Elisabeth Bumiller and Allison Kopicki. New York Times, 26 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/HyL9li

Excerpt:

The latest New York Times/CBS News poll…found that more than two-thirds of those polled — 69 percent — thought that the United States should not be at war in Afghanistan. Just four months ago, 53 percent said that Americans should no longer be fighting in the conflict.

William Hartung. Foreign Policy in Focus, 26 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/HsgyYJ

Excerpt:

Romney’s proposal implies that the Pentagon is essentially an entitlement program that should receive a set share of our total economic resources regardless of what’s happening here at home or elsewhere on the planet. In Romney World, the Pentagon’s only role would be to engorge itself. If the GDP were to drop, it’s unlikely that, as president, he would reduce Pentagon spending accordingly.

International Crisis Group. Asia Report N°221, 26 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/H6bVBL

Excerpt:

A negotiated political settlement is a desirable outcome to the conflict in Afghanistan, but current talks with the Taliban are unlikely to result in a sustainable peace. There is a risk that negotiations under present conditions could further destabilise the country and region. Debilitated by internal political divisions and external pressures, the Karzai government is poorly positioned to cut a deal with leaders of the insurgency. Afghanistan’s security forces are ill-prepared to handle the power vacuum that will occur following the exit of international troops. As political competition heats up within the country in the run-up to NATO’s withdrawal of combat forces at the end of 2014, the differing priorities and preferences of the parties to the conflict – from the Afghan government to the Taliban leadership to key regional and wider international actors – will further undermine the prospects of peace. To avoid another civil war, a major course correction is needed that results in the appointment of a UN-mandated mediation team and the adoption of a more realistic approach to resolution of the conflict.

Carl Conetta. PDA Briefing Memo #54, 23 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/GTaHbL

On 13 February 2013, President Obama put down the administration’s marker in the budget debate for 2013. The President’s request proposes a budget pie about as large as the one adopted in 2008. However, comparing the 2013 request to the sum appropriated in 2008 shows that the Pentagon is being offered a bigger slice this time around.

• The administration’s budget request for FY 2013 rolls discretionary spending back to the level of 2008 in nominal terms.
• War spending is slated to decline substantially from the 2008 level. However, much of the savings is cycled back into peacetime security spending, which increases.
• Comparing 2008 and 2013 shows the budget plan to increase the proportion of non-war discretionary dollars devoted to National Defense – up from 50% to 52%.

Comparison of Discretionary Spending Allocation – 2008 vs 2013 Request
(billions of nominal dollars)
Sources: See “Notes” at end.

“Security basket” gains ground

How does the President’s new budget reshape federal priorities?

This is best understood by comparing it to the 2008 budget, which was the last budget fully enacted before President Obama took office. Also, the 2013 budget request approximately rolls back discretionary spending to the 2008 level in nominal terms. (If we take inflation into account, there’s a real reduction; still, the nominal similarity of the two budgets helps us to discern the change in priorities, if any).

The table shows the differences in budget allocation between the 2008 budget and President Obama’s 2013 budget request. For there to be “real” (inflation-corrected growth) sums must rise by at least 8% from 2008 levels.

What do we see comparing the 2013 request with the 2008 appropriation?

• Discretionary spending declines, but this is due largely to the reduction in war spending. In fact, the decline in discretionary is not as great as the decline in war spending. Take war out of the picture and the result is that discretionary spending increases in nominal terms. (However, it does not increase as much as inflation for the 2008-2013 period, which is 8%.)

• Looking at the discretionary “Security Basket” as initially defined by the Budget Control
Act to include National Defense, International Affairs, Veterans, and Homeland Security, we see it growing by 12% – which exceeds the rate of inflation.

• Within the “Security Basket,” National Defense (mostly the Pentagon plus some weapons spending in the Department of Energy) grows by 10.3% – slightly more than the rate of inflation.

• By contrast, the “Non-security Basket” (which is everything else) declines by 3.2% in nominal terms – and by considerably more in “real” or inflation-adjusted terms

• As a result of these changes in allocation, “Security Basket” spending would grow as a proportion of all discretionary spending. National Defense spending, a subset of “Security,” would also grow proportionately.

In the President’s 2013 request, three members of the “Security Basket” get bigger shares than in 2008 and one sees its share decline. The winners are National Defense, International Affairs, and especially Veteran Affairs. The loser is Homeland Security.

A hypothetical alternative

What might have the FY 2013 budget looked like if the proportion devoted to defense and security had been held to their 2008 percentages?

• Using 2008 proportions, the 2013 “Security Basket” would be set at $677.4 billion, which is $35.9 billion less than actually requested.

• Using 2008 proportions, National Defense spending would be set at $532.4 billion – which is $18.4 billion less than planned. The Pentagon base budget is part of this and would be set at $508 billion, which is $17.5 billion less than actually requested.

• Had the “Non-security Basket” been held at its 2008 proportion, it would receive $381.1 billion, which is $35.9 billion more than requested in the administration’s budget. This amount has been moved from non-security to security funding.

Two provisos

There are two provisos to the above analysis:

First, the analysis assumes that war spending for 2013 will not rise before the fiscal year ends; and

Second, the analysis does not take into account the undue migration of approximately $4 billion in personnel costs from the base budget to the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) fund. If we disallow this shift of base budget costs to the OCO account, the 2013 Pentagon request is not $525.4 billion, but $529.4 billion. And this implies a greater growth in the Pentagon’s budget slice than reported above.

Notes

Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government – Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington DC: White House Office of Management and the Budget, 2013), Table 5.4 Discretionary Budget Authority by Agency 1976-2017

Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government – Fiscal Year 2013 (Washington DC: White House Office of Management and the Budget, 2013), Table 32-1 Policy Budget Authority and Outlays by Function, Category and Program.

Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government – Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington DC: White House Office of Management and the Budget, 2010), Table 26-1 Policy Budget Authority and Outlays by Function, Category and Program.

Carl Conetta. Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #54, 23 March 2012. A comparison of discretionary spending in 2008 and 2013 shows an increased tilt toward the “Security Basket” and National Defense. http://defensealt.org/GTaHbL

David Rothkopf. Foreign Policy, 19 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/GSUypF

Excerpt:

Certainly there has been national debate about whether we should have been involved in those wars, one that has belatedly delivered the message to our political leadership that it is time to bring our troops home. But about one crucial array of issues concerning our involvement we have been stunningly silent: the competence of our military leaders, the effectiveness of the strategies they have employed, and the very structure and character of our military itself.

Mark Mazzetti and Thom Shanker. New York Times, 19 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/GJt7O3

Excerpt:

A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials.

C.J. Radin. The Long War Journal, 18 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/GJ8zo8

Excerpt:

In June 2011, President Obama announced that the US would begin withdrawing military forces from Afghanistan and transferring responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The US goal is to be substantially out of Afghanistan by 2014, with ANSF responsible for the entire country.

The plan for 2013 is currently being developed. The final version will be presented for approval at the NATO summit in Chicago in May. While still incomplete, portions of the plan have been disclosed or can be deduced. According to The Guardian, Obama described the next phase of the transition as follows: “This includes shifting to a support role next year, in 2013, in advance of Afghans taking full responsibility for security in 2014. We’re going to complete this mission, and we’re going to do it responsibly.”

The most significant element of the plan is that US and ISAF forces will stop conducting combat operations in late 2013. The ANSF will then be responsible for executing all combat operations in Afghanistan.

Winslow Wheeler. AOL Defense, 16 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/AxrAFS

Excerpt:

The US defense budget is not just dominant; it is operating at a level completely independent of the perceived threat…America’s defense budget strategists declare it will be “doomsday” if we size to anything less than five times China and Russia combined.

Information Dissemination, 15 March 2012. The projected FY13 ship inactivation schedule for inactivating U.S. Naval vessels. http://defensealt.org/GKezMl

Benjamin H. Friedman and Charles Knight. The National Interest, 6 March 2012.
http://defensealt.org/y7oMHq

Excerpt:

A war tax or an effective cap on war spending can serve as a disincentive to reckless war making.

Paul Pillar. Washington Monthly, March/April 2012.
http://defensealt.org/GJ3P5j

Excerpt:

Fears of a bomb in Tehran’s hands are overhyped, and a war to prevent it would be a disaster.

David Rohde. Foreign Policy, March/April 2012.
http://defensealt.org/GWFKHn

Excerpt:

Obama has embraced the CIA, expanded its powers, and approved more targeted killings than any modern president. Over the last three years, the Obama administration has carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, more than five times the 44 approved under George W. Bush. And after promising to make counterterrorism operations more transparent and rein in executive power, Obama has arguably done the opposite, maintaining secrecy and expanding presidential authority.

To a far greater extent than the Bush White House, Obama and his top aides relied on the CIA for its analysis of Pakistan, according to current and former senior administration officials. As a result, preserving the agency’s ability to carry out counterterrorism, or “CT,” operations in Pakistan became of paramount importance.

“The most important thing when it came to Pakistan was to be able to carry out drone strikes and nothing else,” said a former official who spoke on condition of anonymity. “The so-called strategic focus of the bilateral relationship was there solely to serve the CT approach.”

Additional Source:
New America Foundation: Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2012, Updated 13 March 2012. http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones

Jim Lobe. AntiWar.com, 25 February 2012.
http://defensealt.org/yRw693

Excerpt:

Despite the IAEA’s apparent lack of progress, Iran’s acceptance last week of a long-standing request from EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton on behalf of the P5+1 to resume negotiations, stalled for over a year, makes it likely that a new round of talks will take place in late March or April, probably in Istanbul…Anticipation of those talks, as well as the rapid escalation of tensions over the last two months, particularly between Israel and Iran, has provoked a flurry of proposals to revive the dormant diplomatic track, if only to calm a situation threatening to spin out of control.

Charles Knight, commentary, 24 February 2012.

The Pentagon, the Obama administration, and many members of Congress hope that cuts to the defense budget stop with those mandated in the first stage caps of the 2011 Budget Control Act and made more specific in the President’s recently announced FY13 budget plan. As Reuters has reported the Obama FY13 budget shifts away from an austerity frame, partially adopted in 2012, to instead emphasize a program of higher taxes on the rich, a continuing tax cut for wage earners, and public investments in infrastructure, education and police services.

It is safe to predict that most all Republicans and some Democrats in Congress will join to block the President’s tax/revenue enhancement programs and domestic economic investments. The political stalemate on further deficit/debt reduction that followed passage of the BCA last year will remain in place through the remainder of 2012.

Even if we assume that after this year’s election Congress will find a way to avoid the particulars in the so-called “sequester” (second-stage) provision of the 2011 Budget Control Act, the pressure for deeper cuts will remain.

To see why the pressure for more defense cuts will continue into next year we need look no further than a new report from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget called Primary Numbers: The GOP Candidates and the National Debt. Their analysis shows that in 2021 the fiscal plans the GOP candidates will yield the following national debt levels as percentages of GDP:

Gingrich – 114%

Santorum – 104%

Romney – 86%

Paul – 76%

By odd coincidence Ron Paul’s plan and President Obama’s plan both end up at a debt level of 76% of GDP in 2021. Of course, the two plans get there by very different mechanisms. Obama’s plan relies substantially on increased revenue (including tax increases) and Paul’s mostly on spending cuts, including deeper cuts in the defense budget.

What makes the Pentagon budget vulnerable after the election is that the centrist Democratic president and the libertarian Republican candidate have positioned themselves as the most fiscally conservative, while the leading Republican contenders are looking like spend and don’t tax radicals.

Gingrich grabs for the mantel of Reagonomic fiscal policy by favoring an increase of national debt to 114% of GDP. Santorum is a close second at 104% of GDP. By comparison, Romney appears moderate at 86% of GDP, 13% higher than Obama or Paul. Romney is in favor of increasing military spending.

The problem for the Pentagon is that both Obama’s and Romney’s plans are politically unrealistic and very unlikely to be implemented. Obama keeps the debt low largely through tax increases — which will not happen if Congress remains controlled by Republicans. A failure to raise new revenues will be critical. If the Administration were able to get higher taxes on the rich it would facilitate holding DoD cuts to the level of the FY13 plan. Failure to achieve these tax increases will mean two things: 1) it will be much harder to get a domestic investment program (even if the Democrats do better than expected in November) and 2) the attractiveness to a significant portion of liberals and conservatives of additional DoD cuts will continue.

Romney, on the other hand, plans to keep taxes low and increases defense spending — therefore his fiscal plan depends on deeper cuts in domestic spending and substantial cuts to entitlements. Given that domestic spending has been cut to the bone in most accounts and entitlement programs have survived all conservative assaults to date, Romney’s plan seems equally unlikely. For more on the limits of the Romney plan see Ezra Klein here.

So there is every reason to believe that after this year’s election powerful fiscal conservatives who can see beyond the partisan nonsense will look hard again at the Pentagon’s budget to find things to cut. This condition means that the nation will remain open to strategic adjustment for some years to come.

Projected National Debt from GOP Candidates' Fiscal Plans

Alireza Nader. RAND, 23 February 2012.
http://defensealt.org/zXmokM

Excerpt:

Khamenei is not an irrational actor… His possible intent in developing a nuclear weapons capability almost certainly is not to destroy Israel, but rather to guard against a foreign attack or counter an internal challenge.

Now that speculation and discussion of a possible attack from Israel on Iranian nuclear development facilities is rampant, it is time to bring back a review I did on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq:

First Strike Guidelines: The Case of Iraq
Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #25
by Charles Knight, 16 September 2002 (revised and updated 10 March 2003)
http://www.comw.org/pda/0209schneider.html

Excerpt:

…despite the repeated use of the term “preemption” to describe their counterproliferation strategy (see the 2002 National Security Strategy), the Bush administration’s strategic approach to Iraq is one of preventive war. The U.S. Department of Defense defines preventive war as “war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk” while it defines preemptive attack as “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.” Preventive war has long been understood to be highly destabilizing and it is nearly impossible to reconcile it with the notions of non-aggression imbedded in the United Nations Charter.

Michael E. O’Hanlon and Bruce Riedel. Brookings Institute, 15 February 2012.
http://defensealt.org/A1HHL6

Excerpt:

The next president will need to move closer to a policy of containing Pakistani aggression, which would mean a more hostile relationship. But, it should be a focused hostility, aimed not at hurting Pakistan’s people but rather at holding its army and intelligence branches accountable.

Editor’s Comment:
I suppose we should give the authors credit for their display of imagination. I, for one, can’t imagine this strategy working. It also raises the question in my mind as to who would be doing the “aggression”, Pakistan or the U.S.?