Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), pp. 21-25, January 2010.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/DOTE F-35 JSF 2009 Annual Report.pdf

Majority Staff, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 16 December 2009. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/2009-12-16StaffMemo.pdf

Excerpt:

[The] number of Defense Department Contractors in Afghanistan May reach 160,000. There are currently 104,000 Defense Department contractors working in Afghanistan. The increase in troops may require an additional 56,000 Defense Department contractors, bringing the total number of Defense contractors in Afghanistan to 160,000.

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 30 November 2009.
http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf

Excerpt:

The reasons behind the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and its lasting consequences are examined over three sections in this report. The first section traces bin Laden’s path from southern Afghanistan to the mountains of Tora Bora and lays out new and previous evidence that he was there. The second explores new information behind the decision not to launch an assault. The final section examines the military options that might have led to his capture or death at Tora Bora and the ongoing impact of the failure to bring him back ‘‘dead or alive.’’

Karl E. Eikenberry. Embassy of the U.S.A., Kabul, 08 November 2009.
http://static1.firedoglake.com/37/files/2009/11/Winning-in-Afghanistan.pdf

Karl W. Eikenberry. The The New York Times has published two cables authored by the U.S. Ambassador to Kabul addressed to Secretary of State Clinton. The first is dated 06 November 2009 and is entitled “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns”. The second is dated 09 November 2009 and is entitled “Looking Beyond Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”.
http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan

Editor’s Comment:

Quibble: COIN is a tactic, not a strategy. Non-quibble: Wars are rarely decided at the tactical level.

Inspector General, DoD, 19 October 2009.
http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy10/10-002.pdf

Excerpt:

As part of our audit of the FY 2008 DOD Agency-side financial statements, DOD management acknowledged that 13 previously-identified material weaknesses continued to exist.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), DoD, 29 September 2009.
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/CPO/DSCA_StratPlan_2009-2014.pdf

Robert Haddick. Small Wars Journal, 22 September 2009.
article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/the-army-wants-your-comments-o/
Army Capstone Concept draft: http://defensealt.org/H6QBMm
Post your comments: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8486

The White House. 17 September 2009. Hosted on the Council on Foreign Relations website.
http://defensealt.org/HlC0uO

Stanley A. McChrystal. NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, 30 August 2009 (unclassified). Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/090830mcchrystal.pdf

Excerpt:

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans.

Barack Obama. Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention at the Phoenix Convention Center, 17 August 2009.
http://defensealt.org/HInTEy

Karl W. Eikenberry and Stanley A. McChrystal. Embassy of the U.S.A. Kabul and U.S. Forces Afghanistan. 10 August 2009 (printable .pdf file). Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute Website.
http://defensealt.org/HctLGV

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 2009.
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf

Hillary Rodham Clinton. U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 15 July 2009.

Department of State, 10 July 2009.

The United States faces a set of complex, varied, and numerous foreign policy challenges. No one set of tools is sufficient for solving or managing them. Our success in exercising effective global leadership depends upon a robust and effective State Department and USAID working side-by-side with a strong military. By using all the tools of American power, we can pave the way for shared peace, progress and prosperity. This comprehensive approach is the essence of smart power.

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) will provide the short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint for our diplomatic and development efforts. Our goal is to use this process to guide us to agile, responsive, and effective institutions of diplomacy and development, including how to transition from approaches no longer commensurate with current challenges. It will offer guidance on how we develop policies; how we allocate our resources; how we deploy our staff; and how we exercise our authorities. Specifically, the final report of the QDDR will lay out:

The baseline: An assessment of (1) the range of global threats, challenges and opportunities both today and over the next two decades that should inform our diplomatic and development strategies; and (2) the current status of our approaches to diplomacy and development, with emphasis on the relationship between diplomacy and development in our existing policies and structures.

The ends: A clear statement of our overarching foreign policy and development objectives, our specific policy priorities, and our expected results, with an emphasis on the achievable and not merely the desirable.

The ways: A set of recommendations on the strategies needed to achieve these results, including the timing and sequencing of decisions and implementation.

The means: A set of recommendations on (1) the tools and resources needed to implement the strategy; and (2) management and organizational reforms that will improve outcomes and efficiency.

The metrics: A set of recommendations on performance measures to assess outcomes, and–where feasible–impacts.

The links: An assessment of how the results and recommendations of this review fit into broader interagency, whole-of-government approaches, and into the Administration’s larger foreign policy framework.

The QDDR will be managed by a senior leadership team under the direction of the Secretary of State and led by the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, with the Administrator of USAID and the Director of the Policy Planning serving as co-chairs. The QDDR leadership team will include senior representation from State, USAID and MCC, and will engage with Congress, Cabinet agencies, and seek input from non-government experts. Findings and recommendations of the QDDR will contribute to an interagency process aimed at developing a whole-of-government approach. The final report will be presented to the President and Congress and be made available to the public.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)

SEC. 1035. NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL.

(a) Establishment- There is established a bipartisan, independent panel to be known as the National Defense Panel (in this section referred to as the `Panel’). The Panel shall have the duties set forth in this section.

(b) Membership- The Panel shall be composed of twelve members who are recognized experts in matters relating to the national security of the United States. The members shall be appointed as follows:

(1) Three by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(2) Three by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(3) Two by the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(4) Two by the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(5) Two by the Secretary of Defense.

(c) Co-chairs of the Panel- The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee of Armed Services of the Senate shall each designate one of their appointees under subsection (b) to serve as co-chair of the panel.

(d) Period of Appointment; Vacancies- Members shall be appointed for the life of the Panel. Any vacancy in the Panel shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(e) Duties- The Panel shall–

(1) review the national defense strategy, the national military strategy, the Secretary of Defense’s terms of reference, and any other materials providing the basis for, or substantial inputs to, the work of the Department of Defense on the 2009 quadrennial defense review under section 118 of title 10, United States Code (in this subsection referred to as the `2009 QDR’), as well as the 2009 QDR itself;

(2) conduct an assessment of the assumptions, strategy, findings, costs, and risks of the report of the 2009 QDR, with particular attention paid to the risks described in that report;

(3) submit to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary an independent assessment of a variety of possible force structures of the Armed Forces, including the force structure identified in the report of the 2009 QDR, suitable to meet the requirements identified in the review required in paragraph (1);

(4) to the extent practicable, estimate the funding required by fiscal year, in constant fiscal year 2010 dollars, to organize, equip, and support the forces contemplated under the force structures assessed in the assessment under paragraph (3); and

(5) provide to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, through the reports under subsection (g), any recommendations it considers appropriate for their consideration.

(f) First Meeting-

(1) The Panel shall hold its first meeting no later than 30 days after the date as of which all appointments to the Panel under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (b) have been made.

(2) If the Secretary of Defense has not made the Secretary’s appointments to the Panel under subsection (b)(5) by the date of the first meeting pursuant to paragraph (1), the Panel shall convene with the remaining members.

(g) Reports-

(1) Not later than April 15, 2010, the Panel shall submit an interim report on its findings to the congressional defense committees and to the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Not later than January 15, 2011, the Panel shall submit its final report, together with any recommendations, to the congressional defense committees and to the Secretary of Defense.

(3) Not later than February 15, 2011, the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit to the committees referred to in paragraph (2) the Secretary’s comments on the Panel’s final report under that paragraph.

(h) Information From Federal Agencies- The Panel may secure directly from the Department of Defense and any of its components such information as the Panel considers necessary to carry out its duties under this section. The head of the department or agency concerned shall ensure that information requested by the Panel under this subsection is promptly provided.

(i) FFRDC Support- Upon the request of the co-chairs of the Panel, the Secretary of Defense shall make available to the Panel the services of any federally funded research and development center that is covered by a sponsoring agreement of the Department of Defense.

(j) Personnel Matters- The Panel shall have the authorities provided in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, and shall be subject to the conditions set forth in such section.

(k) Payment of Panel Expenses- Funds for activities of the Panel shall be provided from amounts available to the Department of Defense.

(l) Termination- The Panel shall terminate 45 days after the date on which the Panel submits its final report under subsection (g)(2).

James Jones. Atlantic Council, 27 May 2009.
http://www.acus.org/event/nsa-james-jones-first-speech/transcript

Barack Obama. remarks, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, 05 April 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

Excerpt:

… as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.”

… the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.