Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2012.
http://defensealt.org/ymU504
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Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), February 2012.
http://defensealt.org/ymU504
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U.S. Air Force. February 2012.
http://defensealt.org/HA4Mbm
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Department of Defense. 05 January 2012.
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf
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Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. October 2011.
http://defensealt.org/H7NCl2
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The White House. September 2011.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/66998459/WH-Report-on-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan-September-2011
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The White House, 29 June 2011.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/06/29/fact-sheet-national-strategy-counterterrorism
White House Fact Sheet National Strategy for Counterterrorism
The White House
June 29, 2011
“As a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been done.”
–President Barack Obama
May 1, 2011
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, found here, http://defensealt.org/H1dCDG formalizes the approach that President Obama and his Administration have been pursuing and adapting for the past two and half years to prevent terrorist attacks and to deliver devastating blows against al-Qa’ida, including the successful mission to kill Usama bin Laden.
Rather than defining our entire national security policy, this counterterrorism strategy is one part of President Obama’s larger National Security Strategy, which seeks to advance our enduring national security interests, including our security, prosperity, respect for universal values and global cooperation to meet global challenges.
This Strategy builds upon the progress we have made in the decade since 9/11, in partnership with Congress, to build our counterterrorism and homeland security capacity as a nation. It neither represents a wholesale overhaul—nor a wholesale retention—of previous policies and strategies.
Threat—This Strategy recognizes there are numerous nations and groups that support terrorism to oppose U.S. interests, including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and HAMAS, and we will use the full range of our foreign policy tools to protect the United States against these threats.
However, the principal focus of this counterterrorism strategy is the network that poses the most direct and significant threat to the United States—al-Qa’ida, its affiliates and its adherents.
Al-Qa’ida has murdered thousands of our citizens, including on 9/11.
Al-Qa’ida affiliates—groups that have aligned with al-Qa’ida—have attempted to attack us, such as Yemen-based al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) failed attempt to bomb a Detroit-bound airliner on December 25, 2009.
Al-Qa’ida adherents—individuals, sometimes American citizens, who cooperate with or are inspired by al-Qa’ida—have engaged in terrorism, including the tragic slaughter of our service members at Fort Hood in 2009.
Our Ultimate Objective—This Strategy is clear and precise in our ultimate objective: we will disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qa’ida—its leadership core in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, its affiliates and adherents to ensure the security of our citizens and interests.
Our Posture—We are at war. We are waging a broad, sustained, integrated and relentless campaign that harnesses every element of American power to defeat al-Qa’ida.
Our Goals–To defeat al-Qa’ida, we are pursuing specific counterterrorism goals, including:
Our Principles—Our pursuit of these goals is guided by several key principles, including:
Devastating Blows Against Al-Qa’ida—guided by this Strategy, we have achieved significant progress against al-Qa’ida over the past two and a half years.
“On a Path to Defeat”—As President Obama stated in his June 22 remarks on our way forward in Afghanistan, “we have put al Qaeda on a path to defeat, and we will not relent until the job is done.”
Information seized from his compound reveals bin Laden’s concerns about al-Qa’ida’s long-term viability.
Editor’s Comment:
In terms of military means of countering terrorism it has been reported that this Counterterrorism Strategy signals the shift away from large-scale ground interventions in foreign countries and consequently will reduce the requirement for counter-insurgency capabilities in the armed forces. Instead it relies more on special forces assisted by drones to target principals in terrorist organizations.
Time will tell whether COIN is on the way out.
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Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, 19 August 2010.
http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf
Excerpt:
This pamphlet revises the conceptual and operating focus of the Army from major combat operations to that of operational adaptability employing full-spectrum operations under conditions of uncertainty and complexity.
TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 describes how future Army forces conduct operations as part of the joint force to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies in the future operational environment. The pamphlet describes the employment of forces in the 2016-2028 timeframe and identifies capabilities required for future success to guide Army force development efforts.
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Hearing on Achieving National Security through Sustainable Spending, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, National Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 20 July 2010.
This hearing continued the Subcommittee’s oversight of defense spending by examining recent scholarship and policy research on defense budget reform, including the conclusions and recommendations made in a recent report by the Sustainable Defense Task Force, Debt, Deficits, & Defense: A Way Forward, which presents a series of recommendations to reduce the budget of the Department of Defense by $960 billion by 2020.
Witnesses offered perspectives on the Department of Defense’s plan to cut military spending in the context of national security priorities and the current economic environment. The Department of Defense’s budget has accounted for nearly 65 percent of the increase in federal discretionary spending since 2001. Citing the role of defense spending in the overall economic health of the United States, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently called for reductions in defense spending by eliminating wasteful spending and unnecessary weapons systems, and reducing overhead costs at the Pentagon.
To watch a webcast of the hearing, click here: http://defensealt.org/HqvuHX
Witnesses:
* Carl Conetta, Co-Director, Project on Defense Alternatives
* Benjamin Friedman, Research Fellow, Cato Institute
* Todd Harrison, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
* Gary Schmitt, Ph.D., Director, Advanced Strategic Studies, American Enterprise Institute
* Gordon Adams, Ph.D., Distinguished Fellow, Stimson Center
Opening Statement of Chairman John F. Tierney
Prepared Statement of Mr. Carl Conetta
Prepared Statement of Mr. Benjamin Friedman
Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd Harrison
Prepared Statement of Dr. Gary Schmitt
Prepared Statement of Dr. Gordon Adams
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The White House, May 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1005NSS.pdf
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Office of the Secretary of Defense, 06 April 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/2010NPR.pdf
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as delivered by Adm. Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas Wednesday, 03 March 2010.
http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1336
Excerpt:
I’ve come to three conclusions – three principles – about the proper use of modern military forces:
1) … military power should not – maybe cannot – be the last resort of the state. Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools to policymakers. We can, merely by our presence, help alter certain behavior. Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy. We can assist rapidly in disaster-relief efforts, as we did in the aftermath of Haiti’s earthquake. We can help gather intelligence, support reconnaissance and provide security.
And we can do so on little or no notice. That ease of use is critical for deterrence. An expeditionary force that provides immediate, tangible effects. It is also vital when innocent lives are at risk. So yes, the military may be the best and sometimes the first tool; it should never be the only tool.
2) Force should, to the maximum extent possible, be applied in a precise and principled way.
3) Policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another. Some in the military no doubt would prefer political leadership that lays out a specific strategy and then gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the implementation to commanders in the field. But the experience of the last nine years tells us two things: A clear strategy for military operations is essential; and that strategy will have to change as those operations evolve. In other words, success in these types of wars is iterative; it is not decisive.
Editor’s Comment:
Mullen’s first principle is dangerous in the extreme. It is a sad reminder of the militarization of the American state. Mullen suffers from an inexplicable amnesia of the horrors of war in the 20th Century.
America will likely be paying a high price for decades to come in what comes around from the quick and easy resort to war in 2002-2003 by policy-makers enthralled with their military instrument. If war is not a last resort, then policy-makers are abject failures as leaders.
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Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University – As Prepared for Delivery, 18 February 2010.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president-biden-national-defense-university
Excerpt:
Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective. The Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which Secretary Gates released two weeks ago, present a plan to further strengthen our preeminent conventional forces to defend our nation and our allies.
Capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield, conventional warheads with worldwide reach, and others that we are developing enable us to reduce the role of nuclear weapons, as other nuclear powers join us in drawing down. With these modern capabilities, even with deep nuclear reductions, we will remain undeniably strong.
Editor’s Comment:
When Vice President Biden speaks of plans to “further strengthen … preeminent conventional forces” with “capabilities like an adaptive missile defense shield” and “conventional warheads with worldwide reach” he seeks to reassure his domestic audience that nuclear disarmament will not make America less secure. His words, however, do not reassure other nuclear powers or potential future nuclear powers such as Iran who will perceive these enhanced American conventional capabilities as strategic threats to their national security.
Biden surely understands that he is not really offering us a pathway to nuclear abolition. We will not get there if other nations are expected to relinquish their nuclear arsenals to face “undeniable” conventional power from the U.S.
If Biden’s speech truly represents the elaboration of the “President’s Prague Agenda” it leaves us with a very big gap (conceptually and practically) between the near term goal Biden articulates (“We will work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”) and the longer term goal (“We are working both to stop [nuclear weapons] proliferation and eventually to eliminate them.”) which President Obama confirmed in Prague.
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DoD summary prepared for press briefing, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/FY11budgetsummary-dod.pdf
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Office of the Secretary of Defense, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002QDR2010.pdf

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Office of the Secretary of Defense, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/1002BMDR.pdf
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final version as published by InsideDefense.com on 30 January 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/100130qdr2010.pdf
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“pre-decisional” draft dated 03 December 2010 and published by InsideDefense.com on 27 January 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/draftQDR2010.pdf
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Congressional Budget Office, 26 January 2010.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/01-26-Outlook.pdf
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