O paradoxo Obama desarmamento

Greg Mello. Boletim dos Cientistas Atômicos, 10 de Fevereiro de 2010.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox Greg Mello é o diretor-executivo e co-fundador do Grupo de Estudos Los Alamos .
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Em abril passado em Praga, o presidente Barack Obama fez um discurso que muitos têm interpretado como um compromisso com o desarmamento nuclear significativo.

Agora, no entanto, a Casa Branca está solicitando um dos maiores aumentos na história gastos ogiva. Se o seu pedido é totalmente financiado, os gastos com ogiva subiria 10 por cento em um único ano, com novos aumentos prometidos para o futuro. Los Alamos National Laboratory, o maior alvo da generosidade Obama, veria um aumento do orçamento 22 por cento, maior nível desde 1944. Em particular, o financiamento para um novo complexo "pit" fábrica de plutônio não teria mais que o dobro, sinalizando o compromisso de produzir novas armas nucleares de uma década, portanto.

Então, como é o orçamento do presidente compatível com a sua visão do desarmamento?

A resposta é simples: Não há evidências de que Obama tem, nem nunca teve, qualquer visão. Ele não disse nada nesse sentido, em Praga. Lá, ele apenas falou do seu compromisso "de buscar. . . um mundo sem armas nucleares ", uma vaga aspiração e dificilmente um romance em que o nível de abstração. Ele disse que, entretanto, os Estados Unidos "vai manter um arsenal seguro, seguro e eficaz para dissuadir qualquer adversário, e garantir que a defesa de nossos aliados."

Uma vez que as armas nucleares não fazer, e não vai nunca ", dissuadir qualquer adversário", este também era altamente aspiracional, se não fútil. A busca vã de um arsenal "efetivo" que pode impedir "qualquer" adversário requer inovação incessante e contínuo investimento real, incluindo o investimento na dissuasão estendida para que Obama se referiu. A promessa de tais investimentos, e não o desarmamento, foi a mensagem operatório em Praga, tanto quanto o estoque dos EUA estava preocupado. Na verdade, propostas de novos investimentos na dissuasão ampliada já estavam sendo embalados para o Congresso quando Obama falou.

Para cumprir sua suposta "visão de desarmamento", Obama ofereceu apenas duas abordagens, em Praga, tanto por tempo indeterminado. Primeiro, falou vagamente de reduzir "o papel das armas nucleares em nossa estratégia de segurança nacional." É muito claro o que pode realmente dizer, ou mesmo o que poderia significar. Muito provavelmente se refere ao discurso oficial, o que dizem as autoridades sobre a doutrina nuclear, em oposição aos fatos reais sobre o terreno. Em segundo lugar, Obama prometeu negociar "um novo Tratado Estratégico de Redução de Armas [START] com os russos." Tanto quanto o desarmamento nuclear foi no discurso, era isso.

Claro, Obama também disse que sua administração seria prontamente prosseguir a ratificação do Tratado Abrangente de Proibição de Testes, uma ação ainda não tomadas e um completamente sem relação com EUA desarmamento. O resto do discurso foi dedicada à não-proliferação de iniciativas várias que seu governo planejava buscar.

Em 8 de julho, Obama eo presidente russo, Dmitry Medvedev anunciou seu entendimento comum, comprometendo seus respectivos países para algo entre 500 a 1.100 veículos de entrega estratégicos e de 1.500 a 1.675 ogivas estratégicas, metas muito modestas a serem alcançados um total de sete anos após o tratado entrou em vigor. Total de números arsenal não iria mudar, portanto ogivas estratégicas podem ser tomadas a partir de implantação e colocados numa reserva-de-alertado, em vigor. O tratado não afetaria ogivas não-estratégicos. Não exigiria desmantelamento. Como Hans Kristensen, da Federação dos Cientistas Americanos explicou, os limites de entrega de veículos requerem pouca, ou nenhuma, mudar de EUA e Rússia implantações esperados.

Ironicamente, é possível que o PDF aposentadoria de 4.000 ou mais ogivas norte-americanas sob o Tratado de Moscou e outras reformas ordenadas por George W. Bush pode ser superior a qualquer coisa Obama faz em termos de desarmamento. Quanto ao complexo de estoques e armas, as aspirações de Bush foram muito mais hawkish do que o Congresso acabou por aceitar. Orçamentos reais para ogivas caiu durante os últimos três anos no cargo. Agora, com os democratas que controlam o poder executivo e duas casas do Congresso, a contenção do Congresso é notável por sua ausência. O que Obama parece ser principalmente "desarmamento" é a resistência do Congresso a variações de algumas das mesmas propostas de Bush tinham dificuldade para autorizar e financiar.

Última Maio Obama enviou seu primeiro orçamento ao Congresso, pedindo gastos ogiva plana. Nessa altura, a administração foi ainda exibir uma abordagem medido para substituição e expansão das capacidades ogiva.

Dito isto, no orçamento do ano passado a Casa Branca fez aquiescer a uma demanda do Pentágono para solicitar o financiamento para uma grande atualização a quatro B61 bomba nuclear variantes, um dos quais tinha acabado de completar um 20-year-plus extensão da vida. Apenas um dia antes que o orçamento foi lançada uma revisão grande estratégia nuclear previamente solicitado pelas comissões armados serviços foi revelado. Foi presidido por William Perry, um membro do conselho de administração da empresa que gerencia Los Alamos, e recorrente da Guerra Fria fixação James Schlesinger. [A divulgação completa: Perry também é membro do Conselho de Administração do Boletim de patrocinadores.]

As recomendações do relatório para maiores gastos e desenvolvimento de armas rapidamente começou a servir como um ponto de encontro para a defesa falcões-certamente o ponto do exercício. No geral, foi em grande parte um pastiche conclusory de reciclados noções da Guerra Fria, totalmente desprovido de análise e muitas vezes factualmente errado. Mas nem a Casa Branca nem líderes democratas do Congresso ofereceu qualquer resistência ou contestação pública às suas conclusões.

Mais amplamente, a oposição à contenção nuclear no âmbito da administração rapidamente emergiu de seus redutos habituais no National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), o Pentágono, STRATCOM, e os jogadores interessados ​​de ambos os partidos no Congresso. Além disso, Obama deixou nomeações chave de Bush no lugar em NNSA, enquanto o Pentágono acrescentou algumas caras conhecidas da administração Clinton, deixando sérias dúvidas sobre a capacidade da Casa Branca para desenvolver uma compreensão independente dos problemas, muito menos um presente ao Congresso.

De qualquer forma, de ratificação do Tratado potencial é certamente um fator importante no pensamento da Casa Branca. Republicanos do Senado, como esperado, estão exigindo investimentos significativos nucleares antes da ratificação, considerando de qualquer INÍCIO seguimento tratado. Falcões democratas, especialmente os poderosos com carne de porco-tambor interesses em jogo, tais como Novo México senador Jeff Bingaman, também devem ser satisfeitas no processo de ratificação. Todos em tudo isto faz com que o último orçamento de Obama pedir uma espécie de "rendição preventiva" para falcões nucleares. Então, se o presidente tem um desarmamento "visão" é irrelevante. O que é importante são os compromissos políticos consagrados na solicitação de orçamento e se o Congresso aprová-los.

Investimentos na escala solicitado deve ser categoricamente inaceitável para todos nós. O país eo mundo enfrentam desafios de segurança verdadeiramente apocalípticas da mudança climática e escassez ameaçadora de combustíveis de transporte. Nossa economia está muito fraca e permanecerá assim no futuro previsível. Os aumentos propostos no gasto de armas nucleares, incorporado como eles estão em um orçamento militar global maior do que qualquer outra desde a década de 1940, deve ser uma convocação para um compromisso político renovado em serviço dos valores fundamentais que sustentam esta, ou qualquer, a sociedade.

Esses valores estão agora seriamente ameaçado, pelo menos não por uma Casa Branca incerto sobre, ou relutantes ou incapazes de lutar, o que é certo.

Link permanente para este post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=1

Charles Knight comentários sobre Mello

Mello faz um bom trabalho de explicar porque haverá pouco progresso em direção à abolição nuclear durante a administração Obama. Além disso, ele faz um bom caso que o atual governo parece estar caminhando para alimentar as armas nucleares complexo em maior grau do que Bush era capaz. Quem teria o pensamento!

Mas Mello perde em alguns pontos. Uma delas é que ele descarta muito rapidamente a aspiração abolição nuclear Obama declarou em Praga. Estas poucas palavras podem ter pouco efeito sobre a política, mas eles marcam um retorno à retórica de todas as administrações era atômica até George W. Bush marcadamente abandonado tais aspirações. Qual é o valor do que a retórica? Principalmente, dá credibilidade para aqueles que organizam em torno de abolição - algo de valor, mas não muito.

Em segundo lugar, Mello afirma que, quando Obama falou de ...

Reduzindo ... "o papel das armas nucleares na nossa estratégia de segurança nacional" está longe de ser claro que isso pode realmente dizer, ou mesmo o que poderia significar.

Na verdade, esta declaração de Obama se refere a algo muito específico e importante. Os EUA vem avançando por várias décadas a um nível sem precedentes de dominação força convencional sobre todas as outras nações (ver Bernard I. Finel sobre o significado estratégico do poder militar dos EUA convencional). Neste ponto os EUA podem antecipar a ganhar vantagem ainda mais estratégico se pode convencer outros países a juntar-se ao dispor de armamento nuclear (para uma declaração oficial desta fórmula estratégica ver discurso o vice-presidente Biden na National Defense University em 18 de fevereiro de 2010.) Este é de facto muito uma aspiração!

Esta conexão de domínio convencional ao domínio nuclear traz-me à outra lacuna do artigo Mello. Abolição das armas nucleares será impossível sem uma reestruturação significativa da comunidade internacional (em) sistema de segurança. Por que a Rússia ou a China armas nucleares ou Evite a Coréia do Norte eo Irã abandonar os esforços para obtê-los, enquanto essas nações permanecem totalmente vulnerável a ataque convencional EUA?

Líderes populares de esforços para o desarmamento nuclear quase nunca reconhecer este problema estratégico. Isso é um desserviço à sua causa, porque deixa um grande obstáculo para o desarmamento no lugar com nenhum plano (ou até mesmo a consciência da necessidade de um plano) para removê-lo.

A eventualidade de um acordo para abolir as armas nucleares vai exigir que os EUA primeiro sacar o seu poder militar convencional. E concomitante a um empate lá no fundo do poder dos EUA militar convencional, deve haver uma acumulação de estruturas internacionais que podem ocupar mais e mais a responsabilidade pela segurança global.

Essa transferência de poder e responsabilidade, provavelmente, acontecer algum dia, mas certamente não são atualmente nesse caminho. Essa é mais uma "mudança" que Obama não está perseguindo, nem mesmo aspirationally.

Link permanente para este post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=2

Greg Mello responde aos comentários de Charles Knight

Eu acho que seus comentários são excelentes. Deixe-me começar com o segundo, com a qual eu concordo totalmente. Nosso trabalho aqui no [Los Alamos] Grupo de Estudo tem enfatizado as questões de armas nucleares em parte por causa da nossa geográfica, e portanto político, locus adjacente às duas maiores laboratórios de armas nucleares.

A barreira para o desarmamento nuclear representada pelas políticas militares e investimentos que expressam uma aspiração de "dominância de pleno espectro" em escala global é quase certamente insuperável. O desarmamento nuclear só é consistente com uma concepção bastante diferente de segurança nacional do que temos agora e com uma estrutura bastante diferente económico internamente também. A boa notícia - e eu acho que temos que torná-lo bom, onde ele pode não aparecer tão à primeira vista, já que não temos outra escolha - é que o nosso império está falhando.

O seu primeiro ponto, que diz respeito ao valor simbólico de declarações de Obama sobre o desarmamento, é também o som, mas acho que o valor simbólico é largamente compensados ​​pela passividade e complacência que suas declarações geraram na sociedade civil. Os atores e forças que podem e devem ser vigorosamente trabalhando para o desarmamento ter sido desarmado por si o que equivale a propaganda.

A hipocrisia pode ser a homenagem ao ideal pelo real, mas não é liderança, não é honesto, e não vai produzir qualquer coisa de valor neste caso. No momento, ele está permitindo a criação de armas nucleares a fazer o que não poderia realizar previamente: aumentar a capacidade de produção e fornecer apoio maior, não menor, das armas nucleares em todos os seus aspectos, tanto material como simbolicamente.

Aspiração de Obama desarmamento, assim chamado, é um eco fraco em comparação com o total apoio-throated de armas nucleares é de habilitação.

Link permanente para este post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=3

O (segundo) Obama desarmamento paradoxo

Martin Senn. Www.armscontrol.at, 10 de Fevereiro de 2010.
http://www.armscontrol.at/?p=758
Martin Senn é um professor de Segurança Internacional da Universidade de Innsbruck (Áustria). O foco da sua pesquisa é sobre a proliferação nuclear, não-e proliferação de contra-, bem como na defesa de mísseis balísticos.

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Greg Mello tem um op-ed na página web do Boletim dos Cientistas Atômicos no qual ele argumenta que o aumento do financiamento para armas nucleares na solicitação de orçamento federal contradiz objetivo declarado do presidente Obama de um mundo sem armas nucleares. Agora aqui é a minha opinião sobre um segundo Obama desarmamento paradoxo:

Leitura através do relatório do DoD comentário BMD no outro dia, duas coisas me chamou a atenção:

Primeiro: Na seção sobre a cooperação com a Federação Russa, o relatório afirma que ". A Administração vai continuar a rejeitar quaisquer restrições negociadas na defesa dos EUA de mísseis balísticos" (p. 34) Isso soa como haverá tempos difíceis à frente para novas reduções ofensivas como russos elites políticas e militares têm repetidamente ligado novas reduções a um acordo sobre defesa de mísseis (se você tiver o comum "a Rússia tem para desarmar qualquer maneira"-argumento em mente, você deve cair pelo blog Pavel Podvig e deixe-se convencer de Pelo contrário)

Em segundo lugar, e ainda mais interessante: O relatório também observa que os EUA precisam para pôr ênfase no desenvolvimento e implantação de

... Defesas antimísseis que são relocável e escalável. Ativos podem ser relocáveis ​​subiu para uma região em tempos de crise, proporcionando maior capacidade contra um tamanho maior ameaça raid. Este recurso permitirá também que as defesas de mísseis a ser exercida em regiões relativamente rapidamente. Ativos escaláveis ​​podem ser integrados em arquiteturas existentes regionais. (P. 27)

Além disso, o Departamento de Defesa pretende

... Para desenvolver uma "envolver no controle remoto" de tecnologia que inclui não só o lançamento em dados de uma faixa do sensor remoto, mas também a capacidade de uplink de dados de outros activos que o radar Aegis. Isso permitirá que o interceptador de mísseis para engajar a ameaça em escalas maiores. "(P. 22)

Uma ilustração na mesma página mostra uma frente baseado em radar de banda X e um sensor baseado no espaço fornecendo informações para um navio Aegis.

Ok, agora aqui é uma breve passagem do Livro Dean Wilkening do Adelphi 2000 "Defesa de Mísseis Balísticos ea estabilidade estratégica":

Somente quando superior-tier interceptores são guiados em vôo fora do alcance do seu controle e os radares de controle de fogo podem THAAD ou NTW [Marinha Theater Wide] fornecer uma cobertura substancial de os EUA. Por exemplo, se os dados precisos da trilha é obtido no início da trajetória de um míssil intercontinental através de sensores, tais como atualizados alerta precoce radares localizados fora os EUA ou SBIRS-Baixo, e esta faixa de dados é comunicada aos interceptadores em vôo, em seguida, o THAAD hipotético pegada contra mísseis balísticos intercontinentais aumenta a um círculo de cerca de 1,100 km de diâmetro. Isto implica que 10-12 sites poderiam cobrir os Estados Unidos continentais. Entre três e quatro pegadas NTW seria necessário nestas circunstâncias. Atualmente, nem THAAD nem NTW está sendo projetado para aceitar dados de pista em vôo, exceto de seus radares de terra ou mar-based. No entanto, se SBIRS-Low for implantado, os planejadores da Rússia temendo o pior pode acreditar que superior-tier DTM interceptadores podem ser guiados em vôo usando seus dados de pista, especialmente se o interceptor de vôo sistema de comunicações é implementado como parte de um futuro EUA NMD sistema. [Grifo nosso]

Em suma, é difícil imaginar que a Rússia ou a China estaria disposta a reduzir consideravelmente seus arsenais ofensivos, se os EUA mantém a capacidade de aumentar a defesa da pátria com a deslocalização e / ou conexão de sistemas de DTM com sensores remotos.

Link permanente para este post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=4

Bill Hartung responde à troca de Mello-Knight

William D. Hartung é director das Armas e da Iniciativa de Segurança na New America Foundation. Ele respondeu em 15 de fevereiro de 2010 para a troca de Knight-Mello de pontos de vista sobre o desarmamento nuclear ea administração Obama .

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Aspirações de Obama vão além da sua declaração em Praga. Ele está no meio da negociação de novas armas nucleares a
tratado de redução com a Rússia, com um possível acompanhamento na procura de cortes mais profundos, ele se comprometeu publicamente a prosseguir a ratificação do Tratado Abrangente de Proibição de Testes e um tratado que proíba a produção de materiais para fabricação de bomba
(Tratado de Corte materiais cindíveis), ele está hospedando uma cúpula sobre segurança nuclear de dezenas de nações para trabalhar em planos para garantir ou destruir "armas nucleares" soltas e bomba tomada de materiais, e ele organizou uma reunião do Conselho de Segurança da ONU (o primeiro presidente dos EUA a fazê-lo) para reforçar as promessas de desarmamento de vários jogadores-chave.

Algumas dessas mudanças podem ocorrer sem uma grande reestruturação das forças americanas convencionais (novas reduções com a Rússia e novas medidas de segurança nuclear, por exemplo).

Tudo além disso vai exigir mudanças substanciais em primeiro lugar, como Charles sugere, não só nas forças norte-americanas convencionais e postura, mas na política regional em matéria de segurança dinâmica no Sul da Ásia (Índia e Paquistão) e Oriente Médio (Israel, Irã e série de questões relacionadas , incluindo uma setttlement israelense-palestino). E as ações atuais, como aumentar os gastos com as armas nucleares complexos precisa ser revertida.

Muitos desses fatores são raramente ou não totalmente discutida por muitos - mas não todos - ". Chegando a zero" dos defensores dos

Então, eu acho que eu concordo com muitas das observações feitas por Charles e Greg, mas eu não estou pronto para desistir da perspectiva de algumas mudanças significativas nas políticas nucleares e posturas. Minha sensação é que devemos aplaudir compromissos de Obama e mantenha-o à sua palavra, não presumo que o progresso é impossível.

Link permanente para este post: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate?postTabs=5

Paul Ingram responde para Mello-Knight troca

Paul Ingram é o diretor-executivo da British American Security Information Council (BASIC) . Ele respondeu em 15 de fevereiro de 2010 para a troca de Mello-Cavaleiro de pontos de vista sobre o desarmamento nuclear ea administração Obama .

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Todo mundo sabe que neste mundo difícil da política realista nucleares que não vale a pena ser ingénuo. O que é menos freqüentemente reconhecido é que em um mundo de ameaças globais, pode ser igualmente perigoso para jogar um jogo de extrema confiança do zero.

Então nós temos que passar por este mundo estranho e difícil navegar uma série constante e complexo de cálculos considerados, fazer julgamentos baseados em evidências e na experiência anterior, o que podemos confiar e que não podemos. Isso vale tanto para aqueles de nós que tentam influenciar os tomadores de decisão, tanto quanto para os funcionários que tomam decisões sobre a política externa.

Assim, quando um presidente se levanta e faz um discurso que contém dentro de si compromissos para um mundo livre de armas nucleares, propondo uma série de iniciativas, e olhando para a frente a compromissos concretos no curto prazo, vale a pena ter esperança, mas não ingênuos. E nós temos o primeiro teste desta esperança num futuro muito próximo, quando o presidente vem de publicar uma versão da sua Revisão da Postura Nuclear aguardada.

Deixe-me dizer desde já que não estou intimamente familiarizado com o funcionamento interno do plano do Adminsitration Obama jogo, com o NPR, o botão START follow-on negociações, esses investimentos. Eu não gosto desses investimentos na infra-estrutura [Complexo armas] mais do que Greg. Eu acho que eles são um desperdício de recursos dos contribuintes EUA, e América e no mundo seria melhor sem elas, com os orçamentos existentes dedicados a promover liquidação da infra-estrutura, limpeza e similares.

Mas continuam a existir várias razões para o tratamento de diplomacia nuclear de Obama, e esses investimentos, a sério:

1) É um novo ponto de partida. Agora, aquecer esse fato, mas concordo com Greg, este não é um motivo de grande celebração.

2) Não há benefícios óbvios eleitorais neste Obama para além dos resultados concretos internacionais que pertencem. Poucos americanos vão votar de forma diferente sobre isso, a menos que o presidente Obama realmente oferece sobre esta agenda e parece vir a próxima eleição como um presidente que entrega na cena internacional. Na verdade, se a agenda eram um cínico, ele será mais provável que acabam visto como um grande Presidente de promessas e fraco na entrega - se ele é genuíno ou não, este é um resultado provável e muito deprimente.

3) A visão de que está sendo tomada pela Administração sobre a necessidade de este nível de investimento extra pode ser equivocada, mas ele faz manter um certo nível de consistência interna. Vamos ser honestos, poucas coisas na política são pura e simples, preto e branco. Mesmo o relatório do JASON, ao apontar que as ogivas estavam em boa forma, disse que a própria infra-estrutura estava sob forte tensão por falta de investimento eo desafio de atrair talentos para a profissão. A crença de que precisamos reduzir lentamente e multilateralmente, mantendo uma força nuclear no futuro pode ser frustrante para muitos de nós, e destacar o fato de que ainda vivemos em um mundo onde os governos ainda não compreenderam a necessidade de mudanças mais radicais em suas posturas, mas não contradiz a visão. E vamos ser claros aqui, compromisso com a visão de um mundo livre de armas nucleares, enquanto que apenas o primeiro passo, é importante, no entanto. E se você estivesse com sede na França, você sabe o que é um grande passo que foi.

4) Talvez o mais importante, a administração Obama, e nós mesmos, precisamos considerar estrategicamente como podemos realisticamente trazer a maioria dos americanos, russos, e Deus sabe, o indianos, paquistaneses e israelenses junto com a gente (todos estes dias centra-se na iranianos, mas confie em mim, eles são fáceis em comparação). Não é eficaz apenas para afirmar posições e empurre através de iniciativas contra a oposição da maioria, mesmo quando você é o homem mais poderoso do mundo. Você ainda tem que convencer o Congresso, o povo norte-americanos, e, em seguida, colegas no exterior, em uma teia enorme complexo de inter-relações que não são favoráveis ​​ao debate racional, muito menos instrução. É preciso envolvimento suave, a abertura para outras perspectivas, valorização da diversidade, trabalho em equipe e muitas outras habilidades além do trabalho de cooperação política para construir o processo necessário para o desarmamento. E isso leva confiança. E que provavelmente requer o tipo de investimento que estamos testemunhando hoje.

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Jonathan Granoff responde à troca de Mello-Knight

Jonathan Granoff é presidente da Global Security Institute . Ele respondeu em 15 de fevereiro de 2010 para a troca de Knight-Mello de pontos de vista sobre o desarmamento nuclear ea administração Obama .
Jonathan Granoff é o autor do memorando de Obama: Armas Nucleares , que apareceu em Tikkun Magazine, janeiro-fevereiro de 2009.

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Presidente Obama foi superado pelo DOD e DOE? Eles representavam uma análise muito inteligente. Se o progresso é para ser tido em não-proliferação, tais como apoio a uma proibição de testes, então modernização ea capacidade de reforçar a capacidade de melhorar o arsenal parece ser o custo. Será que isso ainda lhes permite dizer que a modernização "pode ​​exigir o teste algum dia?" Este será um enorme benefício para aqueles que querem parar a proibição de testes. Não vai ser como negócio da administração Clinton com Estoques Stewardship onde ele pensou que o financiamento seria gerar o seu apoio à proibição de testes, mas não ganhar o apoio fora cheio de DOE?

Estou constantemente surpreendido por quão ingênuo políticos aparecem quando desafiados por planeadores militares estratégicos. Então, eu afirmar isso como um exemplo onde parece que o presidente Obama realmente quer fazer curso (não necessariamente sobre o desarmamento, mas certamente em não-proliferação) e até aqui ele está ficando cul de demitidos.

Ou, ele é plenamente consciente da estratégia que está sendo jogado fora. Será que o Sr. Mello acho que ele estava sendo enganosa no discurso de Praga, ou apenas um pouco bonito?

Independentemente disso, os programas atuais que estão sendo financiados que destaca o Sr. Mello certamente fará alcançar qualquer reforço das aspirações não-proliferação do TNP Administração no próximo muito difícil. Eles certamente não parecem ser consistentes com o compromisso de desarmamento.

Espero, sinceramente, eu estou errado e estamos ansiosos para ouvir de algumas pessoas do atual governo a quem eu respeito muito, como arroz Embaixador e Secretário de Estado Adjunto Gottemoeller.

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Greg Mello responde para Jonathan Granoff

Entre seus outros pontos interessantes, você levanta esta questão: "Será que o Sr. Mello acho que ele [Obama] foi sendo enganoso no discurso de Praga, ou apenas um pouco bonito?" Eu diria que não. A substituição de uma aspiração para um compromisso ou promessa é um dispositivo retórico tão normal essas questões não se colocam. Tanto o orador ea audiência esperam algum tipo de reconhecimento ritual de nossas aspirações comuns. A diferença entre essas aspirações e nossa prática real é bastante embaraçoso; muitos membros do público que procura algum tipo de fantasia ponte entre os dois. Eles não querem que as más notícias, eles querem "esperança".

De alguma forma nós passamos de "Eu vou colocar uma galinha em cada panela" para "eu vou procurar colocar uma galinha em cada panela." Há menos responsabilidade na segunda formulação, que pode ser especialmente útil em um momento de contrair as perspectivas nacionais - em que a contração, a maior despesa nuclear militar estou criticando desempenha um papel central simbólico. Nossas esperanças são maiores do que as realidades disponíveis para atendê-los. Nós, e nossos doadores e apoiadores, quero Papai Noel.

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Todd Fino responde à troca de Mello-Knight

Todd Fino organizou e desenvolveu o Global Zero campanha para a eliminação das armas nucleares como um oficial do programa no World Security Institute . Ele está atualmente trabalhando para estabelecer o Irã de dados Portal da Universidade de Princeton. Ele respondeu em 18 de fevereiro de 2010 para a troca de Knight-Mello de pontos de vista sobre o desarmamento nuclear ea administração Obama.

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Pedido do presidente Obama orçamento extremamente generosa para os laboratórios de armas nucleares ferveu longo chiando ansiedades sobre o impacto da política concreta de sua frequentemente expresso "visão" para "um mundo sem armas nucleares." Alinhando com a série proeminente do op-eds no The Wall Street Journal, Obama repeated this earnest aspiration consistently throughout the campaign for the presidency, and in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech and April 2009 policy speech in Prague.

Given the ambition of this vision in practical terms, and, of course, the now apparent serious interest in its achievement by predecessor Ronald Reagan, it is not surprising that long-time advocates have expected policy proposals that would explicitly move in this direction. Yet, these budgeting numbers signal an overall regression. They will further institutionalize the development of new weapons and will make restructuring the labs toward other functions more difficult.

The failure to assure advocates began at the rhetoric's root. Despite the welcome credibility they have given the anti-nuclear cause, the op-ed authors – George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and William Perry – had a burden to consider how other countries perceive the size and activities of our weapons laboratories. At the same time in 2007 that American anti-nuclear lobbyists and activists were feverishly working to block funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) in Congress, Kissinger forwarded an analysis by Shultz and Hoover fellow Sidney Drell to Sen. Pete Domenici supporting investments in the program. And although Nunn declared that he was opposed to the RRW, he signaled his acceptance for large-scale increases in lab funding in the foursome's third op-ed in The Wall Street Journal on January 19, 2010. Unlike the previous op-eds, which were enthusiastically endorsed by others and received with much fanfare by the press, this one seemed clinically designed to give their reputational blessing to the upcoming budget numbers.

Chief nuclear negotiator under President Reagan, Max Kampelman, who has claimed that he originally prompted George Shultz to return to the question of elimination, has advocated a bold path to zero using multilateral processes in the United Nations. Indeed, outlining the divisions among the foreign policy elite, the Global Zero campaign was initiated by a number of attendees of the Shultz-led Hoover Institution meetings who were dissatisfied with the extreme focus on short-term “steps” instead of the explicit practicalities of achieving the ultimate goal. And following that, the policy program of Global Zero itself has revealed a split between the advocates of immediate multilateralization of the strategic arms control process and others who propose that a decades-long series of US-Russia agreements expand into a multilateral process.

These assorted divisions among the elite may come to the fore at the May NPT Review Conference as other nations test the United States' new-found commitment to the treaty's stated objective of disarmament. Given the current crises involving Iran and North Korea and the shortening window of Obama's dynamism on the world stage, if the President fails to inspire others to adopt his “vision” and work toward elimination concretely, he may miss a singular opportunity. If CTBT, which is symbolic despite its limitations, is not ratified by the conference date, these budget requests alone may devastate US credibility. And as Greg Mello's logic indicates, other nations are unlikely to be impressed with the scale of the START follow-on treaty, and there are not yet any indications that the posture review language on “the role” of nuclear weapons will be that momentous in terms of practical implications.

In order to blunt these concerns and sincerely recommit to the vision, there are a number of policy proposals the Obama administration could potentially advocate going into the review conference:

1. A funded international program that would initiate cooperative research into verification technologies and enforcement strategies that would be required in a world of “global zero.”

2. The initiation of an international audit of all existing nuclear weapons and material.

3. Sponsorship of initial discussions on a timeline for negotiations and targets involved in the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

However, as Charles Knight mentioned with respect to international concerns about the United States' superiority in conventional weapons, these actions would only be a start. Given the terrifying overall budget projections and the abject failure of our military contracting and procurement processes, the United States needs to reformulate its entire defense posture and budget. In order to convince states like Russia and China to approach low numbers of nuclear weapons, it might even be necessary to consider multilateral treaty restrictions on general conventional forces and on specific advanced weapons systems like Prompt Global Strike. If the elimination aspiration is sincere, then these concerns are unavoidable and should be seriously studied and contemplated.

Max Kampelman, the symbolic initiator of the present return to abolitionism, has spoken powerfully of what real leadership by an American president, especially when morally confident and unabashed, can accomplish. President Obama's rhetoric on the elimination of nuclear weapons apparently inspired some enough to award him the Nobel Peace Prize; if he is sincere, he owes it to the younger generation to present a clear path to elimination, if not in his lifetime, then in ours.

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The Obama disarmament paradox: A rebuttal

John Isaacs and Robert G. Gard, Jr. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 24 February 2010.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox-rebuttal

John Isaacs : The executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Isaacs represents the center's sister organization, Council for a Livable World, on Capitol Hill. His expertise is in how Congress works, especially when it pertains to national security issues such as nuclear weapons and missile defense. Previously, he served as a legislative assistant on foreign affairs to former New York Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz.

Robert G. Gard Jr. : A consultant on international security and education, Gard is the chair of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation's Board of Directors. He also is a member of the Bulletin's Science and Security Board. Previously, he served as president of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and as director of the Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. During a military career that spanned three decades, he was an assistant to the secretary of defense and president of the National Defense University.

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Greg Mello's recent Bulletin article “ The Obama Disarmament Paradox ” distorts the Obama administration's nuclear agenda by making unjustified assumptions that discredit President Barack Obama's historic commitment to seek a nuclear-weapon-free world. Obama has committed to such a goal several times–both before and after his election in November 2008. But Mello calls that a “vague aspiration” rather than a commitment. Yet the evidence he provides to support his assertion isn't persuasive.

In fact, the president has advocated for numerous initiatives in a comprehensive nonproliferation program. These include winning UN Security Council endorsement for a nuclear-weapon-free world; negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia, which Obama considers an interim agreement toward further reductions; preparing a Nuclear Posture Review consistent with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy; pledging to secure all loose nuclear materials over a four-year period; and taking an active role at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

As President Obama stated during his seminal Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is a long-term goal that might not be achievable in his lifetime, but that doesn't minimize the necessity of taking interim steps to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.

Mello sees Obama's requested increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget for stockpile stewardship and the construction of new facilities at the nuclear laboratories as a commitment to the production of new nuclear weapons. Yet the administration has made clear that there are no such plans underfoot; the 2011 budget request states unequivocally that “new weapons systems will not be built.” As such, the president's requested increase in nuclear expenditures should be viewed in the context of seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further nuclear weapon reductions.

More largely, there is nothing inconsistent between a vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world and ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent in the interim, including refurbishment of aging systems, providing the labs with facilities to replace their deteriorating physical plants, and maintaining the essential expertise that the scientists at the labs provide. Nor does such a deterrent require “unending innovation,” as Mello claims. Our current nuclear weapons inventory, validated by extensive testing, is more than adequate to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, our troops abroad, and our allies, provided sufficient resources are dedicated to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Mello also seems to forget that the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world is both national and international law; the NPT, which the United States has ratified, includes a commitment to seek nuclear disarmament. Not to mention that the treaty has an important practical component: Its non-nuclear weapon states have conditioned treaty cooperation on the NPT's nuclear weapon states fulfilling their obligations under Article VI to move toward full nuclear disarmament.

Thus, the “vision” of a nuclear-weapon-free world is essential as context for “the various nonproliferation initiatives” in Obama's plan to reduce dangerous threats to our national security–eg, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

President John F. Kennedy's June 1963 nuclear test ban speech at American University is famous not only for its rhetoric but also for its follow-through: Kennedy's words led to the end of aboveground nuclear testing. While it is legitimate to be skeptical about how successful Obama will be in implementing his disarmament agenda, let's hope Mello and others will wait to see how the follow-through progresses before they judge him too harshly. Anything else would be unfair.

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Greg Mello responds to John Isaacs and Robert Gard:

A “commitment” to a goal that a speaker says he may not achieve in his lifetime (let alone in his administration, the only germane period) is by definition an aspiration at best. If that “commitment” isn't concrete and specific it is vague. Such were Obama's very few words in Prague (and since) pertaining to disarmament. There have been no significant actions.
I am interested in action — ours and the government's — not “hope.”

In your reply, you simply reiterate the Administration's themes on these points.

If you look over what you wrote, you will see that you freely conflate disarmament with nonproliferation issues and initiatives. You're not alone; many people do. I suppose that's the idea. These are quite different things, obviously. Preventing others from acquiring a nuclear deterrent has precious little to do with getting rid of my own. I nowhere argue against sound, just, and legal measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.

I think you err significantly when you say “the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world is both national and international law.” It is the achievement, not the pursuit, of this goal that is a binding legal requirement, unanimously confirmed by the International Court of Justice. Attempting to substitute an alleged aspiration (and that ominously vague), for achievement is a big step down from logic and law, a grave political disservice. This is all the more true when this alleged aspiration comes from the very temporary leader of the world's largest and most aggressive military power, and is then followed by a very large increase in nuclear weapons spending.

I never said that a nuclear deterrent required “unending innovation.” I suspect we agree that the reverse is true. What I said was quite different: that the “deterrence of any adversary” to which Obama referred was unachievable, and therefore its pursuit implied unending innovation. I think investment itself, together with an ideology of technical “progress” – often expressed through fads like the quest for greater device “surety” – creates the hope that a “credible” nuclear deterrent, a deterrent that is relevant to “any” adversary as well as one that is “safe” and “secure,” can someday finally be achieved. Nuclear weapons will never be safe, secure, and they will never deter “any” adversary.

There's many reasons why our leaders engage in this kind of crazy talk, and none of them are pretty.

Disarmament aside, the warhead complex, especially at the physics labs, is riddled with waste and unnecessary programs and missions, which help drive down morale and scientific quality. I and many others believe the complex is grossly over-funded (by at least 40%) for the mission of maintaining the present arsenal indefinitely. Much smaller arsenals, right on down to zero, would be quite desirable from every perspective, and cheaper. The US arsenal can be unilaterally reduced to much lower levels without any loss of US “security.”

If Obama wants to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security, and expects anybody to believe him, he must actually do so. Instead, building thousands of significantly upgraded bombs (a process already underway) with new requests to develop and produce more kinds of upgraded bombs, and the factories to make them, isn't disarmament at all. It's the modernization of everything for the long run – warheads, delivery systems, factories, everything.

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Robert Gard and John Isaacs continue the exchange:

It's gratifying to learn that Greg Mello agrees with us on the desirability of both sound measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and a “much smaller” US nuclear arsenal. For our part, we agree with him that the increase in funds programmed for the nuclear laboratories is excessive, although we don't see any inconsistency between ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile and reducing its size.

We may have a basic disagreement regarding deterrence. It's not clear whether Mello's quote of deterring “any adversary” includes non-state actors or only nation states. If he is referring to nation states only, we believe even extended deterrence can be accomplished without “unending innovation” and with a smaller stockpile. If his definition includes non-state actors bent on terrorism, no amount of innovation or real investment can deter them from using a nuclear weapon should they acquire one.

We certainly concede the point that most measures designed to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation wouldn't qualify as disarmament, but they may facilitate reductions in nuclear stockpiles, which would qualify as disarmament.

Finally, let's return to the basic issue of President Obama's commitment to seeking, as a goal, a nuclear-weapon-free world. Even if it is an “aspiration,” that doesn't reduce its importance. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” And although Mello might not consider the action “significant,” Obama did chair a UN Security Council meeting with other heads of state that resulted in a resolution affirming the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Additionally, to meet our obligation under Article VI, Obama has stated his intent to follow up the new START treaty with negotiations involving all of the nuclear powers to reduce stockpiles of weapons.

Coming full circle, these actions taken are essential to obtain the cooperation of the non-nuclear weapons states in measures to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation, which both we and Mello favor.

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Matthew Hoey responds the the Mello-Knight exchange

Matthew Hoey is the founder of the Military Space Transparency Project (MSTP) and a former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS) where he specialized in forecasting developments in missile defense and military space technologies. He responded on 02 March 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration.
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President Obama's hopes to begin the long march toward a nuclear free future are not limited to just words, though I understand how some may believe this to be the case. Upon closer examination, the President is taking the critical first steps in an effort to go beyond his address at Prague. The President is in the process of negotiating a new arms control treaty with the Russians, and it is highly likely that he will be pursuing even deeper cuts in the future. He has also made efforts to expand and strengthen the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Where are the results? Why have we not seen action? When will the nuclear threat begin to wane–even if it happens ever so slightly?

This is a very informative thread, and I have enjoyed reading all of the entries. What Charles [Knight] has initiated here serves as an example of how if we draw upon all of the myriad arguments before us, we are sure to paint a more nuanced picture of the road to consensus and cooperation. The same could not be truer in regard to our domestic political and international diplomatic climates as well. Parties in all corners have legitimate disputes and concerns, and until these are all fully addressed in a courageous and aggressive new fashion it is my belief that our drive towards zero will never get in gear. Here are my thoughts on how we can get moving.

One step would be for both American and Russian defense industries to gradually be converted into commercial industries – in the current global economy this would be slow to begin but would eventually reap tremendous benefits. Such a transition would even free university students from the confines of military contractors as a leading option for employment, ensuring that this generation of young people would not be bound to the archaic practices of the military industrial complex. The ripple effects on cooperative defense would be tremendous. As it is, our overall military capabilities are already unrivaled. Such reductions in military spending and subsequent reinvestment in new technology would not in fact lessen our strategic dominance, since cooperative defense would diminish the move-countermove dynamic that has long undermined disarmament efforts. Then taking into consideration cooperative defense and the promotion of one another's security, our mutual economic potential would be enhanced further, thus strengthening our international relationship to an unprecedented level.

This would not be a cooperative security agreement limited to just sharing military and launch data; such a partnership would also extend into a shared strategic defense. In this era where the war on terror and the threat from extremism is the focal point of nations such as the US and Russia—ever posed with internally-based security threats and intrusions by radicals who would not hesitate to use a nuclear weapons in a major city—this simply makes sense.

The pursuit of missile defense to guard against incoming threats is the single greatest impediment to progress – this is the lynch pin, and under the banner of reducing national security threats it does nothing more than increase them. It is a fool's pursuit. Should the United States pull back from its BMD aspirations in concert with the initiation of cooperative defense discussions, real progress toward reducing the threat of a missile attack against the US could begin. This would also help to motivate the US and Russia to find common ground in regard to Iran during this heady time. With the world's two military superpowers acting as enhanced security and economic partners, it is more likely that this leadership by example would take hold and could spur the beginning of a global trend over the long run.

Spending has long been unrestrained within the nuclear complex and the national labs. This is a perennial phenomenon—the effect of unwavering pork barrel spending and lobbying by elected officials in cahoots with the defense industry to bring home jobs to their home districts. This cannot be undone without disastrous results. The US economy is addicted to the defense dollar and must be weaned from it gradually. This would come in the form of a transition away from the development of destructive technology and towards the development of beneficial technologies, for example, alternative energy solutions or emerging technologies that would enhance space exploration. Far too many working American families rely upon the defense budget and the nuclear dollar. If consensus for disarmament efforts is to extend across the aisles of Congress and the Senate, this must be understood and honored. If not, we face divisions and a squandered opportunity that may not present itself again.

Once such a transition takes place, a type of economic vacuum effect could commence where free markets, capitalism and innovation driven by new technology could lift the US and Russian economies out of the mud that is the threat of nuclear annihilation. This vacuum effect was not possible in years past, and is actually enabled by the current economic crises and the need for new industries that would contribute to economic recovery and job creation. It does not require any more courage, concessions or clarity to pursue a world without nuclear weapons through such avenues than what is needed to cling onto weapons that can and will someday kill millions.

When placed side-by-side, exchanges and the resulting debates regarding the increase in the nuclear complex budget versus the White House's current policy positions beg for such a solution. In fact, if such a solution is initiated cautiously through careful consideration of the needs of all parties, it could ripple across the economy help to address our greatest global challenges. This could be accomplished while progressively extracting more and more American and Russian scientists from the nuclear gadgetry industry and channeling their enormous individual and collective talents into a more prosperous direction.

Barack Obama and Dimitri Medvedev have the courage and clarity to understand and express their willingness to discuss a world without nuclear weapons. Progress will require a steadfast commitment to courage in the face of the defense industry and the clarity to see that thousands of Russian and Americans rely on these industries and will need jobs that provide the means to support their families. Cooperative defense will lead to the beginning of a transition from massive defense spending to productive civilian investment that stands to benefit all.

Offering concessions and placing cooperative defense on the table while viewing the road ahead in a broader context should get the discussion moving in a direction that turns words into additional actions. As long as the United States refuses to give up missile defense in Eastern Europe we will remain at a standstill.

It was Dr. Randall Forsberg who opened my mind to this way of thinking. She taught me about how cooperative security could be used as a vehicle for peace. Her words that follow, written in 1992, ring today with a renewed poignancy:

The end of the Cold war represents a turning point for the role of military force in international affairs. At this unique juncture in history, the world's main military spenders and arms producers have an unprecedented opportunity to move from confrontation to cooperation. The United States, the European nations, Japan and the republics of the former USSR can now replace their traditional security policies, based on deterrence and unilateral intervention, with cooperative policies based on minimum deterrence, non-offensive defense, nonproliferation, and multilateral peacekeeping.

There are four important reasons to make this change, and make it quickly:

First, massive resources are at stake. With a cooperative security policy, the United States could cut the annual military budget… A peace dividend on this order is exactly what we need to revitalize the economy and meet the backlog of needs in housing, health, education, environment and economic infrastructure.

Second, the cooperative approach to security is prerequisite to stopping the global proliferation of armaments and arms industries. The prospect of proliferation has become the single greatest military threat to this country and to the world…

Third, the choice by the major industrial nations either to perpetuate a US-dominated international security system or to develop a more cooperative system will have far-reaching political ramifications at home and abroad… here in America, the change would help reverse the nasty mixture of cynicism, violence, and racism that has increasingly pervaded our society since the first Reagan Administration made increases in military spending at the price of national debt and deep cuts in domestic programs.

Last but not least, a cooperative approach to security is likely to be far more effective than the traditional approach in reducing the incidence and scale of war. Despite these enormous stakes, Congress and the Administration have, until recently, refused even to consider substantial cuts in post-Cold war defense spending, much less seize the unprecedented opportunity to develop a cooperative security system. [Randall Forsberg, "Defense Cuts and Cooperative Security in the Post-Cold War World", Boston Review , May 1992]

Should President Obama choose to accept this torch I believe that we can achieve the goals outlined in Prague within our lifetime.

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Following are a number of posts relevant to this debate. They serve as reference, furthering the discussion.

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Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic

Barack Obama. remarks, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic , 05 April 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

Trecho:

… as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.”

… the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.

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Nuclear weapons debate takes new form

James Carroll. Boston Globe , 15 June 2009 .

Trecho:

Prague was arguably the most important presidential speech in decades. Again, what made that resounding call for a new “form of the forms of thought” about nuclear weapons, was the president's starting point – an acknowledgment of special American culpability. “As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act.”

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Odds Contra o Desarmamento Nuclear

Charles V. Peña. antiwar.com , 29 July 2009.
http://original.antiwar.com/pena/2009/07/28/nuclear-disarmament/

Trecho:

…a country can be a party to the NPT but decide that abiding by the treaty is no longer in its best interests and withdraw, which is exactly what North Korea chose to do in January 2003, claiming, “A dangerous situation where our nation's sovereignty and our state's security are being seriously violated is prevailing on the Korean Peninsula due to the US vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK.” Given that North Korea had been named a member of the axis of evil a year earlier and the United States was on the verge of invading Iraq (a non-nuclear power), it's perfectly understandable that the regime in Pyongyang might believe it was in the DPRK's “supreme interests” to no longer formally agree to be a nonnuclear power, ie, a pushover for regime change.

The NPT is not a universal treaty. There are 193 countries in the world, but not all of them are signatories to the NPT. The result is the so-called “D3 problem,” or the de facto nuclear states: India, Pakistan, and Israel. These countries were never part of the NPT regime and were thus able to develop nuclear weapons, because they are under no obligation to abide by the NPT. And it's not lost on the rest of the world – particularly the Muslim world – that the United States doesn't hold Israel to the same standard as Iran. Indeed, like previous presidents, Obama refuses to even acknowledge that Israel is a nuclear power.

…the NPT does not exist in a vacuum. It's impossible to ignore US foreign policy, particularly a proclivity for military intervention supported by Democrats and Republicans alike. Since the end of the Cold War marked by the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the United States has engaged in nine major military operations, but only one of those – Operation Enduring Freedom – was unambiguously in response to a direct threat to the United States. This is a powerful incentive for countries such as Iran and North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons as the only reliable deterrent against US invasion. As long as the United States continues to have an interventionist foreign policy (and the Obama administration has not overseen a sea change in US foreign policy), it will be next to impossible to prevent proliferation.

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Together Toward Nuclear Zero: Understanding Chinese and Russian Security Concerns

Cristina Hansell and Nikita Perfilyev. The Nonproliferation Review , November 2009.
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915796781&fulltext=713240928

Trecho:

…if Chinese military experts decide that China needs the capability of a maneuvering warhead to evade missile defense interceptors, they may need to test the redesigned warheads. It is not clear that the Obama administration, however, will be willing to back down on missile defense in order to obtain Chinese agreement on a CTBT. Without a CTBT, though, further progress toward disarmament is unlikely; the nuclear weapon states' commitment to NPT Article VI will not be taken seriously by non-nuclear weapon states, and the possibility of a future arms race (instigated in large part by the fear of US missile defenses and precision weapons) is increased.

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A Roadmap for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

Jared Gassen and Bill Wickersham. book chapter, November 2009.

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Trecho:

Here's how a global nuclear disarmament treaty could work. First, it would spell out a decades-long schedule for the verified destruction of all weapons, materials and facilities. Those possessing the largest arsenals — the United States and Russia — would make deep cuts first. Those with smaller arsenals would join at specified dates and levels. To ensure that no state gained an advantage, the treaty would incorporate “rest stops”: if a state refused to comply with a scheduled measure, other nations' reductions would be suspended until the violation was corrected. This dynamic would generate momentum, but also ensure that if the effort collapsed, the signatories would be no less secure than before.

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Charles Knight responds to Barry Blechman

There is something missing in this measured disarmament scheme which invalidates it as a path to full nuclear disarmament. Blechman makes an erroneous assumption shared by too many nuclear disarmament advocates. He assumes that nuclear weapons are a class of weapons that can be dealt with in isolation from the problems of international security and insecurity. Nuclear weapons cannot be separated strategically from the context of the conventional military power they supplement.

Note the following phrase in the above excerpt from Blechman: “To ensure that no state gained an advantage…” His prescription applies only to nuclear weapons and presumes no adjustments to conventional military power. In those conditions some states stand to gain considerable advantage from nuclear disarmament.

Imagine the case of Russia in Blechman's staged draw down of nuclear forces with the US As Russia approaches zero nuclear weapons they become more and more vulnerable to superior US conventional military power.

Without parallel and compensatory reductions and adjustments in conventional forces and strong political assurances weaker nations such as Russia will never agree to give up all their nuclear weapons.

Careful schemes of balanced nuclear weapons disarmament of the type that Blechman argues for cannot by themselves get us to zero nuclear weapons. Compensating for the national insecurities arising from imbalances in conventional military power must be part of any formula for full nuclear disarmament. We need to work toward an international security regime that delivers the reassurance gained of at least fifty years without international aggression and military intervention. After that period of consistent international peace, nuclear nations may be ready to go to zero. This is the only path with any real chance of getting there.

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Implementing the President's Prague Agenda: Vice President Biden's Speech at the National Defense University

Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University – As Prepared for Delivery, 18 February 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-national-defense-university

Trecho:

Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies.

Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong.

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Charles Knight comments on the Biden speech

When Vice President Biden speaks of plans to “further strengthen … preeminent conventional forces” with “capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield” and “conventional warheads with worldwide reach” he seeks to reassure his domestic audience that nuclear disarmament will not make America less secure.

His words, however, do not reassure other nuclear powers or potential future nuclear powers such as Iran who will perceive these enhanced American conventional capabilities as strategic threats to their national security.

Biden surely understands that he is not really offering us a pathway to nuclear abolition. We will not get there if other nations are expected to relinquish their nuclear arsenals to face “undeniable” conventional power from the US

If Biden's speech truly represents the elaboration of the “President's Prague Agenda” it leaves us with a very big gap (conceptually and practically) between the near term goal Biden articulates (“We will work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”) and the longer term goal (“We are working both to stop [nuclear weapons] proliferation and eventually to eliminate them.”) which President Obama confirmed in Prague.

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Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century

Matt Eckel. Foreign Policy Watch , 01 March 2010.
http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/nuclear-weapons-in-twenty-first-century.html

Trecho:

Though American leaders try not to say it out loud too often, one of the reasons Iran's nuclear program is unsettling to Washington is that it constrains the ability of the United States to topple the Iranian regime by force, should push come to shove. As a global hegemon, having the ability to wave our conventional military around and implicitly threaten recalcitrant middle powers with conquest is something America likes to be able to do. It's much harder if the recalcitrant middle power in question can credibly threaten to take out a couple of allied capital cities. Israel's nuclear program was originally founded on this logic, as was that of France.

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Debate: Waiting for Obama's Policy on Nukes

Christopher A. Ford. AOL News , 05 March 2010.
http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-waiting-for-obamas-policy-on-nukes/19385644

Trecho:

… but remarkably, for all his nuclear posing, no one knows what Obama's nuclear weapons policy actually is. So far, his administration has done little of real import. Obama seeks a modest new arms-reduction treaty with Russia but contemplates cuts that would not have been too shocking from the Bush administration — which, in fact, actually began these negotiations in 2006. The administration also wants to reattempt ratification of the nuclear test ban defeated in the Senate in 1999, although the treaty's Senate prospects are dimming. As a result, at this point Obama's “transformative” arms-control agenda looks like President Bill Clinton's from the mid-1990s.

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Debate: On the Right Nuclear Weapons Track

Will Marshall. AOL News , 05 March 2010.
http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-on-the-right-nuclear-weapons-track/19385662

Trecho:

Obama reasons that, by holding up its end of the bargain, the United States can strengthen global nonproliferation norms and intensify pressure on Tehran and other regimes that may be thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons. And as White House officials have stressed, the nuclear “zero option” is a policy aspiration, not something anyone believes is achievable anytime soon.

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O atual mortal Toward Armas Nucleares

James Carroll. Boston Globe , 15 March 2010. Hosted on the CommonDreams website.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/03/15-5

Think of Niagara Falls. Think of the onrushing current as the river pours itself toward the massive cascade. Imagine a lone swimmer a hundred yards or so upstream, desperately stroking against the current to keep from being swept over the precipice. That swimmer is President Obama, the river is the world, and the falls is the threat of unchecked nuclear weapons.

Henry James used the image of Niagara to describe the rush into World War I: “. . .the tide that bore us along.” Hannah Arendt defined the wars of the 20th century as events “cascading like a Niagara Falls of history.” Jonathan Schell used Niagara as an organizing metaphor for his indispensable critique of war, “The Unconquerable World.”

But now the image has entered the lexicon of strategic experts who warn of a coming “cascade of proliferation,” one nation following another into the deadly chasm of nuclear weapons unless present nuclear powers find a way to reverse the current. The main burden is on Russia and the United States, which together possess the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons, but President Obama deliberately made himself central to the challenge when he said in Prague, “I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

Now the Niagara current is taking him the other way. Here are the landmarks that define the swimmer's momentum.

■ The US-Russia Treaty. Negotiators in Geneva are late in reaching agreement on a nuclear arms treaty to replace START, which expired last December. Obama is threading a needle, having to meet Russian requirements (for example, on missile defense) while anticipating Republican objections in the US Senate (for example, on missile defense). Warning: Bill Clinton was humiliated when the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999. Republicans' recalcitrance on health care is peanuts compared to the damage their rejection of a new START treaty would do.

■ The Nuclear Posture Review, the Congress-mandated report on how the administration defines nuclear needs today. This, too, is overdue, probably because the White House has been pushing back against the Pentagon on numerous issues. Are nukes for deterrence only? Will the United States renounce first use? Having stopped the Bush-era program to build a new nuclear weapon, will Obama allow further research and development? What nations will be named as potential nuclear threats? Warning: The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review was Clinton's Pentagon Waterloo. It affirmed the Cold War status quo, killing serious arms reduction until now.

■ Although usually considered apart, the broader US defense posture has turned into a key motivator for other nations to go nuclear. The current Pentagon budget ($5 trillion for 2010-2017) is so far beyond any other country, and the conventional military capacity it buys is so dominant, as to reinforce the nuclear option abroad as the sole protection against potential US attack. Isso é novo.

■ In April, a world leaders nuclear summit will be held in Washington, but both nuclear haves and have-nots will be taking positions based on the US-Russia Treaty (and its prospects for ratification) and the Nuclear Posture Review. Warning: if China sees US missile defense as potentially aimed its way, a new nuclear arms race is on.

■ In May, the signatories to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty will hold their eighth regular review session in New York. Since the nations that agreed to forego nuclear weapons did so on the condition that the nuclear nations work steadily toward abolition, the key question will be whether Obama has in fact begun to deliver on his declared intention. If not, get ready for the cascade.

In truth, the current rushing toward Niagara cannot be resisted. Not seven nuclear nations, therefore, but 17, or, ultimately, 70. But beware an analysis like this. The falls are an analogy, not a fact. Obama warned of such fatalism, calling it in Prague, “a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.” Therefore, reject the analogy. Obama is not a lone swimmer, but a voice of all humanity. The nuclear future is not pre-determined. Human choices are being made right now to define it anew.