Alissa J. Rubin. New York Times. 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/weekinreview/01RUBIN.html

Gian P. Gentile. New York Times, 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/opinion/31iht-edgentile.html?_r=1

Excerpt:

History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.

The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.

Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case.

Yaroslav Trofimov. Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2009.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125686434305817635.html

Fabius Maximus, 30 October 2009.
http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2009/10/30/maturity/

C-Span.org, 29 October 2009.
http://www.c-span.org/Watch/Media/2009/10/29/Terr/A/24975/RAND+Forum+on+US+Policy+Afghanistan.aspx

Paul Rogers. Open Democracy, 29 October 2009. Hosted on the Commondreams website.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/11/03-6

Excerpt:

If there is a way ahead, it rests not on short-term calculations about troop numbers but on a larger reassessment by the Barack Obama administration of the entire US security posture in the middle east and southwest Asia. This will have to do more than crisis-manage the dire problems inherited from George W Bush; what is needed is no less than a move beyond military-led thinking to an integrated understanding of what security in the 21st century actually is.

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 29 October 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/65640/historically-unimportant-intelligence-board-may-actually-become-important

Michael A. Cohen. The New Republic, 29 October 2009.
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/disputations-false-dichotomy

for Biddle article see: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/is-there-a-middle-way-biddl

Excerpt:

In poker terms, Biddle’s argument is the equivalent of betting all your chips on an inside straight draw. And then doing it again on the next hand.

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 28 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/102809cdpm1.htm

Colin S. Gray. Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 28 October 2009.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=947

Karen DeYoung. Washington Post, 27 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102603394.html

For the fulltext and a key excerpt from Matthew P. Hoh’s resignation letter see http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/resignation-letter-of-matthew-p-hoh.

David Trulio. Budget Insight, 27 October 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/homeland-security-appropriations-context-major-features-and-some-key-issues-under-the-surface/

Excerpt:

Secretary Janet Napolitano will provide her conclusions from the [Quadrennial Homeland Security Review] to Congress in a final report by December 31, 2009. Norquist explains that “the results of that review, and the funding shown in the budget and the multiyear FYHSP [Future Years Homeland Security Program] that accompany it, will give a more complete picture of where this administration is headed.”

Michael T. Klare. Tom Dispatch, 26 October 2009.
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175131/michael_klare_the_great_superpower_meltdown

Excerpt:

How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma President Obama and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.

article references http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/global-trends-2025

Paul McGeough. The Age, 24 October 2009. from an address at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/afghan-insurgency-given-new-life-by-their-enemies-20091023-hd58.html

Excerpts:

Afghans do want governance – they want good governance. But they have been ripped off every time it’s been within their grasp. And the worst rip-off has been in the last eight years, because democracy and good governance were the gifts offered by the West – by governments that supposedly knew about these things.

In their refusal to back Kabul or the Coalition, Afghans are not saying yea or neigh on the Taliban in isolation – the call they make as they try to go about their daily existence, is on the credibility of the Taliban as compared with that of the Karzai government and the Coalition.

It’s too late for McChrystal to make protecting the most-threatened sections of the Afghan population the key objective, because both the Kabul Government and the coalition lack credibility in the eyes of the people. In the absence of any significant Afghan government presence, much beyond Kabul, it is American military and aid workers – and those from several other coalition countries – that are seen as the face of government and as keepers of the cash, of which there is not enough and which takes forever to translate into meaningful development.

Rebecca Williams. Budget Insight, 23 October 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/23/timeline-and-associated-costs-for-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-iraq/

for CBO report see:
http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/withdrawal-of-u-s-forces-from-iraq-possible-timelines-and-estimated-costs

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 23 October 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/10/23/hill-aides-call-for-jsf-restructure/

Steve Hynd. News Hoggers, 22 October 2009.
http://www.newshoggers.com/blog/2009/10/mixed-signals-from-pentagon-president-on-iraq-withdrawal.html

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 22 October 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/64830/state-dept-project-signals-big-foreign-policy-change

Selig S. Harrison. The Nation, 21 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/harrison

Excerpt:

…to offset Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, replace the present “Af-Pak” strategy with a broader regional strategy that encourages India, Iran, Russia, China and Tajikistan–all of which oppose a Taliban takeover–to play a more active role in shaping Afghanistan’s economic and political future and in setting the terms for a gradual US-NATO withdrawal.

Stephen M. Walt. The Nation, 21 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/walt

Melvin A. Goodman, truthout, 20 October 2009.
http://www.truthout.org/1020095

Stephen Biddle. The New Republic, 20 October 2009.
http://www.tnr.com/print/article/world/there-middle-way

Harvey Sapolsky. Defense News, 19 October 2009.

Seven months ago, the U.S. military was being praised by many security specialists as finally having gotten it: It un­derstood that its future was coun­terinsurgency best practices, which means nation-build­ing under fire from insur­gents in the world’s tough­est neighbor­ hoods. Yes, it had taken a while, but the mili­tary’s top lead­ership had fi­nally seen the light. Future war would mean fighting insurgencies, and counterin­surgency was an intera­gency mili­ tary/civilian team effort requiring skills in building governments, putting in the national plumbing — lights, roads, sewers, schools — and protecting the citizens from insurgents while training the local military to conduct se­curity operations and to think and behave democratically.

U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus wrote the manual. All the big think tanks and study groups had called it. America needed to nation-build to fight terrorism. Defense Secre­tary Robert Gates had cut the pro­grams of the old thinkers who wanted Cold War-type systems in­stead of signing up for the new fight. The neo-cons had been ban­ished, but their democracy­spreading anti-al-Qaida strategy had melded nearly seamlessly with liberal internationalist doc­trine stating that terrorism was bred in the hopelessness of failed impoverished states.

Afghanistan was to be the test case. Iraq was the bad war, but Afghanistan was the good one. Our allies were there, NATO somehow being tricked into showing up. The United Nations was there. Humanitarian groups were there. Next door was a threatened Pakistan, the Muslim nation with nuclear weapons and an extremist presence. We had to get Afghanistan right.

The new administration was for it. The new security team was filled with advocates recruited from the think tanks and academia, people who had done the articles and con­ference volumes on the subject. Most of the correspondents cover­ing the war were on board. There was a consensus as much as con­sensus exists these days.

Nation-Builders Vanish

And today it all seems so long ago. There is hardly anyone be­yond the few neo-cons left stand­ing and some Republican com­mentators who is willing to en­dorse the military’s plan for the full nation-building deal. Counterinsur­gent advocates are silent. Liberal interventionists are silent. We hear only how corrupt the Afghan gov­ernment is and how backward Afghanistan is, as if this is news.

The Obama administration is supposedly mulling its options, ignoring the nation-building goals it was proclaiming for Afghanis­tan in March and still giving speeches about as late as August.

I think the U.S. health care de­bate did it. The Obama administra­tion is having a much harder fight to gain enactment of health-care reform than seemed likely in the spring. The big Democratic ma­jorities it has in Congress are ap­parently not big enough to get it done. The cost of reform is being questioned, especially after the se­ries of expensive bailouts for the nation’s banks, housing market and auto industry. War and domes­tic reform don’t mix well.

In the modern parade of Demo­cratic Party presidents, Franklin Roosevelt did reform first, then war; Harry Truman did war, not reform; Lyndon Johnson tried re­form and war simultaneously, and essentially lost both and a Demo­crat majority for a generation. Jimmy Carter did nothing, and President Bill Clinton tried but gave up on both reform and war.

I think President Obama is go­ing to downplay the war, not sur­rendering outright but finding a way to make the war less impor­tant politically than reform or less visible until reform is secure domestically. More troops per­haps, but deployed more slowly than requested. More aid for Afghanistan, but dependent upon the demonstration of the Afghan government’s own improvements. Most of the nation-builder advo­cates are loyal Democrats and will hold their tongues. The war, and certainly the application of the full counterinsurgency manu­al, has been postponed until health care reform is in place. ■

Inspector General, DoD, 19 October 2009.
http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy10/10-002.pdf

Excerpt:

As part of our audit of the FY 2008 DOD Agency-side financial statements, DOD management acknowledged that 13 previously-identified material weaknesses continued to exist.

James Kitfield. National Journal, 17 October 2009.
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20091017_2858.php

Galrahn. Information Dissemination, 16 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/cbo-on-ballistic-missile-defense.html

Excerpt:

In January 2009 (on the basis of the 2009 FYDP), CBO projected that total investment costs for missile defense would be at least $10 billion per year, peaking at $17 billion in 2018; unbudgeted costs could add another $4 billion annually. The Secretary announced in April 2009 that the ABL program would be limited to a single aircraft, that no additional ground-based interceptors would be deployed in Alaska, and that the Multiple Kill Vehicle program would be terminated. With those and other changes, the 2010 request for the Missile Defense Agency would be $1.4 billion smaller than the amount provided in 2009. Incorporating those changes, CBO now projects that total investment costs for missile defense would average about $8 billion annually through 2028, peaking at about $10 billion in 2014. The total savings, averaging $2 billion per year, include the specific savings from restructuring the ABL program…

The CBO report – http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10633/10-14-DoD_2010_HBC_Testimony.pdf

Sandra I. Erwin. National Defense Magazine, November 2009.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/November/Pages/ContractorsShouldNotPanicOverProgramCuts.aspx

David Isenberg. PRIO, 15 October 2009.
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1720057691/Isenberg Private Military Contractors PRIO Report-2009.pdf

Christopher J. Castelli. Inside Defense, 15 October 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=PENTAGON-25-41-8&f=defense_2002.ask

…another provision (section 2822), which originated with Senate authorizers, calls for a new annual Pentagon report on global defense posture realignment and an update on an interagency review. The first annual report would be due to Congress early next year with the submission of the FY-11 budget request. It would discuss the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy as well as the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations.

Jon Ward. Washington Times, 15 October 2009.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/15/obama-weighs-more-than-afghan-troop-buildup//print/

Syed Saleem Shahzad. Asia Times, 15 October 2009.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html

Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman. Foreign Policy, 15 October 2009.
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/15/why_the_us_shouldnt_put_all_its_security_eggs_in_the_al_qaeda_basket

Daniel L. Davis. U.S. Army (unofficial and unclassified), 14 October 2009. Hosted on the Sic Semper Tyrannis Website.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/files/go-deep-_14-oct-09_.pdf

Excerpt:
In 2009 Afghanistan today, conditions on the ground are nothing like that of Iraq of early 2007 and there is little reason to believe the tactical success achieved by the Iraq surge could be repeated today in Afghanistan. There is presently no successful “Sons of Iraq”- type operation that would remove large numbers of enemy fighters from the streets, valleys and mountains. No large segment of the insurgency has indicated any interest in establishing a ceasefire with allied forces. The insurgency in Afghanistan today is spread over hundreds of thousands of square miles of inhospitable terrain and even 40,000 additional fighters would likely be insufficient to militarily stem the tide.

Tom Hayden. The Nation, 14 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091102/hayden/single

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 14 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/101409cdpm1.htm

Matthew S. Goldberg. testimony before Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, Congressional Budget Office, 14 October 2009.
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10633/10-14-DoD_2010_HBC_Testimony.pdf

Statement of Stephen Daggett, Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets, Congressional Research Service, before the House Committee on the Budget, 14 October 2009.
http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/10.14.2009_Daggett_Testimony.pdf

One common criticism of the “capabilities based” analysis of the 2001 and 2006 QDRs, even as they
helped to broaden awareness of the range of threats, is that the analytical framework did not help much in
allocating resources away from some areas and into others. Leaving aside whether such criticism is fair,
the current Administration has emphasized the need to analyze specific threats in order to establish
priorities. The question that follows is, how boldly will the current QDR address the potential need for
major changes in forces in view of its assessment of new challenges?

Dexter Filkens. New York Times Magazine, 14 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/magazine/18Afghanistan-t.html

Comment:

…our military leadership in Afghanistan acts, to judge by Filkins piece, as if winning were a hard but typical thing to do, if only things were done right this time. (By the way, if Filkins had written a piece similar in tone about LeBron James, it would be considered embarrassingly fawning. Why is it that our objective reporters for major newspapers regularly fall in love with their military subjects and cast them as stars? And why is such work never considered embarrassing?)
~ Tom Dispatch
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175130

Christopher M. Lehman. Boston Globe, 14 October 2009.
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/10/14/keeping_the_aircraft_carrier_fleet_afloat?mode=PF

Editor’s Comment:
It has been several decades since simply counting the numbers of weapon systems or platforms has been anything like a reliable measure of military power. In a modern military effective power is achieved by the combination of well-trained men and women, good weapon systems and platforms, advanced communications, allocation of forces, and controls and, of course, guided missiles and munitions.

Christopher Lehman’s op-ed in defense of the eleven carrier fleet (Boston Globe 14 October 2009) fails to mention, let alone assess, any of these crucial aspects of the modern Navy. Nor does he mention the numerous expeditionary strike groups, surface action groups, and missile armed submarines that also project American power around the globe. And he does not mention that a term of preference in today’s Navy is “network-centric.”

Although the number of platforms (ships) in today’s Navy is considerably fewer than during the Cold War, the firepower on today’s collection of ships has more than doubled, and is still growing. And that is only a starting place for measuring the effective power of the Navy. Reducing the size of the carrier fleet by one or two flattops is not a high risk proposition for the national security of the United States.

References:

http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/osd-considers-nine-carrier-fleet
http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/navy_network.htm
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/08/possible-savings-from-decreasing-the-aircraft-carrier-battle-fleet/

Reader Comment from a letter to the Boston Globe:

Michael Lind. Salon, 13 October 2009.
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/10/13/nuclear_weapons/index.html

Editor’s Comment:
Even if the nuclear abolition movement grows in power and is able to convince the governments of the U.S., France, and Great Britain to move toward abolishing their nuclear weaponry, there is little chance that other great powers such as Russia, China, and India will follow suit — not as long as any of those powers can imagine a conventional war against the U.S. (or against other countries with powerful conventional forces.) Unfortunately, there is no way to separate the problems of nuclear weaponry from the problems of international power politics and war. You can work hard to deny the connection in your mind, but in the end denial won’t help the cause of making the world safer. If there is to be really deep nuclear disarmament it must be in concert with conventional disarmament and new agency for international security.

James Vega. The Democratic Strategist, 12 October 2009.
http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/_memos/tds_SM_Vega_Afg.pdf

Andrew J. Bacevich. Boston Globe, 11 October 2009.
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/10/11/afghanistan___the_proxy_war?mode=PF

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 09 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/100909cdpm2.htm

Sebastian Sprenger. Inside Defense, 09 October 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=1092009_oct9b&f=defense_2002.ask

Excerpt:

The area of information operations also showed much need for improvement during the war game, officials have said. “We saw in the game that our forces will often be operating in areas with multiple competing narratives at play,” Davenport said today. “In the war game, red was often able to maintain the initiative in the battle of the narrative, forcing blue to be largely reactive,” he added.

Galrahn. Information Dissemination, 09 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/fiscal-year-2010-budget-final.html

Stephen Abott. Budget Insight, 08 October 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/08/possible-savings-from-decreasing-the-aircraft-carrier-battle-fleet/

For background and an assessment of the carrier “requirement” see http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/osd-considers-nine-carrier-fleet

Inside Defense reports on 08 October 2009 that the Congressional Conference Agreement provides for Congress to appoint eight members to the mandated QDR Independent Panel (see panel charter). This will bring the total number of panelists to twenty.

Gordon Adams. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 08 October 2009.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/gordon-adams/afghanistan-and-pakistan-the-graveyard-us-foreign-policy-plannin

Melvin A. Goodman. truthout, 08 October 2009.
http://www.truthout.org/10080910

Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Washington Post, 08 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100704088.html

CBO, 07 October 2009.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10523/10-07-TierneyTroopWithdrawal.pdf

Robert Scheer, truth dig. 06 October 2009.
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20091007_a_war_of_absurdity/

Galrahn. Information Dissemination, 03 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/misunderstanding-problem.html

Excerpt:

When I see the story saying “President Obama has reaffirmed a 4-decade-old secret understanding that has allowed Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to international inspections,” I read it as not only protecting Israel’s right to have nuclear weapons, but Israel seeking assurances in writing that they have the right to use nuclear weapons if necessary… perhaps on a well protected nuclear facility.

After all, if Israel is willing to accept the risk of attacking Iran knowing full well a few conventional bombs could very easily cost the United States its strategic objectives in both Afghanistan and Iraq, efforts paid for with 8 years of American blood; Israel will make damn sure they destroy what they intend to in an attack on Iran. This whole issue is about whether Israel assesses that Iran will use nuclear weapons against Israel. If the defensive purpose of nuclear weapons is to defend a country from being attacked with nuclear weapons, and defending Israel from potential Iranian nuclear weapon use against Israel is the issue here, then I think Israel use of nuclear weapons must be considered as part of the calculus.

Disbelieve Israel would go nuclear all you want, but Israels short, modern history is one of Israel consistently taking enormous risks, both politically and militarily. It is the rule rather than the exception, something we should not forget; particularly considering that the new buried and concealed nuclear site everyone is discussing is in Qom – a Shi’a Islam holy city.

Eli Lake. Washington Times, 02 October 2009.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/02/president-obama-has-reaffirmed-a-4-decade-old-secr/

Excerpt:

President Obama has reaffirmed a 4-decade-old secret understanding that has allowed Israel to keep a nuclear arsenal without opening it to international inspections.

Israel had been nervous that Mr. Obama would not continue the 1969 understanding because of his strong support for nonproliferation and priority on preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Gina Cavallaro and Kris Osborn. Defense News, 01 Oct 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=LAN&s=TOP&i=4304167

Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook. Joint Forces Quarterly, October 2009.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i55/4.pdf

Thomas G. Mahnken. Joint Forces Quarterly, 01 October 2009.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i55/3.pdf

Gian P. Gentile. Parameters, Autumn 2009.
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/09autumn/gentile.pdf

Excerpt:

Population-centric COIN may be a reasonable operational method to use in certain circumstances, but it is not a strategy.

Editor’s Comment:

Agreed! COIN is a collection of tactics. What is missing in Afghanistan is a strategy with any credible chance of success … despite the lip-service to political solutions.

General Stanley McChrystal, Commander ISAF, speech on Afghanistan to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 01 October 2009.
http://www.iiss.org/EasysiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=31537&type=full&servicetype=Attachment

Robert H. Scales. Armed Forces Journal, October 2009.
http://www.afji.com/2009/10/4266625

Frank G. Hoffman. Armed Forces Journal, October 2009.
http://www.afji.com/2009/10/4198658

Michael A. Cohen. Dissent, Fall 2009.
http://spi.typepad.com/files/arms-for-the-world.pdf

Excerpt:

… the defining characteristic of U.S. foreign policy and national security policy in the post–cold-war era is the extent to which America’s foreign policy agenda is being crafted and implemented by the military. …Whether it’s waging the war on terror or the war on drugs; nation-building in post-conflict environments; development, democracy promotion, or diplomacy; fighting cyber-criminals or training foreign armies, the global face of the United States today is generally that of a soldier.

Mackenzie Eaglen and Jim Talent. Armed Forces Journal, October 2009.
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4262271

Editor’s Comment: Before launching into their polemic calling for even more investments in the military sector (on top of 40+% real growth in the last decade for the Pentagon base budget) Eaglen and Talent usefully point out that the forthcoming QDR is, in a formal sense, based on the last Bush administration National Security Strategy, now three years old.

Logically, if the QDR is to serve as an expression of how military planning, program and posture align with national security and defense strategy, then our current schedule for the production of these documents is seriously out of sync with political cycles. It is reasonable to expect that an incoming administration, such as Obama’s, might require eighteen months to review and craft a revision of the National Security Strategy.

Starting with a revised National Security Strategy (The White House) appearing in June 2011 a schedule for the derivative documents might then be:

National Defense Strategy (SecDef’s office) – January 2012
National Military Strategy (Joint Chiefs) – June 2012
Quadrennial Defense Review (SecDef’s office) – June 2012

Note the logic of this sequencing: The White House sets any considered changes in the broad strategy (the National Security Strategy) eighteen months after coming into office. The Secretary of Defense then leads the process of determining and announcing six months later refinements to the National Defense Strategy. The Joint Chiefs have six additional months to refine their National Military Strategy document which is published the same month as the DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (which puts the strategy, defense planning/posture and budget all together.)