Iraq on the Edge

Joost R. Hiltermann. New York Review of Books, 19 November 2009.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23371

Excerpt:

Festering unresolved for years, the Kirkuk conflict has started to contaminate Baghdad politics to the point of disabling Maliki’s government. It has already complicated efforts to create a law governing petroleum and natural gas, for example, and it may well hold up the formation of a new government in the spring. America’s legacy in Iraq could be a divided country that is left to fight over an undefined boundary with Kurdistan while a dysfunctional Baghdad government governs in name only.

GHTime Code(s): 16d3a 46bef f8a00 986af e0958 f93e1 65a30 

Comptroller Rolls Out Draft FY-11 Budget; Major Decisions Still To Come

Jason Sherman. Inside Defense, 18 November 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=11182009_nov18b

Excerpt:

Most of the adjustments directed would make changes on the margins of the service investment plans… The review by the Pentagon’s comptroller shop has not yielded any decisions to terminate any major weapons programs, sources said.

GHTime Code(s): ce081 nc 

Pentagon budget drop anticipated

Roxana Tiron. The Hill, 18 November 2009.
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/68515-pentagon-budget-drop-anticipated

Excerpt:

CBO also projects that carrying out the Pentagon’s plans in its 2010 budget request — excluding overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere — would require defense resources averaging $567 billion annually (in constant 2010 dollars) from 2011 to 2028. That amount is about 6 percent more than the $534 billion the Obama administration requested for the 2010 budget, excluding overseas contingency funds, according to Goldberg.

Reasons why more resources would be required in the long run include the likelihood of growing military pay and benefits; a projected increase in the cost of operating and maintaining aging equipment as well as newer and more complex systems; plans to develop advanced weapons systems to replace aging ones; and investments in advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems to meet emerging security threats.

GHTime Code(s): 0cbc2 

A Unified Security Budget for the United States – FY2010

Miriam Pemberton. Institute for Policy Studies, 18 November 2009.
http://www.ips-dc.org/getfile.php?id=461

Excerpt

Because [the Obama administration's 2010] military budget is larger, in real terms, than any of its Bush administration predecessors, 87 percent of our overall security resources are still allocated to the tools of military force. And because of this, the increases in spending on defense and prevention, as important as they are, amount to deckchair arranging on the ship of security spending. The goal of rebalanced security, as a budgetary matter, remains to be realized.

GHTime Code(s): fc217 

Integrating Security: Preparing for the National Security Threats of the 21st Century

Lawrence Korb, Sean Duggan, and Laura Conley. Center for American Progress, 18 November 2009.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/11/pdf/integrating_security.pdf

GHTime Code(s): 505a0 

Gen. Wesley Clark calls for exit from Afghanistan

John Byrne. 70news.com, 18 November 2009.
http://www.70news.com/2009/11/18/gen-wesley-clark-calls-for-exit-from-afghanistan/

Excerpt:

You’ve got to “figure out where you’re going,” Clark told the House Armed Services subcommittee on oversight and investigations. “How do we get out of here? Because our presence long term there is not a good thing. We’re playing into the hands of people who don’t like foreigners in a country that’s not tolerant of diversity. And that’s not going to change.”

Editor’s Comment:

“If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.” ~ Lewis Carroll. (English Logician, Mathematician, Photographer and Novelist, especially remembered for Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 1832-1898)

GHTime Code(s): nc 08b68 59611 73071 nc 

Army Data Show Constraints on Troop Increase Potential: Escalation in Afghanistan Could Leave Few Brigades in Reserve

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 18 November 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/68174/army-data-shows-contraints-on-troop-increase-potential

Excerpt:

[Lawrence] Korb … said a more realistic troop increase for Afghanistan would be 10,000 soldiers until the drawdown of troops from Iraq “begins in earnest.” There are currently 120,000 U.S. troops remaining in Iraq, almost twice the total in Afghanistan, though Gen. Raymond Odierno, the commander of U.S. troops in Iraq, told Congress in September that he plans to reduce that total to around 50,000 by August 30, 2010. Alternatively, Korb said, Obama could speed up the pace of redeployment out of Iraq in order to relieve the stress on the force… But under current Pentagon policy, soldiers would still need to receive at least 12 months of recuperation time back in the U.S. before potential assignment in Afghanistan.

GHTime Code(s): nc 

QDR Panel Stalls, Loses Warner

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 17 November 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/17/qdr-panel-stalls-loses-warner/

Excerpt:

House-Senate conferees added eight members to the QDR panel that will be picked by congressional defense committee leaders and it looks as if Warner was uncomfortable with the additions… Mackenzie Eaglen at the conservative Heritage Institute led the push for a panel to keep its eye on the QDR — the law establishing the QDR requires such a panel but it has sometimes been ignored in the past.

GHTime Code(s): 0a9a9 

Building on 2 blunders: the dubious case for counterinsurgency

Stephen M. Walt. Foreign Policy, 16 November 2009.
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/16/building_on_2_blunders_the_dubious_case_for_counterinsurgency

Editor’s Comment

Walt makes a fundamental strategic point. The Bush wars involved operational and grand strategic errors, so why institutionalize a shift in defense planning that in effect has the U.S. military prepare for more strategic errors by our leadership? Why not opt to correct the error? It is really an elemental point of strategy: Don’t compound error!

I understand how military professionals who have been ordered to take on foolish strategic missions might feel that counterinsurgency theory is an attractive way out of their tactical and operational dilemmas. But there is really no excuse for civilian leaders, including Sec Def Gates, chasing the mirage of COIN as if it were an answer for our current problems dealing with the consequences of a disastrous Bush national security strategy. Change the strategy and there will be no need for investments in COIN!

GHTime Code(s): 1e86c c84d1 9b3cd 3b395 45c19 

High Costs Weigh on Troop Debate for Afghan War

Christopher Drew. New York Times, 14 November 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/us/politics/15cost.html

Excerpt:

…even if Mr. Obama opts for a lower troop commitment, Afghanistan’s new costs could wash out the projected $26 billion expected to be saved in 2010 from withdrawing troops from Iraq. And the overall military budget could rise to as much as $734 billion, or 10 percent more than the peak of $667 billion under the Bush administration.

GHTime Code(s): a8a10 

Securitization of US Foreign Assistance Hinders Long Term Development Goals

Trice Kabundi. Budget Insight, 13 November 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/11/13/securitization-of-us-foreign-assistance-hinders-long-term-development-goals/

Excerpt:

…during a USIP event on USAID’s Community Stabilization Program this past Tuesday. Panelist Nabil Al-Tikriti argued that “there exists such a thing as humanitarian space,” and the more the military either engaged in humanitarian assistance or linked objectives with those providing humanitarian assistance, NGO’s/relief workers would be affected and targeted. In his eyes, the DOD’s shift creates a situation where civilian relief workers are now often identified with “military men.”

GHTime Code(s): af1e5 

Conceptualizations of Insurgency and its Effects on the Counterinsurgency Policy Process

Adam L. Silverman. Sic Semper Tyrannis, 12 November 2009.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_semper_tyrannis/2009/11/conceptualizations-of-insurgency-and-its-effects-on-the-counterinsurgency-policy-process.html

Excerpt:

Given the reality that the US faces in Afghanistan; the historic lack of functional centralized government, exceedingly high number of societal elements, many of which are geographically isolated or semi-isolated, the illegitimacy of the current Afghan government, and the fact that groups we are fighting are not all insurgents makes successfully reaching the COIN end state of tethering Afghan society back to the Afghan state very, very difficult. The debate on the use of COIN really needs to be focused in on this difficult set of Afghan circumstances and whether they allow any chance for a positive counterinsurgency outcome.

GHTime Code(s): 0338a 3ddb4 

Inouye balks at war funding fix

David Rogers. Politico, 10 November 2009.
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1109/29357.html

Excerpts:

Under almost all scenarios before Obama, billions more than the contingency funds requested in his 2010 budget will be needed…

Most estimates of how much more the Pentagon may need now run in the range of $30 billion to $40 billion.

GHTime Code(s): 9b505 

Winning in Afghanistan: A Message from Ambassador Eikenberry

Karl E. Eikenberry. Embassy of the U.S.A., Kabul, 08 November 2009.
http://static1.firedoglake.com/37/files/2009/11/Winning-in-Afghanistan.pdf

GHTime Code(s): nc f0ed3 

Full Spectrum Dominance and COIN

Dave Anderson. News Hoggers, 06 November 2009.
http://www.newshoggers.com/blog/2009/11/full-spectrum-dominance-and-coin.html

Excerpt:

COIN does not decrease the chance of future interventions; it instead probably increases the chance of future interventions and invasions as it is a “solution” that is “proven to work” as long as not too many questions are raised about either what “working” means or the initial rosy scenario assumptions that are made to sell the invasion.

GHTime Code(s): 1111d 

Research and Development in the FY 2010 Defense Budget

Patrick J Clemins. Budget Insight, 03 November 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/11/03/research-and-development-in-the-fy-2010-defense-budget/

GHTime Code(s): f05f1 

Pull the plug on the Afghan surge

Charles Kupchan and Steven Simon. Financial Times, 03 November 2009.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1e98cbae-c8c6-11de-8f9d-00144feabdc0.html

GHTime Code(s): 6a62e 

Industrial Policy Debate: Should The Pentagon Pick Winners and Losers?

Sandra I. Erwin. National Defense Magazine, November 2009.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/November/Pages/IndustrialPolicyDebateShouldthePentagonPickWinnersandLosers.aspx

Excerpt:

Acquisition and R&D accounts now make up 34 percent of the defense base budget. Assuming a flat budget and growth in personnel a bit above inflation, modernization accounts 10 years from now will be down to 25 percent of the budget, according to TechAmerica estimates.

Unless the Defense Department decides to reduce the size of the force, procurement spending will continue to be squeezed, says budget analyst Steve Daggett, of the Congressional Research Service. He estimates that the average service member costs 45 percent more — including salary and benefits after adjusting for inflation — than in 2000.

Industry analyst Jim McAleese, of McAleese & Associates, says he is certain that the Obama administration has effectively flat-lined defense spending for the foreseeable future. But many major decisions have yet to be made regarding how money will be allocated within a flat budget.

“I would caution you to really pay attention to Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ vision,” McAleese says in an interview with Federal News Radio. “I believe he is fundamentally using the QDR [quadrennial defense review] to put the finishing touches on his legacy. Gates wants to “optimize” the Army for long-duration counterinsurgencies, he says. “The priority in the Army will be investing in a world-class quality combat force, that is well-supported, and that the soldiers’ families are well-supported.” The upshot is that many of the expensive weapons systems that the services have been accustomed to buying will no longer be affordable.

GHTime Code(s): a0407 

Fixing a Failed Strategy in Afghanistan

Gilles Dorronsoro. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009.
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/fixing_failed_strategy.pdf

Excerpt:

…the International Coalition, with its limited resources and diminishing popular support, should focus on its core interests: preventing the Taliban from retaking Afghan cities, avoiding the risk that al-Qaeda would try to reestablish sanctuaries there, pursue a more aggressive counterinsurgency strategy in the North, and reallocate its civilian aid resources to places where the insurgency is still weak.

Editor’s Comment

Some would say that Pashtunistan is already a nation which can’t yet fully establish itself as a state (although there is already considerable local governance, both Pashtun tribal and Taliban.) Presently Punjabi (Pakistani) and US/NATO military intervention prevent the establishment of a state.

Dorronsoro’s Afghan war strategy would seem to be a step in moving the Pashtunistan national cause to within a decade or so of success. Of course, the cities of Kandahar and Jalalabad would have to fall under Pashtunistan governance eventually, even if Western forces resisted for some years.

Map of Pashtunistan

GHTime Code(s): 77ad3 a24eb 89add 

From Iraq, Lessons for the Next War

Alissa J. Rubin. New York Times. 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/weekinreview/01RUBIN.html

GHTime Code(s): 43176 

Chimera of Victory

Gian P. Gentile. New York Times, 31 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/31/opinion/31iht-edgentile.html?_r=1

Excerpt:

History shows that occupation by foreign armies with the intent of changing occupied societies does not work and ends up costing considerable blood and treasure.

The notion that if only an army gets a few more troops, with different and better generals, then within a few years it can defeat a multi-faceted insurgency set in the middle of civil war, is not supported by an honest reading of history.

Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq show this to be the case.

GHTime Code(s): c7c01 f348b 7d268 

Support Grows for Pursuit of Peace Deals With the Taliban

Yaroslav Trofimov. Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2009.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125686434305817635.html

GHTime Code(s): c3d6e 

Another crack in the foundation: the maturity of the government’s debt

Fabius Maximus, 30 October 2009.
http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2009/10/30/maturity/

GHTime Code(s): b30ac 

RAND Forum on U.S. Policy Afghanistan

C-Span.org, 29 October 2009.
http://www.c-span.org/Watch/Media/2009/10/29/Terr/A/24975/RAND+Forum+on+US+Policy+Afghanistan.aspx

GHTime Code(s): f02e6 910e6 

AfPak-Iraq: Wrong War, Wrong Thinking. The United States faces mounting problems in the three leading conflict-zones of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.

Paul Rogers. Open Democracy, 29 October 2009. Hosted on the Commondreams website.
http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/11/03-6

Excerpt:

If there is a way ahead, it rests not on short-term calculations about troop numbers but on a larger reassessment by the Barack Obama administration of the entire US security posture in the middle east and southwest Asia. This will have to do more than crisis-manage the dire problems inherited from George W Bush; what is needed is no less than a move beyond military-led thinking to an integrated understanding of what security in the 21st century actually is.

GHTime Code(s): 46e0b bc29f 

Historically Unimportant Intelligence Board May Actually Become Important

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 29 October 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/65640/historically-unimportant-intelligence-board-may-actually-become-important

GHTime Code(s): fabce 

False Dichotomy: We have more options in Afghanistan than Biddle lets on

Michael A. Cohen. The New Republic, 29 October 2009.
http://www.tnr.com/article/world/disputations-false-dichotomy

for Biddle article see: http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/is-there-a-middle-way-biddl

Excerpt:

In poker terms, Biddle’s argument is the equivalent of betting all your chips on an inside straight draw. And then doing it again on the next hand.

GHTime Code(s): 13125 

Senator: Pentagon must make painful spending adjustments

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 28 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/102809cdpm1.htm

GHTime Code(s): cb9c9 38d36 

Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict

Colin S. Gray. Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 28 October 2009.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=947

GHTime Code(s): 362fc 

U.S. official resigns over Afghan war

Karen DeYoung. Washington Post, 27 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102603394.html

For the fulltext and a key excerpt from Matthew P. Hoh’s resignation letter see http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/resignation-letter-of-matthew-p-hoh.

GHTime Code(s): 7df93 4967d d7f58 

Homeland Security Appropriations: Context, Major Features, and Some Key Issues Under the Surface

David Trulio. Budget Insight, 27 October 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/homeland-security-appropriations-context-major-features-and-some-key-issues-under-the-surface/

Excerpt:

Secretary Janet Napolitano will provide her conclusions from the [Quadrennial Homeland Security Review] to Congress in a final report by December 31, 2009. Norquist explains that “the results of that review, and the funding shown in the budget and the multiyear FYHSP [Future Years Homeland Security Program] that accompany it, will give a more complete picture of where this administration is headed.”

GHTime Code(s): nc f2f71 

Welcome to 2025: American Preeminence Is Disappearing Fifteen Years Early

Michael T. Klare. Tom Dispatch, 26 October 2009.
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175131/michael_klare_the_great_superpower_meltdown

Excerpt:

How much longer will Washington feel that Americans can afford to subsidize a global role that includes garrisoning much of the planet and fighting distant wars in the name of global security, when the American economy is losing so much ground to its competitors? This is the dilemma President Obama and his advisers must confront in the altered world of 2025.

article references http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/global-trends-2025

GHTime Code(s): bcd2b 1cbce nc 

Afghan insurgency given new life by their enemies

Paul McGeough. The Age, 24 October 2009. from an address at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University in Canberra.
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/afghan-insurgency-given-new-life-by-their-enemies-20091023-hd58.html

Excerpts:

Afghans do want governance – they want good governance. But they have been ripped off every time it’s been within their grasp. And the worst rip-off has been in the last eight years, because democracy and good governance were the gifts offered by the West – by governments that supposedly knew about these things.

In their refusal to back Kabul or the Coalition, Afghans are not saying yea or neigh on the Taliban in isolation – the call they make as they try to go about their daily existence, is on the credibility of the Taliban as compared with that of the Karzai government and the Coalition.

It’s too late for McChrystal to make protecting the most-threatened sections of the Afghan population the key objective, because both the Kabul Government and the coalition lack credibility in the eyes of the people. In the absence of any significant Afghan government presence, much beyond Kabul, it is American military and aid workers – and those from several other coalition countries – that are seen as the face of government and as keepers of the cash, of which there is not enough and which takes forever to translate into meaningful development.

GHTime Code(s): be469 

Timeline and Associated Costs for Withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq

Rebecca Williams. Budget Insight, 23 October 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/23/timeline-and-associated-costs-for-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-iraq/

for CBO report see:
http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/withdrawal-of-u-s-forces-from-iraq-possible-timelines-and-estimated-costs

GHTime Code(s): 096ae 

Hill Aides Call For JSF Restructure

Colin Clark. DoD Buzz, 23 October 2009.
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/10/23/hill-aides-call-for-jsf-restructure/

GHTime Code(s): 8318e 

Mixed Signals From Pentagon, President On Iraq Withdrawal

Steve Hynd. News Hoggers, 22 October 2009.
http://www.newshoggers.com/blog/2009/10/mixed-signals-from-pentagon-president-on-iraq-withdrawal.html

GHTime Code(s): 74b87 6c7e0 

State Dept Project Signals Foreign Policy Shift: Review Could Shift Resources to Civilian Agencies for Foreign Development

Spencer Ackerman. The Washington Independent, 22 October 2009.
http://washingtonindependent.com/64830/state-dept-project-signals-big-foreign-policy-change

GHTime Code(s): 92719 

The Ethnic Split

Selig S. Harrison. The Nation, 21 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/harrison

Excerpt:

…to offset Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, replace the present “Af-Pak” strategy with a broader regional strategy that encourages India, Iran, Russia, China and Tajikistan–all of which oppose a Taliban takeover–to play a more active role in shaping Afghanistan’s economic and political future and in setting the terms for a gradual US-NATO withdrawal.

GHTime Code(s): 1eab3 12173 

High Cost, Low Odds

Stephen M. Walt. The Nation, 21 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091109/walt

GHTime Code(s): 84964 

The Urgent Need to Demilitarize the National Security State

Melvin A. Goodman, truthout, 20 October 2009.
http://www.truthout.org/1020095

GHTime Code(s): 95569 

Is There a Middle Way?

Stephen Biddle. The New Republic, 20 October 2009.
http://www.tnr.com/print/article/world/there-middle-way

GHTime Code(s): 6fdfb 

The War Has Been Postponed

Harvey Sapolsky. Defense News, 19 October 2009.

Seven months ago, the U.S. military was being praised by many security specialists as finally having gotten it: It un­derstood that its future was coun­terinsurgency best practices, which means nation-build­ing under fire from insur­gents in the world’s tough­est neighbor­ hoods. Yes, it had taken a while, but the mili­tary’s top lead­ership had fi­nally seen the light. Future war would mean fighting insurgencies, and counterin­surgency was an intera­gency mili­ tary/civilian team effort requiring skills in building governments, putting in the national plumbing — lights, roads, sewers, schools — and protecting the citizens from insurgents while training the local military to conduct se­curity operations and to think and behave democratically.

U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus wrote the manual. All the big think tanks and study groups had called it. America needed to nation-build to fight terrorism. Defense Secre­tary Robert Gates had cut the pro­grams of the old thinkers who wanted Cold War-type systems in­stead of signing up for the new fight. The neo-cons had been ban­ished, but their democracy­spreading anti-al-Qaida strategy had melded nearly seamlessly with liberal internationalist doc­trine stating that terrorism was bred in the hopelessness of failed impoverished states.

Afghanistan was to be the test case. Iraq was the bad war, but Afghanistan was the good one. Our allies were there, NATO somehow being tricked into showing up. The United Nations was there. Humanitarian groups were there. Next door was a threatened Pakistan, the Muslim nation with nuclear weapons and an extremist presence. We had to get Afghanistan right.

The new administration was for it. The new security team was filled with advocates recruited from the think tanks and academia, people who had done the articles and con­ference volumes on the subject. Most of the correspondents cover­ing the war were on board. There was a consensus as much as con­sensus exists these days.

Nation-Builders Vanish

And today it all seems so long ago. There is hardly anyone be­yond the few neo-cons left stand­ing and some Republican com­mentators who is willing to en­dorse the military’s plan for the full nation-building deal. Counterinsur­gent advocates are silent. Liberal interventionists are silent. We hear only how corrupt the Afghan gov­ernment is and how backward Afghanistan is, as if this is news.

The Obama administration is supposedly mulling its options, ignoring the nation-building goals it was proclaiming for Afghanis­tan in March and still giving speeches about as late as August.

I think the U.S. health care de­bate did it. The Obama administra­tion is having a much harder fight to gain enactment of health-care reform than seemed likely in the spring. The big Democratic ma­jorities it has in Congress are ap­parently not big enough to get it done. The cost of reform is being questioned, especially after the se­ries of expensive bailouts for the nation’s banks, housing market and auto industry. War and domes­tic reform don’t mix well.

In the modern parade of Demo­cratic Party presidents, Franklin Roosevelt did reform first, then war; Harry Truman did war, not reform; Lyndon Johnson tried re­form and war simultaneously, and essentially lost both and a Demo­crat majority for a generation. Jimmy Carter did nothing, and President Bill Clinton tried but gave up on both reform and war.

I think President Obama is go­ing to downplay the war, not sur­rendering outright but finding a way to make the war less impor­tant politically than reform or less visible until reform is secure domestically. More troops per­haps, but deployed more slowly than requested. More aid for Afghanistan, but dependent upon the demonstration of the Afghan government’s own improvements. Most of the nation-builder advo­cates are loyal Democrats and will hold their tongues. The war, and certainly the application of the full counterinsurgency manu­al, has been postponed until health care reform is in place. ■

GHTime Code(s): c494a 49726 

Summary of DoD Office of the Inspector General Audits of Financical Management

Inspector General, DoD, 19 October 2009.
http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy10/10-002.pdf

Excerpt:

As part of our audit of the FY 2008 DOD Agency-side financial statements, DOD management acknowledged that 13 previously-identified material weaknesses continued to exist.

GHTime Code(s): 68d95 11ce5 

Afghanistan Is Obama’s War Now

James Kitfield. National Journal, 17 October 2009.
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/nj_20091017_2858.php

GHTime Code(s): 1230e 

CBO On Ballistic Missile Defense

Galrahn. Information Dissemination, 16 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/cbo-on-ballistic-missile-defense.html

Excerpt:

In January 2009 (on the basis of the 2009 FYDP), CBO projected that total investment costs for missile defense would be at least $10 billion per year, peaking at $17 billion in 2018; unbudgeted costs could add another $4 billion annually. The Secretary announced in April 2009 that the ABL program would be limited to a single aircraft, that no additional ground-based interceptors would be deployed in Alaska, and that the Multiple Kill Vehicle program would be terminated. With those and other changes, the 2010 request for the Missile Defense Agency would be $1.4 billion smaller than the amount provided in 2009. Incorporating those changes, CBO now projects that total investment costs for missile defense would average about $8 billion annually through 2028, peaking at about $10 billion in 2014. The total savings, averaging $2 billion per year, include the specific savings from restructuring the ABL program…

The CBO report – http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10633/10-14-DoD_2010_HBC_Testimony.pdf

GHTime Code(s): b428b 

Contractors Should Not Panic Over Program Cuts

Sandra I. Erwin. National Defense Magazine, November 2009.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/November/Pages/ContractorsShouldNotPanicOverProgramCuts.aspx

GHTime Code(s): 96d8a 

Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy

David Isenberg. PRIO, 15 October 2009.
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-1720057691/Isenberg Private Military Contractors PRIO Report-2009.pdf

GHTime Code(s): fe45b 29436 bbabd 2a8ad 

Flurry of New Pentagon Reports To Accompany QDR in Early 2010

Christopher J. Castelli. Inside Defense, 15 October 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=PENTAGON-25-41-8&f=defense_2002.ask

…another provision (section 2822), which originated with Senate authorizers, calls for a new annual Pentagon report on global defense posture realignment and an update on an interagency review. The first annual report would be due to Congress early next year with the submission of the FY-11 budget request. It would discuss the status of overseas base closure and realignment actions undertaken as part of a global defense posture realignment strategy as well as the status of development and execution of comprehensive master plans for overseas military main operating bases, forward operating sites and cooperative security locations.

GHTime Code(s): nc 

Obama weighs Afghan strategy, not just troop buildup

Jon Ward. Washington Times, 15 October 2009.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/15/obama-weighs-more-than-afghan-troop-buildup//print/

GHTime Code(s): 372c2 

Al-Qaeda’s guerrilla chief lays out strategy

Syed Saleem Shahzad. Asia Times, 15 October 2009.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ15Df03.html

GHTime Code(s): 754d2 4e906 

Don’t put all the security eggs in the al Qaeda basket

Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cookman. Foreign Policy, 15 October 2009.
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/15/why_the_us_shouldnt_put_all_its_security_eggs_in_the_al_qaeda_basket

GHTime Code(s): c4cd8 ca583 

Go Big or Go Deep: An Analysis of Strategy Options on Afghanistan

Daniel L. Davis. U.S. Army (unofficial and unclassified), 14 October 2009. Hosted on the Sic Semper Tyrannis Website.
http://turcopolier.typepad.com/files/go-deep-_14-oct-09_.pdf

Excerpt:
In 2009 Afghanistan today, conditions on the ground are nothing like that of Iraq of early 2007 and there is little reason to believe the tactical success achieved by the Iraq surge could be repeated today in Afghanistan. There is presently no successful “Sons of Iraq”- type operation that would remove large numbers of enemy fighters from the streets, valleys and mountains. No large segment of the insurgency has indicated any interest in establishing a ceasefire with allied forces. The insurgency in Afghanistan today is spread over hundreds of thousands of square miles of inhospitable terrain and even 40,000 additional fighters would likely be insufficient to militarily stem the tide.

GHTime Code(s): 87822 bb391 

Kilcullen’s Long War

Tom Hayden. The Nation, 14 October 2009.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20091102/hayden/single

GHTime Code(s): 88450 

CBO forecasts rising Defense costs

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 14 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/101409cdpm1.htm

GHTime Code(s): 92838 

Long-Term Implications of the Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Submission

Matthew S. Goldberg. testimony before Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, Congressional Budget Office, 14 October 2009.
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10633/10-14-DoD_2010_HBC_Testimony.pdf

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The Cost of Current Defense Plans: An Analysis of Budget Issues

Statement of Stephen Daggett, Specialist in Defense Policy and Budgets, Congressional Research Service, before the House Committee on the Budget, 14 October 2009.
http://budget.house.gov/hearings/2009/10.14.2009_Daggett_Testimony.pdf

One common criticism of the “capabilities based” analysis of the 2001 and 2006 QDRs, even as they
helped to broaden awareness of the range of threats, is that the analytical framework did not help much in
allocating resources away from some areas and into others. Leaving aside whether such criticism is fair,
the current Administration has emphasized the need to analyze specific threats in order to establish
priorities. The question that follows is, how boldly will the current QDR address the potential need for
major changes in forces in view of its assessment of new challenges?

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Stanley McChrystal’s Long War

Dexter Filkens. New York Times Magazine, 14 October 2009.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/magazine/18Afghanistan-t.html

Comment:

…our military leadership in Afghanistan acts, to judge by Filkins piece, as if winning were a hard but typical thing to do, if only things were done right this time. (By the way, if Filkins had written a piece similar in tone about LeBron James, it would be considered embarrassingly fawning. Why is it that our objective reporters for major newspapers regularly fall in love with their military subjects and cast them as stars? And why is such work never considered embarrassing?)
~ Tom Dispatch
http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175130

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Keeping the aircraft carrier fleet afloat

Christopher M. Lehman. Boston Globe, 14 October 2009.
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/10/14/keeping_the_aircraft_carrier_fleet_afloat?mode=PF

Editor’s Comment:
It has been several decades since simply counting the numbers of weapon systems or platforms has been anything like a reliable measure of military power. In a modern military effective power is achieved by the combination of well-trained men and women, good weapon systems and platforms, advanced communications, allocation of forces, and controls and, of course, guided missiles and munitions.

Christopher Lehman’s op-ed in defense of the eleven carrier fleet (Boston Globe 14 October 2009) fails to mention, let alone assess, any of these crucial aspects of the modern Navy. Nor does he mention the numerous expeditionary strike groups, surface action groups, and missile armed submarines that also project American power around the globe. And he does not mention that a term of preference in today’s Navy is “network-centric.”

Although the number of platforms (ships) in today’s Navy is considerably fewer than during the Cold War, the firepower on today’s collection of ships has more than doubled, and is still growing. And that is only a starting place for measuring the effective power of the Navy. Reducing the size of the carrier fleet by one or two flattops is not a high risk proposition for the national security of the United States.

References:

Reader Comment from a letter to the Boston Globe:

Isn’t it inappropriate for the Globe to publish an oped advocating the construction of aircraft carriers when the author works at a consulting firm that represents Northrop Grumman, the company responsible for carrier construction? In Christopher Lehman’s Oct. 14 oped, “Keeping the aircraft carrier fleet afloat,’’ the Globe did not bother to disclose the author’s financial stake in the position he was arguing, which would have helped readers evaluate Lehman’s credibility (or lack thereof) as a dispassionate analyst.

Lehman doesn’t base his case on military or strategic grounds, conceding at the very beginning that “the United States does not need aircraft carriers to counter those of other countries.’’ Instead, he asserts that carriers are valuable as power projectors that the United States uses to affect crises “without releasing a single weapon.’’ In other words, while carriers might not actually do much militarily, they make us feel like we’re shaping outcomes. Proponents of building more carriers can then cite such shaping, which is impossible to prove or disprove, as evidence that we need more carriers.

Lehman also points out that carriers both act as “levers of American good will’’ and are being built by many other countries, including some considered potential future adversaries of the United States. On the first point, humanitarian missions are not sufficient justification to build $11-billion-per-ship carriers that spend most of their time floating around in the middle of the ocean. Other ships are more practical. A carrier is a weapon of war, and arguments that try to frame it as anything else are disingenuous. On the second point, Lehman implies that because other countries build carriers, the United States should build them, too. “Keeping up with the Joneses’’ is the antithesis of strategic thinking, particularly when the United States already maintains such a large advantage in military capability.

– Travis Sharp, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Washington, D.C.

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How I learned to stop worrying and live with the bomb: neither terrorists nor rogue states like North Korea are likely to use nuclear weapons

Michael Lind. Salon, 13 October 2009.
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/10/13/nuclear_weapons/index.html

Editor’s Comment:
Even if the nuclear abolition movement grows in power and is able to convince the governments of the U.S., France, and Great Britain to move toward abolishing their nuclear weaponry, there is little chance that other great powers such as Russia, China, and India will follow suit — not as long as any of those powers can imagine a conventional war against the U.S. (or against other countries with powerful conventional forces.) Unfortunately, there is no way to separate the problems of nuclear weaponry from the problems of international power politics and war. You can work hard to deny the connection in your mind, but in the end denial won’t help the cause of making the world safer. If there is to be really deep nuclear disarmament it must be in concert with conventional disarmament and new agency for international security.

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The key issue in Afghanistan isn’t the number of troops we send, it’s the mission that they’re given – and that’s why the military doctrine and strategy of “counterinsurgency” is totally inadequate as a guide

James Vega. The Democratic Strategist, 12 October 2009.
http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/_memos/tds_SM_Vega_Afg.pdf

GHTime Code(s): 81236 

Afghanistan – the proxy war

Andrew J. Bacevich. Boston Globe, 11 October 2009.
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/10/11/afghanistan___the_proxy_war?mode=PF

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Generals want faster, focused procurement

Megan Scully. Government Executive, 09 October 2009.
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1009/100909cdpm2.htm

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Secret War Game Report Alerted QDR Leaders to Raft of Vulnerabilities

Sebastian Sprenger. Inside Defense, 09 October 2009.
http://www.insidedefense.com/secure/display.asp?docnum=1092009_oct9b&f=defense_2002.ask

Excerpt:

The area of information operations also showed much need for improvement during the war game, officials have said. “We saw in the game that our forces will often be operating in areas with multiple competing narratives at play,” Davenport said today. “In the war game, red was often able to maintain the initiative in the battle of the narrative, forcing blue to be largely reactive,” he added.

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Fiscal Year 2010 Budget – Final

Galrahn. Information Dissemination, 09 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/fiscal-year-2010-budget-final.html

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Possible Savings from Decreasing the Aircraft Carrier Battle Fleet

Stephen Abott. Budget Insight, 08 October 2009.
http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2009/10/08/possible-savings-from-decreasing-the-aircraft-carrier-battle-fleet/

For background and an assessment of the carrier “requirement” see http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/osd-considers-nine-carrier-fleet

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Congressional Conference Agreement calls for 8 congressionally appointed members of the QDR Independent Panel

Inside Defense reports on 08 October 2009 that the Congressional Conference Agreement provides for Congress to appoint eight members to the mandated QDR Independent Panel (see panel charter). This will bring the total number of panelists to twenty.

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Afghanistan and Pakistan: The graveyard for U.S. foreign policy planning?

Gordon Adams. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 08 October 2009.
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/gordon-adams/afghanistan-and-pakistan-the-graveyard-us-foreign-policy-plannin

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Five Myths on Afghanistan

Melvin A. Goodman. truthout, 08 October 2009.
http://www.truthout.org/10080910

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Civilian, Military Officials at Odds Over Resources Needed for Afghan Mission

Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Washington Post, 08 October 2009.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/07/AR2009100704088.html

GHTime Code(s): 957d8 cfd24 

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq: Possible Timelines and Estimated Costs

CBO, 07 October 2009.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc10523/10-07-TierneyTroopWithdrawal.pdf

GHTime Code(s): 6c89a 

A War of Absurdity

Robert Scheer, truth dig. 06 October 2009.
http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20091007_a_war_of_absurdity/

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Misunderstanding the Problem: Iran and Israel

Galrahn. Information Dissemination, 03 October 2009.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/10/misunderstanding-problem.html

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U.S. Army To Switch 2 Heavy Brigades to Strykers

Gina Cavallaro and Kris Osborn. Defense News, 01 Oct 2009.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?c=LAN&s=TOP&i=4304167

GHTime Code(s): c687c 

Developing Strategists: Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy

Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook. Joint Forces Quarterly, October 2009.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i55/4.pdf

GHTime Code(s): 86535 

A New Grand Bargain: Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Defense Planning

Thomas G. Mahnken. Joint Forces Quarterly, 01 October 2009.
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i55/3.pdf

GHTime Code(s): 432f3