Archive for the ‘Grand’ Category

Reasonable Defense: A Sustainable Approach to Securing the Nation

(printable PDF version) (summary) (appendix of tables and charts) by Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report, 14 November 2012. Provides a detailed strategic argument for the re-balancing of investments in the instruments of national power and offers a new force posture and Pentagon budget appropriate to strategic conditions.  Main report includes 9 tables.  Appendix has 18 additional tables and charts addressing personnel, force structure, and budgets.

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

Department of Defense. 05 January 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf

A bandwagon for offshore balancing?

Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, 01 December, 2011.
http://defensealt.org/Hy7KQE

Excerpt:

…offshore balancing is the right strategy even when our coffers are full, provided that no peer competitors are threatening to dominate key strategic regions. Even during good times, it makes no sense to take on unnecessary burdens or to allow allies to free-ride on Uncle Sam’s hubristic desire to be the “indispensable nation” in almost every corner of the world. In other words, offshore balancing isn’t just a strategy for hard times; it is also the best available strategy in a world where the United States is the strongest power, prone to trigger unnecessary antagonism, and vulnerable to being dragged into unnecessary wars.

Going for Broke: The Budgetary Consequences of Current US Defense Strategy

Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo #52, 25 October 2011.
http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/1110bm52.pdf

Excerpt:

The sharp rise in the Pentagon’s base budget since 1998 (46% in real terms) is substantially due to strategic choice, not security requirements, per se. It reflects a refusal to set priorities as well as a move away from the traditional goals of military deterrence, containment, and defense to more ambitious ends: threat prevention, command of the commons, and the transformation of the global security environment. The geographic scope of routine US military activity also has expanded.

companion piece: The Pentagon’s New Mission Set: A Sustainable Choice?, by Carl Conetta. An updated and expanded excerpt from the Report of the Task Force on a Unified Security Budget (USB) for the United States, August 2011. http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/111024Pentagon-missions.pdf

National Security Strategy

The White House, May 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1005NSS.pdf

If You Could See America Through China’s Eyes

Steve Clemons. TPM Cafe, 13 February 2010.
http://defensealt.org/Ht0whj

Public Opinion on Global Issues: A Web-based Digest of Polling from Around the World

Council on Foreign Relations, November 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HiOnep

Project website — http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/iigg/pop/

Excerpt:

Publics around the world—including in the United States—are strongly internationalist in orientation. They believe that global challenges are simply too complex and daunting to be addressed by unilateral or even regional means. In every country polled, most people support a global system based on the rule of law, international treaties, and robust multilateral institutions. They believe their own government is obliged to abide by international law, even when doing so is at odds with its perceived national interest. Large majorities, including among Americans, reject a hegemonic role for the United States, but do want the United States to participate in multilateral efforts to address international issues.

Welcome to 2025: American Preeminence Is Disappearing Fifteen Years Early

Michael T. Klare. Tom Dispatch, 26 October 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HGy9yD

Excerpt:

How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma President Obama and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.

article references http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/global-trends-2025

Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy

David Isenberg. PRIO, 15 October 2009.
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1720057691/Isenberg Private Military Contractors PRIO Report-2009.pdf

Al-Qaeda’s guerrilla chief lays out strategy

Syed Saleem Shahzad. Asia Times, 15 October 2009.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html

Illusions of Victory

Douglas MacGregor. Defense News, 28 September 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4296926&c=FEA&s=COM

“If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.”

Lewis Carroll. (English Logician, Mathematician, Photographer and Novelist, especially remembered for Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 1832-1898)

Containment Succeeded, Pre-emption Failed — Time For A New National Strategy?

an expert online panel, National Journal National Security Expert Blog, 10 August 2009.

Intervention Today Means a Less Secure Tomorrow

William Pfaff. Tribune Media Services, 05 August 2009.

excerpt:

…the more wars you undertake abroad, the more places you intervene, and the more bases you build around the world, the less secure you are.

Council on Foreign Relations Address by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

Hillary Rodham Clinton. Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 15 July 2009. Audio and video available.

Deconstructing Our Dark Age Future

P. Michael Phillips. Parameters, Summer 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HcJIs2

Excerpt:

The state as described in this article differs greatly from the ideal imagined in the Westphalian paradigm. States do not universally enjoy unrestricted sovereignty. Nor are they equal. In fact, the sovereignty of a great number of the states in the international system is merely ascriptive.

Because these imperfect conditions have more or less existed since long before 1648, it may be more helpful to think of any observed chaos in the international system as the natural condition, rather than a decline into disorder. If the system is not melting down, are so-called nonstate actors as signifcant for the long-term as they appear to be for the present?

The return of multipolarity is a long-overdue blessing in disguise. Shaped properly, the rise of other credible powers may permit Washington to more widely distribute the responsibility of collective security among a more diverse and culturally relevant audience. Shepherding—not resisting—the emergence of multiple spheres of influence within a reconceptualized normative framework, one moving beyond simple Wilsonian idealism, has potential to co-opt potential troublemakers and might offer a better vehicle for expanding global prosperity by increasing the number of empowered stakeholders. Such a system might, over time, evolve into a practical security council of states reflecting not ancient martial relationships, but in-
stead the distribution of actual global power. Most importantly, the United States would be empowered to devise a transition away from the draining role of world policeman to one more befitting a global ombudsman. This shift can at once conserve American power for the long haul while insulating the nation from ultimate responsibility. Finally, such a system would more effectively highlight state troublemakers and allow the United States to focus its finite resources on real rather than imagined threats.

American Grand Strategy after War

Dallas D. Owens and Ionut C. Popescu. Strategic Studies Institute Colloquium Brief, Army War College, 22 May 2009. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

Tony Cordesman’s Speech at National Defense University on 10 March 2009

www.informationdissemination.net, 20 March 2009.

Excerpt:

Any meaningful strategy must be based on detailed force plans, procurement plans, program budgets, and measure of effectiveness.

If God really hates you, you may end up working on a Quadrennial Defense Review: The most pointless and destructive planning effort imaginable. You will waste two years on a document decoupled from a real world force plan, from an honest set of decisions about manpower or procurement, with no clear budget or FYDP, and with no metrics to measure or determine its success.

If God merely dislikes you, you may end up helping your service chief or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs draft one of those vague, anodyne strategy documents that is all concepts and no plans or execution.

If God is totally indifferent, you will end up working on our national strategy and simply be irrelevant.