Max Bergmann. The Wonk Room, 17 March 2010.
http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2010/03/17/air-force-strategists-say-us-should-cut-nukes/

Excerpt:

Noting that during the Cold War “the actual marginal utility of additional forces was quite small,” the authors conclude that a significantly smaller arsenal of nuclear weapons will be more than enough to maintain an effective deterrence and to assure allies without any cost to our security. The article backs the far reaching report from the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which called for reductions of US forces to 500 nuclear weapons by 2025. Forsyth, Saltzman, and Schaub argue that it is possible to go even further.

Roy Gutman. McClatchy Newspapers, 14 March 2010.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/14/90083/weve-met-the-enemy-in-afghanistan.html

Excerpt:

Today, although the United States and more than three dozen NATO allies and other countries are supporting Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the Taliban dominate a growing swath of territory, and their power trumps the government’s in three-quarters of the country.

Although they’re often portrayed as mindless fanatics, the militant Islamists’ “life experience” from their years in the wilderness, their study of American military tactics and their analysis of the Karzai government’s shortcomings have helped reverse their fortunes, U.S. intelligence experts say.

Marc Ambinder. The Atlantic Online, 26 February 2010.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/02/why-the-nuclear-review-is-delayed/36660/

Excerpt:

… the release of the long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review will be delayed well into March because the basic issue — when, and why, the U.S. would use nuclear weapons, remains a contentious subject of debate.

Winslow Wheeler. Straus Military Reform Project, 24 February 2010.

Under the Freedom of Information Act, the Straus Military Reform Project has obtained almost two years of monthly reports from the Defense Contract Management Agency on Lockheed-Martin’s production of the F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter.” The most recent of those reports show deterioration from previous reports in several respects.

The Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) most recent reports cover the months July through November, 2009. These will soon be available at the Straus Military Reform Project website.

Major elements of the July through November reports can be summarized as follows:

The F-35 assembly line at Forth worth is being cannibalized for parts to support flight testing. This may be the first time an assembly line has been cannibalized for parts for such a tiny number of flight test aircraft as Lockheed-Martin has been able to get into the air. See summary of August report below.

Continuing and sometimes deteriorating nature of the delays at Lockheed-Martin’s (L-M) Fort Worth plant refutes the L-M contention that things are getting better and that the F-35 program learned from the past and with new design techniques is avoiding the kinds of problems experienced by “legacy” aircraft programs.

The cause, nature and implications of the “stand down” mentioned in the November report could well be important, but details are redacted in the DCMA reports and the press is yet to uncover the nature of the “stand down.” It is a matter looking for an explanation.

Some details from the reports follow:

July Report: Page 4 talks about a new DCMA estimate to complete System Design and Development, but the numbers are redacted. DCMA calls the L-M estimate “inadequate.” This DCMA estimate is before the Pentagon’s second independent Joint Estimating Team (JET II) estimate was finished and available, and is presumably independent. Most importantly, it clearly was available for SecDef Gates Forth Worth visit in August. Was it briefed to him? If so, why was Gates so positive about the program at that visit; if it was not, is that an example of why the F-35 program manager, General Heinz, was fired: i.e. that troubling information was not getting to Gates on this high visibility program.

Page 4 also mentions without further discussion a “BF-4 STOVL Upper Lift Fan Door incident.” The context is the rising costs of the overall system, but there are no details. Given that the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B is on a short schedule to deployment, is this a problem that will further complicate the schedule for the F-35B?

Page 4 identifies a “Corrective Action Plan” to address “EVMS,” “Earned Value Management system” or the system that LM uses to measure and report execution of the program and its budget. I understand it to be the core method DOD uses to monitor and manage the program. Results of the plan are due to DCMA in August. (The October Report states that the plan was submitted, but no specifics are reported. It is only stated that “a more focused Review will occur in three to five months by the DCMA….” [Page 4 of October Report.]). There has been some reporting on the failure to meet EVMS criteria in the press. The threat to L-M is that it will have to maintain its “certification” to perform EVMS calculations—if it is lost, L-M could end up not legally eligible to be a contractor to the federal government.

August Report: L-M is cannibalizing the production line to provide spare parts for the flight test program (pp. 3 & 4). These cannibalizations are “causing significant workload to supply chain personnel and are disrupting the production line.” There is no further discussion or explanation. This may be the first time a development aircraft’s production line was cannibalized for spares.

September Report: “Execution of the Flight Test Schedule continues to be a significant Program concern.” (Page 3.)

“The volume of major CR’s [Change Requests] is projected to continue.” “…the number of major changes has exceeded projections. Additionally, the impact of timing these changes and the disruption to the floor were not anticipated.” (Page 3.) This would seem to be exactly the kind of thing that L-M promised would not happen: i.e. that they had learned from previous programs and with the benefits of advanced computer design, the F-35 would not have the kinds of design disruptions so common with “legacy” aircraft.

Page 4 addresses another delay issue: ”Wing-at-Mate” problems. These, I understand, have to do with the decision to mate the wing to the fuselage before the wing is “stuffed”. The plan was to mate the completed wing to the fuselage. But, because of delays, L-M decided to add wing components after mating, which – being inefficient — slows things down more.

“Composite production is not meeting the demands of the production operations – composites for the AFT and Empennage assemblies are paced by the availability and quality of composites.” (Page 4.) Again, the modern design feature of composites, said to not just reduce weight (of the over weight aircraft) but to facilitate design and fabrication is proving to be a source of delay and complication.

October Report: Flight test schedule still “a significant Program concern.” “AF-1 continues to be in a maintenance period as of this report, progressing towards taxi tests and first flight.” (Page 3.) This is an example of a problem addressed in earlier DCMA reports: aircraft coming off the production line incomplete and incapable of flight. They are sent to adjacent hangars for post-production production. This pre-first flight “maintenance” would seem to be a misleading misnomer.

Mentions that the program is about to get its “sixth schedule revision.” (Page 3.)

More on the “Wing-at-Mate overlap” which appears to be improving. (Page 3.)

November Report: Due to the need for the sixth schedule revision — coming in early 2010 — “Recent Program summary charts, scorecards, and management briefings do not consistently depict performance to the master schedule baseline.” (Page 3.)

The graph on page 6 shows Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft delivery rate is on average 80 days late. The rate significantly deteriorated in April and stayed at that deteriorated rate. Individual aircraft deliveries are significantly above that: AF-6 will be 92 days late; AF-7 will be 142 days late. A sentence presumably explaining the increased delay was redacted. (Page 6.) This category is rated “red” by DCMA. On the other hand, DCMA confirms public reports that while LRIP 1 & 2 aircraft are months late, the “risk” that LRIP 3 aircraft will be late is rated as “low.”

Suppliers’ Delivery Rate (Page 8.) is also getting worse, now down to about 75% on-time. This category is also rated “red” by DCMA.

The Management Reserve of money is gone, “further straining the financial management of the Program.” Amounts are redacted. Given USATL Carter’s decision to used LRIP production money for SDD, how much of that will go to L-M’s management reserve slush fund, rather than directly to SDD activities?

A section is titled “Maintenance and Quality Verification Stand-Down” immediately followed by several redacted lines. Later the section states “This incident triggered a maintenance and quality verification stand-down to determine systemic root causes for increasing aircraft impoundment and suspension of operations incidents to date.” And later, “The focus areas are Software, Rework/Repairs, System Check Out Procedures (SCOPs) and Aerospace Equipment Instructions (AEIs).” (page 4.) The discussion in the section titled “Improve Software Productivity” refers to “F-35 stand-down events” and explains that a “Joint Process Review” effort to address software issues was “postponed until further notice as it was overcome by F-35 stand down events that took precedence.” (Page 18.)

This “stand down” would appear to have some significance, but has not been reported to the public by L-M or DOD.

Note: for links to the DCMA reports cited here see Winslow Wheeler, Pentagon Reports Document Continuing Lockheed-Martin Failures, Center for Defense Information, 24 February 2010.

Nir Rosen. The Best Defense, 23 February 2010.
http://defensealt.org/HogQCa

Excerpt:

Iraqis on the street are no longer scared of rival militias so much, or of being exterminated and they no longer have as much support for the religious parties. Maliki is still perceived by many to be not very sectarian and not very religious, and more of a “nationalist.” Another thing people would notice if they focused on “the street” is that the militias are finished, the Awakening Groups/SOIs are finished, so violence is limited to assassinations with silencers and sticky bombs and the occasional spectacular terrorist attack — all manageable and not strategically important, even if tragic. Politicians might be talking the sectarian talk but Iraqis have grown very cynical.

DoD summary prepared for press briefing, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/FY11budgetsummary-dod.pdf

Greg Mello. Los Alamos Study Group, 01 February 2010.
http://www.lasg.org/press/2010/press_release_1Feb2010.html

Chris Hellman, National Priorities Project, 29 January 2010.

Sources and Methodology: Much of the information contained here comes from various media accounts or discussions with analysts and congressional staff.

Introduction: The Obama Administration will release its budget request for Fiscal Year 2011 on Monday, February 1. At the same time, the Defense Department is expected to release an additional emergency supplemental funding request to cover the FY 2010 costs of the Afghanistan “surge” not covered by the “Overseas Contingency Operations” funding included in the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326). [See “Funding for Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” below.]

Total “Top Line” Spending: $580 Billion [Function 050] – [NOTE: These totals do not include the cost of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.] Unlike most years, the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2010 budget request did not project Defense Department [Function 051] future year funding. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projected $541.8 billion for Fiscal Year 2011. Previously the Administration had pledged to hold Pentagon spending at $534 billion plus inflation. More recently, however, it has been reported that defense spending will grow by a total of $100 billion, plus inflation, over the next five years. Estimating 2 percent inflation (roughly $11 billion), and adding an additional $10 billion (assuming that the $100 billion in new spending over five years will be weighted toward the “out” years) means a nominal increase of roughly $21 billion, or $555 billion for defense [Function 051]. In addition, OMB projected a further $16.6 billion for nuclear weapons-related activities of the Department of Energy [Function 053] and $7.1 billion for miscellaneous defense activities [Function 054], for a total defense spending level of $579 billion [Function 050].

Funding the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – Prior to Fiscal Year 2010, funding for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were funded outside the annual defense budget through special supplemental appropriations. After taking office the Obama Administration pledged that it would end this practice and, beginning with its FY 2010 budget request, would include funding for ongoing military operations in the annual request. As a result, the FY 2010 request included $130 billion for “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).” Subsequent to that, however, the Administration decided to send “surge” of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. As a result, the Pentagon’s funding request will consist of two parts – a small $30-$35 billion supplemental request for additional FY 2010 funds to cover the cost of the “surge,” and a larger $165 billion request for OCO in FY 2011.

Including the additional funding for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, total defense spending in FY 2011 could exceed $745 billion.

Program Terminations – The Pentagon will again seek to terminate weapons programs that are either under-performing, those for which there is no requirement, or those which don’t fit with the Department’s strategic vision. The Pentagon will not seek additional funding for the C-17 transport aircraft or the second engine source for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), both of which it sought to terminate in FY 2010, but for which Congress appropriated unrequested funds. In addition the Pentagon will reportedly not seek funding for the Navy’s CG(x) cruiser replacement program, or its EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft replacement program.

“Winners” – The Army will invest heavily in helicopters, including the CH-47 “Chinook,” the family of UH-60 “Blackhawks,” and the development of a heavy-lift helicopter. The request will contain funding for the Air Force’s oft-delayed airborne tanker program. Funding will continue to grow for a broad range of unmanned systems, both aerial and ground-based.

Missile Defense: Steady-State at $9 Billion – The FY 2011 request is likely to be at or slightly below current funding levels. In addition, the Pentagon will likely continue efforts to reorient missile defense away from long-range development of a national system, and increase focus on systems at or near operational capability such as the Navy’s program based on the AEGIS system and the Standard-3 missile.

Shipbuilding: Steady State – The Navy will continue to spend roughly $14 billion on shipbuilding. This will include funding for two DDG-51 destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), two “Virginia” class submarines, one “San Antonio” amphibious assault ship and two other ships – possibly an LHA replacement vessel and/or T-AKE supply ships. Development funding will also be included for the “Ohio” ballistic missile submarine replacement program.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Slight Increase – Despite recent Pentagon reports detailing problems with the F-35 aircraft, the Pentagon is continuing its efforts to accelerate the program, although not quite as rapidly as anticipated. While Congress funded 30 aircraft in FY 2010, the Pentagon is requesting 42 aircraft for FY 2011 in its base budget, plus one additional aircraft in the “OCO” accounts. Previous plans had called for funding 48 F-35s in FY 2011.

Gordon Adams. Budget Insight, 29 January 2010.
http://defensealt.org/Hc4g7t

Excerpt:

In the security assistance arena, look for a major assertion of direct DOD responsibility for training and equipping foreign security forces (called the “security sector”) on a global basis, consistent with the budget request forecast above. This might include the creation of new DOD “Security Force Assistance” teams and missions. It might also include an expanded DOD program to advise ministries of defense in other countries. The December 3 QDR draft also proposed that DOD have joint authority with State over State’s own security assistance accounts, though that language may have disappeared in the final version.

John T. Bennett. Defense News, 27 January 2010.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4473825&c=AME&s=TOP

Excerpt:

The new force-shaping model was derived from what the draft report calls the Pentagon’s four defense strategy priorities: “prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the force.” Sources say the priorities are known within the QDR process as “the Four Ps.”

The planning framework is designed to prepare U.S. forces to, according to the review, carry out “a broad, plausible range of several overlapping operations to prevent and deter conflict and, if necessary, to defend the United States, its allies and partners, selected critical infrastructure, and other national interests.”

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 26 January 2010.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0110/012610cdpm1.htm

Excerpt:

“There is no way — no way — that the defense budget will be immune to deficit reduction,” Stan Collender, a former House and Senate Budget committee aide…

Reuters, 21 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60K6QK20100121

Reuters, 20 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60K07I20100121

Excerpt:

The documents, labeled as “draft” and “pre-decisional,” showed continued strong funding for shipbuilding, fighter and electronic warfare aircraft and other weapons programs. They also pointed to continued effort to beef up intelligence programs, unmanned systems, cyber security, and enhanced efforts to counter biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Josh Rogin. The Cable, 20 January 2010.
http://defensealt.org/HiIFt1

Excerpt:

One big chunk of funding at issue is in foreign security assistance, known as the “1206″ account, which could total about $500 million next year. This is money used to do things like military training and joint operations with countries outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Indonesia and Somalia.

Since the military doesn’t have the lead in those countries, the funding should flow through State, right? Well, not in 2011. The president’s budget will keep those funds in the Pentagon’s purse in its Feb. 1 budget release, following a pitched internal battle in which the State Department eventually conceded.

Tony Capaccio. bloomberg.com, 19 January 2009.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a0UQXRzi1Fhc

Excerpt:

Sixteen of 168 planned flights were completed in fiscal 2009, the second year of flight testing, according to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of weapons testing. The program calls for 5,000 sorties to prove the aircraft’s flying capabilities, electronics and software.

The development phase must now be extended by at least one year, to October 2015, according to Gilmore, the former head of the Congressional Budget Office’s defense unit.

George C. Wilson. Government Executive, 19 January 2010.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0110/011910cdam1.htm

Excerpt:

“There ain’t no education in a second kick of a mule.”

for more on the F-35 see: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/gates-calls-for-delay-in-pentagon-purchases-of-lockheed-f-35s-capaccio

Anne Flaherty and Anne Gearan. Los Angeles Times, 13 January 2010.
http://www.startribune.com/templates/Print_This_Story?sid=81277532

Excerpt:

The administration’s Quadrennial Defense Review, the main articulation of U.S. military doctrine, is due to Congress on Feb. 1. Top military commanders were briefed on the document at the Pentagon on Monday and Tuesday. They also received a preview of the administration’s budget plans through 2015.

The four-year review outlines six key mission areas and spells out capabilities and goals the Pentagon wants to develop. The pilotless drones used for surveillance and attack missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan are a priority, with the goals of speeding up the purchase of new Reaper drones and expanding Predator and Reaper drone flights through 2013.

Winslow T. Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information has written a commentary on this report entitled “Just What We Need: More Pentagon Spending” for the Huffington Post, 13 January 2010.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winslow-t-wheeler/just-what-we-need-more-pe_b_422297.html

Tony Capaccio. Business Week, 07 January 2010.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-07/gates-calls-for-delay-in-pentagon-purchases-of-lockheed-f-35s.html

Excerpt:

One recent study agreed with a similar one from a year earlier that predicted a 2 1/2 year delay in development beyond the current target of October 2014 and an added cost of $16.5 billion. The new estimate recommended the Pentagon add $314 million to the five-year plan to beef up testing. Gates did so.

Editor’s Comment:

With Afghan war costs rising and political pressure to reign in the federal deficit mounting Gates needs to reduce the year to year Pentagon procurement budget for big ticket items. Postponing and stringing out the acquisition of major platform buys (such as a new fighter aircraft like the F-35) is one way to get some of those savings without having to take on the much harder political task of canceling programs or cutting structure. Unfortunately such an approach usually makes an acquisition program more costly when production efficiencies of scale are lost as fewer units are manufactured each year over a longer period.

This article says, “More than $2.8 billion that was budgeted earlier to buy the military’s next-generation fighter would instead be used to continue its development.” So it may seem that this decision simply shifts spending from production to development accounts with neutral effect on the Pentagon topline. However the article doesn’t adequately address whether Gates may have been facing increased development costs overlapping ambitious production schedules which would have cost much more in the next five years than had been previously planned. This decision delays the onset of large production costs to the years after 2014.

The Navy has indicated it will need to buy more F/A-18s if the F-35 doesn’t appear when it had previously been promised. But the Navy’s requirement assumes there are no carrier cuts (and associated Naval combat wing cuts) in this period. If there are, it will make those F/A-18s redundant.

And what if five years from now drones are proving themselves to be the combat craft of the future at the very time the F-35 is meant to start appearing in operational units in significant numbers? Maybe then the buy of the next generation manned fighter plane can be in the range of 1200 units instead of the 2400 units in the current plan. Then we could realize real savings in this acquisition program. (for some options on future fighter buys and program savings see: David Axe, “Congressional Budget Office’s Plans to Save the Air Force”, War is Boring, 18 May 2009.)

If five years from now drones play a more central role in air combat power and there are fewer carriers in the fleet the decision to slow the F-35 acquisition program down will prove to be a very practical one.