from flit, 29 September 2009.
http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/archives/2009_09_29.html

The following charts show combat KIAs per province, starting in 2006. It indicates where the truly heavy fighting is, and where insurgents are making inroads.

Fighting has just started in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in earnest. Fatalities are observed throughout the west and eastern regions, while the north is immune. Konar, Nuristan, Uruzgan and Kabul provinces (the little comma-shaped one) are the next highest.

The first coalition KIAs in the north, around Mazar and Kunduz. Helmand gets worse, while Kandahar and Uruzgan stay about the same. The fighting in the east worsens as well in Nangarhar, Paktia and Paktika provinces.

Again, Helmand worsens. Kandahar and Uruzgan and Zabul stay about the same. Coalition casualties increase in all regions over the year before, but particularly in Konar and Kabul provinces. Ghazni and Wardak provinces also see increases in fatalities as attacks on and around Highway 1 between Kandahar and Kabul trend up.

Partial results for the first three-quarters of this year show where the fighting continues to intensify. (Keep in mind that some of these provinces will get pinker still.) Notably Wardak and Kabul provinces have become significantly more dangerous to Coalition forces this year, as well as Kunduz in the north. Kandahar has also had more combat KIAs this year than last (49 vs 46) so by the end of the year it will likely end up redder than before, as well. But Helmand, which has seen 129 fatalities this year, up from 76 the year before, is still well ahead of all the rest. Helmand’s growth in KIAs (as well as Kandahar’s and Zabul)’s are obviously somewhat due to increased Western resources being applied there (more targets) in successive years, but as the majority of these fatalities were due to IEDs, and thus insurgent-initiated, the difference in fatality figures between provinces is very much going to be a reflection of where insurgent strategic-level efforts are on the increase as well, rather than purely changes to coalition op tempo.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), DoD, 29 September 2009.
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/CPO/DSCA_StratPlan_2009-2014.pdf

Vago Muradian and Kris Osborn. Defense News, 28 September 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4296905&c=FEA&s=CVS

Katherine McIntire Peters. Government Executive, 28 September 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=43682&dcn=todaysnews

Douglas MacGregor. Defense News, 28 September 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4296926&c=FEA&s=COM

Lewis Carroll. (English Logician, Mathematician, Photographer and Novelist, especially remembered for Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 1832-1898)

Robert Haddick. Small Wars Journal, 25 September 2009.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/print/this-week-at-war/

National Priorities Project, 24 September 2009.
http://vcnv.org/files/NPP_Security_Spending_Primer.pdf

David Petraeus and Bernard Trainor. Marine Corps University, 23 September 2009.
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/COIN%20Symposium%20Documents/Transcript%20-%20GEN%20Petraeus.pdf

Stephen Biddle. Council on Foreign Relations interview, 23 September 2009.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20283/us_policy_toward_afghanistan.html

Information Dissemination, 23 September 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/09/fact-check-technicals-of-aegis-bmd.html

Information Dissemination, 23 September 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/09/latest-fy-2011-navy-plan-rumor.html

Tony Capaccio. Bloomberg, 23 September 2009.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aNMlnU1TAETo

Robert Haddick. Small Wars Journal, 22 September 2009.
article: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/the-army-wants-your-comments-o/
Army Capstone Concept draft: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/doc/Army%20Capstone%20Concept%20V%202%207.2.pdf
Post your comments: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8486

Noah Shachtman. Wired Magazine, 21 September 2009.
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/people/magazine/17-10/ff_smartlist_gates?currentPage=all

Glenn Kessler. Washington Post, 19 September 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/18/AR2009091803739.html

Rebecca Williams. Budget Insight, 18 September 2009.
http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf

The White House. 17 September 2009. Hosted on the Council on Foreign Relations website.
http://www.cfr.org/publication/20225/fact_sheet_on_us_missile_defense_policy.html

Stephen Abott. Budget Insight, 16 September 2009.
http://thewillandthewallet.squarespace.com/blog/2009/9/16/top-line-intel-budget-totals-75-billion.html

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 16 September 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/16/gates-dismisses-fighter-gap/

Bryant Jordan. DoD Buzz, 16 September 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/16/a-plane-for-all-seasons/

Justin Kelly and Michael James Brennan. Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 16 September 2009.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=939

Excerpt:

Recent western military exploits in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East
Timor, all represent, if not strategic failure, at least failures of strategy. The question we need to ask
ourselves is whether this weakness is endemic or at least partially a result of our own theoretical failings by
allowing operational art to escape from any reasonable delimitation and, by so doing, subvert the role of
strategy and hide the need for a strategic art?

Editor’s Comment:

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, there emerged in this country a revisionist narrative of “meddling” by civilian leaders such as Johnson and McNamara which had “prevented” the military from winning the war. Although this narrative was almost entirely counter factual, it has had enough resonance in a nation deeply troubled by the war’s outcome that subsequent civilian leadership has opted to effectively “hand-off” wars to their generals and step back from responsibility for key strategic decisions.

Generals are, for the most part, skilled operational practitioners, but only sometimes do they have well-developed strategic skills or wisdom. As the authors point out, handing-off responsibility for strategic decisions to the generals is an error in the practice of grand strategy… and we should not be surprised with how often our subsequent wars have gone badly.

My hope is that President Obama will read this essay before making his decision about what to do next in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Otto Kreisher. Congress Daily, 16 September 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0909/091609cdam1.htm

John M. Donnelly. Congressional Quarterly Today, 16 September 2009.
http://votersforpeace.us/press/index.php?itemid=2908

as obtained by Foreign Policy, 16 September 2009.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/16/evaluating_progress_in_afghanistan_pakistan?page=full

Katherine McIntire Peters. Government Executive, 15 September 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0909/091509kp1.htm

Greg Grant. DoD Buzz, 15 September 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/09/15/u-s-air-dominance-eroding/

Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 14 September 2009.
http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2009/09/letter_to_presi.php

Malou Innocent and Ted Galen Carpenter. Cato Institute, 14 September 2009.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf

Matthew P. Hoh. 10 September 2009. Hosted on the Commonwealth Institute Website.
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/HohResignationLetter.pdf

Excerpt:

The Pashtun insurgency, which is composed of multiple, seemingly infinite, local groups, is fed by what is perceived by the Pashtun people as a continued and sustained assault, going back centuries, on Pashtun land, culture, traditions and religion by internal and external enemies. The U.S. and NATO presence and operations in Pashtun valleys and villages, as well as Afghan army and police units that are led and composed of non-Pashtun soldiers and police, provide an occupation force against which the insurgency is justified. In both the RC East and South, I have observed the the bulk of the insurgency fights not for the white banner of the Taliban, but rather against the presence of foreign soldiers and taxes imposed by an unrepresentative government in Kabul.

Reader Comment:

I am now an old man. In the 60/70s I served under John P Vann in Vietnam for a total of over 2 years. I have read Mr Hoh´s letter with great interest. It reminds me of the integrity, compassion and patriotism that Mr Vann displayed, in words and deeds over and again. There was nobody even close, except Ron Ziegler and General Krulak on a good day. Time and pride wore him down, nobody can in the end escape the green machine. For Mr Vann it worked on his vanity until he became Mr B52. And if it could wear down Mr Vann, nobody is safe. I do hope that Mr Hoh gets listened to, that he is supported and that we get out of a war in Afghanistan that we do want to win and that we do not presently have the courage to get out of. ~ Ola Kristofersson

David Axe. Budget Insight, 08 September 2009.
http://www.warisboring.com/2009/09/08/stimson-centers-budget-insight-blog-navys-chance-for-reform-slipping-away/

Marc Lynch. The New Foreign Policy.com, 07 September 2009.
http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/07/civil_wars_literature_and_iraq

Paul McLeary. War, the military, COIN and stuff, 04 September 2009.
http://paulmcleary.typepad.com/paul_mcleary/2009/09/the-failed-history-of-the-qdr.html

Ben Smith. Politico, 04 September 2009.
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0909/Conservatives_back_Obama_on_Afghanistan.html

Chuck Hagel. The Washington Post, 03 September 2009. Posted on the Atlantic Council Website.
http://acus.org/new_atlanticist/limits-force

Christopher Hellman. National Priorities Project, 02 September 2009.
http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/090809_military_operations_afghanistan/

Winslow Wheeler. Military.com. 02 September 2009
http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,199801,00.html

W. Patrick Lang. Sic Semper Tyrannis, 02 September 2009.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/09/the-broken-hinge-in-mcchrystals-paper.html

Richard L. Kugler. National Defense University, September 2009.
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2067%20Deterring%20Iran.pdf

Afghanistan Research Reachback Center White Paper, TRADOC G2 Human Terrain System, United States Army, September 2009.
http://easterncampaign.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/my-cousins-enemy-is-my-friend-a-study-of-pashtun-tribes.pdf

Excerpt:

Though tribe is a factor in Pashtun society, it is neither the only source of Pashtun identity nor the only foundation of Pashtun social organization. Traditions of shared kinship have formed the narrative foundations for Pashtun tribal organization, and historical forces have reinforced these structures. However, both in the past and where kin-based social structures still exist among Pashtuns, other social forms routinely arise and trump the importance of tribe and tribal organization. Rivalry between close male relatives, the formation of factions within kin groups, and the dynamics of patronage make Pashtun social structures far more complex than if they followed the classical anthropological definition of “tribe.”

Tara McKelvey. Columbia Journalism Review, September/October 2009.
http://www.cjr.org/cover_story/too_close_for_comfort.php?page=all