as delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas Wednesday, 03 March 2010.
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1336

Excerpt:

I’ve come to three conclusions – three principles – about the proper use of modern military forces:

1) … military power should not – maybe cannot – be the last resort of the state. Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools to policymakers. We can, merely by our presence, help alter certain behavior. Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy. We can assist rapidly in disaster-relief efforts, as we did in the aftermath of Haiti’s earthquake. We can help gather intelligence, support reconnaissance and provide security.

And we can do so on little or no notice. That ease of use is critical for deterrence. An expeditionary force that provides immediate, tangible effects. It is also vital when innocent lives are at risk. So yes, the military may be the best and sometimes the first tool; it should never be the only tool.

2) Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way.

3) Policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another. Some in the military no doubt would prefer political leadership that lays out a specific strategy and then gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the implementation to commanders in the field. But the experience of the last nine years tells us two things: A clear strategy for military operations is essential; and that strategy will have to change as those operations evolve. In other words, success in these types of wars is iterative; it is not decisive.

Editor’s Comment:

Mullen’s first principle is dangerous in the extreme. It is a sad reminder of the militarization of the American state. Mullen suffers from an inexplicable amnesia of the horrors of war in the 20th Century.

America will likely be paying a high price for decades to come in what comes around from the quick and easy resort to war in 2002-2003 by policy-makers enthralled with their military instrument. If war is not a last resort, then policy-makers are abject failures as leaders.

Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University – As Prepared for Delivery, 18 February 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-national-defense-university

Excerpt:

Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies.

Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong.

Editor’s Comment:

When Vice President Biden speaks of plans to “further strengthen … preeminent conventional forces” with “capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield” and “conventional warheads with worldwide reach” he seeks to reassure his domestic audience that nuclear disarmament will not make America less secure. His words, however, do not reassure other nuclear powers or potential future nuclear powers such as Iran who will perceive these enhanced American conventional capabilities as strategic threats to their national security.

Biden surely understands that he is not really offering us a pathway to nuclear abolition. We will not get there if other nations are expected to relinquish their nuclear arsenals to face “undeniable” conventional power from the U.S.

If Biden’s speech truly represents the elaboration of the “President’s Prague Agenda” it leaves us with a very big gap (conceptually and practically) between the near term goal Biden articulates (“We will work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”) and the longer term goal (“We are working both to stop [nuclear weapons] proliferation and eventually to eliminate them.”) which President Obama confirmed in Prague.

DoD summary prepared for press briefing, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/FY11budgetsummary-dod.pdf

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002QDR2010.pdf

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002BMDR.pdf

final version as published by InsideDefense.com on 30 January 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/100130qdr2010.pdf

“pre-decisional” draft dated 03 December 2010 and published by InsideDefense.com on 27 January 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/draftQDR2010.pdf

Congressional Budget Office, 26 January 2010.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/01-26-Outlook.pdf

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), pp. 21-25, January 2010.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/DOTE F-35 JSF 2009 Annual Report.pdf

Majority Staff, Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight, 16 December 2009. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/2009-12-16StaffMemo.pdf

Excerpt:

[The] number of Defense Department Contractors in Afghanistan May reach 160,000. There are currently 104,000 Defense Department contractors working in Afghanistan. The increase in troops may require an additional 56,000 Defense Department contractors, bringing the total number of Defense contractors in Afghanistan to 160,000.

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 30 November 2009.
http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf

Excerpt:

The reasons behind the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and its lasting consequences are examined over three sections in this report. The first section traces bin Laden’s path from southern Afghanistan to the mountains of Tora Bora and lays out new and previous evidence that he was there. The second explores new information behind the decision not to launch an assault. The final section examines the military options that might have led to his capture or death at Tora Bora and the ongoing impact of the failure to bring him back ‘‘dead or alive.’’

Karl E. Eikenberry. Embassy of the U.S.A., Kabul, 08 November 2009.
http://static1.firedoglake.com/37/files/2009/11/Winning-in-Afghanistan.pdf

Karl W. Eikenberry. The The New York Times has published two cables authored by the U.S. Ambassador to Kabul addressed to Secretary of State Clinton. The first is dated 06 November 2009 and is entitled “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns”. The second is dated 09 November 2009 and is entitled “Looking Beyond Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan”.
http://documents.nytimes.com/eikenberry-s-memos-on-the-strategy-in-afghanistan

Editor’s Comment:

Quibble: COIN is a tactic, not a strategy. Non-quibble: Wars are rarely decided at the tactical level.

Inspector General, DoD, 19 October 2009.
http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy10/10-002.pdf

Excerpt:

As part of our audit of the FY 2008 DOD Agency-side financial statements, DOD management acknowledged that 13 previously-identified material weaknesses continued to exist.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), DoD, 29 September 2009.
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/CPO/DSCA_StratPlan_2009-2014.pdf

Robert Haddick. Small Wars Journal, 22 September 2009.
article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/the-army-wants-your-comments-o/
Army Capstone Concept draft: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/doc/Army%20Capstone%20Concept%20V%202%207.2.pdf
Post your comments: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8486

The White House. 17 September 2009. Hosted on the Council on Foreign Relations website.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20225/fact_sheet_on_us_missile_defense_policy.html

16 September 2009. Hosted by the Inside Defense Website.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/data_extra/pdf8/dplus2009_3075.pdf

Stanley A. McChrystal. NATO International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, 30 August 2009 (unclassified). Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/090830mcchrystal.pdf

Excerpt:

NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans.

Barack Obama. Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention at the Phoenix Convention Center, 17 August 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20038/obamas_speech_on_afghanistan_and_pakistan_august_2009.html

Karl W. Eikenberry and Stanley A. McChrystal. Embassy of the U.S.A. Kabul and U.S. Forces Afghanistan. 10 August 2009 (printable .pdf file). Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute Website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0908eikenberryandmcchrystal.pdf

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 2009.
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf

Hillary Rodham Clinton. U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 15 July 2009.

Department of State, 10 July 2009.

The United States faces a set of complex, varied, and numerous foreign policy challenges. No one set of tools is sufficient for solving or managing them. Our success in exercising effective global leadership depends upon a robust and effective State Department and USAID working side-by-side with a strong military. By using all the tools of American power, we can pave the way for shared peace, progress and prosperity. This comprehensive approach is the essence of smart power.

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) will provide the short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint for our diplomatic and development efforts. Our goal is to use this process to guide us to agile, responsive, and effective institutions of diplomacy and development, including how to transition from approaches no longer commensurate with current challenges. It will offer guidance on how we develop policies; how we allocate our resources; how we deploy our staff; and how we exercise our authorities. Specifically, the final report of the QDDR will lay out:

The baseline: An assessment of (1) the range of global threats, challenges and opportunities both today and over the next two decades that should inform our diplomatic and development strategies; and (2) the current status of our approaches to diplomacy and development, with emphasis on the relationship between diplomacy and development in our existing policies and structures.

The ends: A clear statement of our overarching foreign policy and development objectives, our specific policy priorities, and our expected results, with an emphasis on the achievable and not merely the desirable.

The ways: A set of recommendations on the strategies needed to achieve these results, including the timing and sequencing of decisions and implementation.

The means: A set of recommendations on (1) the tools and resources needed to implement the strategy; and (2) management and organizational reforms that will improve outcomes and efficiency.

The metrics: A set of recommendations on performance measures to assess outcomes, and–where feasible–impacts.

The links: An assessment of how the results and recommendations of this review fit into broader interagency, whole-of-government approaches, and into the Administration’s larger foreign policy framework.

The QDDR will be managed by a senior leadership team under the direction of the Secretary of State and led by the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, with the Administrator of USAID and the Director of the Policy Planning serving as co-chairs. The QDDR leadership team will include senior representation from State, USAID and MCC, and will engage with Congress, Cabinet agencies, and seek input from non-government experts. Findings and recommendations of the QDDR will contribute to an interagency process aimed at developing a whole-of-government approach. The final report will be presented to the President and Congress and be made available to the public.

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)

SEC. 1035. NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL.

(a) Establishment- There is established a bipartisan, independent panel to be known as the National Defense Panel (in this section referred to as the `Panel’). The Panel shall have the duties set forth in this section.

(b) Membership- The Panel shall be composed of twelve members who are recognized experts in matters relating to the national security of the United States. The members shall be appointed as follows:

(1) Three by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(2) Three by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(3) Two by the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.

(4) Two by the ranking member of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

(5) Two by the Secretary of Defense.

(c) Co-chairs of the Panel- The chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee of Armed Services of the Senate shall each designate one of their appointees under subsection (b) to serve as co-chair of the panel.

(d) Period of Appointment; Vacancies- Members shall be appointed for the life of the Panel. Any vacancy in the Panel shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.

(e) Duties- The Panel shall–

(1) review the national defense strategy, the national military strategy, the Secretary of Defense’s terms of reference, and any other materials providing the basis for, or substantial inputs to, the work of the Department of Defense on the 2009 quadrennial defense review under section 118 of title 10, United States Code (in this subsection referred to as the `2009 QDR’), as well as the 2009 QDR itself;

(2) conduct an assessment of the assumptions, strategy, findings, costs, and risks of the report of the 2009 QDR, with particular attention paid to the risks described in that report;

(3) submit to the congressional defense committees and the Secretary an independent assessment of a variety of possible force structures of the Armed Forces, including the force structure identified in the report of the 2009 QDR, suitable to meet the requirements identified in the review required in paragraph (1);

(4) to the extent practicable, estimate the funding required by fiscal year, in constant fiscal year 2010 dollars, to organize, equip, and support the forces contemplated under the force structures assessed in the assessment under paragraph (3); and

(5) provide to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, through the reports under subsection (g), any recommendations it considers appropriate for their consideration.

(f) First Meeting-

(1) The Panel shall hold its first meeting no later than 30 days after the date as of which all appointments to the Panel under paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (b) have been made.

(2) If the Secretary of Defense has not made the Secretary’s appointments to the Panel under subsection (b)(5) by the date of the first meeting pursuant to paragraph (1), the Panel shall convene with the remaining members.

(g) Reports-

(1) Not later than April 15, 2010, the Panel shall submit an interim report on its findings to the congressional defense committees and to the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Not later than January 15, 2011, the Panel shall submit its final report, together with any recommendations, to the congressional defense committees and to the Secretary of Defense.

(3) Not later than February 15, 2011, the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall submit to the committees referred to in paragraph (2) the Secretary’s comments on the Panel’s final report under that paragraph.

(h) Information From Federal Agencies- The Panel may secure directly from the Department of Defense and any of its components such information as the Panel considers necessary to carry out its duties under this section. The head of the department or agency concerned shall ensure that information requested by the Panel under this subsection is promptly provided.

(i) FFRDC Support- Upon the request of the co-chairs of the Panel, the Secretary of Defense shall make available to the Panel the services of any federally funded research and development center that is covered by a sponsoring agreement of the Department of Defense.

(j) Personnel Matters- The Panel shall have the authorities provided in section 3161 of title 5, United States Code, and shall be subject to the conditions set forth in such section.

(k) Payment of Panel Expenses- Funds for activities of the Panel shall be provided from amounts available to the Department of Defense.

(l) Termination- The Panel shall terminate 45 days after the date on which the Panel submits its final report under subsection (g)(2).

James Jones. Atlantic Council, 27 May 2009.
http://www.acus.org/event/nsa-james-jones-first-speech/transcript

Barack Obama. remarks, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, 05 April 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/

Excerpt:

… as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.) I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.”

… the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies –- including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). March 2009.http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM2009PostureStatement.pdf

The White House, March 2009.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf

DoD, January 2009. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

Office of the Director of National Intelligence, November 2008.
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf

Arlington, VA: Office of the Secretary of Defense, June 2008. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute website (printable .pdf file).

(printable .pdf file)

U.S. Army, 2008. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

USN, USMC, USCG. October 2007. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

Homeland Security Council. October 2007. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, 15 December 2006

The White House, March 2006. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 06 February 2006. Posted on the Commonwealth Institute Website (printable .pdf file).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004

H.R.3230
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997

Subtitle B–Force Structure Review

SEC. 921. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ‘Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996′.

SEC. 922. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has conducted two substantial assessments of the force structure of the Armed Forces necessary to meet United States defense requirements.
(2) The assessment by the Bush Administration (known as the ‘Base Force’ assessment) and the assessment by the Clinton Administration (known as the ‘Bottom-Up Review’) were intended to reassess the force structure of the Armed Forces in light of the changing realities of the post-Cold War world.
(3) Both assessments served an important purpose in focusing attention on the need to reevaluate the military posture of the United States, but the pace of global change necessitates a new, comprehensive assessment of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure of the Armed Forces required to meet the threats to the United States in the twenty-first century.
(4) The Bottom-Up Review has been criticized on several points, including– (A) The assumptions underlying the strategy of planning to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts; (B) The force levels recommended to carry out that strategy; and (C) The funding proposed for such recommended force levels.
(5) In response to the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense endorsed the concept of conducting a quadrennial review of the defense program at the beginning of each newly elected Presidential administration, and the Department intends to complete the first such review in 1997.
(6) The review is to involve a comprehensive examination of defense strategy, the force structure of the active, guard, and reserve components, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies in order to determine and express the defense strategy of the United States and to establish a revised defense program through the year 2005.
(7) In order to ensure that the force structure of the Armed Forces is adequate to meet the challenges to the national security interests of the United States in the twenty-first century.

Sec. 923. QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.

(a) REQUIREMENT IN 1997- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall complete in 1997 a review of the defense program of the United States intended to satisfy the requirements for a Quadrennial Defense Review as identified in the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. The review shall include a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005.

(b) INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL-
(1) The Secretary shall apprise the National Defense Panel established under section 924, on an ongoing basis, of the work undertaken in the conduct of the review.
(2) Not later than March 14, 1997, the Chairman of the National Defense Panel shall submit to the Secretary the Panel’s assessment of work undertaken in the conduct of the review as of that date and shall include in the assessment the recommendations of the Panel for improvements to the review, including recommendations for additional matters to be covered in the review.

c) ASSESSMENTS OF REVIEW- Upon completion of the review, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the National Defense Panel, on behalf of the Panel, shall each prepare and submit to the Secretary such Chairman’s assessment of the review in time for the inclusion of the assessment in its entirety in the report under subsection (d).

d) REPORT- Not later than May 15, 1997, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives a comprehensive report on the review. The report shall include the following:
(1) The results of the review, including a comprehensive discussion of the defense strategy of the United States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy.
(2) The threats examined for purposes of the review and the scenarios developed in the examination of such threats.
(3) The assumptions used in the review, including assumptions relating to the cooperation of allies and mission-sharing, levels of acceptable risk, warning times, and intensity and duration of conflict.
(4) The effect on the force structure of preparations for and participation in peace operations and military operations other than war.
(5) The effect on the force structure of the utilization by the Armed Forces of technologies anticipated to be available by the year 2005, including precision guided munitions, stealth, night vision, digitization, and communications, and the changes in octrine and operational concepts that would result from the utilization of such technologies.
(6) The manpower and sustainment policies required under the defense strategy to support engagement in conflicts lasting more than 120 days.
(7) The anticipated roles and missions of the reserve components in the defense strategy and the strength, capabilities, and equipment necessary to assure that the reserve components can capably discharge those roles and missions.
(8) The appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces (commonly referred to as the ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio) under the defense strategy, including, in particular, the appropriate number and size of headquarter units and Defense Agencies for that purpose.
(9) The air-lift and sea-lift capabilities required to support the defense strategy.
(10) The forward presence, pre-positioning, and other anticipatory deployments necessary under the defense strategy for conflict deterrence and adequate military response to anticipated conflicts.
(11) The extent to which resources must be shifted among two or more theaters under the defense strategy in the event of conflict in such theaters.
(12) The advisability of revisions to the Unified Command Plan as a result of the defense strategy.
(13) Any other matter the Secretary considers appropriate.