



**The Center for Strategic and International Studies**

**Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy**

**1800 K Street, NW • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006**

**Phone: +1-202-775-3270 • Fax: +1-202-457-8746**

**Web: [www.csis.org/burke](http://www.csis.org/burke)**

# **Iraq, the Gulf, Afghanistan: The Way Ahead**

**Anthony H. Cordesman**

**Arleigh A. Burke Chair**

**May 1, 2007**

# Key Challenges

# Key Challenges

- **Continuing threat from Neo-Salafi extremist groups; Risk of Sunni Shi'ite divide.**
- **Lingering uncertain “victory” in Iraq or forced withdrawal.**
- **Challenge of Iran in political terms, proliferation, asymmetric warfare.**
- **Problem of restructuring securing posture in the Gulf.**
- **Need for decisive action in Afghanistan.**
- **Pakistan as unstable ally**
- **Regional impact of perceptions of war on terrorism, Iraq War and Arab-Israeli conflict.**

# The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq

## AFGHANISTAN

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~32,000

## AFGHANISTAN

- Land Mass – 647,500 sq km
- Population – 31,056,947 people
- Land locked, primarily agrarian economy
- Lacks both transportation and information infrastructure
- Restrictive terrain dominates the country

## IRAQ

TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES

~162,000

## IRAQ

- Land Mass – 432,162 sq km
- Population – 26,783,383 people
- Economy dominated by the oil sector
- Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure

# The Iraq War


# Key Challenges

- **“Five Wars:”**
  - **Hardline Islamist insurgency**
  - **Arab Sunni vs. Arab Shi’ite**
  - **Arab vs. Kurd vs. Other minority.**
  - **Shi’ite vs. Shi’ite**
  - **Sunni vs. Sunni**
- **Security as seen by Iraqis as a whole.**
- **Iraqi security force development.**
- **Political conciliation and/or coexistence Near Term economic security and services, longer term development. Petroleum development**
- **Creation of a stable political structure:**
  - **Real political parties.**
  - **National, federal, provincial, and local government.**
  - **Rule of law: Police courts, anti-corruption.**
  - **Solve constitution and federalism problems.**
- **Neighbors: Iran, turkey, and.....**

# Rise in Tension: Mid 06 vs. Jan 07


How would you describe the tensions in your neighborhood today?  
(Scale of 1 to 10)

Jan 07



How would you describe the tensions in the country today?  
(Scale of 1 to 10)


Jan 07



Source: Nationwide Poll


# Is There a Civil War in Iraq?

Is Iraq in a Civil War (Percent Saying Yes)





# Overall Tensions




## Perception of Tensions by Province


Name	Less (1 – 10) More Tension In Neighborhood	More Tension In Country
Al Anbar	8	10
Baghdad	7	9
Basra	3	9
Diyala	6	9
Dhi Qar	2	9
Najaf	2	8
Maysan	2	8
Qadisiyah	3	7
Muthanna	2	8
Wasit	3	8
Babil	5	9
Karbala	2	8
Salah ad Din	7	9
Ninawa	2	10
Kirkuk/Tamin	6	8
Sulaymaniya	2	9
Erbil	2	9
Dahuk	2	10

# “Soft Cleansing”


Ethnic Cleansing and Displacement (Percent)




# “Trained and Equipped” Manpower



# Army Units “in the Lead”



# Conciliation: The “Minority Report”



## Minority Votes by Province

Name	Percent
Al Anbar	26.25
Baghdad	43.45
Basra	22.5
Diyala	62.47
Dhi Qar	13.26
Najaf	18.01
Maysan	13.1
Qadisiyah	18.53
Muthanna	13.54
Wasit	19.26
Babil	23.84
Karbala	23.92
Salah ad Din	66.91
Ninawa	63.29
Kirkuk	46.6
Sulaymaniya	12.82
Erbil	5.31
Dahuk	9.69

# The Civil-Military Challenge

- **Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. March 7, 2007:**
  - **“I think that the words "civil war" oversimplify a very complex situation in Iraq. I believe that there are essentially four wars going on in Iraq. One is Shi'a on Shi'a, principally in the south; the second is sectarian conflict, principally in Baghdad, but not solely; third is the insurgency; and fourth is al Qaeda, and al Qaeda is attacking, at times, all of those targets... it's not, I think, just a matter of politics or semantics. I think it oversimplifies it. It's a bumper sticker answer to what's going on in Iraq.**
- **To which we now add Sunni versus Sunni?**

# The Key Role of Civil-Military Affairs

## US Civil-Military Affairs

- Counterinsurgency (Win)
- Aid ISF Military development (Win)
- Aid ISF Police development and creation of courts & rule of law (Hold)
- Aid Iraqi political conciliation and coexistence (Hold & Build)
- Iraqi governance & government services aid (Hold & Build)
- Iraq economic stability, growth, services, infrastructure (Hold & Build)
- Iraqi elections and political development (Hold & Build)

## Iraqi Civil-Military Affairs

- Political conciliation and coexistence
- Iraqi Military
- Iraqi Police & Rule of Law
- Governance & Government services
- Economic stability, development and services
- Local elections
- Federalism?

# A Surge Without a Strategy: Uncertain Civil-Military Time Lines

Action	Date
• Full US military build-up in Baghdad	• June-July
• Iraqi Army Deployment	• May-?
• Iraqi Police Active	• ?????
• Iraqi political conciliation and coexistence	• ?????
• Baghdad “ring” and other threats deployments & strategy	• ????
• Iraqi governance & government services aid	• ????
• PRTs fully staffed, flow of economic aid	• ????
• Post-surge plan for rest of country	• ????



# The Real Long-Term “Plan”

## Action

- Surge ends
- US Troop levels below 100,000
- Iraqi Army Aid Phases Out
- Iraqi Police aid Phase Out
- Iraqi Governance & Government services aid
- Phase out Economic Aid

## Date

- End 2007? Mid 2008
- No plan. 2008-2010?
- No Plan. 2010-2013?
- No Plan. 2010-2013?
- No Plan. 2010-2013?
- No Plan. 2010-2013?

# Conciliation & Coexistence: The Sine Qua Non?

- **An oil law and technical annexes that assure all major Iraqi factions of an equitable share of today's oil revenues and the future development of Iraq's oil and gas resources.**
- **Giving the Sunnis real participation in the national government at every level, and creating ministries and government structures that fairly mix Arab Shi'ite, Arab Sunni, Kurd, and other minorities.**
- **ReBaathification and giving a clean slate or amnesty to all who served under the Ba'ath not guilty of violent crimes.**
- **Amending the constitution to create a structure that protects the rights of all Iraqis, and which creates viable compromises, or clearly defers or omits, areas of critical sectarian and ethnic division.**
- **As part of this, working out an approach to federation that will avoid civil conflict.**
- **Creating and implementing local election laws, particularly at the provincial level.**
- **Disbanding or assimilating militias, or creating retraining centers and funding programs to deal with members.**

# What Might Work - I

- **Develop honest metrics of security** tied to each struggle, covering the entire country, and linked to the local economic situation and quality of governance.
- **Create net assessments that do not focus on threats, but the overall situation and progress, with summary reporting at the level of major cities and governorates.** Tie US programs and priorities to such efforts, provide the level of credibility and transparency necessary to build broader Congressional and US public support if this is still possible.
- **Develop honest and meaningful metrics of progress in Iraqi force development**, not spin- oriented nonsense like “trained and equipped” manpower and forces “in the lead.”
- **Create military and police force development plans based on realistic time scales and with adequate levels of resources.**
- **Tie force development far more firmly to aid efforts to build up the police legal system, governance, and legitimate local authority.** “Win” is pointless without “hold” and “build.”

# What Might Work - II

- **Use US pressure and influence in civil-military areas, but don't export the burden or the blame to Iraqis.** It won't pressure them in ways that are not destructive.
- **Continue to make political conciliation and compromise a key priority, but accept the message that Iraq cannot easily be unified as a secular national entity.**
- **Accept the practical need to create safe and viable Arab Sunni, Arab Shi'ite, and Kurdish areas within Iraq;** find ways of sharing revenues and power on sectarian and ethnic terms. At this point. Divided Kurdish and Arab areas, and Sunni and Shi'ite areas with limited numbers of mixed cities seem almost certain to emerge.
- **Focus aid on immediate efforts at use aid funds to support stability and to ease Iraq's diverse conflicts.** Eliminate USAID and USACE managers in Washington, and US contractors in both the US and Iraq, as much as possible. Concentrate on CERP and PRT driven aid as critical tool in "hold" and "build" and to make up for lack of Iraqi government presence, competence, and integrity. Focus national efforts on showing Iraqis that the US will aid them do it the Iraqi way in critical areas like revitalizing state industry.
- **Accept the fact no meaningful victory is possible within the life of this Administration.** Make bipartisan efforts to both create an understanding of the long-term efforts needed if the current security plan succeeds, and to recast the US role in Iraq and Gulf on an enduring basis if it does not.

# What Might Work - III

- **Success means actually implementing the best achievable mix of:**
  - **An oil law and technical annexes that assure all major Iraqi factions of an equitable share of today's oil revenues and the future development of Iraq's oil and gas resources.**
  - **Giving the Sunnis real participation in the national government at every level, and creating ministries and government structures that fairly mix Arab Shi'ite, Arab Sunni, Kurd, and other minorities.**
  - **ReBa'athification and giving a clean slate or amnesty to all who served under the Ba'ath not guilty of violent crimes.**
  - **Amending the constitution to create a structure that protects the rights of all Iraqis, and which creates viable compromises, or clearly defers or omits, areas of critical sectarian and ethnic division.**
  - **As part of this, working out an approach to federation that will avoid civil conflict.**
  - **Creating and implementing local election laws, particularly at the provincial level.**
  - **Disbanding or assimilating militias, or creating retraining centers and funding programs to deal with members.**
  - **Focus on day-today government services, not politics and further to rush democracy and Western standards into Iraq.**

# Iran & The Gulf

# “Iraq & Gulf: Key Challenges

- **Continuing threat from Neo-Salafi extremist groups; Risk of Sunni Shi’ite divide.**
- **Rebuilding US-UK position in face of lingering uncertain “victory” in Iraq or forced withdrawal.**
- **Creation of more effective GCC and national military and counterrorism forces.**
- **Challenge of Iran in political terms, proliferation, asymmetric warfare.**
  - **Proliferation**
  - **Iraq**
  - **Afghanistan**
  - **Asymmetric forces**
  - **Ties to Syria; “Shi’ite crescent”**
  - **Proxy forces: Hezbollah**
  - **Use of Hamas, PIJ**

# Iran's Hypothetical Forces

- Less than 50 nuclear weapons, most fission, possibly some boosted. 30 Nuclear warheads, 20 bombs.
- Most 20-30 Kt, some 100 KT
- 100 Shahab 3 and 3 ER on mobile TELs. 60 TELs.
- Su-24, F-14 convert, and Su-37 strike aircraft.
- Reverse engineered KH-55 cruise missiles.
- Mustard and persistent nerve gas, stable bombs, bombs and warheads with cluster munitions.
- Limited satellite targeting and damage assessment capability.
- Limited ballistic missile point defense capability with SA-300/SA-400
- Meaningful civil defense? No.



300 miles  
500 km



**Sites circled in red  
unknown pre-mid 2002**

- MW** Megawatts
- Uranium processing facility
- Uranium mines
- Heavy-water facility
- Research reactors / research facilities
- Uranium enrichment facility
- Light-water reactor (under construction)


Source: IISMaps

# Iranian Missile Program


Shahab-3



No Dong




Shahab-4



Variant




IRIS



<u>Range</u>	1,300	1,300	2,000	2,000	3,000
<u>Payload</u>	~1,000	700-1000	?	700	~1,000
<u>IOC</u>	2002	?	?	?	2005

# *Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Ballistic Missiles*



<b>IRAN</b>		
<b>Current Missile Delivery System</b>	<b>Range (km)</b>	<b>Source</b>
..... CSS-8	150	China
———— SCUD B	300	Libya; North Korea
- - - - SCUD C	500	North Korea
<b>Potential Missile Delivery System</b>		
	<b>Range (km)</b>	<b>Potential Source</b>
No Dong	1,000	North Korea
Taepo Dong 1	More than 1,500	North Korea
Taepo Dong 2	4,000–6,000	North Korea

Should Iran receive long range missiles from North Korea, or develop its own, it could threaten a much wider area.

# “Least Bad” Options

- **Continued diplomacy - Open formal dialogue**
- **Strengthened military and diplomatic containment**
- **Rebuilding US-UK position in face of lingering uncertain “victory” in Iraq or forced withdrawal.**
- **Creation of more effective GCC and national military and counterrorism forces.**
- **Military Options.**
  - **Prevention-Preemption**
  - **Containment**
  - **Missile, cruise, and air defenses**
  - **Extended deterrence.**
- **Broad Islamic and Arab challenge to Sunni religious extremism and violence**
- **Arab-Israeli peace.**

# **The Afghan (Pakistan) Conflict**

# Afghanistan: Key Challenges

- **Government and governance ineffective at national, provincial and local levels; corruption is endemic.**
- **Economy is not moving forward at the level that benefits ordinary Afghan; rural development very weak with major problems with narcotics.**
- **Lack of an educated class, modern infrastructure, economic base to build upon.**
- **Current US and NATO aid and activity levels are inadequate.**
- **Reconstituted enemy is more lethal**
- **Pakistan sanctuary is enemy advantage**
- **Major rise in violence in West and South, Rising threat in other areas**
- **Violence likely to be at least equal next year and may well be higher.**
- **Afghan forces developing but require major increases in aid and years of support; police are a critical challenge**
- **NATO effort has insufficient forces and only US, Canadian, British, Danes, and Dutch forces are in the fight. Romanians have been in limited action but are largely road bound due to wrong APCs.**
- **Increased Narco-trafficking/crime**
- **Threat exploits limited transportation infrastructure.**





# Increase in Threat Activity: 2005 vs. 2006

- **Area with high levels of threat activity more than six times larger, some though a result of expanded NATO operations and presence.**
- **Suicide attacks up more than six times: 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006. (Kill 15 coalition soldiers and kill 206 Afghan civilians and wound 460.)**
- **Nearly threefold increase in direct fire attacks: 1,558 to 4,542**
- **Indirect fire and IED attacks more than double. IEDs up from 783 to 1,677 - although kill 250+ IED operators (50 cell leaders). Indirect up from 599 to 1,511. Other attacks up from 295 to 635.**
- **Attacks on Coalition forces 2 1/2 times up from 1,107 to 2,891.**
- **Attacks on Afghan forces up four times: 830 to 3,549.**
- **Major increase in local fighters (GoA's lack of influence in remote areas resulting in more locally recruited fighters and greater support for the insurgency).**

# Enemy Activity

01 January – 31 December (2005 & 2006)

Activity for Period		
Type of Activity	2005	2006
Suicide Attacks	27	139
School Attacks	98	129
Direct Fire *	1558	4542
Indirect Fire	599	1511
IEDs	783	1677




Note: Does not include land mine strikes

\* Direct Fire includes SAFIRE events



# Afghan Perceptions of the Rising Threat

ABC News/BBC poll found more than four in 10 Afghans report Taliban violence in their own local area, including killings, bombings or torching of schools or government buildings and armed conflict with government troops. 64% saw some rise in Taliban threat. That soars far higher in specific regions, notably in southern Helmand and Kandahar provinces, where eight in 10 report poor security.




One in six Afghans say people in their area provide Taliban fighters with food or money – and that jumps to more than a third in the Northwest, nearly half in the country's Southwest provinces overall, and two-thirds specifically in Helmand and Kandahar.


Most Afghans, 57 percent, now call the Taliban the single greatest danger to their country, up 16 points from the first ABC News poll in Afghanistan a year ago. Only in the eastern provinces does the Taliban have a rival threat, drug traffickers.

Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Poll, December 2006

# Enemy Elements By Area of Influence



# How Afghan Views Vary by Area




# Pakistan's Dangerous Role

- Little doubt Pakistani government now tolerates Al Qa'ida, Taliban, other insurgent operations.
- Peace agreement with tribal leaders on September 5th in North Waziristan was de facto surrender.
- India, Kashmir, Baluchi separatism, Pashtun question, support of native Islamists have higher Pakistani government priority than war on terrorism.
- Act as de facto government in parts of Eastern Pakistan.
- Some Madrassas are Taliban and Al Qa'ida bases, some virtually on border with Afghanistan.
- Parts of Army like 11th Division do seem committed to opposing Al Qa'ida and Taliban.
- Pakistani ISI is divided but some elements clearly aid insurgents.

# Iran's Uncertain Role

- Major political and aid presence in West and Shi'ite areas.
- Governors and ANA confirm Iranian presence even in eastern areas.
- Many of 31 million Afghans are Shi'ite and 50% speak Dari, the equivalent of Farsi
- 9% are Hazara and 19% are Shi'ite
- Experts differ over whether Iran acts to preserve on interests or supports action against US and ISAF. No claims such actions as yet present serious problem.
- Weak government and uncertain role of NATO in North and West gives Iraq significant geographic window.

# The Regional French, German, Italian Power Vacuum and Impact of Insufficient British and US Forces



# NATO: Need More Unity and More Forces

- NATO has good military leaders on the ground, but no unity of mission, or true interoperability National caveats to what are effective rules of engagement need to be removed
- Force levels are inadequate to deal with existing threat and contain its expansion.
- Forces began as protectors of nation building, now must fight.
- Britain, Canada, Netherlands and US are in the fight. Danes and Romanians have done some fighting; Poles are coming with out adequate equipment but willing to fight.
- France, Germany, and Italy are not in the fight because of political constraints and rules of engagement.
- Britain, Canada, Netherlands lack adequate armor, IS&R, and airpower, although are getting better. Canada will be first to introduce tanks.
- Britain needs a 50% to 100% increase in force strength to deal with high threat provinces like Helmand. Has been forced into a “devils” bargain with the tribal leaders Helomand Province that limits its operation and gives Taliban added freedom of action.
- NATO lacks a “long war” strategy, and economic aid levels to match its military efforts. Must have a campaign plan to deal with expected Taliban spring offensive in the South.
- Germany failed to develop effective police forces and wasted a three year window of opportunity
- Britain and NATO are trapped into a unrealistic and unworkable drug eradication effort and strategy.

# US Four Point Program for NATO Allies

- **Increased troops, and military and police advisors.**
- **More money to underwrite the reconstruction and civilian aid teams**
- **End restrictions by each country on what their forces are allowed to**
- **Greater effort to fight poppy production and drug trafficking through Afghanistan**



# Afghan Government Weaknesses

**Continuing tension between government in Kabul and ethnic and sectarian regions: Warlords, Mujahideen, regional leaders, legislature, and president.**

**Lack of qualified officials, depth in actual government.**

**Corruption and nepotism.**

**Impact of dependence on narcoeconomy, backlash against it.**

**Weakness, corruption, and ineffectiveness of justice system and police.**

**Pashtun tensions with other groups, tribalism.**

**Resentment of modernization and reform; religious and cultural backlash.**

**Poor quality of governance; failure to provide effective services and presence in field: Water, roads, schools, health, security.**

**Critical infrastructure and water problems.**

**Lack of economic progress and reform; scale of aid program and government activity.**


**Rampant corruption, absence of rule of law, and failure of Government to provide equitable social services are rapidly undermining Afghan popular support for democratic governance model and possibly foreign military presence**

# Problems in Politics and Governance

- **Most Afghans say the government and local police alike have a strong presence in their area – few say so of the Taliban – and trust the current authorities, at least somewhat, to provide security.**
- **Again likely reflecting the Taliban’s broad unpopularity, big majorities continue to call the U.S.-led invasion a good thing for their country (88 percent), to express a favorable opinion of the United States (74 percent) and to prefer the current Afghan government to Taliban rule (88 percent).**
- **Sixty-eight percent approve of Karzai’s work – down from 83 percent last year, but still a level most national leaders would envy.**
- **Fifty-nine percent think the parliament is working for the benefit of the Afghan people – down from 77 percent, but still far better than Americans’ ratings of the U.S. Congress.**
- **Positive ratings of the performance of the United States in Afghanistan are down by 11 points, to 57 percent. Provincial governments are rated positively by 52 percent.**
- **78 percent of Afghans call official corruption a problem in the area where they live – and 55 percent call it a big problem.**
- **One in four report that they or someone they know has had to pay a bribe to receive proper service from the government – and that jumps to four in 10 in the country’s Northwest, where corruption is particularly severe.**

# Ethnic and Sectarian Differences

- About four in 10 Afghans are Pashtuns.
- 18 percent of Pashtuns express a favorable view of the Taliban, compared with four percent of other Afghans.
- Far fewer Pashtuns describe the Taliban as the country's greatest danger – 46 percent, compared with 74 percent of Hazaras and 61 percent of Tajiks.



- 
- Afghanistan is 87 percent Sunni, 12 percent Shiite.

Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Poll, December 2006

# Major Ethnic Divisions




# The Narco-Economy

- **Opium production up 49% in 2006**
- **90% of global illegal opium output**
- **Opium economy 1/3 of total economic activity**
- **But, involves 4% of cultivatable areas**
- **Most districts and localities do not grow opium**
- **An estimated 13 percent of the population involved in opium poppy cultivation.**
- **Income concentrated in a few powerful players**
- **“Counternarcotics efforts have deepened the corruption and hurt the poorest.”**

# Crime and Narcotics

- **Key threat to stability, government, Afghan military, police, and justice systems.**
- **Major source of corruption.**
- **Supports “warlords,” regional power centers.**
- **Important source of terrorist/insurgent financing.**
- **Overlaps with mixed areas of opposition to government.**
- **Serious religious and local backlash.**
- **Ineffective anti-narcotics and eradication programs, mixed with failure to provide incentives and development, create further problems for government, nation building, and allied forces.**
- **Eradication efforts had little impact in 2005, but sent a signal that more was coming and led to a major increase in drug support for Taliban in 2006.**


# Aid and the Urban-Rural Gap



Source: Adapted from Gary E. Langer, ABC News and ABC News/BBC Poll, December 2006

# Recent US Aid: Too Little, Too Late

**Note:  
Programs do  
Not Add to  
Total**



	2004	2005	2006	2007
■ TOTAL	*1,133.3	*1,568.8	*617.7	*802.8
■ PL 480	49.2	57	2.1	-
■ Other Infectious	1	2.1	3.5	1.1
□ Vulnerable Children	4.8	4.2	0	1.5
■ Child/Maternal Health	65.9	34.1	26	46
■ Family Planning/Rep Health	8.3	11.9	22	28.8
■ Democracy & Governance	147	29.2	88	161
□ Human Rights	1.9	-	-	-
■ Economic Growth	571.8	1282.7	381.6	214.5
■ Agriculture & Environ	165.9	109.9	37	246
□ Higher Education & Training	0	0	0	4
□ Basic Eductation	89.2	37.9	37.8	24

USAID, FY2007 Program Justification, Program Budget by Sector



# The New US Aid Request

- **Total aid will be \$10.6 billion, this in the FY07 supplemental**
- **-- \$2 billion in civilian reconstruction aid**
- **May become available too slowly. It will be a combination of '07 CR, 07 supplemental and \$335 million (in an '08 GWOT supplemental that has.**
- **-- \$8.6 billion on military training and assistance**
- **Since 2001, the US has given \$14.2 billion in aid to Afghanistan...**
- **-- \$9 billion in security assistance**
- **-- \$5.2 billion for reconstruction**

# Key Needs for a New Strategy

- **Quality of governance, security, and economic development need emphasis over politics.**
- **Accept reality that development of effective government and economy will take 5-10 years; no instant success is possible.**
- **Building up Afghan capabilities and fighting corruption require slow, patient efforts on national basis**
- **Major increases in economic aid are needed at sustained level at the national, provincial, and local level.**
- **Security and aid must reach ordinary Afghans in rural areas, particularly in South and Northeast.**
- **New approach to counter narcotics that emphasizes dealing with high level traffickers, time, incentives, anti-corruption, and counterinsurgency.**
- **More US and NATO forces are needed for at least several years.**
- **Restructuring of national efforts in NATO force to create a truly unified and effective effort.**
- **Major additional aid and advisory resources needed to develop security: Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).**
- **Must deal with Pakistan as “sanctuary,” and contain Iran.**

# Key Steps Toward Victory - I

- **Adopt a true long war strategy for creating an effective Afghan political and governance system**
- **Treat improvement government and governance at the national, district, and local level as a key center of gravity, build long-term institutional capability.**
- **Raise economic aid and focus on effective local services and program, and focus on mid-term water, road, and other projects to create viable economic alternatives.**
- **Provide the full package of supplemental US funding and added forces being sought by the embassy and military team.**
- **Bite the bullet and add two more US infantry battalions to a full brigade, and more SOF.**
- **Drastically increase number of non-military US Government governance, justice, counter-narcotic and economic reconstruction experts assigned to US Embassy and PRTs. The US military and CIA are disproportionately carrying the weight of what must be an all-government effort with the robust delivery of non-military campaign effects**
- **Elevate information to the status of a major line of operations.**
- **Treat counter narcotics as an integral element of counterinsurgency. Focus on traffickers and replacement crops, not eradication.**

# Key Steps Toward Victory - II

- **Face the real-world dangers imposed by Pakistani action and put the necessary pressure (with major aid incentives) on Pakistan.**
- **Talk to Iran and Central Asian neighboring states; there may be little to gain, but there is little to lose. Engage with Russia, India, and China as well, to address their own regional power vital interests.**
- **Take a realistic approach to NATO's current failures and weaknesses. Seek the all the added allied forces, added aid resources, and integration that are really needed.**
- **Seek substantial British reinforcements. Accept the trade-off Britain may have to make between stepped up withdrawals in Iraq and deploying adequate forces in Afghanistan.**
- **Proliferate best counterinsurgency practices from U.S. agencies to the wider NATO/ISAF effort.**
- **Create a NATO in-country counterinsurgency school to ensure uniform doctrine and especially sharing of best business practices.**
- **Plan to provide US precision, netcentric airpower for all NATO as well as the current mix of US, Canadian, British, Romanian, Dutch, and soon Polish ground forces.**

# Key Steps Toward Victory - III

- **Develop a GOA-authored and owned whole-of-government campaign plan.**
- **Bolster GOA capacity and capability, especially at province/district level.**
- **Promote greater emphasis on Afghan information operations, with emphasis on counternarcotics, in the context of a comprehensive GOA campaign plan.**
- **Promote the innovative CFC-A “Afghan First” Program that focuses on development of Afghan productive capacity with the USG, NATO, and international community to stimulate economic growth and employment.**
- **Improve the quality of Afghan Army and Police trainers by utilizing more active duty combat-seasoned officers and NCOs. 0**
- **Increase the size, scope, and quality of the ANSF training effort; the Afghan Army and Police are growing stronger but need both more ETTs and OMLTs AND more teams with previous combat experience to continue to be effective, especially with combat-experienced Afghan Army and Police forces. Provide robust resourcing for these teams.**
- **Proliferate best-practice methods of cooperation with GOA and Afghan forces, applied by US military forces, to the wider force.**