الأرشيف لتصنيف 'تعليق'

الحقيقة، الكذب وأفغانستان: كيف قادة عسكريين وتخذلونا

اللفتنانت كولونيل دانيال لام ديفيس. مجلة القوات المسلحة، فبراير 2012.
http://defensealt.org/zjV1gq

مقتطفات:

انا اول واجهت رفيع المستوى مراوغة خلال 1997 على مستوى الفرقة "التجربة" التي تحولت الى setpiece أكثر بكثير من التجربة. خلال عشاء في فورت هود بولاية تكساس، وقال قادة قيادة التدريب والعقيدة لي أن تجربة المحاربون المتقدم (AWE) قد أظهرت أن "الانقسام الرقمي" مع عدد أقل من الجنود والعتاد وأكثر من ذلك يمكن أن يكون أكثر فعالية بكثير من الانقسامات الحالية. في اليوم التالي، لاحظ وفدنا للموظفين في الكونغرس التظاهرة مباشرة، وأنها لم تستغرق وقتا طويلا لتحقيق وجود مادة القليل لهذه المزاعم. وقد أجريت فعلا في الواقع لا التجريب المشروعة. وكانت جميع المعلمات كتابتها بعناية. وكان كل تسلسل الأحداث محتومة والنتائج. كان AWE ببساطة عرضا مكلفة، وتصاغ في لغة التجارب العلمية، وقدم في بيانات صحفية متوهجة والتصريحات العلنية، وتهدف إلى إقناع الكونغرس لتمويل تفضيل الجيش.

... عندما يتعين عليها اتخاذ قرار سواء لمواصلة الحرب، وتغيير أهدافها أو لإغلاق وهي الحملة التي لا يمكن تحقيق النصر بسعر مقبول، قادتنا كبار التزاما اقول الكونغرس والشعب الأمريكي الحقيقة بدون تزويق، والسماح للشعب يقرر ما مسار العمل في الاختيار. وهذا هو جوهر السيطرة المدنية على الجيش. الشعب الأميركي يستحق أفضل من ما قد حصلت من قادتهم العسكريين كبير على مدى عدد من السنوات الماضية. وببساطة نقول الحقيقة قد تكون بداية جيدة.

استعادة التوازن لدينا: استراتيجية البنتاغون العسكرية الجديد يأخذ خطوة صغيرة

كريستوفر بريبل وفارس تشارلز. هافينغتون بوست، 20 يناير 2012.
http://defensealt.org/ysCbHQ

مقتطفات:

التوازن يعتمد على ما أنت واقف على. مع الاحترام لأمننا الجسدي، لقد أنعم الله على الولايات المتحدة مع السلام القارية وندرة من الأعداء الأقوياء. جيشنا هو أفضل مدرب، أفضل بقيادة الولايات المتحدة، وأفضل تجهيزا في العالم. فمن مواردنا المالية غير مستقرة واقتصادنا الراكد التي تجعلنا عرضة للتعثر.

لسوء الحظ، فإن استراتيجية جديدة لا نقدر تماما نقاط القوة لدينا، كما أنه لا يعالج بشكل كامل نقاط ضعفنا. في النهاية، إلا أنه لا تحقيق التوازن أيزنهاور المتبجح.

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عزل ليس الكل انه متصدع ليصل الى

DefenseTracker.com، 18 يناير 2012.
http://defensetracker.com/web/؟p=1681

مقتطفات:

جزء من هستيريا "يوم القيامة آلية" نشر من قبل وزير الدفاع بانيتا، ورفيقه في حروب الميزانية، تسونغ. باك مكيون، كانت تلقائية من التخفيضات، في لوحات عبر تنحية أن يفرض على ميزانية الدفاع في كانون الثاني المقبل، في حال المرجح أن أعرج الكونجرس بطة وخليفتها العام المقبل على حد سواء أن تكون مختلة مثل علبة حمراء والديدان الزرقاء لدينا الآن. (أما الجزء الآخر من هذه الهستيريا هو "الرعب" من العودة إلى مستويات عام 2007 من ميزانية قاعدة الانفاق الدفاعي.)

يبدو أن الرئيس لديه السلطة القانونية القائمة لتعديل آلية تنحية ولكن ليس من كمية الخفض المطلوب.

لا حاجة للاسلحة النووية كل هذه

فيليب توبمان. نيويورك تايمز، 08 يناير 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/reducing-the-nuclear-arsenal.html

مقتطفات:

إذا كان الرئيس يضغط ضد المدافعين عن النظام القديم في وزارة الدفاع وحصون أخرى من الكهنوت النووي، وانه يمكن الحفاظ على الأمن الأميركي في حين جعل الولايات المتحدة رائدة أكثر مصداقية على واحدة من قضايا اليوم الأكثر أهمية - احتواء انتشار الأسلحة النووية الأسلحة. مثل سلسلة المدخن سؤال الآخرين على التخلي عن السجائر، والولايات المتحدة، مع ترسانتها المتضخمة، تبدو منافقة عندما تضغط على الدول الأخرى لخفض الأسلحة، ووقف إنتاج قنبلة يورانيوم عالي التخصيب ...

متعلق:

دفاع الصفحة مراجعة استراتيجية المناقشة النووية

هو ليون بانيتا الرجل المناسب ليكون وزير الدفاع؟

وينسلو ويلر. TIME Battleland، 13 ديسمبر، 2011.

مقتطفات:

دون ادراج الانفاق على الحرب، وميزانية وزارة الدفاع قاعدة تحت عنوان "آلية يوم القيامة" لم يعد في القريب أو في مرحلة ما بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية عالية، لكنها أيضا ليست بالقرب من أي من أدنى مستوياتها التاريخية. في الحقيقة، هو ما يقرب من 38 مليار دولار فوق الإنفاق السنوي خلال فترة الحرب الباردة ...

ألف عربة للموازنة في الخارج؟

ستيفن والت م. السياسة الخارجية، 01 ديسمبر، 2011.
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/01/a_bandwagon_for_offshore_balancing~~V

مقتطفات:

... موازنة البحرية هي الاستراتيجية الصحيحة حتى عندما يكون لدينا هي خزائن كامل، بشرط أن لا تهدد المنافسين النظير للهيمنة على المناطق الاستراتيجية الرئيسية. حتى في أوقات جيدة، وأنه من غير المنطقي أن يتحملوا أعباء لا لزوم لها أو السماح للحلفاء على الركوب مجانا على رغبة العم سام المتغطرسة بأن تكون "أمة لا غنى عنه" في كل ركن من العالم. وبعبارة أخرى، تحقيق التوازن في الخارج ليست مجرد استراتيجية للالأوقات الصعبة، بل هو أيضا أفضل استراتيجية متاحة في العالم، حيث الولايات المتحدة هي أقوى قوة، عرضة لتحريك العداء لا لزوم لها، وعرضة للالانجرار الى حروب لا داعي لها.

المطلعون: الولايات المتحدة يجب أن تبدأ "المحور" لآسيا عن طريق الدبلوماسية وليس خطوات عسكرية

سارة Sorcher. مجلة ناشونال جورنال، 29 نوفمبر 2011.

مقتطفات:

أعلن الرئيس أوباما في الآونة الأخيرة خطوات لتعزيز بنية السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية مع التركيز الجديد على المحيط الهادئ، بما في ذلك خطط لنشر 2500 جندي الى قاعدة في أستراليا للجميع في حين أن الإصرار على أن أي تخفيضات في الانفاق الدفاعي الولايات المتحدة لن يأتي على حساب من الأولويات في منطقة آسيا والمحيط الهادئ. وقال 39 في المئة من المطلعين حتى مثل كثيرين في واشنطن بحذر عين الصين التحديث السريع للمؤسسة العسكرية وتوسيع الوجود البحري في المحيط الهادئ، والخطوة التالية هي تحسين الاشتباك الأميركي مع بكين مع تجنب أي خطوات عسكرية ذات الصلة.

التاريخ يبين خطر لتخفيض نفقات الدفاع التعسفي

بولا ج. ثورنهيل. سي إن إن، 23 نوفمبر 2011.
http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/23/opinion/thornhill-defense-cuts/index.html

مقتطفات:

قيادة البلاد في حاجة إلى خطة بديلة بحيث يكون افتراض بطولي - أو الأمل - حول استبعاد من الحروب في المستقبل لا يؤدي دون قصد إلى كارثة استراتيجية. هذا هو أصعب مما يبدو. وخطة بديلة تسمح بمزيد من المرونة لتلبية ما يمكن ان تذهب الخطأ في البيئة الاستراتيجية بدلا من مجرد جعل التخفيضات في الميزانية.

المحرر التعليق:

خطة B هو الحفاظ على حسن "الاحتياطي الاستراتيجي". كما المحافظين الجدد أود أن أشير إلى أن الولايات المتحدة تنفق 4.5٪ فقط من ناتجها المحلي الإجمالي على قوتها العسكرية. إذا التهديدات الجديدة قرصة، يمكن للولايات المتحدة المنحدر بسهولة الإنفاق والمشاركة فيها كبيرة لا تزال القاعدة الصناعية والمعرفة. مشكلة هذا البلد يواجه مع استراتيجية إعادة هو غياب الإرادة السياسية. القادة المدنيين وترغب في ان تطلب من الشعب الأمريكي للتضحية. والحرس الوطني القوي وقوة الاحتياط التي لا يساء استخدامها من قبل انتشار قوات باستمرار الى حروب لا داعي لها، وتوقع المجتمعية لدفع ضريبة إضافية في أوقات الطوارئ الوطنية هي أسس ما هذا البلد بحاجة إلى أن تكون مستعدة من الناحية الاستراتيجية مع الحفاظ على السلم الدائمة صغير قوة . ويمكن مع مثل هذه الخطة الاستراتيجية أن الولايات المتحدة مشروطة تماما عن أي تهديد.

والحل 1٪ يعطي الخيارات الاستراتيجية في البنتاغون

ماثيو يثرمان. بلومبرغ الحكومة، 21 نوفمبر 2011.
http://defensealt.org/veAUPs

أسطول مقتصد للإنقاذ

مايكل اوهانلون. نيويورك تايمز، 14 نوفمبر 2011.
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/1114_defense_budget_ohanlon.aspx

مقتطفات:

عن طريق الحفاظ على سفينة في الخارج لبضع سنوات، وجود اثنين من طواقم حصة تلك السفينة، وكذلك سفينة تدريب في المنزل، والبحرية ويمكن تحسين كفاءتها نشر من قبل ما يصل الى 40 في المئة للسفينة الواحدة، مع انجاز حوالي ثلاثة وما السفن 1/2 ، في المتوسط، ربما يتطلب خمس سنوات. مع التركيز على المقاتلين البحرية السطحية الكبيرة، وطرادات ومدمرات، يمكن لهذا النهج يسمح نظريا حوالي 60 سفينة (مع أقل قليلا من نصفهم من المنتشرة في الخارج في وقت واحد) للحفاظ على وجود عالمي ان البحرية تقول انها تحتاج، بدلا من 94 السفن انها تسعى في الوقت الراهن.

الجنرال أوديرنو فواصل رمز على الأسلحة لماذا يكلف كثيرا لذلك

لورين تومسون باء. معهد ليكسينجتون، 11 نوفمبر 2011.
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/gen-odierno-breaks-the-code-on-why-weapons-cost-so-much؟a=1&c=1171

مقتطفات:

الجنرال أوديرنو في نوفمبر تشرين الثاني 2 ملاحظات تشير إلى أن يدرك أنه ليس فقط المقاولين الذين يرفع تكلفة برامج. ويخبز في كثير من الأحيان في تجاوز التكاليف في بداية لمطالب الباروك أن نظام اكتساب تفرض على المطورين. هذه المطالب تؤدي إلى التأخير في الجدول الزمني الطويل، وتكاليف وحدة لا يمكن تحمله، وخصائص الأسلحة التي لا تستطيع ان تلبي تطلعات المستولون. والأهم من ذلك أنها تبطئ تقديم أفضل أنظمة قتالية الى قوات مقاتلة.

إسرائيل ضد إيران: رد فعل سلبي الإقليمية

بول روجرز. الديموقراطية المفتوحة، 11 نوفمبر 2011.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/israel-vs-iran-regional-blowback

مقتطفات:

واقع لا مفر منه هو قريب من ذلك من مواجهة ايران ستشتري قريبا ترسانة نووية محدودة. هذا هو لأنه حتى في تفجير محدود من ايران سيخلق ديناميكية جديدة حيث إيران هي في مركز المنطقة في مرحلة ما بعد الهجوم، سيكون لها العديد من الخيارات الجديدة لفرض تكاليف على معارضيها، وسوف تذهب كاملة الخيمة لردع خاصة بها.

إذا كنت تريد السلام، توقف يطالبون الحرب

كيلسي هارتيجان. الديمقراطية ارسنال، 10 نوفمبر 2011.
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2011/11/if-you-want-peace-stop-clamoring-for-war.html

مقتطفات:

إذا رومني يعتقد أنه يمكن أن الفالس إلى المكتب البيضاوي، وإعطاء بعض الخطب وعرة وصعبة وفجأة ايران ستفتح أبوابها لمفتشي الوكالة الدولية، وأيضا، انه في لايقاظا قاسيا.

والبيانات الطنانة المعادية لن يحل الوضع مع ايران. في الواقع، فإن معظم الخبراء ان اقول لكم انها سوف يزيد الأمر سوءا. والتهديدات بعمل عسكري، أو ما هو أسوأ، العمل العسكري الفعلي، ولعب فقط في أيدي المتشددين في إيران ... وإذا كان الوجود العسكري الأميركي على وشك أن تقنع إيران على التعاون، وأود أن يعتقد أنه كان يمكن أن يحدث الآن.

10 العوامل التي قد تؤدي الى حرب مع ايران

برايان فيليبس. AntiWar.com، 9 نوفمبر 2011.
http://original.antiwar.com/bphillips/2011/11/08/10-factors-that-may-lead-to-war-with-iran/~~V

تبحث لخفض ميزانية الدفاع؟ تبدأ QDR.

أبو Muqawama. مركز جديد لأمريكا الأمن، 13 أكتوبر 2011.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/10/looking-trim-defense-budget-start-qdr.html

مقتطفات:

إعلان يوم أمس أن وزارة الدفاع وتشكيل "مجموعة خيارات استراتيجية" لتحديد الأولويات والمخاطر القادمة من 450 مليار دولار في خفض محتمل في الميزانية هو أحدث مثال على التفاهه لمراجعة الدفاع كل أربع سنوات (QDR). ان وثيقة استراتيجية تحدد بالضرورة المخاطر والأولويات، ولكن منذ QDR لا يفعل، وزارة الدفاع لديها على إنشاء فريق جديد كليا يعمل على ان تفعل ذلك.

انظر أيضا: هل QDR "حيلة علاقات عامة" أو جهد مخلص للتوفيق بين موقف والميزانية مع الاستراتيجية؟

إنهاء سياستنا الخارجية العسكري يوفر المال

إيثان بولاك، والسياسة الاقتصادية معهد المدونة، 20 سبتمبر 2011. http://www.epi.org/blog/militaristic-foreign-policy-saves-money/

واحد من الانتقادات المستمرة لخطة الرئيس أوباما المالية هو أن يكون ذلك ضروريا خفض الانفاق على الحرب وفورات. في الأساس، ومكتب الميزانية في الكونغرس يحسب خط الأساس في الدفاع عن جزء من خلال اتخاذ آخرها حرب تكميلية (وتسمى تقنيا عمليات الطوارئ في الخارج، أو OCO) وعلى افتراض أن المبلغ، أخذ التضخم في الاعتبار، وستنفق كل سنة في الأفق المنظور. وهذا يضيف ما يصل الى حوالى 1.73 تريليون دولار على مدى 10 سنوات. اقتراح الرئيس، ومع ذلك، لا يشمل سوى 653 مليار دولار في الإنفاق OCO أكثر من 10 عاما، وذلك لتحقيق وفورات من نحو 1.1 تريليون دولار.

بعض النقاد، ومع ذلك، يزعم أنه لا يمكن أن تحسب هذه الوفورات لأن الأساس OCO البنك المركزي العماني في حد ذاته ليس واقعيا، وبالتالي تحقيق وفورات ليست "حقيقية". على سبيل المثال، لجنة الميزانية الفيدرالية المسؤولة (CRFB) يجادل بأن حساب هذه المدخرات هو "وسيلة للتحايل الميزانية" ان الرئيس يستخدم "لتضخيم مدخراته." ووفقا لهذا النقد، وآخر خط الأساس للنفقات OCO ينبغي أن تستخدم، إما طلب ميزانية الرئيس أو سياسة البنك المركزي العماني لسحب الخيار، التي من شأنها أن تقلل من خط الأساس، وجعل من المستحيل عمليا لتحقيق وفورات في الميزانية من خفض الانفاق على الحرب.

كل الاحترام الواجب للCRFB والنقاد الأخرى، ولكن هذا النقد هو سخيف. الأساس OCO البنك المركزي العماني ليست "غير واقعي"، بدلا من ذلك، لأنها تمثل تكاليف نهج الرئيس بوش في غزو محورها العدواني للسياسة الخارجية تمديدها إلى الأبد. الرئيس أوباما، لحسن الحظ، في عملية محاولة لتغيير نهج أميركا في السياسة الخارجية، وسحب القوات من العراق وأفغانستان، وتتجه نحو نهج أكثر المتعددة الأطراف، والمريض، والدبلوماسية، والأهم من ذلك أقل تكلفة. وعلاوة على ذلك، تقترح الخطة المالية للحد من الانفاق OCO، مما يجعل متأكد من أن تتحقق هذه الوفورات.

مقاربة الرئيس أوباما للسياسة الخارجية يكلف أقل من المال في الرئيس بوش، وتوقعات الميزانية ينبغي أن تعكس تلك المدخرات.

المحرر التعليق:

يجب أن يكون علامة على مدى سوء الأمور بالنسبة للتقدميين أن برنامج التحصين الموسع تحتفل الآن سحابة كبيرة من الدخان من إدارة أوباما ترسل إلى تحويل الانتباه عن التخفيضات في الميزانية الحقيقية، وبوجه خاص، لحماية البنتاغون من مزيد من التخفيضات في معارك المالية . وقد عملت إيثان بولاك لمكتب الإدارة والميزانية، لذلك فهو يدرك بالتأكيد تشويه المحاسبة في صلب التوقعات الأساسية البنك المركزي العماني على أساس القانون الحالي. لا شخص واحد في العالم (بما في ذلك تلك الموجودة في البنك المركزي العماني الذي يعد المرجعية) ويعتقد أن النفقات OCO ستستمر لتمويل الحروب في العراق وأفغانستان في نفس مستوى عام 2011. هذا هو السبب في البنك المركزي العماني لم إلى "سحب خيار السياسة العامة" - لتقدير التكاليف OCO على الأرجح. هذه العملية الأخيرة ليست "سخيفة"، ولا أن الاقتراحات مثل هذه التقديرات أن تكون أساسا للنظر في خطط خفض الميزانية.

يجب أن السيد بولاك نعرف أيضا أن تقديم الرئيس أوباما ميزانية FY12 إلى الكونغرس يحتوي فقط على 50 مليار دولار في السنة لمدة OCO للسنوات المقبلة. الذي هو؟ 118 مليار دولار إلى الأبد أو 50 مليار دولار إلى الأبد؟ لا يمكنك الحصول عليه في كلا الاتجاهين.

البنك المركزي العماني التعادل في أسفل الخيار هو أفضل بالتأكيد عن الميزانية (والعجز
تخفيض) التخطيط الذي إما غير واقعي "نائبا" (التي
هي ببساطة تصرف غير مسؤول الميزانية) أو الأداة الأساسية من البنك المركزي العماني
118 مليار دولار إلى الأبد.

إذا كان الرئيس أوباما يرغب في الإعلان عن خطة لانقاذ ذات مغزى
كميات من OCO وقال انه في حاجة لاعلان انسحاب أسرع من أفغانستان ... ولكن بعد ذلك لا أحد يعتقد حقا انه سيترك
أفغانستان في عام 2014. لذلك هذا هو كل الدخان والمرايا ... والتقدميين ينبغي أن يشعر رهيب حول هذا الموضوع، وليس الاحتفال.

هو مخادع للادعاء بأن البنك المركزي العماني في الأساس OCO على نحو ما هو مسؤولية بوش. بل هو مجرد قطعة أثرية منهجية لكيفية البنك المركزي العماني يقوم خط الأساس.

وكان الرئيس أوباما في تهمة منذ ما يقرب من ثلاث سنوات، ولم ترفع جميع القوات الى الوطن من العراق، وبدأت بالكاد التعادل عليه في أفغانستان. وOCO السنة الجارية من 118 مليار دولار هي مسؤوليته كما هو زائف، نيس من إسقاط إلى الأمام عشر سنوات، وبعد ذلك تدعي وفورات من الانفاق "653000000000 $ ... أكثر من عشر سنوات. واضاف" اذا كان على استعداد حقا لإنهاء الحرب في أفغانستان سرعان ما قد تكون قادرة على خفض هذا OCO الى النصف وتوفير 325 مليار دولار من انخفاض تكاليف الحرب في المستقبل لخفض العجز.

وحتى اضطر الوضع المعقد لهذا العام في الميزانية في الكونغرس انه يده
واصلت لإطعام وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية مع الميزانيات قاعدة أعلى وأعلى من كل عام. لا يوجد أي دليل على أن الرئيس أوباما "تجاه السياسة الخارجية ... [هو] أقل تكلفة" ... ليس بقدر ما تجود عرضت ما يصل الى وزارة الدفاع الامريكية تشعر بالقلق.

يجب علينا ألا نبني سياسة تقدمية في الدخان والمرايا. مثل
السياسة يضر فقط لنا على المدى البعيد.

ويمكن الاطلاع على آخر نقد لهذه الحيلة في الميزانية: http://capitalgainsandgames.com/blog/gordon-adams/2369/how-about-those-defense-savings .

___________________________________________________________

وزارة الدفاع في سؤال $ 64B: "أين هو أن $ 64B؟"

ماثيو يثرمان. الإرادة ومحفظة، 26 يوليو 2011.
http://thewillandthewallet.squarespace.com/blog/2011/7/26/dods-64b-question-where-is-that-64b.html

مقتطفات:

"البنك المركزي العماني قد قال منذ وقت طويل أن تكاليف وزارة الدفاع بما في ذلك برنامج يقلل، في الآونة الأخيرة، تقريرها عن الآثار الطويلة الأجل لعام 2012 من المستقبل برنامج الدفاع سنوات. خلصت إلى أن الدراسة ان "الفرق بين إسقاط البنك المركزي العماني وتقديرات وزارة الدفاع في لFYDP حوالي 2٪، أو حوالي 64 مليار دولار، على مدى فترة خمس سنوات." "

يجب أن بانيتا محاربة أربع حروب: أفغانستان، العراق، ليبيا، والنفايات

التحرير. بوسطن غلوب، 30 يونيو 2011.

عندما يأخذ ليون بانيتا على رأس وزارة الدفاع غدا، وقال انه سيتم مواجهة خيارات صعبة حول الجهود العسكرية الأمريكية في أفغانستان والعراق، وليبيا. بل إلحاحا على قدم المساواة - بل ويحتمل أن تكون أكثر تعقيدا - المشكلة تكمن في ميزانية وزارة الدفاع والإنفاق. وكان وزير المنتهية ولايته روبرت غيتس جيدة في تشدق الحاجة للسيطرة على الانفاق، وأنه لاحظ مؤخرا ان "الولايات المتحدة يجب ان تنفق ما يصل الى الضرورية للدفاع الوطني، ولكن ليس أكثر من قرش واحد'' ولكن ميزانية الوزارة قد ارتفعت خط الأساس. استغرق كل عام منذ أكثر من غيتس - من 450 مليار دولار إلى ما يزيد على 550000000000 بعد أربع سنوات. هذا العام وحده، وزارة الدفاع الامريكية تسعى للحصول على زيادة 3.4 في المئة من الميزانية لعام 2010.

انها ليست فقط في الحروب، وهي تمثل أقل من 30 في المئة من طلب وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية ميزانية ضخمة. في سياق الإنفاق الحكومي الأخرى، وزارة الدفاع هو ضخم جدا. مقابل كل 100 دولار من الإنفاق الحكومي التقديرية، على مدى 30 $ يذهب إلى نفقات الدفاع من غير حرب. في نطاق ساحق، والحاجة إلى أكثر من تخفيضات تدريجية للنظم فشلت ملحة.

غيتس ادعى مؤخرا أن وزارة الدفاع الامريكية قد خفضت بالفعل 300 مليار دولار، ولكن الرياضيات تشير إلى عكس ذلك. وجاءت هذه الاموال من البرامج المقررة بالفعل سيتم إنهاؤها. وبعبارة أخرى تحقيق وفورات في الأولويات العسكرية الأخرى. بعد مشيرا الى ان البحرية معركة الناقل 11 مجموعة كانت مفرطة، ورفض غيتس للقضاء على واحدة واحدة.

وبانيتا حاجة لإلقاء نظرة أكثر انضباطا والنظامية في الميزانية. ليس هناك نقص المشورة من نفوذ مراكز الأبحاث والدراسات المستقلة، بما في ذلك في العام الماضي تقرير فرقة العمل وزير الدفاع المستدامة ، وهي مجموعة من الحزبين يعقدها الممثل بارني فرانك. وتوصياتهم خفض 960 مليار دولار بين عامي 2011 و 2020، إلا إذا كانت وزارة الدفاع الامريكية ستعمل عليها.

تخفيض عدد الأسلحة النووية المنتشرة إلى النصف - إلى 1000 رأس حربي - يتسق مع التركيز على خفض الاسلحة النووية والجهود المبذولة من دعاة الحد من التسلح. وهذه الخطوة وحدها توفر اكثر من 100 مليار دولار على مدى 10 عاما. الحد من القوات التقليدية بواسطة 50000، الذي سيترك 100000 الأفراد الذين يتم نشرهم في أوروبا وآسيا، هي أكثر واقعية هيكل القوة. ان مجرد إلغاء الأنظمة القليلة التي ليست فعالة من حيث التكلفة ولا بد حفظ أكثر من ذلك. وMV-22 اوسبري والاستطلاعية مركبة قتال لمدة طويلة في ورطة، والقصير في قدرة. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، مكتب الميزانية في الكونغرس ومكتب محاسبة الحكومة على حد سواء وقد اقترحت تغييرات على دعم الجهود المبذولة، مثل، وصيانة العرض، والبنية الأساسية، التي يمكن أن تنقذ 100 مليار دولار في العقد المقبل.

ويمكن تحقيق كل هذا دون المساس بالأمن القومي. بانيتا يحتاج إلى ممارسة الضغط على القوى السياسية التي تدعي أي تخفيضات جعل الأمة عرضة لأعداء مختلف. العجز هو خطر أمني أكبر من ذلك بكثير.

للأسف، وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية لا تزال أكبر وكالة فدرالية أن ببساطة لا يمكن ان تمر اختبار مدقق حسابات مستقل، وعندما يتعرضون لإجراءات مسك الدفاتر العادية، فإنه لا يمكن، بأي درجة من الدقة، والإنفاق على المسار الصحيح، والاحتيال، والنفايات، أو التكرار. أعطت لنفسها سبتمبر 2017 موعدا نهائيا لاستعداد "لمراجعة الحسابات.'' هذا ليس قريبا بما فيه الكفاية. بانيتا، الذي، كما الرئيس السابق لمكتب الادارة والموازنة، لديه سمعة كمقاتل صارم للانضباط المالي. وقال انه بحاجة للحصول على منزل في البنتاغون من أجل يوم واحد.

روبرت غيتس إرث مخيب للآمال

ميلفين غودمان. بالتيمور صن، 29 يونيو 2011.

مقتطفات:

في محاضراته الأخيرة، وحذر السيد غيتس ضد أي تجميد في الإنفاق الدفاعي، وترك السيد بانيتا للتعامل مع نظم أسلحة ومهمات عسكرية ان الولايات المتحدة لم تعد قادرة على تحمله. كما أن المدير السابق لمكتب الادارة والميزانية، والسيد بانيتا يفهم من المفترض أن الولايات المتحدة، مع أقل من 25 في المئة من الناتج الاقتصادي في العالم وأكثر من 50 في المئة من النفقات العسكرية في العالم، سوف تضطر إلى تقليص بعض الأسلحة و البعثات. وقد نمت ميزانية الدفاع أكثر من 50 في المئة في السنوات ال 10 الماضية، وتجاوز الآن وتيرة الإنفاق من حقبة الحرب الباردة، بما في ذلك الحروب في كوريا وفيتنام، فضلا عن تراكم زمن السلم من الرئيس رونالد ريغان.

A reexamination of current troop deployments must include the tens of thousands of troops in Europe and Asia more than six decades after the end of World War II; hundreds of bases and facilities the world over; and the excessive willingness to project power in areas such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, where vital national interests are not at stake.

أفغانستان: للحصول على وفورات حقيقية، جعل الانسحاب ريال مدريد

وليام هارتونغ. هافينغتون بوست، 28 يونيو 2011.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-hartung/afghanistan-for-real-savi_b_886241.html

مقتطفات:

There won't be large scale savings from the winding down of the Afghan war until virtually all US forces are withdrawn. Even then there are still likely to be ongoing costs for training, equipping and possibly even paying Afghan security forces, which could cost up to $10 billion or more per year if current rates are maintained. But the vast bulk of the $120 billion per year now being spent on the war will be freed up for other purposes: deficit reduction, or public investments, or some combination of the two.

An end to the Afghan and Iraq wars may also open the way to a more comprehensive public debate on the Pentagon's $550 billion-plus annual base budget — a sum over four times as large as what we spend on the wars. Politically, making real cuts in Pentagon spending during a time of war is a tough sell, even given our current budgetary predicament. But an end to the wars combined with the pressure from the deficit could lead to real cuts in the Pentagon's base budget as well, especially if we adopt a new strategy that forswears major wars of occupation or large-scale insurgency campaigns of the kind our nation has waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we cut the war spending and bring the Pentagon's larger budget into line with reality, then we'll be talking real money.

شرطي أفضل اللاعبين في العالم

جيف جاكوبي. بوسطن غلوب، 22 يونيو 2011.

مقتطفات:

... مع قوة عظمى تأتي مسؤوليات كبيرة، وأحيانا واحدة من تلك المسؤوليات هو تدمير الوحوش: لإنزال الطغاة الذين يقع ضحيتها الأبرياء وتنتهك قواعد الحضارة. إذا الأحياء والمدن بحاجة إلى الشرطة، لأنها تقف على السبب في العالم يفعل أيضا. ومثلما المجرمين المحلية تزدهر عندما الشرطة تنظر في الاتجاه الآخر، ذلك المجرمين على المسرح العالمي.

عالمنا يحتاج الى شرطي. وعما إذا كان معظم الأميركيين شئنا أم أبينا، ولا يصلح إلا على أمة لا غنى عنه لهذا المنصب.

المحرر التعليق:

عندما ثلاثة أرباع الأميركيين يرفضون دور الشرطي العالمي للولايات المتحدة ربما أنهم يفهمون شيئا جوهريا عن الشرطة أن جيف جاكوبي لا. قوة الشرطة دون رقابة من قبل السلطة القضائية وهيئة توجيهية من القانون هو بالتأكيد صيغة للاستبداد.

جاكوبي لن تؤيد الطغيان، ولكن الهوايه ليكون شرطيا عالميا من قبل شاغلي البيت الأبيض الذين يتم انتخابهم من قبل ومسؤولة إلى 10٪ فقط من سكان العالم في اتخاذ قرار بأن تكون الحراسة على الساحة العالمية. نعتبر أن الأميركيين لن يكون حتى في الأسلحة إذا ما كانت الصين أو روسيا أخذت على عاتقها أن تكون لجان الأمن الأهلية العالمية.

لقادة الولايات المتحدة لذلك بكل سرور لتولي هذا الدور لا يؤدي إلا إلى تأخير في اليوم عندما يكون لدينا قادرة على المؤسسات الدولية والقضائية والشرطية. إذا قادتنا محاولة للتفكير حتى بضع سنوات في المستقبل يجب أن يكون واضحا لهم أن ممارسة اليقظة لا يخدم المصالح الأميركية.

[نشرت نسخة من هذا التعليق بمثابة رسالة إلى المحرر في صحيفة بوسطن غلوب، 28 يونيو 2011.]

غير المسحوبة التوازنات في مشروع قانون تفويض الدفاع الوطني FY12

وينسلو ويلر. زائر، 24 مايو 2011.

وسيتم مناقشة مشروع قانون تفويض الدفاع الوطني، والموارد البشرية 1540، من قبل مجلس النواب هذا الاسبوع. مشروع القانون هو نتاج عمل لجنة القوات المسلحة بمجلس النواب (HASC)، برئاسة عضو الكونغرس باك مكيون، R. - كاليفورنيا.

قسم التشغيل والصيانة (العنوان الثالث والأربعون) من مشروع القانون هو واحد من المهم لها أكبر وأكثر. "O & M" ويتناول الدعم والخدمات اللوجستية، والصيانة والتدريب وأشياء أخرى كثيرة اللازمة لتمكين قواتنا المسلحة من العمل بفعالية. وطلب 170800000000 $ من قبل الرئيس أوباما، وزاد أن لجنة من قبل 361 مليون دولار إلى 171100000000 $. ومع ذلك، للوصول إلى هناك ووضعت اللجنة بعض الطرق الالتفافية.

رش في جميع أنحاء O & M اللقب في HASC أضاف تخصص المختلفة (مثال واحد قاصر: 4.0 مليون دولار ل "أنظمة التدريب محاكاة للجيش" [ص 430 من تقرير اللجنة.]). وجاءت كل هذه إلى أكثر بكثير من الشبكة 361 مليون دولار إضافة إلى مشروع القانون. كان على اللجنة وموظفيها للعثور على تعويضات للمساعدة في دفع هذه الأشياء الجيدة تخصيص والإضافات الأخرى.

في السنوات الماضية، وسرد HASC (والقوات المسلحة بمجلس الشيوخ، واللجان الفرعية وزير الدفاع في مجلسي النواب واللجان المخصصات في مجلس الشيوخ) غريب تخفيضات السبر في أقسام التشغيل والصيانة من فواتيرهم - ". الأرصدة غير الملتزم بها" هذه يجب أن تكون التعديلات التقنية لل الأموال المخصصة سابقا للخدمات العسكرية المختلفة لمختلف البرامج، وإنما أصبح "غير المسحوبة" عندما النفقات المخطط لها لا يحدث، ويفترض أن تصبح متاحة للموازنة للإنفاق جديد، أو - إذا كان للجنة أن تكون أكثر استعدادا لدافعي الضرائب - العودة إلى وزارة الخزانة.

على سبيل المثال، في ص. 432 من تقرير اللجنة HASC، الجداول ليا جيش & M تظهر انخفاضا من 384600000 $ المسمى "جيش غير المسحوبة أرصدة تقدير." هذا المبلغ يحدث أن تكون 1.1٪ من طلب الرئيس ليا جيش مجموع & M (34735000000 $).

قسم البحرية في التشغيل والصيانة في مشروع القانون HASC يظهر انخفاضا 435900000 دولار من أجل "تقدير البحرية الأرصدة غير الملتزم بها." لسبب غريب، هذا المبلغ يحسب أيضا ليصل إلى 1.1٪ من طلب الرئيس لO البحرية & M (39365000000 $).

غريب حتى، سلاح مشاة البحرية O & M لتخفيض الأرصدة غير الملتزم بها وكذلك 1.1٪ (66 مليون دولار من طلب 5،960 مليار دولار).

نفس الشيء بالنسبة للقوات الجوية، ونفسه بنسبة 1.1٪ (400800000 دولار من طلب 36195000000 $).

وتناقش أيا من هذه أو شرحها في نص تقرير اللجنة، وإلا "تفسير" نحصل عليه هو انهم "جيش [أو البحرية، أو سلاح الجو، الخ.] تقدير الأرصدة غير الملتزم بها".

أن كل هذه "التقديرات"، والتي ينبغي أن تكون تقنية في طبيعتها، وتأتي لتفوح منها رائحة 1.1٪ من الألعاب في النظام. اثنين من الأسئلة ذات الصلة: من قام به؟ ولماذا؟

أولا، أنا السؤال بجدية ما اذا كانت هذه التقديرات مماثلة مريح لم تأتي في الواقع من الخدمات العسكرية. ويتطلب ذلك غريبا إلى حد ما (وخادع) كمية من التنسيق من جانب كل منهم إلى كل ذلك يأتي إلى 1.1٪ من ميزانية كل منها طلبات التشغيل والصيانة.

ثانيا، فلماذا لا توجد "الأرصدة غير الملتزم بها" في عمليات الشراء وعناوين البحث والتطوير، والتي هي ثقيلة مع هذا النوع من الانفاق التي يمكن في نهاية المطاف "غير المسحوبة"؟

ثالثا، لماذا لا يتم هذا المال الذي عاد إلى وزارة الخزانة، من أين جاء وينتمي في الواقع الآن إذا لم يعد في حاجة الى المال من قبل وزارة الدفاع؟

هناك الكثير من الأسئلة الأخرى، ولكن نأمل تحصل على الانجراف بلدي. وعوضا عن HASC استغرق ووصفها بأنها "الأرصدة غير الملتزم بها،" ليست سوى عبر whacks المجلس في واحدة من أكثر الروايات أهمية في ميزانية وزارة الدفاع - واحد أن يجعل لعسكري مدربين تدريبا جيدا ودعمها. لماذا هو HASC تفعل هذه التخفيضات عبر المجلس، ولماذا يفعلون ذلك في التشغيل والصيانة؟

هناك بعض "غير الملتزم بها توازن" القضايا الأخرى في مشروع القانون. من جانب الدفاع واسعة من التشغيل والصيانة كما أخذت ضربة 456800000 دولار من طلب من 30.940 مليار دولار. هذا ويأتي إلى 1.47٪. لماذا الجزء الذي يدعم القوات الخاصة وغيرها تأخذ أكبر ضربة متناسبة من الخدمات العسكرية الأخرى؟

أيضا، وبرنامج الصحة وزير الدفاع يأخذ ضربة 225 مليون دولار والذي هو "وأوضح" بأنه "تقدير مكتب المحاسبة الحكومية"، ولكن يتم تقديم أي تحليل أو تفسير آخر غاو.

ميزانية الأفراد العسكريين أن يدفع رواتب العسكريين يأخذ ضربة 693 مليون دولار من طلب 142828000000 $ (0.48٪). لقد وجدت أي تفسير.

أخيرا، القسم 2107 يسمح للأمين الجيش لاستخدام 115 مليون دولار في الانفاق من قبل "غير المسحوبة" لتمويل منشأة لمعالجة المياه في ولاية كاليفورنيا فورت ايروين. ربما يمكن لممثل البيت من منطقة فورت ايروين شرح كيفية كل هذه الأعمال، وكيف انه أو انها حصلت على تمويل بعض أوجه الانفاق في منطقة من هذه الأموال في كل مكان.

في رأيي، يمكن أن HASC، المكلفة الاشراف على وزارة الدفاع، واستخدام القليل من الرقابة نفسها.

ميزانية الدفاع الامريكية: احصل على ريال مدريد، في البنتاغون

الدفاع افتتاحية أخبار، 16 مايو 2011.
http://rempost.blogspot.com/2011/05/us-defense-budget-get-real-pentagon.html~~V

مقتطفات:

هناك قول قديم بأن واشنطن لا المال هو أقل واقعية من خارج عاما المال. وهذا يعني أن كل ما هو أبعد من مشروع قانون الانفاق المباشر هو نظري بحت.

مراقبة الشرط هو وسيلة شعبية للحد من التكاليف من أسلحة جديدة، ولكن من المهم بنفس القدر للسيطرة على عدد متزايد من البعثات.

يجب أن تكون الخطوة الأولى لضمان استعراض الأدوار والمهمات، بأمر من الحشو مائلة أوباما غير ضرورية ومكلفة في القدرات.

ثانيا، يجب على البنتاغون تجنب تفعل ما فعلت - تصوير أرقام لينة مثل تلك التي من الصعب أن تفعل شيئا سوى تعريضها للنقد.

وأخيرا، إلى إجراء تخفيضات من الحكمة، ويجب أن البنتاغون تحسين العمليات الداخلية والإدارة المالية لتحديد ما هو الإنفاق، وكيف. بدون بيانات الصلب، فإنه من الصعب التوصل إلى تحقيق وفورات الثابت.

تسعى جاهدة غيتس 400 مليار دولار وفورات

كارل كونيتا. مشروع البدائل الدفاعية ملاحظة، 30 أبريل 2011.

لماذا إنفاقنا دفاع عالية جدا وعلى ما يبدو خارج نطاق السيطرة؟ اريق الكثير من الحبر معالجة هذه المسألة، بما في ذلك بلدي قصيرة، ميزانية وزارة الدفاع هارب .

قد أندي باسيفيتش الاقتراب من الديناميات السياسية الرئيسية في لماذا لا يزال الإنفاق العسكري المحصن .

ليس هناك مثال أفضل من الديناميكية السياسية المختلة وظيفيا التي تنظم موازنة وزارة الدفاع من تأكيد الرئيس أوباما (أبريل 13، 2011) من الادعاء بأن وزير الدفاع غيتس قد "المحفوظة" الأمة 400 مليار دولار في نفقات الدفاع. وليس هناك أفضل من التوضيح من الفقر من حديثنا عن هذا الموضوع من كون المطالبة يذهب إلى حد كبير دون منازع.

أكثر من 400 مليار دولار في وقت سابق "وفورات" وزارة الدفاع أن الرئيس أوباما قد نسبت الى غيتس ليست "وفورات" بالمعنى العادي للكلمة. فهي لا تظهر كما التخفيضات في ميزانية وزارة الدفاع تخطط من سنة إلى أخرى، كما هو مبين أدناه. في أحسن الأحوال، إلا أنها تمثل وزارة الدفاع هامشية تعديل برامجها وتطلعاتها للتعامل مع نمو طفيف ارتفاع تكاليف.

الخام القياس: وبعد أن قالت انها لن تقدم "محملة بالكامل" كاديلاك لX سعر محدد، وبعد أن اكتشف أن هذا السعر غير واقعي تماما المقدرة، وهو تاجر سيارات الديكورات ظهر بعض الميزات ويسلم شيء أقل للحصول على السعر الموعودة كامل . ومعظم المستهلكين نسمي هذا احتال 1، وليس الادخار.

وقد يكون البديل عن وزارة الدفاع لمواصلة تعزيز طلبات الميزانية اللاحقة لتعكس تماما نمو التكاليف، وترك الكونغرس والسلطة التنفيذية وإعادة النظر في ما يريدون شراء. أفترض يمكن للمرء أن يقول أن وزارة الدفاع قد "حفظ" هذه السلطات من صداع من اتخاذ هذا القرار. قد تواجه بشكل كامل تسعير واقعية البرامج الحالية تؤدي الى اعادة نظر شاملة مستمرة للموقف الدفاع لدينا وجهود التحديث. ولكن هذا أكثر من اللازم للنظر فيها.

الآن، دعونا في محاولة لايجاد هؤلاء 400 مليار دولار في "وفورات" ....

ال 400 مليار دولار

1. جزء كبير من 400 مليار دولار التي ادعى وزير الدفاع غيتس قد أدت إلى إنقاذ مستمد من اعلانه أبريل 2009 من برنامج التخفيضات. بوابات يدعي أن الأنظمة والبرامج هو قطع في عام 2009 سيكون في نهاية المطاف تكلف أكثر من 300 مليار دولار. ومع ذلك، على الأقل كان بعض من هذه برمجتها على الفور، وهذا يعني: وزارة الدفاع استخدام المدخرات لشراء أشياء أخرى.

أبريل 2009 ميزانية الدفاع غيتس التوصية بيان

2. في آب 2010 وكانون الثاني 2011، ورد وزير الدفاع غيتس إضافية "التخفيضات" و "وفورات" يبلغ مجموعها 178 مليار دولار. لهذا، تم برمجتها مباشرة 100 مليار دولار لشراء أشياء أخرى أو تغطية التكاليف الأخرى. كان من المفترض أن تبقى 78 مليار دولار لإطلاق سراح من المدار البنتاغون للمساعدة في سداد العجز. في بيان أغسطس 2010، نجد جيتس يدعي أن له في وقت سابق من 2009 جهد أنقذ بالفعل أكثر من 300 مليار دولار.

بيان جيتس أغسطس 2010 على مبادرة الكفاءة وزارة

بيان جيتس يناير 2011 بشأن دائرة الموازنة وزيادة الكفاءة

المساعد الشخصي الرقمي إعادة تخطيط ملخص: 178 مليار دولار

3. كم (إن وجد) في وقت سابق من معين "أكثر من 300 مليار دولار" في تحقيق وفورات وبالمثل تم خلال للحد من العجز؟ تبحث في خطط الموازنة الفعلي، وماذا نرى؟ تم الإعلان عن أول 300 مليار دولار في نيسان 2009، وربما بشكل معقول أنها أظهرت على النحو الفرق بين خطة الماضي ميزانية بوش (FY09)، وأول خطة ميزانية أوباما (FY10).

مقارنة بين هذه الخطط في الميزانية الاثنين هو سهل للسنوات 2010-2013:
- بوش FY09 إجمالي الإنفاق المخطط للفترة 2010-2013 = 2155000000000
- أوباما FY10 إجمالي الإنفاق المخطط للفترة 2010-2013 = 2183000000000

بزيادة ليس الحد من الفقر، وبناء عليه: أي وفورات واضحة في السنوات القريبة.

4. وتوقعت خطة أوباما الميزانية المقبلة (FY11) زيادة كبيرة خلال ولايته الاولى. لذلك، أي وفورات واضح هناك أيضا.

5. فقط في الخطة القادمة - خطة FY12 - لا نرى انخفاضا في الانفاق المخطط لها بين FY12 و FY11 الخطط. في السنوات التسع التي تتداخل بين الخطط وFY11 FY12، ونحن نرى انخفاضا من نحو 233 مليار دولار.

لكن الخطة FY12 يلي إعلان جيتس الثانية من التخفيضات وتحقيق وفورات (تلخيصها في # 2 أعلاه). هكذا، على الأقل، 78 بليون دولار مستمد من ذلك وليس التخفيضات في وقت سابق. في الواقع، عندما نقارن خطة FY12 مع الخطة FY11 للسنوات 2012-2016، وهناك انخفاض في الإنفاق المخطط لها من 76 مليار دولار. لا يوجد حتى الآن أثر واضح من "تخفيضات"، أبريل 2009 ولكن.

6. حسنا، كما ذكر أعلاه، فإن الفرق بين مجموع الخطة FY11 و FY12 للسنوات 2012-2020 هو 233 مليار دولار. 233 ناقص 78 = 155. هذا التراجع التخطيط إضافية من 155 مليار دولار يظهر على مدى السنوات بعد عام 2016. ربما لذلك وجدنا ما لا يقل عن 155 مليار دولار من الخفض في وقت سابق من المفترض؟ ربما استغرق الأمر مجرد 2 سنة التسجيل؟ ربما.

وقال "ربما" لأن ميزانية FY12 أوباما يعتزم العودة لفات الانفاق بالضبط تقريبا إلى المستويات المتوقعة في الميزانية FY10 أوباما ... هي الميزانية التي كانت أكبر من ميزانية بوش الأخيرة وكونها الميزانية التي لم تظهر أي تأثير من العرض غيتس في أبريل 2009. وبعبارة أخرى: أوباما FY12 ميزانية تتحرك ببساطة يعود لخطة الإنفاق في المستقبل أنتج في FY11 إلى مستوى كان قد اقترح في FY10. خطة FY12 يختفي ببساطة الزيادة المقترحة في FY11.

7. الأخرى الممكنة (على الأرجح) قراءة من كل ذلك هو ما يلي: (ط) أي من الأصلي 300 بليون دولار "إنقاذ" من أي وقت مضى ترك وزارة الدفاع،
(ثانيا) 78 مليار دولار أن غيتس عرضت ما يصل الى تخفيض العجز هو فقط "وفورات" المحدد في الواقع حتى الآن لاظهار الواقع على خط النار في تخفيض الإنفاق المخطط لها، و (الثالث) وغيرها من 155 مليار دولار على أن خطة FY12 ينقص من FY11 كما تشمل الخطة تخفيضات غير محدد حتى الآن، والكفاءة.

أوباما: "توفير 400 مليار دولار" "مرة أخرى"؟

المحرر التعليق

13 أبريل 2011 (منقحة ومحدثة 16 أبريل 2011)

في "خطاب عجز" الرئيس أوباما 13 أبريل يقول:

كما يجب علينا أن العثور على مزيد من التوفير في البرامج المحلية، يجب علينا أن تفعل الشيء نفسه في الدفاع. على مدى العامين الماضيين، اتخذت غيتس بشجاعة على الهدر في الإنفاق، وتوفير 400 مليار دولار في الإنفاق الحالية والمستقبلية. وأعتقد أننا يمكن أن نفعل ذلك مرة أخرى.

ربما ما "فعل ذلك مرة أخرى" يعني؟

المساهمة في الواقع 400 مليار دولار من ميزانيات البنتاغون المتوقعة لتخفيض العجز؟

وسوف يتطلب ذلك وزارة الدفاع الامريكية لتأخذ في وتنفق 400 $ أقل مليار دولار. ولكن من الصعب جدا تحديد المساهمة الفعلية بكثير لخفض العجز في الأولى 400 مليار دولار في البنتاغون الرئيس أوباما يشير إلى تحقيق وفورات وتعتقد يمكن أن تتكرر.

دعونا نلقي نظرة سريعة على مكونات هذا المتخلف 400 مليار دولار خلال وقت العمل الأول.

أعلن هذا وزير الدفاع غيتس يناير الماضي 78 مليار دولار في تخفيضات على مدى خمس سنوات. في فبراير شباط عندما ظهر الرئيس FY12 ميزانية جميع ولكن تبخرت 70 مليار دولار من هذا كما خفض العجز التحيات. وقد استهلكت 68 مليار دولار من عمليات الطوارئ في الخارج خاصة (الحرب) ميزانية كما تم استبدال النائب FY11 المتوقعة من 50 مليار دولار من الميزانية FY12 OCO حقيقي من 118 مليار دولار. آخر 2 مليار دولار في المدخرات ويبدو أن اختفت ببساطة في توقعات ميزانية السنة الخامسة، ربما بسبب تلك "أخطاء التقريب" غذر أن الطاعون ميزانيات البنتاغون.

في عام 2010 أعلن وزير الدفاع غيتس 100 مليار دولار في المدخرات "الكفاءة". وكان صريحا جدا في ذلك الوقت، قائلا انه تم حفظ كل المدخرات في وزارة الدفاع الامريكية لدفع ثمن المتطلبات الأخرى. لذلك لا يمكننا الاعتماد بصورة شرعية هؤلاء نحو خفض العجز، ويفترض أن الرئيس لم تعتمد تلك نحو 400 مليار دولار الذي تم حفظه.

بحيث يترك حوالي 322 مليار دولار وفورات في البنتاغون ان البيت الابيض يحتاج إلى حساب ل.

في شهادة أمام لجنة القوات المسلحة بمجلس الشيوخ في 17 فبراير 2011 قال غيتس:

... أكثر من ميزانيات الدفاع الماضي اللذين قدمهما الرئيس أوباما، نحن قلصت أو ألغت برامج المضطربة أو الزائدة التي سيكون لها تكلفة أكثر من 330 مليار دولار اذا نظر اليها من خلال لإنجاز.

يربط هذا على خطاب الرئيس أوباما أخبار الدفاع تقارير (13 أبريل 2011) ما يلي:

من 400 مليار دولار المحفوظة بالفعل، ومن المفترض 330 مليار دولار يأتي من خفض غيتس إلى برامج الأسلحة - على سبيل المثال إلى إلغاء الجيش المستقبل لمقاومة أنظمة البرامج وقاذفة قنابل سلاح الجو في الجيل التالي، وكلاهما غيتس انتهت في ميزانية 2010 . ومع ذلك، فقد تم استبدال هذه البرامج هما: الجيش وتطوير المركبات القتالية البرية، والقوات الجوية قد أطلقت برنامجا مهاجم سببا في تراجع.

"يفترض"، و "لكن" هي الكلمات الرئيسية في الفقرة السابقة. أن تكون المدخرات الحقيقية التي تساهم في أي وسيلة مجدية لخفض العجز فإن لالغاء برنامج يجب أن تؤدي إلى انخفاض TOPLINE موازنة وزارة الدفاع (...) وليس الاستعاضة عن بعض النفقات الأخرى.

جوردون آدمز من مركز ستيمسون يقيم المطالبة الادخار 330 مليار دولار في آخر 5 نوفمبر 2010 على هذا النحو:

غيتس لم خفض 330 مليار دولار من الدفاع. وقال انه عندما أعلن عن تخفيضات الأجهزة، وقدرت وفورات في مهلة سنة على 330 مليار دولار، لكنه لم يقطع النيكل من ميزانيات الدفاع يتوقع ويريد، كما قال بشكل واضح، لاستخدام هذه الوفورات عن غيرها من الاستثمارات، لا نعطيهم عودة إلى دافعي الضرائب. وهذا الرقم هو الطريق كبيرة جدا، على أي حال، لأنه أنهى F-22 وطائرة C-17 الشحن عندما لا يكون واحد منهم كان في الميزانية على المدى الطويل (انه كان يحاول ترك كلا البرنامجين التوصل إلى وفاة طبيعية ، كما هو مخطط لها، ويبقي الكونجرس في الحصول على الطريق.) بل لعله أكثر كبيرة جدا لأن مدخراته الرقم لا صاف من الاستثمارات البديلة التي اقترحها للبعثات نفسه، مثل استبدال الأنظمة القتالية المستقبلية إنهاء (FCS) مركبة مع جيش جديد مركبة R & D برنامج. لذا فإن مشاجرة كبيرة على عدد غير، ولكن لا خفض كبير في الدفاع هنا.

حتى الآن وزارة الدفاع أو مكتب الإدارة والميزانية لم تسفر عن أي محاسبة من هذه المدخرات من المفترض الغاء برنامج جيتس "التي تشير إلى المكان الذي يخرج من TOPLINE. في هذه الأثناء قد يكون من الحكمة أن نقلل بشكل كبير من قيمتها عند التفكير في الانفاق الاتحادي العام.

ما نعرفه بالتأكيد هو أن ميزانيات البنتاغون تستمر في الارتفاع على الرغم من "وفورات". وزارة الدفاع والإدارة قد يجادل بأن ميزانية البنتاغون قد نمت بشكل أسرع إذا غيتس لم يتخذ هؤلاء "الشجاع" قطع البرنامج. ربما. ولكن "كان" هي ببساطة ليست واحدة كما تساهم فعلا في الحد من العجز الذي يتطلب تخفيضات حقيقية في TOPLINE من ميزانية البنتاغون.

من حيث خفض TOPLINE من ميزانية البنتاغون، عندما نلغي التخفيضات التي طال انتظارها في تكاليف الحرب، لا يمكننا الاعتماد فقط 8 مليارات دولار التي غيتس تخلت للحد من العجز في خطة عام الدفاع خمسة (FYDP) من خلال FY16.

أبحث عن عشر سنوات وهناك المزيد من المدخرات في توقعات الرئيس. زميلي كارل كونيتا يجد 164 مليار دولار الإنفاق أقل في البنتاغون الأربعة المتداخلة "من سنة" (FY17-20) عند مقارنة العروض الرئيس ميزانية FY11 وFy12.

ونحن قد التكهن بأن هذا هو المكان الذي علينا أن ندرك بعض من "غيتس 330 مليار دولار في المدخرات، ولكن سيكون من التكهنات فقط ...

حتى الآن أثبتت لا أحد في الإدارة بما يكفي من التفصيل كيف أن البنتاجون سوف يسهم كثيرا من أي شيء في اتجاه خفض العجز في الميزانية الفدرالية، على الرغم من أخطاء التقريب.

خبراء رسالة على الانفاق على الدفاع واللجنة الوطنية المعنية المسؤولية المالية والإصلاح

American Flag header

18 نوفمبر 2010

عزيزي الرئيس المشارك باولز وسيمبسون الرئيس المشارك:

نحن نكتب لكم عن خبراء في الأمن القومي والاقتصاد الدفاع لنقل وجهات نظرنا بشأن الآثار المترتبة الأمن القومي من عمل اللجنة، وخاصة الحاجة إلى تحقيق تخفيضات في الإنفاق العسكري المسؤول. في هذا الصدد، نعرب عن تقديرنا للمبادرة التي اتخذتموها في اقتراحكم 10 نوفمبر عام 2010 لمشروع للجنة. فإنه يبدأ عملية ضرورية للتفكير جدي، والنقاش، والعمل.

حيوية لاقتصادنا هو حجر الزاوية في قوة أمتنا. نتقاسم رغبة اللجنة لتحقيق منزلنا في النظام المالي. القيام بذلك ليست مجرد مسألة الاقتصاد. تقليص الدين الوطني هو أيضا ضرورة للأمن القومي.

حتى الآن، وإعفاء إدارة أوباما وزارة الدفاع من أي تخفيضات في الميزانية. هذا هو قصير النظر: إنه يجعل من الصعب لإنجاز مهمة استعادة قوتنا الاقتصادية، والذي هو دعامة من قوتنا العسكرية.

كما بقية الأمة يجاهد لخفض عبء الديون، والخطة الحالية هو زيادة ميزانية وزارة الدفاع قاعدة بنسبة 10 في المئة من حيث القيمة الحقيقية خلال العقد المقبل. هذا من شأنه أن يأتي على رأس هذه الزيادة 52 في المئة تقريبا حقيقي في الانفاق قاعدة عسكرية منذ عام 1998. (وكان وعندما يتم تضمين تكاليف الحرب الزيادة أكبر بكثير: 95 في المئة).

نحن نقدر جهود وزير الدفاع غيتس "لإصلاح عمل في البنتاغون وممارسات الاستحواذ. ومع ذلك، حتى لو اصلاحاته تفي بوعودها، والخطة الحالية لا ترجمتها إلى وفورات في الميزانية التي تساهم في حل مشكلة العجز لدينا. هدفهم واضح هو أن الأموال الحرة لاستخدامات أخرى داخل وزارة الدفاع الامريكية. هذه ليست جيدة بما فيه الكفاية.

منح الدفاع على نظام خاص يعرض للخطر جهود خفض العجز كله. الدفاع الإنفاق اليوم يشكل أكثر من 55 في المئة من الإنفاق التقديري، و 23 في المئة من الميزانية الاتحادية. استثناء للدفاع، ليس فقط على نطاق أوسع يقوض الدعوة إلى المسؤولية المالية، ولكن أيضا يجعل من إجمالي ميزانية ضبط النفس أصعب بكثير من الناحية العملية والاقتصادية والسياسية.

لا نحتاج إلى وضع قوتنا الاقتصادية للخطر بهذه الطريقة. اليوم الولايات المتحدة تمتلك هامشا واسعا من التفوق العسكري على الصعيد العالمي. يمكن للميزانية وزارة الدفاع تتحمل انخفاضا كبيرا دون المساس بأمننا أساسي.

ونحن ندرك أن خصوم عسكرية أكبر قد ترتفع إلى تواجهنا في المستقبل. ولكن أفضل التحوط ضد هذا الاحتمال هو اليقظة واقتصاد نابض بالحياة دعم عسكري قادر على التكيف مع التحديات الجديدة عند ظهورها.

يمكننا تحقيق أكبر اقتصاد الدفاع اليوم في العديد من الطرق، وكلها نحثكم على النظر بجدية. علينا أن نكون أكثر واقعية في الأهداف التي وضعناها لقواتنا المسلحة، وأكثر انتقائية في خياراتنا فيما يتعلق باستخدامها في الخارج. يتعين علينا أن نركز قواتنا العسكرية لتحقيق أهداف أمنية أساسية وعلى تلك التهديدات الحالية والناشئة التي تؤثر علينا بصورة مباشرة.

نحن بحاجة أيضا إلى أن تكون أكثر حكمة في اختيارنا للأدوات الأمنية عند التعامل مع التحديات الدولية. قواتنا المسلحة هي الأصول باهظة الثمن بشكل فريد وبالنسبة لبعض المهام لا صك آخر وسوف نفعل. لتحديات كثيرة، ومع ذلك، فإن الجيش ليس هو الخيار الأكثر فعالية من حيث التكلفة. يمكننا تحقيق مزيد من الكفاءة اليوم دون الانتقاص من الأمن لدينا من قبل أفضل التمييز بين مهمات عسكرية حيوية، مرغوب فيه، وغير الضرورية والقدرات.

هناك مجموعة متنوعة من خيارات محددة من شأنها أن تحقق وفورات، وبعضها أقل من نصفه. النقطة المهمة، ومع ذلك، هو التزام راسخ لطلب تحقيق وفورات من خلال إعادة تقييم استراتيجية دفاعنا، وضعنا العالمي، وسائلنا للإنتاج وإدارة القوة العسكرية.

■ ومنذ نهاية الحرب الباردة، وقد يطلب منا قواتنا العسكرية للتحضير لإجراء المزيد من أنواع والبعثات في أكثر الأماكن حول العالم. قائمة وزارة الدفاع الأمريكية مهمة تضم الآن ليس فقط الحرب الوقائية وتغيير النظام، وبناء الأمة، ولكن أيضا جهود مبهما "تشكيل البيئة الاستراتيجية" ووضع حد لظهور تهديدات. حان الوقت لتقليم بعض هذه البعثات واستعادة التركيز على الدفاع والردع.

■ القوة القتالية الأميركية يتجاوز بشكل كبير من أن أي مزيج معقول من الخصوم التقليدية. واستشهد مثالا واحدا فقط، وقد لاحظ وزير الدفاع غيتس ان البحرية الاميركية اليوم قادر على مثل القوات البحرية 13 القادمة جنبا إلى جنب، ومعظمها يتم تشغيلها من قبل حلفائنا. يمكننا انقاذ بأمان بواسطة التشذيب الهامش الحالي للتفوق.

■ وجود أميركا في زمن السلم العسكرية الدائمة في الخارج إلى حد كبير من مخلفات الحرب الباردة. ويمكن تقليل ذلك دون تقويض الأمنية الأساسية للولايات المتحدة أو حلفائها.

■ لقد كشفت الحرب في العراق وأفغانستان وحدود القوة العسكرية. تجنب هذه الأنواع من عملية ستسمح لنا على الصعيد العالمي لدحر الزيادة الأخيرة في حجم الجيش ومشاة البحرية لدينا.

■ The Pentagon's acquisition process has repeatedly failed, routinely delivering weapons and equipment late, over cost, and less capable than promised. Some of the most expensive systems correspond to threats that are least prominent today and unlikely to regain prominence soon. In these cases, savings can be safely realized by cancelling, delaying, or reducing procurement or by seeking less costly alternatives.

■ Recent efforts to reform Defense Department financial management and acquisition practices must be strengthened. And we must impose budget discipline to trim service redundancies and streamline command, support systems, and infrastructure.

Change along these lines is bound to be controversial. Budget reductions are never easy – no less for defense than in any area of government. However, fiscal realities call on us to strike a new balance between investing in military power and attending to the fundamentals of national strength on which our true power rests. We can achieve safe savings in defense if we are willing to rethink how we produce military power and how, why, and where we put it to use.

مع خالص التقدير،

  • Gordon Adams, American University and Stimson Center
  • Robert Art, Brandeis University
  • Deborah Avant, UC Irvine
  • Andrew Bacevich, Boston University
  • Richard Betts, Columbia University
  • Linda Bilmes, Kennedy School, Harvard University
  • Steven Clemons, New America Foundation
  • Joshua Cohen, Stanford University and co-editor, Boston Review
  • Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives
  • Owen R. Cote Jr., Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Michael Desch, University of Notre Dame
  • Matthew Evangelista, Cornell University
  • Benjamin H. Friedman, Cato Institute
  • Lt. Gen. (USA, Ret.) Robert G. Gard, Jr., Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
  • David Gold, Graduate Program in International Affairs, The New School
  • William Hartung, Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation
  • David Hendrickson, Colorado College
  • Michael Intriligator, UCLA and Milken Institute
  • Robert Jervis, Columbia University
  • Sean Kay, Ohio Wesleyan University
  • Elizabeth Kier, University of Washington
  • Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives
  • Lawrence Korb, Center for American Progress
  • Peter Krogh, Georgetown University
  • Richard Ned Lebow, Dartmouth College
  • Walter LaFeber, Cornell University
  • Col. (USA, Ret.) Douglas Macgregor
  • Scott McConnell, editor-at-large, The American Conservative
  • John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
  • Steven E. Miller, Harvard University and editor-in-chief, International Security
  • Steven Metz, national security analyst and writer
  • Janne Nolan, American Security Project
  • Robert Paarlberg, Wellesley College and Harvard University
  • Paul Pillar, Georgetown University
  • Barry Posen, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Christopher Preble, Cato Institute
  • Daryl Press, Dartmouth College
  • Jeffrey Record, defense policy analyst and author
  • David Rieff, author
  • Thomas Schelling, University of Maryland
  • Jack Snyder, Columbia University
  • J. Ann Tickner, University of Southern California
  • Robert Tucker, Johns Hopkins University
  • Stephen Van Evera, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Stephen Walt, Harvard University
  • Kenneth Waltz, Columbia University
  • Cindy Williams, Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • Daniel Wirls, UC Santa Cruz
    • This letter reflects the opinions of the individual signatories. Institutions are listed for identification purposes only. The letter is the result of a joint effort by The Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and the Project on Defense Alternatives .

      How will the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform balance the budget in 2015?

      Editor's Commentary

      There are at least as many reasons to think that significant real reductions in defense spending will be hard to achieve as there are reasons to doubt that significant revenue increases will be found or that substantial reductions in entitlement spending will happen. “Political realities” are indeed daunting for any of the options the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform will consider. If there were quick, easy and obvious decisions to be had there would be no need for the Commission.

      Political realities change over time in part because underlying realities eventually change political calculation. Such is the case with defense spending. After more than a decade of rapid growth there is likely to be some retrenchment in the middle of this decade, notably by 2015.

      The likely path of defense spending this decade was recently forecast by the high-tech industry association Tech America Foundation in their DoD Topline Forecast 2011-2020 .

      Tech America's forecast is for a real reduction in the base Pentagon budget (not including Overseas Contingency Operation war supplemental funding) of 9% or $45 billion (USD 2011) in 2015 relative to the 2011 base budget.

      When taking into account the Pentagon's preferred budget path this decade of at least 1% real annual growth, Tech America forecasts a reduction in defense spending by 2015 of 16%.

      Tech America's forecast of Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) war supplemental spending during the decade is also important to consider. Since FY10 (President Obama's first budget) there has been an OCO war supplemental DoD budget line for FY12-FY15 of $50 billion per year. The OCO war supplemental in the FY11 budget is $159 billion.

      Although the actual OCO war supplemental might come down in FY12, with the military operational demands in Afghanistan remaining elevated it is unlikely the OCO war supplemental will come down even $50 billion, let alone $109 billion in FY12. Tech America forecasts OCO war expenditures of $122 billion in FY12.

      These likely under-budgeted OCO war supplemental costs should be counted as probable additions to the national debt beyond those already projected by the government.

      Tech America's forecast is for the OCO supplemental to be $122 billion in FY12, $102 billion in FY13, $69 billion in FY14 and $57 billion in FY15. That adds up to $150 billion more than is budgeted in the Five Year Defense Plan … an un-budgeted addition to the national debt.

      For the target year of the federal budget reaching “primary balance” in FY15, the forecast OCO war supplemental will add $7 billion to the problem that the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform faces in attempting to balance the budget in that year.

      Security Isn't Cheap

      Adam J. Hebert. Air Force Magazine , November, 2010.
      http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/November%202010/1110edit.aspx

      مقتطفات:

      …ill-advised calls to cut the Pentagon budget follow as predictably as the tides. Without credible analysis of strategy or requirements, critics are once again declaring defense spending to be out of control.

      المحرر التعليق:

      In his editorial Security Isn't Cheap Adam J. Herbert cites the work of the Sustainable Defense Task Force as a case in point of critics of Pentagon spending recommending cuts “without credible analysis of strategy or requirements.” As a member of the task force I differ over the credibility of our analysis. But let me speak to where I agree with Mr. Herbert:

      • “Security is not cheap.” In fact it is extremely expensive. When the country is hit with a financial disaster we owe it to the country and our military to reexamine our national security strategy and make sure priorities are clear and that our military investments are cost-effective. In the last twelve years of Pentagon budgets the planning has proceeded as though there is no resource constraint. Unfortunately, that is true of the last QDR as well. Those days are clearly over – Secretary Gates has said as much.

      • “A well-trained, well-equipped, professional military is not cheap. If the nation wants it to cost less, the nation will probably have to ask it to do less.” Exactly. Since the end of the Cold War the US military has steadily advanced its global reach and engagement. Missions have proliferated, including many that should be done by civilians in the State Department and other agencies. Significant numbers of US troops still remain in Europe, even though there is no military threat to Europe that allies can't handle. The most important take-away lesson from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that long low-intensity land wars are not cost-effective uses of US military power and should be avoided whenever possible. Hopefully we can all agree there should never again be such a “war of choice.”

      • “There are certainly ways to reduce defense spending…” Yes, and one that will save around $45 billion in Air Force modernization accounts is available in a choice about how to modernize the fighter fleet. The Air Force has decided to replace its aging F-16s with just about the most expensive new fighter one can dream up, the F-35. In today's fiscal environment either the Air Force will end up with a lot fewer of these planes than planned, or they will choose to get ahead of the budget crunch and modernize with new block versions of the still best of class F-16s and limit the buy of F-35s this decade to a few squadrons for high-intensity air-superiority missions. If serious air competition emerges a decade from now we can then roll out production of F-35s (or perhaps a less costly follow-on to the F-16), planes presumably much improved with ten years or more of further fighter technology development.

      مستقبل الخيارات ميزانية الدفاع يتطلب أولويات استراتيجية واضحة

      Daniel Goure. Early Warning Blog , Lexington Institute, 03 September 2010.
      http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/future-defense-budget-choices-require-clear-strategic-priorities

      مقتطفات:

      The United States cannot afford and the people will not pay for a military that can do battle with uncertainty.

      As a consequence of the need to do battle with uncertainty, emphasis was placed on a military that can cover all bases and do all things. This would not be a wise strategy even if resources were unconstrained. Not all threats are equal. Nor are all interests equally important. Finally, it is possible to make reasoned and reasonable judgments regarding how the future security environment will unfold and define a set of demand signals that would require shifting strategic priorities.

      In the past, when US leaders refused to make choices they allowed the military to shrink symmetrically, by cutting every program or service a little. That approach is self-defeating. It makes no sense to keep a so-called full spectrum military but continually reduce it in size.

      المحرر التعليق:

      Relevant passages from the archives ($3 trillion later):

      Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. “Dueling with Uncertainty”, February 1998.
      http://www.comw.org/pda/bullyweb.html

      There is no escape from uncertainty, but there is relief from uncertainty hysteria. It begins with recognizing that instability has boundaries — just as turbulence in physical systems has discernible onset points and parameters. The turbulence of a river, for instance, corresponds to flow and to the contours of the river's bed and banks. It occurs in patches and not randomly. The weather also is a chaotic system that resists precise long-range forecasting, but allows useful prediction of broader trends and limits.

      Despite uncertainty, statements of probability matter. They indicate the weight of evidence — or whether there is any evidence at all. The uncertainty hawks would flood our concern with a horde of dangers that pass their permissive test of “non-zero probability.” However, by lowering the threshold of alarm, they establish an impossible standard of defense sufficiency: absolute and certain military security. Given finite resources and competing ends, something less will have to do. Strategic wisdom begins with the setting of priorities — and priorities demand strict attention to what appears likely and what does not.

      The world may be less certain and less stable today than during the Cold War, but it also involves less risk for America. Risk is equal parts probability and utility — chances and stakes. With the end of global superpower contention, America's stakes in most of the world's varied conflicts has diminished. So has the magnitude of the military threats to American interests. This permits a sharper distinction between interests and compelling interests, turbulence and relevant turbulence, uncertainties and critical uncertainties. And this distinction will pay dividends whenever the country turns to consider large-scale military endeavors, commitments, and investments.

      Among the visions that guide present policy, one is absent conspicuously: a world in which economic issues have displaced military ones as the central focus of global competitions and concerns. Failing to engage this prospect, the recent defense policy reviews are oblivious to the opportunity cost of military spending. And it is this lapse that gives license to their speculative methods and overweening goals.

      The United States continues to invest more of its national product in defense than does its allies, more than the world average, and much more than its chief economic competitors. By disregarding the requirements and consequences of increased global economic competition, present policy makes an unacknowledged bet about the future: The Soviet Union is gone and no comparable military challenge to the West exists, except as distant possibility. Nonetheless, the American prospect depends as much as ever, if not more, on the specifically military aspects of strength. Of this much, the uncertainty hawks seem certain.

      كارل كونيتا يتحدث عن القيمة الاستراتيجية للحصول على منزل في البلاد المالية من أجل

      Capitol Visitors Center, 11 June 2010.

      Obama's National Security Strategy: How Will It Be Managed?

      Laura A. Hall. Budget Insight , 27 May 2010.

      مقتطفات:

      On the military side, no clear prioritization of missions. As in the QDR, the NSS provides no priorities among military missions, but repeats a long shopping list that could drive force structure and budget expectations even higher than they are now.

      Tomorrow's Disarmament Debates

      Christopher Ford. Remarks presented to a side event at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New Paradigms Forum , Hudson Institute, 20 May 2010.
      http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=250

      مقتطفات:

      … as present-day disarmament debates shift from a focus specifically upon nuclear weaponry to a broader focus upon full-spectrum military asymmetry, the disarmament discourse is characterized by competition between two conceptual paradigms that are quite incompatible even when their respective adherents seem to agree upon the importance of nuclear disarmament.

      Let's explore this a bit. Even as it seeks to pander to the conventional wisdom of the disarmament movement by attempting to purchase nonproliferation cooperation with concessions on disarmament, the Obama Administration seems to have embraced – as did the Bush Administration before it, though far less emphatically and flamboyantly – a vision of nuclear reductions and potential future disarmament profoundly at odds with much of the conceptual framework that underpins this conventional wisdom. Fundamentally, to the extent that there can be said to be a vision of disarmament progress prevalent among US policy making elites, it is one that assumes and values military asymmetries favoring the United States.

      It is not merely that the Obama Administration sees the development of improved nuclear weapons production capabilities as being essential to American reductions, as part of a strategy of substituting potential weapons for actual ones as America's strategic “hedge” against future problems. It is in fact that non-nuclear US military advantages are embraced as a way to facilitate reducing, or perhaps even replacing, US reliance upon nuclear weapons: developing PGS or other technologies to supplant nuclear weapons in some missions previously thought to require them; improving BMD against proliferation threats; and relying upon robust conventional power-projection capabilities to maintain the solidity of trans-oceanic alliances that have traditionally relied in part upon forward-deployed US nuclear weapons. No one in today's White House would admit as much, of course, but this agenda – spelled out with some candor in the new 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) – owes as much to the doctrinal vision of President Bush's 2001 NPR as it does to the ideology of the nuclear abolition movement.

      At issue is a real clash between conceptual paradigms about the nature of the global security environment and how best to maintain international peace and security within it. On the one hand, there is a paradigm that one might call “peer-group multilateralism.” It is an ethic of collective action among equals in which countries come together through multilateral (and preferably global and universal) institutions in order to address common challenges. This is a profoundly democratic vision, at least with respect to relations between countries. (Actual democracy for real populations of human beings is an entirely different question, alas.) In it, no one has any particular special privileges, and no one suffers “discrimination” except when misbehavior brings upon miscreants the wrath of the international community – expressed, of course, through formal and collective means. This multilateralist and quasi-democratic paradigm is reflected, for instance, in the consensus negotiation procedures of the CD, and in the one-country-one-vote formula of the UN General Assembly. Even where bodies are structured so as to permit slightly more effective decision-making through smaller size, these principles may yet be seen in provisions for rotating states through seats on the IAEA Board of Governors or in the non-permanent ranks of the UN Security Council.

      In this paradigm, asymmetry of power is philosophically offensive. To prevent or undermine such asymmetry, majoritarian procedures – if not indeed consensus rules – are designed and expected to impede traditional “power politics” and to enable all to participate more or less equally in decision outcomes. Action against common threats is understood as a collective movement both expressing and predicated upon international solidarity, and upon all countries' shared and axiomatically coequal role in preserving peace and security. By the same token, action not pursued with such a collective or at least majoritarian imprimatur is improper action. In a sense, therefore, the multilateral process is felt to create outcome legitimacy.

      On the other end of this conceptual continuum lies a paradigm that one might call the “predominant actor model.” By this account – the essential features of which are evident in the thinking of multiple US administrations, transcending party identification – multilateral institutions operating on the basis of formal equality among near-peers provide an important but sometimes an inadequate means of addressing challenges to international peace and security. It is not necessarily that such institutions fall always or entirely down on the job, but that they are ill-equipped to handle, on their own, the full panoply of international threats that might arise (eg, on account of collective action problems, the high capital costs and high returns to experience in global power-projection capabilities, or psycho-political dynamics of risk-aversion or anti-militarist fashion).

      According to this second model, the security system needs a predominant actor capable of shouldering disproportionate burdens and leading the community's reaction to pressing challenges, and around whom serious systemic responses to some of the gravest challenges can crystallize – particularly, though not exclusively, where the employment of military force is at issue. In effect, this model presumes that international security is to some extent a public good that will be, in economic terms, under-produced, to the detriment of all, if a predominant actor does not sometimes take the reins. In contrast to “peer-group multilateralism,” outcome legitimacy is, in this model, basically process-exogenous, in that certain steps are assumed to be necessary for the preservation of global order and other critical values of the system, and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with the strongest player stepping in to ensure that these steps are taken. (Indeed, if other actors seem unable to do what is needed, it would be wrong for the predominant power not to intervene.) Other states' actual consent to such initiative is desirable, but secondary; the key point is that what is needed actually gets done.

      The United States tends to see itself as playing this predominant role, with its military power and capabilities underpinning the stability of the present global order and system of economic relations. Having inherited from Britain the baton of securing global sea lanes vital to international commerce – and having added to this a broad modern array of global security responsibilities, ranging from providing the power-projection “muscle” behind humanitarian intervention to fighting nuclear weapons proliferation, and from providing security reassurances to far-flung allies to countering access-denial strategies in outer space – Washington sees itself as having a vital role in the international system precisely on account of its disproportionate military power.

      One model thus sees military asymmetry as profoundly subversive of global peace and security, and ultimately regards its erosion as being a requirement for the full success of nuclear disarmament. The other model regards a degree of asymmetry, at least in the right hands, as being essential to global order irrespective of whether or not nuclear weapons exist – and perhaps even especially valuable in preparing to confront the challenges of some hypothetical future in which major conflicts can no longer be “deterred” by nuclear weapons because such devices have been eliminated.

      المحرر التعليق:

      This is an important challenge to the nuclear disarmament “community”.

      Christopher Ford, a nonproliferation official in the second Bush administration, is a consistent critic of “universalism” in international affairs and of the what he considers to be “faux” democratic process in international security institutions and fora. Whatever the validity of his doubts in these regard, what must not be denied by disarmament advocates is the reality that the “predominant actors” in the US security establishment, both military and civilian, firmly believe that the US should be the predominant actor on the world stage and are therefore predisposed to share most of Christopher Ford's doubts (and perhaps allergy) about universalism and inter-national democratic practice.

      More about these important issues later.

      Treaty Signings

      Michael Krepon. Arms Control Wonk , 08 April 2010.
      http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2690/treaty-signings

      مقتطفات:

      Despite claims to the contrary, New START does not inhibit the growth of US conventional power projection capabilities that, unlike nuclear weapons, are militarily useful on battlefields. Nor will New START impede ballistic missile defense programs…

      المحرر التعليق:
      … and that is why, despite the rhetoric of the moment, this treaty doesn't do much to advance us toward the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons. Unbounded conventional military power and missile defenses for Western rich nations are not compatible with the establishment of a global international security regime sufficiently reliable to support the abolition of nuclear weapons.

      For more on this problem see my comments on Vice President Biden's speech at the National Defense University, 18 February 2010.

      في الوقت القاتل نحو التسلح النووي

      James Carroll. Boston Globe , 15 March 2010. Hosted on the CommonDreams website.
      http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/03/15-5

      مقتطفات:

      … experts who warn of a coming “cascade of proliferation,” one nation following another into the deadly chasm of nuclear weapons unless present nuclear powers find a way to reverse the current. The main burden is on Russia and the United States, which together possess the vast majority of the world's nuclear weapons, but President Obama deliberately made himself central to the challenge when he said in Prague, “I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

      Although usually considered apart, the broader US defense posture has turned into a key motivator for other nations to go nuclear. The current Pentagon budget ($5 trillion for 2010-2017) is so far beyond any other country, and the conventional military capacity it buys is so dominant, as to reinforce the nuclear option abroad as the sole protection against potential US attack.

      Can DOD Measure the Resource Allocation for its Strategic Missions?

      Travis Sharp. Nukes of Hazard , 05 March 2010.
      http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2010/3/5/162522/3909

      مقتطفات:

      It would help the Pentagon, the Congress, defense experts, and the American public if DOD published an analytically defensible record of its spending by strategic mission.

      المحرر التعليق:
      نعم، في الواقع.

      Debate: On the Right Nuclear Weapons Track

      Will Marshall. AOL News , 05 March 2010.
      http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-on-the-right-nuclear-weapons-track/19385662

      مقتطفات:

      Obama reasons that, by holding up its end of the bargain, the United States can strengthen global nonproliferation norms and intensify pressure on Tehran and other regimes that may be thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons. And as White House officials have stressed, the nuclear “zero option” is a policy aspiration, not something anyone believes is achievable anytime soon.

      Debate: Waiting for Obama's Policy on Nukes

      Christopher A. Ford. AOL News , 05 March 2010.
      http://www.aolnews.com/opinion/article/debate-waiting-for-obamas-policy-on-nukes/19385644

      مقتطفات:

      … but remarkably, for all his nuclear posing, no one knows what Obama's nuclear weapons policy actually is. So far, his administration has done little of real import. Obama seeks a modest new arms-reduction treaty with Russia but contemplates cuts that would not have been too shocking from the Bush administration — which, in fact, actually began these negotiations in 2006. The administration also wants to reattempt ratification of the nuclear test ban defeated in the Senate in 1999, although the treaty's Senate prospects are dimming. As a result, at this point Obama's “transformative” arms-control agenda looks like President Bill Clinton's from the mid-1990s.

      Forward Observer: QDR is a Quite Disappointing Report

      George C. Wilson. Government Executive , 05 March 2010.
      http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=44743&sid=61

      مقتطفات:

      I spent months in 1997 going behind the scenes at the Pentagon and Congress to find out about all the wheeling and dealing that went into the writing of the QDR that year. “I had high hopes for the QDR,” Gen. Ronald Fogleman, former Air Force Chief of Staff, told me. “In my view, for the QDR to be a success there was going to have to be some fairly significant realignment among the [armed] services.”

      But Fogleman said his hopes for meaningful reform were dashed when the then-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. John Shalikashvili, sent a two-star general to Fogleman's office to deliver this message: “The chairman would like to have the QDR turn out to be as close to the status quo as we can make this thing work. His message is: 'We don't need any Billy Mitchells,'” the general said, referring to Army Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell, who revolutionized the use of air power by demonstrating in 1923 how bombers could sink Navy warships.

      Obama Nuclear Weapons Policy – a debate with ten voices and thirteen parts

      a compilation, Defense Strategy Review Page , 03 March 2010 .
      http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/obama-nuclear-policy-a-debate

      مقتطفات:

      This debate began when Greg Mello of the Los Alamos Study Group wrote a February 10, 2010 commentary for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. I posted his commentary on this site and wrote a response. I then invited a variety of leaders of nuclear disarmament efforts and specialists in nuclear issues to respond to the Mello-Knight exchange.

      In all there have been ten contributors to this debate which touches on many important points of agreement and disagreement. This is a discussion that needs to continue among experts, activists, and the wider citizenry.

      Obama Nuclear Policy Debate Participants to date:

      Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group
      Charles Knight, Project on Defense Alternatives
      Martin Senn, U. of Innsbruck
      Bill Hartung, Arms and Security Initiative, New America Foundation
      Paul Ingram, BASIC
      Jonathan Granoff, Global Security Institute
      Todd Fine, Global Zero
      John Isaacs, Council for a Liveable World
      Robert G. Gard, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
      Matthew Hoey, Military Space Transparency Project

      البنتاغون الميزانية هارب

      Carl Conetta. Foreign Policy in Focus , 03 March 2010.
      http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_pentagons_runaway_budget

      مقتطفات:

      Following the collapse of Soviet power, America's leaders set more ambitious goals for the US military, despite its smaller size. This entailed requiring the armed services to sustain and extend their continuous global presence, improving their readiness and speed, increasing peacetime engagement activities, and preparing to conduct more types of missions quickly and in more areas. Recent US strategy has looked beyond the traditional goals of defense and deterrence, seeking to use military power to actually prevent the emergence of threats and to “shape” the international environment. US defense planners also elevated the importance of lesser and hypothetical threats, thus requiring the military to prepare for many more lower-probability contingencies.

      Assessing the QDR and 2011 defense budget

      Gordon Adams. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 02 March 2010.

      مقتطفات:

      …there is a core assumption in the QDR and defense budget that near-term missions are going to last forever, particularly counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations. The case for this projection seems to be based on the idea that Iraq and Afghanistan are the model for future US military operations. Here the QDR and defense budget miss the point completely. Iraq and Afghanistan were wars of choice, designed to overthrow a regime and rebuild those countries. Which other countries will we need to invade and rebuild in the future? Neither the QDR nor the budget provides any answers, calling into question the logic behind this premise.

      Matthew Hoey responds to the Mello-Knight exchange

      Matthew Hoey is the founder of the Military Space Transparency Project (MSTP) and a former senior research associate at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies (IDDS) where he specialized in forecasting developments in missile defense and military space technologies. He responded on 02 March 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration.
      ________________

      President Obama's hopes to begin the long march toward a nuclear free future are not limited to just words, though I understand how some may believe this to be the case. Upon closer examination, the President is taking the critical first steps in an effort to go beyond his address at Prague. The President is in the process of negotiating a new arms control treaty with the Russians, and it is highly likely that he will be pursuing even deeper cuts in the future. He has also made efforts to expand and strengthen the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Where are the results? Why have we not seen action? When will the nuclear threat begin to wane–even if it happens ever so slightly?

      This is a very informative thread, and I have enjoyed reading all of the entries. What Charles [Knight] has initiated here serves as an example of how if we draw upon all of the myriad arguments before us, we are sure to paint a more nuanced picture of the road to consensus and cooperation. The same could not be truer in regard to our domestic political and international diplomatic climates as well. Parties in all corners have legitimate disputes and concerns, and until these are all fully addressed in a courageous and aggressive new fashion it is my belief that our drive towards zero will never get in gear. Here are my thoughts on how we can get moving.

      One step would be for both American and Russian defense industries to gradually be converted into commercial industries – in the current global economy this would be slow to begin but would eventually reap tremendous benefits. Such a transition would even free university students from the confines of military contractors as a leading option for employment, ensuring that this generation of young people would not be bound to the archaic practices of the military industrial complex. The ripple effects on cooperative defense would be tremendous. As it is, our overall military capabilities are already unrivaled. Such reductions in military spending and subsequent reinvestment in new technology would not in fact lessen our strategic dominance, since cooperative defense would diminish the move-countermove dynamic that has long undermined disarmament efforts. Then taking into consideration cooperative defense and the promotion of one another's security, our mutual economic potential would be enhanced further, thus strengthening our international relationship to an unprecedented level.

      This would not be a cooperative security agreement limited to just sharing military and launch data; such a partnership would also extend into a shared strategic defense. In this era where the war on terror and the threat from extremism is the focal point of nations such as the US and Russia—ever posed with internally-based security threats and intrusions by radicals who would not hesitate to use a nuclear weapons in a major city—this simply makes sense.

      The pursuit of missile defense to guard against incoming threats is the single greatest impediment to progress – this is the lynch pin, and under the banner of reducing national security threats it does nothing more than increase them. It is a fool's pursuit. Should the United States pull back from its BMD aspirations in concert with the initiation of cooperative defense discussions, real progress toward reducing the threat of a missile attack against the US could begin. This would also help to motivate the US and Russia to find common ground in regard to Iran during this heady time. With the world's two military superpowers acting as enhanced security and economic partners, it is more likely that this leadership by example would take hold and could spur the beginning of a global trend over the long run.

      Spending has long been unrestrained within the nuclear complex and the national labs. This is a perennial phenomenon—the effect of unwavering pork barrel spending and lobbying by elected officials in cahoots with the defense industry to bring home jobs to their home districts. This cannot be undone without disastrous results. The US economy is addicted to the defense dollar and must be weaned from it gradually. This would come in the form of a transition away from the development of destructive technology and towards the development of beneficial technologies, for example, alternative energy solutions or emerging technologies that would enhance space exploration. Far too many working American families rely upon the defense budget and the nuclear dollar. If consensus for disarmament efforts is to extend across the aisles of Congress and the Senate, this must be understood and honored. If not, we face divisions and a squandered opportunity that may not present itself again.

      Once such a transition takes place, a type of economic vacuum effect could commence where free markets, capitalism and innovation driven by new technology could lift the US and Russian economies out of the mud that is the threat of nuclear annihilation. This vacuum effect was not possible in years past, and is actually enabled by the current economic crises and the need for new industries that would contribute to economic recovery and job creation. It does not require any more courage, concessions or clarity to pursue a world without nuclear weapons through such avenues than what is needed to cling onto weapons that can and will someday kill millions.

      When placed side-by-side, exchanges and the resulting debates regarding the increase in the nuclear complex budget versus the White House's current policy positions beg for such a solution. In fact, if such a solution is initiated cautiously through careful consideration of the needs of all parties, it could ripple across the economy help to address our greatest global challenges. This could be accomplished while progressively extracting more and more American and Russian scientists from the nuclear gadgetry industry and channeling their enormous individual and collective talents into a more prosperous direction.

      Barack Obama and Dimitri Medvedev have the courage and clarity to understand and express their willingness to discuss a world without nuclear weapons. Progress will require a steadfast commitment to courage in the face of the defense industry and the clarity to see that thousands of Russian and Americans rely on these industries and will need jobs that provide the means to support their families. Cooperative defense will lead to the beginning of a transition from massive defense spending to productive civilian investment that stands to benefit all.

      Offering concessions and placing cooperative defense on the table while viewing the road ahead in a broader context should get the discussion moving in a direction that turns words into additional actions. As long as the United States refuses to give up missile defense in Eastern Europe we will remain at a standstill.

      It was Dr. Randall Forsberg who opened my mind to this way of thinking. She taught me about how cooperative security could be used as a vehicle for peace. Her words that follow, written in 1992, ring today with a renewed poignancy:

      The end of the Cold war represents a turning point for the role of military force in international affairs. At this unique juncture in history, the world's main military spenders and arms producers have an unprecedented opportunity to move from confrontation to cooperation. The United States, the European nations, Japan and the republics of the former USSR can now replace their traditional security policies, based on deterrence and unilateral intervention, with cooperative policies based on minimum deterrence, non-offensive defense, nonproliferation, and multilateral peacekeeping.

      There are four important reasons to make this change, and make it quickly:

      First, massive resources are at stake. With a cooperative security policy, the United States could cut the annual military budget… A peace dividend on this order is exactly what we need to revitalize the economy and meet the backlog of needs in housing, health, education, environment and economic infrastructure.

      Second, the cooperative approach to security is prerequisite to stopping the global proliferation of armaments and arms industries. The prospect of proliferation has become the single greatest military threat to this country and to the world…

      Third, the choice by the major industrial nations either to perpetuate a US-dominated international security system or to develop a more cooperative system will have far-reaching political ramifications at home and abroad… here in America, the change would help reverse the nasty mixture of cynicism, violence, and racism that has increasingly pervaded our society since the first Reagan Administration made increases in military spending at the price of national debt and deep cuts in domestic programs.

      Last but not least, a cooperative approach to security is likely to be far more effective than the traditional approach in reducing the incidence and scale of war. Despite these enormous stakes, Congress and the Administration have, until recently, refused even to consider substantial cuts in post-Cold war defense spending, much less seize the unprecedented opportunity to develop a cooperative security system. [Randall Forsberg, "Defense Cuts and Cooperative Security in the Post-Cold War World", Boston Review , May 1992]

      Should President Obama choose to accept this torch I believe that we can achieve the goals outlined in Prague within our lifetime.

      Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century

      Matt Eckel. Foreign Policy Watch , 01 March 2010.
      http://fpwatch.blogspot.com/2010/03/nuclear-weapons-in-twenty-first-century.html

      مقتطفات:

      Though American leaders try not to say it out loud too often, one of the reasons Iran's nuclear program is unsettling to Washington is that it constrains the ability of the United States to topple the Iranian regime by force, should push come to shove. As a global hegemon, having the ability to wave our conventional military around and implicitly threaten recalcitrant middle powers with conquest is something America likes to be able to do. It's much harder if the recalcitrant middle power in question can credibly threaten to take out a couple of allied capital cities. Israel's nuclear program was originally founded on this logic, as was that of France.

      In Lean Times, Military Spending Still Gets a Pass

      Mark Thompson. Time Magazine , 24 February 2010.
      http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1967353,00.html

      مقتطفات:

      Let's repeat that: even without a superpower rival like the Soviet Union — with its arsenals of nuclear weapons, fleets of tanks and armadas of warships, all manned by 10-foot-tall Red Army troops — the US is now spending more preparing for war against, well, who knows, than we spent readying to fight Moscow. And the Obama Administration has made it clear that defense spending is going to continue to increase, even as fiscal pressures — for bailouts, health care, infrastructure — inexorably mount.

      As far as the eye can see, US taxpayers will be spending one-third more to maintain the US military than their parents and grandparents paid for the nation's Cold War force.

      The Obama disarmament paradox: A rebuttal

      John Isaacs and Robert G. Gard, Jr. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 24 February 2010.
      http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox-rebuttal

      John Isaacs : The executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Isaacs represents the center's sister organization, Council for a Livable World, on Capitol Hill. His expertise is in how Congress works, especially when it pertains to national security issues such as nuclear weapons and missile defense. Previously, he served as a legislative assistant on foreign affairs to former New York Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz.

      Robert G. Gard Jr. : A consultant on international security and education, Gard is the chair of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation's Board of Directors. He also is a member of the Bulletin's Science and Security Board. Previously, he served as president of the Monterey Institute of International Studies and as director of the Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center. During a military career that spanned three decades, he was an assistant to the secretary of defense and president of the National Defense University.

      ______________

      Greg Mello's recent Bulletin article “ The Obama Disarmament Paradox ” distorts the Obama administration's nuclear agenda by making unjustified assumptions that discredit President Barack Obama's historic commitment to seek a nuclear-weapon-free world. Obama has committed to such a goal several times–both before and after his election in November 2008. But Mello calls that a “vague aspiration” rather than a commitment. Yet the evidence he provides to support his assertion isn't persuasive.

      In fact, the president has advocated for numerous initiatives in a comprehensive nonproliferation program. These include winning UN Security Council endorsement for a nuclear-weapon-free world; negotiating a new arms reduction treaty with Russia, which Obama considers an interim agreement toward further reductions; preparing a Nuclear Posture Review consistent with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy; pledging to secure all loose nuclear materials over a four-year period; and taking an active role at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

      As President Obama stated during his seminal Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is a long-term goal that might not be achievable in his lifetime, but that doesn't minimize the necessity of taking interim steps to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation.

      Mello sees Obama's requested increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget for stockpile stewardship and the construction of new facilities at the nuclear laboratories as a commitment to the production of new nuclear weapons. Yet the administration has made clear that there are no such plans underfoot; the 2011 budget request states unequivocally that “new weapons systems will not be built.” As such, the president's requested increase in nuclear expenditures should be viewed in the context of seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and further nuclear weapon reductions.

      More largely, there is nothing inconsistent between a vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world and ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent in the interim, including refurbishment of aging systems, providing the labs with facilities to replace their deteriorating physical plants, and maintaining the essential expertise that the scientists at the labs provide. Nor does such a deterrent require “unending innovation,” as Mello claims. Our current nuclear weapons inventory, validated by extensive testing, is more than adequate to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United States, our troops abroad, and our allies, provided sufficient resources are dedicated to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

      Mello also seems to forget that the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world is both national and international law; the NPT, which the United States has ratified, includes a commitment to seek nuclear disarmament. Not to mention that the treaty has an important practical component: Its non-nuclear weapon states have conditioned treaty cooperation on the NPT's nuclear weapon states fulfilling their obligations under Article VI to move toward full nuclear disarmament.

      Thus, the “vision” of a nuclear-weapon-free world is essential as context for “the various nonproliferation initiatives” in Obama's plan to reduce dangerous threats to our national security–eg, nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

      President John F. Kennedy's June 1963 nuclear test ban speech at American University is famous not only for its rhetoric but also for its follow-through: Kennedy's words led to the end of aboveground nuclear testing. While it is legitimate to be skeptical about how successful Obama will be in implementing his disarmament agenda, let's hope Mello and others will wait to see how the follow-through progresses before they judge him too harshly. Anything else would be unfair.
      ____________

      Greg Mello responds to John Isaacs and Robert Gard:

      A “commitment” to a goal that a speaker says he may not achieve in his lifetime (let alone in his administration, the only germane period) is by definition an aspiration at best. If that “commitment” isn't concrete and specific it is vague. Such were Obama's very few words in Prague (and since) pertaining to disarmament. There have been no significant actions.
      I am interested in action — ours and the government's — not “hope.”

      In your reply, you simply reiterate the Administration's themes on these points.

      If you look over what you wrote, you will see that you freely conflate disarmament with nonproliferation issues and initiatives. You're not alone; many people do. I suppose that's the idea. These are quite different things, obviously. Preventing others from acquiring a nuclear deterrent has precious little to do with getting rid of my own. I nowhere argue against sound, just, and legal measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.

      I think you err significantly when you say “the pursuit of a nuclear-weapons-free world is both national and international law.” It is the achievement, not the pursuit, of this goal that is a binding legal requirement, unanimously confirmed by the International Court of Justice. Attempting to substitute an alleged aspiration (and that ominously vague), for achievement is a big step down from logic and law, a grave political disservice. This is all the more true when this alleged aspiration comes from the very temporary leader of the world's largest and most aggressive military power, and is then followed by a very large increase in nuclear weapons spending.

      I never said that a nuclear deterrent required “unending innovation.” I suspect we agree that the reverse is true. What I said was quite different: that the “deterrence of any adversary” to which Obama referred was unachievable, and therefore its pursuit implied unending innovation. I think investment itself, together with an ideology of technical “progress” – often expressed through fads like the quest for greater device “surety” – creates the hope that a “credible” nuclear deterrent, a deterrent that is relevant to “any” adversary as well as one that is “safe” and “secure,” can someday finally be achieved. Nuclear weapons will never be safe, secure, and they will never deter “any” adversary.

      There's many reasons why our leaders engage in this kind of crazy talk, and none of them are pretty.

      Disarmament aside, the warhead complex, especially at the physics labs, is riddled with waste and unnecessary programs and missions, which help drive down morale and scientific quality. I and many others believe the complex is grossly over-funded (by at least 40%) for the mission of maintaining the present arsenal indefinitely. Much smaller arsenals, right on down to zero, would be quite desirable from every perspective, and cheaper. The US arsenal can be unilaterally reduced to much lower levels without any loss of US “security.”

      If Obama wants to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in national security, and expects anybody to believe him, he must actually do so. Instead, building thousands of significantly upgraded bombs (a process already underway) with new requests to develop and produce more kinds of upgraded bombs, and the factories to make them, isn't disarmament at all. It's the modernization of everything for the long run – warheads, delivery systems, factories, everything.

      ______________

      Robert Gard and John Isaacs continue the exchange:

      It's gratifying to learn that Greg Mello agrees with us on the desirability of both sound measures to prevent nuclear proliferation and a “much smaller” US nuclear arsenal. For our part, we agree with him that the increase in funds programmed for the nuclear laboratories is excessive, although we don't see any inconsistency between ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear stockpile and reducing its size.

      We may have a basic disagreement regarding deterrence. It's not clear whether Mello's quote of deterring “any adversary” includes non-state actors or only nation states. If he is referring to nation states only, we believe even extended deterrence can be accomplished without “unending innovation” and with a smaller stockpile. If his definition includes non-state actors bent on terrorism, no amount of innovation or real investment can deter them from using a nuclear weapon should they acquire one.

      We certainly concede the point that most measures designed to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation wouldn't qualify as disarmament, but they may facilitate reductions in nuclear stockpiles, which would qualify as disarmament.

      Finally, let's return to the basic issue of President Obama's commitment to seeking, as a goal, a nuclear-weapon-free world. Even if it is an “aspiration,” that doesn't reduce its importance. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligates the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” And although Mello might not consider the action “significant,” Obama did chair a UN Security Council meeting with other heads of state that resulted in a resolution affirming the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Additionally, to meet our obligation under Article VI, Obama has stated his intent to follow up the new START treaty with negotiations involving all of the nuclear powers to reduce stockpiles of weapons.

      Coming full circle, these actions taken are essential to obtain the cooperation of the non-nuclear weapons states in measures to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation, which both we and Mello favor.

      for deflecting any scrutiny of the military budget

      Get Serious About Reform: Budget Challenges Will Force Hard Choices

      by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight. Defense News , 21 February 2010.

      During the past decade, the US Defense Department has enjoyed a rise in its budget unprecedented since the Korean War. With President Barack Obama's fiscal 2011 budget request, it is up nearly 100 percent in real terms from its post-Cold War low. But few observers believe that this level of spending can continue in light of the mounting national debt. So it is wise to think now about options for savings.

      A way to begin is to ask, what has driven budgets so high? Obviously, the wars are part of the answer. But they account for only 20 percent of today's expenditures. And they are the least likely targets for economizing.

      It is more fruitful to reflect on the shortcomings in past efforts at defense reform. Can we do it better? It is also worth thinking about the practice of force modernization during the post-Cold War period, which has been distinctly undisciplined.

      The end of the Cold War presented a unique opportunity – as well as a manifest need – for the structural reform of our defense posture. The force reductions of the 1990s necessarily risked decreased efficiency, due to the loss of economies of scale affecting support activities and equipment acquisition. The standard solution to such problems is to restructure as one gets smaller, matching reductions in size with a reduction in complexity – a practice the DoD did not, for the most part, follow.

      Although smaller, DoD and the services have largely retained or even increased their complexity. For instance, there are today 50 major commands either one step above or below the service level – not much different from during the Cold War.

      In our recent study of budget trends , we identify a dozen areas where significant changes had been proposed in the 1990s. These involved service roles and missions, consolidation of various support and training functions, and recentering budget and acquisition planning at the joint level.

      In addition, the need to reform DoD's acquisition, logistics and financial management systems has been evident for a long, long time. However, only two reform initiatives – competitive sourcing and military base closures – were pursued far enough to yield significant annual savings, and these have not amounted to more than 4 percent of the defense budget.

      There also was hope in the mid-1990s that a “revolution in military affairs” might lead to new efficiencies. We would reap more bang for the buck by means of increased battlefield awareness, improved logistics, increased capacities for standoff precision attack, and the networking of units within and across services.

      In some areas, such as precision attack, capability has dramatically increased. Theater logistics also have improved. But nowhere has the revolution in information technology led to manifest and substantial savings. Rather than supplant-ing legacy capabilities and platforms, the new technology has mostly just supplemented them.

      In prospect, the evolution of net-centric warfare might reduce the need for redundant capabilities. But progress toward the services sharing a common nervous system has been slow and mostly involved special operations units and precision ground attack. Generally, net-centric capabilities exist as an anemic overlay to traditional service-centric structures and assets.

      DoD and the services have faced little pressure to economize or transform during the past decade. This is also evident in equipment acquisition.

      We can discern three distinct acquisition trends at work in recent decades. First, there are legacy programs that came forward from the Cold War period with considerable institutional momentum. Second, there are programs reflecting the revolutionary potential of new information technologies. Finally, there are adaptive programs, such as the recent mass purchase of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, that correspond to new mission requirements.

      In an ideal world, the imperative to adapt to new missions and circumstances would draw on the revolutionary potential of new technologies to rewrite or supplant legacy programs. But this has not happened.

      Too much of the $2.5 trillion in modernization funding since 1990 perpetuated the status quo circa 1990. Transformational acquisition was mostly restricted to producing supplements, such as Predator drones, to the legacy arsenal. And adaptive acquisition was largely delayed until field experiences forced a flurry of ad hoc efforts beginning six years ago.

      The Pentagon's central authorities have done too little, too late to compel the integration of modernization efforts along adaptive lines. Legacy, transformational and adaptive modernization have lurched forward together, but poorly integrated and competing for resources. And yet, even though modernization spending now surpasses that of the Reagan era, no one is happy with the result.

      For 10 years, Congress and the White House have been permissive when it comes to defense spending; this has undercut any impetus for reform and prioritization. Obama's decision to further boost the defense budget suggests that this dysfunction will persist for a while, but this, too, is a bubble that will burst. Preparing for that eventuality means revisiting options for structural reform and getting clearer on our strategic priorities.

      Todd Fine responds to the Mello-Knight exchange

      Todd Fine organized and developed the Global Zero campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons as a program officer at the World Security Institute. He is currently working to establish the Iran Data Portal at Princeton University. He responded on 18 February 2010 to the Knight-Mello exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration.

      ___________________

      Fine:

      President Obama's exceedingly generous budget request for the nuclear weapons labs has boiled long-simmering anxieties about the concrete policy impact of his frequently expressed “vision” for “a world without nuclear weapons.” Aligning with the prominent series of op-eds in The Wall Street Journal, Obama repeated this earnest aspiration consistently throughout the campaign for the presidency, and in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech and April 2009 policy speech in Prague.

      Given the ambition of this vision in practical terms, and, of course, the now apparent serious interest in its achievement by predecessor Ronald Reagan, it is not surprising that long-time advocates have expected policy proposals that would explicitly move in this direction. Yet, these budgeting numbers signal an overall regression. They will further institutionalize the development of new weapons and will make restructuring the labs toward other functions more difficult.

      The failure to assure advocates began at the rhetoric's root. Despite the welcome credibility they have given the anti-nuclear cause, the op-ed authors – George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and William Perry – had a burden to consider how other countries perceive the size and activities of our weapons laboratories. At the same time in 2007 that American anti-nuclear lobbyists and activists were feverishly working to block funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) in Congress, Kissinger forwarded an analysis by Shultz and Hoover fellow Sidney Drell to Sen. Pete Domenici supporting investments in the program. And although Nunn declared that he was opposed to the RRW, he signaled his acceptance for large-scale increases in lab funding in the foursome's third op-ed in The Wall Street Journal on January 19, 2010. Unlike the previous op-eds, which were enthusiastically endorsed by others and received with much fanfare by the press, this one seemed clinically designed to give their reputational blessing to the upcoming budget numbers.

      Chief nuclear negotiator under President Reagan, Max Kampelman, who has claimed that he originally prompted George Shultz to return to the question of elimination, has advocated a bold path to zero using multilateral processes in the United Nations. Indeed, outlining the divisions among the foreign policy elite, the Global Zero campaign was initiated by a number of attendees of the Shultz-led Hoover Institution meetings who were dissatisfied with the extreme focus on short-term “steps” instead of the explicit practicalities of achieving the ultimate goal. And following that, the policy program of Global Zero itself has revealed a split between the advocates of immediate multilateralization of the strategic arms control process and others who propose that a decades-long series of US-Russia agreements expand into a multilateral process.

      These assorted divisions among the elite may come to the fore at the May NPT Review Conference as other nations test the United States' new-found commitment to the treaty's stated objective of disarmament. Given the current crises involving Iran and North Korea and the shortening window of Obama's dynamism on the world stage, if the President fails to inspire others to adopt his “vision” and work toward elimination concretely, he may miss a singular opportunity. If CTBT, which is symbolic despite its limitations, is not ratified by the conference date, these budget requests alone may devastate US credibility. And as Greg Mello's logic indicates, other nations are unlikely to be impressed with the scale of the START follow-on treaty, and there are not yet any indications that the posture review language on “the role” of nuclear weapons will be that momentous in terms of practical implications.

      In order to blunt these concerns and sincerely recommit to the vision, there are a number of policy proposals the Obama administration could potentially advocate going into the review conference:

        1. A funded international program that would initiate cooperative research into verification technologies and enforcement strategies that would be required in a world of “global zero.”

        2. The initiation of an international audit of all existing nuclear weapons and material.

        3. Sponsorship of initial discussions on a timeline for negotiations and targets involved in the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

      However, as Charles Knight mentioned with respect to international concerns about the United States' superiority in conventional weapons, these actions would only be a start. Given the terrifying overall budget projections and the abject failure of our military contracting and procurement processes, the United States needs to reformulate its entire defense posture and budget. In order to convince states like Russia and China to approach low numbers of nuclear weapons, it might even be necessary to consider multilateral treaty restrictions on general conventional forces and on specific advanced weapons systems like Prompt Global Strike. If the elimination aspiration is sincere, then these concerns are unavoidable and should be seriously studied and contemplated.

      Max Kampelman, the symbolic initiator of the present return to abolitionism, has spoken powerfully of what real leadership by an American president, especially when morally confident and unabashed, can accomplish. President Obama's rhetoric on the elimination of nuclear weapons apparently inspired some enough to award him the Nobel Peace Prize; if he is sincere, he owes it to the younger generation to present a clear path to elimination, if not in his lifetime, then in ours.

      Stop at Start

      Barry Blechman. New York Times , 18 February 2010.
      http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19blechman.html

      مقتطفات:

      Here's how a global nuclear disarmament treaty could work. First, it would spell out a decades-long schedule for the verified destruction of all weapons, materials and facilities. Those possessing the largest arsenals — the United States and Russia — would make deep cuts first. Those with smaller arsenals would join at specified dates and levels. To ensure that no state gained an advantage, the treaty would incorporate “rest stops”: if a state refused to comply with a scheduled measure, other nations' reductions would be suspended until the violation was corrected. This dynamic would generate momentum, but also ensure that if the effort collapsed, the signatories would be no less secure than before.

      المحرر التعليق:
      There is something missing in this measured disarmament scheme which invalidates it as a path to full nuclear disarmament. Blechman makes an erroneous assumption shared by too many nuclear disarmament advocates. He assumes that nuclear weapons are a class of weapons that can be dealt with in isolation from the problems of international security and insecurity. Nuclear weapons cannot be separated strategically from the context of the conventional military power they supplement.

      Note the following phrase in the above excerpt from Blechman: “To ensure that no state gained an advantage…” His prescription applies only to nuclear weapons and presumes no adjustments to conventional military power. In those conditions some states stand to gain considerable advantage from nuclear disarmament.

      Imagine the case of Russia in Blechman's staged draw down of nuclear forces with the US As Russia approaches zero nuclear weapons they become more and more vulnerable to superior US conventional military power.

      Without parallel and compensatory reductions and adjustments in conventional forces and strong political assurances weaker nations such as Russia will never agree to give up all their nuclear weapons.

      Careful schemes of balanced nuclear weapons disarmament of the type that Blechman argues for cannot by themselves get us to zero nuclear weapons. Compensating for the national insecurities arising from imbalances in conventional military power must be part of any formula for full nuclear disarmament. We need to work toward an international security regime that delivers the reassurance of fifty years without international aggression and military intervention. After that period of peace nuclear nations might be ready to go to zero.

      Obama's Nuclear Decision Day

      Joe Cirincione. Huffington Post , 17 February 2010.
      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/obamas-nuclear-decision-d_b_465223.html

      مقتطفات:

      … democracy does not apply to nuclear weapons policy. It never has. No nation has ever had a vote on whether to go nuclear. These decisions are made in secret. They don't have to be.

      Jonathan Granoff responds to the Mello-Knight exchange

      Jonathan Granoff is president of the Global Security Institute . He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .
      Jonathan Granoff is the author of Memo to Obama: Nuclear Weapons , which appeared in Tikkun Magazine , January-February 2009.

      __________________

      Jonathan Granoff:

      Was President Obama outplayed by DOD and DOE? They have posed a very clever analysis. If progress is to be had on nonproliferation, such as support for a test ban, then modernization and the ability to strengthen the capacity to improve the arsenal seems to be the cost. Does this still allows them to say that the modernization “might require testing someday?” This will be an enormous benefit for those who want to stop the test ban. Will it not be like the Clinton administration's deal with Stockpile Stewardship where he thought funding it would generate their support for the test ban but did not gain the full out support of DOE?

      I am consistently surprised by how naive politicians appear when challenged by strategic military planners. So, I state this as an example where it appears that President Obama really wants to make progress (not necessarily on disarmament, but certainly on nonproliferation) and even here he is getting cul de sacked .

      Or, is he fully aware of the strategy being played out. Does Mr. Mello think he was being deceptive in the Prague speech, or just a bit cute?

      Regardless, the current programs being funded that Mr. Mello highlights will certainly make achieving any strengthening of the nonproliferation aspirations of the Administration at the upcoming NPT very difficult. They certainly do not seem to be consistent with a commitment to disarmament.

      I sincerely hope I am wrong and look forward to hearing from some of the people in the current Administration whom I respect very much, such as Ambassador Rice and Assistant Secretary of State Gottemoeller.

      Greg Mello responds to Jonathan Granoff:

      Among your other interesting points, you raise this question: “Does Mr. Mello think he [Obama] was being deceptive in the Prague speech, or just a bit cute?” I would say neither. The substitution of an aspiration for a commitment or promise is a rhetorical device so normal these questions don't arise. Both the speaker and the audience expect some sort of ritual acknowledgment of our common aspirations. The gap between those aspirations and our actual practice is fairly embarrassing; many members of the audience are looking for some sort of fantasy bridge between the two. They don't want bad news, they want “hope.”

      Somehow we have gone from “I will put a chicken in every pot” to “I will seek to put a chicken in every pot.” There is less accountability in the second formulation, which may be especially helpful in a time of contracting national prospects — in which contraction, the increased nuclear military spending I am criticizing plays a central symbolic role. Our hopes are greater than the realities available to service them. We, and our donors and supporters, want Santa Claus.

      Paul Ingram responds to Mello-Knight exchange

      Paul Ingram is the executive director of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) . He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .

      Ingram:

      Everyone knows that in this tough world of realist nuclear politics it does not pay to be naïve. What is less frequently recognised is that in a world of global threat it can be equally dangerous to play an extreme game of zero trust.

      So we have to go through this strange and difficult world navigating a constant and complex series of considered calculations, making judgments based upon evidence and previous experience, what we can trust and what we cannot. That goes as much for those of us trying to influence decision-makers as much as for officials making decisions over foreign policy.

      So when a President gets up and makes a speech that contains within it commitments to a world free of nuclear weapons, proposing a number of initiatives, and looking forward to concrete commitments in the near term, it pays to be hopeful, but not gullible. And we have the first test of this hope in the very near future when the President comes to publish a version of his long awaited Nuclear Posture Review.

      Let me say at the outset that I am not intimately familiar with the inner workings of the Obama Adminsitration's game plan, with the NPR, the START follow-on negotiations, these investments. I don't like these investments in the infrastructure [weapons complex] any more than Greg. I think they are a waste of US taxpayer's resources, and America and the world would be better off without them, with existing budgets devoted to further winding down the infrastructure, clean-up and the like.

      But there remain several reasons for treating Obama's nuclear diplomacy, and these investments, seriously:

      1) It is a new departure. Now, bask in that fact, but I agree with Greg, this is hardly a cause for great celebration.

      2) There are no obvious electoral benefits in this for Obama beyond the concrete international results that pertain. Few Americans will vote differently on this, unless President Obama actually delivers upon this agenda and appears come the next election as a President that delivers on the international scene. In actual fact, if the agenda were a cynical one, he will more likely end up seen as a President big on promises and weak on delivery – whether he is genuine or not, this is a likely and very depressing outcome.

      3) The view that is being taken by the Administration over the need for this level of extra investment may be misguided, but it does hold a certain level of internal consistency. Let's be honest, few things in politics are pure and simple, black and white. Even the JASON report, when pointing out that the warheads were in good shape, said that the infrastructure itself was under severe strain through lack of investment and the challenge of attracting talent into the profession. The belief that we need to reduce slowly and multilaterally whilst maintaining a nuclear force well into the future may be frustrating to many of us, and highlight the fact that we still live in a world where governments have not yet understood the need for more radical shifts in their postures, but it does not contradict the vision. And let's be clear here, commitment to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, whilst only the first step, is an important one nevertheless. And if you were based in France, you'd know what a big step it was.

      4) Perhaps most important, the Obama Administration, and we ourselves, need to consider strategically how we can realistically bring the majority of Americans, Russians, and God knows, the Indians, Pakistanis and Israelis along with us (everyone these days focuses on the Iranians but trust me, they are easy in comparison). It is not effective simply to state positions and push through initiatives against majority opposition, even when you are the most powerful man in the world. You still have to convince Congress, the Americans people, and then colleagues abroad, in a huge complex web of inter-relationships that are not conducive to rational debate, let alone instruction. It takes gentle engagement, openness to others' perspectives, appreciation of diversity, team work and many other cooperative skills beyond policy work to build the process necessary for disarmament. And that takes building confidence. And that probably requires the sort of investment we are witnessing today.

      Bill Hartung responds to Mello-Knight exchange

      William D. Hartung is Director of the Arms and Security Initiative at the New America Foundation. He responded on 15 February 2010 to the Mello-Knight exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and the Obama administration .

      ______________

      Hartung:

      Obama's aspirations go beyond just his statement at Prague. He is in the midst of negotiating a new nuclear arms
      reduction treaty with Russia, with a possible follow-on seeking deeper cuts; he has committed himself publicly to pursuing ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a treaty banning the production of bomb-making materials
      (the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty); he is hosting a nuclear security summit of scores of nations to work on plans to secure or destroy “loose nukes” and bomb-making materials; and he hosted a meeting of the UN Security Council (the first US president to do so) to reinforce disarmament pledges of numerous key players.

      Some of these changes can occur without major restructuring of US conventional forces (new reductions with Russia and new nuclear security measures, for example).

      Everything beyond that will require substantial changes first, as Charles suggests, not only in US conventional forces and posture but in regional politics in security dynamics in South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Middle East (Israel, Iran, and host of related questions, including an Israeli-Palestinian setttlement). And current actions such as boosting spending on the nuclear weapons complex need to be reversed.

      Many of these factors are rarely or not fully discussed by many — but not all — of the advocates of “getting to zero.”

      So, I guess I agree with many of the points made by Charles and Greg, but I'm not ready to give up on the prospect of some significant changes in nuclear policies and postures. My sense is that we should applaud Obama's commitments and then hold him to his word, not presume that progress is impossible.

      If You Could See America Through China's Eyes

      Steve Clemons. TPM Cafe , 13 February 2010.
      http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/02/13/several_years_ago_i_met/

      ونزع السلاح أوباما مفارقة

      Greg Mello. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , 10 February 2010.
      http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox
      Greg Mello is the executive director and co-founder of the Los Alamos Study Group .

      ______________

      Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama gave a speech that many have interpreted as a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.

      Now, however, the White House is requesting one of the larger increases in warhead spending history. If its request is fully funded, warhead spending would rise 10 percent in a single year, with further increases promised for the future. Los Alamos National Laboratory, the biggest target of the Obama largesse, would see a 22 percent budget increase, its largest since 1944. In particular, funding for a new plutonium “pit” factory complex there would more than double, signaling a commitment to produce new nuclear weapons a decade hence.

      So how is the president's budget compatible with his disarmament vision?

      The answer is simple: There is no evidence that Obama has, or ever had, any such vision. He said nothing to that effect in Prague. There, he merely spoke of his commitment “to seek . . . a world without nuclear weapons,” a vague aspiration and hardly a novel one at that level of abstraction. He said that in the meantime the United States “will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”

      Since nuclear weapons don't, and won't ever, “deter any adversary,” this too was highly aspirational, if not futile. The vain search for an “effective” arsenal that can deter “any” adversary requires unending innovation and continuous real investment, including investment in the extended deterrent to which Obama referred. The promise of such investments, and not disarmament, was the operative message in Prague as far as the US stockpile was concerned. In fact, proposed new investments in extended deterrence were already being packaged for Congress when Obama spoke.

      To fulfill his supposed “disarmament vision,” Obama offered just two approaches in Prague, both indefinite. First, he spoke vaguely of reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” It's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean. Most likely it refers to official discourse–what officials say about nuclear doctrine–as opposed to actual facts on the ground. Second, Obama promised to negotiate “a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START] with the Russians.” As far as nuclear disarmament went in the speech, that was it.

      Of course, Obama also said his administration would promptly pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an action not yet taken and one entirely unrelated to US disarmament. The rest of the speech was devoted to various nonproliferation initiatives that his administration planned to seek.

      On July 8, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced their Joint Understanding, committing their respective countries to somewhere between 500 to 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles and 1,500 to 1,675 deployed strategic warheads, very modest goals to be achieved a full seven years after the treaty entered into force. Total arsenal numbers wouldn't change, so strategic warheads could be taken from deployment and placed in a reserve–de-alerted, in effect. The treaty wouldn't affect nonstrategic warheads. It wouldn't require dismantlement. As Hans Kristensen at the Federation of American Scientists has explained, the delivery vehicle limits require little, if any, change from US and Russian expected deployments.

      Ironically, it's possible that the retirement PDF of 4,000 or more US warheads under the Moscow Treaty and other retirements ordered by George W. Bush may exceed anything Obama does in terms of disarmament. As for the stockpile and weapons complex, Bush's aspirations were far more hawkish than Congress ultimately allowed. Real budgets for warheads fell during his last three years in office. Now, with the Democrats controlling the executive branch and both houses of Congress, congressional restraint is notable by its absence. What Obama mainly seems to be “disarming” is congressional resistance to variations of some of the same proposals Bush found it difficult to authorize and fund.

      Last May Obama sent his first budget to Congress, calling for flat warhead spending. At that time, the administration was still displaying a measured approach toward replacement and expansion of warhead capabilities.

      That said, in last year's budget the White House did acquiesce to a Pentagon demand to request funding for a major upgrade to four B61 nuclear bomb variants–one of which had just completed a 20-year-plus life-extension program. Just one day before that budget was released a grand nuclear strategy review previously requested by the armed services committees was unveiled. It was chaired by William Perry, a member of the governing board of the corporation that manages Los Alamos, and recurrent Cold War fixture James Schlesinger. [Full disclosure: Perry is also a member of the Bulletin's Board of Sponsors.]

      The report's recommendations for increased spending and weapons development quickly began to serve as a rallying point for defense hawks–surely the point of the exercise. Overall, it was largely a conclusory pastiche of recycled Cold War notions, entirely lacking in analysis and often factually wrong. But neither the White House nor leading congressional Democrats offered any public resistance or rebuttal to its conclusions.

      More largely, opposition to nuclear restraint within the administration quickly emerged from its usual redoubts at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Pentagon, STRATCOM, and interested players in both parties in Congress. Plus, Obama left key Bush appointees in place at NNSA while the Pentagon added some familiar faces from the Clinton administration, leaving serious questions about the ability of the White House to develop an independent understanding of the issues, let alone present one to Congress.

      Either way, potential treaty ratification is surely a major factor in White House thinking. Senate Republicans, as expected, are demanding significant nuclear investments prior to considering ratification of any START follow-on treaty. Democratic hawks, especially powerful ones with pork-barrel interests at stake such as New Mexico Sen. Jeff Bingaman, also must be satisfied in the ratification process. All in all this makes the latest Obama budget request a kind of “preemptive surrender” to nuclear hawks. So whether or not the president has a disarmament “vision” is irrelevant. What is important are the policy commitments embodied in the budget request and whether Congress will endorse them.

      Investments on the scale requested should be flatly unacceptable to all of us. The country and the world face truly apocalyptic security challenges from climate change and looming shortages of transportation fuels. Our economy is very weak and will remain so for the foreseeable future. The proposed increases in nuclear weapons spending, embedded as they are in an overall military budget bigger than any since the 1940s, should be a clarion call for renewed political commitment in service of the fundamental values that uphold this, or any, society.

      Those values are now gravely threatened–not least by a White House uncertain about, or unwilling or unable to fight for, what is right.

      المحرر التعليق:

      Mello does a good job of explaining why there will be little progress toward nuclear abolition during the Obama administration. Further he makes a good case that the current administration seems to be headed towards feeding the nuclear weapons complex to a greater degree than Bush was able. Who'd of thought!

      But Mello misses on a couple points. One is that he dismisses too quickly the nuclear abolition aspiration Obama stated in Prague. Those few words may have little affect on policy, but they do mark a return to the rhetoric of all atomic age administrations up until George W. Bush markedly abandoned such aspirations. What is the value of that rhetoric? Mostly it gives credence to those who organize around abolition — something of value, but not much.

      Secondly, Mello states that when Obama spoke of…

      …reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy” it's far from clear what that might actually mean, or even what it could mean.

      Actually, this statement of Obama's refers to something quite specific and important. The US has been advancing for several decades to an unprecedented level of conventional force dominance over all other nations (see Bernard I. Finel on strategic meaning of US conventional military power). At this point the US can anticipate gaining even more strategic advantage if it can convince other nations to join in disposing of nuclear weaponry (for an official statement of this strategic formula see Vice President Biden's speech at the National Defense University on 18 February 2010.) This is indeed quite an aspiration!

      This connection of conventional dominance to nuclear dominance brings me to the other shortcoming of Mello's article. Nuclear abolition will be impossible without a significant restructuring of the international (in-)security system. Why would Russia or China eschew nuclear weapons or N. Korea and Iran abandon efforts to obtain them while these nations remain utterly vulnerable to US conventional strike?

      Leaders of popular efforts for nuclear disarmament almost never acknowledge this strategic problem. That's a disservice to their cause, because it leaves a major obstacle to disarmament in place with no plan (or even awareness of the need for a plan) to remove it.

      The eventuality of an agreement to abolish nuclear weapons will require the US to first draw down its conventional military power. And concurrent to a deep draw down of US conventional military power there must be a build up of international structures which can take up more and more of the responsibility for global security.

      Such a transfer of power and responsibility will probably happen someday , but we are certainly not presently on that path. That is one more “change” that Obama is not pursuing, not even aspirationally.

      Greg Mello responds to the editor's comments:

      I think your comments are excellent. Let me begin with the second one, with which I wholly agree. Our work here at the [Los Alamos] Study Group has emphasized nuclear weapons issues in part because of our geographic, and hence political, locus adjacent to the two largest nuclear weapons laboratories.

      The barrier to nuclear disarmament posed by military policies and investments that express an aspiration for “full spectrum dominance” on a global scale is almost certainly insuperable. Nuclear disarmament is only consistent with a quite different conception of national security than we now have and with a quite different economic structure internally as well. The good news — and I think we have to make it good where it may not appear so at first glance, since we have no other choice — is that our empire is failing.

      Your first point, which relates to the symbolic value of Obama's disarmament statements, is also sound, but here I think that symbolic value is greatly outweighed by the passivity and compliance which his statements have engendered in civil society. The actors and forces which could and should be forcefully working for disarmament have been themselves disarmed by what amounts to propaganda.

      Hypocrisy may be the homage paid to the ideal by the real, but it is not leadership, it is not honest, and it will not produce anything of value in this case. At the moment, it is allowing the nuclear weapons establishment to do what it could not accomplish previously: increase production capacity and provide greater, not lesser, endorsement of nuclear weapons in all their aspects, both materially and symbolically.

      Obama's disarmament aspiration, so called, is a faint echo compared to the full-throated endorsement of nuclear weapons it is enabling.

      Day of Reckoning Ahead for US Defense Spending

      Sandra I. Erwin. National Defense , March 2010.
      http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/March/Pages/DefenseWatch.aspx

      مقتطفات:

      The government's own defense gurus are warning that it is not a question of if, but when the United States will lose its military superpower status.

      These ominous predictions, by all accounts, are hard to fathom. The Pentagon's budget this year is the highest since World War II — and accounts for almost half of what the world's militaries spend.

      But with the nation drowning in debt, it isn't difficult to see how the financial burdens of superpowerdom may be too much to bear. The United States, some experts warn, would be wise to restrain military spending in order to regain its financial strength.

      A False Nuclear Alarm Debunking the Wall Street Journal's radioactive scaremongering

      Joseph Cirincione. Foreign Policy , 06 January 2010.
      http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/a_false_nuclear_alarm?page=0,0

      مقتطفات:

      Policy experts, however, expect the new budget to be released in February to fully fund the nuclear weapons complex and support both the United States' science-and-engineering base and its nuclear stockpile. Vice President Joe Biden — pilloried in the Journal's editorial — is personally leading this effort, meeting with the leaders of US nuclear weapons laboratories, military chiefs, and top experts to forge a budget and strategic consensus.

      There is, in fact, a broad, bipartisan consensus on a new nuclear security strategy that would prevent nuclear terrorism, prevent new nuclear-armed nations, and steadily reduce Cold War nuclear weapons stockpiles. Many conservatives support an approach that would maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for as long as nuclear weapons are needed.

      A False Nuclear Start Forty-one Senators vs. Biden on warhead modernization.

      editorial, Wall Street Journal , 05 January 2010.
      http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704039704574616263692875836.html

      مقتطفات:

      The Obama Administration continues to negotiate with the Russians over a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start), but one big question is whether it can get the result through the US Senate. A group of Senators is telling the White House that it will have little or no chance of success unless it also moves ahead with nuclear-warhead modernization.

      Why COIN Will Fail in Afghanistan

      J. Sigger. Arm Chair Generalist , 31 December 2009.
      http://armchairgeneralist.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/12/why-coin-will-fail-in-afghanistan.html

      A Leak About the Phantom Army

      Meteor Blades. Daily Kos , 30 December 2009.
      http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2009/12/30/820467/-A-Leak-About-the-Phantom-Army

      مقتطفات:

      …the Afghan National Army is a farce; there's little chance of turning it into a cohesive fighting force; and there's zero chance of doing so on a speedy timetable…

      Afghanistan's never-ending challenge

      HDS Greenway. Boston Globe , 16 December 2009.

      مقتطفات:

      The enemy, then as now, always rallied to the reliable call of “jihad'' against the infidel invaders no matter who they were. Of all the tribes, those of the Pashtuns were the most feared.

      The motives for fighting in Afghanistan were fear, prestige, and retribution. The British feared Russian expansion, and always sought to put their man on the throne to do Britain's bidding. Retribution always followed military setbacks, and national prestige was used as the reason to fight on. British control over Afghanistan was thought necessary for the defense of India.

      Russia followed the same scenario, fearing that if Afghanistan's pro-Communist government should fail, it would endanger Russia's Muslim regions.

      The United States invaded Afghanistan out of fear of Al Qaeda, and retribution for 9/11. And today you often hear the national prestige argument that we cannot let the Holy Warriors believe they can defeat a second superpower. More and more, America's Afghan policy is tied into protecting the stability of Pakistan, once part of British India.

      ينقل ميزانية عوامة صناعة الدفاع

      Loren B. Thompson. Lexington Institute, 14 December 2009.
      http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/budget-moves-buoy-defense-industry

      مقتطفات:

      First, even before President Obama decided to send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, the administration had already decided to spend more on overseas contingencies in 2011 that the $130 billion it planned to spend in 2010. Second, Jason Sherman of insidedefense.com reported this month that the White House will support increasing the regular defense budget (not including overseas contingencies) by $14 billion above what was planned for 2011, meaning it will rise from the $542 billion forecast in May to $556 billion. Third, Vago Muradian of Defense News reported this weekend that total increases above the May plan for the regular defense budget across the 2011-2015 spending period will reach $100 billion.

      المحرر التعليق:

      Looks as if the Obama administration's plan to reduce Federal expenditures on war (contingency) operations and to hold increases in the base Pentagon budget to dollar inflation have come unraveled at less than a year into the budgeting plan and the administration. It is a shame, because it is so unnecessary.

      Obama's folly

      Andrew J. Bacevich. Los Angeles Times , 03 December 2009.
      http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich3-2009dec03,0,3209129.story

      مقتطفات:

      So the war launched as a prequel to Iraq now becomes its sequel, with little of substance learned in the interim. To double down in Afghanistan is to ignore the unmistakable lesson of Bush's thoroughly discredited “global war on terror”: Sending US troops to fight interminable wars in distant countries does more to inflame than to extinguish the resentments giving rise to violent anti-Western jihadism

      The Afghanistan Parenthesis

      David Bromwich. Huffington Post , 02 December 2009.
      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/the-afghanistan-parenthes_b_377141.html

      مقتطفات:

      … the president spoke as if Al Qaeda were the name of a distinct, finite, searchable entity that can be subdued by an intensification (lasting exactly 18 months) of American fighting in the country that was once its camp. As for the Taliban, whatever else they may be, they are native to Afghanistan. This cannot be said of Al Qaeda, but it cannot be said, either, of the soldiers, trainers, advisers, and contractors sent by the United States.

      There is a misjudged air of precision in the idea of a renewed and extended war that closes at 18 months because that “benchmark” was settled in advance. How can anyone be sure that the scale of so entangling a mission, with so many pitfalls, will fit neatly into the shape of a year and a half?

      Are American Muslims A Threat?

      response by Michael Brenner to question posed by James Kitfield on National Journal Expert Blog, 19 November 2009.
      http://security.nationaljournal.com/2009/11/are-american-muslims-a-threat.php#1393085

      مقتطفات:

      …all it would take to restore sanity is some slight reflection on our dismal performance everywhere we have tried our hand at manipulation in the Greater Middle East since 9/11. We have been consistently arrogant, incompetent, corrupt – in all senses, callous to the pain inflicted on the natives and ourselves alike, and abject failures.

      بناء في 2 الأخطاء: حالة مشكوك فيها لمكافحة التمرد

      Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy , 16 November 2009.

      Editor's Comment

      Walt makes a fundamental strategic point. The Bush wars involved operational and grand strategic errors, so why institutionalize a shift in defense planning that in effect has the US military prepare for more strategic errors by our leadership? Why not opt to correct the error? It is really an elemental point of strategy: Don't compound error!

      I understand how military professionals who have been ordered to take on foolish strategic missions might feel that counterinsurgency theory is an attractive way out of their tactical and operational dilemmas. But there is really no excuse for civilian leaders, including Sec Def Gates, chasing the mirage of COIN as if it were an answer for our current problems dealing with the consequences of a disastrous Bush national security strategy. Change the strategy and there will be no need for investments in COIN!

      تصورات التمرد وآثارها على عملية سياسة مكافحة التمرد

      Adam L. Silverman. Sic Semper Tyrannis , 12 November 2009.

      مقتطفات:

      Given the reality that the US faces in Afghanistan; the historic lack of functional centralized government, exceedingly high number of societal elements, many of which are geographically isolated or semi-isolated, the illegitimacy of the current Afghan government, and the fact that groups we are fighting are not all insurgents makes successfully reaching the COIN end state of tethering Afghan society back to the Afghan state very, very difficult. The debate on the use of COIN really needs to be focused in on this difficult set of Afghan circumstances and whether they allow any chance for a positive counterinsurgency outcome.

      Full Spectrum Dominance and COIN

      Dave Anderson. News Hoggers , 06 November 2009.
      http://www.newshoggers.com/blog/2009/11/full-spectrum-dominance-and-coin.html

      مقتطفات:

      COIN does not decrease the chance of future interventions; it instead probably increases the chance of future interventions and invasions as it is a “solution” that is “proven to work” as long as not too many questions are raised about either what “working” means or the initial rosy scenario assumptions that are made to sell the invasion.

      اسحب القابس على موجة الأفغاني

      تشارلز كوبشان وستيفن سايمون. فاينانشيال تايمز، 03 نوفمبر 2009.
      http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e98cbae-c8c6-11de-8f9d-00144feabdc0.html

      From Iraq, Lessons for the Next War

      Alissa J. Rubin. New York Times . 31 October 2009.
      http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/weekinreview/01RUBIN.html

      الوهم من النصر

      Gian P. Gentile. New York Times , 31 October 2009.
      http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/opinion/31iht-edgentile.html?_r=1

      مقتطفات:

      History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.

      The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.

      Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case.

      AfPak-Iraq: Wrong War, Wrong Thinking. The United States faces mounting problems in the three leading conflict-zones of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

      Paul Rogers. Open Democracy , 29 October 2009. Hosted on the Commondreams website.
      http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/11/03-6

      مقتطفات:

      If there is a way ahead, it rests not on short-term calculations about troop numbers but on a larger reassessment by the Barack Obama administration of the entire US security posture in the middle east and southwest Asia. This will have to do more than crisis-manage the dire problems inherited from George W Bush; what is needed is no less than a move beyond military-led thinking to an integrated understanding of what security in the 21st century actually is.

      False Dichotomy: We have more options in Afghanistan than Biddle lets on

      Michael A. Cohen. The New Republic , 29 October 2009.
      http://www.tnr.com/article/world/disputations-false-dichotomy

      for Biddle article see: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/is-there-a-middle-way-biddl

      مقتطفات:

      In poker terms, Biddle's argument is the equivalent of betting all your chips on an inside straight draw. And then doing it again on the next hand.

      Welcome to 2025: American Preeminence Is Disappearing Fifteen Years Early

      Michael T. Klare. Tom Dispatch , 26 October 2009.
      http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175131/michael_klare_the_great_superpower_meltdown

      مقتطفات:

      How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma President Obama and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.

      article references http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/global-trends-2025

      التمرد في افغانستان نظرا حياة جديدة من قبل أعدائهم

      Paul McGeough. The Age , 24 October 2009. from an address at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.

      Excerpts:

      Afghans do want governance – they want good governance. But they have been ripped off every time it's been within their grasp. And the worst rip-off has been in the last eight years, because democracy and good governance were the gifts offered by the West – by governments that supposedly knew about these things.

      In their refusal to back Kabul or the Coalition, Afghans are not saying yea or neigh on the Taliban in isolation – the call they make as they try to go about their daily existence, is on the credibility of the Taliban as compared with that of the Karzai government and the Coalition.

      It's too late for McChrystal to make protecting the most-threatened sections of the Afghan population the key objective, because both the Kabul Government and the coalition lack credibility in the eyes of the people. In the absence of any significant Afghan government presence, much beyond Kabul, it is American military and aid workers – and those from several other coalition countries – that are seen as the face of government and as keepers of the cash, of which there is not enough and which takes forever to translate into meaningful development.