Archive for the ‘Official’ Category

December 3rd Draft of the 2010 QDR

“pre-decisional” draft dated 03 December 2010 and published by InsideDefense.com on 27 January 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/draftQDR2010.pdf

The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020

Congressional Budget Office, 26 January 2010.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/01-26-Outlook.pdf

F-35 (JSF) Section of the 2009 Annual Report of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E)

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), pp. 21-25, January 2010.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/DOTE F-35 JSF 2009 Annual Report.pdf

Majority Staff Memorandum prepared for Hearing on Afghanistan Contracts, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 16 December 2009

Majority Staff, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 16 December 2009. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/2009-12-16StaffMemo.pdf

Excerpt:

[The] number of Defense Department Contractors in Afghanistan May reach 160,000. There are currently 104,000 Defense Department contractors working in Afghanistan. The increase in troops may require an additional 56,000 Defense Department contractors, bringing the total number of Defense contractors in Afghanistan to 160,000.

Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed To Get bin Laden and Why it Matters Today

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 30 November 2009.
http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf

Excerpt:

The reasons behind the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and its lasting consequences are examined over three sections in this report. The first section traces bin Laden’s path from southern Afghanistan to the mountains of Tora Bora and lays out new and previous evidence that he was there. The second explores new information behind the decision not to launch an assault. The final section examines the military options that might have led to his capture or death at Tora Bora and the ongoing impact of the failure to bring him back ‘‘dead or alive.’’

Winning in Afghanistan: A Message from Ambassador Eikenberry

Karl E. Eikenberry. Embassy of the U.S.A., Kabul, 08 November 2009.
http://static1.firedoglake.com/37/files/2009/11/Winning-in-Afghanistan.pdf

Ambassador Eikenberry’s Cables on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan

Karl W. Eikenberry. The The New York Times has published two cables authored by the U.S. Ambassador to Kabul addressed to Secretary of State Clinton. The first is dated 06 November 2009 and is entitled “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns”. The second is dated 09 November 2009 and is entitled “Looking Beyond Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”.
http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan

Editor’s Comment:

Quibble: COIN is a tactic, not a strategy. Non-quibble: Wars are rarely decided at the tactical level.

Summary of DoD Office of the Inspector General Audits of Financical Management

Inspector General, DoD, 19 October 2009.
http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy10/10-002.pdf

Excerpt:

As part of our audit of the FY 2008 DOD Agency-side financial statements, DOD management acknowledged that 13 previously-identified material weaknesses continued to exist.