Roy Gutman. McClatchy Newspapers, 14 March 2010.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/14/90083/weve-met-the-enemy-in-afghanistan.html

Excerpt:

Today, although the United States and more than three dozen NATO allies and other countries are supporting Afghan President Hamid Karzai, the Taliban dominate a growing swath of territory, and their power trumps the government’s in three-quarters of the country.

Although they’re often portrayed as mindless fanatics, the militant Islamists’ “life experience” from their years in the wilderness, their study of American military tactics and their analysis of the Karzai government’s shortcomings have helped reverse their fortunes, U.S. intelligence experts say.

Marc Ambinder. The Atlantic Online, 26 February 2010.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/02/why-the-nuclear-review-is-delayed/36660/

Excerpt:

… the release of the long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review will be delayed well into March because the basic issue — when, and why, the U.S. would use nuclear weapons, remains a contentious subject of debate.

Winslow Wheeler. Straus Military Reform Project, 24 February 2010.

Under the Freedom of Information Act, the Straus Military Reform Project has obtained almost two years of monthly reports from the Defense Contract Management Agency on Lockheed-Martin’s production of the F-35 “Joint Strike Fighter.” The most recent of those reports show deterioration from previous reports in several respects.

The Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) most recent reports cover the months July through November, 2009. These will soon be available at the Straus Military Reform Project website.

Major elements of the July through November reports can be summarized as follows:

The F-35 assembly line at Forth worth is being cannibalized for parts to support flight testing. This may be the first time an assembly line has been cannibalized for parts for such a tiny number of flight test aircraft as Lockheed-Martin has been able to get into the air. See summary of August report below.

Continuing and sometimes deteriorating nature of the delays at Lockheed-Martin’s (L-M) Fort Worth plant refutes the L-M contention that things are getting better and that the F-35 program learned from the past and with new design techniques is avoiding the kinds of problems experienced by “legacy” aircraft programs.

The cause, nature and implications of the “stand down” mentioned in the November report could well be important, but details are redacted in the DCMA reports and the press is yet to uncover the nature of the “stand down.” It is a matter looking for an explanation.

Some details from the reports follow:

July Report: Page 4 talks about a new DCMA estimate to complete System Design and Development, but the numbers are redacted. DCMA calls the L-M estimate “inadequate.” This DCMA estimate is before the Pentagon’s second independent Joint Estimating Team (JET II) estimate was finished and available, and is presumably independent. Most importantly, it clearly was available for SecDef Gates Forth Worth visit in August. Was it briefed to him? If so, why was Gates so positive about the program at that visit; if it was not, is that an example of why the F-35 program manager, General Heinz, was fired: i.e. that troubling information was not getting to Gates on this high visibility program.

Page 4 also mentions without further discussion a “BF-4 STOVL Upper Lift Fan Door incident.” The context is the rising costs of the overall system, but there are no details. Given that the Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) F-35B is on a short schedule to deployment, is this a problem that will further complicate the schedule for the F-35B?

Page 4 identifies a “Corrective Action Plan” to address “EVMS,” “Earned Value Management system” or the system that LM uses to measure and report execution of the program and its budget. I understand it to be the core method DOD uses to monitor and manage the program. Results of the plan are due to DCMA in August. (The October Report states that the plan was submitted, but no specifics are reported. It is only stated that “a more focused Review will occur in three to five months by the DCMA….” [Page 4 of October Report.]). There has been some reporting on the failure to meet EVMS criteria in the press. The threat to L-M is that it will have to maintain its “certification” to perform EVMS calculations—if it is lost, L-M could end up not legally eligible to be a contractor to the federal government.

August Report: L-M is cannibalizing the production line to provide spare parts for the flight test program (pp. 3 & 4). These cannibalizations are “causing significant workload to supply chain personnel and are disrupting the production line.” There is no further discussion or explanation. This may be the first time a development aircraft’s production line was cannibalized for spares.

September Report: “Execution of the Flight Test Schedule continues to be a significant Program concern.” (Page 3.)

“The volume of major CR’s [Change Requests] is projected to continue.” “…the number of major changes has exceeded projections. Additionally, the impact of timing these changes and the disruption to the floor were not anticipated.” (Page 3.) This would seem to be exactly the kind of thing that L-M promised would not happen: i.e. that they had learned from previous programs and with the benefits of advanced computer design, the F-35 would not have the kinds of design disruptions so common with “legacy” aircraft.

Page 4 addresses another delay issue: ”Wing-at-Mate” problems. These, I understand, have to do with the decision to mate the wing to the fuselage before the wing is “stuffed”. The plan was to mate the completed wing to the fuselage. But, because of delays, L-M decided to add wing components after mating, which – being inefficient — slows things down more.

“Composite production is not meeting the demands of the production operations – composites for the AFT and Empennage assemblies are paced by the availability and quality of composites.” (Page 4.) Again, the modern design feature of composites, said to not just reduce weight (of the over weight aircraft) but to facilitate design and fabrication is proving to be a source of delay and complication.

October Report: Flight test schedule still “a significant Program concern.” “AF-1 continues to be in a maintenance period as of this report, progressing towards taxi tests and first flight.” (Page 3.) This is an example of a problem addressed in earlier DCMA reports: aircraft coming off the production line incomplete and incapable of flight. They are sent to adjacent hangars for post-production production. This pre-first flight “maintenance” would seem to be a misleading misnomer.

Mentions that the program is about to get its “sixth schedule revision.” (Page 3.)

More on the “Wing-at-Mate overlap” which appears to be improving. (Page 3.)

November Report: Due to the need for the sixth schedule revision — coming in early 2010 — “Recent Program summary charts, scorecards, and management briefings do not consistently depict performance to the master schedule baseline.” (Page 3.)

The graph on page 6 shows Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft delivery rate is on average 80 days late. The rate significantly deteriorated in April and stayed at that deteriorated rate. Individual aircraft deliveries are significantly above that: AF-6 will be 92 days late; AF-7 will be 142 days late. A sentence presumably explaining the increased delay was redacted. (Page 6.) This category is rated “red” by DCMA. On the other hand, DCMA confirms public reports that while LRIP 1 & 2 aircraft are months late, the “risk” that LRIP 3 aircraft will be late is rated as “low.”

Suppliers’ Delivery Rate (Page 8.) is also getting worse, now down to about 75% on-time. This category is also rated “red” by DCMA.

The Management Reserve of money is gone, “further straining the financial management of the Program.” Amounts are redacted. Given USATL Carter’s decision to used LRIP production money for SDD, how much of that will go to L-M’s management reserve slush fund, rather than directly to SDD activities?

A section is titled “Maintenance and Quality Verification Stand-Down” immediately followed by several redacted lines. Later the section states “This incident triggered a maintenance and quality verification stand-down to determine systemic root causes for increasing aircraft impoundment and suspension of operations incidents to date.” And later, “The focus areas are Software, Rework/Repairs, System Check Out Procedures (SCOPs) and Aerospace Equipment Instructions (AEIs).” (page 4.) The discussion in the section titled “Improve Software Productivity” refers to “F-35 stand-down events” and explains that a “Joint Process Review” effort to address software issues was “postponed until further notice as it was overcome by F-35 stand down events that took precedence.” (Page 18.)

This “stand down” would appear to have some significance, but has not been reported to the public by L-M or DOD.

Note: for links to the DCMA reports cited here see Winslow Wheeler, Pentagon Reports Document Continuing Lockheed-Martin Failures, Center for Defense Information, 24 February 2010.

Nir Rosen. The Best Defense, 23 February 2010.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/23/nir_rosen_stop_the_iraq_madness

Excerpt:

Iraqis on the street are no longer scared of rival militias so much, or of being exterminated and they no longer have as much support for the religious parties. Maliki is still perceived by many to be not very sectarian and not very religious, and more of a “nationalist.” Another thing people would notice if they focused on “the street” is that the militias are finished, the Awakening Groups/SOIs are finished, so violence is limited to assassinations with silencers and sticky bombs and the occasional spectacular terrorist attack — all manageable and not strategically important, even if tragic. Politicians might be talking the sectarian talk but Iraqis have grown very cynical.

DoD summary prepared for press briefing, 01 February 2010. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute website.
http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/FY11budgetsummary-dod.pdf

Greg Mello. Los Alamos Study Group, 01 February 2010.
http://www.lasg.org/press/2010/press_release_1Feb2010.html

Chris Hellman, National Priorities Project, 29 January 2010.

Sources and Methodology: Much of the information contained here comes from various media accounts or discussions with analysts and congressional staff.

Introduction: The Obama Administration will release its budget request for Fiscal Year 2011 on Monday, February 1. At the same time, the Defense Department is expected to release an additional emergency supplemental funding request to cover the FY 2010 costs of the Afghanistan “surge” not covered by the “Overseas Contingency Operations” funding included in the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326). [See “Funding for Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan” below.]

Total “Top Line” Spending: $580 Billion [Function 050] – [NOTE: These totals do not include the cost of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.] Unlike most years, the Pentagon’s Fiscal Year 2010 budget request did not project Defense Department [Function 051] future year funding. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projected $541.8 billion for Fiscal Year 2011. Previously the Administration had pledged to hold Pentagon spending at $534 billion plus inflation. More recently, however, it has been reported that defense spending will grow by a total of $100 billion, plus inflation, over the next five years. Estimating 2 percent inflation (roughly $11 billion), and adding an additional $10 billion (assuming that the $100 billion in new spending over five years will be weighted toward the “out” years) means a nominal increase of roughly $21 billion, or $555 billion for defense [Function 051]. In addition, OMB projected a further $16.6 billion for nuclear weapons-related activities of the Department of Energy [Function 053] and $7.1 billion for miscellaneous defense activities [Function 054], for a total defense spending level of $579 billion [Function 050].

Funding the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – Prior to Fiscal Year 2010, funding for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were funded outside the annual defense budget through special supplemental appropriations. After taking office the Obama Administration pledged that it would end this practice and, beginning with its FY 2010 budget request, would include funding for ongoing military operations in the annual request. As a result, the FY 2010 request included $130 billion for “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO).” Subsequent to that, however, the Administration decided to send “surge” of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. As a result, the Pentagon’s funding request will consist of two parts – a small $30-$35 billion supplemental request for additional FY 2010 funds to cover the cost of the “surge,” and a larger $165 billion request for OCO in FY 2011.

Including the additional funding for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, total defense spending in FY 2011 could exceed $745 billion.

Program Terminations – The Pentagon will again seek to terminate weapons programs that are either under-performing, those for which there is no requirement, or those which don’t fit with the Department’s strategic vision. The Pentagon will not seek additional funding for the C-17 transport aircraft or the second engine source for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), both of which it sought to terminate in FY 2010, but for which Congress appropriated unrequested funds. In addition the Pentagon will reportedly not seek funding for the Navy’s CG(x) cruiser replacement program, or its EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft replacement program.

“Winners” – The Army will invest heavily in helicopters, including the CH-47 “Chinook,” the family of UH-60 “Blackhawks,” and the development of a heavy-lift helicopter. The request will contain funding for the Air Force’s oft-delayed airborne tanker program. Funding will continue to grow for a broad range of unmanned systems, both aerial and ground-based.

Missile Defense: Steady-State at $9 Billion – The FY 2011 request is likely to be at or slightly below current funding levels. In addition, the Pentagon will likely continue efforts to reorient missile defense away from long-range development of a national system, and increase focus on systems at or near operational capability such as the Navy’s program based on the AEGIS system and the Standard-3 missile.

Shipbuilding: Steady State – The Navy will continue to spend roughly $14 billion on shipbuilding. This will include funding for two DDG-51 destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), two “Virginia” class submarines, one “San Antonio” amphibious assault ship and two other ships – possibly an LHA replacement vessel and/or T-AKE supply ships. Development funding will also be included for the “Ohio” ballistic missile submarine replacement program.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Slight Increase – Despite recent Pentagon reports detailing problems with the F-35 aircraft, the Pentagon is continuing its efforts to accelerate the program, although not quite as rapidly as anticipated. While Congress funded 30 aircraft in FY 2010, the Pentagon is requesting 42 aircraft for FY 2011 in its base budget, plus one additional aircraft in the “OCO” accounts. Previous plans had called for funding 48 F-35s in FY 2011.

Gordon Adams. Budget Insight, 29 January 2010.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/01/29/eyes-on-the-budget-anticipating-the-february-1-documents/

Excerpt:

In the security assistance arena, look for a major assertion of direct DOD responsibility for training and equipping foreign security forces (called the “security sector”) on a global basis, consistent with the budget request forecast above. This might include the creation of new DOD “Security Force Assistance” teams and missions. It might also include an expanded DOD program to advise ministries of defense in other countries. The December 3 QDR draft also proposed that DOD have joint authority with State over State’s own security assistance accounts, though that language may have disappeared in the final version.

John T. Bennett. Defense News, 27 January 2010.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4473825&c=AME&s=TOP

Excerpt:

The new force-shaping model was derived from what the draft report calls the Pentagon’s four defense strategy priorities: “prevail in today’s wars; prevent and deter conflict; prepare to succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and preserve and enhance the force.” Sources say the priorities are known within the QDR process as “the Four Ps.”

The planning framework is designed to prepare U.S. forces to, according to the review, carry out “a broad, plausible range of several overlapping operations to prevent and deter conflict and, if necessary, to defend the United States, its allies and partners, selected critical infrastructure, and other national interests.”

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 26 January 2010.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0110/012610cdpm1.htm

Excerpt:

“There is no way — no way — that the defense budget will be immune to deficit reduction,” Stan Collender, a former House and Senate Budget committee aide…

Reuters, 21 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60K6QK20100121

Reuters, 20 January 2010.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60K07I20100121

Excerpt:

The documents, labeled as “draft” and “pre-decisional,” showed continued strong funding for shipbuilding, fighter and electronic warfare aircraft and other weapons programs. They also pointed to continued effort to beef up intelligence programs, unmanned systems, cyber security, and enhanced efforts to counter biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

Josh Rogin. The Cable, 20 January 2010.
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/01/20/pentagon_defeats_state_in_turf_war_round_one

Excerpt:

One big chunk of funding at issue is in foreign security assistance, known as the “1206″ account, which could total about $500 million next year. This is money used to do things like military training and joint operations with countries outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Indonesia and Somalia.

Since the military doesn’t have the lead in those countries, the funding should flow through State, right? Well, not in 2011. The president’s budget will keep those funds in the Pentagon’s purse in its Feb. 1 budget release, following a pitched internal battle in which the State Department eventually conceded.

Tony Capaccio. bloomberg.com, 19 January 2009.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a0UQXRzi1Fhc

Excerpt:

Sixteen of 168 planned flights were completed in fiscal 2009, the second year of flight testing, according to Michael Gilmore, the Pentagon’s director of weapons testing. The program calls for 5,000 sorties to prove the aircraft’s flying capabilities, electronics and software.

The development phase must now be extended by at least one year, to October 2015, according to Gilmore, the former head of the Congressional Budget Office’s defense unit.

George C. Wilson. Government Executive, 19 January 2010.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0110/011910cdam1.htm

Excerpt:

“There ain’t no education in a second kick of a mule.”

for more on the F-35 see: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/gates-calls-for-delay-in-pentagon-purchases-of-lockheed-f-35s-capaccio

Anne Flaherty and Anne Gearan. Los Angeles Times, 13 January 2010.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/politics/wire/sns-ap-us-obama-war-funding,0,3486465.story

Excerpt:

The administration’s Quadrennial Defense Review, the main articulation of U.S. military doctrine, is due to Congress on Feb. 1. Top military commanders were briefed on the document at the Pentagon on Monday and Tuesday. They also received a preview of the administration’s budget plans through 2015.

The four-year review outlines six key mission areas and spells out capabilities and goals the Pentagon wants to develop. The pilotless drones used for surveillance and attack missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan are a priority, with the goals of speeding up the purchase of new Reaper drones and expanding Predator and Reaper drone flights through 2013.

Winslow T. Wheeler, Director, Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information has written a commentary on this report entitled “Just What We Need: More Pentagon Spending” for the Huffington Post, 13 January 2010.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winslow-t-wheeler/just-what-we-need-more-pe_b_422297.html

Tony Capaccio. Business Week, 07 January 2010.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-07/gates-calls-for-delay-in-pentagon-purchases-of-lockheed-f-35s.html

Excerpt:

One recent study agreed with a similar one from a year earlier that predicted a 2 1/2 year delay in development beyond the current target of October 2014 and an added cost of $16.5 billion. The new estimate recommended the Pentagon add $314 million to the five-year plan to beef up testing. Gates did so.

Editor’s Comment:

With Afghan war costs rising and political pressure to reign in the federal deficit mounting Gates needs to reduce the year to year Pentagon procurement budget for big ticket items. Postponing and stringing out the acquisition of major platform buys (such as a new fighter aircraft like the F-35) is one way to get some of those savings without having to take on the much harder political task of canceling programs or cutting structure. Unfortunately such an approach usually makes an acquisition program more costly when production efficiencies of scale are lost as fewer units are manufactured each year over a longer period.

This article says, “More than $2.8 billion that was budgeted earlier to buy the military’s next-generation fighter would instead be used to continue its development.” So it may seem that this decision simply shifts spending from production to development accounts with neutral effect on the Pentagon topline. However the article doesn’t adequately address whether Gates may have been facing increased development costs overlapping ambitious production schedules which would have cost much more in the next five years than had been previously planned. This decision delays the onset of large production costs to the years after 2014.

The Navy has indicated it will need to buy more F/A-18s if the F-35 doesn’t appear when it had previously been promised. But the Navy’s requirement assumes there are no carrier cuts (and associated Naval combat wing cuts) in this period. If there are, it will make those F/A-18s redundant.

And what if five years from now drones are proving themselves to be the combat craft of the future at the very time the F-35 is meant to start appearing in operational units in significant numbers? Maybe then the buy of the next generation manned fighter plane can be in the range of 1200 units instead of the 2400 units in the current plan. Then we could realize real savings in this acquisition program. (for some options on future fighter buys and program savings see: David Axe, “Congressional Budget Office’s Plans to Save the Air Force”, War is Boring, 18 May 2009.)

If five years from now drones play a more central role in air combat power and there are fewer carriers in the fleet the decision to slow the F-35 acquisition program down will prove to be a very practical one.

Paul Richter. Los Angeles Times, 04 January 2010.
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/04/nation/la-na-obama-nuclear4-2010jan04

Excerpt:

A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms.

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 14 December 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/12/14/gates-picks-perry-for-qdr-panel/

Excerpt:

Rep. Ike Skelton, chair­man of the House Armed Services Committee, announced his selec­tions for the QDR panel today. Skelton named one of the Army’s most inno­v­a­tive thinkers, retired gen­eral Robert Scales, and for­mer Air Force his­to­rian Richard Kohn to the inde­pen­dent panel on the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Rep. Buck McKeon, rank­ing mem­ber of the HASC, announced his picks for the QDR panel last week: Jim Talent, the Missouri Republican who served in the House and Senate until 2006 and Eric Edelman, for­mer under­sec­re­tary of defense for pol­icy from 2005 until January 2009.

Loren B. Thompson. Lexington Institute, 14 December 2009.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/budget-moves-buoy-defense-industry

Excerpt:

First, even before President Obama decided to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, the administration had already decided to spend more on overseas contingencies in 2011 that the $130 billion it planned to spend in 2010. Second, Jason Sherman of insidedefense.com reported this month that the White House will support increasing the regular defense budget (not including overseas contingencies) by $14 billion above what was planned for 2011, meaning it will rise from the $542 billion forecast in May to $556 billion. Third, Vago Muradian of Defense News reported this weekend that total increases above the May plan for the regular defense budget across the 2011-2015 spending period will reach $100 billion.

Editor’s Comment:

Looks as if the Obama administration’s plan to reduce Federal expenditures on war (contingency) operations and to hold increases in the base Pentagon budget to dollar inflation have come unraveled at less than a year into the budgeting plan and the administration. It is a shame, because it is so unnecessary.

Sheryl Gay Stolberg. New York Times, 12 December 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/politics/13obey.html

Excerpt:

“It is stunning,” he remembers telling Mr. Obama, “to listen to Johnson talk to Dick Russell, the conservative old wise head in the Senate from Georgia — it is terrible, gut-wrenching to listen to them both say, ‘Well, we know this is damn near a fool’s errand, but we don’t have any choice.’ ”

Rick Maze. Defense News, 10 December 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4414781&c=AME&s=TOP

Excerpt:

The former lawmaker is Jim Talent, a Missouri Republican who served in the House and Senate until he lost a 2006 re-election bid. He was an adviser to the presidential campaign of former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney.

The former Bush administration official picked by McKeon is Eric Edelman, who, as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2005 until January 2009, had responsibilities in areas including bilateral relations, war planning, missile defense and special forces issues.

Christi Parsons and Julian E. Barnes. Los Angeles Times, 23 November 2009.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-na-troop-costs23-2009nov23,0,3233273.story

Excerpt:

…in a memo early this month, obtained by The Times‘ Washington bureau, the Pentagon’s own comptroller produced an estimate that broke with the customary Defense formula and did include construction and equipment.

That memo said the yearly cost of a 40,000-troop increase would be $30 billion to $35 billion — at least $750,000 a person. An increase of 20,000 would cost $20 billion to $25 billion annually, it said — a per-soldier cost equal to or greater than the White House estimate.

Jason Sherman. Inside Defense, 18 November 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=11182009_nov18b

Excerpt:

Most of the adjustments directed would make changes on the margins of the service investment plans… The review by the Pentagon’s comptroller shop has not yielded any decisions to terminate any major weapons programs, sources said.

Roxana Tiron. The Hill, 18 November 2009.
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/68515-pentagon-budget-drop-anticipated

Excerpt:

CBO also projects that carrying out the Pentagon’s plans in its 2010 budget request — excluding overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere — would require defense resources averaging $567 billion annually (in constant 2010 dollars) from 2011 to 2028. That amount is about 6 percent more than the $534 billion the Obama administration requested for the 2010 budget, excluding overseas contingency funds, according to Goldberg.

Reasons why more resources would be required in the long run include the likelihood of growing military pay and benefits; a projected increase in the cost of operating and maintaining aging equipment as well as newer and more complex systems; plans to develop advanced weapons systems to replace aging ones; and investments in advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems to meet emerging security threats.

John Byrne. 70news.com, 18 November 2009.
http://www.70news.com/2009/11/18/gen-wesley-clark-calls-for-exit-from-afghanistan/

Excerpt:

You’ve got to “figure out where you’re going,” Clark told the House Armed Services subcommittee on oversight and investigations. “How do we get out of here? Because our presence long term there is not a good thing. We’re playing into the hands of people who don’t like foreigners in a country that’s not tolerant of diversity. And that’s not going to change.”

Editor’s Comment:

“If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.” ~ Lewis Carroll. (English Logician, Mathematician, Photographer and Novelist, especially remembered for Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 1832-1898)

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 18 November 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/68174/army-data-shows-contraints-on-troop-increase-potential

Excerpt:

[Lawrence] Korb … said a more realistic troop increase for Afghanistan would be 10,000 soldiers until the drawdown of troops from Iraq “begins in earnest.” There are currently 120,000 U.S. troops remaining in Iraq, almost twice the total in Afghanistan, though Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, told Congress in September that he plans to reduce that total to around 50,000 by August 30, 2010. Alternatively, Korb said, Obama could speed up the pace of redeployment out of Iraq in order to relieve the stress on the force… But under current Pentagon policy, soldiers would still need to receive at least 12 months of recuperation time back in the U.S. before potential assignment in Afghanistan.

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 17 November 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/17/qdr-panel-stalls-loses-warner/

Excerpt:

House-Senate conferees added eight members to the QDR panel that will be picked by congressional defense committee leaders and it looks as if Warner was uncomfortable with the additions… Mackenzie Eaglen at the conservative Heritage Institute led the push for a panel to keep its eye on the QDR — the law establishing the QDR requires such a panel but it has sometimes been ignored in the past.

Christopher Drew. New York Times, 14 November 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/us/politics/15cost.html

Excerpt:

…even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.

Steve Hynd. News Hoggers, 12 November 2009.
http://www.newshoggers.com/blog/2009/11/obama-to-ask-for-greater-chinese-involvement-in-afghanistan.html

David Rogers. Politico, 10 November 2009.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1109/29357.html

Excerpts:

Under almost all scenarios before Obama, billions more than the contingency funds requested in his 2010 budget will be needed…

Most estimates of how much more the Pentagon may need now run in the range of $30 billion to $40 billion.

Yaroslav Trofimov. Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2009.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125686434305817635.html

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 29 October 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/65640/historically-unimportant-intelligence-board-may-actually-become-important

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 28 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/102809cdpm1.htm

Karen DeYoung. Washington Post, 27 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102603394.html

For the fulltext and a key excerpt from Matthew P. Hoh’s resignation letter see http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/resignation-letter-of-matthew-p-hoh.

Rebecca Williams. Budget Insight, 23 October 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/23/timeline-and-associated-costs-for-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-iraq/

for CBO report see:
http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/withdrawal-of-u-s-forces-from-iraq-possible-timelines-and-estimated-costs

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 23 October 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/10/23/hill-aides-call-for-jsf-restructure/

Steve Hynd. News Hoggers, 22 October 2009.
http://www.newshoggers.com/blog/2009/10/mixed-signals-from-pentagon-president-on-iraq-withdrawal.html

Sandra I. Erwin. National Defense Magazine, November 2009.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/November/Pages/ContractorsShouldNotPanicOverProgramCuts.aspx

Christopher J. Castelli. Inside Defense, 15 October 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=PENTAGON-25-41-8&f=defense_2002.ask

…another provision (section 2822), which originated with Senate authorizers, calls for a new annual Pentagon report on global defense posture realignment and an update on an interagency review. The first annual report would be due to Congress early next year with the submission of the FY-11 budget request. It would discuss the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy as well as the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations.

Jon Ward. Washington Times, 15 October 2009.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/15/obama-weighs-more-than-afghan-troop-buildup//print/

Syed Saleem Shahzad. Asia Times, 15 October 2009.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 14 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/101409cdpm1.htm

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 09 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/100909cdpm2.htm

Sebastian Sprenger. Inside Defense, 09 October 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=1092009_oct9b&f=defense_2002.ask

Excerpt:

The area of information operations also showed much need for improvement during the war game, officials have said. “We saw in the game that our forces will often be operating in areas with multiple competing narratives at play,” Davenport said today. “In the war game, red was often able to maintain the initiative in the battle of the narrative, forcing blue to be largely reactive,” he added.

Galrahn. Information Dissemination, 09 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/fiscal-year-2010-budget-final.html

Inside Defense reports on 08 October 2009 that the Congressional Conference Agreement provides for Congress to appoint eight members to the mandated QDR Independent Panel (see panel charter). This will bring the total number of panelists to twenty.

Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Washington Post, 08 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100704088.html

Eli Lake. Washington Times, 02 October 2009.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/02/president-obama-has-reaffirmed-a-4-decade-old-secr/

Excerpt:

President Obama has reaffirmed a 4-decade-old secret understanding that has allowed Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to international inspections.

Israel had been nervous that Mr. Obama would not continue the 1969 understanding because of his strong support for nonproliferation and priority on preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Gina Cavallaro and Kris Osborn. Defense News, 01 Oct 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=LAN&s=TOP&i=4304167

Fawzia Sheikh. Inside Defense, 29 September 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=9292009_sept29c&f=defense_2002.ask

Excerpt:

…the South Korean air force will maintain a combined headquarters with American forces; this headquarters will be led by U.S. 7th Air Force and report to the head of the ROK military, Sharp added. In this case, the United States is taking the lead because it offers strong air power, which must be fused with the necessary intelligence collection of North Korean activities, he said, adding that in the event of war on the peninsula the air component would “take out the long-range artillery” of the northern adversary and support ground troops as they move north “for the complete destruction of the North Korean military.”

Vago Muradian and Kris Osborn. Defense News, 28 September 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4296905&c=FEA&s=CVS

Katherine McIntire Peters. Government Executive, 28 September 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=43682&dcn=todaysnews

Information Dissemination, 23 September 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/09/latest-fy-2011-navy-plan-rumor.html

Tony Capaccio. Bloomberg, 23 September 2009.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aNMlnU1TAETo

Glenn Kessler. Washington Post, 19 September 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/18/AR2009091803739.html

Stephen Abott. Budget Insight, 16 September 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/09/16/top-line-intel-budget-totals-75-billion/

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 16 September 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/16/gates-dismisses-fighter-gap/

Bryant Jordan. DoD Buzz, 16 September 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/16/a-plane-for-all-seasons/

Otto Kreisher. Congress Daily, 16 September 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0909/091609cdam1.htm

John M. Donnelly. Congressional Quarterly Today, 16 September 2009.
http://votersforpeace.us/press/index.php?itemid=2908

as obtained by Foreign Policy, 16 September 2009.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan?page=full

Katherine McIntire Peters. Government Executive, 15 September 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0909/091509kp1.htm

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 15 September 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/15/u-s-air-dominance-eroding/

Rebecca Williams. Budget Insight, 27 August 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/08/27/a-larger-deficit-and-national-security-spending/

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 26 August 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/08/26/osd-considers-chopping-flattop/

Editor’s comment

The Project on Defense Alternatives recommended in 2007 reducing the carrier fleet by two saying “reform along these lines would allow a 9-carrier, 8-wing fleet to surge ‘five plus one’ for crisis response. In 2010, these six carriers, fully utilized and equipped with weapons now being fielded or procured, should be able to strike well over twice as many targets per day as the five that deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom.”

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 26 August 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/08/26/mcchrystal-defines-the-mission/

Pentagon Brief, 26 August 2009.
http://pentagonbrief.blogspot.com/2009/08/dods-program-priorities-making-do.html

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 18 August 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/08/18/qdr-its-over-barring-surprises/

Ellen Krenke. Pentagon Brief, 17 August 2009.
http://pentagonbrief.blogspot.com/2009/08/national-guard-cannot-revert-to.html

Megan Scully. Congress Daily, 17 August 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0809/081709cdpm2.htm

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 17 August 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/08/17/getting-the-army-mix-right/

Megan Scully. Congress Daily, 14 August 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0809/081409cdpm1.htm

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 13 August 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/08/13/health-costs-squeezing-dod-budgets/

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 07 August 2009.