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Iraqi Perceptions of the War: Public Opinion by City and Region

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Updated: May 2, 2007

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Introduction

The patterns of conflict in Iraq have grown steadily more complex with time, adding sectarian and ethnic conflicts to what began as a largely Ba'athist dominated resistance in mid-2003. There are now five major patterns of violence:

Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents, where Al Qaeda plays a major role along with at least two other movements. These are the primary source of suicide attacks, car bombings, and attacks on Iraqi and Coalition forces.

Iraqi Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi'ite conflicts, where Shi'ite militias and death squads play a major role, and where sectarian violence, threats, and pressures are forcing the segregation of many areas, leading to displacements, and creating ethnic "cleansing."

Iraqi Arab versus Iraqi Kurdish ethnic conflicts center around the "ethnic fault" line, where control of Kirkuk and the oil fields around it have become a major source of tension and potential conflict that extends to the West to the area around Mosul. The future of the Turcomans and other minorities is directly affected by the outcome, as is national unity. This ethnic struggle also interacts with similar Kurdish ethnic tensions and struggles affecting Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

Arab Shi'ite on Arab Shi'ite struggles for political control and power, particularly in Southeastern Iraq. Each of the three major Shi'ite parties is a rival for power along with smaller parties that play a major role in key cities like Basra. Clashes between Shi'ite factions and militias have so far been limited, but the struggle for control of the Shi'ite shrine cities and the oil-rich provinces in the Southeast may have only begun.

Arab Sunni on Arab Sunni violence now concentrated largely in Al Anbar but spreading eastwards into Diyala. This is partly a struggle for tribal control of given areas, but also a struggle between Sunni Islamist extremist elements like Al Qaeda in Iraq. These struggles ease the pressure on the ISF and Coalition to some degree, but the enemy of an enemy is not necessarily a lasting "friend."

These divisions, however, tell only part of the story. Many Iraqis have divided or multiple loyalties, and the patterns of violence in one area may well differ from another. This becomes far clearer from the detailed results of a recent public opinion poll by ABC News, USA Today, the BBC, and ARD. This poll provided important insights into the overall trends in Iraqi "hearts and minds," but it also provided an important window into just how much Iraqis differ by major city and province. It also shows that any successful effort at counterinsurgency and conciliation must carefully consider all of the patterns in Iraqi perceptions and civil conflict.

Setting the Stage: The Overall Trends in Iraqi Public Opinion

Most of the data in this analysis are provided through the courtesy of the ABC News polling unit, supplemented by data provide by Opinion Research Business (ORB). It and it should be stressed that they were designed as part of a general poll on Iraq, and not for the purposes presented in this analysis. At the same time, all of the struggles in Iraq today are ultimately battles for the control of power, force, space, and money where Iraqi perceptions are critical in determining the outcome. The US and its Coalition allies cannot force solutions on the Iraqis, nor can it afford to try to fight a military battle that ignores how Iraqis see US and Coalition forces, the success of the Iraqi government, their overall security situation, trends in the economy, or the course of their daily lives.

Most of the indicators show that the prospects in Iraq are not good. Virtually all show the level of violence and civil conflict is far higher than most Iraqi and US government sources like to publicly admit. They also show that most Iraqis see the US and Coalition forces as at least a partial threat, do not trust the US or Coalition, and see their aid efforts as failed or non-existent.

Yet, these data do offer hope in some important areas. Most Iraqis still want a unified country, and only the Kurds want federalism. Iraqis do not want sectarian separation, and many still identify themselves as Muslims and not as Sunnis or Shi'ites. Some of these trends are reported in **Table One** and show that many Iraqis have not given up on the future.

Table One

Continuing Iraqi Hope and Desire For Unity (In Percent)

Desired Political System*	Total	Sunni	Shi'ite	Arab	Kurd
Single country, Unified government	64	57	69	73	15
New federal system With independent Regional governments Such as Kurdish North Sunni West, Shiite South	21	28	16	11	72
Neither	6	8	4	7	6
Don't know/refused/ No answer	9	6	10	9	8
Will Life Get Better? Worse?***	11/22/05	3/5/07	Sunni	Shi'ite	Kurd
Much Better	41	14	1	23	14
Somewhat Better	28	26	4	38	39
Same	11	26	27	22	33
Somewhat Worse	6	21	37	13	10
Much Worse	5	13	30	3	3
No Opinion	9	-	-	1	9

* ORB, Public attitudes in Iraq – Four Years On, March 2007, p. 14. ** ABC, USA Today. BBC, ARD Poll, “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007, p. 17.

Living Under Constant Threat

The ABC News poll conducted in March 2007, however, also found that 53% percent of all Iraqis saw security as the most serious single issue facing the country (55% Sunni, 52% Shi'ite, and 45% Kurd), up from 18 percent in 2005. (In some locales that soared -- 80 percent in the divided Sunni Arab/Kurdish city of Kirkuk; nearly as high in Anbar, the center of Sunni Arab discontent, and in Shiite-dominated Basra, Iraq's second-largest city.) Political and military issues made up a close second (26% of all Iraqis, 26% Sunni, 27% Shi'ite, and 18% Kurd.) Only the relatively secure Kurds revealed a significant percentage that saw Iraq's growing economic problems as a dominant factor. (9% of all Iraqis, 9% Sunni, 7% Shi'ite, and 18% Kurd.)¹

The ABC poll also found that a focus on the numbers of Iraqis killed or the number of sectarian incidents sharply underestimates the civil-military challenge. MNF-I, US and Iraqi government statistics on violence in Iraq fail to make a serious effort to estimate threats, kidnappings, woundings, intimidation, or sectarian and ethnic crimes. These 'lower' forms of violence became far more common in Iraq than killings, and represent the bulk of the real-world challenge to the ISF,²

Widespread violence, torn lives, displaced families, emotional damage, collapsing services, an ever-starker sectarian chasm -- and a draining away of the underlying optimism that once prevailed. Violence is the cause, its reach vast. Eighty percent of Iraqis report attacks nearby -- car bombs, snipers, kidnappings, and armed forces fighting each other or abusing civilians. It's worst by far in the capital, Baghdad, but by no means confined there. The personal toll is enormous. More than half of Iraqis, 53 percent, have a close friend or relative who's been hurt or killed in the current violence. One in six says someone in their own household has been harmed. Eighty-six percent worry about a loved one being hurt; two-thirds worry deeply. Huge numbers limit their daily activities to minimize risk. Seven in 10 report multiple signs of traumatic stress.

The poll found that while In 2005, 63 percent of Iraqis said they felt very safe in their neighborhoods in 2005, only 26 percent had said this in early 2007. One in three did not feel safe at all. In Baghdad, home to a fifth of the country's population, eighty-four percent feel entirely unsafe. Even outside of Baghdad, just 32 percent of Iraqis felt "very safe" where they lived compared with 60 percent a year and a half ago.³

Nationally, 12 percent of all Iraqis surveyed reported that ethnic cleansing -- the forced separation of Sunnis and Shiites -- has occurred in their neighborhoods. In mixed-population Baghdad, it's 31 percent. This is not desired: In rare agreement, 97 percent of Sunni Arabs and Shiites alike oppose the separation of Iraqis on sectarian lines. Nonetheless, one in seven Iraqis overall -- rising to a quarter of Sunni Arabs, and more than a third of Baghdad residents -- said they themselves have moved homes in the last year to avoid violence or religious persecution.

¹ ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll, released March 19, 2007, p. 17.

² ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll, released March 19, 2007, pp. 2-3.

³ ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll, released March 19, 2007, pp. 2-3.

As security conditions have worsened, so have expectations for future improvement in the conditions of life -- an especially troubling result, since hopes for a better future can be the glue that holds a struggling society together. In 2004 and 2005 alike, for example, three-quarters of Iraqis expected improvements in the coming year in their security, schools, availability of jobs, medical care, crime protection, clean water and power supply. Today only about 30 to 45 percent still expect any of these to get any better.

The ABC poll asked about nine kinds of violence that broke the security problems Iraqis and ISF forces faced into far more detail than the Coalition and US have ever publicly reported (car bombs, snipers or crossfire, kidnappings, fighting among opposing groups or abuse of civilians by various armed forces). These results are reflected in **Table Two**:⁴

Most Iraqis in Baghdad said at least one of these had occurred nearby; half reported four or more of them. Some 53 percent of Iraqis said a close friend or immediate family member had been hurt in the current violence. That ranged from three in 10 in the Kurdish provinces to nearly eight in 10 in Baghdad. Even outside Baghdad, 74 percent reported at least one form of violence, and 25 percent reported four or more (34 percent excluding the Kurdish area, which was far more peaceful than the country overall).

⁴ ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll, released March 19, 2007, pp. 5-6.

Table Two

Kinds of Violence Iraqis Reported as Occurring Nearby and the Civil-Military Reaction in Early 2007
(In percent)

	All	Baghdad	Kurdistan	Rest of Iraq
Type of Violence Encountered (Percent reporting)				
Kidnappings for ransom	40%	58%	4%	41%
Gov't/anti-gov't fighting	34	57	1	33
Car bombs, suicide attacks	32	52	3	31
Snipers, crossfire	30	56	*	27
Sectarian fighting	25	49	1	22
Perceive Unnecessary Violence by: (Percent reporting)				
U.S./coalition forces	44	59	9	47
Local militia	31	44	2	32
Iraqi police	24	44	1	22
Iraqi Army	24	44	0	22
Any of these	80	100	12	86
Four or more of these	37	70	1	34
Friend/family member harmed	53	77	29	49
Focus of Efforts to Avoid Violence: (Percent who try to avoid)				
	All	Sunni	Shiite	Kurdish
U.S./coalition forces	81%	95	85	40
Passing through checkpoints	66	92	64	17
Passing by police stations/ public buildings	55	91	45	10
Markets/crowds	54	74	53	17
Travel	53	71	54	18
Leaving home	51	77	48	5
Going to/applying for work	43	63	40	7
Sending children to school	39	66	32	3

Source: ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll, released March 19, 2007, pp. 5-6.

Iraqi Civil-Military Views of the United States

One key result of the ABC poll is that many Iraqis do not see the US and Coalition forces as allies or liberators, and the US has definitely failed to win the battle for “hearts and minds.” Iraqis divided, by 48-52 percent, over whether the United States was right or wrong to invade in spring 2003. Once again, however, there are sharp sectarian and ethnic splits. Seventy percent of Shiites and 83 percent of Kurds polled endorsed the invasion. But 98 percent of Sunni Arabs said it was wrong.

There is a little overall confidence in US forces: Eighty-two percent of Iraqis say they’re not confident in US and UK forces -- 88 percent of Shiites as well as 97 percent of Sunni Arabs. (That falls to one-third of generally pro-US Kurds.) In spite of allocating \$38 billion in development funds (some \$33 billion of which were US funds) Reconstruction is another complaint: Nationwide, 67 percent of Iraqis say post-war reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or nonexistent. Sixty percent of Shiites say so; among Sunnis, it’s 94 percent. (Again, attitudes are different in the Kurdish area, where 73 percent call reconstruction effective.)

The detailed results focusing on popular perceptions of the US civil-military effort to date are deeply disturbing. The number of Iraqis who call it “acceptable” to attack U.S. and coalition forces, 17 percent in early 2004, has tripled to 51 percent now, led by near-unanimity among Sunni Arabs. And 78 percent of Iraqis now oppose the presence of U.S. forces on their soil, though far fewer favor an immediate pullout.

Fewer than three in 10 Iraqis polled thought sending additional US troops to Baghdad and Anbar -- the Bush “surge” -- would improve security in these areas. Among Baghdad residents themselves, 36 percent think the surge will help things. In Anbar, where the Sunni Arab opposition is rooted, essentially everyone thought it would make security worse.

The main source of this antipathy was disaffected Sunni Arabs, the group that lost power with the overthrow of Saddam. Ninety-four percent of Sunni Arabs called attacks on U.S. forces acceptable. That compares with 35 percent of newly empowered Shiites (still a large number to endorse violence), vs. seven percent of Kurds, who’re far more favorably inclined toward the United States. These figures compare with polls taken in 2004 that found attacks on Coalition forces were approved by roughly 63% percent of Sunni Arabs and 11 percent of Shiites

Even among Shiites, eight in 10 disapprove of the way the United States and other coalition forces have carried out their responsibilities in Iraq. More than eight in 10 Shiites (as well as 97 percent of Sunni Arabs) oppose the presence of U.S. and other forces in their country. (Kurds, again, differ powerfully; 75 percent support the U.S. presence.) More than seven in 10 Shiites – and nearly all Sunni Arabs – thought the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was making security worse.

Some four in ten Iraqis polled blamed either US and coalition forces (31 percent), or George W. Bush personally (nine percent) for the current violence in Iraq. Al Qaeda and foreign jihadi fighters were cited by 18 percent (far more by Shiites and Kurds than by Sunnis). Indeed, the top mention of local violence measured in the poll was “unnecessary violence against Iraqi citizens by U.S. or coalition forces.” Forty-four percent of Iraqis -- including 60 percent of Sunni Arabs -- reported this as having occurred nearby.

Some 59 percent of the Iraqis polled said they thought the United States controls things in Iraq. Fewer than half as many said so in 2005, 24 percent. Worsening views of US and other forces in Iraq tracks with the rise of violence and deterioration of conditions in key parts of the country. In the first ABC News poll in Iraq, in February 2004, 51 percent of Iraqis opposed the presence of U.S. forces on their soil. By November 2005 that jumped to 65 percent. In February/March 2007, it was 78 percent.

At the same time, Iraqis are equivocal about the timing of a US and Coalition departure and fear a sudden withdrawal. Just over a third (35 percent) favored immediate US withdrawal, peaking at 55 percent of Sunni Arabs -- fewer than might be expected. About four in 10 Iraqis polled -- Sunni and Shiite alike -- said US forces should remain until security is restored. “Leave now” sentiment was up, but not vastly, from 2005 -- 26 percent in 2005, vs. 35 percent in February/March 2007.

Setting the Stage: Regional, Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Divisions in Iraq

Understanding key national trends is only one part, however, of putting polling results by city and governorate into perspective. To understand such results, it is necessary to have at least a basic idea of how Iraq divides into key cities and the nature of its governorates. To put this in perspective, it is also important to understand that no meaningful census exists that describes Iraq's sectarian and ethnic composition, and virtually every sectarian and ethnic group feels it is larger than current estimates indicate, and that population movements, displacements, and cleansing are making "guesstimates" more uncertain by the day.

There seems to be no official Iraqi estimate of the country's Sunni vs. Shiite Arab populations, and no single authoritative source of empirical data on the subject. The most commonly cited estimate is an unsourced reference in the CIA World Factbook (<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>) saying that 60-65 percent of Iraqis are Shiite Muslims, 15-20 percent Kurds and three percent non-Muslims. Though not explicitly stated, that leaves room for 12 to 22 percent Sunni Arabs.

This estimate may be derived from a 1988 book, "Iraq: a Country Study" produced by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. This book (pp. 80-81) characterizes data on ethnicity and religious doctrine in Iraq as "not absolutely reliable." It says, "Officially the government sets the number of Shias at 55 percent. In the 1980s knowledgeable observers began to question this figure, regarding it as low. ...a more reasonable estimate of their number would seem to be between 60 and 65 percent." It adds, "...the Sunni Arabs...constitute a decided minority of only about 13 percent..." These data also are unsourced. The 60-65 percent Shiite estimate matches that in the CIA World Factbook; the 13 percent Sunni Arab estimate compares to the World Factbook's unstated range of 12 to 22 percent.

Recent survey data, including this poll, have had different results. This survey found 47 percent Shiite Arabs, 35 percent Sunni Arabs, 15 percent Kurds and three percent others.

D3 Systems reports that in its previous surveys it has seen Shiite Arabs in a range from the high 40s to low 50s, and Sunni Arabs in a range from the high 20s to mid-30s. The 35 percent Sunni Arab estimate in this poll is at the high end of its previous data, but within that range. This poll had more sampling points than any previous individual national study in Iraq by D3/KARL.

Other Iraq surveys are difficult to compare because they ask religious doctrine different ways, often reporting significant numbers of Muslims of unspecified doctrine, and use different weights, including, in some cases, weighting to a predetermined assumption of distribution by religious doctrine. The ORB poll, for example, drew on 5,019 interviews carried out in home between 10 and 22

February, 2007, using probability samples based on the 1997 census. It was never intended to estimate sect or ethnicity. However, it found that 82% of those surveyed thought of themselves as Arab, 16% as Kurds, 2% as Turcomans, with less than 1% for any other faction.

It also found that when the survey base was asked about its religion, 14% identified themselves as Sunni, 24% as Shi’ites, and 61% as Muslims – giving faith a clear priority over sect. As for minorities, no minority reached 1%. A total of 58% in urban areas and 68% in rural areas identified themselves as Muslims, rather than by sect. The figures by governorate are shown in Table Three below, and show that many Iraqis still think of themselves as Muslims, although some Sunnis in threatened regions may have been afraid to respond, and Shi’ites are clearly more likely to identify themselves by sect than Sunnis:

Table Three

If asked your religion, what do you prefer the answer to be?

Muslim Respondents Only	Baghdad	Basrah	Muthana	Dhi Qar	Maysan	Salahideen	Dohuk	Kirkuk	Sulaymaniyah	Diyala	Ninewa	Babyl	Najaf	Karbala	Al Anbar	Wasit	Qadisiyah	Irbil
Sunni Muslim	8	-	-	-	-	17	17	33	33	8	17	-	-	-	16	-	-	91
Shi’ite Muslim	30	56	60	44	86	-	-	2	-	4	3	27	57	34	-	9	66	-
Muslim	60	43	40	55	14	83	80	63	66	90	81	73	43	66	84	91	33	9

Source: ORB Poll, February 2007, pp. 72-73

That said, the following figures, drawn from CIA and Department of Defense sources, do provide some important perspective on Iraq’s divisions by city and province, and on the poll results that follow:

Figure One shows the location of the governorates (provinces) and major cities in Iraq, and the CIA estimate of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic distribution. It should be note that it makes no estimate of how Iraq Arabs are divided by sect, and does not provided detailed breakouts of the percentages of the smaller minorities. Estimates of such data are extremely uncertain. ABC polls found a much larger percentage of Arab Sunnis, for example, than are reported in most sources.

Figure Two provides a rough estimate of the sectarian and ethnic population by region and governorate, and also shows that size of the minority vote in each governorate in the December 2005 election. This figure shows which provinces are clearly dominated by one ethnic and sectarian group and which are mixed. It also shows, however, that almost all provinces have very substantial minorities that would oppose any form of federalism that gave the majority sectarian or ethnic group control.

Moreover, Sunni versus Sunni fighting in Anbar, and Shi'ite versus Shi'ite tensions and fighting in the Shi'ite areas in the south, and the increasingly unstable Shi'ite coalition, raise serious questions about any form of federalism or separatism. This is particularly true in the four Shi'ite governorates in the Southeast, which has sought some form of separatism in the past, but are now deeply divided politically. Only two Kurdish governorates – Arbi (Irbil) and Dahuk have only token minorities, and they have problems with foreign threats and Turcoman minorities.

Moreover, a map this general cannot show that there are minority enclaves, mixed cities, and other sectarian and ethnic “islands” in most governorates. Similarly, it cannot reflect the fact that many Iraqis see their national identity as more important than their sectarian or ethnic identity, or are in mixed families and marriages.

Figure Three shows Iraq's traditional tribal divisions. Tribes still have a major social and political impact that further complicates Iraq's divisions, and sometimes cut across sectarian and ethnic lines. It should be noted, however, that the real-world map of tribal, sub-tribe, and clan divisions has always been more complex than this map shows. The steady urbanization of Iraq has also forced major shifts in tribal alignments, with urban populations increasingly more critical than rural tribal populations, and that tribal leadership structures are often in a high state of flux with very uncertain loyalties and power structures.

Figure Four shows the sharp rise in perceptions of tensions in Iraq by governorate. This is an estimate based on a different poll and reported by the Department of Defense. It shows that virtually all Iraqi governorates now see tensions as critical, and that there has been a major drop in perceived security and stability since 2005. It is important to note that these results track in broad terms with similar reporting in the ABC poll.

Figure Five provides a comparison of how Iraqis see tensions in their own neighborhood with how they perceive tensions within Iraq as a whole. As might be expected, Iraqis in areas dominated by one sectarian or ethnic faction see local tension as relatively low. It is clear, however, that all Iraqis see Iraq as a whole as deeply divided and tense.

Figure 1: Iraq by Governorate and Summary Demographics




Population: 27,499,638

Ethnic Groups:
 Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5%

Religions:
 Muslim 97% (Shi'a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3%

Languages:
 Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenian

Figure 2: Iraq's Ethnic and Sectarian Character: CIA Estimate



Minority Votes by Province

Province	Majority	Minority Vote in Percent
Anbar	Sunni	26%
Baghdad	Mixed	43%
Basra	Shi'ite	23%
Diyala	Mixed	62%
Dhi Qar	Shi'ite	13%
Najaf	Shi'ite	18%
Maysan	Shi'ite	13%
Qadisiyah	Shi'ite	19%
Muthanna	Shi'ite	14%
Wasit	Mixed	19%
Babil	Mixed	24%
Karbala	Shi'ite	24%
Salahaddin	Mixed	67%
Ninawa	Sunni	73%
Kirkuk	Mixed	57%
Dahuk	Kurd	10%
Sulaymaniyah	Kurd	13%
Arbil	Kurd	5%

Figure 4: The Rise in Iraqi Perceptions of Tension: November 2005 versus January 2007: MNF-I Estimate in Department of Defense Quarterly Report for March 2007





Figure 5: How Iraqi Perceive the Level of Tension Locally and Nationally: MNF-I Estimate in Department of Defense Quarterly Report for March 2007



Perception of Tensions by Province

Name	Less (1 – 10) More Tension In Neighborhood	More Tension In Country
Al Anbar	8	10
Baghdad	7	9
Basra	3	9
Diyala	6	9
Dhi Qar	2	9
Najaf	2	8
Maysan	2	8
Qadisiyah	3	7
Muthanna	2	8
Wasit	3	8
Babil	5	9
Karbala	2	8
Salah ad Din	7	9
Ninawa	2	10
Kirkuk/Tamin	6	8
Sulaymaniya	2	9
Erbil	2	9
Dahuk	2	10

Looking at Iraqi Divisions by City and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Violence

The following figures show the results of the ABC poll by major city and governorate where the ABC News Polling Unit felt the sample was large enough to provide statistically valid results. Some important cities and areas like Mosul have to be omitted for this reason, although the sampling that was done in this city produced anything but optimistic results.

Once again, it should be stressed that the ABC Poll was not designed to support detailed analysis of the trends in the insurgency and civil violence, and any interpretation of the results that goes beyond the obvious implications of the results shown is necessarily somewhat speculative. The reader should also be careful to read the actual spread sheets providing detailed polling results attached at the end of this paper. Graphs can do a great deal to illustrate the diversity in Iraq regarding virtually every issue, and the importance of looking beyond a narrow focus on the insurgency. They can also illustrate the dangers of generalizing by sect or ethnicity. At the same time, it is dangerous to take individual poll results out of the context of the full results for a given question and the overall results of the poll.

Figure Six shows how Iraqis rate the overall security situation when asked whether it is good or bad. As would be expected from the overall trends in Iraq discussed earlier, the responses are negative in every area in Iraq except the Kurdish dominated governorates. Dhi Qar, Suleymaniyah, and Irbil. They are particular bad in the cities of Baghdad and Kirkuk, and the provinces of Anbar, Tamim, Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninevah. It is clear that Iraqis do not perceive violence as confined to the four Sunni and mixed provinces reported in Department of Defense reporting. They see a much wider range of problems and threats than Sunni Islamic insurgents.

Figure Seven shows how Iraqis feel about key aspects of security like freedom of movement, freedom from persecution, and freedom from crime. The same broad patterns emerge, but significant differences do emerge by governorate that do not reflect the levels of Sunni Islamist insurgent activity, and civil violence and threats are generally seen as significantly more threatening than crime. This was not the case in 2003 and 2004.

Figure Eight addresses perceptions of neighborhood security. It is clear that aside from the Kurdish areas, Iraqis generally do not feel safe in their own neighborhoods, and this is true in areas dominated by one sect and by sectarian militias.


Figure Nine shows Iraqi perceptions of violence that has occurred nearby. As is the case with the polling results that follow, Iraqis tend to perceive very different mixes and causes of violence by city and governorate. Urban Iraqis tend to experience more violence than the population as a whole. Car bombings and suicide attacks are experienced most often in governorates with strong Sunni Islamist insurgent activity. Kidnappings are common, but show significant geographic variations as do snipers, crossfire attacks, and sectarian clashes.

Figure Ten shows that significant variations occur by poll and sample in some aspects of how Iraqis reporting violence, but much depends on the questions. The ORB poll reports the same general intensity of violence. Both the ABC and ORB polls did not ask about serious threats, although they found displacements and various forms of cleansing to be a major problem.

Figures Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen provide a range of different ways of looking at how Iraqis see the level of threat they face: In personal terms, national terms by cause of violence, and in national terms by type of violence. One key message is that Iraqis are not focused on the Sunni insurgency, bombings, or killings. They see very complex patterns of violence and a wide range of cause of threats and violence.


- **Figure Eleven** shows that almost all Iraqis have been forced to change the dialing pattern of their lives because of the threats they face in a variety of ordinary activities. The only exceptions are the two most secure Kurdish governorates. The activities that Iraqis seek to avoid, however, so differ strikingly by city and governorate, reflecting the very different mixes of violence in given areas.
 - **Figure Twelve** does indicate, however, that many Iraqis see their personal security threat in terms of a broad perception of a lack of security rather than actual attacks.
 - **Figure Thirteen** shows a somewhat similar set of Iraqi views in terms of the problems affecting Iraq as a whole, but more concern with sectarian violence and terrorism.
 - **Figure Fourteen** shows Iraqis does see serious threats from Al Qa'ida and foreign jihadists, and more general terrorist activity, but that the US ranks close to both threats, depending on the governorate, and a weak government is sometimes seen as a major security problem.
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Figure 6: Net Rating of the Security Situation in Iraq Today (Iraqi responses in percent) – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 7: Percent of Iraqis rating key aspects of personal security as “bad” – ABC Poll (March 2007)




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 8: Percent of Iraqis Saying Not Safe in Own Neighborhoods – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.


Figure 9: What Kinds of Violence have occurred nearby? – ABC Poll (March 2007)



	Total	Baghdad	Basra	Kirkuk	All Other	Anbar	Basrah	Tamim	Babylon	Baghdad	Dhi Qar	Diyala	Nineveh	Suleymaniya	Irbil
Car bombs, suicide attacks	32	52	14	78	22	37	14	78	34	52	1	20	58	-	7
Snipers, crossfire	30	56	29	16	21	30	27	25	20	56	27	31	39	-	1
Fighting among sectarian factions	25	49	18	16	19	-	18	19	43	50	14	24	29	-	3
Kidnappings for ransom	40	58	13	73	33	23	11	76	67	58	34	26	50	3	7
Fighting between government and antigovernment forces	34	57	29	18	27	29	32	26	37	55	29	27	38	-	3


Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 10: Iraqi Personal Knowledge of Major Acts of Violence in Last Three Years: “Which have you personally experienced in the last three years?” – ORB Poll (February 2007)




Source: Opinion Research Business (ORB) “Public Attitudes in Iraq: Four Year Anniversary of Invasion,” March 2007, pp. 7-9.

Figure 11: Percentage of Iraqi Saying They “Quite Often” or “Very Often” Avoid Activities and Places to Avoid Trouble – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 12: What is the single biggest problem facing your life these days? Percent citing security issue by type of perceived personal threat – ABC Poll (March 2007)




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 13: What is your opinion of the single biggest problem affecting Iraq? Percent citing security or political issue by type of threat or issue – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 14: What is your opinion of the single biggest problem affecting Iraq? Percent of Iraqis identifying a given cause of violence as the greatest single biggest problem affecting Iraq as a whole – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Looking at Iraqi Divisions by City and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Civil War

Given the previous data, it should be clear why asking Iraqis whether they face a state of civil war can produce uncertain results. The nature of violence in Iraq is extremely complex, and Iraqis who see US and other Coalition forces as a major threat, or feel that way about foreign jihadists, may not see civil conflict as a civil war even if it is a serious problem in their area. Nevertheless, the ABC poll, and a recent ORB poll, both show that many Iraqis do see themselves as in a civil conflict.

Figure Fifteen shows that Iraqis polled by ABC did feel the nation was already in a civil war. As would be expected, the percentages are highest in the cities and governorates where the fighting has been most intense. Many Kurd, however, answered yes although fighting has been limited, perhaps because they perceive the ethnic threat as high. Shi'ites do not seem to perceive Shi'ite versus Shi'ite tensions and clashes as a civil war.

Figure Sixteen shows that Iraqis in the ORB poll have similar views, but much depends on the way the question is asked. If Iraqis can choose either "in a civil war" or "close to one," they are likely to make a clear distinction between them. Arabs are also much more likely to see a state of civil war than Kurds, and Sunnis see the country closer to civil war than Shi'ites. Governorates with high levels of conflict or tension report very different results from the safer Shi'ite provinces in the south.

Figure Seventeen approaches the issue differently by asking Iraqis about sectarian and ethnic separation. This figure is both revealing and frightening. It does reflect a high degree of displacement or cleansing in some areas, and one wonders what "voluntary" means? In practice, it is likely to represent fear, threats, intimidation as distinguish from major violence. What is particularly striking, however, are the percentages for mixed neighborhoods that have not yet been caught up in separation, which is a warning of just how dangerous a violent, broad-based civil conflict can be. These figures are particularly striking for Basra, Kirkuk, and other cities, but are high for Baghdad. They affect eight of Iraq's provinces, including most Shi'ite ones. The only exceptions are the two Kurdish governorates of Suleymaniyah and Irbil, and the Kurds seem to be ignoring Turcoman and Christian minorities.


The ORB poll found that 21% of all Iraqis polled had had a family member leave them over the last four years as a result of the security situation (15% left the country and 9% went to the more secure Kurdish areas.) The figure for Baghdad Province was 51% (35% left the country and 16% went to the more secure Kurdish areas.) The figure for Diyala Province was 33% (20% left the country and 13% went to the more secure Kurdish areas.) The figure for Ninewa Province was 27% (19% left the country and 8% went to the more secure Kurdish areas.) The figure for Anbar Province was 48% (40% left the country and 8% went to the more secure Kurdish areas.) Of those who left, 50% went to Syria, 19% to Jordan, 10% to the UAE, and 9% to Egypt. The figures were 2% or less for other countries.

Figure Eighteen A and Eighteen B highlight the areas where separation and cleansing are already serious problems. They already include Baghdad city and the Basra, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninevah governorates. They also show that significant numbers of Iraqis have left the country in spite of the major problems in finding countries to enter, widespread poverty in Iraq, and the inability to sell or retain a home or business.

Figure Nineteen shows one of the most tragic aspects of the civil conflicts in Iraq. Only the Kurds show any major popular support for separation, and that is high (43%) only in Suleymaniyah. Iraqis in all major cities and other governorates feel separation is bad, generally by margins of well over 90%.


More generally, the previous charts almost certainly provide more insight into the complexity of violence in Iraq, and its intensity, than asking the civil war question. Like a focus on Al Qa'ida or the Sunni Islamist threat, such a question simply does not reflect the realities Iraqis perceive or the problems the US, its allies, and the Iraqi government face in dealing with local threats and perceptions.

Figure 15: Is Iraq Involved in a Civil War at this time? – ABC Poll (March 2007)




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 16: Iraqi Views of Current State or Prospects of Civil War in February 2007 – ORB Poll (March 2007)*




Source: Opinion Research Business Poll "Iraq, Public Attitudes in Iraq: Four Year Anniversary of the Invasion," March, 2007, pp. 11-13

Figure 17: Has the Separating of People Been Happening In Your Mahallah or Not? Has this been mainly forcible or mainly peaceful? – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 18A: Percentage of Iraqis reporting separation and forcible separation– ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 18A: “Do you have any members of your family that have left Iraq over the previous four years as a result of the security situation?” – ORB Poll (February 2007)



Source: Opinion Research Business (ORB) “Public Attitudes in Iraq: Four Year Anniversary of Invasion,” March 2007, pp. 26-28.

Figure 19: Do you think the separation of people on sectarian lines is a good thing or a bad thing? – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Looking at Iraqi Divisions by City and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Life, the Iraqi Government, and Iraqi Security Forces

Iraqi perceptions of the overall conditions of life are necessarily mixed, and can be misleading. For example, other polls have shown that human beings rarely give way to despair and find ways to cope with major hardships. Asking people if they are optimistic about the future can sometimes produce useful trend analysis, but is not particularly useful as a measure of how serious anything but the most dire conditions really are. In contrast, polls show that people can be very critical of their governments even if they feel it is serving them relatively well. There is a reason that democratic politicians in the power structure of their governments campaign in ways that constantly complain about that same power structure.

Figure Twenty does shows that Iraqis are roughly evenly split over whether things are better now than under Saddam Hussein. As would be expected, Sunnis in Sunni dominated governorates tend to say “no” and Kurds tend to say “yes.” Shi’ites are more divided. The Shi’ites in the more peaceful governorates, however, do tend to say yes by significant majorities.

The ORB poll found that 49% of all Iraqis still believed life was better under the present system. (29% Sunnis, 66% Shi’ites, 75% Kurds.) Only 26% said it was better under the previous regime. (51% Sunnis, 6% Shi’ites, 4% Kurds.) If the responses are broken out by province, however, majorities in Salahadeen (96%), Kirkuk (59%), Diyala (68%), Ninewa (73%) and Anbar (78%) thought that life was better under the previous regime.

Figure Twenty-One shows that when Iraqis are asked if their current lives are good or bad the results are more mixed. Many Iraqis who feel things are better than under Saddam still feel things are now going badly in their lives today. This is a clear warning that being better than Saddam is simply not good enough by the standards of many Iraqis that suffered under his regime.

Figure Twenty-Two shows Iraqis have little confidence in either the national government or local governments. Kurds seem to trust both types of government, a surprising result given Kurdish Arab tensions. Sunnis have no reason to trust the national government, and only limited control over local governments in cities and governorates. Somewhat surprisingly, Shi’ites are less than happy with those they have elected to power, and with local governments as well. Given the other results in the poll, such dissatisfaction is scarcely unexpected. Neither the national nor local governments provide either security or acceptable levels of service. Given the additional problems in sectarian and ethnic divisions, Iraqis have little reason to like or trust the quality of governance they receive in any area in most of the country.


The ORB poll also found that only 45% of Iraqis believed in Prime Minister Maliki’s new security plan and efforts to disarms the militias. A total of 22% did not believe, with a heavily polarized response. A total of 61% of Shi’ites said they believed he would do it, but only 42%

of Sunnis. A total of 22% said they believed it would not work because of militia presence inside the government, and 25% because of corrupt individuals with the security forces. (26% and 29% respectively for Sunnis.)

Figure Twenty-three shows that Iraqis retain more confidence in the army and police than in the government, and generally do not trust militias. These results do not apply in high conflict areas or areas with strong Sunni majorities. The more active the Iraqi forces are, the less they are trusted. As later figures show, at least some of the confidence in the Iraqi army and police also comes from the deep distrust Iraqis feel for both the militias and Coalition forces – the latter are the subject of deep Iraqi resentment and anger.


Figure Twenty-four also shows a lack of confidence in the current national government does not mean support for federalism except among the Kurds. Both the ABC and ORB polls show that Iraqis do not want separation or federalism. In broad terms, this is as true of the Shi'ite south as Arab Sunni areas.

Figure 20: Compared to the time before the war in spring 2003, are the things in your life? (Iraqi responses in percent) – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 21: Overall, how good would you say things are going in your life these days? (Iraqi responses in percent) – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 22: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi National and Local Governments (Iraqi “not confident” responses in percent) – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 23: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi Security Forces and Militias (Iraqis saying “not confident” responses in percent) – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 24: On balance, which of the following alternatives would you prefer for the future of Iraq? ORB Poll (February 2007)



US and Coalition Forces

One of the most striking aspects of public opinion polling in Iraq is the extent to which given groups of Iraqis see the US and Coalition forces as a threat, an enemy, illegitimate, or a danger to avoid. The US may see itself as a liberator, and many Iraqis -- particularly Kurds, do share this view. In broad terms, however, many other -- if not most -- Iraqis see US and Coalition forces as much of a threat as the insurgents and militias.

Figure Twenty-Five shows that collateral damage goes far beyond the number of people killed or injured or material damage. Most Iraqis make a constant effort to avoid the presence of US and Coalition forces, checkpoints, and active police and other Iraqi security activity. This is an important factor in what is a political, ideological, and perceptual struggle.

Figure Twenty-Six shows that nearly half of the Iraqis polled feel they have seen unnecessary violence by US and Coalition forces. It should be noted, however, that many Iraqis also report excessive use of force by the militias. These figures need to be kept in careful perspective. Far more Iraqis have had active contact with US and Coalition forces carrying out actual operations or carrying out defensive road movements, checkpoint, and area security operations that have had contact with the Iraqi Army, Iraq police, or hostile forces like Al Qa'ida. The poll did not ask whether Iraqis saw violence by such movements as "excessive." The survey almost certainly produces positive if Iraqis have had one bad encounter with Coalition forces over time, and Iraqis also may not distinguish between US and Coalition forces and contractor (PSD) security detachments which are notorious for their lack of responsibility and any concern for the reaction of Iraqi civilians.

Figure Twenty-Seven shows Iraqis have little confidence in US and other Coalition forces almost regardless of Iraqi area, sect, or ethnicity. At the same time, the results in Figure Twenty-One are a warning that Iraqis do not see US and Coalition forces as effective or a source of security, with the partial exception of the Kurds. How much of this is based on unfair expectations regarding security, and how much is based on feelings such forces are occupiers and the product of an unjust war -- versus their actual performance -- is a matter of speculation. It is also quite possible that such negatives are again based on a tendency to generalize from the worst personal experience or perception. The fact remains, however, that these results are deeply disturbing.

Figure Twenty-Eight provides a more qualified picture of how negative Iraqi perceptions are of US and Coalition forces. It shows that Kurds and Shi'ites outside combat areas are less likely than Sunnis and Shi'ites in high combat/threat areas to say that US and Coalition forces have done a "very bad" versus a "bad" job.

Figure Twenty-Nine shows that Iraqis are more than angry at US and Coalition forces. Many are actively hostile and support attacks on such forces. They are far less likely to support attacks on Iraqi Army and police forces. The overall level of hostility cuts across regions and ethnic and sectarian lines. Support for attacks on US and Coalition forces often approach 50% even in Shiite and some Kurdish areas. The first polls taken in 2003 shows that only about 37% of Sunnis and 11-12% of Shi'ites supported such attacks. The ABC and other polls have seen a steady rise in such hostility over time. It is not clear, however, how many Iraqis that say they support such attacks actually mean what they say, and only a


small fraction are probably willing to participate. It should also be noted that the more “positive” data on Iraq Army and police forces are much less positive in the areas where Iraqi forces have been active in combat or actively caught in the middle of sectarian and ethnic violence.

Figure Thirty shows that Iraqis initially had little faith in the new “surge strategy” announced in early 2007. This reflects past performance, however, not actual experience with the new strategy and new US-ISF method of operations. **The ORB poll found that 33% of Iraqis (40% of Sunnis, 26% of Shi’ites, and 61% of Kurds felt the new strategy was intended to bring security back to Iraq. Few felt it was designed to take over Iraq, but 22% of Iraqis (27% of Sunnis, 20% of Shi’ites, and 14% of Kurds felt the new strategy was intended to enable the US to attack neighboring countries (e.g. Iran/Syria). The percentages feeling the surge was designed to aid invasions of other countries were particularly high in Salahidin (34%), Kirkuk (26%), and Ninewa (44%) governorates in the North; Anbar (43%) in the Center, and Muthana (43%) in the south.**

Figure Thirty-One indicates that Iraqis do not translate their anger and hostility into demands for the instant departure of US and Coalition forces. Iraqis may not like US and Coalition forces, but only about a third (35%) want such forces to “leave now.” Most (68%) want the US to stay until the Iraqi forces are ready and/or the government is strong and security is restored. Virtually none want any form of lasting US presence, even in Kurdish areas. There is nothing paradoxical about the fact broadly angry and hostile Iraqis wanting US and Coalition forces to stay. The preceding Figures have shown just how endemic perceptions of violence and fears of civil war now are. Iraqis are realistic enough to recognize that US and Coalition forces are better than weakness or anarchy.


Figure Thirty-Two shows, however, that the ORB poll produced much less favorable results, and many Iraqis do feel the security situation would improve if the US and other Coalition forces left immediately. This sentiment was particularly strong in Shi’ite-dominated governorates, raising concerns about the popular support for Coalition forces among Iraq’s largest faction.

Figure 25: Percentage of Iraqi Saying They “Quite Often” or “Very Often” Avoid US and Coalition Forces, Check Points, and Iraq Police and Public Buildings to Avoid Trouble – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 26: What kinds of unnecessary violence have you seen against Iraqi citizens? – ABC Poll (March 2007)




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 27: Percent of Iraqis Expressing No Confidence in US, UK, or Iraqi Military or Security Force – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 28: Percent of Iraqis saying they feel the US and Coalition forces have done a “bad” or “very bad” job of carrying out their responsibilities – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 29: Percent of Iraqis saying attacks are justified on Coalition and Iraqi Forces– ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 30: Percentage of Iraqis saying that that bringing more US forces into Baghdad and Anbar will make security worse or have no effect (Iraqi responses in percent)– ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 31: Iraqi opinion of how long US and Other Occupation Forces Should Remain in Iraq – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 32: “Do you believe things will get better or worse in the immediate weeks following a withdrawal of Multinational (Coalition Forces)?” – ORB Poll (February 2007)*



Source: Opinion Research Business Poll “Iraq, Public Attitudes in Iraq: Four Year Anniversary of the Invasion,” March, 2007. Note: Does not show “don’t know/refused” which varied from 4-11% of those polled.

Perceptions of Aid, the Economy, and Services

One of the great tragedies of the US intervention in Iraq is that the US has obligated more than \$38 billion in US and Iraqi funds in reconstruction efforts that produced little material support and left Iraqis deeply dissatisfied with the results. As the reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) have shown, reporting by the State Department, USAID, and the Corps of Engineers that focuses on the amount of money spent, projects started, and buildings completed is essentially meaningless “spin,” and has nothing to do with the effectiveness of such aid. The same is true of gross macroeconomic statistics that do little more than measure the impact of rising world oil prices on export revenues and the gross volume of monetary transfers resulting from the war.

CSIS, USIP, and other have all proposed meaningful measures of effectiveness. So far, however, no US Department or Agency has provided reporting with any integrity or value aside from SIGIR.

The following poll results strongly suggest that new measures of effectiveness are absolutely critical for any major stability operation, nation building effort, or counterinsurgency campaign.


Figure Thirty-Three shows that nearly 70% of the Iraqis polled feel reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective, very ineffective, or never took place. What is striking about these percentages is that there is a close correlation between the feeling aid was ineffective and Sunni or combat areas. Dollars may be as important a weapon in counterinsurgency and stability operations as bullets, but Iraqis clearly did not feel the impact in the most critical parts of the country.

Figure Thirty-Four shows Iraqis (64%) feel the overall economic situation, and availability of jobs (80%) is bad. The Kurdish area of the country, which has been sustained by aid and oil trafficking is the only part of the country that does not perceive itself as being in an economic crisis. The figures on jobs are a key warning of the potential impact of economic problems as a cause of violence. So are the negatives for Arab Sunni areas, mixed cities, and most Arab Shi'ite areas.

Figure Thirty-Five shows that Iraqis almost universally rate basic economic and government services in electricity, water, and fuel as bad. Views do differ sharply as to how bad a given service is in a given city and governorate, but there is no area where Iraqis feel the government or US aid program has come close to meeting their needs.


Figure Thirty-Six shows that Iraqis are much more divided over the quality of medical services and schools, but views of medical care are largely negative with few exceptions. Iraqi perceptions are that services only approach minimal adequacy in the Shi'ite area in Babylon governorate and the Kurdish governorates in Suleymaniyah and Irbil.

Figure 33: Percent of Iraqis saying the reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or no effort took place – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll "Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 34: Percent of Iraqis rating key aspects of the economy as “bad” – ABC Poll (March 2007)*




Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 35: Percent of Iraqis rating Water, Electricity and Fuel services as “bad” – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

Figure 36: Percent of Iraqis rating Schools and Medical Services as “bad” – ABC Poll (March 2007)*



Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, March 19, 2007.

ABC/USA Today/BBC/ARD Poll: Methodology and Survey Techniques

This survey was conducted for ABC News, USA Today, the BBC and ARD German TV by D3 Systems of Vienna, Va., and KA Research Ltd. of Istanbul. Interviews were conducted in person, in Arabic or Kurdish, among a random national sample of 2,212 Iraqis aged 18 and up from Feb. 25 to March 5, 2007.

Four-hundred-fifty-eight sampling points were distributed proportionate to population size in each of Iraq's 18 provinces, then in each of the 102 districts within the provinces, then by simple random sampling among Iraq's nearly 11,000 villages or neighborhoods, with urban/rural stratification at each stage.

Maps or grids were used to select random starting points within each sampling point, with household selection by random interval and within-household selection by the "next-birthday" method. An average of five interviews were conducted per sampling point. Three of the 458 sampling points were inaccessible for security reasons and were substituted with randomly selected replacements.

Interviews were conducted by 103 trained Iraqi interviewers with 27 supervisors. Just over half of interviews were back-checked by supervisors – 28 percent by direct observation, 14 percent by revisits and 10 percent by phone.

In addition to the national sample, oversamples were drawn in Anbar province, Sadr City, Basra city and Kirkuk city to allow for more reliable analysis in those areas. Population data came from 2005 estimates by the Iraq Ministry of Planning. The sample was weighted by sex, age, education, urban/rural status and population of province.

The survey had a contact rate of 90 percent and a cooperation rate of 62 percent for a net response rate of 56 percent. Including an estimated design effect of 1.51, the results have a margin of sampling error of 2.5 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.

This poll is not weighted to religious doctrine; it's our view that this would be arbitrary and unsupportable in the absence of empirical data establishing appropriate weighting parameters. Experimentally, weighting these results to 30 or even 25 percent Sunni Arab would change numbers on which Sunni Arab and Shiite divisions are greatest, but the average change across all questions would be one or 1.5 percentage points (depending on the weight used), and none of the differences would alter any of the fundamental conclusions in our analysis.

Statistical Tables

4/07: City/provincial analysis of ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll of Iraq. Please credit ABC News Polling Unit.

		City					Province									
		Total	Baghdad	Basra	Kirkuk	Other	Anbar	Basra	Tamim	Babylon	Baghdad	Dhi Qar	Diyala	Nineveh	Suleymaniyah	Irbil
Q1 Overall, how would you say things are going in your life these days?	Sample Size	2,212	431	98	99	1,584	200	171	123	110	491	109	105	189	127	103
	NET GOOD	39%	22%	48%	48%	44%	0%	46%	51%	51%	21%	68%	16%	29%	59%	73%
	1 Very good	8%			30%	11%			27%	13%		14%		5%	19%	18%
	2 Quite good	31%	22%	48%	19%	33%		46%	24%	39%	21%	54%	16%	24%	40%	55%
	NET BAD	61%	78%	52%	52%	57%	100%	54%	49%	49%	79%	32%	84%	71%	41%	27%
	3 Quite bad	32%	34%	35%	4%	33%	31%	34%	6%	33%	34%	31%	32%	39%	34%	21%
4 Very bad	28%	44%	17%	48%	24%	69%	20%	43%	16%	45%	1%	52%	32%	8%	7%	
Q2 Compared to the time before the war in spring 2003, are the things overall in your life?	NET BETTER	42%	40%	73%	44%	41%	0%	67%	46%	47%	38%	41%	19%	39%	55%	67%
	1 Much better	14%	19%	1%	27%	12%		1%	24%	13%	18%	9%		19%	13%	25%
	2 Somewhat better	29%	22%	72%	16%	29%		66%	22%	34%	20%	33%	19%	20%	43%	42%
	3 About the same	22%	18%	6%	4%	24%	35%	7%	6%	25%	20%	31%	23%	21%	20%	21%
	NET WORSE	36%	42%	20%	53%	35%	65%	26%	49%	28%	42%	27%	58%	40%	25%	12%
	4 Somewhat worse	28%	42%	18%	5%	26%	65%	22%	9%	15%	42%	19%	55%	20%	19%	12%
5 Much worse	8%		2%	47%	9%		4%	40%	13%		9%	3%	20%	5%		
Q4 What is the single biggest problem facing your life these days?	1 Lack of security/safety	18%	9%	32%	37%	20%	49%	25%	33%	19%	10%	4%	33%	13%		
	2 War/civil war/unrest	7%	7%	15%	10%	6%	14%	15%	9%	1%	7%	1%	16%	8%	1%	2%
	3 Sectarian violence	7%	5%	5%	12%	7%	9%	6%	12%	25%	5%	2%	6%	9%	2%	1%
	4 Terrorist attacks	9%	6%	9%	15%	10%		15%	15%	18%	5%	3%	3%	6%	1%	4%
	5 Ethnic-religious tension/Persecution/Discrimination	3%	4%		2%	3%	3%	2%	1%	6%	4%		2%	3%	1%	3%

6 Common crime/street crime	4%	6%	13%	8%	3%	4%	11%	7%	4%	6%	2%	9%	4%	2%	1%
7 Economic problems	4%	4%		2%	4%			1%		3%	13%		4%	4%	8%
No jobs/unemployment	6%	5%	1%	2%	7%	4%	3%	4%	5%	5%	18%	2%	5%	7%	6%
Low pay/inconsistent pay	0%				1%						3%			2%	3%
10 High prices/rising prices	5%	5%		6%	5%			4%	4%	5%	15%		1%	15%	15%
11 Lack of goods and services/problems with Food Ration Cards	2%	2%			2%			1%	2%	2%	1%		1%	3%	3%
12 Social problems	1%	3%		2%	1%			1%		2%	2%		2%	1%	5%
13 Can't trust people/social disintegration	2%	4%		0%	1%			0%	1%	4%	2%		1%	2%	2%
14 Quality of life/Poor living standards/poor living conditions	3%	4%		0%	2%			1%	1%	4%	3%		7%	4%	3%
Poor electricity supply	6%	8%	2%	2%	5%	4%	1%	1%	2%	8%		6%	7%	15%	8%
16 Lack of water/sanitation	1%		1%		1%		2%		1%		2%				5%
17 Poor public services/rubble on streets	1%		1%	2%	2%		2%	1%			10%	1%	1%	1%	1%
18 Poor medical services	2%	4%	2%		1%	1%	3%	1%		4%	6%	3%	1%	1%	2%
19 Problems with school/educational opportunities	0%				1%						1%		1%	1%	3%

	20 Housing problems/availability/rent too high/house too small	1%				2%				1%		5%			7%	6%	
	21 Fuel shortages	5%	8%			4%	1%				8%		3%	6%	11%	17%	
	22 Personal problems	0%				1%						1%		0%	2%	1%	
	23 Health problems	0%				0%						2%			2%	1%	
	24 Family problems	0%				0%				1%		2%			2%		
	US occupation/presence	6%	4%	13%	0%	6%	4%	13%	1%	5%	4%		7%	9%		1%	
	26 Political instability/weak government/bad leaders	4%	5%	1%	2%	4%	3%	1%	1%	2%	5%	2%	6%	6%	2%	3%	
	27 Country breaking apart	3%	7%	4%		2%	4%	2%		2%	7%	1%	3%	4%	1%	1%	
	96 None/no problem	0%				0%									1%	2%	
	99 Don't know	0%				0%											
Q9 In terms of Iraq, what in your opinion is the single biggest problem facing Iraq as a whole?	1 Lack of security/safety	22%	12%	35%	13%	25%	35%	39%	15%	24%	12%	20%	32%	18%	1%	17%	
	2 War/civil war/unrest	7%	3%	11%	4%	8%	24%	11%	6%	5%	4%	8%	24%	6%	3%	5%	
	3 Sectarian violence	7%	5%	5%	6%	8%	7%	5%	6%	13%	4%	4%	10%	13%	4%	8%	
	4 Terrorist attacks	9%	6%	6%	11%	11%		4%	12%	19%	6%	17%		5%	8%	24%	
	5 Ethnic or religious tension/Persecution/Discrimination	3%	4%	1%	2%	4%	4%	3%	1%	5%	5%		4%	3%	4%	7%	
	6 Common crime/street crime	3%	6%	6%	2%	2%	4%	6%	1%	5%	6%	2%	7%	1%	1%	3%	
	7 Economic problems	3%	7%			2%					1%	7%	2%		1%	4%	1%
	8 No jobs/unemployment	3%	3%	1%		3%	4%	3%	1%	2%	4%	2%	1%	6%	6%	3%	

9 Low pay/inconsistent pay	0%				1%							0%		7%		
10 High prices/rising prices	2%	4%			6%	2%		4%		4%	2%		1%	12%	2%	
11 Lack of goods and services/problems with Food Ration Cards	1%	2%			2%	1%		1%		2%				3%		
12 Social problems	1%				2%	1%		1%	1%		1%		1%	3%	4%	
13 Can't trust people/social disintegration	1%	5%				0%				4%			0%			
14 Quality of life/Poor living standards/poor living conditions	1%					1%					2%		1%	4%		
15 Poor electricity supply	3%	8%	2%		4%	2%	4%	1%	3%	1%	7%		3%	2%	6%	1%
16 Lack of water/sanitation	0%					0%									4%	
17 Poor public services/rubble on streets	1%					1%		0%			5%				2%	
18 Poor medical services	2%	6%	1%			1%	2%	1%			5%	2%			4%	
19 Problems with school/educational opportunities	0%					0%									2%	
20 Housing problems/availability/rent too high/house too small	0%				0%	1%			0%		1%		0%	1%	4%	
21 Fuel shortages	3%	7%	5%			2%	3%	3%	1%		7%		3%	3%	8%	3%

	22 Political instability/weak government/bad leaders	4%	4%		13%	4%		3%	1%	10%	5%	4%	8%	2%	8%	1%	1%
	23 No independence of Kurdistan	0%			4%	1%				3%						6%	1%
	24 Corruption/bribery	4%	6%	1%	4%	4%			2%	3%		7%	8%	2%	5%	5%	6%
	25 US occupation/presence	9%	8%	10%	9%	9%		8%	8%	10%	9%	8%	7%	5%	11%		2%
	26 Iranian influence	3%		2%	17%	3%		4%	1%	13%	4%		4%	9%			1%
	27 Syrian influence	1%		1%	4%	1%			2%	3%					0%	1%	2%
	28 Saudi Arabian influence	0%		1%		0%			1%					2%			
	29 Presence of Al-Qaeda/foreign jihadis	5%	5%	11%		5%			9%	1%	8%	5%	11%	2%	1%	2%	4%
	99 Don't know	0%				0%											
q11aNET Rating the security situation	1.00 Good	46%	20%	41%	25%	55%			41%	31%	69%	19%	95%	19%	26%	98%	91%
	2.00 Bad	54%	80%	59%	75%	45%	100%	59%	69%	31%	31%	81%	5%	81%	74%	2%	9%
q11bNET Rating the availability of jobs	1.00 Good	20%	15%	28%	31%	21%			33%	31%	15%	15%	5%		18%	62%	54%
	2.00 Bad	80%	85%	72%	69%	79%	100%	67%	69%	85%	85%	95%	100%	82%	38%	46%	
q11cNET Rating the supply of electricity	1.00 Good	12%		28%	27%	14%			31%	28%	16%		36%		12%	21%	1%
	2.00 Bad	88%	100%	72%	73%	86%	100%	69%	72%	84%	100%	64%	100%	88%	79%	99%	
q11dNET Rating the availability of clean water	1.00 Good	30%			31%	41%	21%			34%	39%		40%	9%	44%	73%	63%
	2.00 Bad	69%	100%	100%	69%	59%	79%	100%	66%	61%	100%	60%	91%	56%	27%	37%	
	9.00 No opinion	0%				0%					1%						
q11eNET Rating the availability of medical care	1.00 Good	31%			27%	42%				28%	56%		40%		46%	75%	67%
	2.00 Bad	69%	100%	100%	73%	58%	100%	100%	72%	43%	100%	60%	100%	54%	25%	33%	

	9.00 No opinion	0%				0%				1%								
q11fNET Rating local schools	1.00 Good	43%	14%		67%	53%			63%	67%	13%	82%		56%	87%	77%		
	2.00 Bad	57%	86%	100%	33%	47%	100%	100%	37%	32%	87%	18%	100%	44%	13%	23%		
	9.00 No opinion	0%			0%					1%								
q11gNET Rating local government	1.00 Good	43%	38%	41%	44%	44%		40%	45%	53%	36%	46%	14%	35%	56%	85%		
	2.00 Bad	57%	62%	59%	56%	56%	100%	60%	55%	47%	64%	54%	86%	65%	44%	15%		
q11hNET Rating the availability of basic household things	1.00 Good	38%		43%	47%	48%	34%	43%	43%	49%		71%	31%	50%	61%	47%		
	2.00 Bad	62%	100%	57%	53%	52%	66%	57%	57%	51%	100%	29%	69%	50%	39%	53%		
q11iNET Rating protection from crime	1.00 Good	40%	9%	41%	11%	50%		41%	15%	37%	9%	88%	8%	32%	85%	88%		
	2.00 Bad	60%	91%	59%	89%	50%	100%	59%	85%	63%	91%	12%	92%	68%	15%	12%		
q11jNET Rating economic situation	1.00 Good	36%	15%	14%	33%	43%	18%	19%	35%	46%	14%	55%	21%	40%	69%	65%		
	2.00 Bad	64%	85%	86%	67%	57%	82%	81%	65%	54%	86%	45%	79%	60%	31%	35%		
q11kNET Rating the availability of fuel	1.00 Good	12%		49%	25%	13%		47%	22%	19%		32%	18%	8%	10%	1%		
	2.00 Bad	88%	100%	51%	75%	87%	100%	53%	78%	81%	100%	68%	82%	92%	90%	99%		
q11lNET Rating freedom of movement	1.00 Good	25%		12%	11%	33%		16%	16%	25%		88%		20%	81%	54%		
	2.00 Bad	75%	100%	88%	89%	67%	100%	84%	84%	75%	100%	12%	100%	80%	19%	46%		
q11mNET Rating freedom to live without persecution	1.00 Good	23%		17%	11%	31%		21%	18%	21%		60%		20%	83%	52%		
	2.00 Bad	77%	100%	83%	89%	70%	100%	79%	82%	79%	100%	40%	100%	80%	17%	47%		
	9.00 No opinion	0%			0%											2%		
Q13 How effective or ineffective have the reconstruction efforts been in your area since the war in spring 2003?	NET EFFECTIVE	33%	22%	7%	27%	37%	0%	8%	34%	55%	21%	29%	9%	24%	84%	63%		
	1 Very effective	6%			11%	8%			10%	7%		3%		5%	24%	18%		
	2 Quite effective	26%	22%	7%	16%	29%		8%	24%	47%	21%	26%	9%	19%	60%	45%		
	NET INEFFECTIVE	58%	54%	67%	67%	58%	100%	70%	59%	44%	56%	62%	87%	66%	16%	36%		

	3 Quite ineffective	35%	35%	57%	13%	34%	52%	52%	10%	28%	35%	41%	39%	31%	13%	29%
	4 Very ineffective	23%	18%	10%	55%	24%	48%	18%	49%	16%	20%	20%	48%	34%	4%	7%
	6 No reconstruction was needed in this area	1%			4%	1%			3%					3%		
	7 Although necessary there have been no reconstruction efforts	9%	24%	26%	2%	4%		22%	4%	2%	24%	9%	3%	8%		1%
Q14 Which of the following structures do you believe Iraq should have in the future?	1 One unified Iraq with a central government in Baghdad	58%	44%	31%	59%	63%	100%	37%	65%	75%	47%	70%	80%	78%	22%	12%
	2 Regional states with their own gov't & Baghdad federal gov't	28%	31%	46%	35%	26%		44%	29%	18%	29%	25%	15%	16%	32%	59%
	3 A country divided into separate independent states	14%	26%	23%	6%	11%		19%	6%	6%	24%	5%	5%	7%	46%	27%
	9 Don't know	0%				0%										2%
q16aNET Confidence in Iraqi Army	1.00 Confident	61%	32%	69%	89%	67%		63%	87%	86%	31%	91%	20%	63%	88%	70%
	2.00 Not confident	39%	68%	31%	11%	33%	100%	37%	13%	14%	69%	9%	80%	37%	12%	30%
q16bNET Confidence in the police	1.00 Confident	64%	56%	69%	87%	66%		62%	85%	63%	53%	89%	20%	72%	90%	70%
	2.00 Not confident	36%	44%	31%	13%	34%	100%	38%	15%	37%	47%	11%	80%	28%	10%	30%
q16cNET Confidence in US and UK occupation forces	1.00 Confident	18%	0%		40%	23%			35%	23%	0%	13%	9%	20%	81%	45%
	2.00 Not confident	82%	100%	100%	60%	77%	100%	100%	65%	77%	100%	87%	91%	80%	19%	55%
	9.00 No opinion	0%				0%									1%	
q16dNET Confidence in Local leaders	1.00 Confident	45%	34%	51%	42%	48%		48%	45%	47%	32%	45%	15%	47%	79%	84%
	2.00 Not confident	55%	66%	49%	58%	52%	100%	52%	55%	53%	68%	55%	85%	53%	21%	16%

q16eNET Confidence in Iraq national government	1.00 Confident	49%	46%	51%	42%	50%		48%	46%	49%	44%	68%	15%	30%	74%	75%
	2.00 Not confident	51%	54%	49%	58%	50%	100%	52%	54%	51%	56%	32%	85%	70%	26%	25%
q16fNET Confidence in local militias in this area	1.00 Confident	36%	66%	11%	25%	29%		8%	29%	38%	64%	31%	3%	16%	11%	62%
	2.00 Not confident	64%	34%	89%	75%	71%	100%	92%	71%	62%	36%	69%	97%	84%	87%	38%
	9.00 No opinion	0%				0%									2%	1%
q16gNET Confidence in local teachers	1.00 Confident	71%	58%	60%	80%	75%	52%	61%	76%	81%	58%	82%	61%	74%	86%	89%
	2.00 Not confident	29%	42%	40%	20%	25%	48%	39%	24%	19%	42%	17%	39%	26%	14%	10%
	9.00 No opinion	0%				0%						1%				1%
Q20 Current nat. gov. of Iraq, how do you feel about the way in which it has carried out its responsibilities?	NET GOOD JOB	46%	38%	52%	43%	49%	0%	53%	46%	60%	36%	67%	15%	28%	77%	64%
	1 A very good job	10%		28%	21%	12%		27%	25%	14%		20%	5%	7%	16%	9%
	2 Quite a good job	36%	38%	24%	21%	37%		26%	21%	46%	36%	48%	10%	21%	61%	55%
	NET BAD JOB	54%	63%	48%	57%	51%	100%	47%	54%	40%	64%	33%	85%	72%	23%	34%
	3 Quite a bad job	27%	28%	33%	5%	28%	35%	27%	6%	26%	28%	26%	31%	35%	16%	27%
	4 A very bad job	26%	34%	16%	52%	23%	65%	20%	49%	14%	36%	7%	54%	37%	7%	7%
9 Don't know	0%				0%										2%	
Q24 How do you feel about way US and Coalition forces carried out responsibilities?	NET GOOD JOB	23%	0%	0%	43%	31%	0%	0%	46%	37%	0%	28%	0%	20%	84%	63%
	1 Very good job	6%			20%	7%			18%	2%		5%		7%	20%	17%
	2 Quite a good job	18%			22%	24%			28%	35%		23%		12%	65%	46%
	NET BAD JOB	77%	100%	100%	57%	69%	100%	100%	54%	63%	100%	72%	100%	80%	16%	37%
	3 Quite a bad job	30%	21%	51%	4%	33%	25%	49%	4%	35%	22%	32%	32%	36%	14%	29%
4 Very bad job	46%	79%	49%	54%	36%	75%	51%	50%	28%	78%	40%	68%	44%	2%	8%	
Q25 Support the presence of Coalition forces in Iraq?	NET SUPPORT	22%	0%	0%	41%	29%	0%	0%	43%	32%	0%	22%	7%	23%	88%	62%
	1 Strongly support	6%			26%	7%			22%	4%		3%		8%	20%	29%
	2 Somewhat support	16%	0%		15%	22%			21%	28%	0%	19%	7%	15%	67%	33%
	NET OPPOSE	78%	100%	100%	59%	70%	100%	100%	57%	68%	100%	78%	93%	77%	12%	37%
3 Somewhat oppose	32%	41%	52%	6%	29%	27%	49%	6%	28%	40%	37%	37%	20%	11%	28%	

Q33a In order to avoid trouble have you done any of the following... Avoiding going out of your home?	1 Very often	18%	55%	4%	11%	9%		4%	13%	17%	55%	1%	19%	7%	3%	
	2 Quite often	33%	45%	49%	21%	29%	63%	51%	19%	35%	45%	1%	58%	42%	6%	
	3 Not so often	27%		47%	61%	33%	37%	45%	59%	47%		25%	23%	35%	17%	34%
	4 Never	22%			7%	29%			9%	1%		73%		16%	83%	58%
	9 Don't know	0%				0%				1%						
Q33b Not sending your children to school?	1 Very often	14%	46%		9%	5%			9%	5%	47%		13%	8%	2%	
	2 Quite often	26%	49%	20%	26%	19%	54%	23%	24%	21%	49%	1%	38%	37%	2%	1%
	3 Not so often	28%	5%	80%	41%	32%	46%	77%	40%	41%	4%	13%	49%	36%	13%	26%
	4 Never	32%			24%	44%			27%	33%		87%		19%	85%	72%
Q33c Avoiding passing/driving by police stations and other public buildings?	1 Very often	20%	48%	5%	15%	13%	33%	8%	16%	14%	48%		23%	17%	1%	
	2 Quite often	35%	46%	31%	54%	31%	67%	28%	49%	33%	47%	6%	64%	39%	4%	7%
	3 Not so often	25%	6%	64%	26%	28%		64%	28%	44%	5%	30%	14%	30%	30%	26%
	4 Never	20%			6%	27%			6%	8%		64%		14%	66%	66%
Q33d Avoiding markets and other crowded areas?	1 Very often	21%	57%	1%	16%	12%	12%	3%	22%	20%	57%	3%	13%	20%	4%	
	2 Quite often	33%	43%	24%	45%	30%	38%	24%	40%	48%	43%	16%	39%	39%	6%	24%
	3 Not so often	29%		75%	31%	35%	50%	73%	28%	29%		46%	48%	31%	18%	39%
	4 Never	17%			7%	23%			10%	3%		34%		11%	76%	32%
Q33e Avoiding check points?	1 Very often	29%	55%	30%	19%	22%	38%	31%	19%	31%	56%	5%	32%	34%	3%	
	2 Quite often	36%	45%	61%	52%	32%	62%	64%	46%	35%	44%	10%	62%	29%	7%	15%
	3 Not so often	14%		8%	26%	18%		5%	27%	32%		30%	7%	23%	18%	25%
	4 Never	20%			4%	27%			7%	2%		55%		13%	75%	56%
Q33f Avoiding US and other coalition forces?	1 Very often	46%	56%	54%	49%	43%	69%	56%	43%	53%	56%	32%	64%	39%	7%	20%
	2 Quite often	35%	44%	46%	24%	32%	31%	44%	27%	31%	44%	30%	36%	34%	10%	43%
	3 Not so often	10%			24%	13%			24%	15%		19%		19%	21%	22%
	4 Never	9%			4%	12%			6%	1%		19%		8%	63%	15%
Q33g Avoiding travel?	1 Very often	21%	55%	4%	13%	12%		4%	15%	12%	55%	3%	33%	16%	1%	7%
	2 Quite often	33%	45%	29%	11%	30%	41%	28%	13%	46%	45%	6%	36%	27%	7%	30%
	3 Not so often	29%		59%	66%	35%	59%	59%	63%	42%		39%	27%	37%	22%	36%

	4 Never	17%		8%	11%	23%		8%	9%		51%	3%	20%	70%	27%	
Q33h Being careful about what you say about yourself to others?	1 Very often	31%	52%	67%	14%	23%	70%	65%	16%	18%	51%	9%	66%	20%	2%	12%
	2 Quite often	37%	48%	33%	50%	34%	30%	35%	52%	39%	49%	31%	34%	39%	6%	31%
	3 Not so often	18%			32%	23%				28%	40%			29%	20%	27%
	4 Never	14%			4%	20%			4%	4%			22%	12%	72%	30%
Q33i Avoiding going to work or to apply for work?	1 Very often	17%	55%	1%	13%	7%		1%	12%	7%	55%		16%	10%		3%
	2 Quite often	26%	45%	13%	5%	22%	34%	17%	12%	35%	45%	2%	40%	33%	3%	9%
	3 Not so often	29%		66%	65%	35%	66%	65%	60%	39%		25%	41%	38%	9%	28%
	4 Never	28%		20%	16%	37%		18%	16%	18%		73%	3%	19%	88%	59%
Q34a Please tell me if it has occurred or not nearby here...Car bombs, suicide attacks?	1 Have occurred nearby here	32%	52%	14%	78%	25%	37%	14%	78%	34%	52%	1%	20%	58%		7%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	68%	48%	86%	22%	75%	63%	86%	22%	66%	48%	99%	80%	42%	100%	93%
	9 Don't know	0%				0%										
Q34b Snipers, crossfire?	1 Have occurred nearby here	30%	56%	29%	16%	23%	30%	27%	25%	20%	56%	27%	31%	39%		1%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	70%	44%	71%	84%	77%	70%	73%	75%	80%	44%	73%	69%	61%	100%	98%
	9 Don't know	0%				0%										1%
Q34c Fighting among sectarian factions?	1 Have occurred nearby here	25%	49%	18%	16%	19%		18%	19%	43%	50%	14%	24%	29%		3%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	75%	51%	82%	84%	81%	100%	82%	81%	57%	50%	86%	76%	70%	100%	97%
	9 Don't know	0%				0%								1%		
Q34d Kidnappings for ransom?	1 Have occurred nearby here	40%	58%	13%	73%	35%	23%	11%	76%	67%	58%	34%	26%	50%	3%	7%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	60%	42%	87%	27%	65%	77%	89%	24%	33%	42%	66%	74%	49%	97%	92%
	9 Don't know	0%				0%								1%		1%

Q34e Fighting between Iraqi government and anti-government forces?	1 Have occurred nearby here	34%	57%	29%	18%	28%	29%	32%	26%	37%	55%	29%	27%	38%		3%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	66%	43%	71%	82%	72%	71%	68%	74%	63%	45%	71%	73%	61%	100%	97%
	9 Don't know	0%												0%		
Q34f Unnecessary violence against citizens by US coalition forces?	1 Have occurred nearby here	44%	59%	60%	55%	39%	69%	59%	53%	52%	60%	27%	47%	48%	3%	17%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	55%	41%	40%	45%	61%	31%	41%	47%	48%	40%	73%	53%	49%	97%	83%
	9 Don't know	0%												3%		
Q34g Unnecessary violence against citizens by the Iraqi police?	1 Have occurred nearby here	24%	44%	12%	18%	19%	30%	15%	18%	23%	47%	5%	27%	25%	1%	2%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	76%	56%	88%	82%	81%	70%	85%	82%	77%	53%	95%	73%	73%	99%	98%
	9 Don't know	0%												2%		
Q34h Unnecessary violence against citizens by the Iraqi Army?	1 Have occurred nearby here	24%	44%	11%	16%	19%	41%	15%	16%	19%	47%	2%	25%	26%		
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	76%	56%	89%	84%	81%	59%	85%	84%	81%	53%	98%	75%	70%	100%	100%
	9 Don't know	0%												3%		
Q34i Unnecessary violence against citizens by local militia forces?	1 Have occurred nearby here	31%	44%	23%	16%	28%	18%	24%	16%	43%	47%	37%	42%	35%	1%	5%
	2 Have not occurred nearby here	69%	56%	77%	84%	72%	82%	76%	84%	57%	53%	63%	58%	64%	99%	95%
	9 Don't know	0%												1%		
Q42b During the past year	1 Yes	15%	35%	4%	22%	10%	22%	6%	22%	19%	35%	1%	25%	12%	5%	1%

have you moved to live in a new location (for security reasons)?	2 No	85%	65%	96%	78%	90%	78%	94%	78%	81%	65%	99%	75%	88%	95%	99%
Q44 Has separating of people been happening in your mahallah or not?/Q45 Has this been mainly forcible or mainly voluntary?	Yes it has happened	14%	34%	7%	18%	9%		10%	16%	17%	36%		15%	21%	3%	
	Mainly forcible	12%	31%	6%	5%	7%		9%	4%	10%	32%		11%	18%	1%	
	Mainly voluntary	3%	4%	1%	13%	2%		1%	12%	7%	4%		3%	3%	3%	
	No, remains mixed	38%	49%	66%	36%	33%		60%	31%	83%	49%	43%	52%	33%	12%	1%
	No, never been mixed	47%	16%	27%	45%	58%	100%	30%	52%			15%	57%	33%	46%	82%
	Don't know														3%	
Q46 Do you think separation of people on sectarian lines is good thing or a bad thing for Iraq?	1 Good thing	6%	7%		2%	6%			4%	1%	7%	1%		3%	41%	17%
	2 Bad thing	94%	93%	100%	98%	94%	100%	100%	96%	99%	93%	99%	100%	97%	58%	83%
	9 Don't know														1%	
Q53 Do you think Iraq is or is not involved in a civil war at this time?	1 Yes in civil war	42%	44%	20%	56%	42%	70%	25%	53%	19%	45%	41%	54%	51%	64%	47%
	2 No not in civil war	56%	56%	80%	44%	56%	30%	75%	47%	80%	55%	59%	46%	49%	36%	53%
	9 Don't know	2%				2%				1%					1%	