US Air Force. Februar 2012.
http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120201-027.pdf

Rachel Gerber. Policy Notat, The Stanley Fonden den 1. februar 2012.
http://defensealt.org/AymAmo

Uddrag:

Den 18. januar 2012, Stanley Foundation i samarbejde med Carnegie Corporation i New York og MacArthur Foundation, indkaldt tal er kritiske for den historiske og nutidige udvikling af ansvaret for at Beskyt at vurdere den aktuelle situation i princippet og overveje udvikling globale dynamik, der vil danne rammen, drive og udfordring politiske udvikling i de kommende år.

Oberstløjtnant Daniel L. Davis. Armed Forces Journal, februar 2012.
http://defensealt.org/zjV1gq

Uddrag:

Jeg først mødte senior-niveau utvetydigt under en 1997 division-niveau "eksperiment", som viste sig at være langt mere setpiece end eksperiment. Over middag på Fort Hood, Texas, uddannelse og Lære Command ledere fortalte mig, at Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) havde vist, at en "digital opdeling" med færre tropper og mere udstyr kan være langt mere effektivt end de nuværende divisioner. Den næste dag, vores kongressens medarbejdere delegation observeret demonstrationen på første hånd, og det tog ikke lang tid at indse, at der var lidt stof til kravene. Stort set ingen legitim eksperimenter blev faktisk udført. Alle parametre var omhyggeligt scripted. Alle begivenheder havde en forudbestemt rækkefølge og resultat. Den AWE var simpelthen et dyrt show, affattet på det sprog, videnskabelige eksperimenter og præsenteres i glødende pressemeddelelser og offentlige erklæringer, der er beregnet til at overtale Kongressen til at finansiere hærens præference.

... Når der skal beslutte, om at fortsætte en krig, at ændre sine mål, eller at lukke en kampagne, der ikke kan vindes på en acceptabel pris, vores højtstående ledere har en forpligtelse til at fortælle Kongressen og amerikanske folk usminkede sandhed, og lade folket bestemme, hvad fremgangsmåde til at vælge. Det er selve essensen af ​​den civile kontrol med militæret. De amerikanske folk fortjener bedre end hvad de har fået fra deres øverste uniformerede ledere gennem de sidste mange år. Du skal blot fortælle sandheden ville være en god start.

Anthony H. Cordesman med Bradley Bosserman. Center for Strategiske og Internationale Studier, den 30. januar 2012.
http://defensealt.org/xpBqhn

Uddrag:

USA skal fundamentalt genoverveje sin holdning til "valgfrie krige." Det er langt fra klart, at det kan vinde krigen i Irak, i stedet for give Iran, uden en stærk militær og støtte tilstedeværelse. Det vil afgørende miste den afghanske og pakistanske konflikt, hvis den ikke hurtigt udvikle planer for en militær og diplomatisk tilstedeværelse, og bidrage til at hjælpe Afghanistan i overgangen væk fra afhængighed af udenlandsk militær og økonomisk forbrug under 2012-2020. Amerikanske tropper nedskæringer er ikke en overgangsplan, og fokuserer på tilbagetrækning er en opskrift på nederlag.

Når det er sagt, at USA ikke kan, og bør ikke gentage den fejl, det fremsatte i at intervenere i Irak og Afghanistan. Den skal beskæftige sig med utraditionelle trusler med en langt bedre og mere overkommelige blanding af globale, regionale og nationale strategier, der kan beskæftige sig med spørgsmål som uro i Mellemøsten og Syd-og Centralasien, og terrorisme og ustabilitet på global basis. Det må stole på at hjælpe venligtsindede stater, afskrækkelse, indeslutning, og langt mere begrænsede og mindre bekostelige former for intervention.

fra Projekt Defense Alternatives, den 26. januar 2012

Fremtiden-året Pentagon basen budget plan udgivet af Secretary Panetta den 26 Januar 2012 forudser rullende udgifter tilbage til niveauet i 2008, korrigeret for inflation. Udgifterne til non-krigen del af budgettet i løbet af de næste fem år (2013-2017) vil være omkring 4% lavere end i de seneste fem år (2008-2012) i ​​faste priser. Den virkelige (det vil sige, "inflation korrigeret") ændring fra 2012 vil være en reduktion på 3,2%

Nedenstående figur korrigerer for inflation ved at gøre alle beløb i 2012 dollars. Det viser, at base-budgettet udgifter var sprunget 55% efter inflation mellem 1998 og 2010. Det nye budget Planen opstiller 2013 udgifter på 525 milliarder $, hvilket er 46% over 1998-niveauet.

Det nye budget plan - repræsenteret ved den grønne trend linje - står i skarp kontrast til de reduktioner mandat fra Budget Control Act i henhold til bestemmelserne om beslaglæggelserne (repræsenteret ved den røde tendensen linje). Beslaglæggelse ville rulle Pentagon base-budgettet udgifter tilbage til 2004-niveau, hvilket stadig ville være 31% over niveauet i 1998 (korrigeret for inflation). Det nye budget plan og beslaglæggelse har én ting til fælles: begge ville holde Pentagon udgifter over inflationskorrigeret gennemsnit for den kolde krig år (repræsenteret ved den vandrette streg linie).

Christopher Preble og Charles Knight. Huffington Post, 20. januar 2012.
http://defensealt.org/ysCbHQ

Uddrag:

Balance afhænger af, hvad du står på. Med hensyn til vores fysiske sikkerhed, er USA velsignet med kontinental fred og en mangel på magtfulde fjender. Vores militær er de bedst uddannede, bedste-ledede, og bedst udstyrede i verden. Det er vores ustabile økonomi og vores træge økonomi, der gør os sårbare over for snuble.

Desværre er den nye strategi ikke fuldt ud forstår vores styrker, ligesom det heller ikke helt fat vores svagheder. I sidste ende, betyder det ikke opnå Eisenhowers højt besungne balance.

__________________________________________________

Matthew Rosenberg. New York Times, 20. januar 2012.
http://pulse.me/s/5a33j

Uddrag:

Amerikanske og andre koalitionsstyrker her bliver dræbt i et stigende antal af de meget afghanske soldater de kæmper sammen og tog, i angreb er motiveret af dybe fjendskab mellem de angiveligt allierede styrker, ifølge amerikanske og afghanske officerer og en klassificeret koalition rapport.

Redaktørens kommentar:

Synes lige meget stærke beviser for, at amerikanske styrker har overskredet deres velkomst!

Andrew Taylor. AP, 20. januar 2012.
http://defensealt.org/xN9mYD

Uddrag:

Det Hvide Hus planen, vil sandsynligvis gentage nye skatter og gebyrer forslag, der er nonstarters med Capitol Hill republikanere, ville slukke for hele ni år, 1200 milliarder dollar over-the-board nedskæringer, der er nævnt som en "binde".

"Vi har en binde kommer mindre end et år fra nu, medmindre Kongressen handlinger," sagde en højtstående administration embedsmand. "Vi vil bede Kongressen om at gøre nu, hvad vi mener Kongressen burde have gjort i december, hvilket er gennemføre mere end 1200 milliarder dollars i at nedbringe underskuddet, skal du slukke binde og fastholde de (udgifterne caps)."

DefenseTracker.com den 18. januar 2012.
http://defensetracker.com/web/?p=1681

Uddrag:

En del af "Doomsday Mechanism" hysteri spredes ved forsvarsminister Panetta og hans kammerat i budgettet krige, Cong. Buck McKeon, har været automatik af lineær nævn nedskæringer, der binde vil pålægge forsvarsbudgettet næste januar-i det sandsynlige tilfælde, at lame duck kongressen og dens efterfølger næste år vil både være lige så dysfunktionel som dåse røde og blå orme vi har nu. (Den anden del af hysteri er "rædsel" for at vende tilbage til niveauet i 2007, af uædle budget forsvarsudgifterne.)

Det ser ud til, at præsidenten har eksisterende lovhjemmel til at ændre binde mekanismen, men ikke mængden af ​​nødvendige nedskæringer.

Philip Taubman. New York Times, 08. januar 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/reducing-the-nuclear-arsenal.html

Uddrag:

Hvis præsidenten skubber tilbage mod forsvarerne af den gamle orden i Pentagon og andre skanser i den nukleare præstedømmet, kan han bevare amerikansk sikkerhed, samtidig med at De Forenede Stater en mere troværdig leder på en af ​​nutidens mest kritiske spørgsmål - som indeholder spredning af atomvåben våben. Som en kæderyger beder andre om at opgive cigaretter, lyder USA med sin oppustet arsenal, hykleriske når det lægger pres på andre lande til at skære våben og stoppe produktionen af ​​bombe-grade højt beriget uran ...

Relateret:

Defense Strategi anmeldelse Side Nuclear Debat

Carl Conetta. Projekt om Defense Briefing Notat # 53, 05 januar 2012.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1201bm53.pdf

Uddrag:

Den roll tilbage i finansieringsplaner og de faktiske nedskæringer i budgettet, er tilstrækkelige til at engagere sig ethvert kontor og program i Pentagon. Det gør en omstridt diskussion såvel som en belastning af foder til partipolitik. Det vil hjælpe, hvis vi kan holde tingene i perspektiv. De nedskæringer, vi står overfor i dag er langt mindre dramatiske end dem, efter Den Kolde Krig. Samlet budgetmyndigheden under 1991-1996 var næsten 20% lavere i reelle tal end i 1987-1990 - en nedgang fem gange større end hvad administrationen i dag foreslår. I betragtning af vores nations nuværende økonomiske straights, burde Pentagon fortalere faktisk ånde lettet op.

Department of Defense. 5 Januar 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf

Winslow Wheeler. TIME Battleland, 13 December, 2011.

Uddrag:

Uden inddragelse af krigen udgifter, DOD basen budgettet under "Doomsday Mechanism" er ikke længere på eller i nærheden af ​​sin post-World War II højt, men det er heller ikke tæt på nogen af ​​de historiske lavpunkt. Faktisk er det omkring 38 milliarder dollar over årlige udgifter under Den Kolde Krig ...

Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, 01. december, 2011.
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/01/a_bandwagon_for_offshore_balancing~~V

Uddrag:

... Offshore balance er den rette strategi, selv når vores kasser er fulde, forudsat at der ikke peer konkurrenter truer med at dominere de vigtigste strategiske områder. Selv i gode tider, giver det ingen mening at tage unødvendige byrder eller at tillade allierede til free-tur på Uncle Sams hubristic ønske om at være "uundværlige nation" i næsten alle hjørner af verden. Med andre ord, er offshore afbalancering ikke bare en strategi for hårde tider, det er også den bedste tilgængelige strategi i en verden, hvor USA er den stærkeste magt, tilbøjelige til at udløse unødvendig antagonisme, og udsatte for at blive trukket ind i unødvendige krige.

Sara Sorcher. National Journal, den 29. november 2011.

Uddrag:

Præsident Obama meddelte for nylig skridt til at styrke opbygningen af ​​en amerikansk udenrigspolitik med ny fokus på Stillehavet, herunder planer om at udsende 2.500 soldater på en base i Australien, alt imens insisterer på, at eventuelle reduktioner i USA forsvarsudgifterne ikke kommer på bekostning prioriteter i Asien-Stillehavsområdet. Selv så mange i Washington varsomt øje Kinas hastigt modernisere militæret og udvide flåde tilstedeværelse i Stillehavet, 39 procent af insidere sagde det næste træk er at forbedre amerikansk engagement i Beijing og samtidig undgå enhver form for militær-relaterede trin.

Paula G. Thornhill. CNN, den 23. november 2011.
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/23/opinion/thornhill-defense-cuts/index.html

Uddrag:

Landets ledelse har brug for en Plan B, således at en heroisk antagelse - eller håb - om det usandsynlige i fremtidige krige ikke utilsigtet fører til strategisk katastrofe. Det er sværere end det ser ud. Plan B vil give mere fleksibilitet til at opfylde, hvad der kunne gå galt i det strategiske miljø snarere end blot at gøre budgetnedskæringer.

Redaktørens kommentar:

Plan B er at opretholde en god 'strategisk reserve. " Som neo-konservative gerne påpege, at USA bruger kun 4,5% af sit BNP på sit militær. Hvis nye trusler knibe, kan den amerikanske let ramp up udgifter og engagere det stadig betydelige industri-og videngrundlag. Problemet dette land står med en opløsning strategi er mangel på politisk vilje. Civile ledere er utilbøjelige til at bede det amerikanske folk til at ofre. En robust National Guard og Reserve kraft, ikke misbruges af hyppige implementeringer til unødvendige krige og en samfundsmæssig forventning om at betale en afgift, tillæg i tid af en national katastrofesituation er de grundlæggende elementer af, hvad dette land skal strategisk forberedt og samtidig opretholde en lille stående fredstid kraft . Med sådan en strategisk plan USA kan godt klargøres til nogen trussel.

Matthew Leatherman. Bloomberg regering, den 21. november 2011.
http://defensealt.org/veAUPs

Anthony H. Cordesman og Bradley Bosserman. Center for Strategiske og Internationale Studier, den 17. november 2011.
http://csis.org/files/publication/111511_Defense_Resources_Threats.pdf

Michael E. O'Hanlon. New York Times den 14. november 2011.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1114_defense_budget_ohanlon.aspx

Uddrag:

Ved at holde et skib i udlandet for et par år og har to besætninger aksjer det pågældende fartøj samt et skoleskib derhjemme, kunne Søværnet forbedre sin indsættelse effektiviteten med op til 40 procent per skib, opstilling med omkring tre og en halv skibe, hvad i gennemsnit kan have krævet fem. Fokus på søværnets store overflade kombattanter, krydsere og destroyere, kunne denne tilgang teoretisk mulighed omkring 60 skibe (med lidt mindre end halvdelen af ​​dem indsættes i udlandet på et tidspunkt) for at bevare den globale tilstedeværelse, at søværnet siger den har brug for, snarere end 94 skibe, det i øjeblikket forfølger.

Loren B. Thompson. Lexington Institute, den 11. november 2011.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/gen-odierno-breaks-the-code-on-why-weapons-cost-so-much?a=1&c=1171

Uddrag:

General Odierno har den 2. november bemærkninger tyder på, at han indser det er ikke kun entreprenører, der kører op udgifter til programmer. De budgetoverskridelser ofte bagt i begyndelsen af ​​de barokke krav om, at købet systemet pålægger udviklere. Disse krav resulterer i lange tidsplan forsinkelser og uoverkommelige enhedsomkostningerne, og våben funktioner, der ikke kan opfylde de forventninger appropriators. Endnu vigtigere er, de langsomme levering af bedre at bekæmpe systemer til warfighters.

Paul Rogers. Open Democracy, 11. november 2011.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/israel-vs-iran-regional-blowback

Uddrag:

Den næsten uundgåelige virkelighed er, at ud af konfrontation Iran vil snart få en begrænset atomarsenal. Dette skyldes, at selv et begrænset bombning af Iran vil skabe en ny dynamik, hvor Iran er i centrum af post-angreb regionen vil have flere nye muligheder for at pålægge omkostninger på sine modstandere, og vil gå for fuld udblæsning for sin egen afskrækkende.

Kelsey Hartigan. Demokrati Arsenal, den 10. november 2011.
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2011/11/if-you-want-peace-stop-clamoring-for-war.html

Uddrag:

Hvis Romney mener, at han kan vals i Det Ovale Værelse, give et par rå og hård taler og pludselig Iran vil åbne sine døre for IAEA-inspektører, ja, han er i en brat opvågnen.

Krigerisk retorik vil ikke løse situationen med Iran. Faktisk vil de fleste eksperter fortælle dig, at det vil gøre det værre. Trusler om militære aktioner, eller værre, faktisk militære aktioner, vil kun spille i hænderne på Irans høge ... Hvis en amerikansk militær tilstedeværelse ville overbevise Iran om at samarbejde, ville jeg have troet, det ville være sket nu.

Brian Phillips. AntiWar.com, den 9. november 2011.
http://original.antiwar.com/bphillips/2011/11/08/10-factors-that-may-lead-to-war-with-iran/~~V

Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo # 52, den 25. oktober 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm52.pdf

Uddrag:

Den kraftige stigning i Pentagon base budget siden 1998 (46% i faste priser) er betydeligt på grund af strategiske valg, der ikke sikkerhedskrav, per se. Det afspejler et afslag på at opstille prioriteringer samt en bevægelse væk fra de traditionelle mål for militær afskrækkelse, inddæmning, og forsvar til mere ambitiøse mål: trussel forebyggelse, kommandoen over commons, og omdannelsen af ​​det globale sikkerhedsmiljø. Den geografiske rækkevidde af rutinemæssige amerikanske militær aktivitet har også udvidet.

pendant: Pentagons New Mission Set: En bæredygtig løsning af Carl Conetta?. En opdateret og udvidet uddrag fra rapporten fra taskforcen om en Unified Security Budget (USB) for De Forenede Stater, august 2011. http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/111024Pentagon-missions.pdf

Charles Knight. Projekt om Defense Alternatives Briefing Notat # 51, den 25. oktober 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm51.pdf

Uddrag:

... Beskedne ændringer i den amerikanske militær strategi og global kropsholdning gennemført i løbet af de næste ti år kan pålideligt tilbyde reduktion af underskuddet besparelser fra Pentagon budgettet spænder fra 73 milliarder dollar om året til 118 milliarder dollars om året.

For at opnå de besparelser kun kræver anvendelse af forskellige midler til at opnå strategiske mål. Det er netop, hvad enhver god strategi gør, når forholdene ændrer sig.

Abubakar Siddique. Radio Free Europe, den 25. oktober 2011.

Uddrag:

Erfaringen har vist os, at udenlandske styrker ikke kan bringe fred til Afghanistan. Vi vil have fred, når vi fjerner årsagerne til konflikter mellem [afghanske] folk, "[protest arrangør] Mozhdah sagde. "En af de vigtigste grunde til at bekæmpe her er, at vi ikke stoler på hinanden. Vi har brug for at sidde og snakke med hinanden for at vinde hinandens tillid.

Dan de Luc. Agence France-Presse, den 19. oktober 2011.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=SEA&s=TOP&i=8003142

Uddrag:

"Asien bliver helt klart en prioritet, og vi vil tilpasse vores aktiviteter i overensstemmelse hermed," Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval operationer, fortalte reportere i en telekonference.

Flåden nu konstant opretholder et hangarskib - enten Kitty Hawk eller George Washington - i Stillehavet, end for 10 år siden, da et luftfartsselskab var kun 70 procent af tiden, sagde han.

Abu Muqawama. Center for New American Security, 13. oktober 2011.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/10/looking-trim-defense-budget-start-qdr.html

Uddrag:

Gårsdagens meddelelse om, at det amerikanske forsvarsministerium vil danne en "strategiske valg Group" til at identificere prioriteter og risici forud for 450 milliarder dollar i potentielle nedskæringer til budgettet er det seneste eksempel på værdiløshed af Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). En strategisk dokument nødvendigvis vil identificere risici og prioriteringer, men da QDR gør hverken, det amerikanske forsvarsministerium har til at etablere en helt ny arbejdsgruppe, der skal gøre netop det.

Se også: Er QDR 'et PR-stunt' eller en oprigtig indsats for at forene kropsholdning og budget med strategi?

Andrew Tilghman. Defense News, 12. oktober 2011.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=LAN&s=TOP&i=7935114

Uddrag:

Panetta sagde, at hæren bør forvente reserve-komponent tropper for at være en vigtig del af fremtiden kraft.

"Som vi drage ned fra disse krige, er vi nødt til at holde Guard og reserven operationelle og få erfaring. Dette er den bedste investering, vi har gjort i de sidste 10 år, "sagde han. "Vi er nødt til at fortsætte med at være i stand til at fastholde det som et værdifuldt aktiv, fordi reserven kraft, har en særlig rolle at spille som en kraft, der giver nationen strategisk dybde i tilfælde af krise, adgang til unikke civile færdigheder, som kan være nyttige i moderne konflikter, og som hærens bro til en bredere civilbefolkning. "

Carl Conetta. Projekt om Defense Alternatives Briefing Notat # 50, 11. oktober 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm50.pdf

Uddrag:

Hvad gør binding upraktisk (og markerer det som en skræmmetaktik) er den bratte måde, hvorpå den ville gennemføre nedskæringer. En gradvis tilgang kunne udrette
tilsvarende besparelser uden sammenlignelige forstyrrelser. Som udtænkt, er udbuddet betød
at motivere, i stedet for at afbøde, øgede indtægter og stykker til retten programmer.

Særlig generalinspektør for Iraks Genopbygning. Oktober 2011.
http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October2011.html

Ethan Pollack, The Economic Policy Institute Blog den 20. september 2011. http://www.epi.org/blog/militaristic-foreign-policy-saves-money/

En af de vedvarende kritik af præsident Obamas finanspolitiske plan er at det tæller udgifter til krigsudstyr reduktioner som besparelser. Dybest set, Congressional Budget Office beregner sit forsvar baseline delvist ved at tage den seneste krig supplerende (teknisk kaldes oversøiske uforudsete operationer, eller OCO), og under forudsætning af dette beløb, justeret for inflation, vil blive brugt hvert år i en overskuelig horisont. Dette giver op til ca 1730 milliarder dollar over 10 år. Præsidentens forslag, men omfatter kun 653 milliarder dollar i OCO udgifterne over 10 år, for en besparelse på omkring 1,1 billion dollars.

Nogle kritikere dog, hævder, at disse besparelser ikke kan tælles, fordi CBO OCO baseline i sig selv ikke er realistisk, derfor besparelserne er ikke "rigtige." For eksempel, Udvalget for en ansvarlig føderale budget (CRFB) hævder, at tælle disse besparelser er en "budget gimmick", at præsidenten bruger til at "puste sin opsparing." Ifølge denne kritik en anden baseline for OCO udgifter skal anvendes-enten præsidentens budget anmodningen eller CBO udnyttelsen af kreditmuligheden politiske løsning-hvilket ville mindske den baseline og gøre det praktisk umuligt at generere budgetbesparelser fra reducere krig udgifterne.

Al respekt til CRFB og de andre kritikere, men denne kritik er fjollet. Den CBO OCO baseline er ikke "urealistisk"-stedet, det repræsenterer omkostningerne ved præsident Bushs aggressive invasion-centreret tilgang til udenrigspolitik udvidet i al evighed. Præsident Obama er, heldigvis, i færd med at forsøge at forandre Amerika tilgang til udenrigspolitik, der trækker ned tropper fra Irak og Afghanistan og på vej mod en mere multilateral, tålmodig, diplomatisk, og vigtigst af alt, billigere metode. Desuden, den finanspolitiske planen foreslår at lægge loft over OCO udgifter, dermed sikre disse besparelser realiseres.

Præsident Obamas udenrigspolitiske strategi koster færre penge end præsident Bushs, og budgettet udsigter bør afspejle disse besparelser.

Redaktørens kommentar:

Det må være et tegn på, hvor galt det står for progressive, at EPI nu fylder en stor røgsky fra Obama-administrationen sendt for at aflede opmærksomheden fra den virkelige budgetnedskæringer, og navnlig for at beskytte Pentagon fra yderligere nedskæringer i de finanspolitiske kampe . Ethan Pollack har arbejdet for OMB, så han sikkert forstår den regnskabsmæssige forvrængning indbygget i CBO basisfremskrivningerne baseret på gældende lovgivning. Ikke en eneste person i verden (herunder dem, CBO, der forbereder baseline) mener, at OCO udgifter vil fortsætte med at finansiere krigene i Irak og Afghanistan på samme niveau som 2011. Derfor er CBO har en "trække ned politiske valgmulighed" - at vurdere sandsynlige OCO-omkostningerne. Det sidste øvelse er ikke "dum", eller de forslag, som disse skøn være grundlag for at overveje budget reduktion planer.

Mr. Pollack skal også vide, at præsident Obamas FY12 budget indsendelse til Kongressen indeholder kun 50 milliarder dollar om året til OCO for de kommende år. Hvilket er det? 118 milliarder dollars for evigt, eller 50 milliarder dollar for evigt? Du kan ikke have det på begge måder.

CBO'er trække ned mulighed er helt sikkert bedre for budgettet (og underskud
reduktion) planlægning, som enten urealistiske "pladsholder" (som
er simpelthen uansvarligt budgettering) eller CBO baseline artefakt af
118 milliarder dollars for evigt.

Hvis præsident Obama ønsker at annoncere en plan for at redde meningsfuld
beløb fra OCO han skulle annoncere hurtigere udbetalinger fra Afghanistan ... men så ingen virkelig mener, at han forlader
Afghanistan i 2014. Så det er alt røg og spejle ... og progressive skal føle sig forfærdeligt over det, ikke fejre.

Det er en tilsnigelse at hævde, at CBO baseline OCO er en eller anden måde en Bush ansvar. Det er simpelthen en metodologisk artefakt af, hvordan CBO gør sit baseline.

Præsident Obama har stået for næsten tre år og har ikke bragt alle tropper hjem fra Irak, og har næppe indledt en trække ned i Afghanistan. Den indeværende år OCO på 118 milliarder dollars er hans ansvar som er den falsk-hed til at projicere det frem ti år og derefter hævde besparelser fra at bruge "653 milliarder dollar ... over ti år." Hvis han virkelig var villig til at afslutte krigen i Afghanistan snart han kan være i stand til at skære den OCO i halve og tilbyde 325 milliarder dollar fra reducerede fremtidige krigs omkostninger til nedbringelse af underskuddet.

And until this year's budget imbroglio in Congress forced his hand he
has continued to feed the Pentagon with higher and higher base budgets every year. There is no evidence that President Obama's “approach to foreign policy…[is] less expensive”… not as far as the largesse offered up to the Pentagon is concerned.

We must not base progressive policy on smoke and mirrors. En sådan
politics only hurts us in the long run.

Another critique of this budget gimmick can be found at: http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/gordon-adams/2369/how-about-those-defense-savings .

___________________________________________________________

Det Hvide Hus. September 2011.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/66998459/WH-Report-on-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan-September-2011

W. Andrew Terrill. Strategisk Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2. august 2011.

Matt Leatherman. Vilje og Tegnebog, 26. juli 2011.
http://thewillandthewallet.squarespace.com/blog/2011/7/26/dods-64b-question-where-is-that-64b.html

Uddrag:

"CBO har længe sagt, at Forsvarsministeriets undervurderer programmets omkostninger, herunder senest sin rapport om de langsigtede konsekvenser af 2012 de kommende år Defense Program. Denne undersøgelse konkluderede, at "forskellen mellem den CBO projektion og DOD skøn for FYDP er omkring 2% eller omkring 64 milliarder dollars, over den femårige periode." "

David E. Mosher, assisterende direktør for den nationale sikkerhed, Congressional Budget Office. Vidneudsagn, før Udvalget om budgettet, Repræsentanternes Hus i USA, den 7. juli 2011.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12162/07-07-FYDP_Testimony.pdf

redaktionelle. Boston Globe, 30. juni 2011.

Når Leon Panetta tager roret i forsvarsministeriet i morgen, vil han blive konfronteret med vanskelige valg om den amerikanske militære indsats i Afghanistan, Irak og Libyen. Men en lige så presserende - og potentielt endnu mere uløselig - Problemet er Pentagons budget og udgifter. Udgående sekretær Robert Gates var god til at hykle på behovet for at kontrollere udgifterne, og han bemærkede for nylig, at "USA skal bruge så meget som nødvendigt på nationalt forsvar, men ikke en øre mere'' Men afdelingens baseline budget er steget. hvert år siden Gates overtog - fra 450 milliarder dollars til mere end 550 milliarder dollars fire år senere. Alene i år er Pentagon søger en 3,4 procent stigning fra sit budget for 2010.

Det er ikke kun de krige, de repræsenterer mindre end 30 procent af Pentagons enorme budget anmodning. I forbindelse med andre offentlige udgifter, er Pentagon en monstrum. For hver 100 kroner af regeringen diskretionære udgifter, går over $ 30 til ikke-krig forsvarsudgifter. Omfanget er overvældende, behovet for mere end spredt udskæringer af mislykkede systemer er presserende.

Gates for nylig hævdede, at Pentagon allerede har skåret 300 milliarder dollar, men matematik antyder noget andet. At pengene kom fra programmer, der allerede planlagt til at afsluttes. Besparelserne blev simpelthen sat i andre militære prioriteter. Efter at have konstateret, at flådens 11 carrier kampgrupper var for høje, nægtede Gates til at fjerne en enkelt.

Panetta bliver nødt til at tage en mere disciplineret og systematisk kig på budgettet. Der er ingen mangel på råd fra indflydelsesrige tænketanke og uafhængige undersøgelser, herunder sidste års rapport om bæredygtig Defense Task Force , en tværpolitisk gruppe indkaldes af repræsentant Barney Frank. Deres anbefalinger vil trimme 960 milliarder dollar mellem 2011 og 2020, hvis blot Pentagon ville handle på dem.

Skæring af antallet af udsendte atomvåben halv - til 1.000 sprænghoveder - er i overensstemmelse med en reduceret vægt på atomkrig og bestræbelser på våbenkontrol fortalere. Dette skridt alene vil spare over 100 milliarder dollars over 10 år. Reduktion af konventionelle styrker ved 50.000, hvilket stadig vil efterlade 100.000 medarbejdere udstationeret i Europa og Asien er mere realistisk kraft struktur. Annullering af blot nogle få systemer, som hverken er omkostningseffektive eller væsentlige ville spare mere. MV-22 Osprey og Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle er længe om problemer, og kort på kapacitet. Hertil kommer, både Congressional Budget Office og Government Accountability Office har foreslået ændringer for at støtte bestræbelser, såsom vedligeholdelse, forsyning og infrastruktur, der kan spare 100 milliarder dollar i det næste årti.

Alt dette kunne ske uden at kompromittere den nationale sikkerhed. Panetta nødt til at skubbe på de politiske kræfter, der hævder eventuelle nedskæringer gøre nationen sårbare over for forskellige fjender. Underskuddet er en langt større sikkerhedsrisiko.

Desværre, Pentagon fortsat den største føderale agentur, der simpelthen ikke kan bestå en uafhængig revisor test, når de udsættes for de normale bogholderi procedurer, det kan ikke med nogen nøjagtighed, spor udgifter, svig, spild, eller overflødighed. Det har givet sig selv en September 2017 frist for audit "parathed.'' Det er ikke hurtigt nok. Panetta, der som tidligere leder af Office of Management and Budget, har et ry som en streng forkæmper for finanspolitisk disciplin. Han bliver nødt til at få Pentagon hus med henblik på den første dag.

Task Force on A Unified Security Budget Institute for Policy Studies , July 2011.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/Unified_Security_Budget_FY2012.pdf

Melvin Goodman. Baltimore Sun , 29 June 2011.

Uddrag:

In his recent lectures, Mr. Gates warned against any freeze in defense spending, leaving Mr. Panetta to deal with weapons systems and military missions that the United States can no longer afford. As the former director of the Office of Management and Budget, Mr. Panetta presumably understands that the United States, with less than 25 percent of the world's economic output and more than 50 percent of the world's military expenditures, will have to curtail certain weapons and missions. The defense budget has grown more than 50 percent in the past 10 years and now exceeds the pace of spending of the Cold War era, including the wars in Korea and Vietnam as well as the peacetime buildup of President Ronald Reagan.

A reexamination of current troop deployments must include the tens of thousands of troops in Europe and Asia more than six decades after the end of World War II; hundreds of bases and facilities the world over; and the excessive willingness to project power in areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, where vital national interests are not at stake.

The White House, 29 June 2011.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism

White House Fact Sheet National Strategy for Counterterrorism

Det Hvide Hus
29 juni 2011

“As a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda's terror: Justice has been done.”

–President Barack Obama
1 maj 2011

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, found here, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf formalizes the approach that President Obama and his Administration have been pursuing and adapting for the past two and half years to prevent terrorist attacks and to deliver devastating blows against al-Qa'ida, including the successful mission to kill Usama bin Laden.

Rather than defining our entire national security policy, this counterterrorism strategy is one part of President Obama's larger National Security Strategy, which seeks to advance our enduring national security interests, including our security, prosperity, respect for universal values and global cooperation to meet global challenges.

This Strategy builds upon the progress we have made in the decade since 9/11, in partnership with Congress, to build our counterterrorism and homeland security capacity as a nation. It neither represents a wholesale overhaul—nor a wholesale retention—of previous policies and strategies.

Threat —This Strategy recognizes there are numerous nations and groups that support terrorism to oppose US interests, including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and HAMAS, and we will use the full range of our foreign policy tools to protect the United States against these threats.

However, the principal focus of this counterterrorism strategy is the network that poses the most direct and significant threat to the United States—al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and its adherents.

Al-Qa'ida has murdered thousands of our citizens, including on 9/11.

Al-Qa'ida affiliates—groups that have aligned with al-Qa'ida—have attempted to attack us, such as Yemen-based al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) failed attempt to bomb a Detroit-bound airliner on December 25, 2009.

Al-Qa'ida adherents—individuals, sometimes American citizens, who cooperate with or are inspired by al-Qa'ida—have engaged in terrorism, including the tragic slaughter of our service members at Fort Hood in 2009.

Our Ultimate Objective —This Strategy is clear and precise in our ultimate objective: we will disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qa'ida—its leadership core in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our citizens and interests.

Our Posture —We are at war. We are waging a broad, sustained, integrated and relentless campaign that harnesses every element of American power to defeat al-Qa'ida.

Our Goals –To defeat al-Qa'ida, we are pursuing specific counterterrorism goals, including:

Protecting our homeland by constantly reducing our vulnerabilities and adapting and updating our defenses.

Disrupting, degrading, dismantling and defeating al-Qa'ida wherever it takes root.

Preventing terrorists from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction.

Eliminating the safehavens al-Qa'ida needs to train, plot and launch attacks against us.

Degrading links between al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and adherents.

Countering al-Qa'ida ideology and its attempts to justify violence.

Depriving al-Qa'ida and its affiliates of their enabling means, including illicit financing, logistical support, and online communications.

Our Principles —Our pursuit of these goals is guided by several key principles, including:

Upholding core American values, including rule of law and the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all Americans;

Harnessing every tool at our disposal, including intelligence, military, homeland security and law enforcement, and maximizing cooperation between communities;

Building partnerships to with international institutions and partners so that nations can take the fight to al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and adherents in their own countries;

Applying tools appropriately, recognizing that different threats in different regions demand different tools;

Building a culture of preparedness and resilience at home to prevent terrorist attacks and ensure we can quickly recover should an attack occur.

Devastating Blows Against Al-Qa'ida—guided by this Strategy, we have achieved significant progress against al-Qa'ida over the past two and a half years.

We have put al-Qa'ida under more pressure than at any time since 9/11, affecting its ability to attract new recruits and making it harder for al-Qa'ida to train and plot attacks.

Al-Qa'ida's leadership ranks have been decimated, with more key leaders eliminated in rapid succession than at any time since 9/11.

Virtually every major al-Qa'ida affiliate has lost its key leader or operational commander.

More than half of al-Qa'ida's leadership has been eliminated, including Usama bin Laden.

“On a Path to Defeat” —As President Obama stated in his June 22 remarks on our way forward in Afghanistan, “we have put al Qaeda on a path to defeat, and we will not relent until the job is done.”

Information seized from his compound reveals bin Laden's concerns about al-Qa'ida's long-term viability.

Bin Laden clearly saw that al-Qa'ida is losing the larger battle for hearts and minds.

Bin Laden knew that he had failed to portray America as being at war with Islam.

He knew that al-Qa'ida's murder of so many innocent civilians, most of them Muslims, had deeply and perhaps permanently tarnished al-Qa'ida's image in the world.

Redaktørens kommentar:

In terms of military means of countering terrorism it has been reported that this Counterterrorism Strategy signals the shift away from large-scale ground interventions in foreign countries and consequently will reduce the requirement for counter-insurgency capabilities in the armed forces. Instead it relies more on special forces assisted by drones to target principals in terrorist organizations.

Time will tell whether COIN is on the way out.

William Hartung. Huffington Post , 28 June 2011.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/afghanistan-for-real-savi_b_886241.html

Uddrag:

There won't be large scale savings from the winding down of the Afghan war until virtually all US forces are withdrawn. Even then there are still likely to be ongoing costs for training, equipping and possibly even paying Afghan security forces, which could cost up to $10 billion or more per year if current rates are maintained. But the vast bulk of the $120 billion per year now being spent on the war will be freed up for other purposes: deficit reduction, or public investments, or some combination of the two.

An end to the Afghan and Iraq wars may also open the way to a more comprehensive public debate on the Pentagon's $550 billion-plus annual base budget — a sum over four times as large as what we spend on the wars. Politically, making real cuts in Pentagon spending during a time of war is a tough sell, even given our current budgetary predicament. But an end to the wars combined with the pressure from the deficit could lead to real cuts in the Pentagon's base budget as well, especially if we adopt a new strategy that forswears major wars of occupation or large-scale insurgency campaigns of the kind our nation has waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we cut the war spending and bring the Pentagon's larger budget into line with reality, then we'll be talking real money.

Jeff Jacoby. Boston Globe , 22 June 2011.

Uddrag:

…with great power come great responsibilities, and sometimes one of those responsibilities is to destroy monsters: to take down tyrants who victimize the innocent and flout the rules of civilization. Hvis kvarterer og byer har brug for politiarbejde, det siger sig selv, verden gør også. And just as local criminals thrive when cops look the other way, so do criminals on the world stage.

Our world needs a policeman. And whether most Americans like it or not, only their indispensable nation is fit for the job.

Redaktørens kommentar:

When three-quarters of Americans reject a role of global policeman for the US perhaps they understand something fundamental about policing that Jeff Jacoby doesn't. A police force without oversight by a judiciary and a guiding body of law is surely a formula for tyranny .

Jacoby would never endorse tyranny, but the avocation to be global policemen by White House occupants who are elected by and responsible to only 10% of the world's people is a decision to be a vigilante on the global stage. Consider that Americans would be up in arms if China or Russia took it upon themselves to be global vigilantes.

For the leaders of the US to so gladly to take up this role only serves to delay the day when we have capable international judicial and policing institutions. If our leaders attempt to think even a few years into the future it should be clear to them that the practice of vigilantism does not serve American interests.

[A version of this comment was published as a letter to the editor in the Boston Globe , 28 June 2011.]

Steps Toward Defense Budget Discipline , a Hill briefing sponsored by Taxpayers for Common Sense and the Project on Defense Alternatives, 7 June 2011, video by the Stimson Center . Featuring: Amy Belasco, Carl Conetta, Benjamin Friedman, Matthew Leatherman, Laura Peterson and Winslow Wheeler.

Carlton Meyer. G2mil.com, juni 2011.
http://www.g2mil.com/OBCL.htm

Uddrag:

Here is a list of outdated US military bases overseas that can be promptly closed to save billions of dollars each year…

Close Outdated US Military Bases in Japan – Futenma & Atsugi

Pull Aircraft and Airmen Out of Osan – now in a kill zone

Cut Army Fat in Korea – 8th Army and Daegu

Vacate Two Army Bases in Germany – as once planned

Close Torii Station – a US Army base on Okinawa?

Vacate RAF Lakenheath – the Russians aren't coming

Close Gitmo, the Entire Base – it has no purpose

Close Chinhae Tomorrow – it commands nothing

[There is more argumentation about each of these at the source.]

Winslow Wheeler. Guest Post, 24 May 2011.

The National Defense Authorization bill, HR 1540, will be debated by the House of Representatives this week. The bill is the work product of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Chaired by Congressman Buck McKeon, R. – Calif..

The Operation and Maintenance section (Title XLIII) of the bill is one of its largest and most important. “O&M” deals with the support, logistics, maintenance, training and much else needed to enable our armed forces to function effectively. $170.8 billion was requested by President Obama; the committee increased that by $361 million to $171.1 billion. However, to get there the Committee took some detours.

Sprinkled throughout the O&M title the HASC added various earmarks (one minor example: $4.0 million for “Simulation Training Systems for the Army” [p. 430 of the Committee Report]). All of these came to a lot more than the $361 million net add to the bill. The Committee and its staff had to find offsets to help pay for these earmark goodies and other additions.

In past years, the HASC (and the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Subcommittees of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees) has listed strange sounding reductions in the O&M sections of their bills – “unobligated balances.” These should be technical alterations for money previously appropriated to the various military services for various programs; they become “unobligated” when the planned expenditure does not occur, and they presumably become available for offsets for new spending, or – if the Committee were to be more forthcoming to the taxpayer – return to the Treasury.

For example, on p. 432 of the HASC Committee Report, the tables for Army O&M show a reduction of $384.6 million labeled “Army unobligated balances estimate.” That amount happens to be 1.1% of the president's request for total Army O&M ($34.735 billion).

The Navy section on O&M in the HASC bill shows a $435.9 million reduction for “Navy unobligated balances estimate.” For some strange reason, that amount also calculates to 1.1% of the President's request for Navy O&M ($39.365 billion).

Stranger even, the Marine Corps O&M reduction for unobligated balances as also 1.1% ($66 million of a $5.960 billion request).

Same thing for the Air Force; the same 1.1% ($400.8 million from a $36.195 billion request).

None of these are discussed or explained in the text of the committee report; the only “explanation” we get is that they are “Army [or Navy, or Air Force, etc.] unobligated balances estimate.”

That all of these “estimates,” which should be technical in their nature, come to 1.1% reeks of gaming the system. Two relevant questions: Who did it? And Why?

First, I seriously question if these conveniently similar estimates did indeed come from the military services. That would require a rather strange (and specious) amount of coordination by them all to all come to 1.1% of their respective O&M budget requests.

Secondly, why are there no “unobligated balances” in the procurement and R&D titles, which are heavy with the kind of spending that can end up “unobligated”?

Third, why isn't this money being returned to the Treasury, from whence it came and now belongs if indeed the money is no longer needed by the Defense Department?

There are lots of other questions, but hopefully you get my drift. The offsets the HASC took, calling them “unobligated balances,” are nothing but across the board whacks at one of the most importance accounts in the DOD budget – the one that makes for a well trained and supported military. Why is the HASC doing these across the board cuts, and why are they doing it in O&M?

There are some other “unobligated balance” issues in the bill. The defense wide part of O&M also took a $456.8 million hit from a request of $30.940 billion. This comes to 1.47%. Why does the part that supports the special forces and others take a bigger proportional hit than the other military services?

Also, the Defense Health Program takes a $225 million hit which is “explained” as a “GAO estimate,” but no GAO analysis or other explanation is offered.

The Military Personnel budget that pays military salaries takes a $693 million hit from a $142.828 billion request (.48%). I found no explanation.

Finally, section 2107 permits the Secretary of the Army to use $115 million in previously “unobligated” spending to fund a water treatment facility at Fort Irwin California. Perhaps the House representative from the Fort Irwin area can explain how all this works and how he or she got to fund some spending in the district from these ubiquitous funds.

In my judgment, the HASC, which is charged with oversight of DOD, could use a little oversight itself.

Pentagon's Phantom Savings: $330B Claim Erodes as Programs Reappear
Marcus Weisgerber. Defense News , 16 May 2011.
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2011/05/pentagons-phantom-savings-330b-claim.html

Uddrag:

Nearly 40 percent of that sum [$330 billion] is going straight back into US military programs that replicate the canceled ones, and it's unclear where another 10 percent came from at all, according to a Defense News analysis and to several analysts.

…many of the military services' capability requirements remained in place. More than $130 billion is back on the books, or will be soon, for follow-on or replacement programs. Of the programs canceled in 2010, at least five have already been relaunched, or are in the planning stages to begin again.

Redaktørens kommentar:

When President Obama addressed the nation about the Federal deficit on April 13th he said, “Over the last two years, Secretary Gates has courageously taken on wasteful spending, saving $400 billion in current and future spending. I believe we can do that again.” A number of us military budget analysts looked at each other and said, “Huh, did we miss something?” We hadn't notice any significant cuts in Pentagon spending that could count toward reducing the Federal deficit. Where did the President get that big number?

Of course, we had taken notice when Defense Secretary Gates had announced $78 billion in budget cuts for the FY12 five year defense plan. We noted that the DoD budget would still continue to grow, that some of these cuts were fairly soft (dependent on assumptions about future inflation rates) and most savings would be generated in the out-years. (See: Pentagon Resists Deficit Reduction )

And we had noted that Secretary Gates had cancelled a number of programs in 2009. But we also noted that many of the cancelled programs were being replaced by others substantially reducing the putative savings (see Gordon Adams, Defense Budgets: Still Need to Get it Right! )

In the days following the President's speech we commented on how there was much less real savings than the President attributed to Secretary Gates' “courageous” efforts. I pointed out that $68 billion of the January $78 billion in savings had been consumed when 2012 war costs appeared in the budget released in February, replacing small placeholder numbers.

Benjamin Friedman observed that “current 'savings' consist entirely of spending that the Pentagon reprogrammed and kept, and the future 'savings' come by reducing planned spending growth, rather than reducing actual spending.”

Carl Conetta reviewed the history of these supposed cuts going back to 2009 and compared successive Obama budgets, 2010 through 2012, finding no more than $233 billion in “maybe” DoD reductions in projected out years.

The collective skepticism of independent analysts about the $400 billion no doubt reached the attention of the editors of Defense News , the leading defense industry weekly, where Marcus Weisgerber sought to justify Secretary Gates' claim of $330 billion in savings from the 2009 program cancellations. When DoD officials refused a request to give a program-by-program breakdown of the figure Defense News “used budget justification documents, DoD officials' public statements, annual acquisition reports and Government Accountability Office estimates to project program costs. For classified and far-term programs not on the books – but factored into DoD's projections – think tank and analysts' estimates were used.” The Weisgerber article title, “ Pentagon's Phantom Savings “, sums up the results of Defense News' effort to justify Secretary Gates' claim of savings.

Defense News editorial, 16 May 2011.
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2011/05/us-defense-budget-get-real-pentagon.html

Uddrag:

There is an old Washington saying that no money is less real than out-year money. This means that anything that is beyond the immediate spending bill is purely notional.

Requirement control is a popular method of limiting the costs of new weapons, but it's equally important to control the growing number of missions.

The first step should be to ensure the roles-and-missions review ordered by Obama slashes unnecessary and costly redundancies in capabilities.

Second, the Pentagon must avoid doing what it did – portraying soft numbers as hard ones that do little other than expose it to criticism.

Lastly, to make wise cuts, the Pentagon must improve its internal financial management processes to pinpoint what it's spending and how. Without hard data, it's hard to come up with hard savings.

Charles Knight. Project on Defense Alternatives Note , 12 May 2011.

Word is that two principals in the production of 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review will be charged with producing the “fundamental” defense review President Obama ordered in his April 13th speech on the deficit. They are Kathleen Hicks , Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Planning, who was the lead 2010 QDR author and David Ochmanek , Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Development, who headed the “analysis and integration cell” which pulled together all the analytical aspects of the last QDR.

Update

Defense News reports (23 May 2011) that “The missions and capabilities review will be led by Christine Fox , director of cost assessment and program evaluations [and formerly the President of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)]; Michele Flournoy , defense undersecretary for policy [and the Pentagon official in charge of the 2010 QDR]; and Adm. Michael Mullen , Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”

Redaktørens kommentar:

Putting the same people who did the 2010 review in charge of producing the new review raises an obvious question of whether we should expect anything much “new” or “fundamental” from this review. QDRs in the past have certainly failed to be “fundamental” in any meaningful sense of the word.

One suspects that the foregone sub-text of what Ms. Hicks writes into the new review will be, “We got this pretty much right when we did it last year. Now, of course, if you are willing to take greater security risks you can cut some pieces out of the force posture, but that is a political decision…”

If the new review makes such a smug presentation it will serve the President and the nation poorly. The 2010 QDR did not make any real effort to set clear priorities among the many military requirements it listed, failing one of the principles of strategy development which is to set a practical path within resource constraints. A new fundamental review must present a variety of low-risk options that can be achieved at various resource investment levels. Its authors should not be allowed to simply push the matter of security risk into the political domain.

President Obama would be smart to solicit ideas from a wide variety of sources, reaching far beyond the Pentagon's strategy, policy and force planning staff. If a fundamental review is needed, it is wise to hear and consider diverse voices.

Winslow Wheeler. Center for Defense Information, May 2011.
http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/GreenbookInflationMay11.pdf

Uddrag:

The comparison of DOD's prediction of inflation for itself compared to the commonly accepted GDP measure looms as a major consideration when one considers the time frame that President Obama and Congress are contemplating in the context of deficit reduction. The President's Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform assumed a budget window of 10 years from 2011 to 2020. In his April 13 speech on deficit reduction the president addressed a budget window going out to 2023, when he implied, but did not explain, a reduction in the planned “security” budget of $400 billion in the 2012 -2023 time frame.

There are multiple caveats and uncertainties in the defense related reductions the president appears to have been talking about; these should be identified before identifying how the inflation issue impacts any contemplated savings. They are the following:

• The manner in which the president addressed past and future “savings” made it unclear the extent to which he was addressing actual reductions in spending, or “savings” as efficiencies (ie internal transfers inside the DOD budget as Secretary of Defense Gates has for the most part been conducting);

• No DOD budget figures exist for some of the years the president addressed; available DOD figures go out to only 2016; available OMB figures for defense spending go out to 2021, but the amounts for 2022-2023 are unknown; it is also notable that in recent budget history, most deficit reduction plans have spanned either five or ten years, not twelve; the latter spreads out the annual amount required to be saved, and – more importantly – moving savings out to years as far as ten or twelve years away literally moves them to never-never land;

• No figures were released for any reductions in any year, whether the pre-existing annual budget was known or unknown;

• The target for these $400 billion in “savings” is the “security” budget, not just the Defense Department's budget. The security category includes not just DOD but the State Department/International Affairs budget function, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the nuclear weapons activities of the Department of Energy, and other miscellaneous programs and agencies; the Defense Department's proposed share of the $400 billion “savings” is unknown, and

• Materials released by the White House at the time of the speech asserted that the new plan had a “goal” to hold DOD spending “below” the rate of inflation. While DOD's preferred rates of inflation will – as always – be used for the DOD budget, the differences between the DOD and GDP inflation indices for the years beyond 2016 have also not been made available.

… if the Department of Defense is held to the rate of inflation – or just “below” – as calculated by the DOD inflation indices, it is clear from the above analysis that it will be quite possible for the Pentagon to enjoy “real” growth – under the more generally accepted GDP indices.

Carl Conetta. Project on Defense Alternatives Note , 30 April 2011.

Why is our defense spending so high and apparently out of control? Plenty of ink has been spilled addressing this question, including my own short, The Pentagon's Runaway Budget .

Andy Bacevich may get closer to the key political dynamics in Why Military Spending Remains Untouchable .

There is no better example of the dysfunctional political dynamic governing the Pentagon budget than President Obama's affirmation (April 13, 2011) of the claim that Secretary of Defense Gates has “already saved” the nation $400 billion in defense expenditure. And there is no better illustration of the poverty of our discourse on this subject than the fact that the claim goes largely unchallenged.

Most of the $400 billion in earlier DoD “savings” that President Obama has attributed to Secretary Gates are not “savings” in the ordinary sense of the word. They do not show up as reductions in DoD budget plans from one year to the next, as shown below. At best, they represent DoD marginally adjusting its programs and aspirations to marginally deal with spiraling cost growth.

Rough analogy: Having said it would deliver a “fully-loaded” Cadillac for a specified price X, and having discovered that this estimated price is entirely unrealistic, a car dealer trims back some of the features and delivers something less for the full promised price. Most consumers would call this a gyp, not a savings.

The alternative would be for DoD to further boost subsequent budget requests to fully reflect cost growth, and let Congress and the Executive reconsider what they wanted to buy. I suppose one could say that DoD has “saved” these authorities from the headache of making this decision. Fully confronting a realistic pricing of current programs might lead to a thorough-going rethink of our defense posture and modernization efforts. But that's too much to consider.

Now, let's try to find those $400 billion in “savings”….

THE $400 BILLION

1. Much of the $400 billion that Secretary Gates is claimed to have saved derives from his April 2009 announcement of program cuts. Gates claims that the systems and programs he cut in 2009 would have eventually cost more than $300 billion. However, at least some of this was immediately reprogrammed, meaning: DoD used the savings to buy other things.

April 2009 Gates Defense Budget Recommendation Statement

2. In August 2010 and January 2011, Secretary Gates outlined additional “cuts” and “savings” totaling $178 billion. Of this, $100 billion was immediately reprogrammed to purchase other things or cover other costs. The remaining $78 billion was supposed to be released from the Pentagon orbit to help pay down the deficit. In the August 2010 statement, we find Gates' claiming that his earlier 2009 effort has already saved more than $300 billion.

August 2010 Gates Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative

Jan 2011 Gates Statement on Department Budget and Efficiencies

PDA summary chart re: the $178 billion

3. How much (if any) of the earlier “more than $300 billion” in savings was similarly given over for deficit reduction? Looking at actual budget plans, what do we see? The first $300 billion was announced in April 2009 and it might reasonably have shown up as difference between the last Bush budget plan (FY09) and the first Obama budget plan (FY10).

Comparison between these two budget plans is easy for the years 2010-2013:
- Bush FY09 planned total spending for 2010-2013 = 2.155 trillion
- Obama FY10 planned total spending for 2010-2013 = 2.183 trillion

An increase is not a reduction, therefore: no savings apparent in the near years.

4. Obama's next budget plan (FY11) foresaw a significant increase over his first. So, no savings apparent there either.

5. Only in the next plan – the FY12 plan – do we see a reduction in planned spending between FY12 and FY11 plans. In the nine years that overlap between the FY11 and FY12 plans, we see a reduction of about $233 billion.

But the FY12 plan follows Gates' second announcement of cuts and savings (summarized in #2 above). So, at least, $78 billion derives from that and not the earlier cuts. Indeed, when we compare the FY12 plan with the FY11 plan for the years 2012-2016, there is a reduction in planned spending of $76 billion. Still no apparent impact from the April 2009 “cuts,” however.

6. Well, as noted above, the total difference between the FY11 and FY12 plan for the years 2012-2020 is $233 billion. 233 minus 78 = 155. This additional planning rollback of $155 billion shows up for the years after 2016. So maybe we've found at least $155 billion of the earlier supposed cut? Maybe it just took 2 years to register? Måske.

“Maybe” because the Obama FY12 budget rolls back planned spending almost exactly to the levels foreseen in the Obama FY10 budget …being the budget that was larger than the final Bush budget and being the budget that showed no impact from Gates' April 2009 offer. To put it another way: Obama's FY12 budget simply rolls back the future spending plan he produced in FY11 to the level he had proposed in FY10. The FY12 plan simply disappears the increase proposed in FY11.

7. The other possible (likely) reading of all this is that: (i) None of the original $300 billion “saved” ever left the Pentagon,
(ii) The $78 billion that Gates offered up to deficit reduction is the only “savings” really specified so far to actually show up as a reduction in planned spending, and (iii) The other $155 billion that the FY12 plan subtracts from the FY11 plan involves as yet unspecified cuts and efficiencies.

Project on Defense Alternatives Budget Brief , 28 April 2011.

The Obama Administration to date has made three successive Pentagon budget requests: FY10, FY11, and FY12. Each has looked ten years into the future.

On 13 April, the President offered a new proposal and framework — a revision to achieve greater deficit reduction. It looks forward 12 years. How do all these compare?

In order to compare the President's successive plans, we must stretch the earlier ones out to the new horizon set in his April 13 speech, which is 2023. Reviewing the budget requests shows that in each case the projections for the “out years” — the tail-end years — have been generated by the application of a simple inflator. We can adopt these inflators to stretch all the requests out to 2023. Of course, the result must be regarded as only an estimate of the administration's intent.

The difference between the FY11 and FY12 plans for the 10-year period 2012-2021 is around $240 billion. Stretch it out two more years and the difference grows to about $400 billion. This shows that the differences among the plans (when measured in “then year” dollars) really begin to accumulate as we go further and further into the future.

Keeping in mind that Congress must consider and pass the budget year by year, any series of budget projections going out twelve years, spanning three Presidential terms and differing economic conditions, must be judged distinctly uncertain.

Below are the total budget figures (in “then year” dollars) for the President's successive plans. Each plan is also weighed as a percentage of the earliest one (ie FY10):

FY10 plan for 2012-2023: 7543 billion = 100%

FY11 plan for 2012-2023: 7947 billion = 105%

FY12 plan for 2012-2023: 7512 billion = 99%

New (April 13) proposal for 2012-23: 7112 billion = 94%

The most consequential years for national policy are the next five: 2012-2016, which constitute the FYDP. The President's successive requests for these years are more firm and we needn't do any estimating to derive them. All the Administration budget requests have been explicit about these years. And reviewing the successive requests for 2012-2016 shows that the difference among them is not as substantial:

FY10 plan for 2012-2016: 2878 billion = 100%

FY11 plan for 2012-2016: 2995 billion = 104%

FY12 plan for 2012-2016: 2919 billion = 101%

We don't yet know what the President's April 13 proposal will imply for the 2012-2016 period. It's a fair bet, though, that he will want to reinstate his earlier request to DoD that $150 billion be “saved” in the near future and not just the $78 billion pledged earlier this year by Secretary Gates. That would produce the following:

New plan for 2012-2016: 2845 billion = 99%

If this proves true, the rollback in planned spending for the five years that matter most will be modest, verging on insignificant.

Projekt om Defense Alternatives, briefing Notat # 49, den 25. april 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1104bm49.pdf

Der er god grund til at byde velkommen til en strategisk gennemgang, som lovet af præsident Obama den 13. april. I næsten 14 år, har den amerikanske forsvarspolitik været styret af "QDR konsensus" - et sæt af aksiomer og imperativer, der vandt tilslutning blandt forsvar planlæggere i løbet af fire Quadrennial Defense anmeldelser, der begynder i 1997. In retrospect, this consensus has produced a syndrome of profligate and desultory military activism. Det har fodret de funktionsforstyrrelser i vores militære indkøb system og hjalp drive Pentagon base budget til uholdbare højder. Ganske vist, er det tid til en frisk start. But will the promised review deliver?

Will the review be more open and critical than the QDRs it aims to rectify? Hvor dybt vil det grave? Vil det også til formål at "rette op på?" Eller vil det tjene et mere snævert formål: en revideret handel blandt Commander-in-Chief, hans forsvar sekretær, og høvdinge af de væbnede styrker til at udveksle beskedne nye begrænsninger på budgettet vækst i en stærkt rationale, et bolværk mod yderligere nedskæringer.

Hvad præsidenten søger kun er 400 milliarder dollar i besparelser over 12 år - omkring 6,5% af de planlagte base budgetudgifter. Sidste år, formand finanspolitiske Kommissionen og andre uafhængige task forces identificeret mere end dobbelt så meget i potentielle forsvar besparelser over en periode på bare ti år. Og det er uklart, om præsidenten har til hensigt at udtrække 400 milliarder dollars fra Pentagons budget alene eller fra større "sikkerhed basket", som omfatter internationale anliggender, Homeland Security og Veterans Affairs.

Desuden er det ikke opmuntrende, at formanden klappede Defense Security Gates for at have "allerede er gemt" 400 milliarder dollar i de foregående år, da de fleste af disse "besparelser" aldrig forlod Pentagons kasser, eller bulet regeringens underskud. Hvad nationalstaterne behov nu er "besparelser" i mundrette følelse af en egentlig nedgang i forsvarsudgifterne.

En alvorlig strategisk gennemgang bør sætte betydeligt mere end 6,5% dementi i planlagte fremtidige udgifter. Det bør gøre mere end grænse den fremtidige vækst. And maybe it will. Men vi bør anerkende ved starten, at det, som formanden har foreslået ikke selv er stor nok til rent faktisk at nødvendiggøre en strategisk gennemgang. Ja, vi har brug for en - men ikke fordi formanden håber at beskedent dæmpe Pentagon vækst.

For at give mening, skal en sådan gennemgang se langt ud over 400 milliarder USD i besparelser, og også ud over hvad Finanspolitisk Kommissionen og andre task forces har foreslået. Selvfølgelig er uenige Gates og admiral Mullen. De har allerede offentligt hånet nogen væsentlige nye begrænsninger på deres udgifter som at sætte nationen og dens væbnede styrker i fare. The strategic review should be more than a conciliatory concession to their concerns, which are tendentious.

We can gain needed perspective by comparing recent budget submissions and proposals in historical context. This table prepared by PDA converts recent plans and proposals into average annual Pentagon base budgets, expressed in 2010 dollars. Det viser, at præsidentens ønsker og forslag, herunder hans seneste, ville producere gennemsnitlige årlige budgetter, der optager et smalt bånd af udgifterne. They are all close cousins.

Selv den mere ambitiøse forslag for bæredygtig Defense Task Force ikke langt væk.

All of the President's requests and proposals produce average annual budgets that, in real terms, exceed previous spending, exceed Reagan-era levels of spending, and substantially exceed average spending during the entire Cold War period. (Og, især, budgettet gennemsnittet for den kolde krig gennem årene omfatter udgifter til krigsudstyr, mens de nyere gennemsnit ikke gør.)

Vi bør glæde acceptere mulighed for en gennemgang af forsvarsplanlægning og arbejde for at gøre det umagen værd. Men vi behøver ikke og bør ikke acceptere tanken om, at beskedne ændringer i budgetlægning giver god grund til at ramme "strategien panik"-knappen.

Sebastian Sprenger writing in Inside Defense on 21 April 2011 reports that the QDR Red Team headed by Gen. James Mattis (USMC) and Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessment, raised concerns in 2009 about the fiscal restraint effects of the deep recession on military plans to be represented in the QDR.

The Red Team report was not made public. Da QDR blev offentliggjort i begyndelsen af ​​2010 er det ikke omfatter en præsentation af virkningerne af finanspolitiske begrænsninger.

Last week, a little more than a year later, President Obama asked Secretary Gates to find $400 billion in additional security budget cuts over a twelve year period and called for a new review of military roles and missions.

The effect of this development will be an update of the 2010 QDR which will likely now heed the concerns of the 2009 Red Team concerning fiscal constraints.

On Wednesday April 13th 2001, President Obama announced an initiative to roll back planned security spending by $400 billion over the next 12 years. The nature of these “savings” is not yet clear. Nor is it clear how much will be subtracted from the Pentagon's spending plans.

Nonetheless, Secretary Gates and the Chiefs are not pleased and have begun to make noise about risks to security. Apparently, they were not briefed on the proposal until Tuesday.

Part of the initiative is to begin a “fundamental review of America's missions, capabilities, and our role in a changing world.” What and how much is subtracted from the Pentagon will depend on this review. Notably, the United States just completed a Quadrennial Defense Review last year. What the President proposes is some sort of “second look.” The President, Secretary Gates, and the service chiefs will be the prime movers of this process. How deep their “second look” will go is unclear. And it seems battle lines are already being drawn.

At a press conference on Wednesday, Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell said the review would likely affect the 2013 budget. It will not be ready by June, when congressional debate of the 2012 budget commences.

How open will the review process be? We don't yet know. But the experience of recent defense reviews is not encouraging. Still we should welcome this first step and strive to open up the process. The need for a rethinking our defense strategy and posture was emphasized in the 2010 report of the Sustainable Defense Task Force :

[I]n order to ensure significant savings, we must change how we produce military power and the ways in which we put it to use. Significant savings may depend on our willingness to:

Rethink our national security commitments and goals to ensure they focus clearly on what concerns us the most;

Reset our national security strategy so that it reflects a cost-effective balance among the security instruments at our disposal and uses those instruments in cost-effective ways; and

Reform our system of producing defense assets so it.

News links on President Obama's proposed rollback in planned security spending, his call for a strategic review, and the Pentagon's reaction:

DOD: Finding More Savings In Defense Budget Means Nixing Missions . Christopher J. Castelli. Inside Defense , 13 April 2011.

Obama Calls for Sweeping Review of US Military Strategy . Sandra Erwin. National Defense , 13 April 2011.

Pentagon warns on big defense cuts . Missy Ryan and Jim Wolf. Reuters , 13 April 2011.

Defence chief warns against planned cuts . Daniel Dombey and James Politi. Financial Times , 14 April 2011.

Events frequently overtake long-term Pentagon planning . Megan Scully. Government Executive, 14 April 2011.

Editor's Commentary

13 April 2011 (revised and updated 16 April 2011)

In President Obama's April 13th “deficit speech” he says:

Just as we must find more savings in domestic programs, we must do the same in defense. Over the last two years, Secretary Gates has courageously taken on wasteful spending, saving $400 billion in current and future spending. I believe we can do that again.

What might “do that again” mean?

Actually contribute $400 billion from projected Pentagon budgets to deficit reduction?

That would require the Pentagon to take in and spend $400 billion less. But it is very difficult to identify much actual contribution to deficit reduction in the first $400 billion in Pentagon savings President Obama refers to and believes can be repeated.

Let's take a quick look at the components of that first $400 billion working backward through time.

This past January Secretary Gates announced $78 billion in cuts over five years. In February when the President's FY12 budget appeared all but $70 billion of this as regards deficit reduction evaporated. $68 billion was consumed by the special Overseas Contingency Operations (war) budgeting as the FY11 projected placeholder of $50 billion was replaced by the FY12 real OCO budget of $118 billion. Another $2 billion in the savings appears to have simply vanished in the five year budget projections, perhaps due to those pesky “rounding errors” that plague Pentagon budgets.

In 2010 Secretary Gates announced $100 billion in “efficiency” savings. He was quite forthright at the time, saying that he was keeping all the savings within the Pentagon to pay for other requirements. So we can't legitimately count those toward deficit reduction, and presumably the President did not count those toward the $400 billion that has been saved.

So that leaves about $322 billion in Pentagon savings the White House needs to account for.

In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 February 2011 Secretary Gates said:

…over the last two defense budgets submitted by President Obama, we have curtailed or canceled troubled or excess programs that would have cost more than $330 billion if seen through to completion.

Connecting this to President Obama's speech Defense News reports (13 April 2011) that:

Of the $400 billion already saved, $330 billion is supposed to come from Gates' cuts to weapons programs – for example the cancellation of the Army's Future Combat Systems program and the Air Force's Next-Generation Bomber, both of which Gates terminated in the 2010 budget. Imidlertid har de to programmer blevet erstattet: Hæren er ved at udvikle Ground Combat Vehicle, og Air Force har lanceret en skaleret-back bombefly program.

“Supposed” and “However” are the key words in the preceding paragraph. To be real savings that contribute in any meaningful way to deficit reduction the the program cancellations would have to lead to a declining Pentagon budget topline… and not be replaced by some other expenditure.

Gordon Adams of the Stimson Center assesses the $330 billion savings claim in a 5 November 2010 post this way:

Gates has not cut $330 billion from defense. When he announced hardware cuts, he said the out-year savings were estimated at $330 billion, but he didn't cut a nickel from the projected defense budgets; he wants, as he has clearly said, to use those savings for other investments, not give them back to the taxpayer. And the figure is way too big, anyway, because he terminated the F-22 and the C-17 cargo plane when neither one of them was in the long-term budget (he has been trying to let both programs arrive at a normal death, as planned, and Congress keeps getting in the way.) It is even more too big because his savings figure did not net out the alternative investments he proposed for the same missions, like replacing the terminated Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicle with a new Army vehicle R&D program. Så en stor KerfuffleName over et ikke-tal, men ingen stor nedskæring i forsvaret her.

To date the Pentagon or OMB have not produced any accounting of these supposed savings from Secretary Gates' program cancellations which indicate where they come out of the topline. Meanwhile it would be wise to substantially discount their value when thinking about overall Federal spending.

What we know for sure is that Pentagon budgets continue to rise despite the “savings.” The Pentagon and the Administration might argue that the Pentagon budget would have grown faster if Secretary Gates had not made those “courageous” program cuts. Possibly. But that “would have been” is simply not the same as actually contributing to deficit reduction which requires real cuts in the topline of the Pentagon budget.

In terms of cutting the topline of the Pentagon budget, when we remove the long-awaited reductions in war costs, we can count just $8 billion that Secretary Gates has given up to deficit reduction in the five year defense plan (FYDP) through FY16.

Looking out ten years there are more savings in the President's projections. My colleague Carl Conetta finds $164 billion less Pentagon spending in the overlapping four “out years” (FY17-20) when comparing the President's FY11 and Fy12 budget submissions.

We might speculate that this is where we realize some of Secretary Gates' $330 billion in savings, but it would be only speculation…

So far no one in the Administration has demonstrated in sufficient detail how the Pentagon will contribute much of anything toward reducing the Federal deficit, rounding errors notwithstanding.

Joshua Thiel. Small Wars Journal , 12 April 2011.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/732-thiel1.pdf

Uddrag:

Maneuver warfare at its core is a mechanistic endeavor and fits with a corresponding necessity of top-down hierarchies. Conversely, counterinsurgency is a more ambiguous environment that varies in its complexity and context; it is the chess match of war. It is different in every locale and can cover the entire spectrum of war simultaneously. Consequently, counterinsurgency is difficult to put on a bumper sticker, to trademark as a catch phrase, or sell to a population and their representatives. In 2006 the United States (US) public's perception of success or failure of the Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy was concentrated around the concept of massing combat power in time and space, often called the “The Surge.” The term, “The Surge,” condensed a new counterinsurgency strategy into a simple and quantifiable slogan for the sound bite culture surrounding current affairs in the modern world. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency is more complex than “add more and then you win.”

Comment by Gian Gentile:

Joshua said this at the end of the piece:

“…in Afghanistan in 2011, will the victor once again write the history by touting the Afghanistan troop surge of 2010-2011 rather than the decisive operational changes.”

What evidence, I mean hard evidence (and beyond what officers who were part of the Surge recall)that there was a “decisive operational change.”? How much “decisive” operational change can there be in an area security mission where combat forces are dispersed widely and operate in a decentralized manner? This operational framework was in place in Iraq from spring of 2003 on. The answer is that there was not a decisive change in the operational framework. Oh to be sure there were some tweaks made here and there, a few more outposts here and there, but by and large it remained the same.

Unfortunately a narrative has been constructed that posits that a savior General named Petraeus came on board, reinvented his field army operationally and combined with an increase of troops was the primary cause of the lowering of violence. This is a chimera.

Yet folks, especially us in the Army who have spilled blood in these places, want to believe that what happens or doesnt happen is because of us and what we do or dont do, or because of savior generals riding onto the scene.

Yet the foreign policy elite (and many military leaders) in this country love this narrative and want it to stick because it places emphasis and criticism on the mechanics of doing these wars of intervention and state building and away from the strategy and policy that put them into place. Since success in these wars and conflicts are simply a matter of getting the right number of troops on the ground with the right tactics and with the savior general, then they can be won again and again.

As senior Army generals in Afghanistan argue “the right inputs are finally in place,” so too are we already seeing calls in certain quarters for bog in Libya.

But in Iraq it was neither the increase in troops as part of the Surge (as Joshua effectively argues) nor was it a decisive change in operational framework (as he incorrectly asserts) and instead the lowering of violence had to do with other more critical conditions (the spread of the Anbar awakening, the Shia militia stand-down, the physical seperation of Baghdad into sectarian districts) occurring.

Budget Memo by Charles Knight. 14 February 2011.

For several years now White House budget projections have included a “placeholder for outyear overseas contingency operations” most of which are accounted for by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This placeholder number has been and remains $50 billion. Every year actual OCO (overseas contingency operations) spending turns out to be several times that number. FY11′s OCO is $159 billion and FY12′s is $118 billion .

Adjusting for the effect of the new OCO for FY12, the $68 billion budgeted above the placeholder of $50 billion eats up most of the $78 billion in Pentagon cuts that Secretary Gates offered up in January to fiscal responsibility (only $76 billion actually shows up in the 14 February budget release.) The remaining $8 billion (and much more) will go to the war budgets when reality collides with placeholder projections.

On 14 February Pentagon Comptroller Hale confirmed that the $50 billion placeholders for FY13 and beyond was the “best we can do.” Others make an attempt to be more realistic. The high tech industry association called Tech America annually projects DoD budgets for ten years out. In their 2010 projection they estimate that OCO spending will be $102 billion in FY13 , $69 billion in FY14 and $57billion in FY15 . When we subtract the $50 billion placeholder for each of those years and total the remainder we find that the Pentagon is likely to spend $78 billion more in the years FY13 through FY15 than in the White House budget projections.

In sum, not only does the President's FY12 budget plan give an exemption to the Pentagon from contributing anything substantial to deficit reduction, but the likely cost of the war in Afghanistan will push up the national debt substantially higher than the White House budget projections.

Decoding the Defense Budget by Winslow Wheeler, from The Pentagon Labyrinth , 09 February 2011.

Uddrag:

What Is the Defense Budget?

Each year in early February, the Pentagon releases what is invariably called the “defense budget” in press articles. The numbers presented do not address all forms of defense spending; they do not even address all forms of Pentagon spending.

For example, a table included in the Pentagon's press materials for the 2011 budget shows the “base” (non-Iraq or -Afghanistan war) budget request at $549.8 billion. The materials presented by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are more complete. The 2011 budget request for “base” (non-war) Pentagon spending was $554.1 billion. The additional $4.3 billion was for “mandatory” spending (also known as “entitlement” spending) mostly for personnel programs. The number the Pentagon released was for the “discretionary” (new annual appropriations) spending. The difference may be a minor one in this case, but it can be significant; in past years Congress has added scores of billions in new mandatory spending for military healthcare, and retirement and survivors' benefits.

The more complete exposition of DOD budgets in the OMB materials is not easy to find; it is usually buried in the “Supplemental Materials” to a volume called “Analytical Perspectives” that is released each year the same day the Pentagon releases its version of its budget. Unfortunately, the DOD press corps roundly ignores the more complete OMB materials. To be better informed in future years, track it down.

The same OMB table yields other important information: the additional DOD spending requested for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not just for the budget year but also for succeeding “out-years,” and the non-DOD spending for what OMB calls the “National Defense Budget Function,” which includes nuclear weapons, the Selective Service, the National Defense Stockpile of minerals and commodities, and more. The total for 2011 comes to $738.7 billion in “total” (discretionary plus mandatory) spending.

The same table also yields the budget amounts for the departments of Homeland (domestic) Security, State (for economic and weapons aid and other national security programs) and Veterans Affairs (for what might be called the human cost of wars). Each is clearly related to national security or “defense,” writ broadly. Finally, if you know where to look near the bottom of this long OMB table, you can find some additional spending in the Treasury Department for military retirement and healthcare, and finally the data needed to make a calculation of how much of the 2011 payment for interest on the national debt can fairly be attributed to the Pentagon.

The results of this more complete compilation of the president's 2011 budget request for “defense” is summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Defense Related Budget Requests for 2011.
(President's 2011 Budget Request – in $ billions)

“Base” DOD Budget (Discretionary only) 548.9

DOD (Mandatory only) 4.3

DOD War Spending 159.1

DOD Total 712.3

DOE (Defense) 18.8

Miscellaneous Defense-Related Agencies 7.6

National Defense Budget Function Total 738.7

Homeland Security (DHS) 43.6

Veterans Affairs (DVA) 122.0

International Affairs 65.3

Treasury Dept. Military Retirement Payments 25.9

Interest on DOD Retiree Health Care Fund 5.7

19% of Interest on Debt (DOD Proportional Share) 47.7

Grand Total $1,048,900,000,000.

The next time someone tries to tell you that the numbers DOD throws at you in its press releases are what you should use to understand monies spent for national security, give him a polite smile; then, go to that obscure table in the Supplementary Materials in OMB's “Analytical Perspectives.” It is published online the same day as the Pentagon press release. A few minutes of checking can give you a more complete understanding than what the press will report.

Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo 46 , 26 January 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1101bm46.pdf

Uddrag:

* Although described as a “cut,” Gates' offer would allow defense spending to rise steadily over the next five years.

* Although Gates says that any bigger cuts would court “catastrophe,” all the savings plans grant DoD more money in real terms during the next ten years than it had during the last ten.

* The proposals for bigger cuts would produce average Pentagon base budgets during the next ten years that are only about 5% below Reagan-era spending, adjusted for inflation.

* The Pentagon seeks future budgets that average more than 12% above the Cold War highs.

Sandra Erwin. National Defense Magazine , 24 November 2010.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=258

Uddrag:

An AESA equipped Super Hornet is “generation four-and-a-half,” says [Michael “Ponch” Garcia, a reserve Navy pilot and manager of business development at Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems]. “All the sensors are fifth generation. You won't have super cruise. You won't have 360 stealth. You lose that. But you're getting it for half the price.”

Sandra Erwin. National Defense Magazine , 22 November 2010.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=255

Uddrag:

“The Defense Department's biggest weakness is its budget strategy: the absence of strategic choice,” says Gordon Adams, American University professor who authored the defense recommendations in the Domenici-Rivlin proposal that was presented by former Senate Budget Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (RN.M.) and White House Budget Director under Clinton, Alice Rivlin.

Cutting the defense budget should not be about doing the same with less, Adams says. The reaction to the Simpson-Bowles report, which takes aim at many big-ticket weapon programs and calls for work force reductions, was predictable. Every targeted program or agency, as was seen recently with US Joint Forces Command, is making a case that it is essential to national security, and its supporters already are mobilizing lobbyists and advocacy groups.

The smarter approach would be for the Obama administration and Congress to agree to a scaled-back military strategy, says Adams. “At the end of the day, it's about policy makers restraining their impulse to use the military in the reckless way it's been used in the past 20 years,” he says.

18 November 2010

Dear Co-chairman Bowles and Co-chairman Simpson:

We are writing to you as experts in national security and defense economics to convey our views on the national security implications of the Commission's work and especially the need for achieving responsible reductions in military spending. In this regard, we appreciate the initiative you have taken in your 10 November 2010 draft proposal to the Commission. It begins a necessary process of serious reflection, debate, and action.

The vitality of our economy is the cornerstone of our nation's strength. We share the Commission's desire to bring our financial house into order. Doing so is not merely a question of economics. Reducing the national debt is also a national security imperative.

To date, the Obama administration has exempted the Defense Department from any budget reductions. This is short-sighted: It makes it more difficult to accomplish the task of restoring our economic strength, which is the underpinning of our military power.

As the rest of the nation labors to reduce its debt burden, the current plan is to boost the base DOD budget by 10 percent in real terms over the next decade. This would come on top of the nearly 52 percent real increase in base military spending since 1998. (When war costs are included the increase has been much greater: 95 percent.)

We appreciate Secretary Gates' efforts to reform the Pentagon's business and acquisition practices. However, even if his reforms fulfill their promise, the current plan does not translate them into budgetary savings that contribute to solving our deficit problem. Their explicit aim is to free funds for other uses inside the Pentagon. Det er ikke godt nok.

Granting defense a special dispensation puts at risk the entire deficit reduction effort. Defense spending today constitutes over 55 percent of discretionary spending and 23 percent of the federal budget. An exemption for defense not only undermines the broader call for fiscal responsibility, but also makes overall budget restraint much harder as a practical economic and political matter.

We need not put our economic power at risk in this way. Today the United States possesses a wide margin of global military superiority. The defense budget can bear significant reduction without compromising our essential security.

We recognize that larger military adversaries may rise to face us in the future. But the best hedge against this possibility is vigilance and a vibrant economy supporting a military able to adapt to new challenges as they emerge.

We can achieve greater defense economy today in several ways, all of which we urge you to consider seriously. We need to be more realistic in the goals we set for our armed forces and more selective in our choices regarding their use abroad. We should focus our military on core security goals and on those current and emerging threats that most directly affect us.

We also need to be more judicious in our choice of security instruments when dealing with international challenges. Our armed forces are a uniquely expensive asset and for some tasks no other instrument will do. For many challenges, however, the military is not the most cost-effective choice. We can achieve greater efficiency today without diminishing our security by better discriminating between vital, desirable, and unnecessary military missions and capabilities.

There is a variety of specific options that would produce savings, some of which we describe below. The important point, however, is a firm commitment to seek savings through a reassessment of our defense strategy, our global posture, and our means of producing and managing military power.

■ Since the end of the Cold War, we have required our military to prepare for and conduct more types of missions in more places around the world. The Pentagon's task list now includes not only preventive war, regime change, and nation building, but also vague efforts to “shape the strategic environment” and stem the emergence of threats. It is time to prune some of these missions and restore an emphasis on defense and deterrence.

■ US combat power dramatically exceeds that of any plausible combination of conventional adversaries. To cite just one example, Secretary Gates has observed that the US Navy is today as capable as the next 13 navies combined, most of which are operated by our allies. We can safely save by trimming our current margin of superiority.

■ America's permanent peacetime military presence abroad is largely a legacy of the Cold War. It can be reduced without undermining the essential security of the United States or its allies.

■ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the limits of military power. Avoiding these types of operation globally would allow us to roll back the recent increase in the size of our Army and Marine Corps.

■ The Pentagon's acquisition process has repeatedly failed, routinely delivering weapons and equipment late, over cost, and less capable than promised. Some of the most expensive systems correspond to threats that are least prominent today and unlikely to regain prominence soon. In these cases, savings can be safely realized by cancelling, delaying, or reducing procurement or by seeking less costly alternatives.

■ Recent efforts to reform Defense Department financial management and acquisition practices must be strengthened. And we must impose budget discipline to trim service redundancies and streamline command, support systems, and infrastructure.

Change along these lines is bound to be controversial. Budget reductions are never easy – no less for defense than in any area of government. However, fiscal realities call on us to strike a new balance between investing in military power and attending to the fundamentals of national strength on which our true power rests. We can achieve safe savings in defense if we are willing to rethink how we produce military power and how, why, and where we put it to use.

Med venlig hilsen,

This letter reflects the opinions of the individual signatories. Institutions are listed for identification purposes only. The letter is the result of a joint effort by The Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and the Project on Defense Alternatives .

by Winslow Wheeler.
November 2010.

Based on my experience at the Senate Budget Committee, I learned that reading different deficit reduction plans can be tricky. Some use CBO or other “baselines” as a basis for comparison, but those baselines can be a mystery to some and differ – sometimes by huge amounts – from more readily understood future budget proposals for departments, such as the Pentagon's. Other sources of confusion can be whether the plan applies just to the Pentagon or the larger National Defense Budget Function, uses outlays rather than budget authority, and does or does not include funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sometimes the dollars used are “constant;” sometimes they are “current.”

Sometimes the press and others simply misunderstand elements of an overall plan, such as by reporting a plan's savings for one “illustrative” year as the entirety of the plan's savings. Sometimes uncovering what a plan really means requires close reading of the text and footnotes; in still other cases, it requires prolonged discussion with the authors.

This information paper attempts to remove the various impediments to an apples-to-apples comparison of the major plans to reduce defense spending that have been publicly proposed to the Obama Commission of Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. It compares all the plans to the Obama/Gates Plan for National Defense Spending for the years 2011 to 2020; it addresses only “base” budgets (which exclude spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere), and it applies budget authority in “current” dollars.

Budget Authority Savings
Relative to the Obama/Gates “Base” National Defense Budget 2010-2020
Billions of Dollars, All Dollars Are “Current” Dollars

After the above table each plan is addressed briefly , pointing out its major characteristics. I have attempted to do so objectively, with as little editorial comment as possible.

Editor's Commentary

There are at least as many reasons to think that significant real reductions in defense spending will be hard to achieve as there are reasons to doubt that significant revenue increases will be found or that substantial reductions in entitlement spending will happen. “Political realities” are indeed daunting for any of the options the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform will consider. If there were quick, easy and obvious decisions to be had there would be no need for the Commission.

Political realities change over time in part because underlying realities eventually change political calculation. Such is the case with defense spending. After more than a decade of rapid growth there is likely to be some retrenchment in the middle of this decade, notably by 2015.

The likely path of defense spending this decade was recently forecast by the high-tech industry association Tech America Foundation in their DoD Topline Forecast 2011-2020 .

Tech America's forecast is for a real reduction in the base Pentagon budget (not including Overseas Contingency Operation war supplemental funding) of 9% or $45 billion (USD 2011) in 2015 relative to the 2011 base budget.

When taking into account the Pentagon's preferred budget path this decade of at least 1% real annual growth, Tech America forecasts a reduction in defense spending by 2015 of 16%.

Tech America's forecast of Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) war supplemental spending during the decade is also important to consider. Since FY10 (President Obama's first budget) there has been an OCO war supplemental DoD budget line for FY12-FY15 of $50 billion per year. The OCO war supplemental in the FY11 budget is $159 billion.

Although the actual OCO war supplemental might come down in FY12, with the military operational demands in Afghanistan remaining elevated it is unlikely the OCO war supplemental will come down even $50 billion, let alone $109 billion in FY12. Tech America forecasts OCO war expenditures of $122 billion in FY12.

These likely under-budgeted OCO war supplemental costs should be counted as probable additions to the national debt beyond those already projected by the government.

Tech USA prognose er for OCO supplerende at være 122 milliarder dollar i FY12, 102 milliarder dollar i FY13, 69 milliarder dollar i FY14 og 57 milliarder dollar i FY15. Det giver op til 150 milliarder kroner mere end budgetteret i det femårige Defense Plan ... en FN-budgetterede tillæg til den nationale gæld.

For the target year of the federal budget reaching “primary balance” in FY15, the forecast OCO war supplemental will add $7 billion to the problem that the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform faces in attempting to balance the budget in that year.

Adam J. Hebert. Air Force Magazine , November, 2010.
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/November% 202010/1110edit.aspx

Uddrag:

…ill-advised calls to cut the Pentagon budget follow as predictably as the tides. Uden troværdig analyse af strategi eller krav, der er kritikere igen erklære forsvarsudgifterne at være ude af kontrol.

Redaktørens kommentar:

In his editorial Security Isn't Cheap Adam J. Herbert cites the work of the Sustainable Defense Task Force as a case in point of critics of Pentagon spending recommending cuts “without credible analysis of strategy or requirements.” As a member of the task force I differ over the credibility of our analysis. Men lad mig tale, hvor jeg er enig med Mr. Herbert:

• "Sikkerhed er ikke billigt." I virkeligheden er det ekstremt dyrt. When the country is hit with a financial disaster we owe it to the country and our military to reexamine our national security strategy and make sure priorities are clear and that our military investments are cost-effective. In the last twelve years of Pentagon budgets the planning has proceeded as though there is no resource constraint. Unfortunately, that is true of the last QDR as well. Those days are clearly over – Secretary Gates has said as much.

• "En veluddannet, veludstyret, professionelt militær er ikke billigt. Hvis nationen ønsker det til at koste mindre, vil nationen sandsynligvis nødt til at bede den om at gøre mindre. "Præcis. Since the end of the Cold War the US military has steadily advanced its global reach and engagement. Repræsentationer har spredt sig, herunder mange, der skal udføres af civile i det amerikanske udenrigsministerium og andre organer. Et stort antal af amerikanske tropper stadig i Europa, selvom der ikke er nogen militær trussel mod Europa, at de allierede ikke kan håndtere. The most important take-away lesson from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that long low-intensity land wars are not cost-effective uses of US military power and should be avoided whenever possible. Hopefully we can all agree there should never again be such a “war of choice.”

• “There are certainly ways to reduce defense spending…” Yes, and one that will save around $45 billion in Air Force modernization accounts is available in a choice about how to modernize the fighter fleet. The Air Force has decided to replace its aging F-16s with just about the most expensive new fighter one can dream up, the F-35. I dagens finanspolitiske miljø enten Air Force vil ende op med en masse færre af disse fly end planlagt, eller de vil vælge at komme foran i budgettet stykket og modernisere med nye blok versioner af stadig bedst af klasse F-16 og begrænse køb af F-35S i dette årti til et par eskadriller til højintensive air-overlegenhed missioner. If serious air competition emerges a decade from now we can then roll out production of F-35s (or perhaps a less costly follow-on to the F-16), planes presumably much improved with ten years or more of further fighter technology development.

Thomas PM Barnett. China Security , October 2010.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1010Barnett.pdf

Uddrag:

In sum, ending China's free-riding is arguably more important for long-term system-wide stability than continuing to deter China's military invasion of Taiwan. As globalization's networks continue to expand at a rapid pace, America's ability to play sole Leviathan to the system naturally degrades dramatically. That means, while the likelihood of China's military invasion of Taiwan dissipates with each passing year, the likelihood of America's “imperial exhaustion” most certainly surpasses it in strategic importance in the near term.

History will judge US strategists most severely if our choice to maintain “access” to East Asia by triggering a regional arms race precludes our ability to draw China into strategic co-management of this era of pervasively extending globalization—without a doubt America's greatest strategic achievement. I cannot fault the AirSea Battle Concept as an operational capability designed to keep us in the East Asian balancing “game.” But my fear is that it will—primarily by default and somewhat by “blue” ambition—serve America badly in a strategic sense, absent a proactive political and military engagement effort to balance its negative impact on the most important bilateral relationship of the modern globalization era.

Redaktørens kommentar:

Barnett alerts us to a prospective instance when leading with military capability is likely to be a disservice to strategic interests.

Daniel Goure. Early Warning Blog , Lexington Institute, 03 September 2010.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/future-defense-budget-choices-require-clear-strategic-priorities

Uddrag:

The United States cannot afford and the people will not pay for a military that can do battle with uncertainty.

As a consequence of the need to do battle with uncertainty, emphasis was placed on a military that can cover all bases and do all things. This would not be a wise strategy even if resources were unconstrained. Not all threats are equal. Nor are all interests equally important. Finally, it is possible to make reasoned and reasonable judgments regarding how the future security environment will unfold and define a set of demand signals that would require shifting strategic priorities.

In the past, when US leaders refused to make choices they allowed the military to shrink symmetrically, by cutting every program or service a little. That approach is self-defeating. It makes no sense to keep a so-called full spectrum military but continually reduce it in size.

Redaktørens kommentar:

Relevant passages from the archives ($3 trillion later):

Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. “Dueling with Uncertainty”, February 1998.
http://www.comw.org/pda/bullyweb.html

There is no escape from uncertainty, but there is relief from uncertainty hysteria. It begins with recognizing that instability has boundaries — just as turbulence in physical systems has discernible onset points and parameters. The turbulence of a river, for instance, corresponds to flow and to the contours of the river's bed and banks. It occurs in patches and not randomly. The weather also is a chaotic system that resists precise long-range forecasting, but allows useful prediction of broader trends and limits.

Despite uncertainty, statements of probability matter. They indicate the weight of evidence — or whether there is any evidence at all. The uncertainty hawks would flood our concern with a horde of dangers that pass their permissive test of “non-zero probability.” However, by lowering the threshold of alarm, they establish an impossible standard of defense sufficiency: absolute and certain military security. Given finite resources and competing ends, something less will have to do. Strategic wisdom begins with the setting of priorities — and priorities demand strict attention to what appears likely and what does not.

The world may be less certain and less stable today than during the Cold War, but it also involves less risk for America. Risk is equal parts probability and utility — chances and stakes. With the end of global superpower contention, America's stakes in most of the world's varied conflicts has diminished. So has the magnitude of the military threats to American interests. This permits a sharper distinction between interests and compelling interests, turbulence and relevant turbulence, uncertainties and critical uncertainties. And this distinction will pay dividends whenever the country turns to consider large-scale military endeavors, commitments, and investments.

Among the visions that guide present policy, one is absent conspicuously: a world in which economic issues have displaced military ones as the central focus of global competitions and concerns. Failing to engage this prospect, the recent defense policy reviews are oblivious to the opportunity cost of military spending. And it is this lapse that gives license to their speculative methods and overweening goals.

The United States continues to invest more of its national product in defense than does its allies, more than the world average, and much more than its chief economic competitors. By disregarding the requirements and consequences of increased global economic competition, present policy makes an unacknowledged bet about the future: The Soviet Union is gone and no comparable military challenge to the West exists, except as distant possibility. Nonetheless, the American prospect depends as much as ever, if not more, on the specifically military aspects of strength. Of this much, the uncertainty hawks seem certain.

Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 19 August 2010.
http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf

Uddrag:

Denne pjece reviderer den konceptuelle og drift fokus Hærens fra store kampoperationer til operationel tilpasningsevne ansætte fuld-spektrum operationer under forhold med usikkerhed og kompleksitet.

TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 beskriver, hvordan fremtiden hærstyrker udføre operationer som en del af den fælles styrke til at afskrække konflikter, sejre i krig, og lykkes i en lang række uforudsete udgifter i fremtiden operationelle miljø. The pamphlet describes the employment of forces in the 2016-2028 timeframe and identifies capabilities required for future success to guide Army force development efforts.

Reva Patwardhan. Peace Action West Groundswell Blog , 29 July 2010.
http://blog.peaceactionwest.org/2010/07/29/wikileaks-war-logs-roundup/

Jason Sherman, Inside Defense , 26 July 2010.

A bipartisan independent review of the Obama administration's 20-year blueprint for the Defense Department calls for increasing the size of the Navy to a 346-ship fleet and increasing the US military's posture in the Western Pacific to counter China's growing influence in the region, according to a draft report of the Independent Quadrennial Defense Review Panel.

InsideDefense.com obtained a draft copy of the report titled “ The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century .”

The 20-member blue-ribbon panel — co-chaired by former Defense Secretary William Perry and Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to President George W. Bush — also finds a significant increase in funding is needed to bolster capabilities necessary to counter anti-access challenges, strengthen homeland defense; and to deal with cyber threats.

The panel's report argues that a centerpiece of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review — a force-planning construct that downplayed the significance of preparing to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous major wars, a bedrock of defense planning since 1993, in order to prepare US forces to deal with a wider set of possible contingencies — is unreliable. Instead, the independent panel recommends the Pentagon adopt force levels required by analysis conducted 17 years ago.

The “panel recommends the force structure be sized, at a minimum, at the end strength outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review,” an assessment prepared by then-Defense Secretary Les Aspin, which Perry then worked to implement during his 1994 to 1997 term as secretary. “We further recommend the department's [weapon system] inventory be thoroughly recapitalized and modernized,” states the draft report.

Funding to pay for these capabilities, as well as to recapitalize equipment consumed in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will require resources beyond the $100 billion efficiency savings recently directed by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, according to the report.

The “panel believes that substantial additional resources will be required to modernize the force. Although there is a cost to recapitalizing the military, there is also a price to be paid for not recapitalizing, one that in the long run would be much greater.”

Tasked by Congress — and composed of members appointed by lawmakers and Gates — the panel's report delves into nearly every dimension of the US military enterprise — from personnel policy to weapons acquisition to defense policy formulation — and offers an “explicit warning” about the shape of US weaponry after a nearly a decade of persistent conflict.

“The aging of the inventories and equipment used by the services, the decline in the size of the Navy, and the growing stress on the force means that a train wreck is coming in the areas of personnel, acquisition, and force structure,” states the draft report.

The draft document argues that the Pentagon's force-structure plans “will not provide sufficient capacity” to deal with a major domestic catastrophe while also conducting contingency operations abroad. The panel also asserts that the recently established US Cyber Command should be prepared to assist civilian authorities in defending this domain “beyond” the Defense Department's current role, to support civilian agencies.

The Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review did not include a force-planning construct that explicitly quantifies the number and type of contingencies for which the US military must prepare, removing a formula the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have relied on since the end of the Cold War to justify their force structures and their investment plans, an omission the independent panel laments.

The Pentagon's 1993 Bottom-Up Review, the first major assessment of the the US military's needs after the fall of the Berlin Wall, advanced a requirement to fight and win two major-theater wars nearly simultaneously, a construct that was incorporated in the 1997, 2001 and 2006 QDRs.

“The 2010 QDR, however, did not endorse any metric for determining the size and shape of US forces,” states the independent panel's draft report. Rather, it put diverse, overlapping scenarios, including long-duration stability operations and the defense of the homeland, on par with major regional conflicts when assessing the adequacy of US forces.”

The current size of US ground forces “is close enough to being correct,” according to the draft report.

In addition, the panel argues that the Army is “living off the capital accumulated” during the Reagan administration. “The useful life of that equipment is running out; and, as a result, the inventory is old and in need of recapitalization,” states the draft report, which calls for inventory replacement on a one-for-one basis “with an upward adjustment in the number of naval vessels and certain air and space assets.”

A larger Navy and Air Force, according to the panel, is needed to protect US interests in the Pacific region.

“The force structure in the Asia-Pacific needs to be increased,” states the draft report. “The United States must be fully present in the Asia-Pacific region, to protect American lives and territory, ensure the free flow of commerce, maintain stability, and defend our allies in the region. A robust US force structure, one that is largely rooted in maritime strategy and includes other necessary capabilities, will be essential.”

The panel advances recommendations to reform the structure and organization of both Congress and the executive branch in order to improve oversight of national security matters. The panel also advances suggestions for the Defense and State departments to shore up “institutional weaknesses of the existing security assistance programs and framework.”

Hearing on Achieving National Security through Sustainable Spending, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, National Security and Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 20 July 2010.

This hearing continued the Subcommittee's oversight of defense spending by examining recent scholarship and policy research on defense budget reform, including the conclusions and recommendations made in a recent report by the Sustainable Defense Task Force, Debt, Deficits, & Defense: A Way Forward , which presents a series of recommendations to reduce the budget of the Department of Defense by $960 billion by 2020.

Witnesses offered perspectives on the Department of Defense's plan to cut military spending in the context of national security priorities and the current economic environment. The Department of Defense's budget has accounted for nearly 65 percent of the increase in federal discretionary spending since 2001. Citing the role of defense spending in the overall economic health of the United States, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently called for reductions in defense spending by eliminating wasteful spending and unnecessary weapons systems, and reducing overhead costs at the Pentagon.

To watch a webcast of the hearing, click here: http://groc.edgeboss.net/wmedia/groc/nationalsecurity/2010/07.20.10.ns.defense.budget.wvx

Witnesses:

* Carl Conetta, Co-Director, Project on Defense Alternatives
* Benjamin Friedman, Research Fellow, Cato Institute
* Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
* Gary Schmitt, Ph.D., Director, Advanced Strategic Studies, American Enterprise Institute
* Gordon Adams, Ph.D., Distinguished Fellow, Stimson Center

Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Tierney

Prepared Statement of Mr. Carl Conetta

Prepared Statement of Mr. Benjamin Friedman

Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd Harrison

Prepared Statement of Dr. Gary Schmitt

Prepared Statement of Dr. Gordon Adams

Lance M. Bacon. Navy Times, 28. juni 2010.
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/06/navy_force_cuts_062810w/~~V

Uddrag:

Med øje med svindende budgetter og stigende spændinger med Iran og Nordkorea, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead den 24. juni opfordrede til fortsat internationale partnerskaber for at finpudse en "retfærdig og bæredygtig international orden." Han fortsatte også sin opfordring til finanspolitisk tilbageholdenhed , understreger, at søværnet "kan ikke råd til en skræddersyet løsning til ethvert behov, vi har." Men CNO stadig er stejlt på, at en 313-skib Navy er nødvendig for at opretholde maritim sikkerhed.

Redaktørens kommentar:

Lance M Bacon citater fra en tale af Chief of Naval Operations Roughead på de maritime systemer og teknologi seminar den 22. juni. These quotes are misleading because Roughead is speaking not about reducing the national deficit, but rather about the Navy's need to watch its spending in the context of growing fiscal pressures on service budgets.

Roughead fortsat forpligtet til at målet om en 313 skib kamp flåde. Han støtter desuden sekretær Gate initiativ til at spare 105 milliarder dollar inden for Forsvarsministeriets regnskab over de næste fem år. Gates besparelser ikke vil bidrage med en krone til at nedbringe underskuddet. Han planlægger at pløje alle besparelser tilbage i Pentagon programmer, og det er flådens andel af disse penge at Roughead ønsker at bruge til at hjælpe vokse kampen flåde til 313 skibe.

Ikke alene er Gates ikke tilbyder at bidrage til nedbringelse af underskuddet, men han holder sig til sit mål om realvækst på 1 til 2% om året i Pentagon budgetter. Dette vil øge årlige nationale underskud sted i intervallet $ 6 til 12 mia.

Gates 'position er uholdbar og vil ikke holde. Hvis nationen kommer til at opfylde sine underskud reduktionsforpligtelser Pentagon bliver nødt til at bidrage med sin andel - der er mindst 40% af de 230 milliarder dollars om året stigning i bunden (ikke-krig) budget i det seneste årti. This is the level of cuts the task force has suggested — it is not “extreme”, but rather responsible and realistic.

I forbindelse med den kommende nationale finanspolitisk tilbageholdenhed, er det værste at CNO kan gøre for fortsat presser på for at dyrke Navy kampen flåde til 313 skibe. Jo mere succes han har i at købe nu, hvad der vil vise sig at være uoverkommelige nye skibe, videre flåden bliver nødt til at skrumpe, når strenge budgettering ankommer.

Langt klogere er at begynde at omkonfigurere og trimme flåden nu og spar indkøb dollars for en mere realistisk sæt af prioriteter og en mere behersket strategisk kropsholdning. Taskforcen har fremsat en række prioriteter for magre tider. Lad andre tyder på deres.

Michael Hastings. Rolling Stone, den 22. juni 2010.
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/17390/119236

Uddrag:

When it comes to Afghanistan, history is not on McChrystal's side. The only foreign invader to have any success here was Genghis Khan – and he wasn't hampered by things like human rights, economic development and press scrutiny. The COIN doctrine, bizarrely, draws inspiration from some of the biggest Western military embarrassments in recent memory: France's nasty war in Algeria (lost in 1962) and the American misadventure in Vietnam (lost in 1975). McChrystal, som andre fortalere for COIN, erkender let at oprørsbevægelsen kampagner er i sagens natur rodet, dyrt og let at miste.