OPERATION TELIC:
DID THE UNITED KINGDOM ADEQUATELY PREPARE
FOR PHASE IV STABILITY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ?

by

SEAN ROONEY
B.A., The Catholic University of America, 2000

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts
2006
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ABSTRACT

In March 2003 the United Kingdom initiated Operation TELIC in southern Iraq to assist an international coalition, led by the United States, in an invasion of Iraq. What began as a conventional military operation against a conventional opponent later evolved into an unconventional operation against unconventional forces. This paper examines whether the United Kingdom prepared sufficiently for a post-combat environment whereupon such a fundamental shift in combat operations occurred. This paper will demonstrate how the United Kingdom’s planning was applied to the operational environment, and will further examine what adjustments, if any, were made to existing plans and, if made, determine whether they were successful. This paper does not examine whether the United Kingdom should have participated in the invasion of Iraq. Also, this paper does not make long term predictions as to the future of Iraq. Again, the primary purpose of the paper is to examine the United Kingdom’s planning for Phase IV stability operations. This paper concludes that the challenges which would confront the coalition in Iraq were ignored resulting in inadequate planning for Phase IV stability operations by the United Kingdom. This study also concludes that the United Kingdom’s Phase IV planning was unduly influenced by the United States. Finally, this study suggests that adjustments, through the application of the British Army’s counterinsurgent principles, to Phase IV planning neither failed nor completely succeeded.
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Introduction: Operation TELIC and British Methods of Counterinsurgent Warfare

Historically, the United Kingdom has been involved in numerous counterinsurgent operations. These operations have been conducted in Africa, Asia, and Europe, regions as diverse geographically as they are politically. The United Kingdom’s preparations for Phase I, II and III, of military operations against Iraq have proven to be relatively adequate. This paper seeks to address why planning for Phase IV Stability Operations was apparently inadequate, that, arguably, contributed directly to the insurgency now occurring in Iraq.

This paper asks three questions regarding the British Army’s planning for Operation TELIC. They are:

1) What was the British Army’s operational plan for Phase IV Stability Operations?
2) How were operational planning methods applied?
3) Did adjustments to Phase IV planning methods produce success?

My argument is that the implementation of Phase IV planning proved to be inadequate primarily as a result of inaccurate assumptions made as to the conditions that would exist in the post-combat environment. Most importantly, the status of the United Kingdom as a junior partner in the coalition, particularly in relation to the United States, limited the extent to which the United Kingdom could influence planning for all four phases of combat operations.

This paper does not argue that Phase IV planning never occurred. The United Kingdom did plan for all four phases of Operation TELIC. It seems, however, that planning efforts placed a particular emphasis on Phase III, conventional military operations against Iraq’s conventional military forces, as opposed to planning efforts for Phase IV Stability Operations.1 In retrospect, this disparity of planning effort between Phase III and Phase IV, contributed directly to the establishment of an insurgency in Iraq. Additionally, judging from the evidence, the United

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Kingdom’s concerns for post-combat instability were dismissed by the coalition’s leading partner, the United States.²

This study concludes that the British Army’s operational plans for Phase IV Stability Operations were unduly influenced by the United States. As a consequence, the British Army’s planning proved to be only partially adequate. Adjustments to and the application of Phase IV operational methods reasserted the British Army’s counterinsurgent principles.

The planning for Phase IV operations suggests that too many assumptions were made. The assumptions that led to Operation TELIC have demonstrated a need for better intelligence and intelligence sharing capabilities. Consequently the United Kingdom should defer to its own historical experience and assert a greater influence upon coalition operations.

Chapter I

British Army Counterinsurgent Practice

The British Army is perhaps the most experienced Army in counterinsurgent operations with at least partially successful campaigns in Kenya, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland. In order to meet these and other diverse political and military challenges the British Army institutionalized a standard of professionalism which emphasized both adaptation and flexibility. These concepts developed directly from the United Kingdom’s counterinsurgent and imperial experience.³

The British Army, as the junior service to the Royal Navy, has historically been compelled to improvise due to budget limitations and finite resources.⁴ As a result, flexibility of thought became an absolute requirement for the battlefield success and survival of the British Army.⁵ The United Kingdom’s colonial and imperial experience, where continuity was not the norm, rewarded those in the British Army who proved themselves adaptable and capable of solving local military and political problems.⁶

The United Kingdom’s political system also encouraged the British Army’s philosophy of adaptation and flexibility.⁷ Civilian control over the British Army equated to monetary control. Consequently, the British Army was more responsive to the policy objectives of its political

⁷ Avant, Debrah D., 116.
leaders. Additionally, civilian control, with the ability to dismiss or promote army personnel, affected the bias of the British Army’s leadership. That is, the British Army became more concerned with adapting itself to providing military and political solutions, rather than applying and adhering rigidly to theoretical standards of warfare.

Different armies have derived different operational lessons from their counterinsurgent warfare experiences. The primary lesson for the British Army has been that political solutions not military force, end insurgencies. In the event that force is called for in counterinsurgent operations, the British Army has emphasized the need to utilize minimum force. In comparison to counterinsurgent methods currently employed by the United States in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom), the United Kingdom’s approach generally has thus been less aggressive. Evidence suggests that this has occurred in Iraq even when situations may have justified heightened levels of violence, and is, therefore, keeping in tradition with the United Kingdom’s historical experience.

The hesitancy to employ maximum force is primarily a result of the United Kingdom’s past experience with counterinsurgent operations. This is not to argue that high levels of violence and mistakes have not occurred in past British counterinsurgent operations, as they surely have. What arguably makes the British Army distinct is that it has institutionalized the lesson that counterinsurgent operations are most successful when operations are conducted with a low profile, or a light foot.

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8 Avant, Debrah D., 116.
9 Ibid., 23; 115.
10 Ibid., 23; 115.
British soldiers are taught that economic and political goals take precedence over military goals in counterinsurgent operations. If and when military force is necessary, such force must be minimal and be resorted to only when all else has failed. This lesson has become ingrained culturally in the British Army.

The defining characteristic of the British Army’s experience, however, has been its demonstrated willingness to adapt, even in the midst of counterinsurgent operations. The organizational methods of the British Army allowed for this by establishing an institutional ability to respond with appropriate tactical and strategic solutions to insurgent and imperial problems.

British Army doctrine outlines six counterinsurgent principles reflecting the primacy given to political solutions. These principles are:

1) Political Primacy and Political Aim
2) Coordinated Government Machinery
3) Intelligence and Information
4) Separating the Insurgent from his Support
5) Neutralizing the Insurgent
6) Longer Term Post-Insurgency Planning

Robert F. Thompson, an expert on counterinsurgent warfare, has further defined and heavily influenced British Army thinking regarding counterinsurgent operations. Mr. Thompson developed five additional counterinsurgent principles that have become an inherent part of British Army doctrine. Because of Mr. Thompson’s impact on British institutional thinking, the five principles are worthwhile to list in full. They are:

13 Avant, Debrah D., 116.
14 Ibid., 134.
16 Ibid.
1. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable.
2. The government must function in accordance with law.
3. The government must have an overall plan.
4. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas.
5. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first.¹⁷

Mr. Thompson’s five principles emphasize the importance of establishing a legitimate government that adheres to the principles of law and order. This takes precedence over military operations conducted against insurgent elements. That is, the civilian population must be secured and protected from insurgent attack.

The British Army’s doctrine emphasizes coordination of effort, and intelligence and planning. Each and every task listed in the doctrine, however, presents an enormous undertaking. Adhering to and applying these principles to counterinsurgent operations requires patience and time. It is arguable that applying the counterinsurgent principles in Iraq will be difficult to accomplish given Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divides and chronic lack of security.

United States military doctrine divides combat operations into four phases. Phase I, the deterrence and engagement phase, can broadly be defined as setting the conditions for battlefield engagement when diplomacy has failed.¹⁸ Phase II seizes the initiative, and can be understood as a logistical preparation phase, in which military forces are deployed to a region for imminent

military action.\textsuperscript{19} Phase III is usually termed ‘decisive operations’, that is, the phase of combat operations when military forces are engaged with an opponent.\textsuperscript{20} Phase IV, is the final stage and can easily be understood as the transitory phase from decisive operations to what is commonly referred to as stability operations, or non-combat operations.\textsuperscript{21} During Phase IV, military forces are redeployed out of the theater of operations, as civilian authority and the rule of law are established.\textsuperscript{22}

Arguments have been made suggesting that to neutralize the insurgents in Iraq, the British Army must utilize the methods which they applied in Malaysia. The historical analogy to Malaysia regarding Iraq, however, is not entirely accurate. It is unlikely that methods applied in Malaysia would meet with success in Iraq. Although the experience is useful in understanding counterinsurgent methods, the operational environments are too dissimilar for a repetition of the same methods. Perhaps the single most important difference is that British Army’s counterinsurgent operations in Iraq are being conducting in the midst of a communal civil war with elements of an insurgency. This was not the case in Malaysia, where the British Army was engaged in a struggle against a single Maoist Ideological movement.\textsuperscript{23}

\begin{flushright} 
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid. \\
\end{flushright}
Chapter II

Operation TELIC

Many factors will determine the future success or failure of the British Army’s Phase IV operations in southern Iraq. Throughout the paper measurements of success or failure will be divided in two broad categories. The first measure of success or failure will examine the increase or decrease of insurgent activity. The second measure of success or failure will examine whether economic and reconstruction activities have increased or decreased. The answers to the two categories of questions will determine whether Phase IV planning was accurate and whether adjustments were adequate for the operational environment.

20 March 2003, the United Kingdom initiated Operation TELIC, (from the Greek meaning expressing purpose), to assist the United States led coalition, Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) in the invasion of Iraq. The first objective of the coalition was to force Iraq to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolutions which required the country to disarm and cease production of alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The second objective of the coalition was to remove Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, and his Ba’ath Party regime from power. The third objective was to establish a democratic government in Iraq that would co-exist peacefully with its neighbors.

Operation TELIC involved over forty-six thousand military personnel from the United Kingdom’s Army, Royal Air Force, and Royal Navy. As of March, 2006, over eighty-five thousand members of all branches of the United Kingdom’s military have rotated through Iraq.\textsuperscript{26} The focus of this paper, however, concerns the British Army.

In 2003 the land component of Operation TELIC consisted of roughly twenty-six thousand personnel, which represents one-quarter of the British Army, supported by fifteen thousand vehicles. Units deployed for Phase III operations included the 1\textsuperscript{st} United Kingdom Armoured Division, the 7\textsuperscript{th} Armoured Brigade - commonly referred to as the ‘Desert Rats’ - the 16\textsuperscript{th} Air Assault Brigade, and the 102\textsuperscript{nd} Logistics Brigade. The division and the brigades’ organic elements were enhanced with additional armor, one hundred and sixteen Challenger Tanks, additional infantry, as well as additional logistical capabilities. The division and the respective brigades also included organic Headquarters Staff and medical personnel.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{26}United Kingdom Ministry of Defence. National Audit Office. Operation TELIC – United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. HC 60 Session 2003-2004. 11 December, 2003: 7. Available from http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/nao_reports/03-04/030460.pdf. The Royal Navy initially deployed extensive forces in support of Operation TELIC. In 2003, Royal Naval Task Force 2003 deployed to the Persian Gulf, the body of water which allows Iraq to access the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. These forces consisted of two aircraft carriers, the HMS Ark Royal, and the HMS Ocean, an amphibious helicopter carrier, several destroyers and several frigates, for a total of nineteen warships. The United Kingdom sent an additional fourteen Royal Fleet Auxiliary support vessels which included several mine-hunters, amphibious support vessels, and one hospital ship, the HMS Splendid. The aircraft carriers were withdrawn in 2003, the HMS Ark Royal currently undergoing an extensive modification upgrade, and have yet to be redeployed to the region. Additionally, the amphibious support vessels were withdrawn, along with all of the United Kingdom’s destroyers, and, as of March 2006, have not been redeployed. Into 2006, only a few Royal Navy frigates remain in the Persian Gulf. The Royal Air Force deployed one hundred fixed wing aircraft in 2003 to support Operation TELIC. Included were attack/reconnaissance and bomber/reconnaissance aircraft, the Jaguar and Tornado respectively. Several helicopter, tanker, and transport aircraft, including the C-17, provided support to Operation TELIC. Since 2004, the composite of aircraft has changed little, but the numbers have subsequently decreased.

The United Kingdom is the lead coalition partner in Southern Iraq providing the organizational management for the Multinational Division, South East, MND (SE) in Southern Iraq. Forces under the MND (SE) include military personnel from Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Romania. In all, these forces total approximately five thousand troops. The operational areas of responsibility assigned to the United Kingdom were, and remain, the four provinces of Southern Iraq: Al Basrah (Basra), Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Al Muthanna.

Iraq borders Iran on the east and north, Kuwait to the south, Saudi Arabia to the south and west, Jordan to the west, Syria to the west and north, and Turkey to the north, totaling two thousand miles of border area. Southern Iraq’s climate is generally arid, however, extensive marshes do exist, and extend for seven thousand square miles up to and along the border with Iran. Two historical and large rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, feed the marshes. The rivers converge just north of Iraq’s second largest city, and largest city in the south, Basra. Iraq’s northern border with Iran consists of mountainous terrain, geography nearly impossible to monitor completely, but is outside the United Kingdom’s area of operations.

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During Phase III operations, the British Army was assigned the task of securing the southern flanks of units of the United States Army and of the United States Marine Corps’ I Marine Expeditionary Force, MEF, in their drive to capture Baghdad, as well as farther points north. The British Army also was given the task of securing the economically invaluable deep water port of Umm Qasr, in addition to securing and preventing the sabotage of Iraq’s oil infrastructure in southern Iraq. These tasks were completed successfully and Phase III operations ended in late April 2003, and officially on 1 May, 2003.

Phase IV Stability Operations planning was undertaken by the United Kingdom’s Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) based in Northwood, England. (See Appendix E.) PJHQ is responsible for planning that involves British military personnel with multi-national forces.

Upon completion of Phase III Combat Operations, plans had been drafted by the PJHQ to replace armored and mechanized units in Iraq with infantry and mechanized infantry units. Additional soldiers trained in civil affairs would also be deployed.

The plan was for the British Army to conduct low-profile stability operations and to help the Iraqis transition to a democratic government. The United Kingdom’s planning for Phase IV operations, however, did not occur in a vacuum. Evidence indicates that in comparison to Phase III planning, the coalition simply did not provide the planners of Phase IV operations with the needed manpower or resources or that their concerns and recommendations were simply ignored. The United States exerted extensive influence upon the direction of Phase IV planning.

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It is conceivable that the United Kingdom’s planners for Phase IV planning were constrained by the political priorities of both Washington and Whitehall.

The evidence also suggests that the United States’ direction of Phase IV planning was hampered by an extraordinary amount of bureaucratic infighting between the Pentagon and the United States Department of State. The struggle revolved around the most likely post-combat environment which would exist in Iraq and what necessary resources would be needed. This impeded planning and organizational efforts within the coalition, particularly and perhaps most importantly, with the United Kingdom.

It is arguable that the debate, on whether the United Kingdom planned adequately or not for Phase IV operations, should seek to answer whether the United Kingdom had the capacity or not to impact Phase IV planning in relation to the United States’ dominance over all phases of operational planning. It appears, given concerns expressed by the United Kingdom in 2002, that it did not possess nor was capable of obtaining this capability. That is not to argue that the United Kingdom did not make its own assumptions and mistakes in the immediate aftermath of Phase III operations, as this certainly had occurred.

Jack Straw, the current Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom acknowledged that misjudgments were made. He states: “What we have learnt is that the post-war situation has been more difficult than we planned. The planning for that was less satisfactory than it should have been.” The lack of coordination of effort between the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the Department for International Development and Foreign Office (DFID), confirms Mr. Straw’s candid assessment.

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43 Maddox, Bronwen. “The War was Right, but We Made Mistakes Afterwards.” The Times. 17 March, 2006.
The Ministry of Defence planned for the attack, the Department of International Development planned for an assumed refugee crisis, and the development of international support was planned by the United Kingdom’s Foreign Office, independently of each other. A strategy unit created by Mr. Blair’s Cabinet Office to study failed states determined that “Policies and resources across government are not yet coordinated across government to best effect.”

That is, information and planning efforts were compartmentalized and stove-piped. The overall responsibility, however, for the lack of emphasis on the coalition’s Phase IV planning, must be borne by the United States. Its influence and impact on the United Kingdom’s ability to plan appropriately for Phase IV operations cannot be ignored. In a classified memo sent to Mr. Blair by John Sawers, who was sent to Iraq by Mr. Blair in 2003 for analysis of events, he identified numerous mistakes being made by the leading coalition member, the United States. Mr. Sawers’ analysis determined that the United States was conducting Phase IV operations with “No leadership, no strategy, no coordination, no structure and [was] inaccessible to ordinary Iraqis.”

Major General Albert Whitley, a British Officer assigned to the invasion forces of the United States in 2003, and the deputy commanding General of all land forces, became extremely concerned that Phase IV operations were failing. He reflected in a memo sent to Mr. Blair in 2003 that “We [the United Kingdom] may have been seduced into something we might be inclined to regret. Is strategic failure a possibility? The answer has to be ‘yes’.” General Whitley believed that Phase IV planning was not working well because the emphasis on planning efforts had been placed on Phase III operations. General Whitley remarked that, “There was a blind faith that

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46 Ibid.
Phase IV would work. There was a failure to anticipate the extent of the backlash or mood of Iraqi society.”

Simply put, the post-combat environment after the completion of Phase III operations did not match the coalition’s expectations. This was a result of overly optimistic assumptions regarding the future of Iraq after the completion of Phase III operations. Much of Phase IV planning went forward based upon the hope for best case scenarios, despite competing arguments to the contrary.

Excerpts of a classified memo written by the United Kingdom’s leading foreign policy advisor in July 2002 prior to the initiation of Operation TELIC, and provided to The Times in 2005 outlined the details of a meeting between President George W. Bush of the United States, and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom. The memo explicitly made clear that an analysis of the benefits and the risks of an invasion of Iraq was needed. The authors of the memo express their concern that military planners within the Pentagon were not adequately preparing for Phase IV operations. The memo stated:

A post-war occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise. …the U.S. military plans are virtually silent on this point. Washington could look to us (United Kingdom) to share a disproportionate share of the burden. Further work is required to define more precisely the means by which the desired end state would be created.

Mr. Blair and Mr. Bush believed that Phase III operations would result in a rapid military victory. In retrospect, this prediction accurately reflected the performance of the majority of Iraq’s Army and its will to fight; Phase III operations were rapidly concluded. It is now clear that

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47 Ibid.
where both leaders went terribly wrong was in their assumption for Phase IV operations. Both Mr. Blair and Mr. Bush noted that the transition to Phase IV operations could prove to be difficult, but would be entirely manageable.\textsuperscript{52} Mr. Blair and Mr. Bush assumed that in general, Phase IV operations in Iraq would be conducted in a relatively benign environment.\textsuperscript{53}

Incredibly, and according to the classified memo, Mr. Bush predicted that it would be unlikely for warfare to occur amongst Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups after the cessation of Phase III operations.\textsuperscript{54} Judging from the evidence now available, this was a fatally flawed and hopeful assumption. What did occur was the almost immediate creation of an insurgent network by former members of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party regime and fanatical Sunni fundamentalists that inflamed ethnic and sectarian divisions which have continued to plague Iraq.\textsuperscript{55}

\textit{Demographics}

The most erroneous assumption was that the citizens of Southern Iraq would be cooperative and friendly, expediting the recovery process.\textsuperscript{56} In fact, the opposite was true, as the citizens of Southern Iraq were quite indifferent to the presence of the British Army.\textsuperscript{57} The Iraqi citizens were not only indifferent, but their expectations as to what the British Army should provide were far different from what the United Kingdom prepared for or believed the Iraqis would need.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Rathmell, Andrew, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Van Natta, Don, A10.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Rathmell, Andrew, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{56} MacAskill, Ewen. “U.S. Postwar Iraq Strategy a Mess, Blair was Told.” The Guardian. 14 March, 2006.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Hills, Alice. “Basra and the Referent Points of Twofold War.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. Volume 14, Number 3, Autumn 2003: 27; 28; 30.
\end{itemize}
Indeed the expectations were far removed from what the United Kingdom was even capable of providing.\textsuperscript{58} What the Iraqi citizens expected were immediate improvements in economic and living conditions.\textsuperscript{59} It appears that the United Kingdom continues to struggle to completely fulfill those expectations.

Iraqi judgment on whether conditions had improved, considered conditions prior to Operation GRANBY, not Operation TELIC. Operation GRANBY was the United Kingdom’s involvement in Operation Desert Storm, the invasion of Iraq by a United Nations mandated and United States led coalition in 1991.\textsuperscript{60} The United Kingdom failed to appreciate the long memory of the Iraqi people regarding the extent of their suffering.\textsuperscript{61} For the Iraqis, this included the deprivation incurred as far back as the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{62}

The suffering also included that sustained during the enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, which established no-fly zones over Northern and Southern Iraq.\textsuperscript{63} The question of the legal ramifications of the imposition of the no-fly zones aside, the result was a negative impact upon the economy and infrastructure of those regions, in addition to the inevitably Iraqi civilian casualties which occurred.\textsuperscript{64} Often overlooked, this bombing

\textsuperscript{59} Synnott, 35.
\textsuperscript{60} Hills, 36.
campaign lasted twelve years, from the end of Operation GRANBY in 1991, to the initiation of Operation TELIC in 2003.65

The enforcement of the no-fly zone combined with damage incurred from military operations conducted in Southern Iraq during Phase III operations of Operation TELIC devastated the economic viability of the region. The result was the absolute inability of Southern Iraq to recover quickly. Iraq needed extensive outside assistance and resources. The coalition in general and the United Kingdom in particular, were completely ignorant of the true extent of the decrepit state of Iraq’s infrastructure.66

In retrospect, the coalition and the United Kingdom failed to estimate the true amount of human, monetary assistance and material resources that would be needed to transition from Phase III to Phase IV operations. Additionally, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) left Iraq prior to Operation Granby in 1991 and had yet to return. As the NGOs had left, the task of conducting Phase IV operations would therefore be left solely to the military forces of the coalition.67

The impact of the military campaigns did not take into consideration the detrimental policies of Iraq’s now disposed dictatorial leader, Saddam Hussein, and his Ba’ath party regime. After rebelling against his regime, in the wake of Operation GRANBY, Mr. Hussein ordered draconian reprisals against the citizens of Southern Iraq. This rebellion occurred with the encouragement of the United Kingdom and the United States. Mr. Hussein is responsible for the indiscriminate deaths of thousands in southern Iraq and also for the compulsory resettlement of thousands other because of draining of life sustaining wetlands.68 (See map, Appendix F.)

65 Synnott, 47.
The destruction and economic stagnation incurred through Mr. Hussein’s retributive policies further inhibited the economic growth and recoverability of Southern Iraq at the initiation of Phase IV operations. In 2003, the coalition failed to anticipate that the citizens of Southern Iraq considered the coalition responsible for the economic hardships endured for over a decade. As a consequence of this perception, the Iraqis expected a complete and immediate economic revitalization of southern Iraq.

Additionally, the citizens of southern Iraq were reluctant to become involved, preferring to await the result of the outcome of military operations. This reluctance stemmed from the bitterness many felt at the failure of the United Kingdom and other nations to support the uprising against the Ba’ath party regime in the aftermath of Operation GRANBY. The memory of coalition forces standing idle nearby as the rebellion in Southern Iraq was brutally crushed by Saddam Hussein was too real and subsequently too hard to forgive and forget.

Sectarian Divisions

Iraq’s sectarian divisions are between the Shiites, translated literally as partisans, and the Sunnis, from the word sunnah, meaning tradition. The separation occurred when the Prophet Muhammad, the founder of Islam, died in the seventh century, creating a crisis over his succession. For all intents and purposes, the crisis has yet to be solved, and subsequently, both groups claim historical and moralistic legitimacy over the other. These alternative interpretations of Islam have existed since the seventh century.

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69 Graham-Brown, Sarah, et al., 41.
70 Ibid., 41.
75 Ibid.
In planning for Phase IV operations, the United Kingdom failed to appreciate and understand the extent in which these sectarian divisions existed in Iraq. (See map, Appendix A.) It is conceivable that these divisions are a greater threat to Iraqi national unity than any criminal or insurgent elements. The inability to anticipate what the operational environment would resemble in Southern Iraq after the cessation of Phase III operations reflected an overall lack of cultural and religious understanding by the United Kingdom of the Iraqi people.

The Sunni were the minority religious group which once dominated Iraq through the now deposed Ba’ath party regime. They believe that they are now being deliberately alienated in the development and implementation of the new Iraqi government. Iraq is embroiled in an identity crisis whereupon a decision must be made to form an inclusive national government or to form a loosely formed confederation.

The Shiites within Iraq are the target of the greatest number of insurgent attacks. This suggests that the insurgency possesses a dominant Sunni core. The core consists of fundamentalist Sunni insurgents, Sunni nationals and secularists, and former members of the Ba’ath party regime. This has left Shiite elements feeling threatened.

Because the majority of sectarian violence has targeted Shiites, the Shiites are reluctant to include the Sunni in the developmental process of establishing the new Iraqi government. Compounding the indigenous Iraq religious divide are foreign religious fundamentalist warriors, or Jihadists, many from Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria, who possess a strict interpretation of Islam and whose ambitions for the future of Iraq are questionable. For many of the Jihadists, their

76 Nasr, A27.
primary purpose for being in Iraq is the destruction of coalition forces. The secondary purpose is the creation of an Islamic Caliphate State.\(^{80}\) Iraq continues to function as a point of catalyst for hundreds of militant Muslims.\(^{81}\)

The animosity that exists between the Shiites and the Sunnis is also a reflection of the tribal nature of Iraqi society, of which the two religious sects are a part.\(^{82}\) This dominant lifestyle in the Middle East was not grasped by the United Kingdom in the development of Phase IV planning.\(^{83}\) Both members of the Shiite and Sunnis have codes of honor which call for revenge to correct actual or perceived injustices.\(^{84}\) This has taken the form of revenge killings throughout Iraq, with each group targeting the other.

Sectarian violence has plagued Iraq since the onset of Operation TELIC. This violence increased dramatically in February 2006 with the destruction of the Shiite Shrine in Samarra, Iraq, one of Shia Islam’s most elaborate shrines and holiest places.\(^{85}\) Although this attack occurred outside the British area of responsibility, sectarian violence occurred in Southern Iraq as a response to the Shrine attack.\(^{86}\) Reprisal attacks against Sunnis and Sunni places of worship


\(^{83}\) Ibid.

\(^{84}\) Ibid.


erupted almost immediately across all of Iraq.\textsuperscript{87} Hundreds of Iraqi citizens and police officers have died across Iraq in the ensuing sectarian violence.\textsuperscript{88} (See map, Appendix B.)

Rocket propelled grenades and rifles were fired at a Sunni mosque in Basra, a Southern Iraqi city under British operational responsibility.\textsuperscript{89} Additional reprisals occurred throughout Southern Iraq when more Shiites and Sunnis attacked their respective Mosques and political parties.\textsuperscript{90} The cycle of revenge has left well over one hundred Iraqis dead and the number has not yet abated.\textsuperscript{91} The prospect of increased national disruption and ethnic cleansing in Iraq further challenges British operations.\textsuperscript{92}

Arguably, the extent in which Iraq society was vulnerable to such division and extremism was not fully appreciated nor prepared for by the United Kingdom. Saddam Hussein’s concern over these divisions, plus their inherent danger to his rule, distracted him from fighting coalition forces during Operation TELIC resulting in his neglect of perceptive military advice.\textsuperscript{93} In retrospect, lack of insight into Saddam Hussein’s leadership was an abysmal failure on the part of coalition intelligence, directly contributing to the inadequacy of Phase IV planning.

The neglect to perform an in-depth historical and intelligence analysis of the possible consequences of Phase IV operations is a possible indication as to the extent in which operational

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Knight, Sam. “Bombing of Shia Shrine Sparks Wave of Retaliation.” \textit{The Sunday Times}. 22 February, 2006
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., A8.
planning was rushed and ultimately deficient.\textsuperscript{94} The prospect confronting the British Army is that it will be implementing counter-insurgent strategies, between two rival political and religious factions in a nascent civil war.\textsuperscript{95}

According to commentators such as Stephen Biddle, Iraq is already engulfed in three wars: a communal civil war; an insurgency; and a terrorist, or jihadist war.\textsuperscript{96} As counterinsurgency missions are conducted by the British Army, it increasingly finds itself a constant insurgent and terrorist target while also being caught in the middle of, and trying to prevent, sectarian strife.

\textit{The Influence of Iran}

The failure to establish and maintain security extended to the urban areas of southern Iraq, to its borders with Iran and Syria. Since the initiation of Operation TELIC, the British Army has been unable to secure Iraq’s southern borders with Iran. Tragically, this porous border has created an avenue in which munitions and weapons of increasing lethality and sophistication can easily be transported and given to insurgent elements for use against the coalition.\textsuperscript{97}

The initial and continued inability to secure Iraq’s border with Iran has left Southern Iraq open to infiltration and influence by Iranian elements. Iranian interests in Southern Iraq can be classified into three categories: economic, political, and religious. Iraq offers Iran, the second largest oil producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, (OPEC), accessibility to large oil reserves with established refining centers for production and shipment to overseas


markets.\textsuperscript{98} For Iran, southern Iraq’s ports and navigable rivers make trade and accessibility to the region an attractive alternative to harsher interior desert trade routes.

Some of the largest business investors in Iraq are Iranian, having invested heavily in the restoration of Iraq’s dilapidated infrastructure.\textsuperscript{99} The Iranian government has established contracts which will provide electricity to Iraq and create an oil pipeline which will transport Iraq oil to Iranian ports for disbursement.\textsuperscript{100} Increased Iranian influence was an unexpected and unintended consequence of Operation TELIC. The importance of securing the border so as to limit Iranian influence and to help end the insurgency cannot be understated.

Non-governmental organizations from Iran immediately supplied medical services to Iraqi citizens after the cessation of Phase III operations and continue to do so.\textsuperscript{101} Ahl-ul-Bait, an Iranian non-governmental organization, has provided ambulances, doctors and teachers.\textsuperscript{102} Despite the humanitarian nature of Iranian non-governmental organizations akin to Ahl-ul-Bait, it is conceivable that such organizations provide a front for Iranian intelligence agents.\textsuperscript{103} What may very well have spread into the provision of funds and political instruction to Shiite organizations in Southern Iraq, which have a greater historical connection to Iran.\textsuperscript{104}

Separating the legitimate activity of providing humanitarian assistance in its myriad forms from the aggressive intentions of Iran has created a conundrum for the United Kingdom. The answer remains elusive. Adding to the complexity of this conundrum is the difficulty in determining whether Iranian intentions are indeed benign, that is, as a force for progress and

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., A1.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., A20.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., A20.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., A20.
\end{footnotes}
stability in Iraq, or whether Iran is acting as a force for instability in Iraq, drawing attention away from its nuclear weapons ambition.\textsuperscript{105}

Iran has held the United Kingdom responsible for sectarian violence in Southern Iraq and has demanded the withdrawal of the United Kingdom’s forces.\textsuperscript{106} The United Kingdom has publicly held that Iran is responsible for supplying weapons to the insurgents, and that Iran is seeking to establish undue political influence on the nascent Iraq government and is also encouraging the creation of fundamentalist groups.\textsuperscript{107} Given official Iranian government statements regarding its intention to destroy Anglo-Saxon civilization, and a stated desire to have a world free of Zionism, the United Kingdom’s reluctance to believe that Iranian intentions are everything but benign is understandable.\textsuperscript{108}

Complicating the United Kingdom’s diplomatic relations is its imperial past in the region.\textsuperscript{109} This is particularly true of Iran, where longstanding animosity exists towards the United Kingdom. This animosity has become ingrained in Iranian folklore.\textsuperscript{110} Anything that the United Kingdom does to prevent humanitarian assistance from Iran to Iraq will be readily exploited by insurgent elements as proof that the United Kingdom’s interests in Iraq are neo-colonial and indifferent to the plight of ordinary Iraqis. Arguably, this is plausible, as Iraqi


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
citizens have been prone to believe extensive rumors regarding the intentions of coalition forces in Iraq.  

The City of Basra

Basra is Iraq’s second largest city, with an international airport, one of Iraq’s largest oil and shipping facilities, and a population of 1.5 million, mainly consisting of Shiite Muslims. The city lies one hundred and thirty kilometers from the Persian Gulf and five hundred and fifty kilometers south-east of Baghdad, and is situated on the western shore of Shatt-al Arab, a river formed at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. With dredging, Shatt-al Arab ‘Stream of the Arabs’ is navigable by shallow-draft ocean vessels.

Unfortunately, in the aftermath of Phase III operations and before the initiation of Phase IV operations, the city of Basra suffered from general disorder, extensive looting, and extensive damage to its oil terminals and power plants. The power generating capacity of Iraq is concentrated in the southern region, in addition to seventy percent of Iraq’s known oil reserves. Ninety-eight percent of Iraq’s current budget is dependent upon crude oil exports. Consequently, the protection of southern Iraq’s oil infrastructure is vitally important to the future of Iraq’s economy and the success of the coalition.

116 Ibid.
Chapter III

Phase IV in Practice

In a report written for the Directorate General of Development and Doctrine (DGDD), Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Storr of the British Army comments extensively on the operational capabilities of the British Army during the transition from Phase III to Phase IV operations in Iraq. He writes “...Divisional HQ (Headquarters) released orders for Phase IV – peace support operation – on 21 April, 15 days after Basrah fell.”\(^{117}\) That is, no operational order from Headquarters was issued to tactical units for fifteen days, an indefensible lapse!\(^{118}\)

The tactical units of the British Army advanced at such a rapid pace that Headquarters on the strategic level never managed to adequately catch up with or to provide a clear picture of operational areas of responsibility amongst British units.\(^{119}\) Tactical level units were therefore left without direction and became, on occasion, paralyzed.\(^{120}\) In retrospect, this communication and planning deficiency created an opportunistic environment for looters, and created an atmosphere of mistrust between the British Army and ordinary Iraqis, who believed the British Army was unable, or worse, unwilling to help.

Looting

Many planners assumed that with the cessation of Phase III operations the greatest threat to the stability of Iraq would be refugees, not criminal and insurgent activity.\(^{121}\) The opposite, in fact, was true. Almost immediately, at the conclusion of Phase III operations, looting erupted

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\(^{118}\) Ibid.

\(^{119}\) Ibid.

\(^{120}\) Ibid, 12.

\(^{121}\) Wintour, Patrick. “Ministers Look for the Lessons in Iraq Failures.” The Guardian, 3 December, 2003. The expectation of a refugee crisis was based upon the prior experience of Operation GRANBY, when a refugee crisis in Northern and Southern Iraq did occur. A refugee crisis never materialized in the execution and aftermath of Operation TELIC.
across Iraq. Plans for Phase IV operations did consider the prospect for such activity and preparations had obviously not been made.

In retrospect, it is clear that the provision for security was the most challenging problem for Phase IV operations. Unfortunately, an inability or, in some cases, an unwillingness, to provide security, was the norm.\textsuperscript{122} The failure on the part of the coalition to immediately establish law and order encouraged further looting. Damage caused by the looting was so extensive that future reconstruction projects in Iraq were needlessly delayed. Consequently, ordinary Iraqi citizens became ambivalent towards the military forces of the coalition, further complicating Phase IV operations.\textsuperscript{123} Iraqi resentment began when the looting began.\textsuperscript{124}

The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), and the Fourth Hague Convention (1907), mandate that an occupational force must establish law and order, in addition to meeting the humanitarian needs of the indigenous population.\textsuperscript{125} Judging from the evidence, the coalition was prepared to meet the humanitarian needs of a refugee crisis in a relatively stable environment, but was not prepared to establish law and order on the scale that events in Iraq subsequently demanded.

Coalition forces available for the necessary prosecution of Phase IV operations were simply insufficient. James T. Quinlivan explains that for security to be provided effectively and to be ultimately successful, a force ratio of twenty soldiers per thousand of inhabitants is a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{123} Hills, 38.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Human Rights Watch, 16.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
necessity.\textsuperscript{126} This was the force ratio that the British Army employed in Northern Ireland and also during counterinsurgent operations in Malaysia.\textsuperscript{127}

The original composition of the British Army in Iraq was expected, without the necessary training and support of various civilian components of the United Kingdom, to make the transition to Phase IV operations seamlessly.\textsuperscript{128} The vastness of southern Iraq and the urban nature of many of its key points proved the difficulty of this task. The evidence suggests that the task was simply beyond the immediate capabilities of in-theater forces.

Complicating matters was the absolute, complete, utter collapse of the governing apparatus of the Ba’ath party regime.\textsuperscript{129} The consequence of this was that the aid of local and national governmental bodies, in addition to indigenous, internal security forces, were not available. It is arguable that operations in southern Iraq became an exercise in asset management. In-theater tactical commanders, with a limited number of soldiers, had to prioritize missions.\textsuperscript{130} It is now apparent that tactical decisions had longer term strategic consequences.

Iraqi museums, in addition to educational and government institutions remained vulnerable to, and experienced extensive and widespread looting for weeks after the termination of Phase III operations.\textsuperscript{131} The British Army, with its inherently limited number personnel, did not protect cultural sensitive sites or government buildings, but instead, gave precedence to the protection of Iraq’s energy producing infrastructure. Exacerbating matters for the British Army

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ministry of Defense. Operation TELIC: United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq: 32.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Hills, 40; Ministry of Defense, Operation TELIC: United Kingdom Military Operations in Iraq: 32.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Hills, 40.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Hills, 8.
\end{itemize}
and directly contributing to the ferocity of the looting was the release of thousands of prisoners
by the Ba’ath party regime just prior to the launch of Operation TELIC.\textsuperscript{132}

Arguably, failing to provide security created and encouraged an environment of hostility
towards the military forces of the coalition throughout Iraq. It is arguable, that the coalition
neglected a fundamental tenet of counterinsurgent warfare: support is given to the side that the
population perceives will best protect it.\textsuperscript{133} If the insurgency continues to deny the Iraqi citizenry
their sense of security, the insurgency will succeed.\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Militias}

With the cessation of Phase III operations in 2003, this hostility developed into an
insurgency which has become increasingly volatile, further exacerbating the lack of security. The
inevitability of the development of an insurgency in Iraq is debatable, but the consequence of not
providing adequate security contributed directly to the creation of an insurgency by contributing
to the development of a power vacuum. This vacuum was subsequently filled by former Ba’ath
party members, criminal elements, and diametrically opposed sectarian groups or militias.\textsuperscript{135}
Complicating matters for the British Army has been an inability to identify the affiliation of those
who have been targeting British soldiers in southern Iraq.\textsuperscript{136}

Because of the chaos, ordinary Iraqis either turned to or felt compelled to submit to these
elements for security.\textsuperscript{137} This left the British Army further alienated from the Iraqi people. The
coalition soon realized that as repressive as Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party Regime was, it had

\textsuperscript{133} Hoffman, 113.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 114; Cohen, Roger. “This Officer’s Big Worry Isn’t About Force Levels.” \textit{International Herald Tribune}. 3 December, 2005.
\textsuperscript{135} Hills, 28.
\textsuperscript{136} Hoffman, 11.
maintained a social order, however terrifying. This social order completely collapsed in the aftermath of Operation TELIC. The immediate need to establish some form of law and order was never met and the coalition still struggles to provide security. It is now apparent that Iraqi expectations of the invading coalition forces were high, and this included an assumption that basic services and security conditions would be provided and considerably improved. When this did not happen, militia organizations assumed the role.

The Iraq elements that provided security, particularly armed militias, greatly enhanced their reputation by doing so, giving them an air of legitimacy and permanence. This legitimacy was at the expense of the United Kingdom’s forces. Arguably, as the reputation of the militias increased, the reputation of the United Kingdom forces decreased.

The coalition has refrained from disbanding the Mahdi Army, which operates freely in the poorer enclaves of the city of Basra in the south. The militias, which in some cases are nothing more than opportunistic gangs, have acquired the military capability to engulf Iraq into a civil war along sectarian divisions, and have succeeded in terrorizing ordinary Iraqis. The result has been the creation of virtually fiefdoms in sectors of Iraq, and their existence seems to be tolerated by the coalition.

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Increasing the instability in Iraq has been the ability of the militias to infiltrate into legitimate governmental bodies. Eradicating this will prove to be difficult if not impossible, given the extent to which militias are ingrained in Iraqi society. The result is that both Iraqi citizens and the Iraqi police live and operate in constant fear of the militias, a particularly acute problem in Southern Iraq.

If the British Army is to succeed in southern Iraq, establishing an Iraqi government and police force that the Iraqi citizenry perceives as competent and trustworthy is vitally important. Judging from the evidence, this goal has yet to be obtained. It is conceivable that the perception of the Iraqi citizenry will change when the British Army is able to integrate its counterinsurgent activities with a non-sectarian Iraqi police and military force. As of March 2006, an indication that this has not occurred is reflected in the increased number of law-abiding Iraqis purchasing firearms in addition to individual terrorism insurance policies provided by Iraqi insurance companies. Such policies are the world’s first and are becoming increasingly popular, a further indication of the lack of confidence in Iraq’s current condition.

A social-welfare role has developed for the militias in Basra. The militias have attempted to this role, a role they have become reluctant to relinquish, in the hope of consolidating economic and political power. Too often, Iraqi citizens turn to the militias for...
arbitration and guidance. Given that the culture of militias is engrained in Iraqi society, disbanding them completely is improbable. To remove them and their influence upon the daily lives of ordinary Iraqis is a goal of the coalition, but a tenable method of achieving this has yet to be found. One suggested method, of incorporating elements of the militias into Iraqi’s Army and Security Forces, would be difficult, given the militias’ sectarian loyalties.

Given the prevalence of the criminal gangs that operate with impunity in Basra, and the protection that militias offer to the Iraqi people from such gangs, the likeliness of removing the militia element is unrealistic.¹⁵¹ For the British Army, tolerating the militias and combating the criminal gangs returns us once again to the subject of asset management. The British Army simple cannot be everywhere at once.¹⁵² Insofar as the Iraqi citizenry are concerned, however, the British Army needs to be.

In retrospect, the decision by the coalition to tolerate the militias has unduly complicated matters for the British Army in Southern Iraq.¹⁵³ Bruce Hoffman argues that such tolerance was a mistake. He believes that the coalition implemented a short term solution that created dangerous, long term conditions.¹⁵⁴ He argues that this was a result of the “…failure to deal effectively with Moqtada Al Sadr…as well as the Badr Corps and their subversion and infiltration of the Iraqi security forces in the south.”¹⁵⁵

The Badr Corps is an armed Shiite militia controlled by the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIR.¹⁵⁶ This organization had its roots in the Iran-Iraq war, received

¹⁵¹ Ibid.
¹⁵² Ibid.
¹⁵⁴ Hoffman, Bruce. E-mail correspondence with the author. 23 March, 2006.
¹⁵⁵ Ibid.
extensive training in Iran, and operated from exile in Iran against Saddam Hussein’s Ba‘ath Party Regime. The Badr Corps is extensively involved in the British area of operations.

Moqtada Al Sadr is the Shia religious leader who established the Mehdi Army militia, in Iraq shortly after the completion of Phase III operations, in April 2004. In 2004, the Mehdi Army twice confronted militarily the coalition forces in Iraq. Through his speeches, he has attracted and radicalized support from many of Iraq’s Shia poor. He has argued that the Mehdi Army was established to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq.

Moqtada al Sadr’s Mehdi Army has considerable political influence in the fledgling Iraqi government, and controls much of Southern Iraq. Judging from the evidence, Moqtada al Sadr’s has extended his militia’s influence to include police chiefs and governors in southern Iraq. Incorporating such militias will most likely prove to be extraordinarily difficult, as the radical clerics such as Sadr pursue their own political agendas.

Further complicating matters are the confrontations that have occurred between Sadr’s militia and the British Army, having occurred after the arrest of any of Sadr’s followers. It is arguable that the militias and sectarian violence, not the insurgency, are on the brink of a

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Balkanization process, with all of the horrific possibilities this entails.\textsuperscript{166} The pervasiveness and the power of the militias were demonstrated in the aftermath of the Shrine attack in Samarra, when militias carried out revenge killings with impunity. This has led to a greater emphasis on the part of the coalition to create an impartial, national Iraqi Police force.\textsuperscript{167}

Despite this effort, and because of the militias, the British Army has demonstrated a wariness regarding the Iraqi Police in Basra. This weariness exists despite the extensive training program currently being administered in Southern Iraq for thousands of police cadets.

Unfortunately, clashes have occurred between the Iraqi Police and the British Army, which the British Army has blamed on militia elements within the Police. When local elections took place in Southern Iraq, the British Army, albeit from a distance, monitored polling places in fear that the Iraqi Police might interfere.

One of the best examples of distrust was demonstrated in early January 2006. The British Army raided a local Police Station in Basra, with the official approval of Iraq’s fledging Interior Ministry, to collect suspected insurgent and militia elements.\textsuperscript{168} Despite the origin of such orders, relations between the Iraqi citizenry and the British Army continue to decline.\textsuperscript{169} Because of the raid, demonstrations against the British Army erupted almost immediately, despite the joint origin of the orders.\textsuperscript{170} The incident demonstrates the animosity some elements of the Iraqi population in Basra hold towards the British Army while at the same time demonstrating the vulnerability of the Iraqi Police to insurgent and sectarian influence.


\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.

Administrative and civic problems are further complicated through the incredible cultural and language divide which exists between the Iraqis and the military forces of the coalition and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{171} When the Coalition Provisional Body (CPB) created the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) in 2004, a replacement for the Ba’ath party regime’s now defunct army, the acronym NIC sounded similar to the word “fuck” in Arabic.\textsuperscript{172} It appears that, with such cultural insensitivity, attitudes towards the coalition and the British Army were bound to harden.

For the British soldiers patrolling the cities of southern Iraq, communication can be next to impossible with the indigenous population as a result of the language barrier. Communication has been, at times, relegated to the most rudimentary methods, such as facial expressions and hand gestures. Lack of an adequate language capability contributes greatly to the inability to acquire intelligence from the local population on criminal and insurgent elements.\textsuperscript{173}

Language ineptness in conjunction with the reluctance of the Iraqi population to provide intelligence, out of fear of reprisals from insurgent or militia elements, greatly hinders the United Kingdom’s counterinsurgency methods in Southern Iraq. As a consequence of this, a concerted effort has been made on the part of the United Kingdom to train Arabic Interpreters.\textsuperscript{174} The British Army has few Arabic linguists, the language spoken by the Shia in Southern Iraq, and to train a linguist in basic Arabic takes over a year.\textsuperscript{175}

The strained relations between the people of Southern Iraq and the British Army continue. In March 2006, British soldiers from the 1st Battalion, The Highlanders, traveling in Warrior armored personnel carriers, were surrounded by an angry Iraqi mob on a routine

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{173}] Baily, Alison. “British Troops on Mission to Learn Arabic”.
\item[\textsuperscript{174}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{175}] Ibid
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
patrol. Tragedy was averted when the British soldiers requested air support from the 12th Bomber Squadron, which had deployed two Royal Air Force Tornado bomber/reconnaissance aircraft on a routine air patrol mission. One of the Tornados performed a low level pass over the Iraqis to disperse them. The British soldiers continued on their mission. This incident underscores the volatility of the region and the hostility that is at times directed at the British Army.

How Were Operational Planning Methods Applied?

In 2003 the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence conducted an immediate review of Operation TELIC. The review concluded that a greater need existed to coordinate Phase III and IV operational planning between civilian and military organizations in future military operations. Operation TELIC highlighted this inadequacy and the prompt need for corrective measures.

PJHQ recognized that an immediate need existed for non-lethal crowd control technologies, improved force protection methods, and additional language skills. These in-theater specific skills were provided prior to the first planned troop rotation in Iraq, in June of 2003, and have continued since. Additionally, greater numbers of civil affairs, engineers, and infantry personnel were rotated into Iraq, thoroughly changing the force structure from Phase III operations.

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177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
As previously mentioned, the land component of Operation TELIC consisted of twenty-six thousand personnel in 2003. With the cessation of Phase III operations in May, 2003, this declined to the size of a division, roughly eighteen thousand personnel. In May 2004, personnel declined to brigade size, at eight thousand six hundred, and in May 2005, this number was reduced by a further one hundred. As of March, 2006, roughly eight thousand British soldiers are deployed in southern Iraq. This number is scheduled to decline further, by ten percent, or eight hundred personnel, to roughly seven thousand in May of 2006. This draw down of personnel reflects the British strategy of replacing British soldiers with Iraqi police and military units as they become properly trained and capable of functioning independently.182

As originally planned, heavier mechanized units equipped with Challenger tanks were rotated out, and lighter units with armored Land Rovers and Warrior armored personnel carriers (APCs) were rotated in. Land Rovers have been utilized to the greatest extent possible, as the Warrior Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle, present a much more aggressive image. The Warriors are generally utilized when the British seek to present an aggressive, more muscular image.183 Tanks remain available, but they are few in number.

As defined by the Ministry of Defence, the current mission of the British Army in southern Iraq is “…to conduct operations against former regime extremists and foreign terrorists, and to organize, train, and equip Iraqi security forces in order to create a security environment that permits the process described in UNSCR (United Nations Security Council Resolution) 1637

to be completed on schedule.” UNSCR 1637 extends the presence of MNF-I, at the request of the newly established Iraqi government, to 31 December, 2006.

In southern Iraq, the strategy of the British Army has been to maintain a low profile, allowing the local Iraqi governments and police units to conduct affairs with as little interference as possible. Operational planning methods emphasized the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. This lead to, at the conclusion of Phase III operations, the British Army’s attempt to present a softer image to the Iraqis by removing body amour and helmets. Helmets were replaced with berets and patrols were conducted by foot. It is possible to trace the origins of such tactics to the British Army’s counterinsurgent operations in Northern Ireland. There, the British Army gained invaluable experience in the execution of urban and counter insurgent operations.

The patrols have worked to establish a physical and visible presence for the Iraqi people and to prevent criminal activity. Patrols are now conducted to deter criminal activity and combat insurgent elements. Other patrol activity has involved the search for and recovery of illegal weapons. When and where possible, patrols have been conducted jointly with Iraqi Police. In 2003, Iraqi police units operated unarmed, with British soldiers. Iraqi police units are now armed and conduct both joint and independent patrols in southern Iraq.

Training of Iraqi police is referred to as Security Sector Reform. The Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq, MNSTC-I, of which the United Kingdom has contributed a

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team of experts, is responsibility for Security Sector Reform across all of Iraq. Providing security reform is currently the top priority of the coalition in Iraq. The Royal Military Police (RMP) have been extensively involved in the regeneration of Iraqi police units in southern Iraq. In addition to the RMP, civilian police officers and private contractors from the United Kingdom are supporting the security transition in Iraq by providing basic advice and training.

In 2003, on the outskirts of the city of Basra, the British Army provided food and water at aid distribution points. A local judicial system was established with advice and assistance from the British Army. Additionally, British engineers have helped and continue to help in the restoration of electrical power and water supplies to the people of southern Iraq.

In addition to training Iraqi police, the United Kingdom has been responsible for training elements of the Iraqi Army. As of March, 2006, the United Kingdom has trained and equipped the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army, with nine Battalions having been formed. These units are then paired with British Army units for instruction, training and mentoring.

The United Kingdom is also providing a lead role in the training and development of the Iraqi Navy. A Naval Assistance and Training team has been created that is designed to “…prepare the Iraqi Navy and Marines to protect their nation’s offshore oil infrastructure…”

The importance of the success of this mission to the future economic vitality of Iraq is critical to its economic revitalization.

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192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
Transition to Reconstruction and Development

As a failed state, the magnitude of rebuilding Iraq is enormous. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), is the lead British governmental body involved in reconstruction efforts in Iraq since 2003. The DFID works in conjunction with the British Army, Iraqi Provincial Governors and Iraqi Provisional Councils to determine reconstruction priorities.

The DFID has outlined its reconstruction principles for Iraq into three categories. They are:

1. Rapid, sustainable and equitable economic growth;
2. Effective and accountable government;

As of December, 2005, the DFID has committed £471 million to Iraq, of which £294 million has been distributed, for all three categories. Fifty nine million pounds have been specifically allocated for reconstruction projects in southern Iraq. Of the amount distributed £70 million has been provided to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI).

In April of 2005, the DFID provided an additional £40 million to the Iraq Infrastructure Service Programme. The majority of the fund will be allocated to projects for providing power, and the remainder to projects for providing water and fuel. The programme funded a water treatment training facility in southern Iraq that was designed and built by Iraqi engineers and construction workers. The programme is primarily designed to ensure the long term flow of potable water to the people of the four southern provinces of Iraq. As a result of this programme,

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five hundred thousand, 500,000, people of the city of Basra, out of a total of 1.5 million, will have access to potable water.\textsuperscript{199}

Private construction firms from the United Kingdom are also involved in the redevelopment of Iraq. AMEC, headquartered in London, is one such firm. In March of 2004, AMEC was awarded contracts from the United States government to participate in the effort to restore power generation, water delivery, and sewage facilities. The contracts awarded to AMEC total $780 million, out of a total of $1.6 billion reserved for reconstruction projects in Iraq by the United States government.\textsuperscript{200}

Schools, facilities of higher education, and technical colleges have also been refurbished by the British Army in southern Iraq. A particular emphasis has been placed on the refurbishment of technical colleges to provide Iraqis with the necessary skills to participate in the reconstruction of their society. Hospitals and health care clinics have also been refurbished. In the reconstruction programs sponsored by the British Army, every attempt is made to utilize local Iraqi contractors and workers.\textsuperscript{201}

The coalition efforts to improve Iraqi society through the construction and refurbishment of schools have been diminished by increasing insurgent and sectarian attacks on schools and children. In March, 2006, a roadside bomb exploded outside of a school in Basra, killing one young student. According to the Iraqi Education Ministry, from the end of October, 2005, to


February, 2006, sixty-four school children and one hundred sixty nine teachers have been killed. It appears that the attacks are either a result of insurgent elements seeking to disrupt daily activities or sectarian elements seeking to foment further religious strife.\textsuperscript{202}

The most significant and visible reconstruction projects, however, are being built by and financed through the United States. Not since the Marshall Plan has the United States embarked upon such an ambitious international aid program.\textsuperscript{203} Arguably, in the United Kingdom’s area of operations alone, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Bechtel Corporation, are, for all intents and purposes, in charge of reconstruction. The Bechtel Corporation, a construction, engineering, and project management company has been funded with millions of dollars to build or rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure.\textsuperscript{204} The Bechtel Corporation has dredged and rebuilt Iraq’s sole deep water port, Umm Qasr, in the British sector.\textsuperscript{205}

In Basra, the Bechtel Corporation in cooperation with Iraqi Republic Railways (IRR) has constructed a new European Standard rail line for improved freight service stemming from the port of Umm Qasr to the rest of Iraq.\textsuperscript{206} The Bechtel Corporation also repaired the entire Sweet Water Canal system, which now provides water to the two million residents of the Basra region. Bechtel Corporation also refurbished the entire sewage collection system of the city of Basra.\textsuperscript{207}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{204} Bechtel Corporation. Available from http://www.bechtel.com/overview.htm
\end{thebibliography}
Additionally, the international airport in Basra has been repaired by the Bechtel Corporation, enabling regional and international flights to resume to southern Iraq.208

**Electricity**

Projects that generate electricity, export oil, and provide potable water are measurements of success.209 When these projects are delayed, or subject to interruption by sabotage, as Iraq’s main oil and revenue generating pipeline has been, Iraq’s future economic recovery is threatened.210

In addition to sabotage, the United Kingdom must contend with plant failures that are a result of engineering, general technical failures, or human error.211 Further complicating matters is the deliberate targeting of Iraqis who have technical expertise; specifically those with engineering or medical skills.212 Arguably, the reconstruction effort has become a center of gravity, and for the coalition, success is a race against time.

The insurgency has recognized the importance of restoring Iraq’s electrical grid, and it has become a primary target for sabotage.213 Ominously, electrical production has not returned to the level provided under Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime, which averaged four-thousand megawatts.214 This will be the yardstick by which the Iraqi citizenry will measure progress.215

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retrospect, insight into the difficulty and the amount of effort such relief would entail was sorely lacking.

Interestingly, demand for electricity has surged since the fall of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime. This has occurred because of the increased availability and purchase of electrical appliances. The increased use of electrical appliances may at first appear mundane, but it is a rather serious matter, given the almost daily interruptions of the electrical supply by insurgent attacks. These electric power failures subsequently impact the lives of ordinary Iraqis. This is arguably, an unfortunate and additional indication of the lack of preparation for Phase IV operations, in terms of both economics and infrastructure, for the coalition and the United Kingdom.

The machinations of bureaucratic machinery are additional hindrances to restoring Iraq’s electrical grid. This grid is controlled by Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity, with the assistance of the coalition and foreign companies. Despite, or perhaps because of, the infusion of billions of dollars, the Ministry itself is prone to corruption, impeding its ability to function properly. An additional and severe problem is the diminishing skill set of the Ministry’s labor force.

The ability for Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity to function properly and without corruption is arguably the most important element for success in Iraq. This results from the perception that the Iraqi citizenry considers the restoration of electricity the first step in restoring a semblance of

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215 Kamp, Nina, et al.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
normalcy to Iraq.\textsuperscript{221} The reality, however, is that Iraq will not now, or in the near future, meet twenty-first century standards for power.\textsuperscript{222}

Glenn Zorpette traveled to Iraq for IEEE’s journal, \textit{Spectrum}, to investigate the state of Iraq’s numerous reconstruction projects. According to Mr. Zorpette, given Iraq’s “…demand [for electricity] growing at 23 percent a year, the goal of meeting all of it plus a healthy reserve margin (traditionally 18 percent in developed countries) would be rather difficult even in a developed country let alone in a place like Iraq.”\textsuperscript{223} The possibility exists that, given the insurgency and the initial record of Iraq’s Electrical Ministry, establishing four thousand megawatt hours will remain unlikely if not entirely impossible in the foreseeable future. (See Appendix G.)

Arguably, improvement of Iraq’s oil infrastructure is the most important element for the reconstruction of Iraq. The United States government estimates that prior to the invasion of Iraq, 2.0 million barrels of oil per day were produced, but since the invasion, that number has changed little. In 2006, Iraq produces only 2.08 million barrels of oil per day. The dilapidated state of Iraq’s oil infrastructure, attacks directed against it by insurgents, and the increases in demand have contributed to the lackluster production rates.\textsuperscript{224} (See Appendix G.) Judging from the evidence, the assumption that Iraq’s oil revenues would offset the cost of occupation for the coalition by producing 3 million barrels of oil per day was overly optimistic.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{221} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{222} Zorpette, Glenn. E-mail correspondence with author. 20 March, 2006.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
Communications

Communication capabilities have also been targeted by criminal and insurgent elements as landlines and fiber-optic cables are continuously cut.\textsuperscript{226} Such action has forced the Iraqis to rely almost entirely upon mobile communications.\textsuperscript{227} The carriers in Iraq are limited resulting in the fragmentation of the nascent mobile communications industry.\textsuperscript{228} Nonetheless, mobile communications have been a success, with millions of users.\textsuperscript{229}

Unfortunately, mobile communications devices can also be utilized as detonation devices for bombs and artillery shells, referred to by the coalition as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).\textsuperscript{230} Tracking criminal and insurgent use of mobile phones for communication and as detonation devices is extremely problematic given the innumerable buyers and sellers in Iraq’s fragmented mobile phone industry.\textsuperscript{231} Mobile communications are readily available to the Iraqi people, readily used, and service is rarely interrupted by insurgent activity.\textsuperscript{232} Countermeasures available to the British Army, however, are extremely limited and the soldiers remain vulnerable.

In addition to the incredible increase in the use of mobile communications, wireless internet and television broadcasting services have become available in Iraq to thousands of Iraqis.\textsuperscript{233} In comparison, during the Ba’athist Regime, only four thousand individuals had strictly limited access to the internet, in a society that already limited available television programs.\textsuperscript{234} Now, roughly one-hundred and fifty-thousand individuals have access to the use of the

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{231} Zorpette, Glenn.
internet. The internet has become increasingly popular with a younger generation of Iraqis, who often frequent internet cafes in Iraq and exchange messages. Unfortunately, the internet, akin to mobile communications, is also utilized by insurgent elements, providing these elements with a forum to exchange military tactics and propaganda.

**The British Army's Relations with the Indigenous Population**

Allegations have been made against soldiers of the British Army for operating in a heavy handed manner towards the people of southern Iraq. The veracity of such accounts notwithstanding, this provides material for insurgent elements to exploit. This is occurring at a time when the United Kingdom must do everything reasonable to establish a cooperative environment with local citizens and governing officials; that is, to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis, and to counter insurgent elements.

It is possible that such reports will damage the United Kingdom's international standing and further contribute towards the already prevalent international hostility against the United Kingdom's presence in Southern Iraq. Given the ever present international hostility to the

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237 Ibid.
invasion of Iraq, the allegations are quite damaging.\textsuperscript{241} This has developed into a public relations nightmare for the United Kingdom.

Evidence suggests that the prospect of countering the negative image will be extremely difficult. The insurgents excel at information operations.\textsuperscript{242} Their methods, although rudimentary, are effective, involving the use of banners, posters and even graffiti.\textsuperscript{243} Such acts of vandalism have been encouraged through the sermons of radicalized Islamic Clerics.\textsuperscript{244} Arguably, given the inherent superiority of the United Kingdom’s communication and media capabilities, the inability of the United Kingdom to counter negative insurgent and media portrayals is abysmal, resulting in a virtual tactical and strategic defeat. The evidence indicates that the psychological war is being lost.\textsuperscript{245}

Iraq politicians have complained repeatedly of the alleged heavy handed nature of the United Kingdom’s military personnel in Southern Iraq.\textsuperscript{246} Political leaders in Southern Iraq have threatened to suspend activities with the United Kingdom, and on occasion have carried through with that threat.\textsuperscript{247} When relations are strained or temporarily terminated, influence and


\textsuperscript{243} Rosen, Nir. “Once the Americans Leave, Sunnis will have no Common Cause with Foreign Mujahideen.” \textit{Boston Review}. 11 January, 2006.


intelligence are lost. These are vital components to counter the insurgency. Establishing political relationships takes time, and their loss may prove to be irreversibly damaging.

A further complication are the accusations that the Iraqi Police have also utilized heavy handed methods in the interrogation and jailing of individuals suspected of being criminals or insurgents. The challenge for the Iraqi Police is to transition from a law enforcement agency of brutality under the Ba’ath Party into an organization that respects the rule of law. Changing from a force of brutality to a force that defers to the authority of duly appointed Iraqi Judges will take time. This perhaps, is the greatest challenge for the Iraqi police: that they are perceived to be legitimate and committed to impartiality by the Iraqi people.

The relationship between Iraqi citizens, the Iraqi police, and local authorities clearly demonstrated further signs of strain in 2005, again in Southern Iraq’s central city of Basra. This occurred when members of the United Kingdom’s elite Special Air Service (SAS), working undercover, were arrested and allegedly handed over by an Iraqi police unit to members of a local militia. The British Army launched a raid to free the SAS members.

Negotiations were not entered into with either local authorities or police. The British Army acted alone, without consultation. The incident highlights the lack of trust that exists in Southern Iraq between the British and the Iraqis and further demonstrates the volatility of the

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251 Ibid.
region. As the central city of administration and operation for the United Kingdom, such events are unfortunate and a pronounced set-back for reestablishing the rule of law and order.

Southern Iraq is dominated by Shiite militias, with known connections to, and support from, Iran.\textsuperscript{255} Many of these militias have succeeded in imposing upon the citizens of Basra a strict interpretation of Islam, known as Islamic Sharia law.\textsuperscript{256} Under this interpretation of Islam, the individual behavior of men and women are greatly restricted, more so that of women.\textsuperscript{257} Militia members have attacked female students attending the University of Basra for not abiding with Islamic Sharia laws, allegedly in full view of British troops and Iraqi Police.\textsuperscript{258}

Additionally, insurgent and militia elements have reportedly infiltrated Iraqi Police forces throughout the country.\textsuperscript{259} For the British to be successful in creating a secure environment and establishing a trustful relationship with the Iraqi people, the insurgent and militia elements must be removed from the Iraqi Police. The difficulty in preventing the infiltration of the Iraqi Police demonstrates the continuing difficulty of installing the type of political structure that the United Kingdom desires to implement in Southern Iraq, and the reality of the type of political structure which is capable of being implemented. Currently, the goal of achieving an impartial Iraqi Police force, given the insurgent infiltration and sectarian violence, is unobtainable.

Establishing a trustful relationship between the citizenry and the Iraqi Police will be difficult, as the Iraqi Police in Basra under the Ba’athist regime had little authority and were

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid.
utterly corrupt. Initial equipment shortages plagued the local Police in Basra, but such logistical conditions have since improved. Efforts have been made in training the Iraqi Police in Western methods, emphasizing human rights and police ethics.

This is important for the British Army, as it has argued that its primary objective is to return political and police authority and responsibility over to the Iraqis. At Basra University, a group of male and female students eating together were beaten and dispersed by militia members, who believed that such behavior violated Sharia Law, while Iraqi police merely watched. The incident demonstrates the extent in which the militias have come to dominate Southern Iraq, and the difficulty that the British Army has had in training Iraqi police.

Additionally, such incidents demonstrate the powerlessness of the British Army to prevent all militia activities, which are clearly counter-productive to the establishment of democratic practices and eerily reminiscent of the United Kingdom’s past experience in Iraq.

In the supposed effort not to micro-manage all activities of the Iraqi authorities, ordinary Iraqis are again left without security and forced to live in a climate of fear. This is clearly demonstrated through the activities of an organization in the Basra Police force known as the Jameat, who reportedly defer to the decisions of the militia leaders within the region. The Jameat, in charge of counter-terrorism and internal affairs, has been rumored to have committed murder and torture.

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262 Adams, Paul.


264 Ibid.


Chapter IV

Did Adjustments to Phase IV Methods Produce Success?

In comparison to the rest of Iraq in 2003, southern Iraq was relatively quiet. Professor Ahmed S. Hashim explains: “The insurgency is primarily in Anbar Province, in western Iraq, but also along the fault lines wherever the major ethno-sectarian groups rub up against one another.”267 Because much of the sectarian divide is beyond the British operational area, this could explain the relative success of the British Army’s counter-insurgent methods. A more nuanced picture, however, has developed since that time.

An increase in insurgent activity has occurred in southern Iraq. Insurgent elements have increasingly targeted British soldiers. The ability of the British Army to counter such threats and to control or monitor its area of responsibility effectively is limited.268

An assessment of Phase IV planning based upon the British Army’s six counter insurgent principles suggests that adjustments have had mixed results. The first principle of establishing political primacy has not been fully accomplished by either the coalition or the British Army. The relationship of the British Army with local government officials and police has, at times, been uncooperative. Debate has ensued over the allocation of resources given or promised, and the manner in which the British soldiers have conducted themselves on patrol.

In the city of Basra, the Governor and the Provincial Council terminated relations with the British Army in November, 2005. Foreign Office Minister Kim Howells, from the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, met with the Governor and Provincial Council in

December, 2006 to reestablish communication. Arguably, a visit from a high ranking Foreign Officer Minister, after three years since the initiation of Operation TELIC, should not be necessary. It is conceivable that her visit is an indication that the relationship between local governing authorities and the British Army remains strained and tenuous.

The British Army has failed to prevent a general atmosphere of lawlessness in southern Iraq. Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru, writing for The Washington Post, report that Basra, “...has witnessed dozens of assassinations, claiming members of the former ruling Ba’ath Party, Sunni political leaders and officials of competing Shiite parties. Many [assassinations] have been carried out by uniformed men in police vehicles....” According to the same report, an Iraqi official claimed that 90% of police officers in Basra were loyal to various religious parties, and that militia elements had penetrated the police. If the measure of success of the British Army in southern Iraq were to be based solely on the restoration of law and order, it is arguable that British methods are failing. Abductions, assassinations, and a slight increase in car bombings have occurred since the end of Phase III operations in 2003. In addition to such abominations, other types of criminal activity have not been fully curbed. The prolific smuggling goods, camels, cars, cigarettes, computers, cows, and guns, still occurs through southern Iraq.

The second principle, the coordination of government machinery, has not been accomplished. As addressed in Chapter II, Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity provides the most glaring example of the corruption and ineptness that plagues Iraq. Electricity in the city of Basra has finally, in March 2006, reached levels that existed prior to Operation TELIC. Additionally, the inability to accredit and bring the port of Umm Qasr in southern Iraq up to full capacity is a

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271 Ibid.
272 Ibid.
tremendous financial burden for Iraq. The final example is the inability of the Iraqi parliament to form a national unity government by incorporating all ethnic and sectarian factions within Iraq.

If the measure of success were based on the ability of the Iraqi government to manage and maintain reconstruction projects with the help of the British Army, British methods are producing mixed results. Despite the infusion of millions of dollars and massive reconstruction efforts, many of the completed projects cannot be operated without direct British involvement, whether from the British Army or private contractors. In some sectors of Basra sewage still openly flows into the streets, and a garbage collection system has yet to be created. It is likely that when such basic and civic services are not provided, the soldiers of the British Army could be held responsible by the Iraqi people, resulting in the further deterioration of relations.

Reconstruction projects are highly visible and have become targets of opportunity to criminal and insurgent elements throughout Iraq. The failure to create a secure operational environment has delayed the reconstruction effort throughout Iraq. In the effort to provide security, billions of dollars have been diverted from reconstruction projects to the equipment and training of Iraq Police. It now appears that much of the coalition’s Phase IV planning assumed that Iraqi security forces could be reconstituted quickly and that the policing of Iraq by an Iraqi force would begin almost immediately. Therefore, planners assumed that the military forces of the coalition would be withdrawn within a matter of months, not years.

Additionally, the coalition had not prepared for the administrative and maintenance costs of managing reconstruction projects before, during and after their reconstruction. Finally, the coalition and the United Kingdom have failed to prevent indigenous and foreign corruption

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276 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
in the implementation and progress of reconstruction projects, further exacerbating reconstruction efforts. The possibility exists that every project is vulnerable to corruption, damage or destruction by criminal or insurgent activity, and mismanagement. If this does not change, the evidence indicates that Iraq’s future economic potential, to include attraction from foreign investment, will be severely jeopardized.

The third principle, intelligence and information, continues to be a problem. A language barrier still exists. Allegations of British soldiers abusing Iraqi detainees inhibit the ability of the British Army to gather intelligence from ordinary Iraqis. Ordinary Iraqis remain distrustful of their local governing officials but also of the perceived willingness of the British Army to provide security and revitalize southern Iraq’s economy.

The third principle segues into the fourth principle, the requirement to separate the insurgent from his support, and the fifth principle, the neutralization of the insurgent. As of March, 2006, the British Army has been unable to fully accomplish either task. Insurgent elements still operate and move about freely in Iraqi society. Consequently, identifying, let alone neutralizing the insurgent, has been extremely difficult for the British Army.

Although the United States has made an effort to change, competing arguments suggest that its counterinsurgent methods, in its area of operations, are far too aggressive in comparison to the softer approach taken by the British in Basra, and possibly still overly rely upon technological solutions. A policy brief written in 2004 by The Foreign Policy Centre, argued that

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there was “...a greater sense of calm and cooperation between the local population and the army in areas controlled by the British.” The evidence suggests, given that the British Army has felt compelled to return to the use of body armour and armoured vehicles while on patrol, this relatively benign environment has changed considerably. This could possibly be evidence that the British Army’s less aggressive approach is not the definitive answer.

The sixth principle, longer term post-insurgency planning, appears to rely mostly on the success of reconstruction projects and the ability of the Iraqi parliament to create a national unity government. In this instance, it is conceivable that the possibility of contributing to success is beyond the capabilities of the British Army to influence. The possibility is real, despite the fact that the United Kingdom is the second largest contributor of military personnel to the coalition invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. The United Kingdom’s impact on coalition strategy is, arguably, negligible.

The evidence suggests that the United Kingdom simply cannot match the United States in terms of resources. It is conceivable that a lack of funds equals to a lack of political and military influence upon the coalition. This is a dubious historical moment for the United Kingdom, as it has been relegated to a secondary role in a counterinsurgent effort for the first time in its history.

The United States has undertaken the majority of the cost of the ongoing struggle against the insurgency, as well as the costs of security, and the costs of reconstruction. Total expenditures for the United States may soon surpass one trillion dollars and possibly total an

285 Finer, Jonathan;
incredible two trillion dollars. In comparison, the United Kingdom in 2003 allocated three billion pounds for its military operations in Iraq. Matching the contribution of the United States is a feat beyond the financial resources of the Untied Kingdom.

Sustaining Operation TELIC is a growing concern for political and military leaders of the United Kingdom. British public morale is waning, as British casualties have surpassed the one-hundred mark, and as Operation TELIC has extended into its third year. British opposition to the war has also intensified, with a growing number of citizens and even soldiers of the United Kingdom demanding an immediate end to Operation TELIC.

In addition to an increase in political opposition to Operation TELIC, the United Kingdom is beginning to experience recruitment and retention issues, missing target recruitment numbers for 2008. The United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence, John Reid, has asked Britons for unity on Iraq. Such increased political opposition to Operation TELIC is arguably, a worrisome trend for the British Army in terms of morale and recruitment. Any army involved in counterinsurgent operations requires a force that is disciplined, experienced and well trained. The United Kingdom is currently fielding such a force, but, in military parlance, the operational tempo, or the number of deployments, has increased dramatically, a direct result of Operation TELIC. As a consequence, more is being asked of the current members of the British Army.

In retrospect, Operation TELIC demonstrated an acute communication and planning failure. The possibility exists that the Headquarters Staff of the British Army has become too large and cumbersome. For soldiers of the British Army, orders sent to them from Headquarters

\[\text{References:}\]

288 Ibid.
had become too complex and lengthy. This increased the time needed by British soldiers to read and act upon orders, directly contributed to inaction when the looting began. The evidence suggests that these tactical errors contributed directly to the strategic difficulty of creating a smooth transition into Phase IV operations.

For the British Army, perhaps the most burdensome and dangerous precedent experienced was the tendency of Headquarters to become extensively involved in the conduct of its soldiers during operations. This appears to have contributed to the confusion British soldiers experienced regarding whether to intervene or not when looting began during the transition from Phase III operations to Phase IV. This interference could impede the ability of British soldiers to improvise and create flexible responses in the conduct of counterinsurgent operations.

It is arguable that one of the greatest operational flaws committed by the United Kingdom was a lack of coordination of effort among the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International Development, and the Foreign Office. Each organization prepared for their specific mission, without, it appears, an adequate and in-depth liaison with the other ministries, and most importantly, with the coalition, particularly the United States. It now is clear that greater coordination needs to exist within indigenous organizations and also among allies.

It is now apparent that a greater emphasis must be placed upon the ability to conduct operations in an urban environment. This is primarily a result of the increase of the human population in general and its congregation in major urban environments. Urban environments

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294 Ibid., 1.
295 Ibid., 11.
297 Ibid.
are centers of civil society, finance and government. Criminal activity, economic activities and transportation hubs are also centered in urban environments. The British Army’s experience in Basra, with its inherent importance to the overall wellbeing of Iraq, clearly demonstrates the importance of military operations in urban terrain, MOUT.

The criminals and insurgents in Iraq have recognized that their activities are camouflaged in an urban environment, where they are able to operate a flexible information network and infiltrate and intimidate the Iraq Police and military forces.299 Cities offer places to hide, operate and recruit from the urban population.300 Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, armies that cannot hope to match the firepower and maneuverability of armies such as the United Kingdom’s, will seek to negate their enemy’s overwhelming firepower by not fighting in open terrain.301

The need to provide humanitarian assistance during counterinsurgent and Phase IV operations complicated matters for the coalition in Iraq. Major Mark Bailey, Royal Army Medical Corps, believes that “The equipment we had during Op [Operation] TELIC was not geared towards treating civilian cases-especially children who presented us with significant problems.”302 Although Major Bailey was primarily involved in Phase III operations, his experience can be considered as example that priority was given to Phase III operations over Phase IV. Major Bailey explained that “We [United Kingdom] are probably not as good at providing humanitarian assistance as we think….”303 Given the importance of providing medical care to the civilian population during Phase III and IV operations, it is possible that Major Bailey’s experience demonstrates that the medical corps was not as extensively involved as

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300 Ibid
302 Bailey, Mark. E-mail communication with author. 13 March, 2006.
303 Ibid.
it should have been in the planning for Phase III and IV operations.

The center of gravity in a counterinsurgency is the population. (See map, Appendix A.) Given Iraq’s history of foreign domination, the possibility exists that the Iraqi population will never fully trust the coalition. Judging from the evidence produced from a poll of Iraqi attitudes conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitude (PIPA), in January 2006, trust will be difficult to create. According to the poll, 47% of Iraqis overall approve of attacks on coalition forces. Trust will perhaps only become complete if and when the coalition establishes a firm withdrawal date. The conundrum for the Iraqis is that now, more than ever, an impartial force such as the coalition is needed to separate warring sectarian factions.

Iraq cannot be defined as a classic insurgency. The insurgents in Iraq do not have a unified goal for a political end state, and are fighting to prevent the establishment of a pluralistic democracy. Additionally, in Iraq, unlike Malaysia and other counter insurgent experiences of the United Kingdom, the British Army’s operational goals are not limited.

A recent report completed by the United States government categorizes the economic, political, and security situation as serious. (See Appendix H) Evidence produced by this report indicates that in the British Army’s area of operations, albeit more secure than the rest of Iraq, are not secure enough. The challenge for the coalition is convincing the Iraqi people that a

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pluralistic democracy is in their best interest and that the alternative the insurgency offers, sectarian violence that has created the foundation for a communal civil war, is clearly not. Until this is accomplished violence in Iraq will continue to send the country into chaos and self-destruction.

Jack Straw, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary, has admitted that misjudgments were made during Phase IV operations. Mr. Straw acknowledged that the post-war situation had been more difficult than what the government of the United Kingdom prepared for. When asked if the United Kingdom’s military personnel would remain in Iraq for another three years, Mr. Straw replied that British military personnel would not. Arguably, the turning point for the United Kingdom and the end of Operation TELIC has already arrived.

Conclusion

This paper was concerned with the United Kingdom’s planning for and execution of Phase IV Stability Operations in southern Iraq. The three questions of the paper were:

1) What was the British Army’s operational plan for Phase IV Stability Operations?
2) How were operational planning methods applied?
3) Did adjustments to Phase IV planning methods produce success?

This paper concludes that a plan for Phase IV operations did exist but was based on flawed assumptions and critical constraints, resulting from ignored or inadequate intelligence, and the hope for best case scenarios. This resulted in erroneous application methods and continuous adjustments that have produced mixed results.

310 Maddox, Bronwen. “The War was Right, but We Made Mistakes Afterwards.” The Times. 17 March, 2006.
311 Ibid.
Much of the direction of the planning for Phase IV operations was led by the United States. These failures can be directly attributed to the political leadership of the United States. This effectively led to the relegation of the United Kingdom to a secondary role, thereby negating its ability to influence operational planning. This occurred despite well-documented internalized criticism that existed within the United Kingdom regarding the planning of Phase IV Stability Operations prior to the invasion of Iraq. Despite this, Operation TELIC proceeded apace.

My conclusions have implications for the future conduct of British Army operations that involve coalition forces. Primarily among these is the need for better intelligence and intelligence sharing. Operation TELIC demonstrated the danger of the failure to share intelligence in addition to the compartmentalization of intelligence internally within the United Kingdom and externally with the United States. Consequently, Operation TELIC has demonstrated the difficulty in conducting joint operations with coalition partners. This has led to the realization that there is a greater need for training in joint operations between and among potential coalition partners that move beyond Phase III planning.

The intelligence and the military planners of the United Kingdom need to create an ability to effectively influence their political masters. Consequently, planners must return to a ‘back to basics’ approach for the planning of future military operations. Finally, Operation TELIC has demonstrated the status of the United Kingdom as a junior partner and the need for its future operations to be conducted independently when possible.
Appendix A

Iraqi Population by Density and Province


*Please note the density of the population to the east.

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Appendix B

Map of Iraqi Casualties as of April 2006

British Broadcasting Corporation, BBC, April 2006.

*Please note the number of civilian deaths in Basra, currently the third highest.

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Appendix C

Map Detailing Southern Border Area of Iraq

United Kingdom Ministry of Defence

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IRAQ/KUWAIT BORDER AREA

[Map of the border area between Iraq and Kuwait with place names and border markers.]
Appendix D

Map of Basra Region, Southern Iraq
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
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Appendix E

United Kingdom National Decision Making Chain for Expeditionary Warfare (MOD)
Adapted from United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Organizational Flow Chart, MOD

Defence and Overseas Policy Committee
(Chaired by the Prime Minister)

\[ \begin{align*}
& \overset{\text{Minister of Defence}}{\downarrow} \\
& (\text{MOD}) \\
& \downarrow \\
& \text{Chief of the Defence Staff} \\
& (\text{CDS}) \\
& \downarrow \\
& \text{Director of Operations} \\
& (\text{D Ops}) \\
& \downarrow \\
& \text{Permanent Joint Headquarters} \\
& (\text{PJHQ}) \\
& \overset{\text{Allied Operational HQS}}{\downarrow} \\
& \overset{\text{UK Commands}}{\downarrow} \\
& \overset{\text{Joint Task Force Headquarters}}{\downarrow} (\text{JTFHQ})
\end{align*} \]
Appendix F

Map of Iraq's Marsh Land

Appendix G

Iraq’s Electricity and Oil Production
2004-to present\textsuperscript{316}
Adapted from The New York Times

\textbf{Falling Short}

Electricity and oil production have been well below goals, despite the large amounts of money allocated for projects.

\textbf{ELECTRICITY} Demand is far higher than supply; Baghdad is still without electricity for 15 hours per day.

Megawatt hours per day
\textit{In thousands}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{electricity_graph.png}
\caption{Electricity demand and production graph.}
\end{figure}

\textbf{OIL} Iraq has failed to reach its production goal since the end of 2004.

Barrels per day
\textit{In millions}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{oil_graph.png}
\caption{Oil production graph.}
\end{figure}

Appendix H

Economic, Political and Stability Graphic of Iraq

Adapted from The New York Times

*Please note the southern provinces.

A Provincial Report Card

Based on a recent assessment by American diplomatic and military officials in Baghdad.

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Appendix I

Research Paper Proposal

OPERATION TELIC: DID THE UNITED KINGDOM ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR PHASE IV STABILITY OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ?

1. Statement of Purpose: This research paper seeks to answer four questions regarding the United Kingdom’s experience in southern Iraq, Operation TELIC. The questions are:
   I What was the British Model? or What was the British Army’s Operational Planning for Phase IV Operations?
   II How was that Model Applied? or How were Operational Planning methods applied?
   III How well did the model work? or Did Operational Planning methods produce success?
   IV What adjustments have been made? or What adjustments have been made to Operational Plans?

The primary purpose of the paper is to determine whether the United Kingdom adequately prepared for Phase IV Stability Operations in southern Iraq. The three questions of the paper can easily be summarized at: did a plan exist; how were planning methods applied; and were adjustments successful. Measurements of success or failure will examine the increase or decrease of insurgent attacks, the completion or initiation of reconstruction projects, and indigenous relations. The success or failure of operations in southern Iraq will also be measured against the British Army’s counterinsurgent principles.

2. Research Methods: To the greatest extent possible, sources from the United Kingdom will be utilized. Official documents from the United Kingdom’s Parliament and the Ministry of Defence appear to be promising. The Guardian, The New York Times, and The Independent have provided extensive coverage of Operation TELIC and these sources will be utilized when appropriate. Historical works examining the British Army’s counterinsurgent principles will also be utilized. John A. Nagl’s book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgent lessons from Malaya and Vietnam has proven to be excellent starting point and reference.

3. Outline: Operation TELIC

Question One: The British Model Going in? That is: What was the model for their occupation of Iraq? That is: What was the British Occupational Plan?

1) Introduction
   1. Historical Background
   2. Purpose of Paper
   3. British Methods of Counterinsurgent Warfare

2) Chapter I
   1. British Army Counterinsurgent Practice
2. Phase IV planning, Post-war planning
3. What did UK Army planning emphasize?
4. Were Assumptions made?
5. Was there a plan for Security
6. Insufficient number of troops?
7. Was there a failure to establish law and order?
8. Describe the current security environment
9. Iraq Government Institutions
10. What were the expectations?
11. Iran: Was Iranian influence expected?
12. **Important Question:**
    What are Iranian motivations for their involvement in Southern Iraq?

**Question Two:** How was the model applied? If no model existed, what model did the British devise? That is: What did the British do when their post-war assumptions proved invalid?

3) **Chapter II**
   1. Operation TELIC: Description
   2. Describe Administrative plans
   3. Demographics
   4. Sectarian Divisions
      a. Was this expected?
      b. How has this impacted the United Kingdom’s Area of Operations?
   5. Iran
      a. Was Iranian influence expected?
      b. What are Iranian motivations for involvement in southern Iraq?
   6. The City of Basra

**Question Three:** How well did it work?

4) **Chapter III**
   1) Phase IV in Practice
   2) Looting
   3) Militias
   4) How Were Operational Methods Applied?
   5) Transition to Reconstruction and Development
   6) Electricity
   7) Communications
   8) The British Army’s Relations with the Indigenous Population

**Question Four:** What adjustments have they made?:

5) **Chapter IV**
   1) Did Adjustments to Phase IV Methods Produce Success?
   2) Conclusion
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