U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). March 2009.http://defensealt.org/HcK1TJ

The White House, March 2009.
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DoD, January 2009. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, November 2008.
http://defensealt.org/HiKl6y

Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute website (printable .pdf file).

(printable .pdf file)

U.S. Army, 2008. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

USN, USMC, USCG. October 2007. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

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U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 15 December 2006

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H.R.3230
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997

Subtitle B–Force Structure Review

SEC. 921. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996′.

SEC. 922. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has conducted two substantial assessments of the force structure of the Armed Forces necessary to meet United States defense requirements.
(2) The assessment by the Bush Administration (known as the ‘Base Force’ assessment) and the assessment by the Clinton Administration (known as the ‘Bottom-Up Review’) were intended to reassess the force structure of the Armed Forces in light of the changing realities of the post-Cold War world.
(3) Both assessments served an important purpose in focusing attention on the need to reevaluate the military posture of the United States, but the pace of global change necessitates a new, comprehensive assessment of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure of the Armed Forces required to meet the threats to the United States in the twenty-first century.
(4) The Bottom-Up Review has been criticized on several points, including– (A) The assumptions underlying the strategy of planning to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts; (B) The force levels recommended to carry out that strategy; and (C) The funding proposed for such recommended force levels.
(5) In response to the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense endorsed the concept of conducting a quadrennial review of the defense program at the beginning of each newly elected Presidential administration, and the Department intends to complete the first such review in 1997.
(6) The review is to involve a comprehensive examination of defense strategy, the force structure of the active, guard, and reserve components, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies in order to determine and express the defense strategy of the United States and to establish a revised defense program through the year 2005.
(7) In order to ensure that the force structure of the Armed Forces is adequate to meet the challenges to the national security interests of the United States in the twenty-first century.

Sec. 923. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.

(a) REQUIREMENT IN 1997- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall complete in 1997 a review of the defense program of the United States intended to satisfy the requirements for a Quadrennial Defense Review as identified in the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. The review shall include a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005.

(b) INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL-
(1) The Secretary shall apprise the National Defense Panel established under section 924, on an ongoing basis, of the work undertaken in the conduct of the review.
(2) Not later than March 14, 1997, the Chairman of the National Defense Panel shall submit to the Secretary the Panel’s assessment of work undertaken in the conduct of the review as of that date and shall include in the assessment the recommendations of the Panel for improvements to the review, including recommendations for additional matters to be covered in the review.

c) ASSESSMENTS OF REVIEW- Upon completion of the review, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the National Defense Panel, on behalf of the Panel, shall each prepare and submit to the Secretary such Chairman’s assessment of the review in time for the inclusion of the assessment in its entirety in the report under subsection (d).

d) REPORT- Not later than May 15, 1997, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a comprehensive report on the review. The report shall include the following:
(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy.
(2) The threats examined for purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of such threats.
(3) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to the cooperation of allies and mission-sharing, levels of acceptable risk, warning times, and intensity and duration of conflict.
(4) The effect on the force structure of preparations for and participation in peace operations and military operations other than war.
(5) The effect on the force structure of the utilization by the Armed Forces of technologies anticipated to be available by the year 2005, including precision guided munitions, stealth, night vision, digitization, and communications, and the changes in octrine and operational concepts that would result from the utilization of such technologies.
(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting more than 120 days.
(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.
(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio) under the defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarter units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
(9) The air-lift and sea-lift capabilities required to support the defense strategy.
(10) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.
(11) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
(12) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the defense strategy.
(13) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.