그렉 Mello. 원자 과학자, 2010년 2월 10일의 게시판.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox
Greg Mello is the executive director and co-founder of the Los Alamos Study Group .
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Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama gave a speech that many have interpreted as a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.
Now, however, the White House is requesting one of the larger increases in warhead spending history. If its request is fully funded, warhead spending would rise 10 percent in a single year, with further increases promised for the future. Los Alamos National Laboratory, the biggest target of the Obama largesse, would see a 22 percent budget increase, its largest since 1944. In particular, funding for a new plutonium “pit” factory complex there would more than double, signaling a commitment to produce new nuclear weapons a decade hence.
So how is the president's budget compatible with his disarmament vision?
The answer is simple: There is no evidence that Obama has, or ever had, any such vision. He said nothing to that effect in Prague. There, he merely spoke of his commitment “to seek . . . a world without nuclear weapons,” a vague aspiration and hardly a novel one at that level of abstraction. He said that in the meantime the United States “will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”
핵무기는 안 해 토록되지 않습니다 때문에 어쩔 수 없다면 "어떤 적을 억제,"이것도 높은 포부였다. "모든"적수가 오바 마가 추천하는 확장된 억지력에 대한 투자를 포함한 끝없는 혁신과 지속적인 실제 투자를 필요로 억제 수있다 "효과적인"아스날 허영 검색합니다. 이러한 투자의 약속, 그리고 군축은, 지금까지의 미국 저장고 생각했던만큼 프라하 수술 메시지였다. 오바마 이야기했을 때 실제로, 확장된 억지력에서 제안된 신규 투자는 이미 국회에 포장되고 있었다.
그의 생각 완수하기 위해 '군축 비전 "오바마 대통령은 프라하, 모두 무기한으로 두 접근 방법을 제공했다. 첫째, 그는 줄이는 막연히 이야기 "우리의 국가 안보 전략에서 핵무기의 역할을."그것이 어떤 의미인지조차도 전부 실제로 의미 할지도 모르는 먼 명확에서이야, 또는. 대부분 그것은 공무원들이 교리 - 등 지상에 실제 사실에 대한 핵 반대 말하는 담론 - 어떤 공식을 말합니다. 둘째, 오바마 당선인은 "새 전략 무기 감소 조약 [시작]은 러시아와 함께."협상을 약속으로 지금까지 핵 군축은 연설에서 간대로, 그건했습니다.에게
물론 오바마 대통령은 또한 자신의 행정부가 신속하게 종합 시험 금지 조약, 아직 복용하지 조치와 미국의 군축에 전적으로 관련이없는 하나의 비준을 추구 것이라고 말했다. 연설의 나머지 부분은 자신의 행정부가 추구하고 계획하는 다양한 확산 방지 활동에 전념했다.
7월 8일에서 오바마 대통령과 러시아 대통령은 드미트리 메드 베 데프는 조약 입력한 전체 칠년 후 어딘가 사이에 500 ~ 1,100 전략적 배달 차량 및 1,500 1,675 배치된 전략적 핵탄두, 달성될 수있는 매우 겸손한 목표는 각 해당 국가 짓는 그들의 공동 이해를 발표 강제로. 총 아스날 번호 그래서 전략 핵탄두를 배치 품을에 배치 될 수 변경 않을 리저브 드 경고 유효. 조약은 nonstrategic 탄두에 영향을주지 것입니다. 그것은 dismantlement을 필요로하지 것입니다. 미국 과학자 연맹의 한스 크리스 텐 센은 설명했다시피, 배달 차량 제한은 미국과 러시아 예상되는 전개로 변경되는 경우, 작은가 필요합니다.
아이러니하게도, 그것은 모스크바 조약과 조지 W. 부시 대통령의 지시가 다른 retirements 이하 4000 개 이상의 미국 탄두의 퇴직 PDF는 오바 마가 군축 면에서 않는 것도 초과할 수도 있습니다. 저장고 및 무기 복합에 관해서는 부시 대통령의 열망은 훨씬 더 hawkish 의회가 궁극적으로 허용된 것보다 있었다. 탄두를위한 실제 예산은 사무실에있는 그의 마지막 세 년 동안 하락했다. 자, 이그 제 큐 티브 지점과 양원을 제어하는 민주당으로 국회 구속은 부재에 의한 주목할 것입니다. 오바마 대통령은 주로 '무장 해제'으로 보이는 부시 어렵게 승인하고 자금을 발견 같은 제안을 일부 변형에 대한 의회의 저항이다.
Last May Obama sent his first budget to Congress, calling for flat warhead spending. At that time, the administration was still displaying a measured approach toward replacement and expansion of warhead capabilities.
That said, in last year's budget the White House did acquiesce to a Pentagon demand to request funding for a major upgrade to four B61 nuclear bomb variants–one of which had just completed a 20-year-plus life-extension program. Just one day before that budget was released a grand nuclear strategy review previously requested by the armed services committees was unveiled. It was chaired by William Perry, a member of the governing board of the corporation that manages Los Alamos, and recurrent Cold War fixture James Schlesinger. [Full disclosure: Perry is also a member of the Bulletin's Board of Sponsors.]
The report's recommendations for increased spending and weapons development quickly began to serve as a rallying point for defense hawks–surely the point of the exercise. Overall, it was largely a conclusory pastiche of recycled Cold War notions, entirely lacking in analysis and often factually wrong. But neither the White House nor leading congressional Democrats offered any public resistance or rebuttal to its conclusions.
More largely, opposition to nuclear restraint within the administration quickly emerged from its usual redoubts at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Pentagon, STRATCOM, and interested players in both parties in Congress. Plus, Obama left key Bush appointees in place at NNSA while the Pentagon added some familiar faces from the Clinton administration, leaving serious questions about the ability of the White House to develop an independent understanding of the issues, let alone present one to Congress.
Either way, potential treaty ratification is surely a major factor in White House thinking. Senate Republicans, as expected, are demanding significant nuclear investments prior to considering ratification of any START follow-on treaty. Democratic hawks, especially powerful ones with pork-barrel interests at stake such as New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman, also must be satisfied in the ratification process. All in all this makes the latest Obama budget request a kind of “preemptive surrender” to nuclear hawks. So whether or not the president has a disarmament “vision” is irrelevant. What is important are the policy commitments embodied in the budget request and whether Congress will endorse them.
Investments on the scale requested should be flatly unacceptable to all of us. The country and the world face truly apocalyptic security challenges from climate change and looming shortages of transportation fuels. Our economy is very weak and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The proposed increases in nuclear weapons spending, embedded as they are in an overall military budget bigger than any since the 1940s, should be a clarion call for renewed political commitment in service of the fundamental values that uphold this, or any, society.
Those values are now gravely threatened–not least by a White House uncertain about, or unwilling or unable to fight for, what is right.
에디터의 코멘트 :
Mello does a good job of explaining why there will be little progress toward nuclear abolition during the Obama administration. Further he makes a good case that the current administration seems to be headed towards feeding the nuclear weapons complex to a greater degree than Bush was able. Who'd of thought!
But Mello misses on a couple points. One is that he dismisses too quickly the nuclear abolition aspiration Obama stated in Prague. Those few words may have little affect on policy, but they do mark a return to the rhetoric of all atomic age administrations up until George W. Bush markedly abandoned such aspirations. What is the value of that rhetoric? Mostly it gives credence to those who organize around abolition — something of value, but not much.
Secondly, Mello states that when Obama spoke of…
…reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” it's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean.
Actually, this statement of Obama's refers to something quite specific and important. The US has been advancing for several decades to an unprecedented level of conventional force dominance over all other nations (see Bernard I. Finel on strategic meaning of US conventional military power). At this point the US can anticipate gaining even more strategic advantage if it can convince other nations to join in disposing of nuclear weaponry (for an official statement of this strategic formula see Vice President Biden's speech at the National Defense University on 18 February 2010.) This is indeed quite an aspiration!
This connection of conventional dominance to nuclear dominance brings me to the other shortcoming of Mello's article. Nuclear abolition will be impossible without a significant restructuring of the international (in-)security system. Why would Russia or China eschew nuclear weapons or N. Korea and Iran abandon efforts to obtain them while these nations remain utterly vulnerable to US conventional strike?
Leaders of popular efforts for nuclear disarmament almost never acknowledge this strategic problem. That's a disservice to their cause, because it leaves a major obstacle to disarmament in place with no plan (or even awareness of the need for a plan) to remove it.
The eventuality of an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons will require the US to first draw down its conventional military power. And concurrent to a deep draw down of US conventional military power there must be a build up of international structures which can take up more and more of the responsibility for global security.
Such a transfer of power and responsibility will probably happen someday , but we are certainly not presently on that path. That is one more “change” that Obama is not pursuing, not even aspirationally.
Greg Mello responds to the editor's comments:
난 당신의 의견은 훌륭한 생각합니다. 은 내가 전적으로 동의있는 두번째, 함께 시작합시다. 여기에서 우리의 일은 [로스 알라모 스] 스터디 그룹은 부분 때문에 현장의 두 최대의 핵무기 실험실에 인접, 정치적 우리의 지리적, 그리고 그러므로의 핵무기 문제를 강조하고있다.
지구 규모의 "풀 스펙트럼 지배력"에 대한 열망을 표현 군사 정책 및 투자로 인한 핵 군축에 대한 장벽이 거의 확실하게 이겨 내기 어려운 것입니다. 핵 군축 우리는 이제 내부적으로뿐만 아니라 가지고 상당히 다른 경제 구조를보다 국가 안보에 매우 다른 개념에서만 일관성이다. 좋은 소식은 - 그리고 나는 우리가 다른 방도가 없기 때문에 그것이, 처음 보면 그렇게 나타나지 않을 수있다 어디 그게 좋은 결정 할 것 - 우리의 제국을 실패한다는 것입니다.
오바 마의 군축 정책의 상징적인 가치에 관한 당신의 첫번째 포인트는 역시 소리지만, 나는 여기있는 상징적 가치를 크게 그의 발언은 시민 사회에 engendered했습니다 수동성 및 규정 준수에 의해보다 훨씬 더 무거운라고 생각합니다. 그리고 강제로 군축을 위해 노력하는 것은 자신 있었되어야 수 배우와 군대는 선전을 보냈다 무엇에 의해 무장 해제시켰습니다.
위선은 진짜로 이상적에게 지급 경의 일지 모르지만 그것이 정직하지, 리더십 아니라, 그것이 경우에 가치의 아무것도 생산하지 않습니다. At the moment, it is allowing the nuclear weapons establishment to do what it could not accomplish previously: increase production capacity and provide greater, not lesser, endorsement of nuclear weapons in all their aspects, both materially and symbolically.
Obama's disarmament aspiration, so called, is a faint echo compared to the full-throated endorsement of nuclear weapons it is enabling.
