The Obama disarmament paradox

Greg Mello. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 10 February 2010.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox Greg Mello is the executive director and co-founder of the Los Alamos Study Group .
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Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama gave a speech that many have interpreted as a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.

Now, however, the White House is requesting one of the larger increases in warhead spending history. If its request is fully funded, warhead spending would rise 10 percent in a single year, with further increases promised for the future. Los Alamos National Laboratory, the biggest target of the Obama largesse, would see a 22 percent budget increase, its largest since 1944. In particular, funding for a new plutonium “pit” factory complex there would more than double, signaling a commitment to produce new nuclear weapons a decade hence.

So how is the president's budget compatible with his disarmament vision?

The answer is simple: There is no evidence that Obama has, or ever had, any such vision. He said nothing to that effect in Prague. There, he merely spoke of his commitment “to seek . . . a world without nuclear weapons,” a vague aspiration and hardly a novel one at that level of abstraction. He said that in the meantime the United States “will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”

Since nuclear weapons don't, and won't ever, “deter any adversary,” this too was highly aspirational, if not futile. The vain search for an “effective” arsenal that can deter “any” adversary requires unending innovation and continuous real investment, including investment in the extended deterrent to which Obama referred. The promise of such investments, and not disarmament, was the operative message in Prague as far as the US stockpile was concerned. In fact, proposed new investments in extended deterrence were already being packaged for Congress when Obama spoke.

To fulfill his supposed “disarmament vision,” Obama offered just two approaches in Prague, both indefinite. First, he spoke vaguely of reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” It's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean. Most likely it refers to official discourse–what officials say about nuclear doctrine–as opposed to actual facts on the ground. Second, Obama promised to negotiate “a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] with the Russians.” As far as nuclear disarmament went in the speech, that was it.

Of course, Obama also said his administration would promptly pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an action not yet taken and one entirely unrelated to US disarmament. The rest of the speech was devoted to various nonproliferation initiatives that his administration planned to seek.

On July 8, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced their Joint Understanding, committing their respective countries to somewhere between 500 to 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,500 to 1,675 deployed strategic warheads, very modest goals to be achieved a full seven years after the treaty entered into force. Total arsenal numbers wouldn't change, so strategic warheads could be taken from deployment and placed in a reserve–de-alerted, in effect. The treaty wouldn't affect nonstrategic warheads. It wouldn't require dismantlement. As Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists has explained, the delivery vehicle limits require little, if any, change from US and Russian expected deployments.

Ironically, it's possible that the retirement PDF of 4,000 or more US warheads under the Moscow Treaty and other retirements ordered by George W. Bush may exceed anything Obama does in terms of disarmament. As for the stockpile and weapons complex, Bush's aspirations were far more hawkish than Congress ultimately allowed. Real budgets for warheads fell during his last three years in office. Now, with the Democrats controlling the executive branch and both houses of Congress, congressional restraint is notable by its absence. What Obama mainly seems to be “disarming” is congressional resistance to variations of some of the same proposals Bush found it difficult to authorize and fund.

Last May Obama sent his first budget to Congress, calling for flat warhead spending. At that time, the administration was still displaying a measured approach toward replacement and expansion of warhead capabilities.

That said, in last year's budget the White House did acquiesce to a Pentagon demand to request funding for a major upgrade to four B61 nuclear bomb variants–one of which had just completed a 20-year-plus life-extension program. Just one day before that budget was released a grand nuclear strategy review previously requested by the armed services committees was unveiled. It was chaired by William Perry, a member of the governing board of the corporation that manages Los Alamos, and recurrent Cold War fixture James Schlesinger. [Full disclosure: Perry is also a member of the Bulletin's Board of Sponsors.]

The report's recommendations for increased spending and weapons development quickly began to serve as a rallying point for defense hawks–surely the point of the exercise. Overall, it was largely a conclusory pastiche of recycled Cold War notions, entirely lacking in analysis and often factually wrong. But neither the White House nor leading congressional Democrats offered any public resistance or rebuttal to its conclusions.

More largely, opposition to nuclear restraint within the administration quickly emerged from its usual redoubts at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Pentagon, STRATCOM, and interested players in both parties in Congress. Plus, Obama left key Bush appointees in place at NNSA while the Pentagon added some familiar faces from the Clinton administration, leaving serious questions about the ability of the White House to develop an independent understanding of the issues, let alone present one to Congress.

Either way, potential treaty ratification is surely a major factor in White House thinking. Senate Republicans, as expected, are demanding significant nuclear investments prior to considering ratification of any START follow-on treaty. Democratic hawks, especially powerful ones with pork-barrel interests at stake such as New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman, also must be satisfied in the ratification process. All in all this makes the latest Obama budget request a kind of “preemptive surrender” to nuclear hawks. So whether or not the president has a disarmament “vision” is irrelevant. What is important are the policy commitments embodied in the budget request and whether Congress will endorse them.

Investments on the scale requested should be flatly unacceptable to all of us. The country and the world face truly apocalyptic security challenges from climate change and looming shortages of transportation fuels. Our economy is very weak and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The proposed increases in nuclear weapons spending, embedded as they are in an overall military budget bigger than any since the 1940s, should be a clarion call for renewed political commitment in service of the fundamental values that uphold this, or any, society.

Those values are now gravely threatened–not least by a White House uncertain about, or unwilling or unable to fight for, what is right.

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Charles Knight comments on Mello

Mello does a good job of explaining why there will be little progress toward nuclear abolition during the Obama administration. Further he makes a good case that the current administration seems to be headed towards feeding the nuclear weapons complex to a greater degree than Bush was able. Who'd of thought!

But Mello misses on a couple points. One is that he dismisses too quickly the nuclear abolition aspiration Obama stated in Prague. Those few words may have little affect on policy, but they do mark a return to the rhetoric of all atomic age administrations up until George W. Bush markedly abandoned such aspirations. What is the value of that rhetoric? Mostly it gives credence to those who organize around abolition — something of value, but not much.

Secondly, Mello states that when Obama spoke of…

…reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” it's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean.

V skutočnosti toto tvrdenie Obamu sa zmieňuje o niečo úplne špecifickú a dôležitú. Spojené štáty sa postupuje po niekoľko desaťročí k nebývalej úrovne konvenčných síl nadvlády nad všetkými ostatnými národmi (pozri Bernard I. Finel o strategickom význame americkej konvenčné vojenské sily). V tomto bode USA môžu očakávať získať ešte väčšiu strategickú výhodu, presvedčí ak ostatné národy sa pripojiť v likvidácii jadrových zbraní (pre oficiálne vyhlásenie tejto strategickej vzorce pozri viceprezident Biden v prejave na National Defense University dňa 18. februára 2010.) To je naozaj docela túžba!

Toto spojenie konvenčných dominancie na jadrové dominancie ma privádza k ďalšej nedostatok článku je Mello. Jadrová zrušenie nebude možné bez výraznej reštrukturalizácii medzinárodnej (v-) bezpečnostný systém. Prečo by Rusko alebo Čína sa vyhýbajú jadrových zbraní, alebo Severná Kórea a Irán vzdať sa úsilie o ich získanie, kým tieto krajiny naďalej úplne bezbranný voči americkej konvenčné úder?

Vedúci predstavitelia populárnej úsilí o jadrové odzbrojenie takmer nikdy uznať tento strategický problém. Je to medvediu službu na svoju stranu, pretože necháva hlavnou prekážkou odzbrojenie v mieste, bez plánu (či dokonca povedomie o potrebe plán) odstrániť.

Možnosť dohody o zrušení jadrových zbraní Spojených štátov bude vyžadovať, aby najprv vyčerpať svoje konvenčné vojenské sily. A súčasne k hlbokému čerpanie americkej konvenčné vojenské sily musia byť vybudovať medzinárodné štruktúry, ktorá môže trvať viac a viac zodpovednosti za celosvetovú bezpečnosť.

Takýto presun právomocí a zodpovednosti sa pravdepodobne stane raz, ale rozhodne nie sú v súčasnej dobe na tejto ceste. To je ešte jedna "zmena", že Obama nie je sleduje, dokonca ani aspirationally.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=2

Greg Mello responds to Charles Knight's comments

I think your comments are excellent. Let me begin with the second one, with which I wholly agree. Our work here at the [Los Alamos] Study Group has emphasized nuclear weapons issues in part because of our geographic, and hence political, locus adjacent to the two largest nuclear weapons laboratories.

The barrier to nuclear disarmament posed by military policies and investments that express an aspiration for “full spectrum dominance” on a global scale is almost certainly insuperable. Nuclear disarmament is only consistent with a quite different conception of national security than we now have and with a quite different economic structure internally as well. The good news — and I think we have to make it good where it may not appear so at first glance, since we have no other choice — is that our empire is failing.

Your first point, which relates to the symbolic value of Obama's disarmament statements, is also sound, but here I think that symbolic value is greatly outweighed by the passivity and compliance which his statements have engendered in civil society. The actors and forces which could and should be forcefully working for disarmament have been themselves disarmed by what amounts to propaganda.

Hypocrisy may be the homage paid to the ideal by the real, but it is not leadership, it is not honest, and it will not produce anything of value in this case. At the moment, it is allowing the nuclear weapons establishment to do what it could not accomplish previously: increase production capacity and provide greater, not lesser, endorsement of nuclear weapons in all their aspects, both materially and symbolically.

Obama's disarmament aspiration, so called, is a faint echo compared to the full-throated endorsement of nuclear weapons it is enabling.

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The (second) Obama disarmament paradox

Martin Senn. www.armscontrol.at , 10 February 2010.
http://www.armscontrol.at/?p=758
Martin Senn is a lecturer in International Security at the University of Innsbruck (Austria). The focus of his research is on nuclear proliferation, non- and counter-proliferation, as well as on ballistic missile defense.

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Greg Mello has an op-ed on the web-page of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in which he argues that the increase of funding for nuclear weapons in the federal budget request contradicts President Obama's stated goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Now here is my take on a second Obama disarmament paradox:

Reading through the DoD's BMD Review Report the other day, two things caught my eye:

First: In the section on co-operation with the Russian Federation, the report states that “the Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on US ballistic missile defense.” (p. 34) This sounds like there will be rough times ahead for further offensive reductions as Russian political and military elites have repeatedly linked further reductions to an agreement on missile defense (if you have the common “Russia has to disarm anyway”-argument in mind, you should drop by Pavel Podvig's blog and let yourself convince of the contrary)

Second, and even more interesting: The report also notes that the US needs to put an emphasis on the development and deployment of

… missile defenses that are both relocatable and scalable. Relocatable assets can be surged to a region in times of crisis, providing increased capability against a larger threat raid size. This feature will also allow missile defenses to be brought to bear in regions relatively swiftly. Scalable assets can be integrated into existing regional architectures. (p. 27)

In addition, the DoD intends

… to develop an 'engage on remote' technology that includes not only launching on data from a remote sensor track but also the ability to uplink data from assets other than the Aegis radar. This will allow the interceptor to engage the threat missile at greater ranges.” (p. 22)

An illustration on the same page shows a forward-based X-band radar and a space-based sensor providing information to an Aegis ship.

Alright, now here is a brief passage of Dean Wilkening's 2000 Adelphi Paper “Ballistic Missile Defense and Strategic Stability”:

Only when upper-tier interceptors are guided in flight beyond the range of their tracking and fire control radars can THAAD or NTW [Navy Theater Wide] provide substantial coverage of the US. For example, if accurate track data is obtained early in the trajectory of an intercontinental missile by sensors such as upgraded early-warning radars located outside the US or SBIRS-Low, and this track data is communicated to interceptors in flight , then the hypothetical THAAD footprint against ICBMs increases to a circle about 1,100km in diameter. This implies that 10-12 sites could cover the continental United States. Between three and four NTW footprints would be required under these circumstances. Currently, neither THAAD nor NTW is being designed to accept track data in flight except from their ground- or sea-based radars. However, if SBIRS-Low is deployed, Russian planners fearing the worst might believe that upper-tier TMD interceptors could be guided in flight using its track data, especially if the in-flight interceptor communications system is deployed as part of a future US NMD system. [emphasis added]

On balance, it is hard to imagine that Russia or China would be willing to considerably reduce their offensive arsenals, if the US retains the ability to boost the homeland defense by relocating and/or connecting TMD systems with remote sensors.

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Bill Hartung responds to the Mello-Knight exchange

William D. Hartung is Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation. He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Knight-Mello exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .

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Obama's aspirations go beyond just his statement at Prague. He is in the midst of negotiating a new nuclear arms
reduction treaty with Russia, with a possible follow-on seeking deeper cuts; he has committed himself publicly to pursuing ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a treaty banning the production of bomb-making materials
(the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty); he is hosting a nuclear security summit of scores of nations to work on plans to secure or destroy “loose nukes” and bomb-making materials; and he hosted a meeting of the UN Security Council (the first US president to do so) to reinforce disarmament pledges of numerous key players.

Some of these changes can occur without major restructuring of US conventional forces (new reductions with Russia and new nuclear security measures, for example).

Everything beyond that will require substantial changes first, as Charles suggests, not only in US conventional forces and posture but in regional politics in security dynamics in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Middle East (Israel, Iran, and host of related questions, including an Israeli-Palestinian setttlement). And current actions such as boosting spending on the nuclear weapons complex need to be reversed.

Many of these factors are rarely or not fully discussed by many — but not all — of the advocates of “getting to zero.”

So, I guess I agree with many of the points made by Charles and Greg, but I'm not ready to give up on the prospect of some significant changes in nuclear policies and postures. My sense is that we should applaud Obama's commitments and then hold him to his word, not presume that progress is impossible.

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Paul Ingram responds to Mello-Knight exchange

Paul Ingram is the executive director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) . He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .

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Everyone knows that in this tough world of realist nuclear politics it does not pay to be naïve. What is less frequently recognised is that in a world of global threat it can be equally dangerous to play an extreme game of zero trust.

So we have to go through this strange and difficult world navigating a constant and complex series of considered calculations, making judgments based upon evidence and previous experience, what we can trust and what we cannot. That goes as much for those of us trying to influence decision-makers as much as for officials making decisions over foreign policy.

So when a President gets up and makes a speech that contains within it commitments to a world free of nuclear weapons, proposing a number of initiatives, and looking forward to concrete commitments in the near term, it pays to be hopeful, but not gullible. And we have the first test of this hope in the very near future when the President comes to publish a version of his long awaited Nuclear Posture Review.

Let me say at the outset that I am not intimately familiar with the inner workings of the Obama Adminsitration's game plan, with the NPR, the START follow-on negotiations, these investments. I don't like these investments in the infrastructure [weapons complex] any more than Greg. I think they are a waste of US taxpayer's resources, and America and the world would be better off without them, with existing budgets devoted to further winding down the infrastructure, clean-up and the like.

But there remain several reasons for treating Obama's nuclear diplomacy, and these investments, seriously:

1) It is a new departure. Now, bask in that fact, but I agree with Greg, this is hardly a cause for great celebration.

2) There are no obvious electoral benefits in this for Obama beyond the concrete international results that pertain. Few Americans will vote differently on this, unless President Obama actually delivers upon this agenda and appears come the next election as a President that delivers on the international scene. In actual fact, if the agenda were a cynical one, he will more likely end up seen as a President big on promises and weak on delivery – whether he is genuine or not, this is a likely and very depressing outcome.

3) The view that is being taken by the Administration over the need for this level of extra investment may be misguided, but it does hold a certain level of internal consistency. Let's be honest, few things in politics are pure and simple, black and white. Even the JASON report, when pointing out that the warheads were in good shape, said that the infrastructure itself was under severe strain through lack of investment and the challenge of attracting talent into the profession. The belief that we need to reduce slowly and multilaterally whilst maintaining a nuclear force well into the future may be frustrating to many of us, and highlight the fact that we still live in a world where governments have not yet understood the need for more radical shifts in their postures, but it does not contradict the vision. And let's be clear here, commitment to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, whilst only the first step, is an important one nevertheless. And if you were based in France, you'd know what a big step it was.

4) Perhaps most important, the Obama Administration, and we ourselves, need to consider strategically how we can realistically bring the majority of Americans, Russians, and God knows, the Indians, Pakistanis and Israelis along with us (everyone these days focuses on the Iranians but trust me, they are easy in comparison). It is not effective simply to state positions and push through initiatives against majority opposition, even when you are the most powerful man in the world. You still have to convince Congress, the Americans people, and then colleagues abroad, in a huge complex web of inter-relationships that are not conducive to rational debate, let alone instruction. It takes gentle engagement, openness to others' perspectives, appreciation of diversity, team work and many other cooperative skills beyond policy work to build the process necessary for disarmament. And that takes building confidence. And that probably requires the sort of investment we are witnessing today.

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Jonathan Granoff responds to the Mello-Knight exchange

Jonathan Granoff is president of the Global Security Institute . He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Knight-Mello exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .
Jonathan Granoff is the author of Memo to Obama: Nuclear Weapons , which appeared in Tikkun Magazine , January-February 2009.

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Was President Obama outplayed by DOD and DOE? They have posed a very clever analysis. If progress is to be had on nonproliferation, such as support for a test ban, then modernization and the ability to strengthen the capacity to improve the arsenal seems to be the cost. Does this still allows them to say that the modernization “might require testing someday?” This will be an enormous benefit for those who want to stop the test ban. Will it not be like the Clinton administration's deal with Stockpile Stewardship where he thought funding it would generate their support for the test ban but did not gain the full out support of DOE?

I am consistently surprised by how naive politicians appear when challenged by strategic military planners. So, I state this as an example where it appears that President Obama really wants to make progress (not necessarily on disarmament, but certainly on nonproliferation) and even here he is getting cul de sacked .

Or, is he fully aware of the strategy being played out. Does Mr. Mello think he was being deceptive in the Prague speech, or just a bit cute?

Regardless, the current programs being funded that Mr. Mello highlights will certainly make achieving any strengthening of the nonproliferation aspirations of the Administration at the upcoming NPT very difficult. They certainly do not seem to be consistent with a commitment to disarmament.

I sincerely hope I am wrong and look forward to hearing from some of the people in the current Administration whom I respect very much, such as Ambassador Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Gottemoeller.

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Greg Mello responds to Jonathan Granoff

Among your other interesting points, you raise this question: “Does Mr. Mello think he [Obama] was being deceptive in the Prague speech, or just a bit cute?” I would say neither. The substitution of an aspiration for a commitment or promise is a rhetorical device so normal these questions don't arise. Both the speaker and the audience expect some sort of ritual acknowledgment of our common aspirations. The gap between those aspirations and our actual practice is fairly embarrassing; many members of the audience are looking for some sort of fantasy bridge between the two. They don't want bad news, they want “hope.”

Somehow we have gone from “I will put a chicken in every pot” to “I will seek to put a chicken in every pot.” There is less accountability in the second formulation, which may be especially helpful in a time of contracting national prospects — in which contraction, the increased nuclear military spending I am criticizing plays a central symbolic role. Our hopes are greater than the realities available to service them. We, and our donors and supporters, want Santa Claus.

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Todd Jemné reaguje na Mello, Knight výmena

Todd Jemné organizovaná a rozvíjať v globálnej Zero kampaň za odstránenie jadrových zbraní ako dôstojník u programu svetovej Security Institute . V súčasnej dobe pracuje na vytvorení Irán Data Portal na Princeton University. On odpovedal dňa 18. februára 2010 Knight-Mello výmena názorov o jadrovom odzbrojení a Obamova administratíva.

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Prezident Obama je mimoriadne veľkorysý rozpočet žiadosti o jadrovej zbrane Labs varené dlho tlejúci starosť o konkrétny politický dopad jeho často vyjadruje "vízie" pre "svet bez jadrových zbraní." Vyrovnanie s predného radu op-EDS v The Wall Street Journal, Obama zopakoval vážny snaha jednotne v celej kampani pre predsedníctvo, av jeho Nobelovej ceny za mier reč prijatie a apríla 2009 politické reči v Prahe.

S ohľadom na ambície tejto vízie v praxi, a samozrejme, dnes zrejmé, vážny záujem na jeho úspechu predchodcu Ronald Reagan, nie je divu, že dlhodobé obhajcovia očakávať politické návrhy, ktoré by jednoznačne týmto smerom. Napriek tomu tieto čísla rozpočtu signál celkovej regresiu. Budú ďalej inštitucionalizovať vývoj nových zbraní a bude reštrukturalizácia Labs na ďalšie funkcie zložitejšie.

Opomenutie zaistiť obhajcovia začala v rétorike je root. Cez Vitajte dôveryhodnosť dali protijadrove príčiny, op-ed autori - George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn a William Perry - mal záťaž zvážiť, ako iné krajiny vnímať veľkosť a činnosť našich zbraní laboratórií. V rovnakom čase v roku 2007 Američan anti-nukleárne lobistu a aktivisti sa horúčkovito snaží zablokovať finančné prostriedky pre spoľahlivú náhradné hlavice (RRW) v Kongrese, Kissinger odovzdané analýzy Shultz a Hoover kolega Sidney Drell sa senátor Pete Domenici podporu investícií do program. A aj keď Nunn deklaroval, že on bol proti RRW, on naznačil jeho prijatie pre veľké zvýšenie finančných prostriedkov v laboratóriu štvorica tretej op-ed v The Wall Street Journal 19. januára 2010. Na rozdiel od predchádzajúcej operácie, EDS, ktorý bol nadšene schválený ostatnými a prijatý s veľkou slávou v tlači, tentoraz sa zdalo klinicky navrhnutý tak, aby ich povesti požehnanie nasledujúci rozpočtový čísla.

Hlavný jadrový vyjednávač za prezidenta Reagana, Max Kampelman, ktorý vyhlasoval, že on pôvodne vyzvaní George Shultz sa vrátiť k otázke vylúčenia, obhajoval odvážne cesty na nulu pomocou multilaterálnych procesov v Organizácii spojených národov. V skutočnosti, navrhovať rozdelenie medzi zahraničnej politiky elity, bol Global Zero kampaň zahájená celá škála účastníkov z Shultz-viedol rokovania Hoover inštitúcie, ktorí boli nespokojní s extrémnym dôrazom na krátkodobé "kroky", namiesto explicitného praktickým konečnému cieľu. A po to, že politický program Global Zero sám odhalil rozkol medzi zástancami okamžitého multilateralization o kontrole strategických zbraní procesu a ďalší, ktorí navrhujú, že desaťročia trvajúca séria americko-ruskej dohody o expanziu na multilaterálnej proces.

Tieto rôzne rozdelenie medzi elitu môžu vyniknúť v máji konferencie k hodnoteniu NPT ako iné národy testu Spojených štátov znovu nájdený viazaná Zmluvou o stanovený cieľ odzbrojenia. Vzhľadom na súčasnú krízu týkajúce sa Iránu a Severnej Kórey a skrátenie okna dynamiky Obamu na svetovej scéne, ak prezident nie je schopný inšpirovať ostatných, aby prijali svoje "vízie" a pracovať na elimináciu konkrétne, môže si ujsť jedinečnú príležitosť. Ak sa všeobecnom zákaze jadrových skúšok, čo je symbolické aj cez svoje obmedzenia, nie je ratifikovaná Konferencia Dátum, môžu byť tieto rozpočtové požiadavky sám ničí americkej dôveryhodnosti. A ako Greg Mello je logika napovedá, iné národy sú nepravdepodobné byť ohromení rozsahom START náväznú zmluvu, a tam sú ešte nejaké náznaky, že postoji jazyk na "rolu" jadrových zbraní, bude to významné v Podmienky praktické dôsledky.

V snahe oslabiť tieto obavy a úprimne sa znovu k videniu, existuje viacero návrhov politík Obamova administratíva by mohla advokátka ísť do hodnotiacej konferencie:

1. Financovaný medzinárodný program, ktorý by zaviedol spoločný výskum na overovanie technológií a presadzovania stratégie, ktoré by bolo nutné vo svete "globálnej nula".

2. Začatie medzinárodnej audit všetkých existujúcich jadrových zbraní a materiálu.

3. Sponzorstvo úvodnej diskusii o harmonogram rokovaní a ciele zapojené do eventuálne elimináciu jadrových zbraní.

Avšak, ako Charles Knight uvedené so zreteľom na medzinárodné znepokojenie týkajúce sa Spojených štátov prevahu v konvenčných zbraniach, by sa tieto akcie len začiatok. S ohľadom na celkový rozpočet desivý projekcie a hrozné zlyhanie našich vojenských zmlúv a verejného obstarávania, v Spojených štátoch potrebuje preformulovať celej oblasti obrany a rozpočtu. V snahe presvedčiť štáty ako Rusko a Čína, aby prístup nízky počet jadrových zbraní, to by mohlo byť dokonca nutné zvážiť mnohostranných zmlúv obmedzenia konvenčných síl všeobecné a osobitné pokročilých zbraňových systémov, ako je globálna riadok Strike. Ak je odstránenie ašpirácie je úprimný, potom tieto obavy sú nevyhnutné a mali by byť vážne študovať a premýšľal.

Max Kampelman, the symbolic initiator of the present return to abolitionism, has spoken powerfully of what real leadership by an American president, especially when morally confident and unabashed, can accomplish. President Obama's rhetoric on the elimination of nuclear weapons apparently inspired some enough to award him the Nobel Peace Prize; if he is sincere, he owes it to the younger generation to present a clear path to elimination, if not in his lifetime, then in ours.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=9

The Obama disarmament paradox: A rebuttal

John Isaacs and Robert G. Gard, Jr. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 24 February 2010.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox-rebuttal

John Isaacs : The executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Isaacs represents the center's sister organization, Council for a Livable World, on Capitol Hill. His expertise is in how Congress works, especially when it pertains to national security issues such as nuclear weapons and missile defense. Previously, he served as a legislative assistant on foreign affairs to former New York Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz.

Robert G. Gard Jr. : A consultant on international security and education, Gard is the chair of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation's Board of Directors. He also is a member of the Bulletin's Science and Security Board. Previously, he served as president of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and as director of the Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. During a military career that spanned three decades, he was an assistant to the secretary of defense and president of the National Defense University.

________________

Greg Mello's recent Bulletin article “ The Obama Disarmament Paradox ” distorts the Obama administration's nuclear agenda by making unjustified assumptions that discredit President Barack Obama's historic commitment to seek a nuclear-weapon-free world. Obama has committed to such a goal several times–both before and after his election in November 2008. But Mello calls that a “vague aspiration” rather than a commitment. Yet the evidence he provides to support his assertion isn't persuasive.

In fact, the president has advocated for numerous initiatives in a comprehensive nonproliferation program. These include winning UN Security Council endorsement for a nuclear-weapon-free world; negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia, which Obama considers an interim agreement toward further reductions; preparing a Nuclear Posture Review consistent with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy; pledging to secure all loose nuclear materials over a four-year period; and taking an active role at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

As President Obama stated during his seminal Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is a long-term goal that might not be achievable in his lifetime, but that doesn't minimize the necessity of taking interim steps to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.

Mello sees Obama's requested increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget for stockpile stewardship and the construction of new facilities at the nuclear laboratories as a commitment to the production of new nuclear weapons. Yet the administration has made clear that there are no such plans underfoot; the 2011 budget request states unequivocally that “new weapons systems will not be built.” As such, the president's requested increase in nuclear expenditures should be viewed in the context of seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further nuclear weapon reductions.

More largely, there is nothing inconsistent between a vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world and ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent in the interim, including refurbishment of aging systems, providing the labs with facilities to replace their deteriorating physical plants, and maintaining the essential expertise that the scientists at the labs provide. Nor does such a deterrent require “unending innovation,” as Mello claims. Our current nuclear weapons inventory, validated by extensive testing, is more than adequate to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, our troops abroad, and our allies, provided sufficient resources are dedicated to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Mello also seems to forget that the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world is both national and international law; the NPT, which the United States has ratified, includes a commitment to seek nuclear disarmament. Not to mention that the treaty has an important practical component: Its non-nuclear weapon states have conditioned treaty cooperation on the NPT's nuclear weapon states fulfilling their obligations under Article VI to move toward full nuclear disarmament.

Thus, the “vision” of a nuclear-weapon-free world is essential as context for “the various nonproliferation initiatives” in Obama's plan to reduce dangerous threats to our national security–eg, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

President John F. Kennedy's June 1963 nuclear test ban speech at American University is famous not only for its rhetoric but also for its follow-through: Kennedy's words led to the end of aboveground nuclear testing. While it is legitimate to be skeptical about how successful Obama will be in implementing his disarmament agenda, let's hope Mello and others will wait to see how the follow-through progresses before they judge him too harshly. Anything else would be unfair.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=10

Greg Mello responds to John Isaacs and Robert Gard:

A “commitment” to a goal that a speaker says he may not achieve in his lifetime (let alone in his administration, the only germane period) is by definition an aspiration at best. If that “commitment” isn't concrete and specific it is vague. Such were Obama's very few words in Prague (and since) pertaining to disarmament. There have been no significant actions.
I am interested in action — ours and the government's — not “hope.”

In your reply, you simply reiterate the Administration's themes on these points.

If you look over what you wrote, you will see that you freely conflate disarmament with nonproliferation issues and initiatives. You're not alone; many people do. I suppose that's the idea. These are quite different things, obviously. Preventing others from acquiring a nuclear deterrent has precious little to do with getting rid of my own. I nowhere argue against sound, just, and legal measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.

I think you err significantly when you say “the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world is both national and international law.” It is the achievement, not the pursuit, of this goal that is a binding legal requirement, unanimously confirmed by the International Court of Justice. Attempting to substitute an alleged aspiration (and that ominously vague), for achievement is a big step down from logic and law, a grave political disservice. This is all the more true when this alleged aspiration comes from the very temporary leader of the world's largest and most aggressive military power, and is then followed by a very large increase in nuclear weapons spending.

I never said that a nuclear deterrent required “unending innovation.” I suspect we agree that the reverse is true. What I said was quite different: that the “deterrence of any adversary” to which Obama referred was unachievable, and therefore its pursuit implied unending innovation. I think investment itself, together with an ideology of technical “progress” – often expressed through fads like the quest for greater device “surety” – creates the hope that a “credible” nuclear deterrent, a deterrent that is relevant to “any” adversary as well as one that is “safe” and “secure,” can someday finally be achieved. Nuclear weapons will never be safe, secure, and they will never deter “any” adversary.

There's many reasons why our leaders engage in this kind of crazy talk, and none of them are pretty.

Disarmament aside, the warhead complex, especially at the physics labs, is riddled with waste and unnecessary programs and missions, which help drive down morale and scientific quality. I and many others believe the complex is grossly over-funded (by at least 40%) for the mission of maintaining the present arsenal indefinitely. Much smaller arsenals, right on down to zero, would be quite desirable from every perspective, and cheaper. The US arsenal can be unilaterally reduced to much lower levels without any loss of US “security.”

If Obama wants to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security, and expects anybody to believe him, he must actually do so. Instead, building thousands of significantly upgraded bombs (a process already underway) with new requests to develop and produce more kinds of upgraded bombs, and the factories to make them, isn't disarmament at all. It's the modernization of everything for the long run – warheads, delivery systems, factories, everything.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=11

Robert Gard and John Isaacs continue the exchange:

It's gratifying to learn that Greg Mello agrees with us on the desirability of both sound measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and a “much smaller” US nuclear arsenal. For our part, we agree with him that the increase in funds programmed for the nuclear laboratories is excessive, although we don't see any inconsistency between ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile and reducing its size.

We may have a basic disagreement regarding deterrence. It's not clear whether Mello's quote of deterring “any adversary” includes non-state actors or only nation states. If he is referring to nation states only, we believe even extended deterrence can be accomplished without “unending innovation” and with a smaller stockpile. If his definition includes non-state actors bent on terrorism, no amount of innovation or real investment can deter them from using a nuclear weapon should they acquire one.

We certainly concede the point that most measures designed to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation wouldn't qualify as disarmament, but they may facilitate reductions in nuclear stockpiles, which would qualify as disarmament.

Finally, let's return to the basic issue of President Obama's commitment to seeking, as a goal, a nuclear-weapon-free world. Even if it is an “aspiration,” that doesn't reduce its importance. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” And although Mello might not consider the action “significant,” Obama did chair a UN Security Council meeting with other heads of state that resulted in a resolution affirming the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Additionally, to meet our obligation under Article VI, Obama has stated his intent to follow up the new START treaty with negotiations involving all of the nuclear powers to reduce stockpiles of weapons.

Coming full circle, these actions taken are essential to obtain the cooperation of the non-nuclear weapons states in measures to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation, which both we and Mello favor.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=12

Matthew Hoey responds the the Mello-Knight exchange

Matthew Hoey is the founder of the Military Space Transparency Project (MSTP) and a former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS) where he specialized in forecasting developments in missile defense and military space technologies. He responded on 02 March 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration.
________________

President Obama's hopes to begin the long march toward a nuclear free future are not limited to just words, though I understand how some may believe this to be the case. Upon closer examination, the President is taking the critical first steps in an effort to go beyond his address at Prague. The President is in the process of negotiating a new arms control treaty with the Russians, and it is highly likely that he will be pursuing even deeper cuts in the future. He has also made efforts to expand and strengthen the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Where are the results? Why have we not seen action? When will the nuclear threat begin to wane–even if it happens ever so slightly?

This is a very informative thread, and I have enjoyed reading all of the entries. What Charles [Knight] has initiated here serves as an example of how if we draw upon all of the myriad arguments before us, we are sure to paint a more nuanced picture of the road to consensus and cooperation. The same could not be truer in regard to our domestic political and international diplomatic climates as well. Parties in all corners have legitimate disputes and concerns, and until these are all fully addressed in a courageous and aggressive new fashion it is my belief that our drive towards zero will never get in gear. Here are my thoughts on how we can get moving.

One step would be for both American and Russian defense industries to gradually be converted into commercial industries – in the current global economy this would be slow to begin but would eventually reap tremendous benefits. Such a transition would even free university students from the confines of military contractors as a leading option for employment, ensuring that this generation of young people would not be bound to the archaic practices of the military industrial complex. The ripple effects on cooperative defense would be tremendous. As it is, our overall military capabilities are already unrivaled. Such reductions in military spending and subsequent reinvestment in new technology would not in fact lessen our strategic dominance, since cooperative defense would diminish the move-countermove dynamic that has long undermined disarmament efforts. Then taking into consideration cooperative defense and the promotion of one another's security, our mutual economic potential would be enhanced further, thus strengthening our international relationship to an unprecedented level.

This would not be a cooperative security agreement limited to just sharing military and launch data; such a partnership would also extend into a shared strategic defense. In this era where the war on terror and the threat from extremism is the focal point of nations such as the US and Russia—ever posed with internally-based security threats and intrusions by radicals who would not hesitate to use a nuclear weapons in a major city—this simply makes sense.

Snaha o protiraketovej obrany na ochranu proti hrozbám prichádzajúce je tou najväčšou prekážkou pokroku - to je PIN Lynch, a pod zástavou znižovanie ohrozenia národnej bezpečnosti, že nerobí nič viac, než zvyšovať. Jedná sa o blázna prenasledovania. Spojené štáty by mali dostať sa z jeho túžby BMD v zhode so začatím spolupráce obrany rokovaní, by mohla skutočný pokrok smerom k zmierneniu hrozby raketového útoku proti USA začať. To by tiež pomôcť motivovať USA a Rusko sa nájsť spoločnú reč vo vzťahu k Iránu počas tejto doby opojné. So svetovou dve vojenské veľmoci ako zvýšenie bezpečnosti a hospodárskych partnerov, to je viac pravdepodobné, že toto vedenie príkladom by sa drží a môže urýchliť začiatok globálny trend v dlhodobom výhľade.

Výdavkov je už dlho v neobmedzenej jadrový komplex a národné laboratóriá. Jedná sa o celoročný jav, účinok neochvejné bravčového hlavne výdavky a lobingu zo strany volených predstaviteľov v súčinnosti s obranným priemyslom, aby domáce práce do svojich domovských oblastí. To nie je možné vrátiť späť bez toho, aby katastrofálne následky. Americká ekonomika je závislá na obranu dolára a musí byť odstavený z nej postupne. To by sa v podobe prechodu od vývoja deštruktívne techniky a k rozvoju prospešných technológií, napríklad alternatívne energetické riešenia a nových technológií, ktoré by zvýšili výskumu vesmíru. Príliš mnoho amerických rodín pracujúci spoliehať na rozpočet obrany a jadrovej dolára. Ak je zhoda o odzbrojení, je rozložený medzi regálmi Kongresu a Senátu, musí to byť chápané a ctil. Ak nie, budeme čeliť divízií a premrhal príležitosť, ktorá sa nemôže prezentovať znova.

Akonáhle sa takýto prechod prebieha, typ ekonomickej účinok vákua, mohli začať, kde voľný trh, kapitalizmus a inovácie poháňané nová technológia by mohla zdvihnúť americkej a ruskej ekonomiky z bahna, ktoré je hrozba jadrovej katastrofy. Tento účinok vákua, nebolo možné v minulých rokoch, a je vlastne dovolené súčasná hospodárska kríza a nutnosť nových priemyselných odvetví, ktoré by prispeli k hospodárskemu oživeniu a vytváranie pracovných miest. To nevyžaduje žiadne väčšie odvahy, koncesií alebo jasnosť sledovať svet bez jadrových zbraní prostredníctvom také možnosti, ako to, čo je potrebné k držať na zbrane, ktoré môžu a budú jedného dňa zabije milióny ľudí.

Pri umiestnení vedľa seba, výmeny a následné diskusie o navýšenie rozpočtu oproti jadrový komplex Bieleho domu aktuálne politické postoje žobrať o také riešenie. V skutočnosti, ak takéto riešenie je začať opatrne po starostlivom zvážení potreby všetkých zúčastnených strán, mohlo by to zvlnenie v celej ekonomike pomôcť vyriešiť naše najväčšie globálne výzvy. To by mohlo byť dosiahnutý, zatiaľ čo postupne ťažbu stále viac a viac amerických a ruských vedcov z jadrovej aparáty priemyslu a usmerňovanie ich enormný individuálne a kolektívne talent do viac prosperujúce smerom.

Barack Obama a Dmitrij Medvedev odvahu a jasnosť pochopiť a vyjadriť svoju ochotu diskutovať o svet bez jadrových zbraní. Pokrok bude vyžadovať neochvejné odhodlanie odvahu tvárou v tvár obranného priemyslu a jasnosť vidieť, že tisícky ruských a Američanov spolieha na tieto odvetvia a bude potrebovať pracovných miest, ktoré poskytujú prostriedky na podporu ich rodinám. Kooperatívny obrany povedie k začatiu prechodu z masívnej výdavky na obranu na produktívne investície, ktoré stoja civilné ku prospechu všetkých.

Ponúkať ústupky a ich uvádzanie spolupráci v oblasti obrany na stole pri prezeraní na vozovku v širších súvislostiach by mal dostať diskusie pohybu v smere, ktorý zmení slová do ďalších akcií. Tak dlho, kým Spojené štáty odmieta vzdať protiraketovej obrany vo východnej Európe sme sa zostať v pokoji.

Bol to Dr Randall Forsberg, ktorý mi otvoril myseľ, aby tento spôsob myslenia. Naučila ma, ako by bezpečnostnej spolupráce byť použité ako prostriedok pre mier. Jej slová, ktoré nasledujú, písaný v roku 1992, dnes prsteň s obnovenou naliehavosťou:

Koniec studenej vojny predstavuje zlom v úlohe vojenskej sily v medzinárodných záležitostiach. V tejto jedinečnej situácii v histórii, hlavných svetových vojenských zbraní a výdavkami výrobcovia jedinečnú príležitosť prejsť od konfrontácie k spolupráci. Spojené štáty, európske štáty, Japonsko a republík bývalého ZSSR teraz môžu nahradiť tradičné bezpečnostnej politiky, založenej na zastrašovanie a jednostranné intervenciu a kooperatívnej politiky založenej na minimálnej zastrašovanie, non-útok obrana, nešírenie jadrových zbraní a mnohostranného mieru.

K dispozícii sú štyri závažné dôvody, aby túto zmenu vykonať, a aby to rýchlo:

Po prvé, obrovské prostriedky sú v stávke. S kooperatívne bezpečnostnej politiky, Spojené štáty mohli znížiť ročný vojenský rozpočet ... mierovej dividendy v tomto poradí je presne to, čo potrebujeme k oživeniu ekonomiky a uspokojenie potrieb oneskorenie v oblasti bývania, zdravotníctva, školstva, životného prostredia a ekonomickej infraštruktúry.

Po druhé, kooperatívny prístup k zabezpečeniu je predpokladom pre zastavenie globálneho šírenia zbraní a zbraní priemyslu. Vyhliadky na rozšírenie sa stala tou najväčšou vojenskú hrozbu pre túto krajinu a vo svete ...

Po tretie, voľby od hlavných priemyselných krajín buď udržiavať USA dominujú medzinárodné bezpečnostný systém, alebo vyvinúť väčšiu spoluprácu, systém bude mať ďalekosiahle politické dôsledky doma iv zahraničí ... tu v Amerike, by táto zmena pomôže zvrátiť nepríjemný zmes cynizmu, násilia, rasizmu, ktorý má stále prestúpil našej spoločnosti, pretože prvý Reagan správy z zvyšovanie vojenských výdavkov za cenu štátneho dlhu a hlboké škrty v domácich programov.

V neposlednom rade, kooperatívny prístup k zabezpečeniu je pravdepodobne oveľa účinnejší ako tradičný prístup pri znižovaní výskytu a rozsah vojny. Cez tieto obrovské stávky, Kongres a administratíva, až do nedávnej doby, dokonca odmietol zvažovať zásadné škrty v ére po skončení studenej vojny obranné výdavky, a tým menej využiť jedinečnú príležitosť k rozvoju kooperatívneho systému bezpečnosti. [Randall Forsberg, "Rezy obrany a kooperatívnej bezpečnosti v období po studenej vojne", Boston Review, máj 1992]

Prezident Obama by mal rozhodnúť prijať túto pochodeň verím, že môžeme dosiahnuť ciele stanovené v Prahe v rámci nášho života.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=13

Po niekoľko príspevkov týkajúcich sa tejto debaty. Majú slúžiť ako referenčné, rozvinutím diskusie.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=14

Poznámky prezidenta Baracka Obamu, Hradčanské námestie, Praha, Česká republika

Barack Obama. Pripomienky, Hradčanské námestie, Praha, Česká republika, 05 apríla 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

Ukážka:

... Ako jediná jadrová mocnosť, ktorá atómovú zbraň použila, Spojené štáty morálnu zodpovednosť konať. Nemôžeme v tomto úsilí uspieť sami, ale môžeme ich viesť, môžeme spustiť.

Tak som dnes jasne as presvedčením Amerika sa zaväzuje usilovať o mier a bezpečie sveta bez jadrových zbraní. (Potlesk.) Ja nie som naivná. Tento cieľ sa nedosiahne rýchlo - možno to nebude za môjho života. Bude to vyžadovať trpezlivosť a vytrvalosť. Ale teraz aj my, musí ignorovať hlasy, ktoré nám hovoria, že sa svet nemôže zmeniť. Musíme trvať na tom, "Áno, môžeme."

... Spojené štáty podnikli konkrétne kroky k svetu bez jadrových zbraní. Ak chcete ukončiť studenú vojnu myslenia, znížime úlohu jadrových zbraní v našej národnej jadrovej stratégii a vyzveme ostatných, aby urobili to isté. Nemýľte sa: Kým tieto zbrane budú existovať, budú Spojené štáty udržiavať bezpečný a efektívny arzenál, aby sme odradili každého protivníka a aby sme zaručili obranu našich spojencov - vrátane Česká republika. Ale začneme pracovať na znižovaní nášho arzenálu.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=15

Nukleárne zbrane diskusie sa novej podobe

James Carroll. Boston Globe, 15. júna 2009.

Ukážka:

Praha bola pravdepodobne najvýznamnejšie prezidentský prejav v posledných desaťročiach. Opäť platí, že čo sa to hlasné volanie po novej "forma foriem myslenia" o jadrových zbraniach, prezident bol východiskový bod - potvrdenie o špeciálnych amerických viny. "Ako jediná jadrová mocnosť, ktorá atómovú zbraň použila, Spojené štáty morálnu zodpovednosť konať."

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=16

Kurzy proti jadrovému odzbrojeniu

Charles V. Peña. Antiwar.com, 29. júla 2009.
http://original.antiwar.com/pena/2009/07/28/nuclear-disarmament/

Ukážka:

... A krajina môže byť účastníkom zmluvy o nešírení jadrových, ale rozhodnúť, že dodržiavanie zmluvy už nie je v jej najlepšom záujme a ruší, čo je presne to, čo Severná Kórea sa rozhodla urobiť v januári 2003, vyhlasovať, "nebezpečná situácia, kedy naše národnej suverenity and our state's security are being seriously violated is prevailing on the Korean Peninsula due to the US vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK.” Given that North Korea had been named a member of the axis of evil a year earlier and the United States was on the verge of invading Iraq (a non-nuclear power), it's perfectly understandable that the regime in Pyongyang might believe it was in the DPRK's “supreme interests” to no longer formally agree to be a nonnuclear power, ie, a pushover for regime change.

The NPT is not a universal treaty. There are 193 countries in the world, but not all of them are signatories to the NPT. The result is the so-called “D3 problem,” or the de facto nuclear states: India, Pakistan, and Israel. These countries were never part of the NPT regime and were thus able to develop nuclear weapons, because they are under no obligation to abide by the NPT. And it's not lost on the rest of the world – particularly the Muslim world – that the United States doesn't hold Israel to the same standard as Iran. Indeed, like previous presidents, Obama refuses to even acknowledge that Israel is a nuclear power.

…the NPT does not exist in a vacuum. It's impossible to ignore US foreign policy, particularly a proclivity for military intervention supported by Democrats and Republicans alike. Since the end of the Cold War marked by the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States has engaged in nine major military operations, but only one of those – Operation Enduring Freedom – was unambiguously in response to a direct threat to the United States. This is a powerful incentive for countries such as Iran and North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons as the only reliable deterrent against US invasion. As long as the United States continues to have an interventionist foreign policy (and the Obama administration has not overseen a sea change in US foreign policy), it will be next to impossible to prevent proliferation.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=17

Together Toward Nuclear Zero: Understanding Chinese and Russian Security Concerns

Cristina Hansell and Nikita Perfilyev. The Nonproliferation Review , November 2009.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915796781&fulltext=713240928

Excerpt:

…if Chinese military experts decide that China needs the capability of a maneuvering warhead to evade missile defense interceptors, they may need to test the redesigned warheads. It is not clear that the Obama administration, however, will be willing to back down on missile defense in order to obtain Chinese agreement on a CTBT. Without a CTBT, though, further progress toward disarmament is unlikely; the nuclear weapon states' commitment to NPT Article VI will not be taken seriously by non-nuclear weapon states, and the possibility of a future arms race (instigated in large part by the fear of US missile defenses and precision weapons) is increased.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=18

A Roadmap for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

Jared Gassen and Bill Wickersham. book chapter, November 2009.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=19

Excerpt:

Here's how a global nuclear disarmament treaty could work. First, it would spell out a decades-long schedule for the verified destruction of all weapons, materials and facilities. Those possessing the largest arsenals — the United States and Russia — would make deep cuts first. Those with smaller arsenals would join at specified dates and levels. To ensure that no state gained an advantage, the treaty would incorporate “rest stops”: if a state refused to comply with a scheduled measure, other nations' reductions would be suspended until the violation was corrected. This dynamic would generate momentum, but also ensure that if the effort collapsed, the signatories would be no less secure than before.

Permalink to this post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=20

Charles Knight responds to Barry Blechman

Je tu niečo chýba v tomto meraní odzbrojenia režimu, ktorý zruší ako cesta k plnej jadrovému odzbrojeniu. Blechman je mylný predpoklad zdieľa príliš veľa advokátov jadrové odzbrojenie. Ten predpokladá, že jadrové zbrane sú triedy zbraní, ktoré môžu byť riešené oddelene od problémov medzinárodnej bezpečnosti a neistoty. Jadrové zbrane nemôžu byť oddelené strategicky z kontextu konvenčné vojenské sily, ktoré dopĺňajú.

Poznámka: nasledujúce vety vo vyššie uvedenom výpise z Blechman: "Aby sa zabezpečilo, že žiadny štát získal výhodu ..." Jeho predpis sa vzťahuje len na jadrové zbrane a predpokladá žiadne úpravy na konvenčné vojenské sily. V týchto podmienkach niektorých štátoch získajú značnú výhodu jadrového odzbrojenia.

Predstavte si, že v prípade Ruska v Blechman sa predstavil čerpanie jadrových síl so Spojenými štátmi ako Rusko sa blíži k nule jadrové zbrane, sa stávajú viac a viac zraniteľný vynikajúce americké konvenčné vojenské sily.

Bez súbežné zníženie a vyrovnanie a úpravy v konvenčných síl a silná politická uistenie, slabších národov, ako je Rusko nikdy súhlasiť, aby sa vzdal všetkých svojich jadrových zbraní.

Starostlivé schémy vyvážené jadrové odzbrojenie typu, ktorý Blechman zastáva nemôžu samy o sebe dostaneme na nulu jadrových zbraní. Kompenzácia pre národné neistoty vyplývajúce z nerovnováh v konvenčnej vojenská sila musí byť súčasťou každého vzorce pre úplné jadrové odzbrojenie. Musíme pracovať na medzinárodnej bezpečnostný systém, ktorý poskytuje istotu získal aspoň päťdesiat rokov bez medzinárodnej agresie a vojenskej intervencie. Po túto dobu zodpovedá medzinárodnému mieru, môže byť jadrová národov pripravení ísť na nulu. To je jediná cesta s reálnu šancu sa tam dostať.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=21

Vykonávanie President v Prahe Agenda: viceprezident Biden je reč na National Defense University

Poznámky viceprezidenta Bidena na National Defense University - Ako k doprave, 18. februára 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-national-defense-university

Ukážka:

Teraz, ako naše technológie zlepšuje, vyvíjame nejadrové spôsoby, ako dosiahnuť ten istý cieľ. Štvorročné obranné hodnotenie a hodnotenie protiraketovej obrany, ktorý minister Gates vydal pred dvoma týždňami predložil plán, ako ďalej posilniť našu vynikajúcu konvenčné sily brániť náš národ a naši spojenci.

Funkcie, ako je adaptívne protiraketového štítu, konvenčné hlavice s celosvetovým dosahom, a iné, ktoré vyvíjame nám umožní znížiť úlohu jadrových zbraní, rovnako ako ostatné jadrové mocnosti sa k nám pripojili v čerpaní. U týchto moderných funkcií, a to aj hlbinných úložísk jadrového zníženie, budeme aj naďalej nepochybne silný.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=22

Charles Knight pripomienky k prejavu Biden

Keď viceprezident Biden hovorí o plánoch na "ďalšie posilnenie ... vynikajúci konvenčné sily" s "schopnosti, ako je adaptívne protiraketového štítu" a "konvenčné hlavice s celosvetovým dosahom", sa snaží upokojiť svoje domáce publikum, že jadrové odzbrojenie nebude mať Ameriku menej bezpečnou .

Jeho slová však nie sú uistiť ďalšie jadrové mocnosti alebo budúce jadrové mocnosti, ako je Irán, ktorý bude vnímať toto zvýšené americké konvenčné schopnosti, strategické ohrozenie svojej národnej bezpečnosti.

Biden iste chápe, že nie je v skutočnosti nám ponúka cestu k jadrovej zrušenie. Nebudeme sa tam dostať, ak iné národy sa očakáva, že sa vzdá svojho jadrového arzenálu v tvár "nepopierateľný" konvenčnej energie z USA

Ak sa Biden v prejave skutočne predstavuje vypracovanie "Praha Agenda prezidenta" Je pred nami veľký rozdiel (koncepčne a prakticky) medzi najbližšej dobe cieľom Biden artikuluje ("Budeme sa usilovať o posilnenie jadrového nešírenia jadrových zbraní.") a dlhodobé ciele ("Snažíme sa tak zabrániť [jadrových zbraní] šírenie a nakoniec na ich odstránenie."), ktorý prezident Obama potvrdil v Prahe.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=23

Jadrových zbraní v dvadsiatom prvom storočí

Matt Eckel. Zahraniční politiky hodinky, 01. marca 2010.
http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/nuclear-weapons-in-twenty-first-century.html

Ukážka:

Aj keď americkí vodcovia snažia sa to povedať nahlas príliš často, jeden z dôvodov, iránsky jadrový program, je znepokojujúce, aby Washington je, že obmedzuje schopnosť Spojených štátov s cieľom zvrhnúť iránsky režim, do platnosti by malo tlačiť príde do tuhého. Ako globálny hegemóna, ktoré majú schopnosť mávať okolo seba a konvenčné vojenské nepriamo ohrozujú spurných strednej sily s dobytím je niečo, čo Amerika chce byť schopní robiť. Je to oveľa ťažšie, ak vzdorujúcich veľmoci v otázke môže hroziť uzavrieť niekoľko hlavných miest Spojencov. Izrael jadrový program bol pôvodne založený na túto logiku, ako bolo to vo Francúzsku.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=24

Debata: Čakanie na Obamovej politike na atomovku

Christopher A. Ford. AOL News, 05.3.2010.
http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-waiting-for-obamas-policy-on-nukes/19385644

Ukážka:

... Ale pozoruhodné, že všetky svoje jadrové lode, nikto nevie, čo Obamova politika jadrových zbraní v skutočnosti je. Zatiaľ, jeho administratíva urobila málo skutočných dovozu. Obama hľadá skromný novú zmluvu o znížení stavu zbraní s Ruskom, ale zvažuje škrty, ktoré by boli príliš šokujúce, od správy Bush - ktorá v skutočnosti vlastne začala tieto rokovania v roku 2006. Správa chce reattempt ratifikácii zákaze jadrových skúšok porazil v Senáte v roku 1999, hoci zmluvy Senátom vyhliadky stmievanie. V dôsledku toho sa v tomto bode Obamova "transformačný", kontroly zbrojenia program vyzerá prezidenta Billa Clintona z polovice 1990.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=25

Diskusia: Na pravej jadrových zbraní stopy

Marshall sa. AOL News, 05.3.2010.
http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-on-the-right-nuclear-weapons-track/19385662

Ukážka:

Obama dôvodu, že tým, že drží svoju časť dohody, môžu Spojené štáty posilniť globálne normy nešírenia jadrových zbraní a zosilniť tlak na Teherán a ďalšie režimy, ktoré môže byť uvažovanie o získanie jadrových zbraní. A ako Bieleho domu zdôraznili, že jadrová "nulové varianty", je politika, túžba, nie je niečo, čo niekto domnieva, že je dosiahnuteľný v dohľadnej dobe.

Trvalý odkaz na tento príspevok: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=26

Deadly Aktuálne Ku jadrových zbraní

James Carroll. Boston Globe, 15. marca 2010. Hostiteľom CommonDreams internetových stránkach.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/03/15-5

Myslite na Niagara Falls. Myslite na onrushing prúd rieky tečie sama k masívnej kaskády. Predstavte si, osamelý plavec asi sto metrov proti prúdu, zúfalo hladiť proti prúdu, aby neboli prehnala nad priepasťou. Že plavec je prezident Obama, rieka je na svete, a padá, je hrozba nekontrolované jadrové zbrane.

Henry James používal obraz Niagara popísať ponáhľať do prvej svetovej vojny: ". . . Prúdu, ktorý niesol sme spolu. "Hannah Arendtová definovaný vojen 20. storočia ako akcie" kaskádové ako Niagarské vodopády histórie. "Jonathan Schell Niagara používa ako metaforu pre organizovanie svoje nenahraditeľné kritika vojny," neporaziteľnú svet. "

Ale teraz image vstúpila do slovníka strategických expertov, ktorí varujú pred príchodom "šíriaci zbrojení," jeden národ s iným do smrteľnej priepasti jadrových zbraní, ak súčasné jadrovými mocnosťami nájsť spôsob, ako zvrátiť súčasný. Najviac sa na Rusko a Spojené štáty, ktoré ako celok vykazujú drvivá väčšina svetových jadrových zbraní, ale prezident Obama zámerne robil seba ústredné problém, keď povedal v Prahe, "ja som jasne as presvedčením Amerika sa zaväzuje usilovať mier a bezpečie sveta bez jadrových zbraní. "

Teraz je aktuálna Niagara je s ním na druhú stranu. Tu sú orientačné body, ktoré definujú plavcov hybnosť.

■ americko-ruskej zmluvy. Vyjednávači sa v Ženeve koncom dosiahnutie dohody o jadrových zbraniach zmluvy nahradiť START, ktorej platnosť vypršala v decembri minulého roka. Obama je Threading ihly, ktoré majú spĺňať požiadavky ruských (napríklad o protiraketovej obrane) s predvídaním Republican námietky Senátu USA (napríklad o protiraketovej obrane). Upozornenie: Bill Clinton bol ponížený, keď Senát zamietol všeobecnom zákaze jadrových skúšok v roku 1999. Republikáni "tvrdohlavosť na zdravotnú starostlivosť, je v porovnaní s arašidy poškodenia ich odmietnutia novej zmluvy START by to.

■ Správa o jadrovom postoji, kongres, poverila správu o tom, ako správe definuje jadrovej súčasné potreby. Aj to je po lehote splatnosti, pravdepodobne preto, že Biely dom tlačí chrbtom na Pentagon v celej rade otázok. Sú nukleárne zbrane pre odstrašenie len? Budú Spojené štáty vzdávajú prvom použití? Preruší Bush éry program vybudovať novú jadrovú zbraň, bude Obama umožní ďalší výskum a vývoj? Aké národy budú pomenované ako potenciálny jadrovej hrozby? Upozornenie: v roku 1994 jadrovom postoji bol Clintonov Pentagon Waterloo. To potvrdil status quo studenej vojny, zabíjanie vážne zníženie zbraní až do súčasnosti.

■ Aj keď zvyčajne považované za seba, širší amerického obranného postoja sa stala hlavnou motiváciou pre ostatné národy ísť jadrovej. Súčasný rozpočet Pentagonu ($ 5 bilióna 2010-2017) je tak ďaleko za akékoľvek iné krajiny, a konvenčné vojenské schopnosti, že kupuje, je tak dominantný, ako posilniť možnosť využívania jadrovej energie v zahraničí ako jedinú ochranu proti prípadnému útoku USA. To je nové.

■ V apríli sa svetoví lídri jadrových summit sa bude konať vo Washingtone, ale aj jadrová majetnými a nemajetným sa bude užívať pozície na základe zmluvy medzi USA a Ruskom (a jeho vyhliadky na ratifikáciu) a Správa o jadrovom postoji. Upozornenie: V prípade Číny vidí americkej protiraketovej obrany, prípadne s cieľom jeho cesty, nové preteky v jadrovom zbrojení, je na.

■ V máji sa signatári Nuclear Non-zmluva rozšírenie konajú pravidelné revízie ôsmej zasadnutí v New Yorku. Vzhľadom k tomu, národy, ktoré súhlasili sa zriekol jadrových zbraní sa tak za predpokladu, že jadrová národov prácu neustále na odstránenie, bude kľúčovou otázkou bude, či Obama skutočne začal dodávať na jeho úmysel. Ak nie, pripravte sa na kaskáde.

Po pravde povedané, prúd ženie k Niagara nemožno odolať. Nie sedem jadrových národov, teda, ale 17, a nakoniec 70 rokov. Ale pozor analýzy ako je táto. Pády sú analógie, nie fakt. Obama varoval tohto fatalizmu, volať to v Prahe, "vražedný nepriateľ, pretože ak veríme, že šírenie jadrových zbraní je nevyhnutné, potom sa nejakým spôsobom sme sa k sebe pripustil, že použitie jadrových zbraní je nevyhnutné." Preto, odmietnuť obdobne. Obama nie je osamelý plavec, ale hlas celého ľudstva. Jadrová budúcnosť nie je vopred stanovená. Ľudské možnosti sú vyrobené práve teraz definovať to znova.