group .

      ______________

      Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama gave a speech that many have interpreted as a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.

      Now, however, the White House is requesting one of the larger increases in warhead spending history. If its request is fully funded, warhead spending would rise 10 percent in a single year, with further increases promised for the future. Los Alamos National Laboratory, the biggest target of the Obama largesse, would see a 22 percent budget increase, its largest since 1944. In particular, funding for a new plutonium “pit” factory complex there would more than double, signaling a commitment to produce new nuclear weapons a decade hence.

      So how is the president's budget compatible with his disarmament vision?

      The answer is simple: There is no evidence that Obama has, or ever had, any such vision. He said nothing to that effect in Prague. There, he merely spoke of his commitment “to seek . . . a world without nuclear weapons,” a vague aspiration and hardly a novel one at that level of abstraction. He said that in the meantime the United States “will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”

      Since nuclear weapons don't, and won't ever, “deter any adversary,” this too was highly aspirational, if not futile. The vain search for an “effective” arsenal that can deter “any” adversary requires unending innovation and continuous real investment, including investment in the extended deterrent to which Obama referred. The promise of such investments, and not disarmament, was the operative message in Prague as far as the US stockpile was concerned. In fact, proposed new investments in extended deterrence were already being packaged for Congress when Obama spoke.

      To fulfill his supposed “disarmament vision,” Obama offered just two approaches in Prague, both indefinite. First, he spoke vaguely of reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” It's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean. Most likely it refers to official discourse–what officials say about nuclear doctrine–as opposed to actual facts on the ground. Second, Obama promised to negotiate “a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] with the Russians.” As far as nuclear disarmament went in the speech, that was it.

      Of course, Obama also said his administration would promptly pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an action not yet taken and one entirely unrelated to US disarmament. The rest of the speech was devoted to various nonproliferation initiatives that his administration planned to seek.

      On July 8, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced their Joint Understanding, committing their respective countries to somewhere between 500 to 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,500 to 1,675 deployed strategic warheads, very modest goals to be achieved a full seven years after the treaty entered into force. Total arsenal numbers wouldn't change, so strategic warheads could be taken from deployment and placed in a reserve–de-alerted, in effect. The treaty wouldn't affect nonstrategic warheads. It wouldn't require dismantlement. As Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists has explained, the delivery vehicle limits require little, if any, change from US and Russian expected deployments.

      Ironically, it's possible that the retirement PDF of 4,000 or more US warheads under the Moscow Treaty and other retirements ordered by George W. Bush may exceed anything Obama does in terms of disarmament. As for the stockpile and weapons complex, Bush's aspirations were far more hawkish than Congress ultimately allowed. Real budgets for warheads fell during his last three years in office. Now, with the Democrats controlling the executive branch and both houses of Congress, congressional restraint is notable by its absence. What Obama mainly seems to be “disarming” is congressional resistance to variations of some of the same proposals Bush found it difficult to authorize and fund.

      Last May Obama sent his first budget to Congress, calling for flat warhead spending. At that time, the administration was still displaying a measured approach toward replacement and expansion of warhead capabilities.

      That said, in last year's budget the White House did acquiesce to a Pentagon demand to request funding for a major upgrade to four B61 nuclear bomb variants–one of which had just completed a 20-year-plus life-extension program. Just one day before that budget was released a grand nuclear strategy review previously requested by the armed services committees was unveiled. It was chaired by William Perry, a member of the governing board of the corporation that manages Los Alamos, and recurrent Cold War fixture James Schlesinger. [Full disclosure: Perry is also a member of the Bulletin's Board of Sponsors.]

      The report's recommendations for increased spending and weapons development quickly began to serve as a rallying point for defense hawks–surely the point of the exercise. Overall, it was largely a conclusory pastiche of recycled Cold War notions, entirely lacking in analysis and often factually wrong. But neither the White House nor leading congressional Democrats offered any public resistance or rebuttal to its conclusions.

      More largely, opposition to nuclear restraint within the administration quickly emerged from its usual redoubts at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Pentagon, STRATCOM, and interested players in both parties in Congress. Plus, Obama left key Bush appointees in place at NNSA while the Pentagon added some familiar faces from the Clinton administration, leaving serious questions about the ability of the White House to develop an independent understanding of the issues, let alone present one to Congress.

      Either way, potential treaty ratification is surely a major factor in White House thinking. Senate Republicans, as expected, are demanding significant nuclear investments prior to considering ratification of any START follow-on treaty. Democratic hawks, especially powerful ones with pork-barrel interests at stake such as New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman, also must be satisfied in the ratification process. All in all this makes the latest Obama budget request a kind of “preemptive surrender” to nuclear hawks. So whether or not the president has a disarmament “vision” is irrelevant. What is important are the policy commitments embodied in the budget request and whether Congress will endorse them.

      Investments on the scale requested should be flatly unacceptable to all of us. The country and the world face truly apocalyptic security challenges from climate change and looming shortages of transportation fuels. Our economy is very weak and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The proposed increases in nuclear weapons spending, embedded as they are in an overall military budget bigger than any since the 1940s, should be a clarion call for renewed political commitment in service of the fundamental values that uphold this, or any, society.

      Those values are now gravely threatened–not least by a White House uncertain about, or unwilling or unable to fight for, what is right.

      Redaktörens kommentar:

      Mello does a good job of explaining why there will be little progress toward nuclear abolition during the Obama administration. Further he makes a good case that the current administration seems to be headed towards feeding the nuclear weapons complex to a greater degree than Bush was able. Who'd of thought!

      But Mello misses on a couple points. One is that he dismisses too quickly the nuclear abolition aspiration Obama stated in Prague. Those few words may have little affect on policy, but they do mark a return to the rhetoric of all atomic age administrations up until George W. Bush markedly abandoned such aspirations. What is the value of that rhetoric? Mostly it gives credence to those who organize around abolition — something of value, but not much.

      Secondly, Mello states that when Obama spoke of…

      …reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” it's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean.

      Actually, this statement of Obama's refers to something quite specific and important. The US has been advancing for several decades to an unprecedented level of conventional force dominance over all other nations (see Bernard I. Finel on strategic meaning of US conventional military power). At this point the US can anticipate gaining even more strategic advantage if it can convince other nations to join in disposing of nuclear weaponry (for an official statement of this strategic formula see Vice President Biden's speech at the National Defense University on 18 February 2010.) This is indeed quite an aspiration!

      This connection of conventional dominance to nuclear dominance brings me to the other shortcoming of Mello's article. Nuclear abolition will be impossible without a significant restructuring of the international (in-)security system. Why would Russia or China eschew nuclear weapons or N. Korea and Iran abandon efforts to obtain them while these nations remain utterly vulnerable to US conventional strike?

      Leaders of popular efforts for nuclear disarmament almost never acknowledge this strategic problem. That's a disservice to their cause, because it leaves a major obstacle to disarmament in place with no plan (or even awareness of the need for a plan) to remove it.

      The eventuality of an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons will require the US to first draw down its conventional military power. And concurrent to a deep draw down of US conventional military power there must be a build up of international structures which can take up more and more of the responsibility for global security.

      Such a transfer of power and responsibility will probably happen someday , but we are certainly not presently on that path. That is one more “change” that Obama is not pursuing, not even aspirationally.

      Greg Mello responds to the editor's comments:

      I think your comments are excellent. Let me begin with the second one, with which I wholly agree. Our work here at the [Los Alamos] Study Group has emphasized nuclear weapons issues in part because of our geographic, and hence political, locus adjacent to the two largest nuclear weapons laboratories.

      The barrier to nuclear disarmament posed by military policies and investments that express an aspiration for “full spectrum dominance” on a global scale is almost certainly insuperable. Nuclear disarmament is only consistent with a quite different conception of national security than we now have and with a quite different economic structure internally as well. The good news — and I think we have to make it good where it may not appear so at first glance, since we have no other choice — is that our empire is failing.

      Your first point, which relates to the symbolic value of Obama's disarmament statements, is also sound, but here I think that symbolic value is greatly outweighed by the passivity and compliance which his statements have engendered in civil society. The actors and forces which could and should be forcefully working for disarmament have been themselves disarmed by what amounts to propaganda.

      Hypocrisy may be the homage paid to the ideal by the real, but it is not leadership, it is not honest, and it will not produce anything of value in this case. At the moment, it is allowing the nuclear weapons establishment to do what it could not accomplish previously: increase production capacity and provide greater, not lesser, endorsement of nuclear weapons in all their aspects, both materially and symbolically.

      Obama's disarmament aspiration, so called, is a faint echo compared to the full-throated endorsement of nuclear weapons it is enabling.

      Day of Reckoning Ahead for US Defense Spending

      Sandra I. Erwin. National Defense , March 2010.
      http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/March/Pages/DefenseWatch.aspx

      Utdrag:

      The government's own defense gurus are warning that it is not a question of if, but when the United States will lose its military superpower status.

      These ominous predictions, by all accounts, are hard to fathom. The Pentagon's budget this year is the highest since World War II — and accounts for almost half of what the world's militaries spend.

      But with the nation drowning in debt, it isn't difficult to see how the financial burdens of superpowerdom may be too much to bear. The United States, some experts warn, would be wise to restrain military spending in order to regain its financial strength.

      En falsk Nuclear Alarm avslöja att Wall Street Journals radioaktiva skrämselpropaganda

      Joseph Cirincione. Foreign Policy , 06 January 2010.
      http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/a_false_nuclear_alarm?page=0, 0

      Utdrag:

      Politiska experter räknar dock med den nya budgeten att släppas i februari till fullo finansiera de kärnvapen komplexa och stödja både USA: s vetenskaps-och-engineering bas och sitt kärnvapenprogram lager. Vice President Joe Biden - skampålen i Journal redaktion - personligen leda detta arbete, möten med ledarna för amerikanska kärnvapen laboratorier, militära chefer och ledande experter att skapa en budget och strategisk konsensus.

      Det är i själva verket en bred, tvåparti enighet om en ny kärnsäkerhet strategi som skulle förhindra nukleär terrorism, förhindra nya kärnvapenbestyckade länderna, och stadigt minskar kalla krigets kärnvapen lager. Många konservativa stöder ett tillvägagångssätt som skulle upprätthålla en säker, trygg och effektiv kärnvapenarsenal så länge kärnvapen behövs.

      En falsk Nuclear Start Fyrtioen Senators vs Biden på warhead modernisering.

      editorial, Wall Street Journal , 05 January 2010.
      http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704039704574616263692875836.html

      Utdrag:

      Obama-administrationen fortsätter att förhandla med ryssarna under en ny offensiva vapen (Start), men en stora frågan är om det kan få resultat genom den amerikanska senaten. En grupp senatorer berättar Vita huset att det kommer att ha liten eller ingen chans att lyckas om den inte också går vidare med kärnkraft stridsspets modernisering.

      Why COIN Will Fail in Afghanistan

      J. Sigger. Arm Chair Generalist , 31 December 2009.
      http://armchairgeneralist.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/12/why-coin-will-fail-in-afghanistan.html

      A Leak About the Phantom Army

      Meteor Blades. Daily Kos , 30 December 2009.
      http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/12/30/820467/-A-Leak-About-the-Phantom-Army

      Utdrag:

      …the Afghan National Army is a farce; there's little chance of turning it into a cohesive fighting force; and there's zero chance of doing so on a speedy timetable…

      Afghanistan's never-ending challenge

      HDS Greenway. Boston Globe , 16 December 2009.

      Utdrag:

      The enemy, then as now, always rallied to the reliable call of “jihad'' against the infidel invaders no matter who they were. Of all the tribes, those of the Pashtuns were the most feared.

      The motives for fighting in Afghanistan were fear, prestige, and retribution. The British feared Russian expansion, and always sought to put their man on the throne to do Britain's bidding. Retribution always followed military setbacks, and national prestige was used as the reason to fight on. British control over Afghanistan was thought necessary for the defense of India.

      Russia followed the same scenario, fearing that if Afghanistan's pro-Communist government should fail, it would endanger Russia's Muslim regions.

      The United States invaded Afghanistan out of fear of Al Qaeda, and retribution for 9/11. And today you often hear the national prestige argument that we cannot let the Holy Warriors believe they can defeat a second superpower. More and more, America's Afghan policy is tied into protecting the stability of Pakistan, once part of British India.

      Budget Flyttar Boj Defense Industry

      Loren B. Thompson. Lexington Institute, 14 December 2009.
      http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/budget-moves-buoy-defense-industry

      Utdrag:

      First, even before President Obama decided to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, the administration had already decided to spend more on overseas contingencies in 2011 that the $130 billion it planned to spend in 2010. Second, Jason Sherman of insidedefense.com reported this month that the White House will support increasing the regular defense budget (not including overseas contingencies) by $14 billion above what was planned for 2011, meaning it will rise from the $542 billion forecast in May to $556 billion. Third, Vago Muradian of Defense News reported this weekend that total increases above the May plan for the regular defense budget across the 2011-2015 spending period will reach $100 billion.

      Redaktörens kommentar:

      Looks as if the Obama administration's plan to reduce Federal expenditures on war (contingency) operations and to hold increases in the base Pentagon budget to dollar inflation have come unraveled at less than a year into the budgeting plan and the administration. It is a shame, because it is so unnecessary.

      Obama's folly

      Andrew J. Bacevich. Los Angeles Times , 03 December 2009.
      http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich3-2009dec03,0,3209129.story

      Utdrag:

      So the war launched as a prequel to Iraq now becomes its sequel, with little of substance learned in the interim. To double down in Afghanistan is to ignore the unmistakable lesson of Bush's thoroughly discredited “global war on terror”: Sending US troops to fight interminable wars in distant countries does more to inflame than to extinguish the resentments giving rise to violent anti-Western jihadism

      The Afghanistan Parenthesis

      David Bromwich. Huffington Post , 02 December 2009.
      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/the-afghanistan-parenthes_b_377141.html

      Utdrag:

      … the president spoke as if Al Qaeda were the name of a distinct, finite, searchable entity that can be subdued by an intensification (lasting exactly 18 months) of American fighting in the country that was once its camp. As for the Taliban, whatever else they may be, they are native to Afghanistan. This cannot be said of Al Qaeda, but it cannot be said, either, of the soldiers, trainers, advisers, and contractors sent by the United States.

      There is a misjudged air of precision in the idea of a renewed and extended war that closes at 18 months because that “benchmark” was settled in advance. How can anyone be sure that the scale of so entangling a mission, with so many pitfalls, will fit neatly into the shape of a year and a half?

      Are American Muslims A Threat?

      response by Michael Brenner to question posed by James Kitfield on National Journal Expert Blog, 19 November 2009.
      http://security.nationaljournal.com/2009/11/are-american-muslims-a-threat.php#1393085

      Utdrag:

      …all it would take to restore sanity is some slight reflection on our dismal performance everywhere we have tried our hand at manipulation in the Greater Middle East since 9/11. We have been consistently arrogant, incompetent, corrupt – in all senses, callous to the pain inflicted on the natives and ourselves alike, and abject failures.

      Building on 2 blunders: the dubious case for counterinsurgency

      Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy , 16 November 2009.

      Editor's Comment

      Walt makes a fundamental strategic point. The Bush wars involved operational and grand strategic errors, so why institutionalize a shift in defense planning that in effect has the US military prepare for more strategic errors by our leadership? Why not opt to correct the error? It is really an elemental point of strategy: Don't compound error!

      I understand how military professionals who have been ordered to take on foolish strategic missions might feel that counterinsurgency theory is an attractive way out of their tactical and operational dilemmas. But there is really no excuse for civilian leaders, including Sec Def Gates, chasing the mirage of COIN as if it were an answer for our current problems dealing with the consequences of a disastrous Bush national security strategy. Change the strategy and there will be no need for investments in COIN!

      Begreppsbildningar av uppror och dess effekter på den Counterinsurgency politiska processen

      Adam L. Silverman. Sic Semper Tyrannis , 12 November 2009.

      Utdrag:

      Given the reality that the US faces in Afghanistan; the historic lack of functional centralized government, exceedingly high number of societal elements, many of which are geographically isolated or semi-isolated, the illegitimacy of the current Afghan government, and the fact that groups we are fighting are not all insurgents makes successfully reaching the COIN end state of tethering Afghan society back to the Afghan state very, very difficult. The debate on the use of COIN really needs to be focused in on this difficult set of Afghan circumstances and whether they allow any chance for a positive counterinsurgency outcome.

      Full Spectrum Dominance and COIN

      Dave Anderson. News Hoggers , 06 November 2009.
      http://www.newshoggers.com/blog/2009/11/full-spectrum-dominance-and-coin.html

      Utdrag:

      COIN does not decrease the chance of future interventions; it instead probably increases the chance of future interventions and invasions as it is a “solution” that is “proven to work” as long as not too many questions are raised about either what “working” means or the initial rosy scenario assumptions that are made to sell the invasion.

      Pull the plug on the Afghan surge

      Charles Kupchan and Steven Simon. Financial Times , 03 November 2009.
      http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e98cbae-c8c6-11de-8f9d-00144feabdc0.html

      From Iraq, Lessons for the Next War

      Alissa J. Rubin. New York Times . 31 October 2009.
      http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/weekinreview/01RUBIN.html

      Chimera of Victory

      Gian P. Gentile. New York Times , 31 October 2009.
      http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/opinion/31iht-edgentile.html?_r=1

      Utdrag:

      History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.

      The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.

      Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case.

      AfPak-Iraq: Wrong War, Wrong Thinking. The United States faces mounting problems in the three leading conflict-zones of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

      Paul Rogers. Open Democracy , 29 October 2009. Hosted on the Commondreams website.
      http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/11/03-6

      Utdrag:

      If there is a way ahead, it rests not on short-term calculations about troop numbers but on a larger reassessment by the Barack Obama administration of the entire US security posture in the middle east and southwest Asia. This will have to do more than crisis-manage the dire problems inherited from George W Bush; what is needed is no less than a move beyond military-led thinking to an integrated understanding of what security in the 21st century actually is.

      False Dichotomy: We have more options in Afghanistan than Biddle lets on

      Michael A. Cohen. The New Republic , 29 October 2009.
      http://www.tnr.com/article/world/disputations-false-dichotomy

      for Biddle article see: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/is-there-a-middle-way-biddl

      Utdrag:

      In poker terms, Biddle's argument is the equivalent of betting all your chips on an inside straight draw. And then doing it again on the next hand.

      Welcome to 2025: American Preeminence Is Disappearing Fifteen Years Early

      Michael T. Klare. Tom Dispatch , 26 October 2009.
      http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175131/michael_klare_the_great_superpower_meltdown

      Utdrag:

      How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma President Obama and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.

      article references http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/global-trends-2025

      Afghan upproret fått nytt liv genom sina fiender

      Paul McGeough. The Age , 24 October 2009. from an address at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.

      Excerpts:

      Afghans do want governance – they want good governance. But they have been ripped off every time it's been within their grasp. And the worst rip-off has been in the last eight years, because democracy and good governance were the gifts offered by the West – by governments that supposedly knew about these things.

      In their refusal to back Kabul or the Coalition, Afghans are not saying yea or neigh on the Taliban in isolation – the call they make as they try to go about their daily existence, is on the credibility of the Taliban as compared with that of the Karzai government and the Coalition.

      It's too late for McChrystal to make protecting the most-threatened sections of the Afghan population the key objective, because both the Kabul Government and the coalition lack credibility in the eyes of the people. In the absence of any significant Afghan government presence, much beyond Kabul, it is American military and aid workers – and those from several other coalition countries – that are seen as the face of government and as keepers of the cash, of which there is not enough and which takes forever to translate into meaningful development.