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Iraqi Force Development:
The Challenges of Transparency

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ISF Development Challenges

- **Challenge One:** Creating a process of political conciliation and effective governance, including a central government national security council, MoD, and MoI that can function effectively and with limited corruption

- **Challenge Two:** Creating Iraqi security forces that can deal with Iraq's sectarian, ethnic, and local divisions and provide security for all Iraqis.

- **Challenge Three:** Creating truly independent regular military forces that can gradually replace US and Coalition forces in all required aspects of counterinsurgency and armed nation-building: "Win"

- **Challenge Four:** Creating regular military forces that can gradually deal with foreign threats from Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and potentially Sunni states backing Sunni insurgents.

- **Challenge Five:** Creating effective national paramilitary forces out of the National Police and other such units.

- **Challenge Six:** Finding the right mix of national, regional, and local police forces, and creating an effective plan for creating regular police.

- **Challenge Seven:** Creating an effective mix of border and port security forces.

- **Challenge Eight:** Finding a solution to militias, tribal forces, and other "unofficial" elements.

- **Challenge Nine:** Creating a mix of national and military intelligence and IS&R capabilities seen as effective and loyal to the nation..

- **Challenge Ten:** Moving towards full self-financing with integrity and effectiveness.

Setting the Stage: The Mix of Tasks That ISF Development is Part of:

- Counterinsurgency, counter civil conflict, establishing and maintaining *national* security.

- Political conciliation.

- Effective governance at the central, regional, and local level.

- Movement towards economic development and immediate economic security

- Effective government presence and services in the field.

- Creating of an effective criminal justice system.

- Resolving critical constitutional issues: Oil, federation, religion, law, relative powers of central government.

Armed Nation Building vs. Counterinsurgency

- **Sunni Islamist extremist groups, of which Al Qa'ida is the most visible.**

- **Sunni versus Sunni struggles, including Sunni tribal elements in Anbar and elsewhere.**

- **Iraqi Sunnis versus Iraqi Shi'ites, a growing sectarian struggle mixing violence and other forms of sectarian cleansing and displacement.**

- **Kurdish struggle for autonomy and control of the north, displacing Iraqi Arabs, Turcomans, and other minorities, and seeking control of Kirkuk.**

- **Shi'ite versus Shi'ite power struggles in south. Power struggle between the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC, formerly SCIRI), Fadilah, and the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS).**

- **Nascent political struggle over the role of religion in society, the nature of the rule of law, and the nature of human rights.**

Overall Tensions

Perception of Tensions by Province

Name	(1 – 10) Less to More Tension	
	In Neighborhood	In Country
Al Anbar	8	10
Baghdad	7	9
Basra	3	9
Diyala	6	9
Dhi Qar	2	9
Najaf	2	8
Maysan	2	8
Qadisiyah	3	7
Muthanna	2	8
Wasit	3	8
Babil	5	9
Karbala	2	8
Salah ad Din	7	9
Ninawa	2	10
Kirkuk/Tamin	6	8
Sulaymaniya	2	9
Erbil	2	9
Dahuk	2	10

Is There a Civil War in Iraq?

Is Iraq in a Civil War (Percent Saying Yes)

	Baghdad	Kurdish Areas	Kirkuk	Tikrit/Baquba	Mid-Euphrates	South	
☐ Iraqi Army	77	81	44	40	88	90	
■ Iraqi Police	66	83	44	55	85	92	
☐ Badr Org.	43	1	5	3	29	31	
☐ Mahdi Army	50	1	8	5	52	55	
■ Peshmerga	14	94	19	4	5	4	

"Soft Cleansing"

- Ethnic Cleansing and Displacement (percent)

|	Ethnic Cleansing in Your Area	Moved Home to Avoid Violence/Persecution
◻ All Iraq	12	
◼ Baghdad	31	
◻ All Iraq		15
◻ Sunni Arabs		26
◼ Baghdad		35

What Conciliation Means

- **Armed forces, police, and security services that do not fuel sectarian and ethnic tensions, and provide credible day-to-day security for ordinary Iraqis throughout the nation.**

- **Giving the Sunnis real participation in the national government at every level, and creating ministries and government structures that fairly mix Arab Shi'ite, Arab Sunni, Kurd, and other minorities.**

- **ReBa'athification and giving a clean slate or amnesty to all who served under the Ba'ath not guilty of violent crimes.**

- **An oil law and technical annexes that assure all major Iraqi factions of an equitable share of today's oil revenues and the future development of Iraq's oil and gas resources.**

- **Amending the constitution to create a structure that protects the rights of all Iraqis, and which creates viable compromises, or clearly defers or omits, areas of critical sectarian and ethnic division.**

- **Working out an approach to federation that will avoid civil conflict.**

- **Creating and implementing local election laws, particularly at the provincial level.**

- **Disbanding or assimilating militias, or creating retraining centers and funding programs to deal with members.**

- **Effective day-to-day government services for all Iraqis.**

Total Attacks by Province
February 13 – May 4, 2007

These four provinces have approximately 37% of the population but account for 78% of attacks.

Number of Attacks per Day

Baghdad, Salah ad Din, Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, Basrah, Tamim, Babil, Qadisiyah, Wasit, Dhi Qar, Irbil, Maysan, Karbala, Sulaymaniyah, Muthanna, Najaf, Dahuk

Population weighted map

Source: MNC-I

Average Weekly Attacks
April 1, 2004 – May 4, 2007

Source: MNC-I

Average Daily Casualties*
April 1, 2004 – May 4, 2007

* Casualty data reflect updated data for each period and are derived from unverified initial reports submitted by Coalition elements responding to an incident; the inconclusivity of these numbers constrains them to be used only for comparative purposes.

Source: MNC-I

Sectarian Murders* and Incidents
January 2006 – April 2007

*Sectarian incidents and murders as recorded in MNC-I Significant Activities Database. Sectarian incidents are threats and violence with apparent sectarian motivations. Multiple casualties can result for a single incident. Sectarian murders are murders with distinct characteristics, and are a subset of total civilian casualties (not depicted in this chart).

Source: MNC-I

Conciliation: The "Minority Report"

Minority Votes by Province

Name	Percent
Al Anbar	26.25
Baghdad	43.45
Basra	22.5
Diyala	62.47
Dhi Qar	13.26
Najaf	18.01
Maysan	13.1
Qadisiyah	18.53
Muthanna	13.54
Wasit	19.26
Babil	23.84
Karbala	23.92
Salah ad Din	66.91
Ninawa	63.29
Kirkuk	46.6
Sulaymaniya	12.82
Erbil	5.31
Dahuk	9.69

The Iraqi people would be better off if the country were divided into three or more separate countries that better reflected ethnic or sectarian divisions

Nationwide, 36% of respondents answered that the Iraqi people would be better off if Iraq was divided into three or more separate countries.

Percent answering "Strongly Agree" or "Somewhat Agree"

100%   80%   60%   40%   20%   0%

Source: April 2007 Nationwide Poll

I feel safe and secure in my neighborhood

I feel safe and secure outside of my neighborhood

Iraq: 77%

Iraq: 32%

Percent agreeing

0%   20%   40%   60%   80%   100%

Source: April 2007 Nationwide Poll

How would you describe the tensions in your neighborhood today? (Scale of 1 to 10)

How would you describe the tensions in the country today? (Scale of 1 to 10)

More Tension — Less Tension

10 ————— 1

Source: April 2007 Nationwide Poll

The Key Role of Civil-Military Affairs

US Civil-Military Affairs

• **Counterinsurgency (Win)**

• **Aid ISF Military development (Win)**

• **Aid ISF Police development and creation of courts & rule of law (Hold)**

• **Aid Iraqi political conciliation and coexistence (Hold & Build)**

• **Iraqi governance & government services aid (Hold & Build)**

• **Iraq economic stability, growth, services, infrastructure (Hold & Build)**

• **Iraqi elections and political development (Hold & Build)**

Iraqi Civil-Military Affairs

• **Political conciliation and coexistence**

• **Iraqi Military**

• **Iraqi Police & Rule of Law**

• **Governance & Government services**

• **Economic stability, development and services**

• **Local elections**

• **Federalism?**

Provincial Security Transition Assessment
As of May 2007

Source: MNF-I

Iraqi Army and National Police with Lead Responsibility for Counter-Insurgency Operations in Their Areas

May 06

Baghdad Area

Mosul
Tal'Afar
Kirkuk
Samarra
Ramadi
Fallujah
Najaf
Basrah

Component	DIV HQs	BDE HQs	BNs
Iraqi Army	2	14	57
National Police	0	2	6
Total	2	16	63

Source: MNC-I, C3 as of May 7, 2006

May 07

Baghdad Area

Mosul
Tall 'Afar
Kirkuk
Samarra
Ramadi
Fallujah
Najaf
Basrah

Iraqi Army Lead
National Police Lead

Component	DIV HQs	BDE HQs	BNs
Iraqi Army	9	31	95
National Police	0	0	0
Total	9	31	95

Source: MNC-I, C3 as of May 14, 2007

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Unrealistic Data on Transfer of Security Responsibility

- Data on the transfer of security responsibility disguise the fact such transfers often do not bring security or give control to the central government.

- British cuts in Maysan Province were driven by local Shi'ite factions, and the other provinces under "Provincial Iraqi Control" are all Shi'ite provinces in the south where the ISF and central government have uncertain authority.

- Transfer of authority in the three Kurdish-dominated provinces will effectively raise more problems in terms of Kurdish separatism and tension with Iraqi Arabs. (p. 29)

- The fact that the US and other Coalition forces have transferred or closed 61 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) out of 122 is not a measure of ISF competence, but rather US force cuts and shifts.

- Does not address continued dependence on embeds, partner units, and US/Coalition artillery, armor, air combat, mobility, and IS&R capability.

Overarching Issues

- **Sectarian and ethnic divisions in the military are not addressed, nor are the risks of splits within the forces if civil conflicts divided the country. Efforts to strengthen the role of Sunnis and create more balanced and truly national forces are not addressed in any meaningful way and seem to have failed.**

- **Failure to address sectarian, ethnic, tribal, and local differences applies to the entire June 2007 analysis of the ISF, and is particularly disturbing when the real-world meaning of transfer of responsibility is to create sectarian and ethnic power centers with little or uncertain allegiance to the central government.**

- **Reporting on Ministry Capacity Development (pp. 31-33 and 37-39) essentially repeats past statements without any indication of serious progress in addressing the problems involved. The activities listed seem useful, but their effectiveness and timing remains almost completely unclear.**

Failure to Address ISF Role in National Defense

- **If there is a plan to create Iraqi military forces capable of actually defending the country once the US and its Coalition allies leave, no mention is made anywhere in the report.**

- **Planned increase in the Army from 10 to 12 divisions seems designed solely to improve counterinsurgency and internal security capabilities (p. 40).**

- **Developing Navy readiness will take until 2010 (p. 42).**

- **No estimates of when the air force will make its existing aircraft operational, or acquire combat aircraft. (pp. 42-43)**

Total Number of Trained Iraqi Security Forces*

Component	# Trained
Ministry of Interior Forces	
Police	~135,000
National Police	~26,300
Border Enforcement	~28,400
Dignitary Protection	~500
MOI Forensics Unit	~4,000
Total MoI	~194,200
Ministry of Defense Forces	
Army	~135,800
Support Forces	~13,000
Special Operations	~1,500
Air Force	~900
Navy	~1,100
Total MoD	~152,300
Total Trained ISF	~346,500

* These numbers are not the same as those present for duty. Includes all personnel trained as part of Objective COIN Force, Objective Civil Security Force, and replacement and expansion initiatives. Does not include 18,000 replenishments.

Data as of May 14, 2007

"Trained and Equipped" Manpower

|	July 05	Jan 06	July 06	Dec 06	March 07	May 14 07	June 13 07
▣ Minstry of Defense							
▣ Army	78200	104400	113200	132700	132856	135800	154500
▣ Navy	700	800	1100	1100	1135	1100	1100
▣ Air Force	200	500	700	900	929	900	900
▣ Total MOD	*79100	*105700	*115000	*134700	*134920	*152300	*154,500
▣ Ministry of Interior							
▣ National Police			24300	24400	24400	26300	26300
▣ Regular Police/Highway	64100	77500					
▣ Regular Police			135000	135000	135000	135000	135000
▣ Other Forces	30700	40500	23400	28900	28860	32900	32900
▣ Total MOI	*94800	*118000	*160100	*188300	*188260	*194,200	*194,200
▣ GRAND TOTAL	*173900	*223700	*275100	*323000	*323100	*346,600	*348,700

Unrealistic Data on Trained and Equipped Manpower

- **Data on trained and equipped manpower (p. 30) remain a fundamentally dishonest measure of capability.**

- **No indication of how many such personnel remain in service, or are active in units.**

- **Unclear that more than 65% of the 152,300 men in the MoD forces are actually present on a given day (p. 40), or that the figure is higher than 40-70% for the 194,200 men in the MoI forces (p. 31).**

- **Many of those present are not active – particularly in the MoI forces. The fact that estimates of 20% attrition per year in trained and equipped manpower are being reviewed is scarcely reassuring. (p. 31)**

Unrealistic Data on Equipment Levels and Capabilities

- **Saying that the army has 100% of its critical equipment needs, and the police have 89%, ignores the fact that the equipment TO&Es are too light to really allow independent operations.**

- **Critical problems exist in equipment maintenance and availability in many units, and no reliable system for equipment accountability exists in many units. Recurrent outside reporting indicates that equipment is not reaching units at levels it should**

- **June 2007 report says that combat loss and attrition may have removed a "significant portion" of equipment from the MOI, but does not address the role of corruption in equipment attrition or the inability to determine how much equipment has gone to hostile factions.**

MOD Forces' Assessed Capabilities

Source: MNF-I as of May 14, 2007

Exaggeration of Army Readiness and Capabilities - I

- **No meaningful readiness data for the 101 Iraqi Army battalions said to be in service (the total force now has 10 divisions, 36 brigades, and 112 battalions), and saying that 95 of these 101 battalions "have the lead in counterinsurgency operations in their areas of responsibility" is little short of absurd (p. 30-31).**

- **All active combat units are still heavily dependent on US embeds, Coalition partner units, outside supply, and outside artillery, armor, or air support in an emergency. Many have serious officer, NCO, and sectarian or ethnic problems.**

- **Data on total Army force readiness, which includes strategic infrastructure battalion, shows 89 battalions in the lead with Coalition enablers or fully independent. There is no breakdown of which units are "in the lead," or a breakdown of actual unit quality, combat experience, or readiness.**

Exaggeration of Army Readiness and Capabilities – II

- A total of 43 battalions are said to be unready, with no indication of what units are involved. There is no explanation of why these data on page 41 differ from those on pages 30-31.

- Actual manning problems were openly addressed in unclassified reporting down to the battalion level early in the postwar period, but have never been addressed since.

- The US has also abandoned its previous detailed readiness reporting in four different unclassified categories, and the report ignores the highly detailed Transitional Readiness Assessments that the Defense Department refuses to de-classify or even share with Congress.

- Unit performance histories are what count. Not quantified metrics or categories.

MOI National Police Forces' Assessed Capabilities

Source: MNF-I as of May 14, 2007

No Clear Plan For, or Assessment Of, the Regular Police - I

- **There is no discussion of any overall plan for police development, for dealing with the problems created by local police and security forces, for dealing with the problems created by ethnic and sectarian ties and links to militias, for problems with ties to criminal elements, or for tying police activity to an effective court and criminal justice system.**

- **The data on police readiness says nothing about capability assessments or the result of PTT monitoring efforts and does not provide a meaningful assessment of progress to date even for the surge effort in Baghdad. (p. 33)**

- **There are no data on how many police are in service who are not Coalition-trained or equipped, or the areas where the police are or are not effective and/or loyal to the central government.**

No Clear Plan For, or Assessment Of, the Regular Police - II

- **The report does note that militia infiltration remains a significant problem, and so does collusion with criminal gangs. "Even when the police are not affiliated with a militia or organized crime, there is often mistrust between the police and judiciary, each viewing the other as corrupt." (p. 34)**

- **The need to define the paramilitary functions of various police elements is never addressed.**

- **Nor, is their critical function in following "win" by Coalition and Iraqi Army forces with the ability to "hold" secure areas.**

- **The so-called "year of the police" in 2006 seems to have been followed by the year of no plans or well-defined goals.**

Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports Entry

- **Progress reporting on creating a major Directorate of Border Enforcement and Directorate of Ports Entry only discusses force size and the number of forts.**

- **No assessment of the effectiveness of such forces, although they now total over 29,660 and operate some 420 forts and facilities (p. 35).**

- **Report does not address reports that the border forts are extremely poorly equipped. These problems are particularly troubling because of the long history of ineffective efforts to create border controls throughout the Middle East, endemic smuggling, corrupt and inactive border and custom officials, and forces that have ties to local militias or insurgents – or which can be bribed or intimidated by them.**

- **There seems to be a serious risk that this effort with have little or no meaning, particularly in dealing with Shi'ite infiltration and arms smuggling from Iran.**

Intelligence and Security Service Issues

- **The reporting largely dodges around the severe sectarian and ethnic problems and divisions within the government affecting the creation of the National Information and Investigation Agency. (p. 36)**

- **The June 2007 report makes no mention of allegations that Iraq's intelligence service has split into an official American/CIA-funded Iraqi National Intelligence Service, and an unofficial pro-Shiite intelligence agency run through the office of the Minister of State for National Security.**

- **The major problems in creating Iraqi intelligence capabilities, distrust of the CIA funded and advised force, and the need to create a viable military, police, and civil mix of intelligence and IS&R capabilities to replace the advanced programs and capabilities now provided by the US and Coalition forces is never addressed.**

Facilities Protection Service

- **Seems to be no significant progress in actually reforming the 98,000 men in the various elements of the Facilities Protection Service:**

- **"Without a new law or clear directive from the Prime Minister, most Ministries remain resistant to this initiative…Because the FPS is not part of the Coalition's programmed train and equip requirements, metrics such as numbers of personnel or equipping status are not included in the overall data." (p. 36).**

- **Acute problems with spending on ineffective or ghost forces, corruption, ties to insurgents and militias, and a resulting lack of meaningful protection of critical facilities are not addressed.**

- **Consistent allegations that many elements of the FPS are corrupt or extensions of the various militias.**

Failure to Address ISF Role in National Defense

- **If there is a plan to create Iraqi military forces capable of actually defending the country once the US and its Coalition allies leave, no mention is made anywhere in the report.**

- **Planned increase in the Army from 10 to 12 divisions seems designed solely to improve counterinsurgency and internal security capabilities (p. 40).**

- **Developing Navy readiness will take until 2010 (p. 42).**

- **No estimates of when the air force will make its existing aircraft operational, or acquire combat aircraft. (pp. 42-43)**

A Surge Without a Strategy: Uncertain Civil-Military Time Lines

Action	Date
• Full US military build-up in Baghdad	• June-July
• Iraqi Army Deployment	• May-?
• Iraqi Police Active	• ?????
•Iraqi political conciliation and coexistence	• ?????
•Baghdad "ring" and other threats deployments & strategy	• ????
• Iraqi governance & government services aid	• ????
•PRTs fully staffed, flow of economic aid	• ????
• Post-surge plan for rest of country	• ????

The Real Time-Scale for Success

Action

• **Surge ends**

•**US Troop levels below 100,000**

• **Iraqi Army Aid Phases Out**

•**Iraq Army, Air Force, and Navy national defense capability**

• **Iraqi Police Aid Phases Out**

• **Iraqi Governance & Government services aid**

•**Phase out Economic Aid**

Date

• **End 2007? Mid 2008**

• **No plan. 2008-2010?**

• **No Plan. 2010-2013?**

• **No Plan. 2010-2013?**

•**No Plan. 2010-2013?**

•**No Plan. 2010-2013?**

•**No Plan. 2010-2013?**

What Might Work - I

- **Transparency and Credibility: End the spin and omissions.**

- **Declassify virtually everything without a major operational risk.** Even with the Congress, credibility is 95% unclassified information and direct responsiveness to immediate needs.

- **Develop honest metrics of security** tied to each struggle, covering the entire country, and linked to the local economic situation and quality of governance.

- **Develop honest and meaningful metrics of progress in Iraqi force development**, not spin- oriented nonsense like "trained and equipped" manpower and forces "in the lead."

- **Create net assessments that do not focus on threats, but the overall situation and progress, with summary reporting for each area of civil conflict at the level of major cities and governorates**. Tie US programs and priorities to such efforts, provide the level of credibility and transparency necessary to build broader Congressional and US public support if this is still possible.

What Might Work - II

- **Create military and police force development plans based on realistic time scales and with adequate levels of resources**. Develop metrics for plans that have credible, but not rigid benchmarks. Admit risks and failures.

- **Tie force development far more firmly to aid efforts to build up the police legal system, governance, and legitimate local authority**. "Win" is pointless without "hold" and "build."

- **Accept the practical need to create safe and viable Arab Sunni, Arab Shi'ite, and Kurdish areas within Iraq**; find ways of developing regional and local security, and sharing revenues and power on sectarian and ethnic terms. At this point, divided Kurdish and Arab areas, and Sunni and Shi'ite areas with limited numbers of mixed cities seem almost certain to emerge.

- **Focus aid on immediate efforts, and use aid funds to support stability and to ease Iraq's diverse conflicts**. Concentrate on CERP and PRT driven-aid as critical tool in "hold" and "build" and to make up for lack of Iraqi government presence, competence, and integrity. Focus national efforts on showing Iraqis that the US will aid them and will do it the Iraqi way in critical areas like revitalizing state industry.

What Might Work - III

- **Admit the fact that no meaningful victory is possible within the life of this Administration**. Make bipartisan efforts to both create an understanding of the long-term efforts needed if the current security plan succeeds, and to recast the US role in Iraq and the Gulf on an enduring basis if it does not.

- **Give the Congress everything generated in theater**. Make the Congress a partner if possible.