Força Aérea dos EUA. Fevereiro de 2012.
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120201-027.pdf

Rachel Gerber Memo. Política, Fundação Stanley, 1 de Fevereiro de 2012.
http://defensealt.org/AymAmo

Trecho:

Em 18 de janeiro de 2012, a Fundação Stanley, em parceria com a Carnegie Corporation de Nova York ea Fundação MacArthur, convocou figuras essenciais para a evolução histórica e contemporânea da Responsabilidade de Proteger para avaliar o estado actual do princípio e considerar a evolução dinâmica global que vai enquadrar, dirigir, e desenvolvimento de políticas desafio nos próximos anos.

Anthony H. Cordesman com Bradley Bosserman. Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, 30 de Janeiro de 2012.
http://defensealt.org/xpBqhn

Trecho:

Os EUA devem repensar a sua abordagem de "guerras opcionais." Está longe de ser claro que ele pode ganhar a guerra do Iraque, ao invés de fortalecer o Irã, sem um exército forte e presença ajuda. Vai perder decisivamente o conflito afegão e no Paquistão se não desenvolver rapidamente planos para uma presença militar e diplomática, e ajudar a ajudar o Afeganistão na transição longe da dependência dos gastos militares e econômica estrangeira durante 2012-2020. Cortes de tropas dos EUA não são um plano de transição, e centrando-se sobre a retirada é uma receita para a derrota.

Dito isto, os EUA não podem e não devem, repita o mesmo erro cometido em intervir no Iraque e no Afeganistão. É preciso lidar com as ameaças não-tradicionais com uma mistura muito melhor e mais acessível de estratégias globais, regionais e nacionais que podem lidar com questões como a crise no Oriente Médio e Sul e na Ásia Central, e do terrorismo e da instabilidade em uma base global. É preciso confiar em ajudar estados amigos, dissuasão, contenção e formas muito mais limitados e menos onerosa de intervenção.

from the Project on Defense Alternatives, 26 January 2012

The future-years Pentagon base budget plan released by Secretary Panetta on 26 January 2012 foresees rolling spending back to the level of 2008, corrected for inflation. Spending on the non-war part of the budget during the next five years (2013-2017) will be about 4% lower than during the past five (2008-2012) in real terms. The real (that is, “inflation corrected”) change from 2012 will be a reduction of 3.2%

The chart below corrects for inflation by rendering all sums in 2012 dollars. It shows that base-budget spending had jumped 55% after inflation between 1998 and 2010. The new budget plan sets 2013 spending at $525 billion, which is 46% above the 1998 level.

The new budget plan – represented by the green trend line — stands in stark contrast to the reductions mandated by the Budget Control Act under the provisions for sequestration (represented by the red trend line). Sequestration would roll Pentagon base-budget spending back to the level of 2004, which would still be 31% above the 1998 level (corrected for inflation). The new budget plan and sequestration do have one thing in common: both would keep Pentagon spending above the inflation-adjusted average for the Cold War years (represented by the horizontal dash line).

Christopher Preble and Charles Knight. Huffington Post , 20 January 2012.
http://defensealt.org/ysCbHQ

Trecho:

Balance depends on what you are standing on. With respect to our physical security, the United States is blessed with continental peace and a dearth of powerful enemies. Our military is the best-trained, best-led, and best-equipped in the world. It is our unstable finances and our sluggish economy that make us vulnerable to stumbling.

Unfortunately, the new strategy does not fully appreciate our strengths, nor does it fully address our weaknesses. In the end, it does not achieve Eisenhower's vaunted balance.

__________________________________________________

Matthew Rosenberg. New York Times, 20 de Janeiro de 2012.
http://pulse.me/s/5a33j

Trecho:

As forças da coalizão norte-americanos e outro aqui estão sendo mortas em número cada vez maior pelos soldados muito afegãos que lutam ao lado do trem e, em ataques motivados por profunda animosidade entre as forças aliadas, supostamente, de acordo com oficiais americanos e afegãos e um relatório coalizão classificado.

Comentário do Editor:

Parece uma evidência muito forte de que as forças norte-americanas permaneceram sua bem-vindos!

Andrew Taylor. AP, 20 de Janeiro de 2012.
http://defensealt.org/xN9mYD

Trecho:

O plano da Casa Branca, provavelmente para reprisar novos impostos e propostas de honorários que são nonstarters com Capitol Hill republicanos, seria desligar toda a nove anos, 1200000000000 dólares em todo-o-board cortes de gastos, referidos como um "seqüestro".

"Temos um seqüestro vem menos de um ano a partir de agora, a menos que os atos do Congresso", disse um alto funcionário do governo. "Nós vamos pedir ao Congresso para fazer agora o que achamos que o Congresso deveria ter feito em dezembro, que é aprovar mais de US $ 1,2 trilhão em redução do défice, desligue o seqüestro e manter os limites de gastos ()."

DefenseTracker.com , 18 January 2012.
http://defensetracker.com/web/?p=1681

Trecho:

Part of the “Doomsday Mechanism” hysteria spread by Defense Secretary Panetta and his comrade in the budget wars, Cong. Buck McKeon, has been the automaticity of the across-the-boards cuts that sequester would impose on the defense budget next January–in the likely event that the lame duck Congress and its successor next year will both be as dysfunctional as the can of red and blue worms we have now. (The other part of the hysteria is the “horror” of returning to 2007 levels of base budget defense spending.)

It seems that the president has existing statutory authority to modify the sequester mechanism–but not the amount of cuts required.

Philip Taubman. New York Times , 08 January 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/reducing-the-nuclear-arsenal.html

Trecho:

If the president pushes back against the defenders of the old order at the Pentagon and other redoubts of the nuclear priesthood, he can preserve American security while making the United States a more credible leader on one of today's most critical issues — containing the spread of nuclear weapons. Like a chain smoker asking others to give up cigarettes, the United States, with its bloated arsenal, sounds hypocritical when it puts pressure on other nations to cut weapons and stop producing bomb-grade highly enriched uranium…

Relacionado:

Defense Strategy Review Page Nuclear Debate

Carl Conetta Projeto. No Memo Briefing Defesa # 53, 05 de janeiro de 2012.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1201bm53.pdf

Trecho:

A parte traseira do rolo em planos de gastos e os cortes reais para o orçamento são suficientes para envolver todos os escritórios e programa no Pentágono. Isso contribui para um debate contencioso, bem como uma carga de forragens para a política partidária. Ele irá ajudar se podemos manter as coisas em perspectiva. Os cortes que enfrentamos hoje são muito menos dramáticos do que aqueles que seguem a Guerra Fria. Autoridade orçamental agregado durante 1991-1996 foi de quase 20% menor em termos reais do que durante 1987-1990 - uma queda de cinco vezes maior do que a administração propõe hoje. Dada a nossa nação atuais straights econômicos, os defensores do Pentágono deve realmente dar um suspiro de alívio.

Departamento de Defesa. 05 de janeiro de 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf

Winslow Wheeler. TEMPO Battleland, 13 de dezembro de 2011.

Trecho:

Sem a inclusão de gastos com a guerra, o orçamento base de DOD sob o "Mecanismo de Doomsday" não é mais em ou perto de sua pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial alto, mas também não é perto de qualquer um dos níveis mínimos históricos. Na verdade, é cerca de 38000 milhões dólar acima de gastos anuais durante a Guerra Fria ...

Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy , 01 December, 2011.
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/01/a_bandwagon_for_offshore_balancing

Trecho:

…offshore balancing is the right strategy even when our coffers are full, provided that no peer competitors are threatening to dominate key strategic regions. Even during good times, it makes no sense to take on unnecessary burdens or to allow allies to free-ride on Uncle Sam's hubristic desire to be the “indispensable nation” in almost every corner of the world. In other words, offshore balancing isn't just a strategy for hard times; it is also the best available strategy in a world where the United States is the strongest power, prone to trigger unnecessary antagonism, and vulnerable to being dragged into unnecessary wars.

Sara Sorcher. National Journal, 29 de novembro de 2011.

Trecho:

Presidente Obama anunciou recentemente medidas para reforçar a arquitetura de uma política externa americana com novo foco sobre o Pacífico, incluindo planos para implantar 2.500 soldados a uma base na Austrália, o tempo todo insistindo que quaisquer reduções nos EUA os gastos com defesa não virá à custa de prioridades na região da Ásia-Pacífico. Mesmo que muitos em Washington com cautela olho China está rapidamente a modernização militar e expansão da presença naval no Pacífico, 39 por cento dos Insiders disse que o próximo passo é melhorar o envolvimento americano com Pequim, evitando quaisquer medidas militares relacionados.

Paula G. Thornhill. CNN , 23 November 2011.
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/23/opinion/thornhill-defense-cuts/index.html

Trecho:

The nation's leadership needs a Plan B so that a heroic assumption — or hope — about the unlikelihood of future wars does not inadvertently lead to strategic disaster. This is harder than it seems. Plan B would allow more flexibility to meet what could go wrong in the strategic environment rather than just making budget cuts.

Comentário do Editor:

Plano B é manter um bom 'reserva estratégica'. Como neo-conservadores gostam de apontar os Estados Unidos gastam apenas 4,5% do seu PIB em suas Forças Armadas. Se pitada novas ameaças, os EUA podem facilmente crescer o gasto e se envolver ainda a sua base industrial considerável e conhecimento. O problema deste país enfrenta com uma estratégia de reconstituição é a falta de vontade política. Os líderes civis são avessos a pedir ao povo americano para o sacrifício. A Guarda Nacional robusto e força de reserva que não é abusada por freqüentes desdobramentos para guerras desnecessárias e uma expectativa da sociedade para pagar uma sobretaxa fiscal em tempos de emergência nacional são os fundamentos de que este país precisa ser estrategicamente preparada, mantendo uma força de paz pequeno pé . Com esse plano estratégico os EUA podem ser bem provisionado para qualquer ameaça.

Mateus Leatherman. Governo Bloomberg, 21 de novembro de 2011.
http://defensealt.org/veAUPs

Anthony H. Cordesman e Bradley Bosserman. Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, 17 de novembro de 2011.
http://csis.org/files/publication/111511_Defense_Resources_Threats.pdf

Michael E. O'Hanlon. New York Times, 14 de novembro de 2011.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1114_defense_budget_ohanlon.aspx

Trecho:

Ao manter um navio no exterior por um par de anos e ter partes duas tripulações desse navio, bem como um navio de treinamento em casa, a Marinha poderia melhorar a sua eficiência de implantação em até 40 por cento ao navio, cumprindo com cerca de três navios e um meio que , em média, pode ter exigido cinco. Focalizando combatentes grandes da Marinha de superfície, cruzadores e destróieres, esta abordagem poderia, teoricamente, permitir que cerca de 60 navios (com pouco menos da metade deles implantados no exterior de cada vez) para manter a presença global que a Marinha diz que precisa, ao invés de 94 navios que está cursando.

Loren B. Thompson. Lexington Institute, 11 de novembro de 2011.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/gen-odierno-breaks-the-code-on-why-weapons-cost-so-much?a=1&c=1171

Trecho:

Novembro o general Odierno de 2 observações indicam que ele percebe que não é apenas empreiteiros que fazem subir o custo dos programas. As derrapagens de custos são muitas vezes cozido no começo pelas exigências barrocas que o sistema de aquisição impõe aos desenvolvedores. Essas demandas resultam em longos atrasos no cronograma, custos unitários exorbitantes, e características de armas que não podem atender as expectativas dos apropriadores. Mais importante, elas diminuem a entrega de melhores sistemas de combate para combatentes.

Paul Rogers. Open Democracy , 11 November 2011.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/israel-vs-iran-regional-blowback

Trecho:

The near-unavoidable reality is that out of confrontation Iran will soon acquire a limited nuclear arsenal. This is because even a limited bombing of Iran will create a new dynamic where Iran is at the centre of the post-attack region; will have several new options to impose costs on its opponents; and will go full-tilt for its own deterrent.

Kelsey Hartigan Arsenal. Democracia, 10 de novembro de 2011.
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2011/11/if-you-want-peace-stop-clamoring-for-war.html

Trecho:

Se Romney acredita que pode valsa no Salão Oval, dar alguns discursos áspero e duro e de repente o Irã vai abrir as suas portas aos inspectores da AIEA, bem, ele é dentro para um despertar rude.

Retórica beligerante não vai resolver a situação com o Irã. Na verdade, a maioria dos especialistas vão dizer que ele irá torná-lo pior. As ameaças de ação militar, ou pior, a ação militar real, só vai jogar nas mãos de extremistas do Irã ... Se uma presença militar dos EUA estava indo para convencer o Irã a cooperar, eu teria pensado que teria acontecido até agora.

Brian Phillips. AntiWar.com, 9 de novembro de 2011.
http://original.antiwar.com/bphillips/2011/11/08/10-factors-that-may-lead-to-war-with-iran/~~V

Carl Conetta. Memo Briefing PDA # 52 de 25 de Outubro de 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm52.pdf

Trecho:

O forte aumento no orçamento do Pentágono base desde 1998 (46% em termos reais) é substancialmente devido à escolha estratégica não, os requisitos de segurança, por si só. Ela reflete a recusa de definir prioridades, bem como um afastamento dos objectivos tradicionais de dissuasão militar, de contenção e defesa para fins mais ambiciosos: a prevenção de ameaças, o comando do commons, ea transformação do ambiente de segurança global. O âmbito geográfico de atividade dos EUA rotina militar também se expandiu.

parte do companheiro: Conjunto do Pentágono nova missão: uma opção sustentável, de Carl Conetta?. Um trecho atualizada e ampliada a partir do Relatório da Força-Tarefa em um orçamento de Segurança Unificada (USB) para os Estados Unidos, agosto de 2011. http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/111024Pentagon-missions.pdf

Charles Knight. Projeto em Defesa Memo Briefing Alternativas # 51 de 25 outubro de 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm51.pdf

Trecho:

... Mudanças modestas a estratégia militar dos EUA e da postura global, implementado ao longo dos próximos dez anos pode oferecer de forma confiável de redução do défice de poupança a partir do orçamento do Pentágono que varia de $ 73000000000 por ano, para 118,000 milhões dólares por ano.

Para alcançar as economias requer apenas a aplicação de meios diferentes para atingir objetivos estratégicos. Isso é precisamente o que qualquer boa estratégia faz quando as condições mudam.

Abubakar Siddique. Radio Free Europe , 25 October 2011.

Trecho:

Experience has shown us that foreign forces cannot bring peace to Afghanistan. We will have peace when we remove the causes of conflict among [Afghan] people,” [protest organizer] Mozhdah said. “One of the key reasons for fighting here is that we don't trust each other. We need to sit and talk to each other to gain each others trust.

Dan de Luc. Agence France-Presse, 19 de outubro de 2011.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=SEA&s=TOP&i=8003142

Trecho:

"A Ásia será claramente uma prioridade e vamos ajustar nossas operações nesse sentido," o almirante Jonathan Greenert, chefe de operações navais, disse a repórteres em uma teleconferência.

A Marinha agora mantém constantemente um porta-aviões - ou o Falcão Kitty ou o George Washington - no Pacífico, em comparação a 10 anos atrás, quando um veículo estava disponível apenas 70 por cento do tempo, disse ele.

Abu Muqawama. Center for New American Security, 13 October 2011.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/10/looking-trim-defense-budget-start-qdr.html

Trecho:

Yesterday's announcement that the Department of Defense will form a “Strategic Choices Group” to identify priorities and risks ahead of $450 billion in potential cuts to the budget is the latest example of the worthlessness of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). A strategic document would necessarily identify risks and priorities, but since the QDR does neither, the Department of Defense has to establish an entirely new working group to do just that.

See also: Is the QDR 'a PR stunt' or a sincere effort to reconcile posture and budget with strategy?

Andrew Tilghman. Defense News, 12 de outubro de 2011.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=LAN&s=TOP&i=7935114

Trecho:

Panetta disse que o Exército deve esperar reserva-componente tropas para ser uma parte vital da força de futuro.

"À medida que sacar a partir destas guerras, é preciso manter a Guarda ea Reserva operacional e ganhar experiência. Este é o melhor investimento que fiz nos últimos 10 anos ", disse ele. "Precisamos continuar a ser capaz de manter isso como um bem valioso porque a força de reserva tem um papel especial a desempenhar como uma força que dá a profundidade estratégica nação em caso de acesso crise, os únicos conjuntos de habilidades civis que podem ser úteis em conflitos modernos e como a ponte do Exército para uma ampla população civil. "

Carl Conetta. Projeto em Defesa Memo Briefing Alternativas # 50, 11 de Outubro de 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm50.pdf

Trecho:

What makes sequestration impractical (and marks it as a scare tactic) is the precipitous manner in which it would implement cuts. A gradual approach could accomplish
equivalent savings without comparable disruption. As devised, the provision is meant
to motivate, rather than mitigate, revenue increases and cuts to entitlement programs.

Inspetor Geral Especial para a Reconstrução do Iraque. Outubro de 2011.
http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October2011.html

Ethan Pollack, The Economic Policy Institute Blog , 20 September 2011. http://www.epi.org/blog/militaristic-foreign-policy-saves-money/

One of the persistent criticisms of President Obama's fiscal plan is that it counts war spending reductions as savings. Basically, the Congressional Budget Office calculates its defense baseline in part by taking the most recent war supplemental (technically called Overseas Contingency Operations, or OCO) and assuming that amount—adjusted for inflation—will be spent each year over the foreseeable horizon. This adds up to about $1.73 trillion over 10 years. The president's proposal, however, includes only $653 billion in OCO spending over 10 years, for a savings of about $1.1 trillion.

Some critics, however, allege that these savings cannot be counted because the CBO OCO baseline itself isn't realistic, therefore the savings are not “real.” For example, the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) argues that counting these savings is a “budget gimmick” that the president uses to “inflate his savings.” According to this critique, another baseline for OCO expenditures should be used—either the president's budget request or the CBO's drawdown policy option—which would lower the baseline and make it practically impossible to generate budget savings from reducing war spending.

Todo o respeito devido a CRFB e os outros críticos, mas esta crítica é bobagem. A CBO base OCO não é "irrealista", em vez disso, representa os custos de abordagem do presidente Bush invasão centrada agressivo da política externa estendida em perpetuidade. O presidente Obama é, felizmente, no processo de tentar mudar a abordagem americana para a política externa, atraindo para as tropas do Iraque e Afeganistão e se movendo em direção a uma abordagem mais multilateral, paciente, diplomática e, mais importante abordagem, menos caro. Além disso, o plano propõe fiscal para limitar os gastos OCO, assegurando desse modo essas economias são realizados.

Abordagem do presidente Barack Obama a política externa custa menos dinheiro do que o presidente Bush, e as perspectivas orçamento deve refletir essas economias.

Comentário do Editor:

Deve ser um sinal de quão ruim as coisas são para os progressistas que EPI agora celebra uma baforada de fumaça grande da administração Obama enviou para desviar a atenção das reduções orçamentais reais e, em particular, para proteger o Pentágono de mais cortes nas batalhas fiscais . Ethan Pollack trabalhou para OMB, então ele certamente entende a distorção contábil incorporado as projeções iniciais da OBC com base na legislação atual. Não uma pessoa no mundo (inclusive os CBO que preparar a linha de base) acredita que os gastos OCO vai continuar a financiar as guerras no Iraque e no Afeganistão no mesmo nível em 2011. Por isso, a CBO foi um "sacar opção política" - para estimar os custos prováveis ​​OCO. Esse último exercício não é "bobo", nem as sugestões de que tais estimativas ser a base na análise dos planos de redução de orçamento.

Mr. Pollack must also know that President Obama's FY12 budget submission to Congress contains only $50 billion a year for OCO for future years. Qual é? $118 billion forever or $50 billion forever? Você não pode ter as duas coisas.

CBO's draw down option is surely better for budget (and deficit
reduction) planning that either the unrealistic “placeholder” (which
is simply irresponsible budgeting) or the CBO baseline artifact of
$118 billion forever.

If President Obama wishes to announce a plan to save meaningful
amounts from OCO he would need to announce more rapid withdrawals from Afghanistan… but then no one really believes he is leaving
Afghanistan in 2014. So this is all smoke and mirrors…and progressives should feel terrible about it, not celebrate.

It is disingenuous to claim that the CBO's baseline OCO is somehow a Bush responsibility. It is simply a methodological artifact of how CBO does its baseline.

President Obama has been in charge for nearly three years and has not brought all the troops home from Iraq and has hardly begun a draw down in Afghanistan. The current year OCO of $118 billion is his responsibility as is the phoney-ness of projecting it forward ten years and then claiming savings from spending “$653 billion…over ten years.” If he was really willing to end the war in Afghanistan soon he might be able to cut that OCO in half and offer $325 billion from reduced future war costs to deficit reduction.

And until this year's budget imbroglio in Congress forced his hand he
has continued to feed the Pentagon with higher and higher base budgets every year. There is no evidence that President Obama's “approach to foreign policy…[is] less expensive”… not as far as the largesse offered up to the Pentagon is concerned.

We must not base progressive policy on smoke and mirrors. Tal
politics only hurts us in the long run.

Another critique of this budget gimmick can be found at: http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/gordon-adams/2369/how-about-those-defense-savings .

___________________________________________________________

A Casa Branca. Setembro de 2011.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/66998459/WH-Report-on-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan-September-2011

W. Andrew Terrill. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2 August 2011.

Mateus Leatherman. A Vontade ea Carteira, 26 de Julho de 2011.
http://thewillandthewallet.squarespace.com/blog/2011/7/26/dods-64b-question-where-is-that-64b.html

Trecho:

"CBO há muito tempo disse que os custos do programa do Ministério da Defesa subestima incluindo, mais recentemente, seu relatório sobre as implicações de longo prazo do Programa de Defesa do Futuro 2012 Anos. O estudo concluiu que "a diferença entre a projeção CBO e as estimativas do DOD para o FYDP é de cerca de 2%, ou cerca de US $ 64 bilhões, durante o período de cinco anos." "

David E. Mosher, diretor assistente de segurança nacional, Congressional Budget Office. Depoimento perante a Comissão do Orçamento, EUA Câmara dos Representantes, 07 de julho de 2011.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12162/07-07-FYDP_Testimony.pdf

editorial. Boston Globe , 30 June 2011.

Quando Leon Panetta assume o cargo no Departamento de Defesa amanhã, ele irá enfrentar escolhas difíceis sobre os esforços militares dos EUA no Afeganistão, Iraque e Líbia. But an equally pressing — and potentially even more intractable — problem is the Pentagon's budget and spending. Outgoing secretary Robert Gates was good at paying lip service to the need to control spending; he noted recently that “the United States should spend as much as necessary on national defense, but not one penny more.'' But the department's baseline budget has risen every year since Gates took over — from $450 billion to more than $550 billion four years later. This year alone, the Pentagon is seeking a 3.4 percent increase from its 2010 budget.

Não são apenas as guerras, pois eles representam menos de 30 por cento do pedido do Pentágono orçamento enorme. No contexto de outros gastos governamentais, o Pentágono é um monstro. Para cada $ 100 de despesas discricionárias, mais de $ 30 vai para as despesas não-guerra de defesa. O escopo é esmagadora; a necessidade de mais do que aos poucos cortes de sistemas com falhas é urgente.

Gates recently claimed that the Pentagon has already cut $300 billion, but the math suggests otherwise. Esse dinheiro veio de programas já agendados para ser encerrado. The savings were simply put into other military priorities. Depois de notar que 11 da Marinha grupos de batalha de transporte eram excessivos, Gates se recusou a eliminar um único.

Panetta will need to take a more disciplined and systemic look at the budget. There is no shortage of advice from influential think tanks and independent studies, including last year's report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force , a bipartisan group convened by Representative Barney Frank. As suas recomendações seria cortar 960.000 milhões dólares entre 2011 e 2020, se apenas o Pentágono agir sobre eles.

Cutting the number of deployed nuclear weapons by half — to 1,000 warheads — is consistent with a reduced emphasis on nuclear warfare and the efforts of arms control advocates. This move alone would save over $100 billion over 10 years. Reducing conventional forces by 50,000, which would still leave 100,000 personnel deployed in Europe and Asia, is more realistic force structure. Cancelling just a few systems that are neither cost-effective nor essential would save more. The MV-22 Osprey and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle are long on trouble, and short on capability. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office both have proposed changes to support efforts, such as maintenance, supply, and infrastructure, that could save $100 billion in the next decade.

All this could be accomplished without compromising national security. Panetta needs to push back on the political forces that claim any cuts make the nation vulnerable to various enemies. The deficit is a much greater security risk.

Infelizmente, o Pentágono continua a ser a maior agência federal que simplesmente não pode passar um teste de auditor independente, quando submetida aos procedimentos de escrituração normais, ele não pode, com alguma precisão, os gastos pista, fraude, desperdício ou redundância. It has given itself a September 2017 deadline for audit “readiness.'' That's not soon enough. Panetta, que, como o ex-chefe do Escritório de Administração e Orçamento, tem uma reputação como um lutador rigoroso de disciplina fiscal. Ele vai precisar de ter a casa do Pentágono, a fim de um dia.

Task Force on A Unified Security Budget Institute for Policy Studies , July 2011.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/Unified_Security_Budget_FY2012.pdf

Melvin Goodman. Baltimore Sun, 29 Junho de 2011.

Trecho:

Em suas palestras recentes, Gates advertiu contra qualquer congelamento nos gastos de defesa, deixando Panetta para lidar com sistemas de armas e missões militares que os Estados Unidos já não podem pagar. Como o ex-diretor do Escritório de Administração e Orçamento, Panetta presumivelmente entende que os Estados Unidos, com menos de 25 por cento da produção econômica mundial e mais de 50 por cento dos gastos militares do mundo, terá que restringir certas armas e missões. O orçamento da defesa cresceu mais de 50 por cento nos últimos 10 anos e agora supera o ritmo de gastos da era da Guerra Fria, incluindo as guerras da Coréia e do Vietnã, bem como o acúmulo de paz do presidente Ronald Reagan.

Um reexame das implementações atuais de tropas deve incluir as dezenas de milhares de tropas na Europa e na Ásia há mais de seis décadas após o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, centenas de bases e instalações em todo o mundo, e a vontade excessiva de projectar poder em áreas como Iraque, Afeganistão e Líbia, onde interesses nacionais vitais não estão em jogo.

The White House, 29 June 2011.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism

White House Fact Sheet National Strategy for Counterterrorism

A Casa Branca
29 de junho de 2011

“As a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda's terror: Justice has been done.”

–President Barack Obama
01 de maio de 2011

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, found here, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf formalizes the approach that President Obama and his Administration have been pursuing and adapting for the past two and half years to prevent terrorist attacks and to deliver devastating blows against al-Qa'ida, including the successful mission to kill Usama bin Laden.

Rather than defining our entire national security policy, this counterterrorism strategy is one part of President Obama's larger National Security Strategy, which seeks to advance our enduring national security interests, including our security, prosperity, respect for universal values and global cooperation to meet global challenges.

This Strategy builds upon the progress we have made in the decade since 9/11, in partnership with Congress, to build our counterterrorism and homeland security capacity as a nation. It neither represents a wholesale overhaul—nor a wholesale retention—of previous policies and strategies.

Threat —This Strategy recognizes there are numerous nations and groups that support terrorism to oppose US interests, including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and HAMAS, and we will use the full range of our foreign policy tools to protect the United States against these threats.

However, the principal focus of this counterterrorism strategy is the network that poses the most direct and significant threat to the United States—al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and its adherents.

Al-Qa'ida has murdered thousands of our citizens, including on 9/11.

Al-Qa'ida affiliates—groups that have aligned with al-Qa'ida—have attempted to attack us, such as Yemen-based al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) failed attempt to bomb a Detroit-bound airliner on December 25, 2009.

Al-Qa'ida adherents—individuals, sometimes American citizens, who cooperate with or are inspired by al-Qa'ida—have engaged in terrorism, including the tragic slaughter of our service members at Fort Hood in 2009.

Our Ultimate Objective —This Strategy is clear and precise in our ultimate objective: we will disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qa'ida—its leadership core in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our citizens and interests.

Our Posture —We are at war. We are waging a broad, sustained, integrated and relentless campaign that harnesses every element of American power to defeat al-Qa'ida.

Our Goals –To defeat al-Qa'ida, we are pursuing specific counterterrorism goals, including:

Protecting our homeland by constantly reducing our vulnerabilities and adapting and updating our defenses.

Disrupting, degrading, dismantling and defeating al-Qa'ida wherever it takes root.

Preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction.

Eliminating the safehavens al-Qa'ida needs to train, plot and launch attacks against us.

Degrading links between al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and adherents.

Countering al-Qa'ida ideology and its attempts to justify violence.

Depriving al-Qa'ida and its affiliates of their enabling means, including illicit financing, logistical support, and online communications.

Our Principles —Our pursuit of these goals is guided by several key principles, including:

Upholding core American values, including rule of law and the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all Americans;

Harnessing every tool at our disposal, including intelligence, military, homeland security and law enforcement, and maximizing cooperation between communities;

Building partnerships to with international institutions and partners so that nations can take the fight to al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and adherents in their own countries;

Applying tools appropriately, recognizing that different threats in different regions demand different tools;

Building a culture of preparedness and resilience at home to prevent terrorist attacks and ensure we can quickly recover should an attack occur.

Devastating Blows Against Al-Qa'ida—guided by this Strategy, we have achieved significant progress against al-Qa'ida over the past two and a half years.

We have put al-Qa'ida under more pressure than at any time since 9/11, affecting its ability to attract new recruits and making it harder for al-Qa'ida to train and plot attacks.

Al-Qa'ida's leadership ranks have been decimated, with more key leaders eliminated in rapid succession than at any time since 9/11.

Virtually every major al-Qa'ida affiliate has lost its key leader or operational commander.

More than half of al-Qa'ida's leadership has been eliminated, including Usama bin Laden.

“On a Path to Defeat” —As President Obama stated in his June 22 remarks on our way forward in Afghanistan, “we have put al Qaeda on a path to defeat, and we will not relent until the job is done.”

Information seized from his compound reveals bin Laden's concerns about al-Qa'ida's long-term viability.

Bin Laden clearly saw that al-Qa'ida is losing the larger battle for hearts and minds.

Bin Laden knew that he had failed to portray America as being at war with Islam.

He knew that al-Qa'ida's murder of so many innocent civilians, most of them Muslims, had deeply and perhaps permanently tarnished al-Qa'ida's image in the world.

Editor's Comment:

In terms of military means of countering terrorism it has been reported that this Counterterrorism Strategy signals the shift away from large-scale ground interventions in foreign countries and consequently will reduce the requirement for counter-insurgency capabilities in the armed forces. Instead it relies more on special forces assisted by drones to target principals in terrorist organizations.

Time will tell whether COIN is on the way out.

William Hartung. Huffington Post, 28 de Junho de 2011.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/afghanistan-for-real-savi_b_886241.html

Trecho:

Não haverá poupanças em larga escala a partir do encerramento progressivo da guerra no Afeganistão, até praticamente todas as forças norte-americanas sejam retiradas. Mesmo assim ainda há chances de haver custos em curso para treinamento, equipamento e possivelmente até mesmo pagando forças de segurança afegãs, o que poderia custar até US $ 10 bilhões ou mais por ano se as taxas atuais são mantidas. Mas a grande massa de os US $ 120 bilhões por ano passou a ser utilizada a guerra vai ser liberada para outros fins: redução do défice, ou investimentos públicos, ou alguma combinação dos dois.

Um fim para o Afeganistão e as guerras do Iraque também pode abrir o caminho para um debate mais abrangente pública sobre o orçamento do Pentágono base de 550000 milhões dólares-plus anual - uma soma mais de quatro vezes maior do que o que gastamos com as guerras. Politicamente, fazer cortes reais nos gastos do Pentágono durante um tempo de guerra é uma tarefa difícil, mesmo dada a nossa situação orçamental actual. Mas um fim às guerras, combinados com a pressão do déficit pode levar a cortes reais no orçamento do Pentágono de base, bem como, especialmente se adotar uma nova estratégia que forswears grandes guerras de campanhas de ocupação ou de grande escala insurreição do tipo da nossa nação tem empreendido no Iraque e no Afeganistão. Se cortarmos os gastos de guerra e trazer maior orçamento do Pentágono em linha com a realidade, então estaremos falando de dinheiro real.

Jeff Jacoby. Boston Globe , 22 June 2011.

Trecho:

... Com grande poder vêm grandes responsabilidades, e às vezes uma dessas responsabilidades é destruir os monstros: para derrubar tiranos que vitimam inocentes e desrespeitam as regras da civilização. Se os bairros e as cidades precisam de policiamento, que está para raciocinar o mundo faz também. E assim como os criminosos locais prosperar quando policiais olhar para o outro, assim como os criminosos no cenário mundial.

Nosso mundo precisa de um policial. E se a maioria dos norte-americanos gostam ou não, só nação a sua indispensável é apto para o trabalho.

Comentário do Editor:

Quando três quartos dos americanos rejeitam o papel de polícia global para os EUA, talvez eles entendam algo fundamental sobre policiamento que Jeff Jacoby não. Uma força policial sem a supervisão de um Judiciário e um corpo orientador da lei é certamente uma fórmula para a tirania.

Jacoby nunca iria endossar a tirania, mas a vocação para ser global por policiais ocupantes da Casa Branca que são eleitos por e responsável por apenas 10% da população mundial é uma decisão de ser um vigilante no palco global. Considere que os americanos estariam em pé de guerra, se a China ou a Rússia tomou para si a ser vigilantes globais.

Para os líderes de que os EUA tão alegremente para assumir esse papel só serve para atrasar o dia em que temos capazes instituições internacionais judiciais e policiais. Se os nossos dirigentes tentam pensar até alguns anos no futuro deve ficar claro para eles que a prática de vigilantismo não serve os interesses americanos.

[Uma versão deste comentário foi publicado como carta ao editor do Boston Globe, 28 de Junho de 2011.]

Sandra Erwin. National Defense , 10 June 2011.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=441

Trecho:

Not only are there internal disagreements within the Pentagon and the Obama administration over what the military services will be doing in the future, but factions within Congress also will be pushing individual agendas. “In Congress, you have 535 individuals and every one of them thinks they're in charge,” O'Keefe said. “If you don't have some benchmark to work with to start the discussion,” the Pentagon will lose control over what gets cut in future budgets.

“If there is no strategic framework, that is what will happen: The process takes over,” said O'Keefe. Defense leaders should come up with a reasonable strategic framework as early as possible that they can sell to Congress, he said. “Absent that, it is going to be the programmers and bean counters driving the train to meet a number.”

A coherent message from the Defense Department is “missing right now,” said John J. Hamre, president of CSIS and former deputy defense secretary.

“What are we really trying to plan for, as a Defense Department, that is good for 20 years?” he asked. “Are we going to get the hell out of these wars and never fight them again? What are we preparing for?” he added. “That, I think, is the work for the next six months.”

There has to be a sense of urgency about articulating a plan for the future of the US military, because increasingly the American public is losing patience with seemingly endless wars and gridlock over how to move forward, Hamre said

Passos para a disciplina de Defesa do Orçamento , um briefing Colina patrocinado pelos contribuintes para o bom senso eo Projeto sobre Alternativas de Defesa, 7 de Junho de 2011, de vídeo pelo Centro Stimson . Elenco: Amy Belasco, Carl Conetta, Benjamin Friedman, Leatherman Mateus, Laura Peterson e Winslow Wheeler.

Carlton Meyer. G2mil.com, junho de 2011.
http://www.g2mil.com/OBCL.htm

Trecho:

Aqui está uma lista de bases militares norte-americanas no exterior desatualizados que podem ser imediatamente fechados para economizar bilhões de dólares a cada ano ...

Feche Bases militares estadunidenses na desatualizados Japão - Futenma & Atsugi

Puxe aeronaves e militares da Força Aérea de Osan Out - agora em uma zona de matança

Cut Exército Gordura na Coréia - 8 º Exército e Daegu

Desocupar Duas Bases do Exército na Alemanha - como uma vez planejado

Perto da Estação de Torii - uma base dos EUA Exército em Okinawa?

Desocupar Lakenheath RAF - os russos não estão vindo

Fechar Gitmo, toda a base - que não tem nenhum propósito

Feche Chinhae Amanhã - ele comanda nada

[Há mais argumentação sobre cada um deles na origem.]

Winslow Wheeler. Guest Post, 24 May 2011.

The National Defense Authorization bill, HR 1540, will be debated by the House of Representatives this week. The bill is the work product of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Chaired by Congressman Buck McKeon, R. – Calif..

The Operation and Maintenance section (Title XLIII) of the bill is one of its largest and most important. “O&M” deals with the support, logistics, maintenance, training and much else needed to enable our armed forces to function effectively. $170.8 billion was requested by President Obama; the committee increased that by $361 million to $171.1 billion. However, to get there the Committee took some detours.

Sprinkled throughout the O&M title the HASC added various earmarks (one minor example: $4.0 million for “Simulation Training Systems for the Army” [p. 430 of the Committee Report]). All of these came to a lot more than the $361 million net add to the bill. The Committee and its staff had to find offsets to help pay for these earmark goodies and other additions.

In past years, the HASC (and the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittees of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees) has listed strange sounding reductions in the O&M sections of their bills – “unobligated balances.” These should be technical alterations for money previously appropriated to the various military services for various programs; they become “unobligated” when the planned expenditure does not occur, and they presumably become available for offsets for new spending, or – if the Committee were to be more forthcoming to the taxpayer – return to the Treasury.

For example, on p. 432 of the HASC Committee Report, the tables for Army O&M show a reduction of $384.6 million labeled “Army unobligated balances estimate.” That amount happens to be 1.1% of the president's request for total Army O&M ($34.735 billion).

The Navy section on O&M in the HASC bill shows a $435.9 million reduction for “Navy unobligated balances estimate.” For some strange reason, that amount also calculates to 1.1% of the President's request for Navy O&M ($39.365 billion).

Stranger even, the Marine Corps O&M reduction for unobligated balances as also 1.1% ($66 million of a $5.960 billion request).

Same thing for the Air Force; the same 1.1% ($400.8 million from a $36.195 billion request).

None of these are discussed or explained in the text of the committee report; the only “explanation” we get is that they are “Army [or Navy, or Air Force, etc.] unobligated balances estimate.”

That all of these “estimates,” which should be technical in their nature, come to 1.1% reeks of gaming the system. Two relevant questions: Who did it? E por quê?

First, I seriously question if these conveniently similar estimates did indeed come from the military services. That would require a rather strange (and specious) amount of coordination by them all to all come to 1.1% of their respective O&M budget requests.

Secondly, why are there no “unobligated balances” in the procurement and R&D titles, which are heavy with the kind of spending that can end up “unobligated”?

Third, why isn't this money being returned to the Treasury, from whence it came and now belongs if indeed the money is no longer needed by the Defense Department?

There are lots of other questions, but hopefully you get my drift. The offsets the HASC took, calling them “unobligated balances,” are nothing but across the board whacks at one of the most importance accounts in the DOD budget – the one that makes for a well trained and supported military. Why is the HASC doing these across the board cuts, and why are they doing it in O&M?

There are some other “unobligated balance” issues in the bill. The defense wide part of O&M also took a $456.8 million hit from a request of $30.940 billion. This comes to 1.47%. Why does the part that supports the special forces and others take a bigger proportional hit than the other military services?

Also, the Defense Health Program takes a $225 million hit which is “explained” as a “GAO estimate,” but no GAO analysis or other explanation is offered.

The Military Personnel budget that pays military salaries takes a $693 million hit from a $142.828 billion request (.48%). I found no explanation.

Finally, section 2107 permits the Secretary of the Army to use $115 million in previously “unobligated” spending to fund a water treatment facility at Fort Irwin California. Perhaps the House representative from the Fort Irwin area can explain how all this works and how he or she got to fund some spending in the district from these ubiquitous funds.

In my judgment, the HASC, which is charged with oversight of DOD, could use a little oversight itself.

Pentagon's Phantom Savings: $330B Claim Erodes as Programs Reappear
Marcus Weisgerber. Defense News , 16 May 2011.
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2011/05/pentagons-phantom-savings-330b-claim.html

Trecho:

Nearly 40 percent of that sum [$330 billion] is going straight back into US military programs that replicate the canceled ones, and it's unclear where another 10 percent came from at all, according to a Defense News analysis and to several analysts.

…many of the military services' capability requirements remained in place. More than $130 billion is back on the books, or will be soon, for follow-on or replacement programs. Of the programs canceled in 2010, at least five have already been relaunched, or are in the planning stages to begin again.

Comentário do Editor:

When President Obama addressed the nation about the Federal deficit on April 13th he said, “Over the last two years, Secretary Gates has courageously taken on wasteful spending, saving $400 billion in current and future spending. I believe we can do that again.” A number of us military budget analysts looked at each other and said, “Huh, did we miss something?” We hadn't notice any significant cuts in Pentagon spending that could count toward reducing the Federal deficit. Where did the President get that big number?

Of course, we had taken notice when Defense Secretary Gates had announced $78 billion in budget cuts for the FY12 five year defense plan. We noted that the DoD budget would still continue to grow, that some of these cuts were fairly soft (dependent on assumptions about future inflation rates) and most savings would be generated in the out-years. (See: Pentagon Resists Deficit Reduction )

And we had noted that Secretary Gates had cancelled a number of programs in 2009. But we also noted that many of the cancelled programs were being replaced by others substantially reducing the putative savings (see Gordon Adams, Defense Budgets: Still Need to Get it Right! )

In the days following the President's speech we commented on how there was much less real savings than the President attributed to Secretary Gates' “courageous” efforts. I pointed out that $68 billion of the January $78 billion in savings had been consumed when 2012 war costs appeared in the budget released in February, replacing small placeholder numbers.

Benjamin Friedman observed that “current 'savings' consist entirely of spending that the Pentagon reprogrammed and kept, and the future 'savings' come by reducing planned spending growth, rather than reducing actual spending.”

Carl Conetta reviewed the history of these supposed cuts going back to 2009 and compared successive Obama budgets, 2010 through 2012, finding no more than $233 billion in “maybe” DoD reductions in projected out years.

The collective skepticism of independent analysts about the $400 billion no doubt reached the attention of the editors of Defense News , the leading defense industry weekly, where Marcus Weisgerber sought to justify Secretary Gates' claim of $330 billion in savings from the 2009 program cancellations. When DoD officials refused a request to give a program-by-program breakdown of the figure Defense News “used budget justification documents, DoD officials' public statements, annual acquisition reports and Government Accountability Office estimates to project program costs. For classified and far-term programs not on the books – but factored into DoD's projections – think tank and analysts' estimates were used.” The Weisgerber article title, “ Pentagon's Phantom Savings “, sums up the results of Defense News' effort to justify Secretary Gates' claim of savings.

Defesa editorial News, 16 de maio de 2011.
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2011/05/us-defense-budget-get-real-pentagon.html~~V

Trecho:

Há um velho ditado de que Washington não o dinheiro é menos real do que no ano-dinheiro. Isto significa que qualquer coisa que está além da conta da despesa imediata é puramente teórico.

Controle exigência é um método popular de limitar os custos de novas armas, mas é igualmente importante para controlar o crescente número de missões.

O primeiro passo deve ser o de assegurar a revisão papéis e missões ordenadas por despedimentos Obama barras desnecessárias e dispendiosas nas capacidades.

Em segundo lugar, o Pentágono deve evitar fazer o que ele fez - retratando números macios como os duros que fazem pouco mais do que expô-lo à crítica.

Por último, a fazer cortes sábios, o Pentágono deve melhorar seus processos internos de gestão financeira para identificar o que é gasto e como. Sem dados concretos, é difícil chegar a poupança rígidos.

Charles Knight. Project on Defense Alternatives Note , 12 May 2011.

Word is that two principals in the production of 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review will be charged with producing the “fundamental” defense review President Obama ordered in his April 13th speech on the deficit. They are Kathleen Hicks , Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Planning, who was the lead 2010 QDR author and David Ochmanek , Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, who headed the “analysis and integration cell” which pulled together all the analytical aspects of the last QDR.

Atualizar

Defense News reports (23 May 2011) that “The missions and capabilities review will be led by Christine Fox , director of cost assessment and program evaluations [and formerly the President of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)]; Michele Flournoy , defense undersecretary for policy [and the Pentagon official in charge of the 2010 QDR]; and Adm. Michael Mullen , Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Comentário do Editor:

Putting the same people who did the 2010 review in charge of producing the new review raises an obvious question of whether we should expect anything much “new” or “fundamental” from this review. QDRs in the past have certainly failed to be “fundamental” in any meaningful sense of the word.

One suspects that the foregone sub-text of what Ms. Hicks writes into the new review will be, “We got this pretty much right when we did it last year. Now, of course, if you are willing to take greater security risks you can cut some pieces out of the force posture, but that is a political decision…”

If the new review makes such a smug presentation it will serve the President and the nation poorly. The 2010 QDR did not make any real effort to set clear priorities among the many military requirements it listed, failing one of the principles of strategy development which is to set a practical path within resource constraints. A new fundamental review must present a variety of low-risk options that can be achieved at various resource investment levels. Its authors should not be allowed to simply push the matter of security risk into the political domain.

President Obama would be smart to solicit ideas from a wide variety of sources, reaching far beyond the Pentagon's strategy, policy and force planning staff. If a fundamental review is needed, it is wise to hear and consider diverse voices.

Winslow Wheeler. Center for Defense Information, May 2011.
http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/GreenbookInflationMay11.pdf

Trecho:

The comparison of DOD's prediction of inflation for itself compared to the commonly accepted GDP measure looms as a major consideration when one considers the time frame that President Obama and Congress are contemplating in the context of deficit reduction. The President's Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform assumed a budget window of 10 years from 2011 to 2020. In his April 13 speech on deficit reduction the president addressed a budget window going out to 2023, when he implied, but did not explain, a reduction in the planned “security” budget of $400 billion in the 2012 -2023 time frame.

There are multiple caveats and uncertainties in the defense related reductions the president appears to have been talking about; these should be identified before identifying how the inflation issue impacts any contemplated savings. Eles são a seguinte redacção:

• The manner in which the president addressed past and future “savings” made it unclear the extent to which he was addressing actual reductions in spending, or “savings” as efficiencies (ie internal transfers inside the DOD budget as Secretary of Defense Gates has for the most part been conducting);

• No DOD budget figures exist for some of the years the president addressed; available DOD figures go out to only 2016; available OMB figures for defense spending go out to 2021, but the amounts for 2022-2023 are unknown; it is also notable that in recent budget history, most deficit reduction plans have spanned either five or ten years, not twelve; the latter spreads out the annual amount required to be saved, and – more importantly – moving savings out to years as far as ten or twelve years away literally moves them to never-never land;

• No figures were released for any reductions in any year, whether the pre-existing annual budget was known or unknown;

• The target for these $400 billion in “savings” is the “security” budget, not just the Defense Department's budget. The security category includes not just DOD but the State Department/International Affairs budget function, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the nuclear weapons activities of the Department of Energy, and other miscellaneous programs and agencies; the Defense Department's proposed share of the $400 billion “savings” is unknown, and

• Materials released by the White House at the time of the speech asserted that the new plan had a “goal” to hold DOD spending “below” the rate of inflation. While DOD's preferred rates of inflation will – as always – be used for the DOD budget, the differences between the DOD and GDP inflation indices for the years beyond 2016 have also not been made available.

… if the Department of Defense is held to the rate of inflation – or just “below” – as calculated by the DOD inflation indices, it is clear from the above analysis that it will be quite possible for the Pentagon to enjoy “real” growth – under the more generally accepted GDP indices.

Carl Conetta. Projeto sobre Alternativas de Defesa Note, 30 de Abril de 2011.

Por que nossa gastos com a defesa tão alto e aparentemente fora de controle? Muita tinta foi derramada tratar dessa questão, incluindo o meu próprio resumo, o orçamento do Pentágono em Fuga .

Andy Bacevich pode chegar mais perto das principais dinâmicas políticas em Por Gastos Militares permanece intocável .

Não há melhor exemplo da dinâmica disfuncional política que rege o orçamento do Pentágono do que afirmação do presidente Obama (13 de abril de 2011) da alegação de que o Secretário de Defesa Gates "já salvou" a nação $ 400 bilhões em gastos com a defesa. E não há melhor ilustração da pobreza do nosso discurso sobre este assunto do que o facto de o crédito passa em grande medida sem contestação.

A maior parte dos US $ 400 bilhões em mais cedo DoD "poupança" que o presidente Obama atribuiu a Gates secretário não são "economias" no sentido comum da palavra. Eles não aparecem como reduções DoD planos orçamentais de um ano para o outro, como mostrado abaixo. Na melhor das hipóteses, eles representam DoD marginalmente ajustando os seus programas e aspirações para marginalmente lidar com o crescimento dos custos em espiral.

Analogia grosseira: Dito que iria entregar um "totalmente carregado" Cadillac por um determinado preço X, e ter descoberto que o preço estimado é totalmente irrealista, um negociante de carro de volta apara algumas das características e oferece algo a menos para o preço total prometida . A maioria dos consumidores chamaria isso de enganar um não, uma poupança.

A alternativa seria a DoD para impulsionar ainda mais a pedidos de orçamento subseqüentes para reflectir plenamente o crescimento dos custos, e deixar que o Congresso eo Executivo reconsiderar o que eles queriam comprar. Acho que se poderia dizer que DoD foi "salvo" estas autoridades da dor de cabeça de tomar essa decisão. Totalmente confrontar um preço realista dos programas atuais poderia levar a uma reflexão profunda-going da nossa postura de defesa e os esforços de modernização. Mas isso é demais para considerar.

Agora, vamos tentar encontrar os $ 400 bilhões em "economias" ....

THE $400 BILLION

1. Much of the $400 billion that Secretary Gates is claimed to have saved derives from his April 2009 announcement of program cuts. Gates claims that the systems and programs he cut in 2009 would have eventually cost more than $300 billion. However, at least some of this was immediately reprogrammed, meaning: DoD used the savings to buy other things.

April 2009 Gates Defense Budget Recommendation Statement

2. In August 2010 and January 2011, Secretary Gates outlined additional “cuts” and “savings” totaling $178 billion. Of this, $100 billion was immediately reprogrammed to purchase other things or cover other costs. The remaining $78 billion was supposed to be released from the Pentagon orbit to help pay down the deficit. In the August 2010 statement, we find Gates' claiming that his earlier 2009 effort has already saved more than $300 billion.

August 2010 Gates Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative

Jan 2011 Gates Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies

PDA summary chart re: the $178 billion

3. How much (if any) of the earlier “more than $300 billion” in savings was similarly given over for deficit reduction? Looking at actual budget plans, what do we see? The first $300 billion was announced in April 2009 and it might reasonably have shown up as difference between the last Bush budget plan (FY09) and the first Obama budget plan (FY10).

Comparison between these two budget plans is easy for the years 2010-2013:
- Bush FY09 planned total spending for 2010-2013 = 2.155 trillion
- Obama FY10 planned total spending for 2010-2013 = 2.183 trillion

An increase is not a reduction, therefore: no savings apparent in the near years.

4. Obama's next budget plan (FY11) foresaw a significant increase over his first. So, no savings apparent there either.

5. Only in the next plan – the FY12 plan – do we see a reduction in planned spending between FY12 and FY11 plans. In the nine years that overlap between the FY11 and FY12 plans, we see a reduction of about $233 billion.

But the FY12 plan follows Gates' second announcement of cuts and savings (summarized in #2 above). So, at least, $78 billion derives from that and not the earlier cuts. Indeed, when we compare the FY12 plan with the FY11 plan for the years 2012-2016, there is a reduction in planned spending of $76 billion. Still no apparent impact from the April 2009 “cuts,” however.

6. Well, as noted above, the total difference between the FY11 and FY12 plan for the years 2012-2020 is $233 billion. 233 minus 78 = 155. This additional planning rollback of $155 billion shows up for the years after 2016. So maybe we've found at least $155 billion of the earlier supposed cut? Maybe it just took 2 years to register? Talvez.

“Maybe” because the Obama FY12 budget rolls back planned spending almost exactly to the levels foreseen in the Obama FY10 budget …being the budget that was larger than the final Bush budget and being the budget that showed no impact from Gates' April 2009 offer. To put it another way: Obama's FY12 budget simply rolls back the future spending plan he produced in FY11 to the level he had proposed in FY10. The FY12 plan simply disappears the increase proposed in FY11.

7. The other possible (likely) reading of all this is that: (i) None of the original $300 billion “saved” ever left the Pentagon,
(ii) The $78 billion that Gates offered up to deficit reduction is the only “savings” really specified so far to actually show up as a reduction in planned spending, and (iii) The other $155 billion that the FY12 plan subtracts from the FY11 plan involves as yet unspecified cuts and efficiencies.

Project on Defense Alternatives Budget Brief , 28 April 2011.

The Obama Administration to date has made three successive Pentagon budget requests: FY10, FY11, and FY12. Each has looked ten years into the future.

On 13 April, the President offered a new proposal and framework — a revision to achieve greater deficit reduction. It looks forward 12 years. How do all these compare?

A fim de comparar os planos sucessivos do presidente, é preciso esticar as anteriores até o novo horizonte definido em seu discurso de 13 de abril, que é 2023. Analisar os pedidos de orçamento mostra que, em cada caso, as projeções para os anos "para fora" - os anos cauda-end - foram gerados pela aplicação de um inflador simples. Podemos adotar essas inflators de esticar todos os pedidos para fora para 2023. Claro, o resultado deve ser considerado como apenas a estimativa um de intenções da administração.

A diferença entre os FY11 e FY12 planos para o período de 10 anos 2012-2021 é de cerca de $ 240 bilhões. Esticá-la por mais dois anos ea diferença cresce para cerca de US $ 400 bilhões. Isso mostra que as diferenças entre os planos (quando medido em "depois do ano" de dólares) realmente começar a se acumular à medida que avançamos mais e mais para o futuro.

Tendo em mente que o Congresso deve considerar e passar o ano orçamental por ano, qualquer série de projecções orçamentais sair doze anos, ao longo de três mandatos presidenciais e diferentes condições econômicas, deve ser julgado distintamente incerta.

Abaixo estão os valores do orçamento total (em "depois do ano" de dólares) para sucessivos planos do presidente. Cada plano é também pesou como uma porcentagem de o mais rapidamente uma (ou seja, EF10):

FY10 plan for 2012-2023: 7543 billion = 100%

FY11 plan for 2012-2023: 7947 billion = 105%

FY12 plan for 2012-2023: 7512 billion = 99%

New (April 13) proposal for 2012-23: 7112 billion = 94%

The most consequential years for national policy are the next five: 2012-2016, which constitute the FYDP. The President's successive requests for these years are more firm and we needn't do any estimating to derive them. All the Administration budget requests have been explicit about these years. And reviewing the successive requests for 2012-2016 shows that the difference among them is not as substantial:

FY10 plan for 2012-2016: 2878 billion = 100%

FY11 plan for 2012-2016: 2995 billion = 104%

FY12 plan for 2012-2016: 2919 billion = 101%

We don't yet know what the President's April 13 proposal will imply for the 2012-2016 period. It's a fair bet, though, that he will want to reinstate his earlier request to DoD that $150 billion be “saved” in the near future and not just the $78 billion pledged earlier this year by Secretary Gates. That would produce the following:

New plan for 2012-2016: 2845 billion = 99%

If this proves true, the rollback in planned spending for the five years that matter most will be modest, verging on insignificant.

Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo #49, 25 April 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1104bm49.pdf

There is good reason to welcome a strategic review, as promised by President Obama on 13 April. For nearly 14 years, US defense policy has been guided by the “QDR consensus” – a set of axioms and imperatives that won adherence among defense planners in the course of four Quadrennial Defense Reviews, beginning in 1997. In retrospect, this consensus has produced a syndrome of profligate and desultory military activism. It has fed the dysfunctions of our military procurement system and helped drive the Pentagon's base budget to unsustainable heights. Certainly, it is time for a fresh start. But will the promised review deliver?

Will the review be more open and critical than the QDRs it aims to rectify? How deep will it dig? Will it even aim to “rectify?” Or will it serve a more narrow purpose: a revised bargain among the Commander-in-Chief, his defense secretary, and the chiefs of the armed services to exchange modest new constraints on budget growth for a strong rationale, a bulwark, against any further cuts.

What the President seeks is only $400 billion in savings over 12 years – about 6.5% of planned base budget expenditures. Last year, the President's Fiscal Commission and other independent task forces identified more than twice as much in potential defense savings over a period of just ten years. And it is unclear whether the President intends to extract the $400 billion from the Pentagon's budget alone or from the larger “security basket,” which includes International Affairs, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs.

Also, it is not encouraging that the President applauded Defense Security Gates for having “already saved” $400 billion in previous years, when most of those “savings” never left the Pentagon's coffers, nor dented the government's deficits. What the nation needs now are “savings” in the colloquial sense of an actual decrease in defense spending.

A serious strategic review should enable considerably more than a 6.5% retraction in planned future expenditures. It should do more than limit future growth. And maybe it will. But we should recognize at the start that what the President has proposed is not itself substantial enough to actually necessitate a strategic review. Yes, we need one – but not because the President hopes to modestly dampen Pentagon growth.

To be meaningful, such a review must look well beyond $400 billion in savings, and even beyond what the Fiscal Commission and other task forces have proposed. Of course, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen disagree. They have already publicly derided any substantial new constraints on their spending as putting the nation and its armed services at risk. The strategic review should be more than a conciliatory concession to their concerns, which are tendentious.

We can gain needed perspective by comparing recent budget submissions and proposals in historical context. This table prepared by PDA converts recent plans and proposals into average annual Pentagon base budgets, expressed in 2010 dollars. It shows that the President's requests and proposals, including his recent one, would produce average annual budgets that occupy a narrow band of spending. They are all close cousins.

Even the more ambitious proposal by the Sustainable Defense Task Force does not go far afield.

All of the President's requests and proposals produce average annual budgets that, in real terms, exceed previous spending, exceed Reagan-era levels of spending, and substantially exceed average spending during the entire Cold War period. (And, notably, the budget average for the Cold War years includes war spending, while the more recent averages do not.)

We should gladly accept the opportunity for a review of defense planning and work to make it worthwhile. But we need not and should not accept the idea that modest revisions in budget planning give good reason to hit the “strategy panic” button.

Sebastian Sprenger writing in Inside Defense on 21 April 2011 reports that the QDR Red Team headed by Gen. James Mattis (USMC) and Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessment, raised concerns in 2009 about the fiscal restraint effects of the deep recession on military plans to be represented in the QDR.

The Red Team report was not made public. When the QDR was published in early 2010 it did not include a presentation of the effects of fiscal constraints.

Last week, a little more than a year later, President Obama asked Secretary Gates to find $400 billion in additional security budget cuts over a twelve year period and called for a new review of military roles and missions.

The effect of this development will be an update of the 2010 QDR which will likely now heed the concerns of the 2009 Red Team concerning fiscal constraints.

On Wednesday April 13th 2001, President Obama announced an initiative to roll back planned security spending by $400 billion over the next 12 years. A natureza destas "economias" Ainda não está claro. Também não é claro o quanto será descontado dos planos de gastos do Pentágono.

No entanto, o secretário Gates e os chefes não estão satisfeitos e começaram a fazer barulho sobre os riscos à segurança. Aparentemente, eles não foram informados sobre a proposta até terça-feira.

Part of the initiative is to begin a “fundamental review of America's missions, capabilities, and our role in a changing world.” What and how much is subtracted from the Pentagon will depend on this review. Notavelmente, os Estados Unidos acabou de completar uma Revisão Quadrienal de Defesa no ano passado. O que o presidente propõe é uma espécie de "segundo olhar." O presidente, o secretário Gates, e os chefes de serviço serão os principais motores desse processo. Qual a profundidade o seu "segundo olhar" vai não é clara. E parece que as linhas de batalha estão já a ser desenhado.

At a press conference on Wednesday, Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell said the review would likely affect the 2013 budget. Não vai ficar pronto até junho, quando o debate parlamentar do orçamento 2012 começa.

Como será aberto o processo de revisão ser? Nós ainda não sabemos. Mas a experiência das revisões recentes de defesa não é encorajador. Ainda devemos saudar este primeiro passo e se esforçam para abrir o processo. The need for a rethinking our defense strategy and posture was emphasized in the 2010 report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force :

[I] ara garantir uma economia significativa, devemos mudar a maneira como nós produzimos poder militar e as maneiras pelas quais nós colocá-lo para usar. Economias significativas podem depender da nossa vontade de:

Repensar os nossos compromissos de segurança nacional e metas para garantir que eles se concentrar claramente sobre o que nos interessa mais;

Redefinir nossa estratégia de segurança nacional para que ele reflita um equilíbrio custo-benefício entre os instrumentos de segurança à nossa disposição e utiliza os instrumentos de custo-benefício, e

Reformar o nosso sistema de produção de meios de defesa por isso.

News links on President Obama's proposed rollback in planned security spending, his call for a strategic review, and the Pentagon's reaction:

DOD: Encontrando mais a poupança do Orçamento de Defesa Meios nixing Missões . Christopher J. Castelli. Inside Defense , 13 April 2011.

Obama pede revisão abrangente de estratégia militar dos EUA . Sandra Erwin. Defesa Nacional, 13 de abril de 2011.

Pentágono alerta sobre cortes na defesa grandes . Missy Ryan e Jim Wolf. Reuters, 13 de abril de 2011.

Defesa chefe adverte contra os cortes planejados . Daniel Dombey e James Politi. Financial Times, 14 de Abril de 2011.

Events frequently overtake long-term Pentagon planning . Megan Scully Executivo do Governo., 14 de abril de 2011.

Editor's Commentary

13 April 2011 (revised and updated 16 April 2011)

In President Obama's April 13th “deficit speech” he says:

Just as we must find more savings in domestic programs, we must do the same in defense. Over the last two years, Secretary Gates has courageously taken on wasteful spending, saving $400 billion in current and future spending. I believe we can do that again.

What might “do that again” mean?

Actually contribute $400 billion from projected Pentagon budgets to deficit reduction?

That would require the Pentagon to take in and spend $400 billion less. But it is very difficult to identify much actual contribution to deficit reduction in the first $400 billion in Pentagon savings President Obama refers to and believes can be repeated.

Let's take a quick look at the components of that first $400 billion working backward through time.

This past January Secretary Gates announced $78 billion in cuts over five years. In February when the President's FY12 budget appeared all but $70 billion of this as regards deficit reduction evaporated. $68 billion was consumed by the special Overseas Contingency Operations (war) budgeting as the FY11 projected placeholder of $50 billion was replaced by the FY12 real OCO budget of $118 billion. Another $2 billion in the savings appears to have simply vanished in the five year budget projections, perhaps due to those pesky “rounding errors” that plague Pentagon budgets.

In 2010 Secretary Gates announced $100 billion in “efficiency” savings. He was quite forthright at the time, saying that he was keeping all the savings within the Pentagon to pay for other requirements. So we can't legitimately count those toward deficit reduction, and presumably the President did not count those toward the $400 billion that has been saved.

So that leaves about $322 billion in Pentagon savings the White House needs to account for.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 February 2011 Secretary Gates said:

…over the last two defense budgets submitted by President Obama, we have curtailed or canceled troubled or excess programs that would have cost more than $330 billion if seen through to completion.

Connecting this to President Obama's speech Defense News reports (13 April 2011) that:

Of the $400 billion already saved, $330 billion is supposed to come from Gates' cuts to weapons programs – for example the cancellation of the Army's Future Combat Systems program and the Air Force's Next-Generation Bomber, both of which Gates terminated in the 2010 budget. However, those two programs have been replaced: The Army is developing the Ground Combat Vehicle, and the Air Force has launched a scaled-back bomber program.

“Supposed” and “However” are the key words in the preceding paragraph. To be real savings that contribute in any meaningful way to deficit reduction the the program cancellations would have to lead to a declining Pentagon budget topline… and not be replaced by some other expenditure.

Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center assesses the $330 billion savings claim in a 5 November 2010 post this way:

Gates has not cut $330 billion from defense. When he announced hardware cuts, he said the out-year savings were estimated at $330 billion, but he didn't cut a nickel from the projected defense budgets; he wants, as he has clearly said, to use those savings for other investments, not give them back to the taxpayer. And the figure is way too big, anyway, because he terminated the F-22 and the C-17 cargo plane when neither one of them was in the long-term budget (he has been trying to let both programs arrive at a normal death, as planned, and Congress keeps getting in the way.) It is even more too big because his savings figure did not net out the alternative investments he proposed for the same missions, like replacing the terminated Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicle with a new Army vehicle R&D program. So a big kerfuffle over a non-number, but no big cut in defense here.

To date the Pentagon or OMB have not produced any accounting of these supposed savings from Secretary Gates' program cancellations which indicate where they come out of the topline. Meanwhile it would be wise to substantially discount their value when thinking about overall Federal spending.

What we know for sure is that Pentagon budgets continue to rise despite the “savings.” The Pentagon and the Administration might argue that the Pentagon budget would have grown faster if Secretary Gates had not made those “courageous” program cuts. Possivelmente. But that “would have been” is simply not the same as actually contributing to deficit reduction which requires real cuts in the topline of the Pentagon budget.

In terms of cutting the topline of the Pentagon budget, when we remove the long-awaited reductions in war costs, we can count just $8 billion that Secretary Gates has given up to deficit reduction in the five year defense plan (FYDP) through FY16.

Looking out ten years there are more savings in the President's projections. My colleague Carl Conetta finds $164 billion less Pentagon spending in the overlapping four “out years” (FY17-20) when comparing the President's FY11 and Fy12 budget submissions.

We might speculate that this is where we realize some of Secretary Gates' $330 billion in savings, but it would be only speculation…

So far no one in the Administration has demonstrated in sufficient detail how the Pentagon will contribute much of anything toward reducing the Federal deficit, rounding errors notwithstanding.

Joshua Thiel. Small Wars Journal , 12 April 2011.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/732-thiel1.pdf

Trecho:

Maneuver warfare at its core is a mechanistic endeavor and fits with a corresponding necessity of top-down hierarchies. Conversely, counterinsurgency is a more ambiguous environment that varies in its complexity and context; it is the chess match of war. It is different in every locale and can cover the entire spectrum of war simultaneously. Consequently, counterinsurgency is difficult to put on a bumper sticker, to trademark as a catch phrase, or sell to a population and their representatives. In 2006 the United States (US) public's perception of success or failure of the Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy was concentrated around the concept of massing combat power in time and space, often called the “The Surge.” The term, “The Surge,” condensed a new counterinsurgency strategy into a simple and quantifiable slogan for the sound bite culture surrounding current affairs in the modern world. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency is more complex than “add more and then you win.”

Comment by Gian Gentile:

Joshua said this at the end of the piece:

“…in Afghanistan in 2011, will the victor once again write the history by touting the Afghanistan troop surge of 2010-2011 rather than the decisive operational changes.”

What evidence, I mean hard evidence (and beyond what officers who were part of the Surge recall)that there was a “decisive operational change.”? How much “decisive” operational change can there be in an area security mission where combat forces are dispersed widely and operate in a decentralized manner? This operational framework was in place in Iraq from spring of 2003 on. The answer is that there was not a decisive change in the operational framework. Oh to be sure there were some tweaks made here and there, a few more outposts here and there, but by and large it remained the same.

Unfortunately a narrative has been constructed that posits that a savior General named Petraeus came on board, reinvented his field army operationally and combined with an increase of troops was the primary cause of the lowering of violence. This is a chimera.

Yet folks, especially us in the Army who have spilled blood in these places, want to believe that what happens or doesnt happen is because of us and what we do or dont do, or because of savior generals riding onto the scene.

Yet the foreign policy elite (and many military leaders) in this country love this narrative and want it to stick because it places emphasis and criticism on the mechanics of doing these wars of intervention and state building and away from the strategy and policy that put them into place. Since success in these wars and conflicts are simply a matter of getting the right number of troops on the ground with the right tactics and with the savior general, then they can be won again and again.

As senior Army generals in Afghanistan argue “the right inputs are finally in place,” so too are we already seeing calls in certain quarters for bog in Libya.

But in Iraq it was neither the increase in troops as part of the Surge (as Joshua effectively argues) nor was it a decisive change in operational framework (as he incorrectly asserts) and instead the lowering of violence had to do with other more critical conditions (the spread of the Anbar awakening, the Shia militia stand-down, the physical seperation of Baghdad into sectarian districts) occurring.

Memo Orçamento por Charles Knight. 14 de fevereiro de 2011.

For several years now White House budget projections have included a “placeholder for outyear overseas contingency operations” most of which are accounted for by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This placeholder number has been and remains $50 billion. Every year actual OCO (overseas contingency operations) spending turns out to be several times that number. FY11′s OCO is $159 billion and FY12′s is $118 billion .

Adjusting for the effect of the new OCO for FY12, the $68 billion budgeted above the placeholder of $50 billion eats up most of the $78 billion in Pentagon cuts that Secretary Gates offered up in January to fiscal responsibility (only $76 billion actually shows up in the 14 February budget release.) The remaining $8 billion (and much more) will go to the war budgets when reality collides with placeholder projections.

On 14 February Pentagon Comptroller Hale confirmed that the $50 billion placeholders for FY13 and beyond was the “best we can do.” Others make an attempt to be more realistic. The high tech industry association called Tech America annually projects DoD budgets for ten years out. In their 2010 projection they estimate that OCO spending will be $102 billion in FY13 , $69 billion in FY14 and $57billion in FY15 . When we subtract the $50 billion placeholder for each of those years and total the remainder we find that the Pentagon is likely to spend $78 billion more in the years FY13 through FY15 than in the White House budget projections.

In sum, not only does the President's FY12 budget plan give an exemption to the Pentagon from contributing anything substantial to deficit reduction, but the likely cost of the war in Afghanistan will push up the national debt substantially higher than the White House budget projections.

Decoding the Defense Budget by Winslow Wheeler, from The Pentagon Labyrinth , 09 February 2011.

Trecho:

What Is the Defense Budget?

Each year in early February, the Pentagon releases what is invariably called the “defense budget” in press articles. The numbers presented do not address all forms of defense spending; they do not even address all forms of Pentagon spending.

For example, a table included in the Pentagon's press materials for the 2011 budget shows the “base” (non-Iraq or -Afghanistan war) budget request at $549.8 billion. The materials presented by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are more complete. The 2011 budget request for “base” (non-war) Pentagon spending was $554.1 billion. The additional $4.3 billion was for “mandatory” spending (also known as “entitlement” spending) mostly for personnel programs. The number the Pentagon released was for the “discretionary” (new annual appropriations) spending. The difference may be a minor one in this case, but it can be significant; in past years Congress has added scores of billions in new mandatory spending for military healthcare, and retirement and survivors' benefits.

The more complete exposition of DOD budgets in the OMB materials is not easy to find; it is usually buried in the “Supplemental Materials” to a volume called “Analytical Perspectives” that is released each year the same day the Pentagon releases its version of its budget. Unfortunately, the DOD press corps roundly ignores the more complete OMB materials. To be better informed in future years, track it down.

The same OMB table yields other important information: the additional DOD spending requested for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not just for the budget year but also for succeeding “out-years,” and the non-DOD spending for what OMB calls the “National Defense Budget Function,” which includes nuclear weapons, the Selective Service, the National Defense Stockpile of minerals and commodities, and more. The total for 2011 comes to $738.7 billion in “total” (discretionary plus mandatory) spending.

The same table also yields the budget amounts for the departments of Homeland (domestic) Security, State (for economic and weapons aid and other national security programs) and Veterans Affairs (for what might be called the human cost of wars). Each is clearly related to national security or “defense,” writ broadly. Finally, if you know where to look near the bottom of this long OMB table, you can find some additional spending in the Treasury Department for military retirement and healthcare, and finally the data needed to make a calculation of how much of the 2011 payment for interest on the national debt can fairly be attributed to the Pentagon.

The results of this more complete compilation of the president's 2011 budget request for “defense” is summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Defense Related Budget Requests for 2011.
(President's 2011 Budget Request – in $ billions)

“Base” DOD Budget (Discretionary only) 548.9

DOD (Mandatory only) 4.3

DOD War Spending 159.1

DOD Total 712.3

DOE (Defense) 18.8

Miscellaneous Defense-Related Agencies 7.6

National Defense Budget Function Total 738.7

Homeland Security (DHS) 43.6

Veterans Affairs (DVA) 122.0

International Affairs 65.3

Treasury Dept. Military Retirement Payments 25.9

Interest on DOD Retiree Health Care Fund 5.7

19% of Interest on Debt (DOD Proportional Share) 47.7

Grand Total $1,048,900,000,000.

A próxima vez que alguém tenta dizer-lhe que os números DOD joga em você, em seus comunicados à imprensa são o que você deve usar para entender dinheiro gasto para a segurança nacional, dar-lhe um sorriso educado, então, ir a essa tabela obscuro nos materiais suplementares em OMB "perspectivas analíticas." É publicados on-line no mesmo dia que o comunicado de imprensa do Pentágono. A poucos minutos de verificação pode dar-lhe uma compreensão mais completa do que o que a imprensa se reportará.

Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo 46 , 26 January 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1101bm46.pdf

Trecho:

* Embora descrito como um "corte", oferta de Gates permitirá que os gastos com defesa a subir firmemente ao longo dos próximos cinco anos.

* Embora Gates diz que quaisquer cortes maiores que cortejar "catástrofe", todos os planos de poupança concessão DoD mais dinheiro em termos reais durante os próximos dez anos do que teve durante os últimos dez.

* As propostas de cortes maiores produziria orçamentos de base média do Pentágono durante os próximos dez anos que são apenas cerca de 5% abaixo da era Reagan os gastos, ajustados pela inflação.

* O Pentágono pretende que os futuros orçamentos média, mais de 12% acima dos pontos altos da Guerra Fria.

Sandra Erwin. National Defense Magazine , 24 November 2010.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=258

Trecho:

An AESA equipped Super Hornet is “generation four-and-a-half,” says [Michael “Ponch” Garcia, a reserve Navy pilot and manager of business development at Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems]. “All the sensors are fifth generation. You won't have super cruise. You won't have 360 stealth. Você perde isso. But you're getting it for half the price.”

Sandra Erwin. Revista Nacional de Defesa, 22 de novembro de 2010.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=255

Trecho:

"A maior fraqueza do Departamento de Defesa é a sua estratégia orçamental: a ausência de escolha estratégica", diz Gordon Adams, professor americano da Universidade que foi o autor das recomendações de defesa na proposta Domenici-Rivlin, que foi apresentado pelo ex-presidente da Comissão de Orçamento do Senado Pete Domenici (RN. M.) e White diretor de orçamento da Casa em Clinton, Alice Rivlin.

Cortar o orçamento de defesa não deve ser sobre fazer o mesmo com menos, diz Adams. A reação ao relatório Simpson-Bowles, que mira em muitos programas de big-ticket armas e apela para a redução da força de trabalho, era previsível. Cada programa direcionado ou agência, como se viu recentemente com EUA Comando das Forças Conjuntas, está fazendo um caso que é essencial para a segurança nacional, e seus defensores já estão se mobilizando lobistas e grupos de defesa.

A abordagem mais inteligente seria para o governo Obama eo Congresso para concordar com uma estratégia reduzida do militar, diz Adams. "No final do dia, é sobre os formuladores de políticas restritivas seu impulso de usar o militar da forma imprudente tem sido usado nos últimos 20 anos", diz ele.

18 nov 2010

Dear Co-chairman Bowles and Co-chairman Simpson:

We are writing to you as experts in national security and defense economics to convey our views on the national security implications of the Commission's work and especially the need for achieving responsible reductions in military spending. In this regard, we appreciate the initiative you have taken in your 10 November 2010 draft proposal to the Commission. It begins a necessary process of serious reflection, debate, and action.

The vitality of our economy is the cornerstone of our nation's strength. We share the Commission's desire to bring our financial house into order. Doing so is not merely a question of economics. Reducing the national debt is also a national security imperative.

To date, the Obama administration has exempted the Defense Department from any budget reductions. This is short-sighted: It makes it more difficult to accomplish the task of restoring our economic strength, which is the underpinning of our military power.

As the rest of the nation labors to reduce its debt burden, the current plan is to boost the base DOD budget by 10 percent in real terms over the next decade. This would come on top of the nearly 52 percent real increase in base military spending since 1998. (When war costs are included the increase has been much greater: 95 percent.)

We appreciate Secretary Gates' efforts to reform the Pentagon's business and acquisition practices. However, even if his reforms fulfill their promise, the current plan does not translate them into budgetary savings that contribute to solving our deficit problem. Their explicit aim is to free funds for other uses inside the Pentagon. Isso não é bom o suficiente.

Granting defense a special dispensation puts at risk the entire deficit reduction effort. Defense spending today constitutes over 55 percent of discretionary spending and 23 percent of the federal budget. An exemption for defense not only undermines the broader call for fiscal responsibility, but also makes overall budget restraint much harder as a practical economic and political matter.

We need not put our economic power at risk in this way. Today the United States possesses a wide margin of global military superiority. The defense budget can bear significant reduction without compromising our essential security.

We recognize that larger military adversaries may rise to face us in the future. But the best hedge against this possibility is vigilance and a vibrant economy supporting a military able to adapt to new challenges as they emerge.

We can achieve greater defense economy today in several ways, all of which we urge you to consider seriously. We need to be more realistic in the goals we set for our armed forces and more selective in our choices regarding their use abroad. We should focus our military on core security goals and on those current and emerging threats that most directly affect us.

We also need to be more judicious in our choice of security instruments when dealing with international challenges. Our armed forces are a uniquely expensive asset and for some tasks no other instrument will do. For many challenges, however, the military is not the most cost-effective choice. We can achieve greater efficiency today without diminishing our security by better discriminating between vital, desirable, and unnecessary military missions and capabilities.

There is a variety of specific options that would produce savings, some of which we describe below. The important point, however, is a firm commitment to seek savings through a reassessment of our defense strategy, our global posture, and our means of producing and managing military power.

■ Since the end of the Cold War, we have required our military to prepare for and conduct more types of missions in more places around the world. The Pentagon's task list now includes not only preventive war, regime change, and nation building, but also vague efforts to “shape the strategic environment” and stem the emergence of threats. It is time to prune some of these missions and restore an emphasis on defense and deterrence.

■ US combat power dramatically exceeds that of any plausible combination of conventional adversaries. To cite just one example, Secretary Gates has observed that the US Navy is today as capable as the next 13 navies combined, most of which are operated by our allies. We can safely save by trimming our current margin of superiority.

■ America's permanent peacetime military presence abroad is largely a legacy of the Cold War. It can be reduced without undermining the essential security of the United States or its allies.

■ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the limits of military power. Avoiding these types of operation globally would allow us to roll back the recent increase in the size of our Army and Marine Corps.

■ The Pentagon's acquisition process has repeatedly failed, routinely delivering weapons and equipment late, over cost, and less capable than promised. Some of the most expensive systems correspond to threats that are least prominent today and unlikely to regain prominence soon. In these cases, savings can be safely realized by cancelling, delaying, or reducing procurement or by seeking less costly alternatives.

■ Recent efforts to reform Defense Department financial management and acquisition practices must be strengthened. And we must impose budget discipline to trim service redundancies and streamline command, support systems, and infrastructure.

Change along these lines is bound to be controversial. Budget reductions are never easy – no less for defense than in any area of government. However, fiscal realities call on us to strike a new balance between investing in military power and attending to the fundamentals of national strength on which our true power rests. We can achieve safe savings in defense if we are willing to rethink how we produce military power and how, why, and where we put it to use.

Atenciosamente,

This letter reflects the opinions of the individual signatories. Institutions are listed for identification purposes only. The letter is the result of a joint effort by The Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and the Project on Defense Alternatives .

por Winslow Wheeler.
Novembro de 2010.

Baseado na minha experiência na Comissão de Orçamento do Senado, eu aprendi que a leitura de diferentes planos de redução do défice pode ser complicado. Alguns CBO uso ou outras "linhas de base" como base para comparação, mas essas linhas de base pode ser um mistério para alguns e diferentes - às vezes por enormes quantidades - de mais fácil compreensão propostas orçamentárias futuras para os departamentos, como o do Pentágono. Outras fontes de confusão pode ser se o plano se aplica apenas para o Pentágono ou a maior National Função Orçamento de Defesa, usa gastos ao invés de autoridade orçamental, e faz ou não incluir financiamento para as guerras no Iraque e no Afeganistão. Sometimes the dollars used are “constant;” sometimes they are “current.”

Sometimes the press and others simply misunderstand elements of an overall plan, such as by reporting a plan's savings for one “illustrative” year as the entirety of the plan's savings. Sometimes uncovering what a plan really means requires close reading of the text and footnotes; in still other cases, it requires prolonged discussion with the authors.

This information paper attempts to remove the various impediments to an apples-to-apples comparison of the major plans to reduce defense spending that have been publicly proposed to the Obama Commission of Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. It compares all the plans to the Obama/Gates Plan for National Defense Spending for the years 2011 to 2020; it addresses only “base” budgets (which exclude spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere), and it applies budget authority in “current” dollars.

Budget Authority Savings
Relative to the Obama/Gates “Base” National Defense Budget 2010-2020
Billions of Dollars, All Dollars Are “Current” Dollars

Depois que a tabela acima de cada plano é abordado brevemente , apontando suas principais características. Tentei fazê-lo com objetividade, como comentário editorial possível.

Editor's Commentary

There are at least as many reasons to think that significant real reductions in defense spending will be hard to achieve as there are reasons to doubt that significant revenue increases will be found or that substantial reductions in entitlement spending will happen. “Political realities” are indeed daunting for any of the options the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform will consider. If there were quick, easy and obvious decisions to be had there would be no need for the Commission.

Political realities change over time in part because underlying realities eventually change political calculation. Such is the case with defense spending. After more than a decade of rapid growth there is likely to be some retrenchment in the middle of this decade, notably by 2015.

The likely path of defense spending this decade was recently forecast by the high-tech industry association Tech America Foundation in their DoD Topline Forecast 2011-2020 .

Tech America's forecast is for a real reduction in the base Pentagon budget (not including Overseas Contingency Operation war supplemental funding) of 9% or $45 billion (USD 2011) in 2015 relative to the 2011 base budget.

When taking into account the Pentagon's preferred budget path this decade of at least 1% real annual growth, Tech America forecasts a reduction in defense spending by 2015 of 16%.

Tech America's forecast of Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) war supplemental spending during the decade is also important to consider. Since FY10 (President Obama's first budget) there has been an OCO war supplemental DoD budget line for FY12-FY15 of $50 billion per year. The OCO war supplemental in the FY11 budget is $159 billion.

Although the actual OCO war supplemental might come down in FY12, with the military operational demands in Afghanistan remaining elevated it is unlikely the OCO war supplemental will come down even $50 billion, let alone $109 billion in FY12. Tech America forecasts OCO war expenditures of $122 billion in FY12.

These likely under-budgeted OCO war supplemental costs should be counted as probable additions to the national debt beyond those already projected by the government.

Tech America's forecast is for the OCO supplemental to be $122 billion in FY12, $102 billion in FY13, $69 billion in FY14 and $57 billion in FY15. That adds up to $150 billion more than is budgeted in the Five Year Defense Plan … an un-budgeted addition to the national debt.

For the target year of the federal budget reaching “primary balance” in FY15, the forecast OCO war supplemental will add $7 billion to the problem that the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform faces in attempting to balance the budget in that year.

Adam J. Hebert. Air Force Magazine, Novembro de 2010.
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/November 202010/1110edit.aspx%

Trecho:

... Imprudentes chamadas para cortar o orçamento do Pentágono seguir tão previsíveis quanto as marés. Sem uma análise credível da estratégia ou requisitos, os críticos mais uma vez declarar gastos com a defesa para estar fora de controle.

Comentário do Editor:

Em seu editorial de Segurança não é barato Adam J. Herbert cita o trabalho da Força Tarefa da Defesa Sustentável como um caso no ponto de críticos de cortes de gastos do Pentágono recomendando "sem uma análise credível da estratégia ou necessidades." Como membro da força-tarefa Discordo sobre a credibilidade de nossa análise. Mas deixe-me falar onde eu concordo com o Sr. Herbert:

• "A segurança não é barato." Na verdade, é extremamente caro. When the country is hit with a financial disaster we owe it to the country and our military to reexamine our national security strategy and make sure priorities are clear and that our military investments are cost-effective. Nos últimos doze anos de orçamentos do Pentágono o planejamento procedeu como se não há restrição de recursos. Infelizmente, isso é verdade para o QDR última também. Esses dias são claramente mais - O secretário Gates disse tanto.

• "Uma bem treinada, bem equipada militar profissional, não é barato. Se a nação quer a custar menos, o país provavelmente terá que pedir para ele fazer menos. "Exatamente. Desde o fim da Guerra Fria os militares dos EUA tem vindo a avançar o seu alcance global e engajamento. Missões têm proliferado, incluindo muitos que deve ser feito por civis no Departamento de Estado e outras agências. Um número significativo de tropas norte-americanas ainda permanecem na Europa, mesmo que não haja nenhuma ameaça militar para a Europa que os aliados não pode manipular. A mais importante lição take-away das guerras no Iraque e no Afeganistão é que longas guerras de baixa intensidade de terra não são rentáveis ​​usos de poder militar dos EUA e deve ser evitado sempre que possível. Espero que todos podemos concordar não deve nunca mais ser como uma "guerra de escolha".

• "Há certamente formas de reduzir gastos com a defesa ..." Sim, e um que vai economizar cerca de US $ 45 bilhões em contas de modernização da Força Aérea está disponível em uma escolha sobre como modernizar a frota de caças. A Força Aérea decidiu substituir o seu envelhecimento F-16 com apenas sobre o lutador mais novo e caro, pode-se sonhar, o F-35. In today's fiscal environment either the Air Force will end up with a lot fewer of these planes than planned, or they will choose to get ahead of the budget crunch and modernize with new block versions of the still best of class F-16s and limit the buy of F-35s this decade to a few squadrons for high-intensity air-superiority missions. Se a concorrência ar sério emerge de uma década a partir de agora podemos então lançar a produção de caças F-35 (ou talvez um menos dispendioso do follow-on para o F-16), os aviões presumivelmente muito melhor, com dez ou mais anos de desenvolvimento lutador tecnologia.

Thomas PM Barnett. China Segurança, Outubro de 2010.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1010Barnett.pdf

Trecho:

Em suma, terminando parasitismo da China é sem dúvida mais importante para a estabilidade a longo prazo de todo o sistema de continuar a deter a invasão militar da China de Taiwan. As globalization's networks continue to expand at a rapid pace, America's ability to play sole Leviathan to the system naturally degrades dramatically. Isso significa que, enquanto a probabilidade de invasão militar da China de Taiwan se dissipa com o passar dos anos, a probabilidade de "esgotamento imperial" dos Estados Unidos certamente supera em importância estratégica no curto prazo.

History will judge US strategists most severely if our choice to maintain “access” to East Asia by triggering a regional arms race precludes our ability to draw China into strategic co-management of this era of pervasively extending globalization—without a doubt America's greatest strategic achievement. I cannot fault the AirSea Battle Concept as an operational capability designed to keep us in the East Asian balancing “game.” But my fear is that it will—primarily by default and somewhat by “blue” ambition—serve America badly in a strategic sense, absent a proactive political and military engagement effort to balance its negative impact on the most important bilateral relationship of the modern globalization era.

Comentário do Editor:

Barnett alerts us to a prospective instance when leading with military capability is likely to be a disservice to strategic interests.

Daniel Goure. Early Warning Blog , Lexington Institute, 03 September 2010.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/future-defense-budget-choices-require-clear-strategic-priorities

Trecho:

The United States cannot afford and the people will not pay for a military that can do battle with uncertainty.

As a consequence of the need to do battle with uncertainty, emphasis was placed on a military that can cover all bases and do all things. This would not be a wise strategy even if resources were unconstrained. Not all threats are equal. Nor are all interests equally important. Finally, it is possible to make reasoned and reasonable judgments regarding how the future security environment will unfold and define a set of demand signals that would require shifting strategic priorities.

In the past, when US leaders refused to make choices they allowed the military to shrink symmetrically, by cutting every program or service a little. That approach is self-defeating. It makes no sense to keep a so-called full spectrum military but continually reduce it in size.

Comentário do Editor:

Relevant passages from the archives ($3 trillion later):

Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. “Dueling with Uncertainty”, February 1998.
http://www.comw.org/pda/bullyweb.html

There is no escape from uncertainty, but there is relief from uncertainty hysteria. It begins with recognizing that instability has boundaries — just as turbulence in physical systems has discernible onset points and parameters. The turbulence of a river, for instance, corresponds to flow and to the contours of the river's bed and banks. It occurs in patches and not randomly. The weather also is a chaotic system that resists precise long-range forecasting, but allows useful prediction of broader trends and limits.

Apesar das incertezas, as declarações de matéria probabilidade. Eles indicam o peso das evidências - ou se há qualquer evidência. Os falcões de incerteza vai inundar a nossa preocupação com uma horda de perigos que passam o teste do permissivo No entanto, reduzindo o limiar de alarme, eles estabelecem um padrão impossível de suficiência de defesa "não-probabilidade zero.": Absoluta e certa segurança militar. Dado recursos finitos e fins concorrentes, algo menos vai ter que fazer sabedoria estratégica começa com a definição de prioridades -. E prioridades exigem estrita atenção ao que parece provável e que não funciona.

O mundo pode estar mais menos certo e menos estável hoje do que durante a Guerra Fria, mas também envolve menos riscos para a América. Risco é a probabilidade partes iguais e utilidade - chances e estacas. Com o fim da disputa superpotência global, as apostas da América, na maioria dos conflitos variados do mundo diminuiu. Então, tem a magnitude das ameaças militares aos interesses americanos. Isto permite uma maior distinção entre os interesses e os interesses convincentes, turbulência e turbulência relevante, incertezas e incertezas críticas. E esta distinção vai pagar dividendos, quando o país se volta para considerar de grande escala esforços militares, compromissos e investimentos.

Entre as visões que a política presente guia, um está ausente visível: um mundo em que as questões econômicas têm deslocado os militares como o foco central das competições globais e as preocupações. Deixar de se envolver essa perspectiva, as análises das políticas recentes de defesa se esquecem que o custo de oportunidade dos gastos militares. E é este lapso que dá licença para os seus métodos e objetivos especulativos arrogante.

Os Estados Unidos continuam a investir mais do seu produto nacional em defesa do que seus aliados, mais do que a média mundial, e muito mais do que seus principais concorrentes econômicos. Ao desconsiderar as exigências e conseqüências da crescente concorrência global econômica, política atual faz uma aposta sobre o futuro não reconhecida: A União Soviética se foi e nenhum desafio comparável militar para o Ocidente existe, exceto como uma possibilidade distante. No entanto, a perspectiva americana depende, como sempre, se não mais, sobre os aspectos especificamente militares da força. Deste tanto, os falcões incerteza parece certo.

Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 19 August 2010.
http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf

Trecho:

This pamphlet revises the conceptual and operating focus of the Army from major combat operations to that of operational adaptability employing full-spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty and complexity.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 describes how future Army forces conduct operations as part of the joint force to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies in the future operational environment. The pamphlet describes the employment of forces in the 2016-2028 timeframe and identifies capabilities required for future success to guide Army force development efforts.

Reva Patwardhan. Peace Action Oeste Groundswell Blog, 29 de Julho de 2010.
http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2010/07/29/wikileaks-war-logs-roundup/

Jason Sherman, Inside Defense , 26 July 2010.

A bipartisan independent review of the Obama administration's 20-year blueprint for the Defense Department calls for increasing the size of the Navy to a 346-ship fleet and increasing the US military's posture in the Western Pacific to counter China's growing influence in the region, according to a draft report of the Independent Quadrennial Defense Review Panel.

InsideDefense.com obtained a draft copy of the report titled “ The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century .”

The 20-member blue-ribbon panel — co-chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry and Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to President George W. Bush — also finds a significant increase in funding is needed to bolster capabilities necessary to counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense; and to deal with cyber threats.

The panel's report argues that a centerpiece of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review — a force-planning construct that downplayed the significance of preparing to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous major wars, a bedrock of defense planning since 1993, in order to prepare US forces to deal with a wider set of possible contingencies — is unreliable. Instead, the independent panel recommends the Pentagon adopt force levels required by analysis conducted 17 years ago.

The “panel recommends the force structure be sized, at a minimum, at the end strength outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review,” an assessment prepared by then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin, which Perry then worked to implement during his 1994 to 1997 term as secretary. “We further recommend the department's [weapon system] inventory be thoroughly recapitalized and modernized,” states the draft report.

Funding to pay for these capabilities, as well as to recapitalize equipment consumed in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will require resources beyond the $100 billion efficiency savings recently directed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, according to the report.

The “panel believes that substantial additional resources will be required to modernize the force. Although there is a cost to recapitalizing the military, there is also a price to be paid for not recapitalizing, one that in the long run would be much greater.”

Tasked by Congress — and composed of members appointed by lawmakers and Gates — the panel's report delves into nearly every dimension of the US military enterprise — from personnel policy to weapons acquisition to defense policy formulation — and offers an “explicit warning” about the shape of US weaponry after a nearly a decade of persistent conflict.

“The aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, and the growing stress on the force means that a train wreck is coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force structure,” states the draft report.

The draft document argues that the Pentagon's force-structure plans “will not provide sufficient capacity” to deal with a major domestic catastrophe while also conducting contingency operations abroad. The panel also asserts that the recently established US Cyber Command should be prepared to assist civilian authorities in defending this domain “beyond” the Defense Department's current role, to support civilian agencies.

The Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review did not include a force-planning construct that explicitly quantifies the number and type of contingencies for which the US military must prepare, removing a formula the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have relied on since the end of the Cold War to justify their force structures and their investment plans, an omission the independent panel laments.

The Pentagon's 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the first major assessment of the the US military's needs after the fall of the Berlin Wall, advanced a requirement to fight and win two major-theater wars nearly simultaneously, a construct that was incorporated in the 1997, 2001 and 2006 QDRs.

“The 2010 QDR, however, did not endorse any metric for determining the size and shape of US forces,” states the independent panel's draft report. Rather, it put diverse, overlapping scenarios, including long-duration stability operations and the defense of the homeland, on par with major regional conflicts when assessing the adequacy of US forces.”

The current size of US ground forces “is close enough to being correct,” according to the draft report.

In addition, the panel argues that the Army is “living off the capital accumulated” during the Reagan administration. “The useful life of that equipment is running out; and, as a result, the inventory is old and in need of recapitalization,” states the draft report, which calls for inventory replacement on a one-for-one basis “with an upward adjustment in the number of naval vessels and certain air and space assets.”

A larger Navy and Air Force, according to the panel, is needed to protect US interests in the Pacific region.

“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased,” states the draft report. “The United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region, to protect American lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and defend our allies in the region. A robust US force structure, one that is largely rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be essential.”

The panel advances recommendations to reform the structure and organization of both Congress and the executive branch in order to improve oversight of national security matters. The panel also advances suggestions for the Defense and State departments to shore up “institutional weaknesses of the existing security assistance programs and framework.”

Hearing on Achieving National Security through Sustainable Spending, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, National Security and Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 20 July 2010.

This hearing continued the Subcommittee's oversight of defense spending by examining recent scholarship and policy research on defense budget reform, including the conclusions and recommendations made in a recent report by the Sustainable Defense Task Force, Debt, Deficits, & Defense: A Way Forward , which presents a series of recommendations to reduce the budget of the Department of Defense by $960 billion by 2020.

Witnesses offered perspectives on the Department of Defense's plan to cut military spending in the context of national security priorities and the current economic environment. The Department of Defense's budget has accounted for nearly 65 percent of the increase in federal discretionary spending since 2001. Citing the role of defense spending in the overall economic health of the United States, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently called for reductions in defense spending by eliminating wasteful spending and unnecessary weapons systems, and reducing overhead costs at the Pentagon.

To watch a webcast of the hearing, click here: http://groc.edgeboss.net/wmedia/groc/nationalsecurity/2010/07.20.10.ns.defense.budget.wvx

Testemunhas:

* Carl Conetta, Co-Director, Project on Defense Alternatives
* Benjamin Friedman, Research Fellow, Cato Institute
* Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
* Gary Schmitt, Ph.D., Director, Advanced Strategic Studies, American Enterprise Institute
* Gordon Adams, Ph.D., Distinguished Fellow, Stimson Center

Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Tierney

Prepared Statement of Mr. Carl Conetta

Prepared Statement of Mr. Benjamin Friedman

Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd Harrison

Prepared Statement of Dr. Gary Schmitt

Prepared Statement of Dr. Gordon Adams

Lance M. Bacon. Navy Times , 28 June 2010.
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/06/navy_force_cuts_062810w/

Trecho:

With an eye on diminishing budgets and rising tensions with Iran and North Korea, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead on June 24 called for continued international partnerships to hone a “just and sustainable international order.” He also continued his call for fiscal restraint, emphasizing that the Navy “cannot afford a tailor-made solution to every need that we have.” But the CNO still is adamant that a 313-ship Navy is needed to maintain maritime security.

Comentário do Editor:

Lance M Bacon quotes from a speech by Chief of Naval Operations Roughead at the Maritime Systems and Technology seminar on June 22nd. These quotes are misleading because Roughead is speaking not about reducing the national deficit, but rather about the Navy's need to watch its spending in the context of growing fiscal pressures on service budgets.

Roughead remains committed to the goal of a 313 ship battle fleet. He also supports Secretary Gate's initiative to save $105 billion within DoD accounts over the next five years. Gates' savings will not contribute a penny to deficit reduction. He plans to plow all savings back into Pentagon programs and it is the Navy's share of this money that Roughead wants to use to help grow the battle fleet to 313 ships.

Not only is Gates not offering to contribute to deficit reduction, but he is sticking to his goal of real growth of 1 to 2% a year for in Pentagon budgets. This will increase annual national deficits somewhere in the range of $6 to 12 billion.

Gates' position is untenable and will not hold. If the nation is going to meet its deficit reduction commitments the Pentagon will have to contribute its share — which is at least 40% of the $230 billion a year increase in its base (non-war) budget during the last decade. This is the level of cuts the task force has suggested — it is not “extreme”, but rather responsible and realistic.

In the context of the coming national fiscal restraint, the worst thing the CNO can do is continue pushing to grow the Navy battle fleet to 313 ships. The more success he has in buying now what will prove to be unaffordable new ships, the further the fleet will have to shrink when austere budgeting arrives.

Far wiser is to start reconfiguring and trimming the fleet now and save procurement dollars for a more realistic set of priorities and a more restrained strategic posture. The task force has put forward one set of priorities for lean times. Let others suggest theirs.

Michael Hastings. Rolling Stone, 22 de Junho de 2010.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236

Trecho:

Quando se trata de Afeganistão, a história não está do lado de McChrystal. O invasor estrangeiro só para ter algum sucesso aqui foi Genghis Khan - e ele não foi prejudicada por coisas como direitos humanos, desenvolvimento econômico e da imprensa. A doutrina COIN, bizarramente, inspira-se alguns dos maiores embaraços militares ocidentais na memória recente: a guerra desagradável da França na Argélia (perdido em 1962) ea desventura americana no Vietnã (perdido em 1975). McChrystal, como outros defensores do COIN, prontamente reconhece que as campanhas de contra-insurgência são inerentemente sujo, caro e fácil de perder.