Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War:

The Critical Problems and Failures the US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Eventually Do the Job

Anthony Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

With the Assistance of:

Brian Burton
Iskandar Jahja

George Sullivan
William D. Sullivan

Revised, November 28, 2006
Executive Summary

Iraq is already in a state of at least limited civil war, and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a broader sectarian and ethnic conflict.

The current combination of insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure, leading to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. It could escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads of all three major ethnic and religious groups.

If Iraq is to avoid split-up and full-blown civil war, it must do far more than create effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). No such effort can succeed without an integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.

Anticipate, Learn and Change versus Persist, React and Be Defeated

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the US has never implemented a realistic, self-critical, or forward-looking approach to any aspect of its policy in Iraq. It is unclear that it could have succeeded under the best of circumstances, and one of its most critical failures has been to consistently deny the fact it was pursuing a high effort in nation building and stability operations that could easily fail.

In practice, however, the US has neither anticipated the problems it must solve or rapidly learned and adapted to the emerging realities in Iraq. Its national security leadership has become a self-inflicted wound, and the US has lurched from delayed response to response, always reacting too slowly, with two few resources and changes, and in a state of quasi-denial.

The strategy to stabilize Iraq that the US announced in the fall of 2005 was deeply flawed in timing and resources. It was based on a grossly exaggerated estimate of political success, an almost deliberately false exaggeration of the success of the economic aid effort and progress in developing the ISF, inadequate efforts to develop effective governance, and a rule of law, and has not succeeded.

The US plan that began to be implemented in the spring of 2006 to concentrate security efforts on Baghdad, to build up Iraqi security forces, and to “clear, hold and build” has not led to a decrease in violence. Insurgents and militias were able to step up attacks during Ramadan, and the number of attacks and of casualties in Baghdad rose.

The Need for Comprehensive Action and Strategy

No strategy that hinges large on the successful development of the ISF can possibly succeed. Iraq must establish both effective governance and a rule of law; not simply
deploy effective military, security, and police forces. Legitimacy does not consist of determining how governments are chosen, but in how well they serve the day-to-day needs of their peoples. Security cannot come through force alone. It must have the checks and balances that can only come when governments and courts are active in the field.

Over time, Iraq must also address its economic and demographic challenges. A nation cannot convert from a corrupt, state-controlled “command kleptocracy” in mid-war. It cannot survive unless it makes such a conversion over time and puts an end to a hopelessly skewed and unfair distribution of income, ends full and partial unemployment levels of 30-60%, and becomes competitive on a regional and global level.

The present reality is that progress in Iraq is slow or faltering in each of the areas necessary to make Iraqi force development successful:

- **Political conciliation:** Iraq’s leaders still seek national unity and compromise, but talk has not been followed by substance. Prime Minister Maliki’s conciliation plan has not taken hold, and the new government has not shown it can implement such plans or bring Arab Sunnis back into an effective political structure. While Muqtada Sadr appears more open to compromise with other factions now, he appears to be losing control over the more radical parts of the Mahdi Army, which may render his more conciliatory position less meaningful.

- **Governance:** The national government cannot even spend its budget; much less demonstrate that it now has an effective ministerial structure or the ability to actually govern in many areas. Actual governance continues to default to local authorities and factions.

- **Legal system and rule of law:** There is no real consensus on what legal system to use, courts do not exist in many areas and are corrupt and ineffective in many others. Legal authority, like governance, is devolving down to the local level.

- **Politics:** The election in late 2005 effectively divided Iraqis by sect and ethnic group, with only a small minority voting for truly national parties. No clear national party structure has emerged since that time. The Shi’ite parties increasingly demonstrate the rivalry between the three main Shi’ite parties. The Kurds are unified but tensions exist over “independence,” dealing with the PKK, and past tensions between the PUK and KDP. Sunnis are just beginning to acquire a true political identity and the two main Sunni parties are divided and divisive.

- **The Role of the Constitution:** The creation of a new constitution has done nothing to establish consensus and much to divide the nation. It leaves more than 50 areas to be clarified, all of which involve potentially divisive debates between sectarian and ethnic groups, and most of which could lead to added tensions over the role of religion in the state.

- **Economic Development:** Increases in macroeconomic figures like the total GDP disguise massive problems with corruption, the distribution of income, and employment, particularly in troubled Sunni areas and the poorer parts of Iraq’s major towns and cities. Young men are often forced to choose between the ISF, insurgency, and militias for purely economic reasons. The real-world economy of Sunni areas continues to deteriorate, and investment in even secure Shi’ite areas is limited by the fear of crime and insurgency. Only the Kurdish area is making real progress towards development.

- **Aid:** Iraq has largely spent the flood of US and other aid provided after the fall of Saddam as well as its oil food money. Large portions of this aid have been spent on corruption, outside contractors and imports, security, and projects with poor planning and execution, which now are unsustainable. Iraq will, however, desperately need major future aid to construct and develop if it can achieve political conciliation and security. The US committed $20.6 billion of $20.9 billion in aid funds as of September 20, 2006. It had obligated $20.1 billion, and spent $15.8 billion.

- **Energy and Oil:** Iraq continued to produce less than 2.5 million barrels of oil per day (2.3 MMBD in September), and exported well under 2 million barrels a day. It was dependent on imported fuel and gasoline for more than 50% of its total needs. No major rehabilitation of Iraq’s oil fields and
facilities has taken place. Waterflooding and heavy oil injection continued to be major problems, and the ability to recover oil from producing fields average less than two-thirds of the world average.

Many Iraqis still have hope for the future in spite of these problems, and still have a strong sense of national identity. The pressures that divide Iraqis, however, do continue to increase.

The Pace of Iraqi Force Development and the Drift Towards Civil War

Developments in Iraq are moving fast, and it is difficult to assess the lasting relevance of very recent events. It remains to be seen whether the announced reshuffle of Prime Minister Maliki’s cabinet will be the start of a development of more inclusive and more effective Iraqi politics, or merely show that the Prime Minister is making an effort.

As for the development of Iraqi security forces, progress is difficult to gauge, because so much US reporting grossly exaggerates progress, ignores or understates real-world problems, and promises unrealistic timelines. The US Defense Department has stopped releasing detailed unclassified material about Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Enforcement readiness, only giving information about how many units are “ready and equipped” and “in the lead.” These are vague, if not meaningless categories – “in the lead” does not indicate the level of independence from US support, and we do not how many “ready and equipped” soldiers quit or deserted the force.

Widespread militia infiltration continues, especially of the police force. Militias also intimidate individual members of the security forces to secure their cooperation or at least forestall action against them. Mixed loyalties not only existed at the level of individual policemen or officers, but also inside the relevant ministries.

There are very real success, and positive trends in the regular Iraqi Army. Even here, however, US military personnel who train or operate with Iraqi units give mixed anecdotal assessments of their quality. There are numerous stories of abuse, corruption, and mixed loyalties, just as well as of individual courage, commitment, and success.

Some individual units said to be “in the lead” are described as highly capable and politically neutral, while others were blatantly partisan or had desertion rates that effectively disbanded the unit. There seemed to be a large consensus among trainers that a continued US security force training effort was vital in order to achieve some semblance of stability in Iraq, but also that it would still take years to succeed with a meaningful political compromise between sects and factions.

The number and quality of Iraqi security forces has increased, but critical problems remain in terms of manpower, troop quality, discipline, and equipment, that will take at least three to five more years to solve. Most importantly, the improvement in Iraqi forces has not yet led to increased security, and the current effort cannot be accelerated or surged in ways that allow the US to make a rapid and successful withdrawal of its forces.

Reacting to American Failures and Self-Inflicted Wounds

US politicians and commanders are being forced to rethink their entire course of action for securing the country. The current strategy is inadequate, and more money, manpower, and patience will not be enough to pull Iraq back from the brink without a new and more realistic strategy for shaping and integrating US efforts. The US mid-term elections are simply a confirmation of this need to make major changes in US policy towards Iraq that
has been acknowledged by the recent replacement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates.

The wrong kind of change, however, can simply make defeat a certainty, increase risk, and help force events to spiral out of control. The demand by some Democrats to pressure the Iraqi government into fostering compromise and conciliation by drawing down troop levels is gathering momentum, but the ISF simply is not ready to take such missions and it is far easier to force Iraq’s leaders to divide along sectarian and ethnic lines that force compromise on a fractured political structure and society. Encouraging federation and separation may well have the same effect.

Some Republicans, including some in the Administration, talk about a major expansion and acceleration of the ISF development effort, and surging in more US soldiers, to create the conditions for Iraqi political viability, an ISF victory, and more rapid US departure. The Pentagon has already endorsed a plan to provide some 30,000 extra Iraqi soldiers (on top of the previous force expansion) and some one billion dollars of extra funding for the new troops.

There is a need to provide more resources to the ISF development effort, but setting realistic goals means understanding the need to make today’s forces effective before any major expansion, to correct drastic past mistakes in developing the police and rushing Iraqi army forces into the field. More time is needed, not less. Moreover, no form of US military action and Iraqi force development can succeed without Iraqi political success. And some major new approach to providing economic aid, helping Iraq develop effective governance, and creating a rule of law and criminal justice system.

The end result is growing tension between three at least partly conflicting imperatives: the wish to draw down US troop levels rather quickly, the need to exert political pressure on the main political players in Iraq, and the need for continuing high force levels to provide security so the slow political process and force training effort can take place. How these conflicting forces will play out remains to be seen.

**Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Well**

Time and resources have been wasted that the US and Iraq did not have. The odds of success are less than even, and may be less than one in four. At best, the development of effective Iraq forces is only one of the steps necessary to bring stability and security, and rollback the forces that can lead Iraq towards more violent forms of civil war. It is, however, one of the critical elements of success.

There is no way to predict Iraq’s future or the exact role Iraqi forces will play over the coming months and years. All that can be predicated is that the US and Iraq must honestly and systematically address each of the current failures in Iraqi force development identified in this report, and do so at a pace that can produce an effective and meaningful result. At a minimum, this means reconfiguring the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of the Interior (MoI), creating Iraqi regular forces designed to fight serious counterinsurgency battles and end civil fighting on a national level, and giving the Iraqi police the aid and advisory resources necessary to make them effective and far less divided and corrupt.

This will take major new amounts of money and more capable US advisors and embeds. It will take 3-5 years, not 18-24 months – although this does not mean enough success to
allow major US and allied troop withdrawals cannot come far earlier. In any case, the rate of the ISF’s process or failure will depend at least a much on Iraqi political compromise and conciliation. If that succeeds, much of the pressure on ISF development will ease; if it fails, ISF development will fail regardless.

If things go well, Iraqi forces will steadily improve with time and play a critical role in bringing the level of security Iraq needs to make political compromise and conciliation work.

Iraqi forces will largely replace Coalition and other foreign forces, at most seeking aid and limited assistance. Iraq’s military will shift its mission from counterinsurgency to defense of the nation against foreign enemies, Iraq’s National Police will defend the nation’s internal security interests and not those of given ethnic and sectarian groups, deal with counterterrorism rather than counterinsurgency, and focus on crime and corruption. Iraq’s other police and security forces will act like the police and security forces of other nations, focusing on crime, local security issues, and providing border security against smuggling and low-level infiltration.

Things can only go well, however, if Iraq can create a working compromise between its sects and ethnic groups, and if US and other outside powers will have the patience and will to support Iraq as it develops into such a state for at least two to three more years of active fighting. Iraq will also need massive additional economic aid to help Iraq unify and develop. Major assistance and advisory programs will be in place until at least 2010, and probably 2015.

Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Badly

The present odds of such success are less than even. In fact, Iraq is more likely to have one of three far less positive futures:

- **Years of turmoil: No one side will truly win.** The nation will not devolve into all out civil war or open forms of division or separation. The result will be an agonizing extension of the status quo in which real political conciliation will fail and every new compromise will be the source of new tensions and fighting. Warring sectarian and ethnic groups will struggle for local control and dominance, dividing the country internally by city and governorate.

  The Iraqi people will lose faith and hope, struggling only to survive. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will become an awkward mix of sectarian and ethnic enclaves and struggles for power and control. The economy will splinter, with a few secure ethnic and sectarian enclaves, but largely dominated by internal tension, insecurity and crime. The US and other outside powers will stay in Iraq and seek to maintain a partial state of order, but every effort to produce lasting solutions and true national unity will collapse.

- **Internal separation, ethnic cleansing, and the façade of unity:** Civil conflict will lead to the de facto separation of the nation into Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurdish enclaves. The nation will maintain the appearance of unity, but the reality will be a level of soft and hard ethnic cleansing that divides most governorates on sectarian and ethnic lines, and most cities into sectarian and ethnic neighborhoods.

  Most governorates and major cities will be dominated by Shi’ite or Kurdish control. An impoverished Sunni enclave will exist in the West, continuing to present at least low-level security challenges. Every “national” decision will be an awkward and unstable compromise. Compromises over key issues like development and modernizing Iraq’s energy industry and infrastructure will be sectarian and ethnic nightmares with Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurd all seeking their own advantage and that of their respective enclaves.
The Iraqi people will be forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will be divided into clearly defined sectarian and ethnic enclaves. The economy will splinter, with the US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and reduce aid to token levels. Iraq will become the “sick man” of the Gulf, and the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.

- **Outright division with at least continuing sectarian and ethnic fighting:** The central government will diminish to total impotence and/or collapse under the pressure of civil conflict. The softer forms of sectarian and ethnic cleansing that take place in the previous scenario will be replaced by vicious fighting for control of given governorates and cities, mass killings, mass forced relocations and migrations, and the ruthless control of remaining minorities.

Iraq will have openly split into three parts, dominated by Shi’ite or Kurdish control, or a Shi’ite-Kurdish federation of convenience whose reality will be the same. An impoverished Sunni enclave will exist in the West, struggling to survive, continuing to present at least low-level security challenges and dependent on outside aid from Sunni states. Economic development and efforts to modernize Iraq’s energy industry and infrastructure will be clearly divided on sectarian and ethnic lines, with the possible exception of pipelines and some limited infrastructure that crosses Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurdish zones. Export capabilities, ports, and water will all be continuing sources of contention.

The Iraqi people will be again forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will divided along clearly defined and possibly warring sectarian and ethnic lines. The economy will steadily decline if not implode. The US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and reduce aid to token levels. Iraq will become the “sick man” of the Gulf, and the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.

**Honestly Addressing the Present State of Iraqi Security Forces**

The effort to create effective Iraqi military, national security and police forces is marginally more successful than Iraq political and economic efforts, but scarcely the level of success the US planned even at the beginning of 2006. It is also far less successful than the Department of Defense has claimed, and has been presented in recent testimony to Congress. It is never clear whether the problem is “spin,” the search for political advantage, the desire to avoid seeing the US accept defeat, or self-deception. The reality is, however, that virtually nothing the US officially says about Iraqi force development can now be taken at face value.

The US has reported Iraqi manning levels based on the number of men it has trained and equipped that often bear no resemblance to the actual manning levels of men that are still in service. It has claimed that Iraqi units are in the lead that in fact have little or no real operational capability or activity, mixing units that reflect very real mission capability with ones that are failed force elements that should actually be assigned the lowest levels of readiness. It has mixed real transfers of responsibility to effective Iraqi forces with cosmetic, politically motivated transfers to Iraqi commands and units that cannot perform such missions and often are dependent on US armor, artillery, airpower, logistics and service support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R).

In all too many cases, the US has rushed Iraqi battalions and force elements into being and then into combat before they are ready, effectively undercutting the Iraqi force development process and sometimes gravely weakening fledgling Iraqi units that are not ready to perform such missions. It often has used US advisors and embedded training
teams that also are not ready for them missions they are supposed to perform, compounding the problems inherent in creating new units.

Other problems come from trying to use force elements built for local defense missions on a national level and in far more demanding forms of counterinsurgency warfare and civil conflict missions than they were recruited for and designed to fight. There are additional problems with corruption, nepotism, creating sufficient junior officers and NCOs, and providing the levels of firepower, mobility, and communications Iraqi forces really need. Hollow units do not learn by being thrust prematurely into combat; they are crippled or wasted.

A major cultural problem in the US military is compounded by the political effort to exaggerate success. Iraq has a major leadership and unit cohesion problem, but the often single-minded US military effort to focus on these aspects of force development has been dangerous from the start. Human beings do not live in the dawn of tomorrow; they live in the noon of today. Most Iraqi officers and NCOs are inevitably caught up in the pressures of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic differences. Most Iraqi enlisted men volunteer because they need the money, because their dependents are desperately in need of their support. At the level of officers and NCOs, the options are ultimately political conciliation and compromise, division by sect or ethnicity with a strong risk of creating separate Shi’ite or Sunni force, or a coup or strong man. The same is true of other ranks in both the regular forces and police. All desperately need an effective pay system and enough income to resist corruption and infiltration? All need family support and adequate means of getting pay to their families. Medical services are critical; so are real-world death and disability benefits. No effort that is not founded on pay and benefits, rather than leadership and motivation, can possibly succeed.

Similarly, it is impossible to treat all Iraqi forces as if they were truly national and could be deployed on a national level. Some units do behave in this manner, and many more can be created over time. The fact is, however, that most Iraqi regulars were recruited for local defense and far less demanding missions. Most police are local, and will be driven by local interest and political conditions. The local role of militias and various non-national security forces cannot be ignored, and must somehow be integrated into the ISF structure or given incentives to disband. No ISF effort can succeed that does not explicitly recognize these realities.

**Success and Failure by Force Element**

If one looks at the real readiness of the Iraqi defense effort, it may be summarized as follows:

- **Ministry of Defense**: Still very much a work in progress. Poorly organized, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, poor planning and fiscal control capability, problems with corruption.

- **The regular army, air force, and navy (130,000 claimed to be operational; real number unknown, but probably below 100,000)**: Some battalion sized elements of the Army (128,230 men trained and equipped) are emerging as a real force at the infantry battalion level with some light mechanized and armored elements. Beginning to emerge as real divisions and brigades, although many headquarters, command and control, combat and service support, logistic and intelligence elements are missing or having little capability. The regular Iraqi military still cannot operate without massive MNF-I support, embedded US and other coalition advisory teams, and largely US mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, fixed and rotary wing air support, air mobility, and logistic and service support.
Air Force (740 men) is at best a small cadre of forces with token reconnaissance and air transport capability. Navy (1,130 men) is slowly emerging as capable of carrying out own patrol missions, but is severely limited in operational capability with little real support capability.

The MNF-I has reported that roughly 92% of the authorized Iraqi Army battalions had been created, and the force building efforts to train and equip forces now focused on combat support forces. It also reported over 65% of authorized personnel in the Iraqi Army support forces were trained and equipped.

Such reports are misleading to the point of being actively dishonest. There are severe problems in much of the reporting on Iraqi forces, and no clear distinction is made between the number of men who went through the training process and the number still on service. The rising manpower and combat unit totals conceal many critical problems in given elements of the ISF order of battle. Gross numbers grossly exaggerate capability.

Even more serious problems exist with reports that say the regular Iraqi forces are taking the lead, and the MNF-I has been successful in transferring responsibility to Iraqi forces and command. The regular military and some paramilitary National Police units are making real progress – but most units are severely undermanned, have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilized, and many are Shi’ite or Kurdish dominated.

While progress was occurring in the army, discussions with MNF-I experts indicate that major Manning and equipment shortfalls existed in given battalions and units, and that substantial numbers of combat battalions said to be “in the lead” had less than 30-50% of their authorized Manning actually present in the unit.

The Department of Defense has reported that 8 SIBs and 106 battalions are in combat, but it is unlikely that even one-third of these totals reflect realistic warfighting capability and there is no way to assess their willingness to engage as truly national forces in civil conflict.

One respected journalist stated on November 28, 2006, “The Iraqi army has about 134,000 men (trained and equipped), but about half are doing only stationary guard duty...of the half that conduct operations, only about 10 battalions are effective – well under 10,000 men.” If anything like these figures are true, then recent MNF-I claims that, “in mid-October 2006 that six of the 10 Iraqi divisions – 30 of the 36 brigades and almost 90 of the 112 battalions were “in the lead,” border on the absurd.

Iraqi forces will be highly dependent on US and other MNF-I support well into 2008, and probably through 2010. Only a truly radical improvement in political conciliation could reduce this dependence, and the present drift towards added civil conflict could sharply increase it.

- Ministry of Interior: Still very much a work in progress and lags behind the MoD in capability. Poorly organized, with elements more loyal to Shi’ite and Kurdish parties than nation. Poor planning and fiscal control capability, serious problems with corruption.

- The National Police (24,400 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown, but closer to 20,000): Some elements have been properly reorganized and are as effective as regular army units. Most still present problems in terms of both loyalty and effectiveness. Still are some ties to Shi’ite and Kurdish militias. A number of units have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilized.

- Other MOI Forces (27,510 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown, but closer to 22,000): Most elements, like the Border Police, are just acquiring proper training and have only light equipment and poor facilities. Some elements are capable in undemanding missions. Most are underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Many are poorly facilized.

- The Regular Police (120,190 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number probably under 85,000): Underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Many will not fight or act if face a local threat. Desertion and absence rates high. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or the police have strong ties to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces. Many are poorly facilized.
The problems in the “trained and equipped police” forces are compounded by large number of locally recruited “police” and security forces loyal to local leaders and sectarian and ethnic factions. Various sectarian and ethnic militias are the real “police” in many areas.

- **Facilities Protection Force, Pipeline Protection Force, and other limited security forces:**
  Underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or are tied to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces.

The US and MNF-I plans that called for Iraqi regular military forces to allow significant Coalition troop reductions in 2006 have failed. Worse, the effort to develop the Iraqi police and security forces has gotten badly out of balance with the effort to develop regular forces and lags more than a year behind it. The so-called “year of the police” has barely begun and will at best gather momentum in 2007. Real-world Iraqi dependence on the present scale of US and allied military support and advisory efforts will continue well into 2008 at the earliest and probably to 2010. Major US and allied troop reductions need to be put on hold indefinitely.

Iraqi forces simply are not ready to assume the burden of national defense. Moreover, even if more effective and realistic force development plans are implemented and given the proper resources, they will still fail unless Iraqi military progress is matched by Iraqi political progress. The only way to avoid this continuing dependence on the US and other outside power without greatly increasing the risk of a major civil war, and collapse of the Iraqi force development effort, would be a level of political conciliation so great as to fundamentally undermine the insurgency and end the drift towards civil war.

**Looking Ahead**

There is no way to summarize Iraqi force development in simple terms, particularly because so much depends in the near term on whether Iraqi efforts at political conciliation, effective governance, and a government presence in the field do or do not succeed. The ISF development effort cannot succeed without major progress in all of these areas, any more than they can succeed without the creation of effective Iraqi forces and Iraqi popular belief that MNF-I forces will leave as soon as possible and Iraq will be truly sovereign.

The one critical punch line that does emerge from this analysis, however, is that there is no near term prospect that Iraqi force development will allow major reductions in MNF-I forces, and that ISF force development can only succeed if the MNF-I provides active combat support well into 2008 and major advisory and aid support through 2010. Every element of ISF development still requires years of effort and support, and any successful policy towards Iraq that offers serious hope of avoiding massive increases in sectarian and ethnic violence, and continued insurgency, requires an honest recognition of this fact.

The US can only do more harm to Iraqi force development if it continues to exaggerate Iraqi capability, attempts to expand Iraqi forces even more quickly, and transfers responsibility before Iraqi forces can do the job. As in Afghanistan, the US can only win in Iraq if it is willing to fight a "long war." Rushing Iraqi forces in, and American forces out, is a strategy where "exit" is given far higher priority than success. It may provide a cosmetic rationale to disguise failure and defeat, but not prevent it.

To put it bluntly, the US government and Department of Defense must stop lying about the true nature of Iraqi readiness and the Iraqi force development. As this report describes in detail, there are many very real successes. The nearly meaningless metrics of success
the US has adopted, however, can easily lead the US to choose the wrong options in Iraq, continue to fail to provide adequate resources, and encourage US and allied withdrawals because of political decisions made for the wrong reasons. Like all elements of strategy, Iraqi force development needs to be based on honesty and realism, not "spin," false claims, and political expediency.
# Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development

**Page xiii**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Intro</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>Other Operational Developments</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Iraq's Regular Forces</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Developments in the Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Army and Special Operations Forces: Increasing, But Mixed Capabilities</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>Progress in the Iraqi Navy</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>Progress in the Iraqi Air Force</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>Developments in the Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>Operational Developments: Summer and Fall 2006</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI.</td>
<td>Looking Ahead</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures

FIGURE 2.1 ................................................................. 11
% EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE IN ABILITY TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN IRAQ* ........................................ 11
CONFLICT IN IRAQ TOWARD CHAOS,” NEW YORK TIMES, NOVEMBER 1, 2006. ................................. 18
FIGURE 3.2 ................................................................. 20
AVERAGE WEEKLY ATTACKS BY TIME PERIOD 1 APR 04-11 AUG 06 ...................................................... 20
FIGURE 3.3 ................................................................. 22
IRAQI GOVERNMENT REPORTS OF CIVILIAN DEATHS FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE 2006 .................... 22
FIGURE 3.4 ................................................................. 24
AVERAGE DAILY CASUALTIES*—IRAQI (INCLUDING ISF) AND COALITION 1 APR 04-11 AUG 06 .......... 24
FIGURE 3.5 ................................................................. 31
INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACKS WEEKLY AVERAGE* BY TIME PERIOD 1 APR 04-11 AUG 06 ................. 31
FIGURE 4.1 ................................................................. 49
TRAINING AND EQUIPPED MOD AND MOD MANPOWER AS OF NOVEMBER 15, 2006 ....................... 49
ABOUT 98% OF THE FORCES TRAINED BY MNF-I FOR THE MOD BELONG TO THE IRAQI ARMY AND ITS
SUPPORT FORCES. THE IRAQI NAVY AND AIR FORCE WILL NOT BE FULLY FORMED UNTIL AT LEAST
SUMMER 2007. ........................................................................................................................................ 49
FIGURE 4.2 ................................................................. 50
TRAINING AND EQUIPPED MANPOWER FOR MAJOR BRANCHES OF MOD MANPOWER ............................ 50
FIGURE 4.3 ................................................................. 51
GAO FIGURES FOR TRAINED AND EQUIPPED TROOPS ........................................................................ 51
FIGURE 4.4 ................................................................. 64
IRAQI UNITS LEADING OPERATIONS AND PROVINCES WITH SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY ............ 64
FIGURE 4.5 ................................................................. 66
MOD FORCES’ ASSESSED CAPABILITIES .......................................................................................... 66
FIGURE 4.6 ................................................................. 71
DETAINEE POPULATION: 2003-2006 ..................................................................................................... 71
FIGURE 4.7 ................................................................. 72
IRAQI HOLDINGS OF DETAINEES BY JURISDICTION ........................................................................... 72
FIGURE 6.1 ................................................................. 83
IRAQI ARMY BATTALIONS IN COMBAT .................................................................................................. 83
FIGURE 6.2 ................................................................. 84
COMBAT OPERATIONS (COMPANY LEVEL AND ABOVE*) ........................................................................ 84
FIGURE 6.3 ................................................................. 89
FUEL SUPPLIED TO IRAQI ARMY UNITS ............................................................................................ 89
FIGURE 7.1 ................................................................. 90
IRAQI NAVAL CAPABILITIES ................................................................................................................. 90
FIGURE 8.1 ................................................................. 92
IRAQI AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES ........................................................................................................... 92
FIGURE 9.1 ................................................................. 95
MOI NATIONAL POLICE FORCES’ ASSESSED CAPABILITIES ............................................................... 95
FIGURE 9.2 ................................................................. 96
FORCE GENERATION TIMELINE ............................................................................................................. 96
FIGURE 10.1 .............................................................. 119
TOTAL ACTIONABLE TIPS ...................................................................................................................... 119
I. Introduction

There is no place for false optimism and illusions in creating effective Iraq forces. “The situation in Iraq remains difficult and complex,” in the words of Gen. George Casey, commander MNF-I. According to Casey, the conflict has evolved from an insurgency focused against Coalition troops to “a struggle for the division of political and economic power among the Iraqis.” He described a threefold threat of Sunni extremists and al Qaeda, Shi’ite extremists, death squads and “the more militant militias,” and the Sunni insurgency. Of these groups, he evaluated Shi’ite groups to be the gravest current threat to stability. Casey emphasized that “violence and progress coexist in Iraq,” saying that 90 percent of the violence occurred in five provinces, which represented less than half of the population.

While one can always argue semantics. General Casey effectively describes a state of limited civil war. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a broader sectarian and ethnic conflict.

There is, however, a serious risk that both the US and Iraq will rely on false optimism and illusions for very different political reasons. The US increasingly wants out; the Iraqi government increasingly want the US presence altered and reduced to support its own internal political objectives. This is leading to fundamental false time scales for action. For example, Gen. Casey in late August speculated about Iraqi forces achieving self-sufficiency within 18 months, while staying committed to event-driven US force reductions:

“I don’t have a date, but I can see over the next 12 to 18 months the Iraqi security forces progressing to a point where they can take on the security responsibilities for the country with very little coalition support. (…) The future coalition presence, 12 to 18 months from now, is going to be decided by the Iraqi government”

In September, President Talabani suggested a similar schedule, saying that the Iraqi Army would be ready to face its challenges on its own “within two years.” Two months after the original statement, Casey again said at the end of October that it would be “another 12 to 18 months or so till, I believe, the Iraqi security forces are completely capable of taking over responsibility for their own security, still probably with some level of support from us (…)”. Money is also an issue. Iraq cannot afford to create and sustain the forces it needs and meet its other objectives for government services and economic develop. The cost of creating Iraqi forces has, however, risen with the level of violence they must deal with/ US financial assistance for Iraqi security grew from $3.24 billion in January 2004 to about $13.7 billion in June 2006. Although most of the funds for rebuilding the military and security forces had come from US sources and had been administered by international forces or contractors, the new Iraqi government was expected to begin playing a greater role in the budgeting and equipment procurement process.

Iraq is already in a state of at least limited civil war, and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a broader sectarian and ethnic conflict.
The current combination of insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure, leading to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. It could escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads of all three major ethnic and religious groups.

If Iraq is to avoid split-up and full-blown civil war, it must do far more than create effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). No such effort can succeed without an integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.

**Anticipate, Learn and Change versus Persist, React and Be Defeated**

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the US has never implemented a realistic, self-critical, or forward-looking approach to any aspect of its policy in Iraq. It is unclear that it could have succeeded under the best of circumstance, and one of its most critical failures has been to consistently deny the fact it was pursuing a high effort in nation building and stability operations that could easily fail.

In practice, however, the US has neither anticipated the problems it must solve or rapidly learned and adapted to the emerging realities in Iraq. Its national security leadership has become a self-inflicted wound, and the US has lurched from delayed response to response, always reacting too slowly, with two few resources and changes, and in a state of quasi-denial.

The strategy the to stabilize Iraq that the US announced in the fall of 2005 was deeply flawed in timing and resources. It was based on a grossly exaggerated estimate of political success, an almost deliberately false exaggeration of the success of the economic aid effort and progress in developing the ISF, inadequate efforts to develop effective governance, and a rule of law, and has not succeeded.

The US plan that began to be implemented in the spring of 2006 to concentrate security efforts on Baghdad, to build up Iraqi security forces, and to “clear, hold and build” has not led to a decrease in violence. Insurgents and militias were able to step up attacks during Ramadan, and the number of attacks and of casualties in Baghdad rose.

**The Need for Comprehensive Action and Strategy**

No strategy that hinges large on the successful development of the ISF can possibly succeed. Iraq must establish both effective governance and a rule of law; not simply deploy effective military, security, and police forces. Legitimacy does not consist of determining how governments are chosen, but in how well they serve the day-to-day needs of their peoples. Security cannot come through force alone. It must have the checks and balances that can only come when governments and courts are active in the field.

Over time, Iraq must also address its economic and demographic challenges. A nation cannot convert from a corrupt, state-controlled “command kleptocracy” in mid-war. It cannot survive unless it makes such a conversion over time and puts an end to a
hopelessly skewed and unfair distribution of income, ends full and partial unemployment levels of 30-60%, and becomes competitive on a regional and global level.

The present reality is that progress in Iraq is slow or faltering in each of the areas necessary to make Iraqi force development successful:

- **Political conciliation:** Iraq’s leaders still seek national unity and compromise, but talk has not been followed by substance. Prime Minister Maliki’s conciliation plan has not taken hold, and the new government has not shown it can implement such plans or bring Arab Sunnis back into an effective political structure. While Muqtada Sadr appears more open to compromise with other factions now, he appears to be losing control over the more radical parts of the Mahdi Army, which may render his more conciliatory position less meaningful.

- **Governance:** The national government cannot even spend its budget; much less demonstrate that it now has an effective ministerial structure or the ability to actually govern in many areas. Actual governance continues to devolve to local authorities and factions.

- **Legal system and rule of law:** There is no real consensus on what legal system to use, courts do not exist in many areas and are corrupt and ineffective in many others. Legal authority, like governance, is devolving down to the local level.

- **Politics:** The election in late 2005 effectively divided Iraqis by sect and ethnic group, with only a small minority voting for truly national parties. No clear national party structure has emerged since that time. The Shi’ite parties increasingly demonstrate the rivalry between the three main Shi’ite parties. The Kurds are unified but tensions exist over “independence,” dealing with the PKK, and past tensions between the PUK and KDP. Sunnis are just beginning to acquire a true political identity and the two main Sunni parties are divided and divisive.

- **The Role of the Constitution:** The creation of a new constitution has done nothing to establish consensus and much to divide the nation. It leaves more than 50 areas to be clarified, all of which involve potentially divisive debates between sectarian and ethnic groups, and most of which could lead to added tensions over the role of religion in the state.

- **Economic Development:** Increases in macroeconomic figures like the total GDP disguise massive problems with corruption, the distribution of income, and employment, particularly in troubled Sunni areas and the poorer parts of Iraq’s major towns and cities. Young men are often forced to choose between the ISF, insurgency, and militias for purely economic reasons. The real-world economy of Sunni areas continues to deteriorate, and investment in even secure Shi’ite areas is limited by the fear of crime and insurgency. Only the Kurdish area is making real progress towards development.

- **Aid:** Iraq has largely spent the flood of US and other aid provided after the fall of Saddam as well as its oil food money. Large portions of this aid have been spent on corruption, outside contractors and imports, security, and projects with poor planning and execution, which now are unsustainable. Iraq will, however, desperately need major future aid to construct and develop if it can achieve political conciliation and security. The US committed $20.6 billion of $20.9 billion in aid funds as of September 20, 2006. It had obligated $20.1 billion, and spent $15.8 billion.

- **Energy and Oil:** Iraq continued to produce less than 2.5 million barrels of oil per day (2.3 MMBD in September), and exported well under 2 million barrels a day. It was dependent on imported fuel and gasoline for more than 50% of its total needs. No major rehabilitation of Iraq’s oil fields and facilities has taken place. Waterflooding and heavy oil injection continued to be major problems, and the ability to recover oil from producing fields average less than two-thirds of the world average.

Many Iraqis still have hope for the future in spite of these problems, and still have a strong sense of national identity. The pressures that divide Iraqis, however, do continue to increase.

**The Pace of Iraqi Force Development and the Drift Towards Civil War**
Developments in Iraq are moving fast, and it is difficult to assess the lasting relevance of very recent events. It remains to be seen whether the announced reshuffle of Prime Minister Maliki’s cabinet will be the start of a development of more inclusive and more effective Iraqi politics, or merely show that the Prime Minister is making an effort.

As for the development of Iraqi security forces, progress is difficult to gauge, because so much US reporting grossly exaggerates progress, ignores or understates real-world problems, and promises unrealistic timelines. The US Defense Department has stopped releasing detailed unclassified material about Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Enforcement readiness, only giving information about how many units are “ready and equipped” and “in the lead.” These are vague, if not meaningless categories – “in the lead” does not indicate the level of independence from US support, and we do not how many “ready and equipped” soldiers quit or deserted the force.

Widespread militia infiltration continues, especially of the police force. Militias also intimidate individual members of the security forces to secure their cooperation or at least forestall action against them. Mixed loyalties not only existed at the level of individual policemen or officers, but also inside the relevant ministries.

There are very real success, and positive trends in the regular Iraqi Army. Even here, however, US military personnel who train or operate with Iraqi units give mixed anecdotal assessments of their quality. There are numerous stories of abuse, corruption, and mixed loyalties, just as well as of individual courage, commitment, and success.

Some individual units said to be “in the lead” are described as highly capable and politically neutral, while others were blatantly partisan or had desertion rates that effectively disbanded the unit. There seemed to be a large consensus among trainers that a continued US security force training effort was vital in order to achieve some semblance of stability in Iraq, but also that it would still take years to succeed with a meaningful political compromise between sects and factions.

The number and quality of Iraqi security forces has increased, but critical problems remain in terms of manpower, troop quality, discipline, and equipment, that will take at least three to five more years to solve. Most importantly, the improvement in Iraqi forces has not yet led to increased security, and the current effort cannot be accelerated or surged in ways that allow the US to make a rapid and successful withdrawal of its forces.

**Reacting to American Failures and Self-Inflicted Wounds**

US politicians and commanders are being forced to rethink their entire course of action for securing the country. The current strategy is inadequate, and more money, manpower, and patience will not be enough to pull Iraq back from the brink without a new and more realistic strategy for shaping and integrating US efforts. The US mid-term elections are simply a confirmation of this need to make major changes in US policy towards Iraq that has been acknowledged by the recent replacement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates.

The wrong kind of change, however, can simply make defeat a certainty, increase risk, and help force events to spiral out of control. The demand by some Democrats to pressure the Iraqi government into fostering compromise and conciliation by drawing down troop levels is gathering momentum, but the ISF simply is not ready to take such missions and it is far easier to force Iraq’s leaders to divide along sectarian and ethnic lines that force
compromise on a fractured political structure and society. Encouraging federation and separation may well have the same effect.

Some Republicans, including some in the Administration, talk about a major expansion and acceleration of the ISF development effort, and surging in more US soldiers, to create the conditions for Iraqi political viability, an ISF victory, and more rapid US departure. The Pentagon has already endorsed a plan to provide some 30,000 extra Iraqi soldiers (on top of the previous force expansion) and some one billion dollars of extra funding for the new troops.

There is a need to provide more resources to the ISF development effort, but setting realistic goals means understanding the need to make today’s forces effective before any major expansion, to correct drastic past mistakes in developing the police and rushing Iraqi army forces into the field. More time is needed, not less. Moreover, no form of US military action and Iraqi force development can succeed without Iraqi political success. And some major new approach to providing economic aid, helping Iraq develop effective governance, and creating a rule of law and criminal justice system.

The end result is growing tension between three at least partly conflicting imperatives: the wish to draw down US troop levels rather quickly, the need to exert political pressure on the main political players in Iraq, and the need for continuing high force levels to provide security so the slow political process and force training effort can take place. How these conflicting forces will play out remains to be seen.

**Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Well**

Time and resources have been wasted that the US and Iraq did not have. The odds of success are less than even, and may be less than one in four. At best, the development of effective Iraq forces is only one of the steps necessary to bring stability and security, and rollback the forces that can lead Iraq towards more violent forms of civil war. It is, however, one of the critical elements of success.

There is no way to predict Iraq’s future or the exact role Iraqi forces will play over the coming months and years. All that can be predicated is that the US and Iraq must honestly and systematically address each of the current failures in Iraqi force development identified in this report, and do so at a pace that can produce an effective and meaningful result. At a minimum, this means reconfiguring the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of the Interior (MoI), creating Iraqi regular forces designed to fight serious counterinsurgency battles and end civil fighting on a national level, and giving the Iraqi police the aid and advisory resources necessary to make them effective and far less divided and corrupt.

This will take major new amounts of money and more capable US advisors and embeds. It will take 3-5 years, not 18-24 months – although this does not mean enough success to allow major US and allied troop withdrawals cannot come far earlier. In any case, the rate of the ISF’s process or failure will depend at least a much on Iraqi political compromise and conciliation. If that succeeds, much of the pressure on ISF development will ease; if it fails, ISF development will fail regardless.

**If** things go well, Iraqi forces will steadily improve with time and play a critical role in bring the level of security Iraq needs to make political compromise and conciliation work.
Iraqi forces will largely replace Coalition and other foreign forces, at most seeking aid and limited assistance. Iraq’s military will shift its mission from counterinsurgency to defense of the nation against foreign enemies. Iraq’s National Police will defend the nation’s internal security interests and not those of given ethnic and sectarian groups, deal with counterterrorism rather than counterinsurgency, and focus on crime and corruption. Iraq’s other police and security forces will act like the police and security forces of other nations, focusing on crime, local security issues, and providing border security against smuggling and low-level infiltration.

Things can only go well, however, if Iraq can create a working compromise between its sects and ethnic groups, and if US and other outside powers will have the patience and will to support Iraq as it develops into such a state for at least two to three more years of active fighting. Iraq will also need massive additional economic aid to help Iraq unify and develop. Major assistance and advisory programs will be in place until at least 2010, and probably 2015.

**Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Badly**

The present odds of such success are less than even. In fact, Iraq is more likely to have one of three far less positive futures:

- **Years of turmoil: No one side will truly win.** The nation will not devolve into all out civil war or open forms of division or separation. The result will be an agonizing extension of the status quo in which real political conciliation will fail and every new compromise will be the source of new tensions and fighting. Warring sectarian and ethnic groups will struggle for local control and dominance, dividing the country internally by city and governorate.

  The Iraqi people will lose faith and hope, struggling only to survive. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will become an awkward mix of sectarian and ethnic enclaves and struggles for power and control. The economy will splinter, with a few secure ethnic and sectarian enclaves, but largely dominated by internal tension, insecurity and crime. The US and other outside powers will stay in Iraq and seek to maintain a partial state of order, but every effort to produce lasting solutions and true national unity will collapse.

- **Internal separation, ethnic cleansing, and the façade of unity:** Civil conflict will lead to the de facto separation of the nation into Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurdish enclaves. The nation will maintain the appearance of unity, but the reality will be a level of soft and hard ethnic cleansing that divides most governorates on sectarian and ethnic lines, and most cities into sectarian and ethnic neighborhoods.

  Most governorates and major cities will be dominated by Shi’ite or Kurdish control. An impoverished Sunni enclave will exist in the West, continuing to present at least low-level security challenges. Every “national” decision will be an awkward and unstable compromise. Compromises over key issues like development and modernizing Iraq’s energy industry and infrastructure will be sectarian and ethnic nightmares with Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurd all seeking their own advantage and that of their respective enclaves.

  The Iraqi people will be forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will be divided into clearly defined sectarian and ethnic enclaves. The economy will splinter, with ... The US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and reduce aid to token levels. Iraq will become the “sick man” of the Gulf, and the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.

- **Outright division with at least continuing sectarian and ethnic fighting:** The central government will diminish to total impotence and/or collapse under the pressure of civil conflict. The softer forms of sectarian and ethnic cleansing that take place in the previous scenario will be replaced by
vicious fighting for control of given governorates and cities, mass killings, mass forced relocations and migrations, and the ruthless control of remaining minorities.

Iraq will have openly split into three parts, dominated by Shi’ite or Kurdish control, or a Shi’ite-Kurdish federation of convenience whose reality will be the same. An impoverished Sunni enclave will exist in the West, struggling to survive, continuing to present at least low-level security challenges and dependent on outside aid from Sunni states. Economic development and efforts to modernize Iraq’s energy industry and infrastructure will be clearly divided on sectarian and ethnic lines, with the possible exception of pipelines and some limited infrastructure that crosses Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurdish zones. Export capabilities, ports, and water will all be continuing sources of contention.

The Iraqi people will be again forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will divided along clearly defined and possibly warring sectarian and ethnic lines. The economy will steadily decline if not implode. The US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and reduce aid to token levels. Iraq will become the “sick man” of the Gulf, and the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.
II. The Political and Economic Dimensions of Iraqi Force Development

Any meaningful assessment of Iraqi force development must recognize that progress in political comprise and conciliation is the sine qua non for success. At present, Iraq is not making the political and economic progress that take the parallel steps needed to allow to successful development of the ISF.

Political Progress

The Iraqi parliament passed a law on October 11 to postpone the creation of “federal” regions for at least 18 months. At the same time, the law set up a system allowing provinces to merge into autonomous regions with considerable autonomy. Federalism as an organizational principle was vaguely incorporated into the Iraqi constitution, but was interpreted differently by different factions. Especially Arab Sunnis still feared that an Iraqi “federation” would leave them with a resource-poor part of the country. The September agreement also formed a 27-member committee to review the constitution.

Several parties, including the Iraqi Accordance Front, secular parties and the bloc of Moqtada al-Sadr, had announced they would vote against the proposed law, but it was backed by the Kurdish bloc and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which gave it the needed majority. The constitutionally mandated deadline for a law on federalism was October 22.

Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul warned the following week that federalism in Iraq could lead to the country’s break-up and threaten regional stability:

The core of the problem is that if Iraq is divided, definitely there will be civil war and definitely neighboring countries will be involved in this. The Middle East can’t shoulder this. It’s too much.

On November 12, Prime Minister Maliki announced that he was planning a major cabinet reshuffle. Speaking in a closed session of Parliament, Maliki suggested that some of his ministers were incompetent but said they had been forced upon him by the country’s major political blocs. Maliki asked parliamentarians for more independence in choosing his cabinet, but did not disclose which ministers he intended to fire. He also said he would not change the political distribution of cabinet seats. Some legislators suggested the changes could include more than half of the current ministers.

When US pressure to reign in militias and reach a political consensus on Iraq’s future intensified in mid-November 2006, both Maliki’s rhetoric and his reaction to militia violence and police infiltration appeared to change, although it is still too to predict how meaningful these changes would be.

After a particularly large-scale kidnapping with probable police involvement had occurred in Baghdad, Maliki said: “What is happening is not terrorism, but the result of disagreements and conflict between militias belonging to this side or that.” The government reacted with large police sweeps, and the interior ministry publicly announced several hours after the abductions that arrest warrants had been issued for several police commanders from the district where the crime had occurred.
Maliki’s foreign policy also took a new turn on November 20, when he announced he would restore diplomatic ties with Syria after nearly 25 years. He announced this step after a meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem. Al-Muallem pledged Syria’s help in quelling sectarian violence in Iraq, while Maliki urged Syria to tighten its borders to stop the flow of foreign Sunni Arab extremists into Iraq.

At the same time, relations with Iran also underwent change. President Talabani was scheduled to meet with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Both Syria and Iran have offered to help stabilize the fractured government in Baghdad.

US State Department spokesman Tom Casey said the Bush administration welcomed “discussion and dialogue” between the three countries, but urged caution: “The problem is not what they say, but what they do,” alluding to Syria not stopping foreign fighters from entering Iraq, and to Iran’s support for Shi’ite militias. The Syrian foreign minister said that while his government had not allowed foreigners to enter Iraq to join the insurgency, it was impossible to completely seal the Syrian-Iraqi border.xv

**Economic Situation**

The US has issued largely meaningless macroeconomic and aid data that do nothing to reflect the real world economic plight of many ordinary Iraqis, and which again sharply exaggerates progress in an area where parallel action is critical to effective Iraq force development. The real-world economic situation is crippled by internal violence and massive mistakes in the past US aid effort. An Inspector General report in late October noted that the decentralization of authority that the CPA initiated had “the effect of empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial government services.”xvi

The report also painted a bleak picture of American reconstruction efforts, stating that only four of Iraq’s 13 provinces had US Provincial Reconstruction Teams or satellite offices that were “generally able” to carry out their missions.xvii Four were “somewhat able,” while three were “less able,” and two were “generally unable” to carry out their PRT missions.xviii (Note that the SIGIR report did not evaluate the PRTs’ performance, only their “ability to meet the mission.”) The main obstacle were security concerns that limited the face-to-face contact of PRT personnel with Iraqi officials, while State Department funding seemed adequate for 2007.xix While the MNF-I told the SIGIR that one-on-one contact with local officials was not necessary for satellite office personnel, staff at the local level thought differently. Overall, the SIGIR evaluates the PRT effort as “individual successes arising from individual efforts and improvisations, which allowed some PRTs to move forward with their capacity-development mission.” The teams were expected to continue operating through FY 2008 and then transition their mission to a traditional USAID training program to develop local governance capacity.xx

The SIGIR report further investigated US military commanders’ use of the Iraqi Interim Government Fund (IIGF). This $136 million fund could be used by US military commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility. As of July 31, 2006, MNC-I had disbursed $114.9 million. While the SIGIR the funds were used for their intended purposes and in accordance with rules and regulations, he noted that project files were incomplete and “data could not be reconciled to the financial records or to the project files.” MNF had also not reported to
the Iraqi government between December 2005 and July 2006, although monthly reporting was required.xxi

The SIGIR recommended several actions to the Commanding General, MNF-I, in order to alleviate these problems.

- "Enforce existing guidance on maintaining project records, including conducting quarterly reviews to ensure the accuracy of IIGF project files.
- Develop a tracking system for controlling and processing IIGF project files through the entire management process
- Continue efforts to improve IRMS accuracy for IIGF projects.xxxii

MNF-I’s comments on the SIGIR’s recommendations were “fully responsive,” and reporting to the Iraqi government resumed in July 2006, although the SIGIR found that the MNF-I July report was not signed by MNF-I until September 13, 2006.xxiii

The Iraqi side of the reconstruction effort was also blamed, with “bureaucratic resistance within the Ministry of Finance, which traditionally has been slow to provide funds,” keeping the Iraqi government from spending its $6 billion budget for major rebuilding projects. Of 142 primary health clinics funded by the US, only six were operational. Some successes, however, were also noted. Electric capacity nationwide passed pre-war levels in the fall of 2006, though not in Baghdad, and oil exports at 1.66 million barrels per day met Iraqi goals. 88% of US projects had been completed when the report was published.xxiv These problems will grow worse, at least in the near-term, and the US has neither plans nor funds to provide major new amounts of aid.

US implementation of nation-building programs is guided by National Security Presidential Directives 36 and 44.xxxvi Since the invasion in 2003, the US Congress has provided more than $38.3 billion in Iraq reconstruction funding.xxvii As of September 30, 2006, international donor funds totaled $15.018 billion, although accurate information on the expenditures of the funds pledged at the Madrid conference continues to be difficult to obtain.xxxii A number of countries have pledged additional money since the Madrid conference, some of them significant amounts. The total amount pledged at the Madrid Conference in 2003 was $13,593,087,293 non-US donor assistance, while the funds pledged since Madrid add up to $1,425,105,009.xxxviii About 25 of these pledges – $3.5 billion – has been expended.xxx

Iraq ranked 137th out of the 158 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. It ranks lower than Egypt, Syria, Iran, and other countries in the region. Iraq’s Commission on Public Integrity requires financial disclosure by senior government officials, from the civilian level of director general and military rank of captain and upward. The commission has threatened to refer noncompliant individuals to court.xxx

**Conciliation Efforts**

Efforts at political conciliation have had some limited success, but scarcely on the necessary scale. On August 20, Iraqi security forces officials, national and local government officials, and local civic, tribal and religious leaders met in Hillah to discuss the government’s national reconciliation objectives and to sign an oath pledging to cooperate to meet these goals, without regard to ethnic, religious or tribal differences. The conference was organized by the provincial police chief, Major General Das Hamza.
A similar meeting was organized August 26-27, drawing several hundred tribal leaders. These meetings had little substantive result, but Iraqis did not lose hope. Figure 2.1 illustrates that overall confidence remained high in the future ability of the army and the police to improve the situation in Iraq. However, the data from the Kurdish areas suggests that geography and sectarian realities play a large role in determining whether militias or government troops are more trusted. Additionally the data on the Shi’a dominated south suggests further suggests that confidence is divided along sectarian lines. Since they are the largest ethnic group and showed the highest participation in governmental programs it is unsurprising that the south shows the greatest confidence in the government.

**Figure 2.1**

% Expressing confidence in ability to improve the situation in Iraq*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Iraqi Army</th>
<th>Iraqi Police</th>
<th>Badr Org</th>
<th>Mahdi Army</th>
<th>Peshmerga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish Areas</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tikrit/Baquba</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Euphrates</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data from Mosul is not included in this chart. It was determined to be unreliable.

Source: Department of State, Office of Research, June 21-July 6, 2006, as adapted from: US Department of Defense, *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*, August 2006 Report to Congress, p. 38; Note: +/- 4% margin of error, but varies among regions

**US Political Developments**

Growing US political pressure to reduce US forces in Iraq -- and the political, military, and economic cost of what many perceive as a losing war -- present additional problems for Iraqi force development. They also are creating more pressure to rush a process that actually needs to be slowed down to become more effective.

After the de facto failure of the Iraqi and US effort to secure Baghdad in Operation Together Forward, US officials tried to speed up both the political and the security transfer processes in Iraq in late October. Gen. Casey announced a timeline for having
Iraqi security forces take control of all 18 provinces of Iraq within 18 months (they were in control of 2 provinces at the time). Ambassador Khalilzad said he wanted a political agreement on the distribution of oil wealth and Iraqi government control over militias within a year.xxxii

President Bush publicly discussed “adjusting tactics,” but at the same time reiterated that a complete US withdrawal was not an option while he was still in office. The week before his comments, information had leaked from the Iraq Study Group headed by former Secretary of State James A Baker III that the administration was preparing for a “course correction”, with the partition of Iraq and a US-backed military coup against al-Maliki not being ruled out. Bush remained largely silent on possible policy changes and appeared ambiguous about his support for the Iraqi prime minister:

“I’m patient. I’m not patient forever. And I’m not patient with dawdling. But I recognize the degree of difficulty of the task, and therefore say to the American people: We won’t cut and run.”xxxiii

White House spokesman Tony Snow said the next day that Bush was not presenting any ultimatums to al-Maliki and was not tying goals to US troop commitments.xxxiv US and Iraqi officials said they were working on a timeframe for “Iraq’s steps toward self-government through 2007 – including political reconciliation and the handover of all 18 provinces,” but said there would be “no penalties” for the Iraqi government should the deadlines be missed.xxxv Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld emphasized this point on October 26.xxxvi One senior Pentagon official, speaking on condition of anonymity, confessed, “There is no plan B.”xxxvii

**Plans to Increase Iraqi, Not US, Forces**

National security adviser Stephen J. Hadley met with Iraqi officials in Baghdad at the end of October 2006, and further large US and Iraqi troop increases to patrol Baghdad were discussed. Mr. Hadley’s deputy, however, said he was not aware of Hadley proposing a troop increase. Other US officials remarked that any further US troop commitments would have to be preceded by Iraqi troop increases in the capital. Any plan to significantly increase the US presence in Baghdad would probably require an extra 10,000 to 30,000 troops there beyond their scheduled rotations.xxxviii

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld endorsed a proposal on October 31 to spend at least $1 billion to expand the size of Iraqi security forces beyond the goal of 325,000 and accelerate their training and equipment process.xxxix In November, Maj. Gen. Caldwell announced there would be a significant Iraqi troop boost of about 30,000. This increase would be two-fold:

18,796 new soldiers were needed to fill 8 new combat brigades, and 12,000 troops would be needed to provide existing units with 110% force levels. These 110% force levels were needed to compensate for the regular leaves granted to troops so they could bring their pay to their families in absence of a functioning banking system. These leaves, coupled with absenteeism, had left units undermanned, in some cases by as much as 25%. The plan was to achieve/maintain operational capability by nominally overmanning units. According to Caldwell:

The 30,000 have already been identified. [...] by the end of November, the first 10,000 will be fully trained and equipped and moved into the Iraqi security forces and then another 10,000 for the next two months each.”xl
Caldwell also announced an annual recruiting goal of 15,000 new soldiers for the Iraqi Army to maintain the current end strength. The new soldiers’ training program was to last 7 weeks, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not expect more US and other trainers to be needed for this mission. He also did not believe the training of these extra forces would prolong the US mission.xli

**The Possibility of US Force Cuts and “Benchmarks”**

At the same time, senior US policymakers suggested alternative political routes. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage suggested troop withdrawals in case of Iraqi government failure to enact reforms more quickly.xlii Joseph R. Biden Jr., the top Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in late October called for the establishment of three regional governments in Iraq – one Shi’ite, one Sunni, and one Kurdish.xliii Senators Carl Levin and Jack Reed suggested another plan, which received the backing of almost all Senate Democrats. House Democrats like Jack Murtha put forth yet other redeployment plans. Hillary Clinton backed the idea of an oil trust that would guarantee that all Iraqis would benefit from the country’s oil wealth, rather than dividing it up by region or ethnic/religious group.xliv

On the other hand, Republican Senator John Warner emphasized that the al-Maliki government needed time to contain violence.xlv Many senior Republicans with close ties to the administration also believed that an aggressive new diplomatic initiative for a Middle East peace settlement and an attempt to engage Iraq’s neighbors (Syria, Iran) were needed to stabilize the country, possibly by organizing an international conference.

Many were waiting for the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton.xlvi Despite much speculation, it was not clear in early November what recommendations the Iraq Study Group would likely give. One likely point, however, was a diplomatic effort to involve Syria and Iran in the solution of Iraq’s problems.xlvii

**Military Reviews and Warnings**

The Joint Staff, meanwhile, was conducting its own review of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well for the broader “Global War on Terror.” The strategy review began in September 2006 and was originally supposed to last 60 days. Although participants were not authorized to speak about the ongoing review process, there was growing consensus among the top brass that more US troops were needed to crush the insurgency and convince the Iraqi public that the US would win, so that Iraqis would have the confidence to support the government and Coalition forces.xlviii The review appears to be favoring a version of one option called “Go Long.” It would temporarily boost US troop levels, followed by subsequent troop reductions and a shift of emphasis to military training and advising.xlix The group’s results were expected in mid-December.

Several retired US generals, including outspoken critics of the war and of Secretary Rumsfeld, openly warned against quick withdrawals and the idea of pressuring the Iraqi government with troop reductions. Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, former head of CENTCOM, stated that

> The logic of this is you put pressure on Maliki and force him to stand up to this. Well, you can’t put pressure on a wounded guy. There is a premise that the Iraqis are not doing enough now, that there is a capability that they have not employed or used. I am not so sure they are capable of stopping sectarian violence.
Zinni instead suggested deploying additional US forces over the next six months to “regain momentum” as part of a broader stabilization effort that would involve economic as well as security force training measures.

Retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste also spoke out against withdrawing US forces too soon. Calling Congressional proposals “terribly naïve,” he said:

> There are lots of things that have to happen to set them up for success. Until they happen, it dies not matter what we tell Maliki.

Batiste argued that the US should instead take a number of proactive steps, including new measures against Iraq’s high unemployment rate, a renewed effort to secure its borders, better cooperation with tribal leaders, a diplomatic effort to engage Iraq’s neighbors, stepped-up training of Iraqi security forces, as well as an effort to weaken, or if necessary, defeat the militias.

Nevertheless, reports also emerged of a growing number of US officers, including senior Army officers, beginning to privately advocate hard timelines for troop reductions to increase pressure on the Iraqi government to find political solutions necessary to improve the security situation. While no officers would advocate such ultimatums publicly, an increasing number had come to the conclusion that a US presence without a deadline enabled Baghdad politicians to avoid making compromises. The logic behind this shift in opinion was that the gridlock in the government was regarded as a greater obstacle to achieving stability than the violence itself. Even though the administration remained publicly opposed to hard withdrawal timetables, military officers felt in late October that it was now acceptable to at least contemplate them, now that the US embassy in Baghdad was drafting benchmarks for the Iraqi government.

> “Even though there are deep reservoirs of unhappiness in the military about certain aspects of administration policy, active duty guys are very reluctant to publicly disagree with the leadership. But the signals are clear from the administration that it is acceptable to talk about timetables. They are taking their cues from their civilian masters.” Kurt Campbell, former DoD official

The debate whether the US should impose timelines and deadlines for Iraqi government security performance heated up in late October, when US ambassador Khalilzad outlined a number of political milestones both the US and Iraqi government had agreed on. They concerned oil revenue sharing, a reconciliation program, and a plan to counter militias. Al-Maliki appeared to reject these benchmarks the day after Khalilzad spoke, but after some further disagreement on the issue the prime minister and the ambassador agreed on a timeline for several political reforms.

Just the week before Bush’s comments, British Army chief Sir Richard Dannatt had suggested that British troops were exacerbating security problems in Iraq and argued for a speedy exit. Prime Minister Blair and General Dannatt later insisted that their views on Iraq were congruent, but did not refer to Dannatt’s original remarks.

Administration policy appeared to rapidly evolve after the mid-term elections on November 7, 2006. President Bush announced the resignation of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on November 8, replacing him with former CIA director Robert M. Gates, who had participated in the Iraq Study Group. Although Gates’ views on the war were not immediately clear, both journalists and politicians expected a policy shift sooner rather than later. According to administration officials, Bush was aware that Gates planned to “clear the E Ring” of the Pentagon of several of Rumsfeld’s senior political appointees.
Gate’s appointment was also seen as a carefully orchestrated attempt to correct policy by symbolically firing Rumsfeld and hiring one of his critics.\textsuperscript{lv}

On November 14, 2006, the President also launched his own formal policy review on the war, asking officials from all national security agencies to prepare a report by mid-December. Administration officials said this report was not intended to compete with the Baker-Hamilton Commission’s findings.\textsuperscript{lv}

While the outline of any new US policy was not clear, it seemed likely there would be more pressure on the Iraqi government to control sectarian violence and growing Democratic pressure to reduce US troop levels.\textsuperscript{lvii} One sign of increased “pressure” came on November 13, just after the US mid-term elections, when CENTOM chief Gen. John P. Abizaid “sternly warned” Prime Minister Maliki that he had to disband Shi’ite militias and provide proof to the US government of successfully completing that process.\textsuperscript{lvii} Senior administration officials said that the President was also considering the idea of significantly increasing US troop levels, but cautioned that this was unlikely without far more Iraqi troops and an increased pacification effort by the Maliki government.\textsuperscript{lviii} In the days after the US mid-term elections, the Democratic call to reduce troop levels “within months” appeared to gain momentum.\textsuperscript{lix}

The reactions from Iraqi officials were mixed; some expressed fear here was that the new Democratic majorities would lead the US to cut funds and to withdraw too many forces too quickly, while others did not foresee a major impact.\textsuperscript{lx} Overall, however, there did not seem to be a strong Iraqi reaction to the US 2006 elections.\textsuperscript{lx}

**Disagreement Between Maliki and the US Administration**

Maliki’s initial reaction to Khalilzad’s comments was strong. The Prime Minister said in an interview on October 26 that Khalilzad's use of the term “benchmark” had been inaccurate. Rather, they had agreed on the issues that needed to be solved, not on a timetable for his government. He was also critical of Coalition performance in training Iraqi security forces, saying that the inadequate equipment of policemen was “the responsibility of the Coalition because they created them [the police]. Maybe they thought that the country would not slip into this situation. Well, now that we are here we need them to build the army quickly.” He also said that “we agree our forces need work but think that if, as we are asking, the rebuilding of our forces was in our own hands, then it would take not 12-18 months but six might be enough.”\textsuperscript{lxii}

Justifying his own policies, Maliki said:

> As far as ‘tough decisions’ go, I say we want to take firm and difficult decision. But anyone who wants to take a difficult decision has to do so from solid ground and so far the ground is unstable – due to current security policies. If anyone is responsible for the poor security situation in Iraq it is the Coalition. I am now prime minister and overall commander of the armed forces yet I cannot move a single company without Coalition approval because of the U.N. mandate. So those who have the authority and could move the forces are also responsible. This should be clear.\textsuperscript{lxii}

Maliki also used the opportunity to criticize US operations in Sadr city.\textsuperscript{lxiv}

**Iranian Influence in Iraq**

Most Shi’ite political parties had strong links with Tehran. SCIRI’s orientation towards the Iranian regime was longstanding and well-documented – the party was formed in
Tehran in 1982 and its armed wing, the Badr Organization, was trained, even staffed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Chatham House also argued that Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army was the probable recipient of Iranian fighters should the time come for an all-out fight between the Mahdi Army and US forces.

Iranian influence was not only felt in the south or in Shi’ite regions – Kurdistan remained vulnerable to Iranian (and Turkish) meddling and “could be turned into a dangerous and volatile region, like the rest of Iraq.” A senior coalition intelligence official said that Iran funded many different groups to ensure continued influence no matter which one came out on top.

Iraqi political and Shi’ite religious leadership viewed Iran’s role with concern. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the pre-eminent Shi’ite cleric, had a very different theological outlook than many Iranian-based clerics. Al-Sistani’s ideas of the separation of the spiritual and political realms was at odds with Iranian style rule of the clerics. Chatham house in 2006 evaluated that:

> “Several Iranian-based Ayatollahs may be well placed to succeed Sistani if anything untoward happened to him, including Kazim al-Haeri of Qom. If this happened, the political landscape of the centre and south of Iraq would change overnight.

There is also a struggle for supremacy in the Shi’a world between the most prominent of the religious centers, and especially Najaf and Qom. During Saddam’s rule, Najaf was virtually off limits as a centre of pilgrimage and Qom benefitted greatly. However, the situation has changed and Najaf is again the pre-eminent city. Maintaining this trend, and keeping control of Najaf away from the clutches of Iran, must surely be on the minds of the learned men of the religious establishment.”

Politically, Iraqis viewed Iranian influence with some sympathy, but realized they had to accommodate both US and Iranian demands.

> “The view from Iraq, however, is in keeping with most of the Arab world outside the Gulf – i.e. why should Iran not have a nuclear weapon? There is little apparent danger that any such weapon would be deployed against Iraq, especially as Iraq is now dominated by Shi’a parties and movements, and it is unrealistic to think that Iraq could pose a threat to Iran at any time in the foreseeable future. Rather, Iraqis tend to view Iran’s bomb as a ‘Muslim bomb’, balancing against it the fact that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, and that the US presence in the region continues unabated.

But Iraqis also recognize that they are caught between the geopolitical wishes of two powers, both of which have to be satisfied. The US maintains a dominant presence on their territory, and retains formative influence over Iraq’s development and integration into the international community. The wishes of the US, therefore, cannot be ignored. But the problem is that the same argument can be applied to the Iran-Iraq relationship. In terms of pure influence, Tehran now has more than Washington and, more importantly, its ability to affect Iraq exists at the level of the street in addition to the more confined spaces of the Green Zone. Furthermore, the ability of Iran to influence Iraqi decision-makers is very well developed, not only among the Shi’a leadership, but also with the Kurds, and to a lesser extent, the Sunnis. Caught between such immovable forces, the Iraqi government may find itself having to say one thing to the US, but in effect, taking pragmatic actions that are more satisfying for Iran.”

President Jalal Talabani publicly spoke out against regional (Iranian) interference in September 2006, threatening that Iraq was prepared to “make trouble” with its neighbors if countries like Iran, Turkey, and Syria did not “stop interfering in our internal affairs.”
III. Trends in Attacks and Violence and Their Impact on Iraqi Force Development

The growing increase in insurgent and sectarian violence provided another powerful set of influences on Iraqi force development during the course of 2006. Despite of a variety of new options in Baghdad and the country as a whole during the summer the average number of weekly attacks continued to increase.

Rising Levels of Violence

Attacks against Coalition forces, the ISF, the civilian population, and infrastructure, increased 15% between May 2006 and the beginning of September, and Iraqi casualties increased by 51% compared to the previous quarter.\textsuperscript{lxv}

The majority (63%) of the attacks over this period were directed against coalition forces. However, the insurgents did not seek close engagement with Coalition forces and the majority of attacks against Coalition forces consisted of IEDs, small arms fire and indirect fire weapons.

A US Central Command briefing slide dated October 18, 2006 described CENTCOM’s assessment of the overall security situation. The slide is shown in Figure 3.1. It was published by the New York Times on November 1, and showed a significant rise in civil conflict since the February bombing of the Samarra shrine, and includes a continuing downward trend in the week before it was prepared. CENTCOM noted several indicators of a deteriorating situation, while the one positive indicator was that fewer “ISF refuse to take orders from central government, [fewer] mass desertions.”\textsuperscript{lxvi}
Figure 3.1
CENTCOM View of Iraq’s Civil War, October 18, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Reads:</th>
<th>Additional Indicators:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political / religious leaders increase public hostile rhetoric</td>
<td>Militias expand security role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▲ Political / religious leaders lose moderating influence over constituents</td>
<td>▲ Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Provocative sectarian attacks / assassinations</td>
<td>▲ Police ineffectual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Unorganized spontaneous mass civil conflict</td>
<td>▲ Army ineffectual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▲ Neighbors enable violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▲ Sectarian tensions / violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>displace populace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▲ Sectarian conflicts between / within ISF forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▲ ISF refuse to take orders from central government, mass desertion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>▲ Kurdish accelerate moves toward secession / annexing Kirkuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Low level violence motivated by sectarian differences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Urban areas experiencing “ethnic cleansing” campaigns to consolidate control … violence at all-time high, spreading geographically.

Baghdad and Anbar continued to be the most volatile provinces accounting for 55% of attacks. According to a June 2006 UN report, an increasingly complex armed opposition continued to be capable of maintaining a consistently high level of violence across Iraq. The worst-affected cities were Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, and Diyala, while other areas, particularly Basra and Kirkuk, saw an increase in the number of violent incidents. Figures published in late September 2006 reported more than 250,000 Iraqis displaced by sectarian violence.

On September 20, 2006, the US military reported a “recent” increase in attacks by Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, other insurgents, and death squads, together with the expectation of a further rise in attacks during Ramadan 2006. The number of deaths among Iraqi security forces, however, fell to 150 in September 2006, the lowest number since June and among the lowest in 18 months. This happened even as US military casualties were climbing.

Possible factors for this development included both insurgents’ concentration on attacking US forces and a stronger and more able Iraqi force. One indication that insurgents have indeed shifted their focus back towards Americans was a radio address by Al Qa’ida in Iraq’s new leader Abu Ayyub Masri calling for such a shift. The trend of fewer casualties among Iraqi forces continued in October, with 139 killed, according to Interior Ministry figures, while US casualties climbed to the highest monthly total in 2006. This number was substantially below the more than 300 Iraqi forces casualties the US military commander in Iraq had announced for Ramadan. (9/23 – 10/22 2006)

Gen. Caldwell attributed the high American death toll in October to “very conscious and deliberate operation” in Ramadi.

Some trends were more uncertain. For example, there appeared to be a drop in civilian casualties during the last week in October. The White House announced a 41% drop in sectarian killings in Baghdad from the high Ramadan levels, and a nationwide casualty drop of approximately 23%. The White House also stated that IED activity, while still producing the most casualties, was at its lowest level in seven months. White House Press Secretary Tony Snow announced that “These statistics are promising, but as I’ve said before, one week does not constitute a trend.”

**Overall Attack Levels**

Attack levels continued to follow the seasonal pattern of increasing through the spring and summer and decreasing in the fall and winter months. Overlaid on this seasonal variation, however, was a trend of increasing violence. Overall, attacks increased by 23% from 2004 to 2005. The number of attacks rose to the highest level ever in July 2006. Indicating increasing violence, total attacks reported from January 2006 through July 2006 were about 57% higher than the total reported during the corresponding period in 2005.

**Patterns in Weekly Attacks**

Figure 3.2 shows the ebb and flow of weekly attacks during different periods and the overall increase in attacks, reflecting the record highs during the summer of 2006.
Figure 3.2:
Average Weekly Attacks by Time Period 1 Apr 04-11 Aug 06

Source: MNC-I, as adapted from: US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress, p. 31; Note: +/- 5% margin of error.

Rising ISF and Iraqi Civilian Casualties

ISF and Iraqi civilians suffered the majority of casualties even though they only received a minority of the overall number of attacks, the. **Figure 3.3** illustrates the ever increasing number of Iraqi casualties, even as the Coalition casualties stabilized. Overall, Iraqi casualties increased by 51% over the previous quarter. Additionally the proportion of attacks targeting civilians increased from making up 11% of all attacks in April 2006 to 15% of all attacks in June 2006. In Baghdad attacks against civilians began at a higher percentage in April (15%) and reflected a greater increase than in the country as a whole, climbing to 22% in June. A report by UNAMI’s Human Rights office stated in September that 3,590 civilians were killed in Iraq during July and 3,009 during August. These figures resulted in a two-month total of 6,599 civilians killed, a record high, increasing from the 6,000 that were killed in the previous two months. For Baghdad, the numbers were 2,884 in July and 2,222 in August, the decrease most likely being the result of greater security because of the “Together Forward” large-scale sweeps. The numbers in Baghdad included body counts from both the morgue and from hospitals in the capitol.

Some American officials said that the morgue’s numbers were inflated. In addition to the record number of civilian deaths, 3780 Iraqi civilians were wounded in July (number estimated) and 4,309 in August, marking a 14% increase. While the numbers decreased from July to August in Baghdad, casualty figures climbed in other areas, notably in Diyala and Mosul, and “further increases were evident towards the end of the month in Baghdad and other governorates.”

The US military initially claimed that new security measures had caused a significant drop in civilian murders in Baghdad during August. However, it later admitted that these numbers did not include mass attacks in either month’s count, which when included showed less improvement in the overall number of civilian deaths in the capitol for July.
and August. Casting further doubt on the existence of significant improvements in the numbers of civilian casualties, the report suggested that while the many deaths occurring in Baghdad were relatively well reported, the numbers reflect a low count of casualties for areas outside the capitol because of data collection difficulties. Anbar Province, for example, which includes Fallujah and Ramadi, reported no deaths in July. lxxxiii
Figure 3.3
Iraqi Government Reports of Civilian Deaths from Political Violence 2006

Rising Average Daily Levels of Violence

As Figure 3.4 shows, the number of Iraqi civilians killed by political, sectarian and ethnic violence continued to climb, according to Interior Ministry figures. While these numbers are significantly lower than UN estimates or the disputed study undertaken by the medical journal The Lancet, they do attest to intensifying violence against civilians, with 1,089 deaths in September and 1,289 in October 2006. According to these numbers, 42 Iraqi civilians were killed per day in October, 18% more than in September.\textsuperscript{lxxxiv}

The casualty figures issued by the Iraqi government, however, threatened to become more politicized. The Prime Minister’s office in October instructed the health ministry to stop providing mortality figures to the UN. The UN’s top official in Iraq, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, warned in a confidential cable that this might affect the UN’s ability to accurately record the number of civilians killed or wounded. The Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad (controlled by the health ministry) had been supplying UN investigators with raw figures from morgues on violent civilian deaths since July 2005. The health ministry’s department of operation provided similar figures from hospitals. One reason for the information cut-off may have been the Prime Minister’s suspicion that the health ministry, controlled by politicians allied to Muqtada al-Sadr, were deliberately overstating fatality numbers.\textsuperscript{lxxxv}

Despite this intended change in information policy, health minister Ali Shammar estimated on November 9, 2006, that an estimated 150,000 civilians had been killed since the 2003 invasion. He later said this figure was based on an estimated average of 100 bodies per day taken to morgues and hospitals, although this calculation would yield a number closer to 133,000 fatalities. Hassan Salem of SCIRI said the 150,000 figure included not only civilian deaths, but also police fatalities and kidnapping victims. Shammar said: “It is an estimate.” His number was three times as high as an LA Times estimate in June that was based on Health Ministry and Baghdad morgue statistics.\textsuperscript{lxxxvi}
Torture, Kidnappings, and Disappearances

Torture continued to be widespread, not only by death squads, but also in official detention centers, where some detainees showed signs of beating, as well as use of “electrical cables, wounds in different parts of their bodies, including in the head and genitals, broken bones of legs and hands, electric and cigarette burns.” Bodies found in Baghdad (most likely victims of death squads) often showed signs of torture that included “acid-induced injuries and burns caused by chemical substances, missing skin, broken bones (back, hands and legs), missing eyes, missing teeth and wounds caused by power drills or nails.” These victims were frequently found dead on the streets with execution style gunshot wounds.

The increase in violence not only caused problems in terms of security and increased casualties, but also caused problem in political and economic spheres. The State Department reported to Congress in July 2006 that the recent increase in violence had hindered Coalition efforts to engage with Iraqi partners. For example, sectarian divisions and violence frustrated Iraqi government efforts to foster reconciliation.

Kidnappings and threats to embassy personnel made some Iraqi ministers reluctant to meet US personnel. A lack of security also hindered relations between Provincial Reconstruction Teams and provincial leaders. The UN noted that security problems were hampering reconstruction efforts, that the diplomatic community remained under serious threat, and that international agencies needed improved security to provide their
services. Overall, the State Department argued that a basic security level was a prerequisite for improvements other realms, which together would help achieve the conditions for withdrawing US forces.

**Increasing Sectarian Violence**

What had become a Sunni insurgency during 2005, increasingly became a sectarian struggle between Sunni and Shi’a factions during 2006 that effectively escalated into a state of limited civil war. Much of the violence was concentrated on controlling the capital, leading to the overwhelming majority of casualties being reported in Baghdad. However increasing violence between Sunni and Shi’a extremists, violence between Kurds and Arabs took place in virtually every mixed area in Iraq. Sunni insurgents, like Shi’ite militias, engaged in ethnic cleansing in urban centers, threatening or killing Shi’ite residents.

The increase in sectarian violence led not only to death and injury but also to further displacements. The UN estimated that about 150,000 Iraqis had fled from their homes as of June 30, 2006, primarily because of direct or indirect threats against them or attacks on family members and their community. Because internally displaced persons’ were competing for limited services, their plight could lead to further intercommunal animosities and generate further displacement. In its August report to Congress on stability and security in Iraq, the Department of Defense acknowledged these trends noting:

> Setbacks in the levels and nature of violence in Iraq affect all other measures of stability, reconstruction, and transition. Sectarian tensions increased over the past quarter, manifested in an increasing numbers of internally displaced persons. Sunni and Shi’a extremists, particularly al-Qa’ida in Iraq and rogue elements of Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), are increasingly interlocked in retaliatory violence and are contesting control of ethnically mixed areas to expand their existing areas of influence.

In an interview with The Associated Press on September 21, 2006, General Casey emphasized the changing nature of the insurgency, saying, “We’re starting to see this conflict here transition from an insurgency against us to a struggle for the division of political and economic power among Iraqis.”

This shift also changed the attitude of different Iraqi actors towards US troops. As Shi’ite militia violence continued to grow, Baghdad’s Sunnis sometimes became more welcoming towards US forces, seeing them increasingly as protectors against death squads.

> “There’s no question we’re seeing that the Sunni extremist elements are in fact being much more engaging with coalition forces. If you go into neighborhoods where traditionally in the past we found some real anti-coalition-force sentiment, it’s probably turned around almost 180.” Maj. Gen. William Caldwell
Figure 3.5:

Sectarian Incidents and Violence: May 2005 – July 2006

Casualty data reflect updated data for each period and are derived from unverified initial reports submitted by coalition elements responding to an incident; the inconclusiveness of these numbers constrains them to be used only for comparative purposes.

Source: MNC-I, as adapted from: US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress, p. 35; Note: +/- 5% margin of error

**Insurgent Attacks on the ISF**

Sectarian and ethnic conflicts were scarcely the only security problem affecting the development of Iraqi security forces; they were key targets in the effort to block the creation of effective Iraqi forces and a key reason many elements of the Iraqi force development effort did not provide a realistic basis for recruiting, training, equipping, and committing Iraqi forces. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the Sunni insurgency remained a pressing problem, even after the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qa'ida in Iraq. DoD reported that al-Qa'ida remained capable of conducting operations due to its resilient command structure of semi-autonomous cells.

October’s 9-month high in US fatalities was driven by assaults by Sunni Arab insurgents, demonstrating their undiminished capability to conduct anti-Coalition operations. 43 of the 103 US deaths occurred in Baghdad, mostly in the capital’s Sunni-dominated western neighborhoods, possibly indicating a shifting focus away from the Sunni heartland to
Baghdad. Yet, two thirds of the attacks continued to occur outside the capital. The other focus of insurgent activity remained Anbar province, with most attacks occurring in Ramadi, the embattled provincial capital.\textsuperscript{xcvii}

Al-Qa'ida in Iraq stepped up insurgency activity during Ramadan 2006, showing that it is apparently not operating at its capability limit.\textsuperscript{xcviii} Al-Qa'ida leadership's broad direction of attacks through public statements also appeared to work, as suggested by the increase in attacks on US forces in the two weeks after its leadership called on insurgents to target American forces on September 7, 2006.\textsuperscript{xcix}

It should be emphasized that foreign fighters still made up a small percentage of the Sunni insurgency, around 20\% according to Iraq's national security advisor, Mowaffak Rubaie, and 10\% or less according to a Brookings Institution Report.\textsuperscript{x} Their total numbers were estimated in the range from 800 to 2,000 in October 2006, with a total insurgency strength of over 20,000 people. The US military estimated that between 50 and 70 foreign fighters crossed the border into Iraq every month, while US and Iraqi forces captured 630 foreign fighters between January and mid-September 2006 (an average of 74 per month). Meanwhile, most insurgents were native Iraqi Sunni Islamists or members of the old Ba'ath party regime.\textsuperscript{ci}

US military spokesman Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell said in November 2006 that Iraqi and US forces had killed more than 425 foreign fighters and caught more than 670 in Iraq in 2006. More than 20\% of those detained came from Syria, Caldwell said.\textsuperscript{cii}

**New Patterns in Insurgent Violence**

Changes continued in insurgent tactics. Insurgents were reported in September 2006 to have started using involuntary “suicide” bombers. This technique involves kidnapping motorists, putting bombs in their cars, and then setting their victims free with their rigged vehicles, detonating the bombs by remote control once the car reached a checkpoint or another target deemed valuable.\textsuperscript{ciii}

Insurgency attacks on the Iraqi security forces in October included the following incidents. Note that “insurgency” and “militia” attacks could not always be clearly distinguished:

- **October 1, 2006**: A policeman was killed in Mosul. Police found the body of another policeman a day after he was kidnapped in the town of al-Shirqat. Mortar rounds landed on a police station wounding seven people, including four policemen, in Mosul.
- **October 2, 2006**: 3 bomb incidents targeting Iraqi security forces killed two people and wounded 7. 3 attacks by gunmen killed 4 police officers, including a colonel in the Interior Ministry, and wounded 5
- **October 3, 2006**: Gunmen attacked a police checkpoint near Tikrit late on Monday, killing a police officer and wounding a policeman.
- **October 4, 2006**: A roadside bomb in Anbar province blasted the motorcade of a police chief, killing six policemen and seriously wounding their chief. A suicide car bomber struck an Iraqi police and army checkpoint in Tal Afar, wounding three policemen, two soldiers and nine civilians. At least 14 people were killed and 75 wounded in a car bomb attack in central Baghdad targeting the convoy of Iraq's industry minister. Two of the bodyguards were killed. A suicide truck bomber blew himself up outside the Iraqi army headquarters in western Ramadi. Only the bomber was killed but a number were wounded. An Iraqi Army brigadier escaped an assassination attempt when his vehicle was struck by a roadside bomb in Kirkuk. Mortar rounds hit an army recruitment centre killing four recruits and wounding eight others in Mosul. A roadside bomb
targeting a police patrol wounded a policeman and a civilian in central Baghdad. Gunmen killed two policemen and wounded four people in the town of Baquba. A suicide car bomber wounded four policemen in Ramadi.

- **October 5, 2006**: A roadside bomb targeting a police patrol wounded two policemen in Mahmudiya. Gunmen killed two people, including a policeman, in Falluja. Gunmen also killed a police officer in Baquba. Police Brigadier Shaaban al-Obeidi died of wounds he sustained in a roadside bombing near his convoy on Wednesday in Anbar province.

- **October 7, 2006**: A suicide car bomb killed 14 people, including four soldiers, and wounded 13, including nine civilians, at a checkpoint in Tal Afar. A roadside bomb killed one policeman in southern Baghdad. Gunmen attacked an Iraqi army checkpoint and wounded four soldiers near Ishaqi. One gunman was killed.

- **October 8, 2006**: Three roadside bombs in Baghdad wounded at least seven policemen. A mortar round landed near a police patrol, killing one policeman and wounding two people. Gunmen killed a policeman and his 8-year-old son in Samarra. One policeman was wounded by gunmen in Baghdad. Baghdad police found the body of the deputy chief of the Interior Ministry internal affairs office. A roadside bomb killed the police chief of Rabia, a small town near the Syrian border.

- **October 9, 2006**: A suicide car bomber killed a policeman and wounded 11 others - a policeman and 10 civilians - at a police checkpoint in Tal Afar. Gunmen shot dead police Colonel Faleh al-Obeidi in Baquba. A roadside bomb killed two policemen and wounded three others near Baquba.

- **October 10, 2006**: Two roadside bombs targeting police wounded five civilians in Mosul. Another roadside bomb killed two policemen in Mussayab. Gunmen killed a police captain in Mosul and two policemen near Kirkuk. Another policeman was shot near Hilla.

- **October 11, 2006**: A roadside bomb targeting a police patrol exploded in west-central Baghdad, killing one and wounding six, including three policemen. Two more roadside bombs targeting a police patrol in eastern Baghdad wounded eight people, including three policemen. One insurgent and two policemen were killed and four people were wounded following clashes after gunmen attacked a police station south of Baghdad. A policeman was shot in front of his house in Falluja. Brigadier Qais al-Mamouri, chief of Babil police, escaped an assassination attempt when his convoy was struck by a roadside bomb in Iskandariya.

- **October 12, 2006**: A motorbike strapped with explosives targeted a police patrol and killed three people, including a policeman, and wounded 15, including five policemen, in Qahira district. Gunmen attacked a police station on Wednesday, killing a policeman and freeing 10 detainees near Diwaniya.

- **October 13, 2006**: A bomb planted inside a police station in Hilla killed Colonel Salam al-Mamoury, commander of a special police force, his deputy and six others. The blast wounded 10 others and punched a hole in the building's ceiling in Hilla.

- **October 14, 2006**: Three policemen were wounded when two mortar rounds hit their building near Hawija.

- **October 15, 2006**: Five people were killed, including three policemen, in Tal Afar by a suicide bomber. In Baghdad, a roadside bomb targeting the convoy of a Finance Ministry official killed four civilians and wounded six. Clashes between gunmen and Iraqi police on Saturday night left three policemen wounded in an area between Baghdad and Kut. Nine gunmen were also arrested.

- **October 16, 2006**: Gunmen killed Farouq Atta, an air force brigadier, and wounded two of his companions on Sunday in northern Baghdad. A roadside bomb targeted the convoy of Mohammad Daeekh, the head of the police crime department, wounding one of his bodyguards in Najaf. Gunmen killed two bodyguards of former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari in Khalis. Three roadside bombs killed three civilians and wounded seven other people, including a policeman, near a bank in central Baghdad. Clashes between police and gunmen killed three people and wounded five in central Baghdad. Gunmen killed 5 more policemen, wounded two, and kidnapped three in different towns and cities.
• October 17, 2006: A suicide car bomber targeted an Iraqi army checkpoint, killing a soldier and wounding two others in Shirqat. A roadside bomb in Baghdad produced the same number of victims. Another suicide car bomber targeting police commandos killed two police and wounded nine, including four civilians, in Baghdad. A roadside bomb aimed at a police patrol wounded five civilians in eastern Baghdad. Also in Baghdad, a mortar round killed two people and wounded three policemen. Gunmen killed a man and wounded a policeman when they attacked the house of the brother of Mosul's governor.

• October 18, 2006: Gunmen killed a policeman in Falluja and another policeman as he was leaving his house in Suwayra. A car bomb targeting an Iraqi army patrol in central Baghdad wounded five civilians. Police found the body of a police officer shot dead in an area between Kerbala and Hilla.

• October 19, 2006: A former police chief, Brigadier Sabar al-Janabi, was killed in front of his home in Falluja on Thursday. He had been detained by U.S. forces and released two weeks before. In Baghdad, gunmen shot dead police Colonel Basim Qasim. A roadside bomb in the capital targeting a police patrol killed five people -- three policemen and two civilians -- and wounded 12, nine of them civilians. Gunmen attacked a police station in Baghdad and killed four policemen and wounded 10 civilians. A car bomb and a roadside bomb in targeting a police patrol killed a civilian and wounded five others in Baghdad, including two policemen. In Kirkuk, a suicide car bomber targeted Iraqi army troops collecting salaries from a bank. He killed at least eight people and wounded 70 others. Also in Kirkuk, two roadside bombs targeting police patrols wounded three policemen and a civilian. Near Kirkuk, a suicide car bomb killed two Iraqi soldiers and wounded four more. Six suicide bombers in vehicles, including one in a fuel truck, attacked Iraqi police and U.S. patrols in Mosul, and insurgents fired mortars and clashed with police. The violence killed at least 20 people. Three Iraqi policemen were killed in clashes with gunmen near Baquba.

• October 21, 2006: Insurgents killed six policemen and wounded two others when they attacked a police station in Baghdad. Also in the capital, gunmen wounded a policeman and two civilians. Gunmen killed three policemen after attacking their patrol in Baquba. A roadside bomb killed two Iraqi soldiers and wounded four in Diwaniya. The governor of Diyal province Raad Rasheed al- Timimi escaped an assassination attempt when a roadside bomb exploded near his motorcade in Baquba.

• October 22, 2006: Gunmen in a car shot and killed one civilian and wounded two policemen in Kirkuk. One civilian was killed and five people, including two policemen, were wounded when a roadside bomb exploded near a police patrol in Latifiya. Two policemen were killed while they were defusing a bomb placed on the side of the road in Iskandariya. Two children were wounded in the attack. Assailants bombed the house of a policeman who was killed a week ago in Mosul, wounding five of his neighbors.

• October 23, 2006: Men at a checkpoint beheaded nine people, including some policemen, after pulling them out of two cars in Baiji.

• October 24, 2006: Clashes erupted between gunmen and police in southern Baghdad, killing two civilians and wounding eight others. Two roadside bombs exploded in quick succession in Kirkuk. The first targeted the police deputy chief and wounded one of his security guards. The second exploded near a police station, wounding two policemen and two civilians. A roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi army patrol killed two soldiers and wounded another one in central Kirkuk.

• October 25, 2006: A roadside bomb targeting a police patrol wounded two policemen in Baghdad. Gunmen wounded a policeman in Diwaniya.

• October 26, 2006: Gunmen ambushed an Iraqi police convoy near Baquba, killing 28 policemen, including the commander, and wounding 25. Earlier, gunmen attacked an Iraqi special police force station near Baquba, killing six police and wounding 10. A suicide bomber in Tal Afar detonated his explosive-laden belt and injured two Iraqi soldiers. Clashes between
gunmen and Iraqi police erupted in towns near Baquba, and hospital sources said there were casualties.

- **October 28, 2006**: A roadside bomb exploded near an Iraqi police patrol, killing one policeman and wounding three. A roadside bomb targeting security forces guarding an oil industry facility wounded two police officers in eastern Baghdad. A third car bomb exploded near a municipal building in Dujail, wounding five people including a policeman. In Falluja, at least two soldiers and one civilian were killed in clashes between Iraqi army and insurgents. Another three civilians were wounded. One Iraqi soldier was killed and three wounded when they raided a house in Hawija and clashed with gunmen inside. Also in Hawija, gunmen killed the head of a women's organization and then shot dead a police officer as they fled her home. Gunmen kidnapped 11 Iraqi soldiers traveling in a minibus at a fake checkpoint in the town of Udaim.

- **October 29, 2006**: A roadside bomb exploded near a police patrol, seriously wounding two people, including a policeman, in the centre of Kirkuk. Gunmen clashed with the Iraqi army on Saturday, killing three soldiers and wounding four near Balad. Gunmen shot dead a policeman near a checkpoint in Kut. Gunmen also killed three people and seriously wounded two, including a police major, in two different incidents on Saturday in Baquba.

- **October 30, 2006**: Police found four bodies, including that of a policeman, in different parts of Mosul. A roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi army convoy injured one soldier, also in Mosul. A suicide car bomber hit an Iraqi army checkpoint at a border pass near Syria, killing four soldiers and wounding one. An hour earlier, another suicide bomber attacked the same checkpoint, causing no casualties. A suicide attacker blew himself up inside a police headquarters in Kirkuk, killing two policemen and a three-year-old girl and wounding 19, including 10 policemen. Police said the attacker was wearing a police officer uniform. Gunmen attacked a police centre in Baiji, killing two policemen. Police retrieved the bodies of six policemen bearing signs of torture and with bullet wounds from a river in Suwayra.

- **October 31**: A roadside bomb targeting a police patrol killed a policeman and wounded three others in Baghdad. A roadside bomb killed one policeman and one civilian in the western city of Falluja. Two civilians were also wounded. Also in Falluja, an Iraqi army soldier died in clashes with gunmen. Four "terrorists" and one Iraqi army lieutenant were killed during a raid on a building used by militants in Tal Afar. Four gunmen and an Iraqi army soldier were killed in clashes in the same city. In Baquba, clashes between gunmen and police left a policeman dead and three others wounded.

**Infrastructure Attacks**

Poor security conditions continued to hamper efforts to rebuild Iraq’s economy. Indicators include the following:

- Iraq’s oil production remained under target levels: during the week of August 16-22, Iraq produced 2.17 million barrels per day, while the Oil Ministry’s goal was 2.5 million barrels (the pre-war level was about 2.6 million barrels per day)
- Over the same week, electricity availability averaged around 5.9 hours per day in Baghdad and 10.7 hours nationwide. Electricity output for the week was only about 9% above the same period in 2005.

Despite the continuing decrease in the number of infrastructure attacks shown in **Figure 3.6**, they continued to have a significant impact. In addition to decreases in production major oil pipelines continue to be sabotaged, shutting down exports. Efforts to increase electricity output by a greater amount were also injured by repeated sabotaging of major electrical transmission lines. To combat these problems, the US planned on focusing efforts on strengthening the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions.
Figure 3.6
Infrastructure Attacks Weekly Average* by Time Period 1 Apr 04-11 Aug 06

The United States has invested about $320.3 million up to October 2006 to improve Iraq’s capability to protect its oil and electricity infrastructure. The protection of key infrastructure nodes and an upgraded Iraqi government capability to protect them itself are part of the overall strategy of the current administration. The US has done much to further this self-sustaining infrastructure protection effort, including the training and equipment of several special security services, and partnering them with coalition forces. These services are the:

- Strategic Infrastructure Battalions
- Oil Protection Force
- Electrical Power Security Service

The SIGIR estimated that between January 2004 and March 2006, Iraq lost a potential $16 billion in oil export revenues because of constraints on its export ability. While MNF-I data on infrastructure attacks is classified, the Iraqi Ministries of Oil and Electricity provide unclassified data. The oil ministry’s data, however, paints an incomplete picture of the attacks on and the vulnerabilities of the energy infrastructure, because it only notes attacks on pipelines, not the “nodal portions of the infrastructure.”

The SIGIR further notes that insurgent attacks is only part of the problem – Iraq’s energy infrastructure is also plagued by criminal activity and simply by its own age and poor maintenance.

Shiite Militias: Open Challenges, Police Infiltration, and Underground Death Squads

“This is the toughest thing I hope I ever do: fighting a counterinsurgency atop a sectarian conflict.” Col. James Pasquarette, commander of the Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team.
At the same time, civil conflict presented a growing problem. Shiite Militias of varying sizes played a steadily rising role in the violence in Iraq during mid 2005 to the fall of 2006. According to the CENTCOM commander, they became the largest contributors to sectarian violence in the country. They targeted Sunnis, mostly civilians, both in retaliation for insurgent attacks and for sectarian reasons. Sunnis in mixed-sect neighborhoods in turn formed local “neighborhood watches”.

The Uncertain Role of the Mahdi Militia

According to a report by the RIIA in 2006, Mahdi Army membership “may now be several hundred thousand strong and is itching for the opportunity to be unleashed upon both the Arab Sunni insurgents and the Multinational Force.” A US Army intelligence analyst in Baghdad said in October 2006 that

“They’ve infiltrated every branch of public service and every political office they could get their hands on. As soon as the US leaves, they’ll be able to dominate the area with key citizens, key positions, key offices. They’ll pretty much have the lay of the land.” – Sgt. 1st Class Jeff Nelson, intelligence analyst with the US Army’s 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment

The same analyst reported ethnic cleansing activities carried out by the Mahdi Army in Baghdad. Its members would paint large red Xs on the sides of houses the militia wanted vacated. People knew they had a few days before it would be firebombed. The organization used this tactic to clear entire clans from neighborhoods and drive rivals from neighborhoods under its control.

US forces found it difficult to respond to death squads in their training mission: “To fight these extrajudicial killings effectively, we need to be embedded, almost one to one, with the Iraqi forces. We need to watch their every move,” said Sgt. 1st Class Jeff Nelson, an intelligence analyst with the US Army’s 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment in Baghdad. Nelson further stated that arrests for sectarian killings were rare because of militia affiliations of Iraqi security forces. When US forces had intelligence on a death squad or killing, they would often share it with their Iraqi counterpart, leading to leaks and blown operation. The Sergeant reported that his battalion had investigated 40 sectarian killings and collected 57 bodies one particular week, with none leading to an arrest. “Sometimes we have a feeling of complete hopelessness,” he said.

Meanwhile, Sadr City, the home territory of the Mahdi Army, was one of the safest parts of Baghdad. Mahdi Army death squads would go to other, contested parts of the city, commit violence, and then return to Sadr City and blend back into the general population there. US officers in Baghdad examined where the victims of sectarian killings were found in Baghdad, and concluded that the perpetrators mostly came from Sadr city:

“Sadr City. That’s the nucleus.” Capt. Will Wade, 1st Battalion, 77th Armored Regiment.

“They’re in the export business, so a lot of their force is outside Sadr City. The fact that the Corleones or the Gottis may live in my neighborhood doesn’t mean they do all their business there.” Maj. Charles St.Clair, military advisor in Sadr City with the 506th Regimental Combat Team

While the Mahdi Army caused more and more violence in, it was not clear how firm Sadr's control over his militia really was. Many security officials believed that he was losing the grip on extremist members. A senior coalition intelligence official in Baghdad said in September 2006: “There are fractures politically inside Sadr’s movement, many of whom don’t find him to be sufficiently radical now that he has taken
a political course of action.\textsuperscript{cxv} One report put the number of “rogue” Mahdi Army members as high as a third of the militia.\textsuperscript{cxvi}

A Coalition intelligence official said in September there were at least six senior militia leaders striking out on their own, including Abu Dera, whom Sunnis believe to be responsible for thousands of murders.\textsuperscript{cxvii} News reports citing “defense sources” reported the loss of control over “large numbers” of militiamen who had formed independent death squads to murder civilians around Baghdad.\textsuperscript{cxviii} Prime Minister Maliki commented that “we don’t know what Mahdi Army means any more.”\textsuperscript{cxix} These defections increased Iran’s avenues for manipulation in Iraq, with more independent Shi’ite groups that could be influenced.\textsuperscript{cxx}

\textbf{The Failure to Disband or Control the Militias}

The problems created by militias being seen as protectors by “their” constituencies became evident when US troops cordoned the Sadr City district in Baghdad in October, looking for a kidnapped US soldier as well as a particularly notorious death squad leader. The US operation forced the Mahdi Army underground in the area, and when attacks happened in the usually safe neighborhood, Sadr supporters blamed the Americans for suppressing the only force that protected them.\textsuperscript{cxxi} Prime Minister Maliki ordered the end of the operation on October 31.\textsuperscript{cxxii}

Prime Minister al-Maliki made several statements to the effect that militias had to be disbanded.\textsuperscript{cxxiii} But his government either lacked the will or the capacity to back his words up with enforcement measures, since they had no apparent effect on the size and vitality of these organizations. Al-Maliki also stressed that “the dissolution of militias must be through the political powers.”\textsuperscript{cxxiv} He stated in late October that the Sunni insurgency was still the main engine of sectarian violence in the country.\textsuperscript{cxxv}

The efforts for all political groups should be focused on the most dangerous challenge, which is al Qa’ida and the Saddam Ba’athists.

After the bombing in Samarra there was sectarian tension. The Mahdi Army and the Badr group and some independents had a reaction to that. But the government managed to stop that. […] Terrorism and the militias are separate issues. There is a political plan aimed at making the militias the priority. The militias are not acceptable but they are not the main reason [for the security situation]. Terrorism is the main reason. There is Sunni pressure and Arab pressure on this but we reject drawing a veil over the Ba’ath party and terrorism. At least we can talk to the militias, we know who they are. The follow Muqtada al Sadr, the Dawa party, Badr etc. We can talk to them but who are terrorists loyal to and who do they follow? Nouri al Maliki, Oct. 26, 2006\textsuperscript{cxxvi}

\textbf{Shi’ite Militias and Links to the ISF}

Shiite militias not only ‘competed’ with the security forces for domination of neighborhoods and cities, they tried to directly influence government forces’ behavior through infiltration and intimidation. They threatened policemen with attacks on their families to coerce their cooperation, for example to let militia members pass checkpoints unsearched. This problem was much harder to address for the government as well as for US officials than infiltration, because it could not be solved by a rather straightforward process like vetting recruits. US troops in Baghdad tried to prevent intimidation of police officers by watching for suspicious cars leaving a police station, with unknown results.\textsuperscript{cxxvii}
Militia infiltration of the security forces not only took place at the level of policemen and soldiers, but, significantly, also at the political level. Iraqi policemen complained that whenever they moved against militias, they would receive phone calls from top politicians telling them to allow these militias to operate. This put commanders in the uncomfortable position of either letting radicals operate freely in their area of responsibility or risking their job. Some American officers went so far as saying that they could judge the importance of a captured Sunni insurgent or Shi’ite militiaman by the number of high-ranking Iraqi commanders calling to demand his release.

The two most influential Shi’ite militias -- Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades (the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)) -- openly challenged Iraqi police’s control of Baghdad and Basra. Other cities were affected, such as Diwaniya, where on August 28 the Mahdi Army battled with Iraqi Army and police for hours in a fight that left at least 40 dead, including 25 soldiers. The background for this clash was the arrest of prominent Sadr supporters by Iraqi forces. The raids were carried out by Iraqi Army units backed by Polish troops. Sadr’s office in Diwaniyah claimed that the arrests had not been made, as usual, by Iraqi police, but by Army units without warrants.

The two largest Shi'ite militias were also major players in Iraqi national politics: Muqtada al-Sadr not only controlled the Mahdi army, but his followers were in charge of 4 out of 40 Iraqi ministries: the ministries of health, transportation, agriculture, and tourism and antiquities. According to a DoD report, the Sadr militia enjoyed popular support in Baghdad and the southern provinces, and was tolerated by some in the Iraqi government. The second big Shi’ite militia, the Badr organization, was the paramilitary wing of SCIRI, one of the two largest Shi’ite political parties in the new government. One of Iraq’s two deputy presidents and the Minister of Finance are SCIRI members.

Moreover, Shiite militias operated underground death squads and appeared to be infiltrating both the police and the army. According to a statement by Gen. George Casey in August 2006, Shi’ite death squads were now responsible for 60% of the killings in Baghdad. One day later, US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad put the percentage of sectarian violence at 77%. There was an increase of incidents in which men in Interior Ministry uniforms rounded up Sunni men, mostly civilians, who were later found dead, hands bound in police handcuffs, showing signs of torture, and shot execution-style. This type of killing started in May 2005, shortly after Bayan Jabr took office as interior minister. Jabr, who was out of office by August 2006, maintained that the perpetrators were outsiders in stolen uniforms. He claimed that death squads mainly emerged from private security services, such as the Facility Protection Service.

Iraqi authorities did try to counteract infiltration. In early October, they pulled an entire brigade of about 700 policemen out of service in its biggest move ever to remove troops with links to death squads. Progress was still at best mixed, as the experience of the American police transition team of the 372nd Military Police Battalion in Baghdad illustrates.

The signs of the militias are everywhere at the Sholeh police station. Posters celebrating Moqtada al-Sadr, head of the Mahdi Army militia, dot the building’s walls. The police chief sometimes remarks that Shiite militias should wipe out all Sunnis. […]
Seventy percent of the Iraqi police force has been infiltrated by militias, primarily the Mahdi Army, according to [the head of the police transition team] and other military police trainers. Police officers are too terrified to patrol enormous swaths of the capital. And while there are some good cops, many have been assassinated or are considering quitting the force. […]

American soldiers said that although they gather evidence of police ties to the militias and present it to Iraqi officials, no one has ever been criminally charged or even lost their jobs. […]

The American soldiers and civilians who train the Iraqis are constantly on guard against the possibility that the police might turn against them. Even in the police headquarters for all of western Baghdad, on of the safest police buildings in the capital, the training team will not remove their body armor or helmets. An armed soldier is assigned to protect each trainer. […]

[The deputy team chief] estimated it would take 30 to 40 years before the Iraqi police could function properly, perhaps longer if the militia infiltration and corruption continue to increase.cxxxviii

It is difficult to precisely attribute such killings to specific ISF and police units or distinguish which were performance by elements of the ISF and by underground groups, but police were probably culpable for some of the incidents, given the frequency of the murders and the practice of recruiting police from local militias. GAO also reported that Shi’ite militias tried to place members into army and police units as a way to serve their interests.cxxxix

There was at least one instance of the Mahdi Army publicly disavowing killings by certain death squads while these death squads continued to serve it by killing Sadr’s enemies. cxxix

Interior minister Bolani told reporters in October 2006 that “very few, individual” security forces were actually involved in death squad activity, with the majority of the culprits coming from the Facilities Protection Service. He also blamed the bodyguards of unnamed politicians to be involved. Bolani described a “problem of impressions” regarding the police role in sectarian killings. The minister stressed the ongoing reforms of the police force, such as retraining efforts and requiring loyalty oaths. He said major changes were needed at the command level of his ministry itself and that he had the government’s support to implement them.cxli

In September 2006, senior US officers for the first time publicly questioned prime minister al-Maliki’s tactics for ending sectarian violence, implying this government was not doing enough in this respect.

> We have to fix this militia issue. We can’t have armed militias competing with Iraq’s security forces. But I have to trust the prime minister to decide when it is that we do that. *Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, second-highest-ranking US military official in Baghdad*

> [The militias are] a problem that the government must deal with immediately. *Major General James Thurman, commander of US forces in Baghdad* cxlii

The prime minister announced a plan on October 3 to deal with militias, saying that only the police should be armed and that militias threaten the future of the government. His comments remained unspecific, however, and only outlined committees that would further investigate the problem.cxlii

Further north, the violence had a more ethnic than religious dimension: in Kirkuk, for example, Iraq’s third-largest city, Arabs and Kurds struggled violently for the control of the city.
Shi’ite Militias and Links to Iran

Some Shi’ite groups had ties to the government of Iran. According to the Director of National Intelligence, Iran provided guidance to political groups as well as weapons and training to militant groups to enable attacks against Coalition forces. Iran also contributed to the increasing lethality of insurgent attacks by enabling Shi’ite militants to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles, similar to those developed by the Lebanese Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{cxliv}

During an August 23 press briefing, the new Deputy Director of Operations for the Joint Staff, Brigadier General Michael Barbero, indicated that there was evidence of Iranian elements inside Iraq helping to train Shi’ite extremists. He further stated that there was “irrefutable” evidence that Iran was responsible for training, funding, and equipping some of the Shiite groups, particularly with advanced IED technology, and that it was his belief that it was the policy of the central government in Tehran to support Shi’ite extremist groups in Iraq.

Wayne White, who led the State Department’s Iraq intelligence team during the war, said a well-placed friend had seen “considerable physical evidence of it, and just about everyone in (Maysan province) knew about it.” Meanwhile, the British troops patrolling Maysan province at the border with Iran were unconvinced that arms were being smuggled into the country from the east. The following comments on the subject were made by British army officers stationed in Maysan province and in Basrah.

“We have found no credible evidence to suggest there is weapons smuggling across the border.”
\textit{Maj. Dominic Roberts}

“I suspect there’s nothing out there. And I intend to prove it.” \textit{Lt. Col. David Labouchere}

“It’s a question of intelligence versus evidence. One hears word of mouth, but one has to see it with one’s own eyes. These are serious consequences, aren’t they?” \textit{Brig. James Everard}

Not only British military personnel thought there were no weapons being smuggled into Iraq from Iran. British Defense Secretary Des Browne said in late August that

“I have not myself seen any evidence – and I don’t think any evidence exists – of government-supported or instigated” armed support of Iran in Iraq.\textsuperscript{cxlv}

Barbero did state, however, that during the five weeks preceding the briefing, the number of incidents of sectarian violence had dropped steadily, with a corresponding drop in the number of attacks on infrastructure in the preceding three weeks. He also pointed to the denouncement of Iran by two Shiite political parties in Iraq that week as a positive development. The two groups publicly called Tehran to task as a destabilizing force responsible for increased violence in Iraq.\textsuperscript{cxlvii} It is also important to note that British forces operating near the Iranian border did not find evidence of Iranian infiltration or arms transfers.\textsuperscript{cxlvii}

Sunni Reprisals Against the Militias and ISF

Sunni groups responded by targeting Shiites collaborating with the police.\textsuperscript{cxlviii} According to the August 2006 DoD report, however, Sunni Arabs had not yet formally organized militias, relying instead on neighborhood watches, Sunni insurgents, and increasingly, al-Qaeda in Iraq.\textsuperscript{cxlix}
Saleh Mutlaq, a moderate Sunni politician, said in late October 2006 that Al Qa'ida in Iraq was gaining support at the expense of the nationalist resistance, claiming that many inmates of US prisons in Iraq were transformed into Al Qa'ida elements during their captivity. The validity of these claims was not immediately clear.\textsuperscript{11}

The UN reported in March 2006 that the deteriorating security situation was evidenced by increased levels of sectarian strife and the sectarian nature of the violence, particularly in ethnically mixed areas. The following figure, taken from the September 2006 GAO report, shows Iraq’s ethnic distribution. Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, and southwest of Basra are key ethnically mixed areas.

11, 2006, p.13

Although US and UN officials recognize the importance of demobilizing the militias, Ambassador Khalilzad stated that it depended on a reduction in the Sunni insurgency. The Ambassador stressed the need for an integrated demobilization involving all sides. This idea was complicated by the fact that both Shi’ite militias and Sunni insurgents increasingly saw themselves as their respective communities’ protectors. DoD in August 2006 reported a self-reinforcing cycle of violence.\textsuperscript{12} Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, under pressure from the national government, had publicly called for an end of sectarian violence and the general disbandment of militias in the country. For Sadr, however, the dissolution of his militia or its integration into the regular security forces would not have been in his interest.\textsuperscript{13} Meanwhile, there were calls by US and Iraqi military officers for the government to officially order militia disarmament:

Until the government comes out and says, ‘Disarm the militias,’ it’s a very ambiguous situation. (…) If there was an announcement by the government, there would be not more ambiguity.”\textsuperscript{(Col. Doug Heckman, US Army)}\textsuperscript{14} In mid-June, Coalition and Iraqi forces had started to clear Baghdad of militia forces, but this mission was still not completed by the end of August.\textsuperscript{15}

**The Uncertain Role of Kurdish Security Forces and Militias**

In Kurdistan, the rivalry for control of key cities between Kurds and Arabs continued. In and around Mosul, 40 to 50 people were being killed each week, according to the city’s deputy governor, Khasro Goran. 70,000 Kurds fled their homes between January and September 2006, many intimidated by death threats. Goran, expected the violence to get worse leading up to the decision what areas would be included into Kurdistan at the end of 2007. He advocated the division of the province.

No single group controlled Mosul in the fall of 2006. The 2\textsuperscript{nd} Iraqi Army Division was based in the city, and the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Division outside it, each 15,000-strong, and both of them at least 50% Kurdish, and with Kurdish commanders. US forces, however, have forbidden these units to patrol too aggressively in order to not provoke negative Sunni Arab reactions. Meanwhile, Mosul’s police force is Arab-controlled, 16,000 policemen are deployed in the province, 6,000 of them in the city. They are not trusted by the city’s Kurds, who had already long accused them of being sympathetic to the Sunni insurgency.

The relationship between US and Arab security forces deteriorated after most police officers resigned in response to the Battle of Fallujah in November 2004. US and Kurdish forces, however, still cooperate, and the Americans there heavily rely on Kurdish
intelligence to search for guerrillas. US forces, originally based at four locations in the city, had retreated to one large base at the airport by fall 2006.

The conflict in predominantly Kurdish areas also played out in the local security forces. In Jalawla, for example, a police station was transferred to a new – Arab – commander in September 2006, prompting Kurdish militiamen to seize the station to prevent the transfer. They were led by the new commander’s predecessor.

Also in September 2006, the regional parliament of Kurdistan sent a draft constitution to the government in Baghdad that included Kirkuk and other disputed areas in the Kurdish-controlled areas.\textsuperscript{cvi}

The militia issue in Kurdistan also had regional implications, with Turkey demanding military action from Iraq to disarm the PKK, which Iraq has so far refused to take. The US on the one hand realized that the Kurds were its strongest allies in Iraq, but on the other hand needed to placate Turkey as a long-standing ally, and wanted to prevent Ankara from turning towards Iran and Syria, who shared Turkey’s interests in suppressing Kurdish nationalist ambitions.\textsuperscript{cvii}

Israeli security contractors seem to have secretly trained Kurdish soldiers, starting in 2004. They were employees of the firms Kudo and Colosium, both subsidiaries of Interop, an Israeli security consulting firm, although both Kudo and Colosium described themselves as Swiss-registered companies. The former Israeli commando soldiers were said to be training two groups of Kurdish soldiers, one guarding the international airport at Irbil (Hawler), and a group of Peshmerga fighters for “special assignments,” such as shooting an attacker in a crowd. It was not clear what type of soldiers comprised the group destined to guard the airport. In addition to training, Kudo provided quad bikes, communications equipment and security fencing. During 2004-5, Interop and Kudo were run by Shlomi Michaels, a former head of Israel's counter-terrorist unit. Any public connection to Israel is a sensitive issue for Kurdish officials, since their political enemies have long accused them of cooperating with Israel.\textsuperscript{cviii}
IV. Progress in Iraqi Force Development: Honestly Addressing the Present State of Iraqi Security Forces

The effort to create effective Iraqi military, national security and police forces is marginally more successful than Iraq political and economic efforts, but scarcely the level of success the US planned even at the beginning of 2006. It is also far less successful than the Department of Defense has claimed, and has been presented in recent testimony to Congress. It is never clear whether the problem is “spin,” the search for political advantage, the desire to avoid seeing the US accept defeat, or self-deception. The reality is, however, that virtually nothing the US officially says about Iraqi force development can now be taken at face value.

The US has reported Iraqi manning levels based on the number of men it has trained and equipped that often bear no resemblance to the actual manning levels of men that are still in service. It has claimed that Iraqi units are in the lead that in fact have little or no real operational capability or activity, mixing units that reflect very real mission capability with ones that are failed force elements that should actually be assigned the lowest levels of readiness. It has mixed real transfers of responsibility to effective Iraqi forces with cosmetic, politically motivated transfers to Iraqi commands and units that cannot perform such missions and often are dependent on US armor, artillery, airpower, logistics and service support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R).

Rushing Force Development Towards Defeat

In all too many cases, the US has rushed Iraqi battalions and force elements into being and then into combat before they are ready, effectively undercutting the Iraqi force development process and sometimes gravely weakening fledging Iraqi units that are not ready to perform such missions. It often has used US advisors and embedded training teams that also are not ready for them missions they are supposed to perform, compounding the problems inherent in creating new units.

Other problems come from trying to use force elements built for local defense missions on a national level and in far more demanding forms of counterinsurgency warfare and civil conflict missions than they were recruited for and designed to fight. There are additional problems with corruption, nepotism, creating sufficient junior officers and NCOs, and providing the levels of firepower, mobility, and communications Iraqi forces really need. Hollow units do not learn by being thrust prematurely into combat; they are crippled or wasted.

Setting Fundamentally Wrong Priorities and Conditions

A major cultural problem in the US military is compounded by the political effort to exaggerate success. Iraq has a major leadership and unit cohesion problem, but the often single-minded US military effort to focus on these aspects of force development has been dangerous from the start. Human beings do not live in the dawn of tomorrow; they live in the noon of today. Most Iraqi officers and NCOs are inevitably caught up in the pressures of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic differences. Most Iraqi enlisted men volunteer because they need the money, because their dependents are desperately in need of their support.
At the level of officers and NCOs, the options are ultimately political conciliation and compromise, division by sect or ethnicity with a strong risk of creating separate Shi’ite or Sunni force, or a coup or strong man. The same is true of other ranks in both the regular forces and police. All desperately need an effective pay system and enough income to resist corruption and infiltration? All need family support and adequate means of getting pay to their families. Medical services are critical; so are real-world death and disability benefits. No effort that is not founded on pay and benefits, rather than leadership and motivation, can possibly succeed.

Similarly, it is impossible to treat all Iraqi forces as if they were truly national and could be deployed on a national level. Some units do behave in this manner, and many more can be created over time. The fact is, however, that most Iraqi regulars were recruited for local defense and far less demanding missions. Most police are local, and will be driven by local interest and political conditions. The local role of militias and various non-“national” security forces cannot be ignored, and must somehow be integrated into the ISF structure or given incentives to disband. No ISF effort can succeed that does not explicitly recognize these realities.

**Success and Failure by Force Element**

If one looks at the real readiness of the Iraqi defense effort, it may be summarized as follows:

- **Ministry of Defense**: Still very much a work in progress. Poorly organized, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, poor planning and fiscal control capability, problems with corruption.

- **The regular army, air force, and navy (130,000 claimed to be operational; real number unknown, but probably below 100,000)**: Some battalion sized elements of the Army (128,230 men trained and equipped) are emerging as a real force at the infantry battalion level with some light mechanized and armored elements. Beginning to emerge as real divisions and brigades, although many headquarters, command and control, combat and service support, logistic and intelligence elements are missing or having little capability. The regular Iraqi military still cannot operate without massive MNF-I support, embedded US and other coalition advisory teams, and largely US mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, fixed and rotary wing air support, air mobility, and logistic and service support.

Air Force (740 men) is at best a small cadre of forces with token reconnaissance and air transport capability. Navy (1,130 men) is slowly emerging as capable of carrying out own patrol missions, but is severely limited in operational capability with little real support capability.

The MNF-I has reported that roughly 92% of the authorized Iraqi Army battalions had been created, and the force building efforts to train and equip forces now focused on combat support forces. It also reported over 65% of authorized personnel in the Iraqi Army support forces were trained and equipped.

Such reports are misleading to the point of being actively dishonest. There are severe problems in much of the reporting on Iraqi forces, and no clear distinction is made between the number of men who went through the training process and the number still on service. The rising manpower and combat unit totals conceal many critical problems in given elements of the ISF order of battle. Gross numbers grossly exaggerate capability.

Even more serious problems exist with reports that say the regular Iraqi forces are taking the lead, and the MNF-I has been successful in transferring responsibility to Iraqi forces and command. The regular military and some paramilitary National Police units are making real progress – but most units are severely undermanned, have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly faciliteted, and many are Shi’ite or Kurdish dominated.
While progress was occurring in the army, discussions with MNF-I experts indicate that major manning and equipment shortfalls existed in given battalions and units, and that substantial numbers of combat battalions said to be “in the lead” had less than 30-50% of their authorized manning actually present in the unit.

The Department of Defense has reported that 8 SIBs and 106 battalions are in combat, but it is unlikely that even one-third of these totals reflect realistic warfighting capability and there is no way to assess their willingness to engage as truly national forces in civil conflict.

One respected journalist stated on November 28, 2006, “The Iraqi army has about 134,000 men (trained and equipped), but about half are doing only stationary guard duty…of the half that conduct operations, only about 10 battalions are effective – well under 10,000 men.” If anything like these figures are true, then recent MNF-I claims that, “in mid-October 2006 that six of the 10 Iraqi divisions – 30 of the 36 brigades and almost 90 of the 112 battalions were “in the lead,”” border on the absurd.

Iraqi forces will be highly dependent on US and other MNF-I support well into 2008, and probably through 2010. Only a truly radical improvement in political conciliation could reduce this dependence, and the present drift towards added civil conflict could sharply increase it.

• **Ministry of Interior**: Still very much a work in progress and lags behind the MoD in capability. Poorly organized, with elements more loyal to Shi’ite and Kurdish parties than nation. Poor planning and fiscal control capability, serious problems with corruption.

• **The National Police** *(24,400 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown, but closer to 20,000)*: Some elements have been properly reorganized and are as effective as regular army units. Most still present problems in terms of both loyalty and effectiveness. Still are some ties to Shi’ite and Kurdish militias. A number of units have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilitated.

• **Other MOI Forces** *(27,510 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number unknown, but closer to 22,000)*: Most elements, like the Border Police, are just acquiring proper training and have only light equipment and poor facilities. Some elements are capable in undemanding missions. Most are underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Many are poorly facilitated.

• **The Regular Police** *(120,190 claimed to be trained and equipped; real number probably under 85,000)*: Underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Many will not fight or act if face a local threat. Desertion and absence rates high. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or the police have strong ties to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces. Many are poorly facilitated.

The problems in the “trained and equipped police” forces are compounded by large number of locally recruited “police” and security forces loyal to local leaders and sectarian and ethnic factions. Various sectarian and ethnic militias are the real “police” in many areas.

• **Facilities Protection Force, Pipeline Protection Force, and other limited security forces**: Underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or are tied to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces.

The US and MNF-I plans that called for Iraqi regular military forces to allow significant Coalition troop reductions in 2006 have failed. Worse, the effort to develop the Iraqi police and security forces has gotten badly out of balance with the effort to develop regular forces and lags more than a year behind it. The so-called “year of the police” has barely begun and will at best gather momentum in 2007. Real-world Iraqi dependence on the present scale of US and allied military support and advisory efforts will continue well into 2008 at the earliest and probably to 2010. Major US and allied troop reductions need to be put on hold indefinitely.

Iraqi forces simply are not ready to assume the burden of national defense. Moreover, even if more effective and realistic force development plans are implemented and given
the proper resources, they will still fail unless Iraqi military progress is matched by Iraqi political progress. The only way to avoid this continuing dependence on the US and other outside power without greatly increasing the risk of a major civil war, and collapse of the Iraqi force development effort, would be a level of political conciliation so great as to fundamentally undermine the insurgency and end the drift towards civil war.

**Uncertain Leadership by the MoD and MoI**

The appointment of a new Minister of Defense on June 8th brought an end to nearly half a year without clear leadership, but scarcely created an effective Ministry. The new Minister, Abd al-Qadr Muhammad Jassim al-Mufraqi, had only limited experience and inherited a Ministry whose staff had limited competence, a reputation for favoritism and corruption, and was deeply divided along sectarian and ethnic lines.

His status as a Sunni raised questions about his authority in a Shi’ite-Kurd dominated government, and he faced rivals in the form of a Sunni Minister of the Interior, Jawad al-Bolani, and two rival and duplicate national security advisors: Muwafaq al-Rubai, the National Security Advisor first appointed under the CPA; and Shirwan al-Waili, the new Minister of Staff for National Security Affairs. Moreover, Prime Minister Maliki called for a major shake-up of his cabinet on November 12, 2006, casting serious doubt as to how long both Mufraqi and the MOI Jawad Bolani would stay in office.

There also were many complaints about the MOI, similar to those about the MoD. MOI Bolani’s case is interesting because he was picked for the exact qualities that came to haunt him: Although he was a Sunni, he came from a nonpartisan, secular background and did not have strong political ties. US officials continued to publicly back Bolani and praised his efforts against corruption and sectarian violence originating within the ministry, pointing out that he had fired 1,775 personnel in his first 60 days, more than any previous minister.

Some Iraqi officials, however, cast him as an ineffective leader who had done little to root out corruption or quell sectarian violence. They singled out his failure to directly challenge known Badr Brigade members within the ministry, especially a cell of militia commanders located on the seventh floor of the Interior Ministry headquarters building. Allegedly, powerful Badr and Mahdi leaders had marginalized Bolani within his own ministry.

At least publicly, however, Bolani did not acquiesce to militia demands. In October, he described the Mahdi Army, along with Sunni insurgent groups, as “outside the political body and structure,” and said “we do not approve of the existence of these militias.”

Bolani also stressed his ministry’s anti-corruption efforts, saying they had purged about 3,000 employees from their ranks for “corruption.” 1,228 of those employees had received administrative punishment, while 10 to 20% had been referred for possible prosecution.

Early October brought new charges against Bolani, this time from Shi’ite parliamentarians. They charged he was letting too many former Ba’ath party members into the police.
Expanding and “Transforming” Iraqi Forces

Overall readiness and manning of all ISF elements still presents major problems that are likely to take several years to solve. Iraq faces major challenges in creating the forces it needs to deal with the mix of threats, especially if the US and its allies attempt to accelerate the transfer of real world responsibility to the Iraqi Army, MOI forces, and police.

While over 300,000 men have been trained and equipped, a large percentage has since left and deserted, substantial numbers have been killed and wounded, and some 10-20% of those who remain are absent at any given time because they leave to take care of their families and transfer their pay in a country where there is no meaningful banking system. The Iraqi regular forces and National Police may only be about 20-25% short of the totals reported for trained and equipped manpower, but the percentages could be much higher. There certainly are many battalion elements with manning levels well under 50%, and many units with critical shortages of officers and NCOs.

The shortfalls in actual strength versus “trained and equipped” figures for the regular police and Facilities Protection Force are much larger, probably well in excess of 30% of the total of men reported as trained and equipped and possibly on the order of 50% -- although so many phantom men, absentees, and inert but manned units exist that any estimates are difficult to impossible. Many units are clearly so badly manned that they are phantom or hollow forces, but the Department of Defense has reported that there is no accurate way to track the total, and anecdotal data are far less reliable than for the regular forces.

Furthermore, such manpower totals would be highly misleading even if they had some shred of credibility. Some units actually have excess manpower, while others have far more serious shortfalls than the average. Units may have adequate total manpower, but be critically short of officers and/or NCOs. Without a break out of manpower that also shows officers and NCOs on hand, total manning data provides little insight into force capability, the time needed to make Iraqi forces effective or for units to replace US and other MNF-I forces, and it is generally more misleading than useful.

The challenges Iraq faces are further complicated by the fact that all Iraqi forces, including the army, were recruited and equipped to serve locally in limited defensive roles, not act as mobile forces trained and equipped to act as active combat units deployable throughout the country to deal with insurgency and civil conflict. This means the recruiting base must now be changed, new pay and arrangements are needed to create a nationally deployable force, and new equipment and facilities will be need for the deployable units thrust into more serious combat.

Creating More Iraqi Forces Before Existing Efforts Pay Off

The Iraqi government is already committed to expanding the Iraqi Army at what may well be an impractical rate. The 2004 campaign plan, which had elaborated and refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities, was revised in April 2006 by MNF-I. In conjunction with the US embassy in Baghdad, a new Joint Campaign Plan was issued with the goal of transferring security responsibility to Iraqi security forces.
Both the Iraqi government and MNF-I developed a consensus towards the end of the summer of 2006, however, that the total number of Iraqi Security Forces would have to be increased in order for Iraqis to assume more serious security responsibilities. The ISF numbered some 298,000 as of late August, and was expected to grow to 325,000 by year’s end. However, the Maliki government became committed to raising this number.\textsuperscript{clxiv}

In late August 2006, the MNF-I reported that the Iraqi government was developing a long-term plan to shape the type of armed forces needed 5 to 10 years in the future.\textsuperscript{clxv} Further details of the plan remained classified as of October 2006.

On October 31st, Defense Minister Abdul-Qadir announced at a Baghdad news conference that Iraq would expand the army beyond previously planned limits. He said that this was done in consultation with Gen.’s Dempsey and Casey, but reporters on the scene felt that the effort was really an “initiative undertaken by the PM to increase the size of the Iraqi Military....”

Abdul-Qadir stated on October 31st that that the Prime Minister’s Initiative for the growth of new Iraqi Army units had been approved by the Prime Minister in September. This would expand the Army by eight brigade-equivalents (approximately 18,700 soldiers). Major General Caldwell supplemented this briefing on November 2nd, and the two briefings provide the following description of the Prime Minister’s “long war” plan for transforming Iraqi forces:

- Add additional combat power in the most heavily contested areas of Iraq (Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, Al Anbar).
- Provide additional units to allow tactical commanders to establish a tactical reserve that can be deployed around the country.
- Provide an additional brigade to the 9th Iraqi Army Division to establish an operational reserve that can be moved around the country. This would be the first unit specifically recruited to act as a mobile force, rather than one designed largely for static local defense. It would begin the transformation of the Iraqi forces to act as a mobile, rather than static force. No details, however, were provided on the pay incentives, changes in equipment, changes in training, and changes in facilities necessary to begin what amounts to a “transformation” of Iraq forces.
- Recruit and train 18,000 men -- in addition to the 18,700 men to create new Iraqi units to provide individual replacements for Iraqi units. The first 10,000 men for this force element were recruited in early October and will be ready in November.
- Provide sufficient redundancy within the Iraqi Army Divisions to allow them to remove units from the battlespace periodically for rearm, refit, and retrain as part of a “long war strategy.” This is essential to allowing units to recover, go back to their home areas, and be retrained and requipped. The goal is a 10% “overage” in manning. This means recruiting 12,000 more men to act as a pool of recruits to fill in existing Iraqi units by “overmanning” their authorized strength to keep a suitable number of soldiers actually in place in such units.

Iraqi force building continued to have high priority during the summer and fall of 2006. The total cost US financial assistance for Iraqi security grew from $3.24 billion in January 2004 to about $13.7 billion in June 2006.\textsuperscript{clxvi} Most of these funds for rebuilding the military and security forces came from US sources although plans called for the new Iraqi government was expected to begin playing a greater role in the budgeting and equipment procurement process.\textsuperscript{clxvii}
Prime Minister Maliki's New Force Initiative

The Prime Minister’s Initiative called for the following new Iraqi forces and force elements, only some of which had specific unit designations and missions:

- Three (3) Division Headquarters:
  - Add 11th Division headquarters, which will split the span of control for battalions in Baghdad between Karkh and Rusafa
  - Add two (2) Strategic Infrastructure Division headquarters to improve command and control of the SIBs

- Five (5) Brigade Headquarters and 20 more Battalions

- Add 4th Bde to the 9th IA Div to provide the division to serve as the Operational Reserve for the IA with four total brigades.
- Add 4th Bde to the 5th IA Div, which will allow a brigade for Diyala.
- Add 6th Bde to the 6th IA Div, which will provide three brigades to each IA division in Baghdad.
- Add 4th Bde to the 7th IA Div, which will add a brigade to western Al Anbar province.
- Add 5th Bde to 10th IA Div.
- Add one battalion to the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Bde of the 8th IA Div, which will add a brigade-equivalent to Diwaniyah.
- Add one battalion to the 2nd and 3rd Bde of the 10th IA Div, which will add nearly two brigade equivalents to Basrash (with the additional 5th Brigade addition noted above)
- Add one (1) Special Forces Battalion to ISOF

The total estimated cost was $800 million, all to be funded by the Iraqi government. It was not explained where this money would come from, how this requirement was shaped, and where the figure of 18,700 individual replacements came from or whether it would come close to dealing with even the existing manpower shortfalls in the regular army.

As has been discussed earlier, it is far from clear that the existing level of progress can be rushed forward. It is extremely difficult to judge the quality of the Iraqi forces development effort at any level of detail using unclassified data. The Pentagon has reported that it was now using three sets of factors to measure progress in developing Iraqi security forces capabilities and responsibilities:

- The number of trained and equipped forces
- The number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that had assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas. In August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed security control.
- The capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). In August 2006, the General Accounting Office had still not obtained the unit-level TRA reports.

The resulting assessments remain classified, however, and the Department of Defense no longer reports on even overall force building in terms of Level I-IV readiness.
Rushing Iraqi Force Development at an Unrealistic Pace

At best, even currently planned efforts will take years to be effective. They are also taking place at a time the political demands on Iraqi force development are becoming steadily less realistic, and Iraqi forces continue to be pushed into service before they are ready and with US embedded training teams that often have readiness and qualification problems of their own. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the pace of Iraqi force development is being dictated by political necessity without due regard to what can really be accomplished and the inevitable loss of life to Iraqi forces that are pushed too hard, too soon. Coupled to ongoing pay problems, corruption, lack of adequate facilities and equipment, lack of proper medical care, lack of proper support for families, and death and disability payments, the end result will often be to the poverty and unemployment of Iraqi young men, and create major effectiveness, desertion, morale and motivation, and future retention problems.

Statements by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, and the impact of the US election, seem to have accelerated US scheduling and allied withdrawal, and expanding Iraqi forces, become a political necessity. It seems to be the only way for the US to stay for a significant period, and the only way to make an Iraqi takeover seem credible. Little about Iraqi performance in the field, however, indicates that the army, security forces, and police are “75% complete” as some US spokesmen had claimed in talking about an 18-24 month time period for a full scale shift of responsibility to Iraqi forces. A realistic timeframe is closer to 3 to 5 years.

The Challenge of Force Transformation

Moreover, executing a real-world handover and expansion of Iraqi forces requires a major force transformation from a static, local defense force. It means creating largely numbers of nationally deployable forces with different training, pay, equipment, mobility and support, and facilities.

This makes it highly questionable as to whether Iraqi force development can be effective in replacing US and allied forces 12 to 18 months, and that Iraqi forces can credibly expand some 36,000 to 48,000 actual men in place beyond their current size, without Iraqi success in reaching a political compromise that sharply reduces the demands for Iraqi effectiveness and the unity of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) in dealing with insurgents, militias, and death squads.

The challenge is also made more difficult by the fact that threat levels have continued to rise. It is meaningless to keep claiming that the security problems are limited to small areas, and ignore intra-Shi’ite fighting and Arab-Kurdish tensions. For example, General Casey stated in a press conference on October 26th that, “…we are in a tough fight here in the center of the country and in Anbar province. But I think it’s important to remind people that 90 percent of the sectarian violence in Iraq takes place in about a 30-mile radius from the center of Baghdad; and that secondly, 90 percent of all violence takes place in five provinces. This is not a country that is awash in sectarian violence. The situation is hard, but it’s not a country that’s awash in sectarian violence.”

This statement is more than self contradictory, it clashes with previous claims in the Department of Defense quarterly status report in August that 81% of the violence took
place in these provinces, and that statement ignored all of the softer forms of sectarian
and ethnic “cleansing” and intra-Shi’ite fighting and Arab-Kurdish tensions.

This does not mean that real progress is not being made in ISF force development, and
there are many reports of individual Iraqi units carrying out local missions, taking risks,
and taking casualties. The fact remains, however, that far too many Iraqi army units are
being credited with taking the lead or being effective in the field, and that effective units
are being lumped together with units that will not perform their missions, which are tied
to sects and factions, and which often have only 50-60% of their manning.

**Overall Progress in the Recruiting, Training and Deployment**

Approximately 322,600 Iraqi soldiers and police were reported to have completed their
initial training and equipment by November 2006. This was an increase of 10,200
over the totals of one month earlier. As the August 2006 Quarterly Status report
made clear, however, large numbers of men were absent, had deserted, or left. Much of
the equipment was missing and could not be accounted for. This was especially true of
the regular police and other MOI forces.

The MNF-I reported that roughly 92% of the authorized Iraqi Army battalions had been
created, and the force building efforts to train and equip forces now focused on combat
support forces. It also reported over 65% of authorized personnel in the Iraqi Army
support forces were trained and equipped.

Such reports are misleading to the point of being actively dishonest, however, because
there are severe problems in much of the reporting on Iraqi forces, and no clear
distinction is made between the number of men who went through the training process
and the number still on service. The rising manpower and combat unit totals conceal
many critical problems in given elements of the ISF order of battle. Gross numbers
grossly exaggerate capability.

While progress was occurring in the army, discussions with MNF-I experts indicate that
major manning and equipment shortfalls existed in given battalions and units, and that
substantial numbers of combat battalions said to be “in the lead” had less than 30-50% of
their authorized manning actually in the unit. As has been noted earlier, one credible
source claimed that, “The Iraqi army has about 134,000 men (trained and equipped), but
about half are doing only stationary guard duty…of the half that conduct operations,
only about 10 battalions are effective – well under 10,000 men.”

Nevertheless, the following figures almost certainly do reflect at least some progress:

- **Figure 4.1** shows MOI and MOD force levels according to the US Department of State, as of September 2006.

- **Figure 4.2** shows the progress in training and equipping the MOI forces, by component, as of the August 2006 DOD report to Congress.

- **Figure 4.3** shows MOD and MOI trained and equipped figures as of September 2006, according the Government Accountability Office.

That said, the Department of Defense notes to Figure 80 provide important warnings
about their accuracy. The same is true of the GAO data in Figure 82. According to GAO,
the State Department reported the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces to
have increased from about 174,000 to 294,000 from July 2005 to August 2006. The GAO also warned, however, that such numbers did not provide a complete picture of the units’ capabilities because they do not give detailed information on the status of equipment, personnel, training, and leadership. GAO also noted that these figures probably overstated the number of forces on duty.\textsuperscript{cxiv}
Figure 4.1

Trained and Equipped MOI and MOD Manpower as of November 15, 2006
(Note: These figures only show the number of men trained and equipped and have nothing to do with the manpower actually in active service in the unit.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>TRAINED &amp; EQUIPPED</th>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>OPERATIONAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICE</td>
<td>~135,000***</td>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>~132,400***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL POLICE</td>
<td>~24,400</td>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>~900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER MOI FORCES</td>
<td>~28,800</td>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>~1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>~188,200**</td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>~134,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Trained and Equipped: 322,600****

*Ministry of Interior Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are included in these numbers; **Ministry of Defense Forces: Unauthorized absence personnel are not included in these numbers; ***Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces. **** Does not include the approximately 144,000 Facilities Protection Service personnel working in 27 ministries. Source: Department of State Weekly Status report, as of November 15, 2006.

About 98% of the forces trained by MNF-I for the MOD belong to the Iraqi Army and its support forces. The Iraqi Navy and Air Force will not be fully formed until at least summer 2007.\textsuperscript{clxxv}
Figure 4.2
Trained and Equipped Manpower for Major Branches of MOI Forces
(Note: These figures only show the number of men trained and equipped and have nothing to do with the manpower and equipment actually in active service in the unit.)

Figure 4.3
GAO Figures for Trained and Equipped Troops
(Note: These figures only show the number of men trained and equipped and have nothing to do with the manpower actually in active service in the unit.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry and Component</th>
<th>July 2005</th>
<th>January 2006</th>
<th>August 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>78,200</td>
<td>105,600</td>
<td>127,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>79,100</strong></td>
<td><strong>106,900</strong></td>
<td><strong>129,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>64,100</td>
<td>82,400</td>
<td>115,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other forces</td>
<td>30,700</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>49,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>94,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>120,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>165,100</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>173,900</strong></td>
<td><strong>227,300</strong></td>
<td><strong>294,100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sectarian and Ethnic Composition: Seeking More Sunnis

There were many other problems in Iraqi force development. The Department of Defense August 2006 Quarterly Status Report described the problems in creating an effective sectarian and ethnic balance in Iraqi forces as follows:\footnote{clxxvi}

The U.S. Government is committed to creating an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, with diverse units loyal to the nation and not sectarian interests. Although competence and merit are the deciding factors when selecting recruits, particularly leaders, the ISF are developing so that they generally mirror the demographic make-up of Iraq. Sectarian lines remain drawn, however, along geographic lines, with Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurdish soldiers mostly serving in units located in geographic areas familiar to their group.

These divisions are even stronger at the battalion level, where battalion commanders of one particular group tend to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional backgrounds. The Minister of Defense, through an Officer Selection Committee, has used the normal transitions to continue to diversify the senior leadership in the Iraqi Army. This continuing process strives to ensure that the Iraqi Army is led by competent leaders who are representative of the national fabric. In the aggregate, Sunni, Kurd, and Shi’a are well and appropriately represented in senior leadership positions.

The Sunni and Kurds are slightly over-represented, while the Shi’a are slightly under-represented, though Shi’a commanders still hold a large majority of command positions. The percentage of Sunni leaders at each level remains constant. At the battalion level, the echelon in which the Shi’a have the highest percentage of commands, they are appropriately represented when compared to the demographics of the Iraqi population. The relatively high percentage of Sunni and Kurds in higher-level commands is a result of the requirement for experienced military leaders, of which few were Shi’a.

Generally, Shi’a and Kurds were excluded from higher-level positions in the former regime. The Kurds, however, benefited from years of experience in the \textit{Peshmerga}. Nationally recruited Iraqi Army divisions are otherwise representative of the ethno-religious composition of the country. The even-numbered divisions were originally formed as National Guard units, with the intent that these units would serve in the respective local regions. The composition of these units tends to be representative of the region in which they serve. Over time, replacements from the national recruiting pool will increase the diversity of these divisions.

The Iraqi government did, however, take continuing initiatives to recruit more Sunnis and to correct some of the earlier problems in de-Ba’athification that had helped block political conciliation and ISF force development. On August 15, 2006, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense started a recruiting drive that featured a direct appeal to former members of the Iraqi Army. In the first 15 days of the effort, the results were as follow:\footnote{clxxvi}

- Former Officers: 1,366
- Non-Commissioned Officers: 628
- Soldiers: 9,700

The recruitment of former officers and NCOs from the former region was particularly significant. Leadership issues and an ineffective and unfilled officer corps remained serious issues in late 2006, with some naming the outright disbanding of the former regime’s military in 2003 as a contributing factor to the void of trained personnel for leadership positions.
Uncertain Success in Recruiting

Manpower numbers also have to be linked to motivation. There is no way to tell how much recruiting reflected any real desire to join the ISF and how much was the result of Iraq’s crippling unemployment problems. The ISF did continue to have far more recruits than it could use, and August 21 saw the culmination of one of the year’s most successful recruiting efforts. For example, more than 950 new Iraqi recruits were ready to begin a 10-week Basic Police Officer training course, after a recruiting drive that focused on screening men from communities in and around the Euphrates River Valley. Some of the new recruits were to receive their training either at the Baghdad Police College, while others would be sent to the Jordan International Police Academy.

The problems lay in retention, willingness to fight, and commitment to the nation versus personal survival, tribe, and faction. Economic desperation made many volunteer. It did not make them stay, or build unit cohesion and effectiveness.

Problems with Pay, Benefits, and Corruption

There is no way to know how many problems now exist with what is probably the most critical single aspect of Iraqi force development to the Iraqis actually in the regular, National Police, and police forces. The US military and advisory effort does not seem to have a system for tracking pay, leave, transfer of money to families, health benefits, and death and disability benefits – if any. This situation is almost certainly worse in the regular police (and terrible in the various low-level security forces) than in the regular forces and National Police. It is probably inadequate to bad I most elements of Iraqi forces.

Corruption, favoritism, and nepotism are inevitable in Iraq. They are part of the political cultural and entire structure of governance. Sectarian, ethnic, and tribal divisions add to the problem, as did abolish the secular, experienced core of Iraqi governance and forces by forcing so many low and mid-level Ba’athists out of government early in the US occupation.

This had made it absolutely vital from the start to look beyond leadership and unit cohesions and create a system that can ensure that abuses are kept within reasonable bounds (those that the men in Iraqi forces can actually live with) and that recruiting, retention training, and embed efforts deal with the reality that most Iraqi officers and NCOs are inevitably caught up in the pressures of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic differences. Most Iraqi enlisted men volunteer because they need the money, because their dependents are desperately in need of their support.

It makes it equally important to have an an effective pay system that can limit the impact of corruption. It has made it critical to look beyond actual pay (and comparability) and to determine what mix of pay, getting pay to their families, medical services, and real-world death and disability benefits can hold Iraqi forces together as they develop. No effort that is not founded on pay and benefits, rather than leadership and motivation, can possibly succeed. Yet, virtually all of the discussions of Iraqi force development either ignore these issues or make mindless statements about the selflessness and patriotism of Iraqi forces. If these issues are not honestly and openly addressed, Iraqi force development cannot possibly succeed.
Critical Problems with US Embeds and Training Teams

The problems in the US training effort in Iraq is generally not well understood, nor is the fact that it has expanded far more quickly that the US can possibly find capable trainers to embed in Iraqi forces, find and retain translators, and create the core of a training effort to build paramilitary police forces – an effort for which the US military has little recent experience and internal training and core competence.

Congressional interest in this aspect of the war has been rather low, and the US Army’s studies have not been released. Even basic information, such as the number of National Guard and Reserves personnel involved in the US training effort, were unusually difficult to attain.

One of the few publicly available sources on the training program has been provided by the US Army’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth. It has conducted interviews for with US advisers to Iraqi forces for the Army’s oral history archives since shortly after the invasion in 2003. It sounds a warning that the US military, Administration, and Congress need to take with deadly seriousness in examining options to expand Iraqi forces.

The US advisers were often under the impression that their mission was given low priority and that it was not well integrated into the overall US military mission in Iraq. Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, a staff officer with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 who trained Iraqi forces, commented:

The thing the Army institutionally is still struggling to learn is that the most important thing we do in counterinsurgency is building host-nation institutions, yet all our organizations are designed around the least important line of operations: combat operations.

Many Iraqi officers seem to agree with their US counterparts that the US presence in Iraq and the advisory presence is still essential to prevent the collapse of the Iraqi government and all-out civil war. They generally viewed US military advisers as sources of great military expertise.

That said, the relationship between US military advisers, “their” Iraqi units and the US partner unit is often strained, inhibiting the Iraqi unit’s progress. Lt. Col. Carl D. Grunow, former trainer of the 2nd Armored Brigade, 9th Mechanized Division, warned:

One of the most frustrating points of friction I observed was caused by mistaken beliefs about [Iraqi units being part of Coalition forces.] Many U.S. commanders thought that the Iraqi force was part of the Coalition and OIF was another exercise in Coalition warfare. Numerous examples demonstrate how this misunderstanding created confusion and discord: An Iraqi platoon leader refusing to participate in a combined patrol because he had not received an order from his battalion commander; Iraqi patrols leaving their assigned area to respond to an MOD order to escort a convoy from Baghdad to Taji; an Iraqi brigade commander ordering a squad to remain in an ambush position, effectively masking a U.S. unit that had already occupied a position nearby; and Iraqi soldiers refusing to follow American orders to search a mosque until the order was cleared by an Iraqi division commander. […] While the American commander’s first impulse was to be furious with the Iraqis, from the perspective of building new units, there was clearly good news in this evidence of a strengthening Iraqi chain of command.

Other former military advisers are more critical of the relationship with regular US units, highlighting such basic flaws as major problems with the Army supply chain. Maj. Pete Fedak, an adviser near Fallujah in 2004, said:
As an adviser, I got the impression that there was an ‘us’ and ‘them.’ In other words, there was an American camp and then, outside, there was a bermed area for the Iraqis, of which we were part. Guys would come under fire so they could get computer supplies, paper and things like that. It was a surreal experience.

Another major problem hampering the training effort is the lack of US and local interpreters, particularly ones that can deal with local dialects and the special semantics and language skills needed for military training and operations.

Maj. Robert Dixon reported that during his tour in 2004, his team had no interpreters at all. Maj. Mike Sullivan, who also advised native forces in 2004, recounted how he would run from the headquarters to a company to “borrow an interpreter, run him over to say something, and then send him back.” The interpreters that were available were often “substandard,” speaking little or no English. This sometimes resulted in the interpreters getting fired, but the Center for Army Lessons Learned also released a study that found one unit that only learned after 10 unproductive months how badly its translators conveyed their instructions to their Iraqi students. The translations were so poor that the Iraqis had trouble to even understand the concepts taught by the Americans.

Many US military advisers were also unimpressed with their peers and their own training. While Maj. Sullivan described the US Army’s instruction for the mission as “very disappointing,” Maj. Jeffrey Allen, an active-duty soldier, noted that all other members of his team were from the National Guard. The team was supposed to have 10 members, but was only allocated five. Allen evaluated it as “weak… in particular the brigade team chief.”

An internal review by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, based on 152 interviews with soldiers involved in the training and advisory program, found that there was “no standardized guideline for preparing military advisers, despite the fact that “a majority of advisors have little to no previous experience or training.”

Iraq’s forces also received less partnership support from US units as US forces became more heavily committed during the course of 2006. At the same time, Iraqi Force Development and “placing Iraqis in the lead” officially became strategic goals, US brigade and battalion commanders had to concentrate their efforts mainly on fighting the insurgency. This left the training responsibility mainly to Iraqi commanders and their US advisers, an arrangement that “can work only if the U.S. force provides enough stability to allow the Iraqis to train and practice tactics, techniques and procedures inside and outside the wire.”

When it came to combined missions, the Iraqi Army involvement was sometimes no more than “a ‘drive-by’ pick-up of an Iraqi squad while the U.S. unit is on the way to the objective.” This type of behavior by US commanders was, of course, understandable. Training Iraqi units during combat operations involved cumbersome translation problems and distracted from the tactical objective at hand; conducting an operation as a purely US or “pick-up Iraqis on the way” mission was the easiest way to avoid these problems. It was, however, not helpful for the development of independently capable forces.

Nonetheless, there appeared to be a slow, but tangible change in US commanders’ attitudes. Especially the practice of having periodic meeting between the American commander and his Iraqi counterparts proved to be helpful.
In November 2005, an OIF III brigade commander staunchly defended his formal authority over Iraqi formations by refusing an IA division commander’s request to allow a company team to participate in a ceremony marking a donation of NATO armored vehicles. During preparation for the December election, this same colonel emphasized that ‘if we want our Iraqi units to play in our battlespace, they better be ready.’ [...] 

During OIF IV, after the sea-change directing that Iraqis be put in the lead, U.S. commanders deferred to the ‘Iraqi solution’ from MOD down to the company level. As the 2d Brigade took over its AO in May 2006, the U.S. commander respected the Iraqi commander’s prerogatives. Although misunderstandings continued to occur, the overall direction was very positive, thus reinforcing the Iraqi chain of command.\textsuperscript{clxxv}

**Key Challenges to US Advisors**

It is interesting to note in this context that Grunow listed several key challenges for US military advisers in his 2006 *Military Review* article:

- **Recruiting, retraining and accountability**: Iraqi soldiers were under effective contract, and always had the option to leave. The only instruments to keep them in the military were money and the soldiers’ sense of duty, and the military had no credible way to punish absent soldiers. Meanwhile, there were numerous incentives for soldiers to quit: from a simple fear that training was too hard to threats against their families. Grunow, who trained an Iraqi Arm armored brigade, recounts that

They have assumed roles in the new Iraqi Army at great personal risk. In my brigade alone, the litany of personal tragedy grew with depressing regularity. The commander’s brother was kidnapped and killed. The deputy commander’s cousins, hired to protect his family, were found murdered and stacked up on his doorstep with a not saying he was next. Two of four battalion commanders had to move their families because of death threats. A deputy battalion commander’s son was kidnapped and has not been found. Staff officers, soldiers, and interpreters spoke of murdered relatives or told harrowing personal stories of close calls with terrorists.

Grunow assesses that “without steadfast American support, these officers and soldiers will likely give up and consider the entire effort a lost cause.”

Another issue was personnel accountability. There were no routine accountability formations, and units usually waited until payday to get a more or less accurate picture of who was assigned to the unit. U.S. advisers actually started counting soldiers at checkpoints to get an idea of their units’ manpower.\textsuperscript{clxxvi}

- **Motivation**: Iraqi commanders were very reluctant to deploy a large percentage of their combat power on missions. US advisers tried to change this by confronting Iraqi commanders with numbers of soldiers and/or vehicles on mission, with no discernable effect. What did change the commanders’ motivation, according to Grunow, was the imminent prospect of the brigade taking the lead in its area of operations.\textsuperscript{clxxvii}

- **Understanding of the mission**: Saddam-era Iraqi commanders were still attuned to the strategy and tactics of the high-intensity Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, “a war with clear battle lines fought with mass military formations, and one in which civilians on the battlefield were a nuisance, not the center of gravity.” Officers and soldiers tried to solve current, low-intensity tactical problems with 1980s methods. “I frequently heard the refrain that if the Americans would only ‘turn them loose,’ the Iraqis would defeat the insurgency in short order,” Grunow recalls.\textsuperscript{clxxviii} His trainees had trouble understanding the strategic importance of governance, infrastructure, and the economy. They rather relied on the liberal application of force, even when it was unjust and/or ineffective. “Iraqi leaders understand our reverence for the rule of law in theory, but not in practice.” Also, officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel were reluctant at initiating and planning small-unit operations.\textsuperscript{clxxix}

Grunow also warned that the Iraqi reaction to enemy fire was more appropriate to largescale attacks than to insurgent tactics.
Unfortunately, the Iraqi ‘death blossom’ is a common tactic witnessed by nearly every U.S. Soldier who has spent any time outside the wire. Any enemy attack on the IA, whether mortar, sniper, or an improvised explosive device, provokes the average Iraqi soldier to empty his 30 round magazine and fire whatever belt of ammunition happens to be in his machine-gun. Ninety percent of the time, there is not target, and the soldiers always agree that this is extremely dangerous, in addition to being a grievous waste of ammunition. But they continue to do it.

A similar phenomenon occurs when Iraqis react to the death of a comrade on the battlefield. The reaction is very dramatic. I once observed overwrought Iraqi soldiers start to rampage through a civilian community, an event that could have been tragic if an adviser had not stepped in to stop it. At another time, an enemy sniper attack triggered a reaction that had Iraqis ‘returning fire’ nearly 90 minutes after the enemy had delivered one deadly shot. This ‘burst reaction’ may be attributed to Iraqis experiencing denial, anger, and grief all at the same time.

- **Infrastructure**: Grunow’s assessment was that some materiel and infrastructure problems could be overcome rather quickly: spare parts would become more available as the National Maintenance Contract would go into effect, soldiers would be paid more regularly, and there would be a routine system to recruit, train, and allocate new soldiers.

More time and effort were needed in order to mold the schools and training centers into a coordinated and effective military education network. Regional support centers could not immediately establish an effective logistics system. Personnel management would also need improvement. The lesson here was that “U.S. support provide[d] critical credibility while these systems [became] available.”

**Cultural Differences**

The cultural challenges affecting Iraq’s forces are less tangible, but equally important. Once again, Grunow provides important insights on the cultural factors that impact on US training of Iraqi units:

- **A more pronounced unwillingness to recognize misconduct or failure** on the part of Iraqi soldiers and officers. “Advisers have found that photographic evidence is essential to achieve a constructive after-action review.”

- **Less diligence and attention to detailed planning.**

  “Iraqis eschew operational calendars and typically forecast little beyond the next 48 to 72 hours. One example of this lack of regard for planning occurred prior to the handing over of operations to the 2d Brigade. The American commander’s battle rhythm included representation at local government meetings each week. When the Iraqis took charge of this schedule, they continually re-tasked responsibility for attendance, selected officers at random to attend and take notes, and generally failed to make the most of this opportunity to engage local leaders. The morning operations and intelligence update, a staple at every American tactical operation center (TOC) and an opportunity to synchronize operations, usually drew only token Iraqi attendance.”

- **Reactive, not proactive behavior.** Grunow relates how the unit he advised did not live up to US standards of long-term planning, but was far more comfortable with improvising on-the-spot solutions than its US partner unit.

Yet, such underlying cultural factors interacted with US and MNF-I efforts that rushed many Iraqi units into battle and very tangible differences in capability:

- Iraqi soldiers only received 3 to 5 weeks of basic training before they are faced with actual operations and combat.

- The fast deployment into the battlespace also applied to entire units. In one instance, a new brigade conducted independent operations with Coalition support only 10 months after receiving its first soldiers.

- Iraqi officers had to make do with much less technical and manpower support than US commanders. “The battle captain in a brigade combat team (BCT) runs a TOC shift of 15 officers...
and soldiers while his Iraqi counterpart typically has 2 radio operators and a cell phone to call the commander.

**Progress in the Transfer of High Level Command and US Bases**

The US and MNF-I have worked with Iraqis, its allies, and outside powers to move towards a full transfer of authority over military operations to the Iraqi government under Iraqi command, subject to suitable conditions. Some of this effort has been The US and MNF-I have already taken many steps to facilities the actual transfer authority for military operations and Iraqi force building to Iraqi hands. At the same time, such steps have often been cosmetic and misleading. Transfer has occurred before Iraqis are really ready and sometimes to force elements that cannot perform their mission. Such transfers also disguise certain key realities:

- Iraqi forces do not have offensive airpower and have only limited operational air mobility. They have no near to mid-term prospect of getting precision air strike capability.
- They are indefinitely dependent on the US for armor and artillery support.
- They are critically short of force enablers like logistics and sustainability. It is dependent on the US for much of the shipping it needs to bring supplies and equipment into the country, and on services that require US bases to be active in Iraq.
- They are indefinitely dependent on US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R) capabilities.
- No plans as yet exist to create Iraqi forces heavy enough to defend Iraq against Iraq's neighbors and create forces capable of defending Iraq's sovereignty.
- Iraq cannot finance the force posture it is creating.

**False and Exaggerated Transfers of Responsibility**

The following measures have already been publicly announced in Iraq and in the Iraqi media, but many rush Iraqi force development forward at rates driven by politics and not readiness or capability. The pace already is far too fast in terms of real world ISF effectiveness and illustrates the danger of rushing still additional measures to transfer control to Iraq. Several years, not months, are required in some cases to make such transfers complete and effective.

In brief, existing measures include:

- Giving 115 Iraqi army units the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas as of August 2006.
- Transitions in provincial security based on monthly reviews of the situation in the provinces and in the provincial capitals by the MNF Division Commander and Provincial Governor, assisted by representatives of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense, and US and UK Embassies.
- A four-phased process that emphasizes the role of the Iraqi government and visibility to the Iraqi people: Implement partnerships. Iraqi Army Lead (IAL), Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), and Iraqi Security Self-Reliance.
• Implement Partnerships. MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands establish and maintain partnerships across the entire spectrum of ISF units, from battalion to ministerial level.

• Iraqi Army Lead (IAL). Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations.

• Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to assume control and to exercise responsibility for the security of their respective provinces. Iraqi Security Self-Reliance. The Government of Iraq achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and IAL) throughout Iraq, and the government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.

• Control of Muthanna province was transferred to the Provincial Governor and the civilian-controlled Iraqi Police Service on July 13th. On September 21 the Italian forces in Dhi Qar Province handed security responsibilities over to Iraqi forces making it the second province to come under local Iraqi control. This paved the way for the departure of most of Italy’s 1,600 troops by the end of 2006. Three northern provinces - Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulaimaniyah - were evaluated in July as ready for transition. Anbar and Basrah were considered as “not ready”, while all other provinces, including Baghdad, were evaluated as “partially ready for transition.” The Department of Defense August 2006 Quarterly Status report on Iraq stated that the ISF may be able to transition to control nine of the 18 provinces by the end of 2006.

• By early August, the Coalition had closed 48 of 110 Forward Operating Bases, handing over 31 to different Iraqi security forces, and 17 to the Ministry of Finance. Thirteen more Forward Operating Bases were scheduled for closure and handover by January 2007. The Department of Defense reported that, “MNF-I will efficiently consolidate its footprint in Iraq to reduce its military basing requirements progressively. Specifically, MNF-I seeks to minimize its presence in major cities while building the flexibility required to support other elements in Iraq, including Coalition partners, PRTs, Transition Teams, Department of State activities, and other supporting units and entities. This process will culminate in the transition through Operational and Strategic Overwatch, which will leverage and maximize support through a minimum number of strategically located FOBs and Convoy Support Centers.”

• The US also reported that MNF-I has begun training Iraqi guards for a potential transition of the Coalition detention facilities and detainees. It stated that transitioning detainee operations was a three-phase process
  
  o Phase 1 consists of individual and collective training of Iraqi guards and leaders, including training alongside their U.S. counterparts inside the facility.
  
  o Phase 2 consists of the removal of U.S. guards and establishment of a U.S. transition team to supervise Iraqi Security Forces and to maintain legal custody of detainees.
  
  o Phase 3 consists of the final removal of all U.S. personnel and turnover of the facilities and legal custody of the detainees to the Government of Iraq. The criteria for transfer includes the requirement for the Government of Iraq to possess the legal authority to hold security detainees, each facility demonstrating the ability to meet the care and custody standard, and the MOJ having effective oversight of the program.

Such efforts would be far more realistic if they were linked to an Iraqi political compromise that removed many of the causes of instability and civil conflict and encouraged Sunni participation and more Shi’ite support.

The truth is that rapid substantive progress is not possible in any area and it takes time and effort to make things work. False promises of progress and US withdrawal can cloak leaving but not lead to success.

This is all too clear from a passage buried deep in the Department of Defense Quarterly status report for August, “The new Minister of Defense, Abd al-Qadr Muhammad Jassim al-Mufraji, is confronting the challenges he faces and is already making his mark…Close
and effective relationships are being forged by team members with all senior MOD headquarters officials, and the confidence, and thus capacity, of these officials is strengthening. The ministries and the Joint Headquarters are expected to be in the lead with Coalition support by the end of 2007.” However, a partnership with these institutions will be required through at least the first peaceful transfer of power in 2010.

**Recent Transfer Developments**

The overall pressure to rush the transfer of responsibility did not mean, however, that there were not real successes in transferring command of valid forces to the new Iraqi government. Successes occurred when transitions in provincial security were based on monthly reviews of the situation in the provinces and in the provincial capitals by the MNF Division Commander and Provincial Governor, assisted by representatives of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense, and US and UK Embassies. The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR) working group presented its monthly recommendations to the JCTSR principals about the readiness of individual provinces. Once a decision to hand over responsibility was made, the JCTSR working group was responsible for providing oversight of the handover process, to develop a public affairs plan, and to arrange a security arrangement for the time after the transfer of control.

- Control of Muthanna province was transferred to the Provincial Governor and the civilian-controlled Iraqi Police Service on July 13th. On September 21 the Italian forces in Dhi Qar Province handed security responsibilities over to Iraqi forces making it the second province to come under local Iraqi control. This paved the way for the departure of most of Italy’s 1,600 troops by the end of 2006. In July three northern provinces – Dahuk, Irbil, and Sulamanlyah – were evaluated as ready for transition. Anbar and Basrah were considered as “not ready”, while all other provinces, including Baghdad, were evaluated as “partially ready for transition.” In mid-October, Gen. George Casey estimated that there would be six or seven provinces under provincial Iraqi control by the end of 2006.

- On August 14, the 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division took control of security operations in the Mahmudyah and Lutufiyah areas of Baghdad. The transition gave the brigade responsibility for security operations in the area in one of the safest areas in Iraq, but this was still real progress over the past and allowed Coalition forces to shift to more of a support role.

- On November 13, 2006, the Iraqi Army assumed responsibility for one of the most dangerous sections of Baghdad. The 6th Iraqi Division, Fourth Brigade, Fifth Battalion, took charge of the 23 square mile section in the south of the capital. It includes Dora, a Sunni neighborhood dominated by hard-line supporters of the old Ba’ath party regime, and also parts of the “triangle of death,” also a volatile area. The battalion is almost equally divided between Sunnis and Shi’ites and commanded by 32-year-old Colonel Ali Fadil. The US Army’s 25th Infantry Division’s Fourth Brigade will stand by and help the Iraqi unit if needed. The 4th brigade has also placed combat advisers among the Iraqi soldiers.

**The Four Step Transfer Process**

The security transition process was valid when it was fully and honestly implemented. In practice, this means actually following the four phased process developed by the MNF-I and one that emphasized the role of the Iraqi government and visibility to the Iraqi people: Implement partnerships. Iraqi Army Lead (IAL), Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), and Iraqi Security Self-Reliance.

- **Implement Partnerships.** MNF-I and its Major Subordinate Commands establish and maintain
partnerships across the entire spectrum of ISF units, from battalion to ministerial level.

- **Iraqi Army Lead (IAL).** Process during which Iraqi Army units progress through stages of capability from unit formation to the ability to conduct counter-insurgency operations.
- **Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC).** Iraqi civil authorities satisfy the conditions required to assume control and to exercise responsibility for the security of their respective provinces.
- **Iraqi Security Self-Reliance.** The Government of Iraq achieves PIC (or a combination of PIC and IAL) throughout Iraq, and the government, through its security ministries, is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces.

These phases are not strictly sequential. For example, the Iraqi Army does not have to assume the lead in a province before Coalition forces may begin transfer of provincial control. This was the case in Muthanna. Phase 1 of the security transition concept—implementing partnerships—is already complete. As described above, the second phase, Iraqi Army lead, is well under way in many provinces. The third phase, establishing provincial Iraqi control over security, will be implemented on an area-by-area basis. The Government of Iraq, jointly with military and political leadership of the United States and Coalition partners in Iraq, will assess when conditions permit handing over security responsibility for specific areas from Coalition forces to the Iraqi civil authorities. The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (JCTSR) has developed criteria to guide the transfer of security responsibility. Recommendations for transfer include an assessment of conditions in four categories:

- Threat Assessment
- ISF Readiness
- Local Governance Capability
- MNF-I Ability to Respond Quickly to Major Threats, if Needed

The recommendation to transfer security responsibility is based on the specific situation in any one province or provincial capital in the context of the overall security environment. The appropriate Multi-National Force Division Commander and Provincial Governor, assisted by representatives of the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense and U.S. and United Kingdom Embassies, conduct monthly assessments of provinces and of provincial capitals. The JCTSR working group meets monthly to review the assessments and to present recommendations to the JCTSR principals regarding which provinces are ready to be transferred. Once a decision is made, the JCTSR working group will provide oversight of the development of transition directives, develop a public affairs plan, and arrange a post-transfer security agreement between MNF-I forces and provincial governors. Every transfer will ensure an effective and successful handover of security responsibilities. Moreover, the transition and reduced presence of MNF-I forces will be plainly visible to the Iraqi people.

**Dangerous Political Cosmetics**

Unfortunately, some key transfer efforts continued to be attempted at a scale where they could not be realistic. For example, the Department of Defense August 2006 Quarterly Status report on Iraq stated that the ISF might be may be able to transition to control nine of the 18 provinces by the end of 2006. It did not explain why this would be possible or provide any risk assessment. It also did not state what level of continued US support would be needed after the transfer.

Similarly, on August 30, US Army General George Casey told reporters in Baghdad that, “over the next 12 to 18 months, I can see the Iraqi Security Forces progressing to a point where they can take on the security responsibilities for the country with very little Coalition support.”

Although this did not yet involve formal Iraqi control, by late August, half of Iraq’s 10 army divisions were de facto in charge of their own territories or in the process of taking
over from Coalition forces. In addition to transferring control of territories Coalition forces continued to hand over Forward Operating Bases to Iraqi personnel.

The Iraqi government also opted for premature political cosmetics. On September 7, the Iraqi government said it was starting to formally take control over the highest echelons of the command its armed forces, beginning with the 8th Army Division, the Navy, and the Air Force. A US military spokesman speculated that further control transfers could take place at a pace of about two divisions per month. The transfer of command included the creation of a chain of command for controlling the armed forces running from the Prime Minister to the defense minister, then to joint headquarters in Baghdad, and finally to the Iraqi ground-forces command. The United States said this self-sufficient line of authority was crucial for the independence of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Politics and the growing divisions between the US and Iraq’s governments increased the pressure on such transfers. On October 28, President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki announced they had set up a working group to speed the transfer of security responsibilities in Iraq to Iraqi government. It included the Iraqi national security advisor, minister of defense and minister of interior, the US ambassador, and the commander of MNF-I. The goals of this group would be “accelerating the pace of training the Iraqi Security Force, Iraqi assumption of command and control over Iraqi forces, and transferring responsibility for security to the government of Iraq.” The plan was presented as a response to Maliki’s wish to speed up the transfer of responsibility.

**Real and False Progress in Assuming Leadership in Field Operations**

As the number of Iraqi units grew, they also took a larger role in field operations, although with far less real world success than the Department of Defense claimed in its reports and testimony to Congress. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units were said to have “assumed the lead” for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas.

As has already been touched upon, however, such claims were often more cosmetic than real. Many units “in the lead” had little real mission responsibility or capability, and were extremely dependent on MNF-I command, planning, and support. The US had ceased to report on the readiness of the units involved in any way that related to their real-world mission readiness and performance. The good were lumped together with the mediocre, bad, and inactive.

This was disguised by claims that approximately one-third of company-sized operations in Iraq from May until August 2006 were conducted independently by Iraqi forces, and there was a 35% increase in the number of Iraqi Army battalions that assumed the lead for counter-insurgency operations.

The Department of Defense reporting and testimony also downplayed the grave problems in MOI forces by reporting that all 27 National Police battalions conducted counter-insurgency operations, and two battalions had the security lead in their areas of responsibility. Additionally, 10 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) were transferred to the Government of Iraq during May through August, bringing the total to 48 of a total 110 FOBs under Iraqi control.
The MNF-I’s refusal to tie its reporting to real-world unit effectiveness led it to report that a total of 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades, and 85 battalions and 2 National Police battalions had assumed the lead responsibility for their respective areas of operation by August 7, 2006. By this time the Iraqi Army was said to have a total strength of 106 combat battalions. There were eight Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) at varying levels of capability with another three combat battalions in the process of forming. The SIBs and other enabling units were seen to be critical for improving the overall quality and independence of the Iraqi forces. Given the fact, outside experts were reported that as few as 10 battalions were effective in late November 2006, such reports presented major credibility problems.

The August 2006 Quarterly Status report to Congress stated:

The Coalition’s primary force development objective to date has been to produce trained, equipped, and capable combat units; there has been less emphasis placed on enablers, including logistics and command and control. Now that more than two-thirds of the Iraqi Army combat units are in the lead, the Coalition’s focus will shift more toward helping the Iraqis develop these enablers.

A September 2006 GAO report was only marginally more realistic, but provided the additional data shown in Figure 4.4, which compares figure from January 2006 to August 2006 for Iraqi units taking the lead on security operations. This figure drew on DoD and State Department reports and the GAO noted that DoD reported more detailed information on security transition in a classified format.

The GAO also stated that when an Iraqi army unit assumed the lead, this did not necessarily mean that the unit was capable of conducting independent operations, since additional capabilities provided by Coalition forces may still have been necessary. Developing these capabilities and certify Iraqi units as fully independent would take time since this involved the further development of logistical elements, ministry capacity and capability, intelligence structures, and command and control.
### Figure 4.4

**Iraqi Units Leading Operations and Provinces with Security Responsibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Security Transition</th>
<th>January 2006</th>
<th>August 2006</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi army units leading counterinsurgency operations in specific areas</td>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brigades</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Provinces that have assumed security responsibility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DoD provided GAO with classified data on the aggregate number Iraqi units at each “Transition Readiness Assessment” level for the GAO September 2006 report, as well as with more detailed information on which Iraqi units had taken the lead in counterinsurgency operations. These data are summarized in Figure 4.5, which shows assessed MOD force capabilities at the unit level as of August 2007: units not yet ready, units fighting side by side with Coalition force, and units in the lead with Coalition enablers or fully independent.

It is important to note, however, that the DoD did not provide unit-by-unit data, which would have provided a clearer overall picture since the individual unit reports contain readiness assessments in several sub-categories (personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, leadership) as well as a narrative assessment of key shortfalls and impediments of the unit to assume the lead for operations. The individual reports also estimate the time needed for the unit to assume the lead.

This failure to honestly tie claims Iraqi forces are “in the lead” to real-world effectiveness casts doubt on the most critical aspects of public US and MNF-I reporting. In fact, the GAO listed three key reasons why an accurate assessment of ISF readiness and progress could only come from the unit-by-unit reports:

- The usefulness of TRA reports as an instrument to measure combat readiness could have been tested.
- The aggregate data could have been verified.
- Shortfalls in specific areas, such as personnel, equipment, logistics, training, and leadership, could have been identified.

The GAO also stated that ultimate goal of continuing to strengthen ISF combat forces and the support units was to eventually eliminate the Iraqi force’s dependence on coalition forces.

No progress has been made in providing more objective reports. Gen. George Casey reported in mid-October 2006 that six of the 10 Iraqi divisions – 30 of the 36 brigades and almost 90 of the 112 battalions were “in the lead.” He still described the task as training and equipping units, then “putting them in the lead,” to finally make them independent. Roughly the same claims were made in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in mid-November.
Figure 4.5
MOD Forces’ Assessed Capabilities

Data as of August 7, 2006. Source: Adapted from: US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress, p. 42. Note: +/-5% margin of error
Issues with Junior Officers and NCOs

Leadership quality and experience take years to develop and a continuing lack of junior officers and NCOs continued to be one of the largest factors hampering development of MOD forces. There were not enough trained officers and NCOs to fill the lower-level staff and leadership positions.

Addressing these leadership problems could only be solved over time as officers were trained and NCOs gained experience. To provide educational opportunities, the Regional Training Centers (RTCs) and the NCO Academy focused on training personnel for junior leadership positions. In addition to the schools, Coalition Military Transition Teams provided additional guidance. The military leadership also began to interact more with civic leaders in their areas of operation, moving toward the possibility of Iraqis becoming more responsible for a comprehensive approach to their own security and interests.

The Department of Defense summarized the situation as follows and in ways that further illustrate the problems concealed in the reporting on the transfer of responsibility and the number of Iraqi forces in the lead:

The lack of junior officers and NCOs continues to be one of the biggest factors impeding development of MOD forces. There is a shortage of school-trained officers and NCOs to fill lower-level staff and leadership positions. The shortage of leaders will abate as officer recruits are commissioned and they join their units. For NCOs, qualified soldiers are being “grown from within” through development and schooling to achieve promotion to NCO leadership positions. The Regional Training Centers (RTCs) and the NCO Academy focus on junior leader development that is critical to building a professional force. The RTCs conduct Squad Leader and Platoon Sergeant Courses. Newly formed Sergeants Major and Chief Warrant Officer Courses have been added to the NCO Professional Education System. Specialized leadership courses, such as Logistics Supervisor, are being conducted at the Iraqi Army Service and Support Institute at Taji. Three Iraqi Military Academies at Zahko, Qalachwan, and Ar Rustimiyah continue to train future officers.

According to Gen. George Casey, one limiting factor to meaningful growth of the Iraqi Army was a dearth of qualified commanders:

“Frankly, some of our guys will say it’s still kind of the limiting factor. (…) If you want to grow two more divisions, the real question is: Can you come up with two divisions’ worth of good Iraqi leaders?”

Another problem was links between Shiite militias and high-level officers at military headquarters as well as government officials, who cancelled a number of operations, protecting friends or certain neighborhoods.

Like the problems in the MOD, the loyalty and competency of those in MOI leadership positions continued to be of even more serious concern. To address these problems and to develop more effective leaders in the IPS three two week long leadership courses were designed: the First Line Supervisor course, the Intermediate Level Course and the Senior Level Course were intended to train company grade, field grade and General Officers respectively. The courses were designed to address topics in police methods, ethics, leadership, management and problem solving at a level appropriate to the various levels of leadership.

Additionally, plans were in place to expand the Intermediate-Level Officers course beginning in the fall of 2006. Among officers with experience in the old regime, forming
Continued progress did take place in turning over the training mission of Iraqi soldiers to Iraqi trainers. In July and August, for example, soldiers from the 24th Scout Platoon, 2nd Brigade, 4th Iraqi Army Division, conducted a three-week training course that covered an array of topics, including weapons maintenance, basic rifle marksmanship, reflexive fire training, basic infantry skills, and urban combat tactics. The presence of Iraqi military trainers was a significant piece of the effort to endow Iraq with the indigenous abilities to build and maintain a force for the long-term.

On August 10, 2006, Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior graduated 16 students from the first Inspector General’s investigation course. The Office of the Inspector General was created as an independent, objective office within the MOI, charged with investigating charges of corruption, fraud, waste, abuse, and other complaints regarding MOI officials. Additionally, the unit was set up to conduct audits and evaluations “to review effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of all MOI personnel and operations.” Charges of corruption, abuse, fraud, and waste had plagued the MOI since its inception. The creation of an internal accountability mechanism was seen as at least one step in the right direction toward combating these deficiencies.

On September 12, 16 Iraqi police officers boarded planes bound for the United States to receive training. The men, members of the Iraqi River Patrol, headed to the US to receive riverine training at the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi. The six-week course was designed to give the selected group skills in such areas as basic seamanship skills and covert night operations. The effort was part of the US military’s “train-the-trainer” effort, whereby these men would go back to Iraq and be responsible for future training of personnel in these techniques.

There were, however, continuing problems with the quality of training, and the rush to create new capabilities led to other problems. During late the summer and early fall of 2006, some military officials began to express discontent with the number of US military personnel being employed in the training and mentoring effort. At the time, there were 4,000 US military advisers serving on Military Transition Teams (MiTTs). The number of partnered units was, however, beginning to drop as of August 2006, with advisers being concentrated on fewer and fewer bases. Moreover, most advisors now operated that at the battalion level and above, while the type of counterinsurgency warfare being taught is actually fought, for the most part, at the company, platoon and squad level.

More tangibly, the rush to create new facilities sometimes created major problems of a different kind. The new Police Academy, for example, was so badly constructed the parts quickly became virtually uninhabitable.
Transfer of Bases

The transfer of bases reflected more realistic progress, and helped defuse Iraqi fears that the US and MNF-I sought to be permanent “occupiers.” By early August, the Coalition had closed 48 of their 110 Forward Operating Bases, handing over 31 to different Iraqi security forces, and 17 to the Ministry of Finance. Thirteen more Forward Operating Bases were scheduled for closure and handover by January 2007. The Department of Defense reported in August that, \textsuperscript{ccxxviii}

MNF-I will efficiently consolidate its footprint in Iraq to reduce its military basing requirements progressively. The MNF-I basing strategy is an integral part of the Campaign Plan. MNF-I uses a conditions based process to synchronize basing requirements with Coalition force structure and projected command and control structure. Several factors are considered when employing this process, including cost-effective use of resources, maintaining security presence where required by the mission and maintaining only those bases required, transition of operations to the ISF as they continue to assume the lead in security operations, and other factors. Specifically, MNF-I seeks to minimize its presence in major cities while building the flexibility required to support other elements in Iraq, including Coalition partners, PRTs, Transition Teams, Department of State activities, and other supporting units and entities. This process will culminate in the transition through Operational and Strategic Overwatch, which will leverage and maximize support through a minimum number of strategically located FOBs and Convoy Support Centers.

Transfer of Detainees

The impact of transforming detainees from MNF-I to ISF control was more uncertain. The US reported that that MNF-I had begun training Iraqi guards for a potential transition of the Coalition detention facilities and detainees. It stated that transitioning detainee operations was a three-phase process, and showed the detainee population shown in Figure 4.6.\textsuperscript{ccxxix}

In June 2006, MNF-I, in coordination with the Government of Iraq, conducted a large-scale release of detainees in support of the newly formed national unity government. The release served as a visible symbol of the government’s commitment to national unity and reconciliation in the progress toward democratic governance and the rule of law. MNF-I released 2,500 low-risk detainees over a period of three weeks. Coupled with the 500 detainees from the normal Combined Review and Release Board process, MNF-I had a net reduction of more than 2,000 detainees in June. A MNF-I special board reviewed approximately 6,500 records to identify the low-risk detainees. Each file was also reviewed by the MNF-I Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to consider any additional intelligence reports. Detainees involved in violent acts, IED making/placement, financing insurgent operations, identified as key insurgent leaders, or who have been recaptured were not considered for release…

- Phase 1 consists of individual and collective training of Iraqi guards and leaders, including training alongside their U.S. counterparts inside the facility.
- Phase 2 consists of the removal of U.S. guards and establishment of a U.S. transition team to supervise Iraqi Security Forces and to maintain legal custody of detainees.
- Phase 3 consists of the final removal of all U.S. personnel and turnover of the facilities and legal custody of the detainees to the Government of Iraq. The criteria for transfer includes the requirement for the Government of Iraq to possess the legal authority to hold security detainees, each facility demonstrating the ability to meet the care and custody standard, and the MOJ having effective oversight of the program.

The MNF-I worried, however, that such efforts were still in Phase 1. It stated that significant challenges exist to ultimately meeting these criteria. The Iraqi Corrections System has not demonstrated the capacity to effectively resource and run a major facility, such as Camp Bucca. Additionally, based on the composition of the guard force, serious
questions remain as to whether they would be able to maintain the required standards of care and custody. The most significant obstacle remains establishing the legal authority to hold security detainees. There is widespread opposition inside the Sunni political leadership to providing this authority to the Government of Iraq.
Figure 4.6

*Derived from US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress, p. 61; Note: +/- 10% margin of error
Some aspects of the problem are clearly getting worse and not better. The UN reported in November 2006 that police and military security operations continued to be based on massive sweeps that resulted in growing numbers of individuals detained and without access to adequate judicial review. According to the Ministry of Human Rights, the total number of detainees for the entire country was 29,256 (13,571 of whom are in MNF I detention facilities) at the end of October, a slight decrease from the number of 30,104 detainees reported at the end of September 35,543 reported at the end of August, and 28,378 in July.

The UN report noted the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights reported the following breakout of detainees by jurisdiction:

### Figure 4.7
**Iraqi Holdings of Detainees by Jurisdiction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNF – I</td>
<td>13,571</td>
<td>13,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>8,450</td>
<td>8,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>4,181</td>
<td>3,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLSA</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals except KRG</td>
<td>27,555</td>
<td>27,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals in Kurdistan</td>
<td>2,549</td>
<td>2,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals all over Iraq</td>
<td>30,104</td>
<td>29,256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UN reported the following problems in this aspect of ISF force development:

Arbitrary detention, grievous conditions of detention, allegations of torture and mistreatment continue to remain an issue of serious concern in Iraq. The absence of judicial guarantees is a pattern and individuals are often arrested without warrant, not informed of the charges against them, and not brought promptly before an investigative judge. Most of the arrests emerge from various factors: the “state of emergency,” extended by the Council of Representatives for an additional 30 days on 2 October, as well as the Anti-Terrorism Law promulgated in 2005 and continuous security sweeps resulting from the various security plans in Baghdad. All those factors continue to swell the number of detainees and overwhelm the judicial system. HRO is also of the view that protracted internment of detainees for “imperative reasons of security”, without judicial oversight, is de facto arbitrary detention.

The synchronization of Iraq’s key justice sector institutions (computerized sharing of data and improved collaboration of police, prisons and courts) is crucial to enhance the effectiveness of administration of justice, as well as remedy arbitrary detention. HRO hopes that the increase in the number of judges will facilitate processing a growing number of judicial cases and avoid impunity for major human rights violations. The process of hand over of MNF-I prisons to Iraqi control continues with the transfer of authority for Abu Ghraib prison to the Iraqi Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Iraqi Army on 2 September. The Suse prison was handed over to the Ministry of Justice on 16 September in an attempt to create enough space for the detainees at the Ministry of Interior (MoI) custody to be transferred to MoJ. UNAMI also finds encouragement in the continuous release of MNF-I security detainees by the Combined Release and Review Board (CRRB).
The Joint Detention Committee (JDC) aimed at reviewing the cases of individuals held for over 18 months continues to meet regularly. The situation of juveniles in detention is particularly worrisome. According to Iraqi law, juveniles are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) since March 2005, although due to a lack of facilities, juveniles held outside Baghdad are still in the custody of the Ministry of Justice. According to the figures provided by MoLSA, on 12 October 2006, 406 juveniles were being detained in 3 facilities in Baghdad, among them 22 females. Due to the fact that there is only one investigative judge in Baghdad dealing with juvenile cases, judicial oversight is not guaranteed. An increase in juvenile arrests has been noted by MoLSA officials as the result of the new security plan in Baghdad.

A recent joint MNF-I and Iraqi experts’ inspection of Al-Kharkh juvenile prison, carried out at MoLSA’s request, revealed that there were 284 inmates, aged from 7 to 22 years, in deplorable hygiene and medical conditions with signs of physical and sexual abuse allegedly committed by the prison guards and/or by their fellow inmates. Some were being detained without charges or convictions.

Inhumane conditions of detention were noticed during the inspection: overcrowding (4 cells holding approximately 70 juveniles each); lack of food, potable water and ventilation and inadequate medical care (3 cases of tuberculosis). Moreover, the convicted were not separated from pre-trial detainees. Of all inmates, 41 inmates were handed over from the Ministry of Interior to the MoLSA bearing signs of mistreatment/torture and sexual abuse. 89. Poor detention conditions have been revealed in the past, during joint MNF-I and Iraqi inspections in places of detention under the control of the Ministry of Interior, Defense and Special Forces throughout the country. HRO welcomes the revival of those inspections following a formal authorization to conduct those inspections issued by the Prime Minister.

Plans for a forthcoming amnesty, as part of the National Reconciliation Plan announced by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki on 25 June in an attempt to boost national reconciliation, are being articulated. According to information communicated to HRO, draft legislation has not yet been circulated. The future amnesty in Iraq will, however, benefit primarily individuals currently in detention (mostly neither charged nor convicted) as well as individual members of the insurgency, militias and other armed groups, who renounce violence and, consistent with international standards, have not been responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

HRO recommends that the category of offences to be covered by the proposed amnesty be clearly defined so as to establish legal certainty and to eliminate ambiguities in implementation and to have national final lists of those to be excluded from the amnesty so as to avoid individual institutions drawing up their own lists. As a general principle, an amnesty shall be without effect with respect to the victims’ right to reparation and shall not prejudice the right to know. Amnesty should also exclude those suspected of having committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture.

In Kirkuk, HRO continued to receive reports alleging that Kurdish militias detain individuals and transfer them to the Kurdistan Region without notifying governorate authorities or the police. There have been allegations that officials in Kirkuk are aware of such practices, yet no effort has been made to halt them. According to official reports, on 30 October, at the request of the Human Rights Committee, the Legal, Health, Social Affairs, Human Rights and Women Parliamentary Committees of the Kurdistan National Assembly met with several KRG ministers.

These Committees have visited prisons in Dahuk, Suleimaniyah and Erbil and have concluded that a large number of prisoners have been arrested without judicial
intervention; most were arrested under violent circumstances; they have been held without trial for long periods and there have been complaints by family members that prisoners were held in unknown locations. The Committees presented their findings and recommended prison and corrective centre reforms.
Long Wars Require Long Efforts: Real-World Iraqi Dependence Through 2010

The MNF-I has sent mixed signals as to how successful the transfer process really is, and its internal reports on ISF readiness are far more critical than the public statements made by the US. Most of its public statements did not tie transfer to effectiveness, did not explain the level of continuing Iraqi dependence, and did not address any aspect of the need to expand ISF capabilities from light counterinsurgency forces to forces fully capable of defending the country against foreign threats.

Gen. Casey speculated in late August that Iraqi forces might achieve self-sufficiency within 18 months, although he made it clear that the US remained committed to event-driven US force reductions:

“I don’t have a date, but I can see over the next 12 to 18 months the Iraqi security forces progressing to a point where they can take on the security responsibilities for the country with very little coalition support. (...) The future coalition presence, 12 to 18 months from now, is going to be decided by the Iraqi government.”

In September, President Talabani suggested a similar schedule, saying that the Iraqi Army would be ready to face its challenges on its own “within two years.” In an early September meeting with visiting British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani predicted a shorter timeline, stating that he believed fighting in Iraq would abate by the end of 2007, and that Iraqi forces would be able to handle any remaining violence.

In the real world, however, a passage buried deep in the Department of Defense status report for August warned that,

The new Minister of Defense, Abd al-Qadr Muhammad Jassim al-Mufraji, is confronting the challenges he faces and is already making his mark. Previous logjams in acquisitions and contracting are being eased, and he is working closely with MNSTC-I to proceed on force development, force expansion, and logistics support. The MOD Transition Team grew to meet this accelerated pace of business and expanded to more than 50, half of whom are Military Professional Resources Incorporated contractors.

Close and effective relationships are being forged by team members with all senior MOD headquarters officials, and the confidence, and thus capacity, of these officials is strengthening. The ministries and the Joint Headquarters are expected to be in the lead with Coalition support by the end of 2007. However, a partnership with these institutions will be required through at least the first peaceful transfer of power in 2010.
V. Developments in the Ministry of Defense

As has been noted in the previous chapter, leadership and management remained uncertain at the ministerial level. The MoD advisory effort was strengthened. At the headquarters level, the Ministry of Defense Transition Team grew to more than 50, half of whom were contractors from Military Professional Resources Inc. ccxxxvii

Nevertheless, the Ministry continued to present serious problems in producing effective plans and policy, making proper appointments, helping to break down sectarian rivalry in the Ministry and armed forces, and in halting corruption. It is also interesting to note that the Defense Department requested US$151 million in the FY2007 Budget Amendment request to sustain the Ministry of the Interior, but did not ask for funding to sustain the Ministry of Defense.

By August, a number of Shi’ite leaders were calling for the dismissal of both the Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior. Prime Minister Maliki resisted such efforts at least through September. He also sought to find ways in which Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’ites, and Kurds could cooperate in reviewing ISF operations of all kinds, and help reduce the constant charges that operations favored one side over the other.

On October 2, 2006, Maliki announced a plan that called for committees of neighborhood leaders in their own community to try to deal with sectarian and ethnic violence by working with the ISF and Iraqi authorities to plan operations like checkpoints, identify high risks, and clear identify legitimate ISF operations from rogue or deception operations. ccxxxviii The fact remained, however, that the civil side of Iraqi force development had made little real progress and did not win the confidence of either the public or a wide range of Iraqi political leaders.

Weaknesses in Iraq’s Regular Military Forces

Equal weaknesses existed in the regular Iraqi forces, all of which further illustrate the problems discussed earlier. Key elements of the Iraqi regular forces were not able to take on the necessary missions in Baghdad, and “Operation Together Forward” exposed many failures that will take time to correct. As of late November, Iraqi forces could not operate in hostile areas in Anbar without massive US support.

Once again, exaggerating the progress in Iraqi forces is just as serious as understating the level of violence and drift towards civil war. General Casey stated at the same press conference on October 26th that, “During the battle of Fallujah, we had a handful of battalions in the Iraqi army, and they operated in support of us. Today, six of the 10 Iraqi divisions are in the lead; 30 of the 36 Iraqi brigades. Almost 90 of the 112 Iraqi battalions are in the lead, and we operate in support of them.”

This statement was technically true, but only because of the virtually meaningless definitions now used for transferring responsibility and “taking the lead.” The reality is that transferring responsibility for security and saying that Iraqi units “are in the lead” has become virtually meaningless and hides massive disparities in the quality and effectiveness of many of the forces involved, most of which are far from being ready to fight in any meaningful way on their own.

The Iraqi Army remained a fragile structure that may well be able to succeed over time, but really cannot be rushed. It has far too few men -- even as a goal -- to really bring
security to the entire nation, particularly if this means urban warfare or “pacification” in Baghdad, with the risk of spreading civil violence in the great Basra area, Kirkuk, and Mosul. The Iraqi air force has around 800 men and no combat support or attack capability. The 1,100-man navy is just beginning to develop meaningful mission capability.

**A Force Too Light and Too Much in Development to Succeed On Its Own**

Manning, motivation, leadership, and pay are only part of the problem. Like all Iraqi forces, the army lacks armor, heavy firepower, tactical mobility, and an Iraqi Air Force capable of providing combat support. No Administration official has presented any plan to properly equip the Iraqi forces to stand on their own, or give them the necessary funding to phase out US combat and air support in 12 to 18 months.

The Department of Defense status report on Iraqi forces for August dodges around some of these issues, but still provides important warnings about how long effective force development will take:

- It says the forces reached 115,000 men at end July: 84% of planned end strength. Generation of Army battalions is said to be 97% complete, and the support forces are only 65% complete. However, other parts of the report note that absenteeism is an average rate of 15%. It notes that, “there is currently no judicial punishment system with the Iraqi Army. Therefore, Iraqi Army Commanders have little legal leverage to compel their soldiers to combat, and soldiers and police can quit with impunity.” (p. 58)

- All previous reporting on Level I-IV reporting has been abandoned for vague and undefined levels of readiness and capability. (pp. 52-53)

- Says the army has 92% of authorized equipment, but fails to describe lack of armor, artillery, heavy squad weapons, and mobility. (pp. 55-56) The focus on numbers trained and equipped ignores the fact that the equipment and facilities were often inadequate and left Iraqi forces dependent on MNF-I support. (p 41) The figures on page 42 portray major gaps between training and equipment in several categories of Iraqi forces, even ignoring their lack of heavy weapons and support equipment.

- Notes that the, “lack of junior officers and NCOs continues to be on of the biggest factors impeding the development of Iraqi forces…” Efforts are being made to correct this, but no clear picture of timelines and capabilities are provided. (pp. 55-56)

- States that the training effort for the MoD has been expanded, but the statements that the ministries and Joint Headquarters are expected to be in the lead by the end of 2007 are too heavily qualified to be meaningful. (p. 56): In fact, the report warns that, “A partnership with those institutions will be required at least through 2010.” (p. 57)

- The data on “Coalition Support Requirements” focuses on logistics, and ignores the need for intelligence, armor, artillery, and air support. It touches on only one part of a major continuing issue where no clear plan seems to currently exist. (pp. 57-58).

- No assessment of naval capability, no force plans. (p. 54)

- Says there is plan to double air force manning from 750 to 1,500 by end 2007. Then describes major continuing operational and readiness problems with existing aircraft that do not include combat aircraft. (pp. 54-55).

- The report does address the major sectarian problems in the regular forces. It does not give any figures or detailed data, but is much franker than it the past about the fact that most units tend to mirror the ethnic and sectarian areas where they operated (although the report fails to mention this
is not true of Sunnis). Emphasis is put on the number of Sunni and Kurdish officers in higher command slots, but growing problems for Sunni officers are not addressed. (p. 58)

**A Crucial Lack of Proper Equipment Plans and Aid Plans**

What may be even more serious -- as the US considers efforts to accelerate Iraqi force development -- is the lack of any clear plan to provide heavier forces, and the honest recognition that the US will almost certainly have to fund this effort initially and for some years to come.

If the US wants out of Iraq, then armor, artillery, mobility, IS&R, close air support, and a large range of support assets must come in. Iraqi governance is not yet ready to manage such efforts, and Iraq cannot fund them. A long-range strategy, plan, and aid funds are critical. If they exist, they exist in remarkable silence.

**Sectarian and Ethnic Problems in the Regular Forces: A Force Never Designed to Fight Civil Conflicts and Civil War**

Sectarian issues were less serious than in the MOI forces, but still presented a broad set of problems. According to the Director of National Intelligence’s February 2006 report, many elements of the Iraqi security forces remained loyal to sectarian and party interests.

Sectarian divisions within the armed forces reflected the fact many units were created along geographic lines. Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds mostly served in geographic areas familiar to their groups. These divisions were even more notable at the battalion level, where battalion commanders tended to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional backgrounds.

Due to greater military experience among Sunnis and Kurds, these groups were over-represented in senior leadership positions. Shi’ites were adequately represented at the battalion level, but less-so at higher echelons. The reason was primarily the military experience required for higher levels of command, which a greater number of Sunnis and Kurds had earned in the old regime’s army and the Peshmerga, respectively.

While the nationally recruited divisions were more representative of Iraq’s ethno-religious composition, the even-numbered divisions were originally formed as National Guard units, to be deployed in their respective local regions. These units continued to be more ethnically and religiously representative of their region, not of Iraq as a whole.

More broadly, even the Army has shown little willingness to become actively involved halting Iraq’s civil fighting, although a few force elements performed well in such missions in Baghdad during the summer and fall of 2006. Like all Iraqi forces, the Army was never recruited, trained, or equipped to fight sectarian and ethnic forces in civil conflict, or intervene in civil war and local civil clashes. If a major civil war does occur, or the country divides along sectarian and ethnic lines, Iraqi regular forces could divide as well. They could fragment even further if the Shi’ite coalition divides, or the Shi’ites and Kurds divide.

A battalion commander with the 1st brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, Maj. Hussein al-Qaisi, said government officials often called him when he tried to arrest suspected high-ranking militia leaders, Sunni as well as Shi’ite. Al-Qaisi, stationed in Baghdad, said: “Sometimes they’ll back them up no matter what. We have to let them go.”
There were reports of US soldiers complaining about their Iraqi counterparts as being “among the worst they’ve ever seen” during combined US and Iraqi army operations in Baghdad in the summer and fall of 2006. Their loyalties appeared unclear as they let militiamen pass checkpoints unhindered during raids and allowed barriers and concertina wire meant to bolster defensive positions to be dragged away. Even the notification of the senior officer at the checkpoint by US troops did not help. US military advisor Lt. Col. Greg Watt attributed this behavior to sectarian loyalties:

From my perspective, you can’t make a distinction between Iraq army Shi’ites and the religious militias. You have a lot of soldiers and family members swayed and persuaded by the religious leadership. (…) There’s no doubt in my mind that (an Iraqi division commander in Baghdad) has soldiers who are followers of religious leaders. Are they loyal to the division commander? Yes. But they may be loyal to both.

He added that another problem was violence against Iraqi soldiers when they were off duty, and threats against their families.

Lt. Col. Avanulas Smiley, a battalion commander in Baghdad, commented on local police acting on tribal or political loyalties:

“I wouldn’t say I find it often, but I suspect it often. You can’t always prove it. And that can cause some frustration on the street with soldiers.”

One example the operational effects of sectarian allegiances by the Iraqi Army – real or alleged – could be seen in Baquba in October 2006. The security situation in the religiously mixed city apparently deteriorated when the Fifth Iraqi Army Division staged raids that led to the arrest of 400 people, nearly all Sunni Arabs. (Note that this is an odd-numbered division, which were supposed to be more representative of Iraq’s population than their even-numbered counterparts) Local Sunni leaders believed this showed the division’s bias against Sunnis and that they were singled out while Shi’ite criminals had been ignored. Subsequently, local Sunni and Shi’ite groups put out calls for help, and fighters from the Shi’ite Jaish al-Mahdi militia as well as Sunni groups, including Al Qa’ida elements, moved into the area.

Effective and Ineffective Units

In the real world, forces are not ready; units are ready. There is no way, however, to make detailed judgments on a unit by unit basis. In general, some experts feel Kurdish units are the most effective because of their experience as guerrilla forces who have retained their officers and cohesion.

Some experts cite the 205th Iraqi Army Battalion, or “Tiger Battalion” for both its military professionalism and competence. Breaking with Saddam-era traditions, officers delegated responsibility to their soldiers. The unit was mostly recruited from within its area of operation, helping it with intelligence collection efforts.

The Second Battalion, Second Brigade, First Iraqi Army Division, operating in Fallujah, was also praised for its effectiveness. Its progress towards operating alone was said to be especially noteworthy given the serious Iraqi morale problems during the fight for the city in 2004.

There is considerable disagreement on how to judge some units’ performance. When the Scorpion unit’s commander, Colonel Salam al-Mamuri, was killed, a Washington Post article described his unit as highly effective and not taking political sides. The Scorpion
unit was noted for taking tough action against both Al-Qa'ida in Iraq and the Mahdi Army. The unit also received high marks from US Special Forces members:

“They are literally the only Iraqi unit under arms in the south that is completely independent of the political parties and the militias. Everyone else – the police, the army – is playing ball for somebody. They won’t.”

“We look at them as peers, we don’t look at them as below us.”

At the same time, some of the best-motivated and best-equipped forces in the National Police have been most heavily implicated in the 2005 prisoner torture scandal. Other army and police units especially known for their brutality displayed a high level of independence from the government. They included several Police Command Units, such as the Scorpion (or Hilla SWAT), Tiger, and Thunder Brigades, founded in 2004 without the consent of US commanders.

Units known to brutalize Sunnis included the Volcano Brigades, the Punishment Committee, and the Secret Investigative Unit. The Wolf Brigade and Maghawir Special Commando Brigades displayed strong continuity from the Saddam era, Wolf being mostly recruited from the former Iraqi Special Forces and Maghawir mostly made up of Saddam-era veterans.

The DoD August quarterly report took a somewhat muted view of these problems, but noted that, Institutional leadership courses are complemented and reinforced through partnership with Coalition Military Transition Teams. These teams, embedded with every Iraqi battalion, brigade, and division, provide daily guidance and mentorship. In addition, Iraqi units are partnered with Coalition force units. These partnerships, combined with the expertise and leadership taught through the institutional base, are critical for development of both unit proficiency and leadership essential to increased operational effectiveness. The importance of ethics, human rights, and leadership in the Iraqi Armed Forces has engendered a concept for a Center for Ethics and Leadership to provide institutional oversight for ethics education, training, and assessment.

A promising trend is that military leadership has become more involved with civic leaders and sheiks in their areas of operation. This activity will continue to reinforce and establish the importance of Iraqis leading and taking responsibility for their own security and interests.
VI. Army and Special Operations Forces: Increasing, but Mixed Capabilities

The Iraqi Army grew from 4 brigades and 23 battalions in November 2005, to 25 brigades and 85 battalions that had assumed responsibility in August 2006. The authorized (not actual) Iraqi Army had risen from 115,000 “trained and equipped” in August to 132,400 on November 15, 2006, although no data existed on actual manning. These figures included SIB personnel and about 9,600 support forces The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) were composed of 1,600 soldiers making up the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force, the Iraqi Commandos, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit.

By the summer and fall of 2006, Ministry of Defense Forces consisting of the Army (including Special Operations Forces), Air Force, and Navy (including Marines) had a force development goal of bringing the total Objective Counter-Insurgency Force up to a level of 137,500 personnel.

The goal for creating the Army was then to create a force composed of 9 infantry divisions and 1 mechanized infantry division, and would make up the bulk of this force. Support would be provided by nine Motorized Transportation Regiments, 5 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units (RSUs), and 91 Garrison Support Units (GSUs). The Taji National Depot was to provide higher-level supply and maintenance.

Additionally each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters was to be supported by a Headquarters and Service Company providing logistical and maintenance support. Finally the Army was to include 17 SIBs and a Special Operations Forces Brigade consisting of two special operational battalions. The target for the Air Force was to be six squadrons and the Navy two squadrons and a Marine battalion.

Progress was also made in creating training units. The three planned Iraqi Training Battalions had now been formed. This allowed Iraqis to train soldiers independently in sufficient quantities. Army recruits attended a 13-week program of basic instruction followed by military occupational training of a length varying from three to seven weeks, depending on specialty. Specialty schools included the Military Intelligence School, Signal School, Bomb Disposal School, Combat Arms Branch School, Engineer School and Military Police School. These schools were intended to both contribute to professionalism in the Iraqi Army and teach the necessary skills for fighting counter-insurgency campaigns.

Training for service and support officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) was provided by the Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute (IASSI) at Taji. By August 2006 IASSI had trained more than 5,000 officers and NCOs.

Although the Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTRs) were approaching full operational capability, a continued lack of competent maintenance personnel hindered their ability to reach full capability. As of August, approximately 80% of planned HSCs had been formed, a third were operational and the remaining HSCs were scheduled to be completed by December 2006. Seventeen Special Operations Forces (SIBs) were in the process of being trained and equipped. The Iraqi Army was in control of the SIBs, but
only 1 SIB was capable of independent operation and all 17 required Coalition logistical support.

**Combat Effectiveness, Readiness, Desertions and Mission Capability**

The Army’s role in combat did increase steadily during this period, although has been discussed earlier, Department of Defense sharply exaggerated the real level of progress:

- **Figure 6.1** compares the number of SIBs and Iraqi army battalions in combat as of August 2006.
- **Figure 6.2** shows the number of combat operations being carried out at the company level and above from December 2005 through August 2006.

Both figures show a steady rise in Iraqi readiness and capability, although it must again be stressed that such reporting has dubious overall credibility. Many units were seriously undermanned, under equipped or under facilitated, and lacked experience and capable leadership. The steady rise in the percentage of ISF operations shown in Figure 86 also ignored the need such units had for external support, the often undemanding nature of ISF operations, and continued dependence on cadres of MNF-I advisors.
NOTE: Includes special operations battalions and Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, but does not include combat support and combat service support units.

Data as of August 7, 2006

Source: Adapted from: US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress, p.52;
Note: +/-5% margin of error
Figure 6.2
Combat Operations (Company level and above*)

* Includes MOD and National Police units; data includes only those ISF independent operations that are reported to the Coalition Data as of August 15, 2006.
US advisers warned that Iraqi forces, both soldiers and officers remained reluctant to initiate contact with the enemy. CENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid painted a franker picture in early September, praising the special operations forces as “some of the best units anywhere in the Middle East,” but admitting disappointment in other units. Gen. John Abizaid stated in early September that while Iraqi army forces were fighting, they were not yet capable of ensuring Iraqi security. He also said that Iraqi and MNF-I efforts to increase the independence of Iraqi Army units continued to focus on combat enablers.

During initial training, approximately 15% attrition was the norm. During deployment, absent-without-leave rates were typically about 1-4% for most Army divisions, although deployment to combat let these rates climb to 5-8%, according to DoD. According to Jane’s Defense Weekly, however, many reports from Iraq suggest higher figures. According to former coalition personnel, these rates depended on whether units deploy in their home areas or not and whether they were tasked to operate against insurgents of their ethnic or religious background.

Iraqi Army leaders in Al Anbar province complained about desertion rates in some units being as high as 40%. US advisors to Iraqi forces pointed to a Catch-22 situation with regard to local recruiting: soldiers would care more about the security of their home town than about an unknown area, but locally recruited soldiers sometimes also found themselves in a conflict of loyalties between family, tribe and friends on the one hand and their unit’s military operations on the other. DoD noted that there was no judicial punishment system within the Iraqi Army, giving commanders little legal leverage to compel their soldiers to combat, so soldiers and police quit with impunity.

When British troops left Camp Abu Naji, just outside Amarah, the ensuing clashes between Iraqi army forces and unknown attackers caused the mutiny of the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Brigade. During the last weekend in August, 100 soldiers of a 550-strong battalion in the southeastern province of Maysan refused to deploy to Baghdad, partly because of concerns about confronting fellow sect members. US Army Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, commander of the Iraq Assistance Group in Baghdad, portrayed the incident as isolated, but admitted to the difficulty of creating truly national forces in Iraq:

What it tells me is that, primarily, the Iraqi army has been a regionally recruited organization, which really means if you are from a particular area, that’s where you’re recruited from, and that’s where your roots are. Now as other units are asked to go to other places, it becomes more difficult because, for many of those soldiers, they just thought that they would be operating in their homeland areas.

**The Role of US Special Operations Forces in Training Iraqi Security Forces**

Much depended on the quality of the MNF-I training effort and the support of embedded training teams and partner units in the field. The level of continued ISF dependence on MNF-I advisors is indicated by the fact that total of 3,768 US Special Forces, Navy SEALs, and Air Force combat controllers were operating in Iraq in September 2006. They were partnered with a third of the Iraqi Army battalions and 13 SWAT-like police units.
Colonel Kenneth Tovo, commander of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula, described their role as follows:

One, they are working with battalion staffs to integrate intelligence and operations and teach them how to target. Two, they are training scout platoons to find and fix the enemy. (...) This task force understands that we cannot kill our way to victory. That said, we live in the security side of the house. We are building Iraqi security force capacity and using that to attack insurgents.

The quality of MNF-I trainers had a major impact on the quality of the forces they trained: From January until September 2006, Iraqi units with special operations advisers detained 2,065 selected targets, including 460 high- and mid-value ones, killed 222 enemy combatants, and wounded 92. Both their targeting and evidence preparation seemed successful, resulting in the continued detention of 70% of those captured. Especially impressive was the 85% conviction rate of those brought to trial, compared to the 40-50% rate of other Iraqi units.

Elite units also helped develop Iraqi forces in the field. In Mosul, a 12-man Special Forces team worked with the 172nd Stryker Brigade, but managed to make the city’s mostly Sunni police force cooperate effectively with the Kurdish Army brigade, which controls Mosul’s eastern half. Special Forces took Iraqi detectives along to raids to collect evidence. Ironically, the reluctance of Mosul judges to bring cases to trial or to impose sentences made part of these successful operations ineffective. The presence of Special Forces soldiers in Mosul also helped compensate for the reduction of MNF-I forces from a division to two battalions reduction in the city over the past two years.

Kirkuk provides another example of Special Forces and 101st Airborne Division training, although no comparable figures on operations were found. A leadership course for Iraqi lieutenants, platoon leaders, and sergeants was set up, where Iraqi officers and sergeants swapped roles, learned to plan operations, and improved basic soldiering skills. Special Forces soldiers were also used as advisers to each Iraqi company. A problem here appeared to be equipment, with Iraqi units using old pickups and Special Forces relying on old Humvees.

Relations between Special Forces and the local US conventional commander appeared worse than in Mosul, however, with the latter not incorporating the whole team into the planning and execution of a sweep through three towns west of Kirkuk, days before the team was scheduled to leave. As in Mosul, the Special Forces team expressed concern that their work needed to be sustained by the units following them, so that local forces would not revert to their old ways.

**Equipping the Force: Summer and Early Fall 2006**

The US planned to provide equipment for 325,000 ISF personnel by December 2006. 277,600 of these had been issued weapons by August 2006.

The US also continued to provide personal equipment such as body armor sets, and also up-armored Humvees and tracked M113 armored personnel carriers. According to Col. Brian Jones, commander of the 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, this significantly shored up the confidence of Iraqi soldiers.

In general, however, Iraqi army forces increasingly complained about the lack of armor, protected vehicles, and artillery. The constant up-armoring of MNF-I forces help reinforce
such complaints as did the fact that stepping up Iraqi operations in the field steadily exposed their lack of protection and firepower.

In October 2006, former Iraqi finance minister Ali Allawi, alleged that a total of “up to $800 million” meant to equip the Iraqi Army had been stolen by former officials through fraudulent arms deals, mostly during the tenure of former interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi. The former minister did not accuse specific officials. Iraqi investigators were, however, investigating former procurement officer Ziad Cattan, who in turn claimed he could account for the hundreds of millions he used to buy weapons. Analysts at Jane’s, however, said this documentation did not prove whether any of the weapons ordered by Cattan were actually delivered.\textsuperscript{cclxxiii}

**Irregularities in US Arms Shipments for Iraqi Forces**

A request by the head of the Senate Armed Services Committee John Warner to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction prompted a discouraging report from SIGIR. About $133 million of the IRRF was used to purchase more than 370,000 weapons through 19 contracts with 142 delivery orders. These weapons were small arms, comprising 12 types ranging from semiautomatic pistols and assault rifles to heavy machine guns and RPG launchers.\textsuperscript{cclxxiv}

The US military did not properly track hundreds of thousands of weapons intended for Iraqi security forces and did not record the serial numbers of nearly half a million weapons provided to Iraqis, making it impossible to track them. It also failed to provide spare parts, repair manuals, and maintenance personnel for the equipment.

Of the 505,093 weapons given to the Ministries of Interior and Defense, only 12,128 were properly recorded. These arms include RPG launchers, assault rifles, machine guns, shotguns, semiautomatic pistols and sniper rifles. Of those weapons, 370,000 were bought with American taxpayer money under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and thus fell within the general mandate of the Special Inspector General.

Although there were standard DoD regulations in place, US military officials in Baghdad said they thought these rules – the DoD small-arms serialization program – did not apply to them. Moreover, there were large discrepancies in the numbers of weapons purchased and those arrived in Iraqi warehouses. The US government directly bought 176,866 semiautomatic pistols, but only 163,386 showed up in warehouses, making for a difference of 13,480. Nearly 100 MP-5 machine guns and all of the 751 M1-assault rifles that were shipped have also vanished.

The total number of lost weapons could indeed be higher, because the Inspector General was only responsible for equipment bought directly with US taxpayer money.\textsuperscript{cclxxv} MNSTC-I responded to the SIGIR’s concerns, but while the SIGIR found some of MNSTC-I’s comments “responsive,” he did not believe that MNSTC-I adequately responded adequately to SIGIR’s recommendation to establish accurate weapon inventories.\textsuperscript{cclxxvi}

Concerning maintenance, the report concluded that Iraqi forces were still heavily dependent on US military forces to sustain them in the areas of fuel, ammunition, troop transport, health care and maintenance. The US planned to scale back its support for logistics and maintenance in 2007, but it was unclear if the Iraqi government was prepared to take over. The US military was unable to provide information on how many
Iraqi logistics personnel it had trained because the records had been deleted in a computer network crash.

“There’s a couple of red flags. Most significantly, is the Iraqi Ministry of Interior properly preparing to take over the mission and sustain it? We don’t know because we don’t have adequate visibility into their budgeting, and to a lesser extent the same red flag is up for the Department of Defense.” Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Moreover, the report found that money for spare parts was allocated for only 5 of the 12 different kinds of weapons sent to Iraq. When the Special Inspector General contacted the Defense and Interior Ministries, they did not know how or where to requisition spare parts. ISF units also apparently decided not to fill vacant arms maintenance positions.

When the report was published, the overall US expenditure for Iraqi weapons had been $133 million and $666 million for Iraqi logistics capabilities.

Support Capabilities and Requirements

The Commanding General, MNF-I, stated on August 30, 2006, that capabilities were one of the key enablers to help develop ISF so they could eventually operate independently of US and coalition forces.

The Multinational Command-Iraq continued to provide logistical support to Iraq’s armed forces, and 22% of the funds spent in this period on supplies and services for the ISF were spent on the armed forces. Despite progress in Iraqi Army logistical capabilities, much work remained to be done in institutional development. The Multinational Force Iraq, Multinational Command, and Multinational Security Transition Command all helped the government in developing a defense logistics system, but until the completion of that system, extensive support to Iraqi forces by the Multinational Force was still necessary.

The August 2006 report by the US Department of Defense summarized the situation as follows:

MNC-I continues to provide logistical support to the Iraqi Armed Forces where the established system falls short. Although there has been some success with Iraqi Army units using their own processes, there is still a great deal of institutional development remaining. MNF-I is working with both MNC-I and MNSTC-I to aid the Government of Iraq in developing a defense logistics system, but in the absence of a self-reliant system, MNF-I must provide extensive support to Iraqi forces.

The Multinational Security Transition Command processed life support contracts worth US$7.8 million in May and June 2006. As of August, all such contracts had been handed over to the Ministry of Defense, while Multinational Security Transition Command had set up a working group to oversee proper support of the ministry to Iraqi Army requirements.

In June 2006, all Iraqi Army units submitted requisitions for fuel. Fuel storage capacity was predicted to be fully fielded by December 2006. The units designated for fuel storage and transportation, the Garrison Support Units and Motorized Transportation Units, were not yet at full strength. Three of the nine planned Motorized Transportation Units were approaching operational capability, but were still hampered by a shortfall of competent maintenance personnel, while the Garrison Support Units were not expected to be functional until March 2007.
According to the SIGIR quarterly report in October 2006, MNF-I made some progress in building effective logistics capabilities within the Iraqi Army and to transition their control to the MoD. The report noted, however, that “significant challenges remain that put at risk MNF-I’s goal to transition a sustainable and maintainable logistics operation to the Ministry of Defense by January 1, 2008.”

One such problem appeared to be the fact that MNSTC-I could not tell SIGIR how many personnel have been trained to support logistics functions. Another uncertainty is whether the MoD, with its 2007 budget yet to be approved, will be prepared to provide the $3.5 billion MNSTC-I says it needs to sustain its operations in 2007.

MNF-I informed SIGIR that it is considering a “train-the-trainer” approach, in which already trained Iraqi logisticians would train other Iraqi soldiers. MNF-I has not yet committed to this training policy.

Figure 6.3 provides data on Coalition support to Iraqi Army units in terms of fuel supply through June 2006.

![Figure 6.3](image)

**Figure 6.3**

**Fuel Supplied to Iraqi Army Units**

*(in Gallons)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JP8</th>
<th>Motor Gasoline</th>
<th>Diesel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr-06</td>
<td>42,347</td>
<td>29,101</td>
<td>133,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-06</td>
<td>89,935</td>
<td>83,965</td>
<td>964,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-06</td>
<td>133,590</td>
<td>964,598</td>
<td>352,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106,403</td>
<td>247,504</td>
<td>1,450,230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VII. Progress in the Iraqi Navy

Iraq’s navy continued to have its main base at Umm Qasr. It was tasked with the defense of Iraq’s small shoreline and its offshore oil loading facilities. Its authorized (not actual) strength was around 1,100 sailors and marines on November 15, 2006, organized into two patrol and assault boat squadrons and a marine battalion.

MNF-I summarized the state of the Iraqi Navy as follows in a report on August 29, 2006:\c\cxxxviii

The Iraqi Navy is tasked with defending Iraq’s coast, territorial waters, vital ports, and offshore oil platforms. The Iraqi Navy has more than 1,100 trained and equipped sailors and marines organized into an operational headquarters, two afloat squadrons, and five Marine companies. The Iraqi Navy is developing independent capabilities for surface surveillance, maritime interdiction, oil terminal protection, and support operations.

The Iraqi Navy Training Department continues to develop unit-level refresher training and naval skills improvements, including basic seamanship and maritime security operations. In June 2006, the Training Department independently conducted basic training and successfully graduated 324 naval recruits. Its training efforts range from mentorship, as conducted by the Naval Transition Team, to active skills training, as conducted by Coalition Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard Forces.

Both the UK Royal Navy and the US Navy reported progress in training and equipment, although efforts at independent operations were still highly erratic. Iraqis regularly served on board US and UK ships, and the Iraqi Marines and Navy boats were closely integrated into coalition operations to protect oil infrastructure.\c\cxxxix

Figure 7.1 provides details on Iraqi naval assets, according to Jane’s Defense Weekly, as of July 2006.

Figure 7.1

Iraqi Naval Capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patrol boats</th>
<th>Rigid inflatable boats</th>
<th>Fast Assault Boats</th>
<th>Offshore patrol support vessels</th>
<th>Al-Faw-class patrol boats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Purchase planned</td>
<td>Purchase planned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VIII. Progress in the Iraqi Air Force

Iraq’s air force remained small. Its authorized (not actual) strength was around 900 on November 15, 2006, up from 750 earlier in the year. Increasing the size of the force continued to be a problem, because of the difficulty in finding qualified applicants. However, both the Seventh Squadron—consisting of five CompAir 7SLs and based at Kirkuk Air Base—and the 70th Squadron—consisting of two Seekers and six CH-2000s and based at Basrah Air Base—were performing operational missions. These missions mostly consisted of patrolling oil pipeline infrastructure in their respective areas.

The MNF-I summarized progress in creating the IAF as follows on August 29, 2006:

The Iraqi Air Force continues to evolve toward supporting the counter-insurgency force, but progress has been slowed by difficulty in recruiting qualified applicants. There are currently 750 personnel in the Iraqi Air Force, with development plans calling for a concentrated recruitment effort over the next 18 months to at least double the personnel by the end of December 2007. This effort is intended to provide a satisfactory corps of professionals as a foundation for future growth.

The Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance aircraft at Kirkuk Air Base (7th Squadron with five CompAir 7SLs) and Basrah Air Base (70th Squadron with two Seekers and six CH-2000s) are performing operational missions. These aircraft are primarily deployed to patrol oil pipeline infrastructure in the north and south, with occasional missions conducted in support of Iraqi Army units.

There have been recent airworthiness issues with the CompAir 7SL aircraft, and the Coalition is working with the Iraqi Air Force to develop solutions and alternatives to continue supporting the mission.

Helicopter operations from Taji Air Base in central Iraq are still in their infancy, but the next six months should see a marked improvement. The 2nd Squadron is expected to receive the first 6 of 16 Huey IIs from a modification factory in the United States by the end of January 2007 and the remainder before April 2007. The 2nd Squadron will primarily be used for casualty evacuation. It is expected to reach initial operational capability by the third quarter of FY2007.

Three C-130Es from 23rd Squadron at New Muthanna Air Base round out the Iraqi Air Force fleet. Early complications with low mission capable rates have been solved, and fleet-wide readiness was measured at 72% in July 2006. The Iraqi Air Force has requested an additional three aircraft from the U.S. Government to bring the fleet total to six. These additional aircraft reflect the Coalition Air Force Transition Team’s force generation plan and efforts are under way to identify additional funding to meet this request.

By the end of January 2007 the 2nd Squadron based at Taji Air Base was expected to receive its first 6 Huey IIs and were expected to use them mostly for casualty evacuation. Finally the 23rd Squadron located at the new Al-Muthanna airbase in Baghdad, consisted of three C-130Es.

Overall the air force largely concentrated on reconnaissance, battlefield mobility and air transport. The control of Iraqi airspace remained a US responsibility, and the Ministry of Defense had not developed plans to procure its own combat aircraft.

Figure 8.1 provides details on Iraqi air force assets, according to Jane’s Defense Weekly, as of July 2006.
**Figure 8.1**

**Iraqi Air Force Capabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>C-130E Hercules transport aircraft</th>
<th>CH-2000 observation aircraft</th>
<th>SB7L-360 Seeker</th>
<th>Mil Mi-8 battlefield helicopters</th>
<th>Bell 206 Jet Ranger helicopters</th>
<th>Bell UH-1 helicopters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># of aircraft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8 (more expected 2007)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16 (upgraded during 2006 in US to Huey II standard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Air Transport</td>
<td>Patrol oil pipelines and other critical infrastructure facilities</td>
<td>Patrol oil pipelines and other critical infrastructure facilities</td>
<td>Troop transport</td>
<td>Basic rotary-wing training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IX. Developments in the Ministry of the Interior

The 24,800 men supposedly in the National Police – and the 28,400 men in the other forces reporting directly to the Ministry of the Interior – were still being purged in the summer and fall of 2006, and these manpower figures for the total number of men that were trained and equipped grossly exaggerated the number of men actually in service. Taking a brigade of the National Police off line in October because it its ties to Shi’ite sectarian violence was a key step in cleaning up the MOI forces, but other elements of the MOI forces still present significant ties to Shi’ite parties, militias, and death squads.

Once again, a careful reading of the Department of Defense quarterly report for August provides important warnings that are disguised in the more optimistic summary reports:

- The report states that major progress has been made in reforming the internal operations of the MOI in every area but logistics and says expect major progress in that area by end 2006. It provides some details on logistic and support contracts and equipment plans. But does not address adequacy of equipment and states that, “…the MOI does not currently have an effective equipment management system in place…it is unknown what percentage of the equipment issued to the MOI is still serviceable.” (pp. 48-50)
- Reports that, “the MOI does not currently have an effective personnel management system. As a result, it is unknown how many of the forces still trained by CPATT are still employed by the MOI.” Puts attrition at least 20% per year. (p. 50)
- Says serious problems in exist in the allocation and training of police in key provinces (p. 50)
- Says both the National Police and DBE are overmanned, and that no estimate y exists of how many are trained and equipped by the MNF-I now actually serve versus those who have left. (p. 51)
- States that merging the National Police Commandos and Public Order Battalions before the January 2006 elections helped reduce sectarian problems and abuses, but no details. (p. 51)
- Notes seriousness of corruption as key problem. (p. 51)
- Flags problems with militia ties and influence, and says some are influenced by Iran, but no details, perspective, or examples. Does note that 45 more transition teams were deployed to the police in July 2006. (pp. 51-52)
- The report does warn about “unprofessional and, at times, criminal behavior” of some National Police units but does not describe which units or the level of progress in dealing with what used to be the Iraqi security forces. (p. 46)
- No meaningful content on correction of past National Police training problems. Does say US and other NPTTs are now embedded in all levels of units down to the battalion level. This should lead to major problems in dealing with sectarian and ethnic abuses and in leadership. They have, however, been able to put a police training team in every police station and facility in Baghdad.
- It is unclear that any meaningful recruiting and vetting process has yet taken hold. (p. 47)
- Says some unquantified progress in creating mechanized battalions and providing armored vehicles. (p. 47)
- The section on the Department of Border Enforcement and Department of Ports of Entry describes a rushed effort of limited present effectiveness with goals that seem unrealistic. The percentage data on manning and equipment say nothing about effectiveness.
- The report effectively says the current strength and capability of the Center for Dignitary Protection is unknown. (p. 48)
The August status report of the Department of Defense summarized the MOI’s problems as follows:

Corruption, illegal activity, and sectarian bias have constrained progress in developing MOI forces. Inappropriate tolerance of and infiltration by Shi’a militias, some of which are influenced by Iran, is the primary concern of the Government of Iraq. A lack of effective leadership and policies to stem corruption through accountability for actions, equipment, and personnel have enabled the theft of pay and equipment, unlawful detentions, and reported cases of abduction and torture or execution of Sunnis. The minister is committed to changing corrupt leaders and instituting policies to eliminate corruption.

An additional 45 transition teams were deployed in July to increase PTT coverage across the country. As stations begin to reach TRA Level 2 in August, transition teams will expand their coverage of nearly 1,000 total stations across Iraq. This will limit infiltration by militias, improve adherence to the rule of law, and prevent complicity and participation in sectarian violence.

**The Growth of MOI Forces**

The number of Ministry of the Interior forces that MNF-I defined as “trained and equipped” grew from approximately 93,000 trained and equipped in November 2005 to more than 160,000 in August 2006, and 188,200 by November 15, 2006.

- **Figure 9.1** contrasts DOD assessed capabilities for the National Police Service, June 2005 and August 2006, at the combat battalion, brigade, and division level.
- **Figure 9.2** provides a force generation timeline, with information on manning and training as well as equipment deliveries, as of August 2006.

Once again, such figures ignored desertions, absentees, and many other problems that meant such figures grossly exaggerated the number of men actually on-hand and performing any useful service.

The MOI forces were also generally less ready and reliable than their regular army counterparts, that they often had more severe manning and equipment problems, that officers and NCO presented more problems, corruption was a greater problem,, and they were more likely to support Shi’ite operations and militias.
Figure 9.1

MOI National Police Forces’ Assessed Capabilities

Data as of August 7, 2006
Note: +/- 5% margin of error.
Figure 9.2
Force Generation Timeline

Part I: Manning and Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st National Police Division</th>
<th>2nd National Police Division</th>
<th>Department of Border Enforcement</th>
<th>National Information and Investigative Agency</th>
<th>Criminal Investigative Division</th>
<th>Iraqi Police Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be trained in 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>3,634</td>
<td>4,351</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>41,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Objective Force at end of 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,238</td>
<td>11,238</td>
<td>28,360</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2006 Training goals expected to be reached by…

| July 2006 | August 2006 | November 2006 | December 2006 (this date is also listed as the training completion date of the “MCU”, which supposedly stands for “Major Crimes Unit”, although neither the term nor the abbreviation are mentioned elsewhere in the August 2006 Report to Congress “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq” from which the data in this table is taken. |

Part II: Equipment

- Overall on track to meet OCSF equipping goals by Dec 06
- Expect significant progress on weapons when shipment arrives from Russia in Aug 06
- Shipping delays regarding comms equipment resolved; equipment inbound
- Pistol purchase contract challenged causing delay in manufacture and delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>9+ CITIES</th>
<th>% Eqpd</th>
<th>Overall Key Shortfall</th>
<th>18 PROVs</th>
<th>% Eqpd</th>
<th>Overall Key Shortfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>AK-47s</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>AK-47s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anbar</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadi</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>AK-47s</td>
<td>Dahuk</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>All Priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Babil</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>PKM</td>
<td>Irbil</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>PKM, Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tal A’Far</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>PKM, Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Salymaniyah</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>All Priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>AK-47s</td>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Glocks, PKM, Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Glocks, PKM, Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>Barah</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>AK-47s, PKM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhi Qar</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dhi Qar</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Glocks, PKM, Comms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diwala</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Glocks, PKM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Muthanna 91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Police 92% B.A., Glocks, PKM, Comms
Equipment Timeline 2006:

- Iraqi Police Service:
  - June: 99-100% in key cities
  - August: 100% (the meaning of this figure from the August 2006 DoD report to Congress is not clear, given the 100% training goal in key cities and the provinces of December 2006)
  - December: 100% for the key cities IPS and the provincial IPS

- National Police:
  - July: 92%
  - November: 96-100%
  - December: 100%

- Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), Department of Ports of Entry (POE)
  - July: 81% DBE
  - August: 97-100% DBE
  - September: 100% DBE
  - December: 100% of DBE and POE

Data as of July 15, 2006

Problems in Manpower and Personnel Management

As of August the MOI did not have an effective system for keeping track of personnel and therefore was unsure how many of the trained recruits remained with the MOI or how many of the 146,000 IPS personnel on payroll had been CPATT trained and equipped. CPATT estimated that the attrition rate would be at least 20% per year in the following years.

In addition to the uncertainties in the overall number of trained police officers on duty there continued to be problems with distribution among provinces. Some provinces were reluctant to take officers off the streets in order to send them to training resulting in those provinces being understaffed with trained personnel. Meanwhile these openings allowed other provinces to fill the empty slots in the academies and having more than their authorized trained force.

The National Police suffered similar problems, having 29,000 officers on payroll but not knowing how many of these had been trained and equipped. Absenteeism continued to be a serious problem with leave policies and undeveloped personnel management accounting for 30-40% of absent personnel. In the IPS shift schedules make it difficult for the coalition teams to offer any assessment of the level of absenteeism.

Critical Problems in the US Training and Embed Effort

Moreover, it was not until October 2005 that the police training effort was consolidated under the US military along with the creation of regular forces. The US military had previously been restricted from providing such training and had little practical experience with creating the kind of paramilitary forces needed to “hold” and deal with civil conflict. The same was true of US police forces.

The mission had not really existed since the US military had effectively abandoned the mission because of problems and abuses in Latin America during the Iran-Contra era, and the US simply lacked cadres of experienced trainers for the kind of forces needed by both the National Police and police. It is a tribute to the US military and civilian advisors that many succeeded in spite of these problems, and many cadres are becoming steadily more effective. It is a reality that many advisors are not competent and should not be serving in their current positions.

Logistics Capabilities

MNC-I spent 84% of the funds used to support the ISF on Iraqi local and national police forces. The October 2006 SIGIR report feared there would be several significant challenges to the MoI logistics capabilities that MNF-I hoped to develop until the end of November 2006. SIGIR believed there was a significant risk that even if the initial goal to develop a sustainable logistics capability plan was achieved by the end of November 2006, the ministry would not be capable of sustaining logistics for the local and national police forces in the near term.

- Implementing the MNF-I plan and achieving logistics capabilities “because the Ministry does not control the Iraqi Police Service.”
- Training enough logistics personnel. “Because MNF-I plans are not yet final, there can be no assurance that MNSTC-I is planning to train enough police forces logistics personnel by the end of 2006.”
Ensuring the availability of sufficient funds to sustain the logistics capabilities of the Iraqi police forces. “MNSTC-I estimates it will cost the Ministry of Interior about $2.4 billion to sustain its operations in 2007. Because the Ministry of Interior’s budget has also not been submitted to or approved by the Iraqi Parliament, its is not possible to assess whether the Ministry of Interior is prepared to provide sufficient funds to support logistics capabilities in 2007.”

SIGIR recommended that MNF-I in cooperation with the MoD and the MoI identify the respective logistics personnel requirements and “formulate a plan for training these personnel.”

**Ongoing Sectarian Issues**

There was a continuing effort to ensure the ethnic diversity of the MOI forces. Older units such as the Public Order Battalions, by August 2006 integrated into the National Police, remained less diverse, since they were formed when Sunni participation in governmental efforts was particularly low. In comparison with these older units the newer ones were increasingly diverse. In contrast with the National Police local police forces typically continue to reflect the ethnicity of the community in which they work.

In addition to the above concerns the problem of infiltration of MOI forces by Shi’ite militias remained a primary concern as corrupt, unprofessional or illegal activities by such groups within the police or with police consent continued to reflect poorly on and degrade the confidence in the police forces. As with the other problems it was hoped that implanting stronger leadership and more effective policies would lead to a lessening of criminal activity and an increase of organizational loyalty. Additionally in July further transition teams were deployed to help limit infiltration by militias and criminal activity by members of the police.

A high profile case of police torture and mistreatment in May 2006 – the “Site 4 case” led to the dismissal and prosecution of 55 Interior Ministry employees. Some remained free as of November, leading Ambassador Khalilzad to warn Iraqi leaders that unless they pursued the case more vigorously, the US might be forced to suspend aid to the police services under the so-called Leahy Law, which prohibits the financing of foreign security forces that commit “gross violations of human rights.”

The police force in Basrah was mentored and trained by Armor Group Services Ltd, a private security contractor. Armor Group’s approach to overcome mixed loyalties due to sectarian or tribal affiliation was to hire young men of about 18-21 years of age, expecting them to be less entangled in traditional networks. Armor Group employees reported this system to work very well for the Basrah police’s Tactical Support Unit, which came to be a very respected unit and one of the very few ones without any corrupt practices.

Basra's general police force, however, met much lower standards. The 7,000 policemen were “notoriously corrupt even by Iraqi standards, and death squads wearing police uniforms and traveling in police vehicles have ab ducted and killed Sunnis and journalists.” British forces had lost oversight over the police in the area, but tried to regain control in October 2006 in “Operation Sinbad.” 1,000 British soldiers backed up by 2,000 Iraqi troops reinforced existing police stations to raise standards.
British training efforts experienced a setback on October 29, 2006, when 17 Iraqi police instructors and two translators were killed on their way home from a British-run training school.  

**Corruption in the MOI and the Critical Issue of Pay and Benefits**

Corruption remained a major problem, although some progress was made. During 2005 the MOI Inspector General (IG) conducted 790 corruption investigations. Of these, 472 (60%) were closed. Of the closed investigations 118 (25%) were forwarded to the CPI or to a court. However, 350 (74%) were closed because of “insufficient evidence,” and 4 (1%) were handled internally.

In order to improve the IG’s capabilities, the Specialized Advance Training Unit at the Baghdad Police College was scheduled to begin training new investigators, a process that was expected to take 18 months. It was clear, however, that it would take years to eliminate a level of corruption that affected both the Ministry and National Police and which was endemic in the regular police.

Equally important, corruption interacted with inadequate pay and benefit systems, poor and over-accelerated training and deployment efforts, poor facilities, a lack of adequate weapons and systems track and control their use, and major problems in transport and communications – some caused by inadequate uparmoring and capability and many cause by a lack of maintenance and support. Some of these problems were the result of training; many were the result of corruption and infiltration coupled to inadequate pay and benefits to retain a force that came under increasing threat.

Far too many elements of the police development effort simply did not plan for the level of capability needed to deal with a cycle of serious insurgency and civil conflict. The human dimension was lost in the rhetoric about patriotism and motivation and the focus on “leadership,” or simply ignored because planners and advisors believed they could not get the necessary aid in a climate where the US sought to rush army units into combat and gave limited priority to the police.

**The “Year of the Police” Gathers Limited Momentum**

It is important to note that while the MNF-I did not honestly address or publicize these problems, and its press releases tended to relentlessly “spin” a totally misleading picture of MOI capabilities, it was address the “year of the police” with a far larger training effort and taking many other steps to reform and improve the MOI forces. The August 2006 status report by the Department of Defense summarized some of these steps as follows:

The MNF-I initiative to develop professional civil security forces able to assume the lead for the security of the Iraqi people has been dubbed the “Year of the Police.” The focus is on creating a force loyal to the people of Iraq and its Constitution, and committed to guaranteeing human rights and the rule of law. This was designated as one of MNC-I’s main efforts in 2006.

Mentoring of civil security forces is conducted by Police Transition Teams (PTTs), National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs), Border Transition Teams (BTTs), and Customs and Border Protection Teams (CBPTs). More than 160 PTTs are assisting the development of the IPS. Because of the large number of police stations dispersed throughout Iraq, the PTT program has initially focused on provincial headquarters, district headquarters, and Iraqi police stations in key strategic cities, but will spread to other stations throughout the country as more stations achieve a higher level of readiness. To conduct their mission, the PTTs travel to their assigned stations to train, teach, and coach the Iraqi police and to conduct joint patrols with their Iraqi counterparts.
The integration of International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) into the PTTs significantly increased the Coalition force’s ability to develop the IPS. The IPLOs provide the civilian police with expertise in all technical aspects of criminal investigation and police station management. The deployment of five additional Military Police companies in July 2006 added extra PTTs, enabling the expansion of the program to assess and assist in the development of the IPS.

Twenty-seven BTTs mentor and enable development of border forces. Additionally, Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Patrol Teams (CBPTs) provide critical mentorship at ports of entry, while 38 National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs) continue to support the development of the National Police units. These transition teams are intended to improve the readiness and capability of their MOI partner units. The Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) is on track to meet the goal of recruiting and training the authorized number of MOI forces by the end of December 2006. The force generation of the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) and the IPS will occur in November 2006 and December 2006, respectively. Specialized police units, such as the Criminal Investigative Division (CID) and the National Information and Investigative Agency (NIIA), will be trained by the end of 2006.

**National Police**

The reorganized National Police was now organized into a headquarters, two divisions, the 1st and 2nd, a mechanized brigade and an Emergency Response Unit (ERU). The 1st and 2nd National Police Divisions had supposed reached 99% of their authorized equipping and manning levels by July 2006, and were expected to complete force generation by December 2006. Overall, approximately 24,300 National Police Personnel had been trained and equipped by August 2006. This was an increase of 1,600 since May of that year, although such figures did not reflect absences and desertions.

Training for the new recruits consisted of six weeks of training in the police academy in northern Baghdad. The equipment of the National Police consisted of small arms, medium machine guns, and RPGs, and light trucks, which were used for patrols. The mechanized battalions were equipped with Armored Security Vehicles and REVAs, a South African wheeled APC. Like the regular police, however, some of the equipment they were supposed to have was not delivered or was somehow lost.

By August the National Police had supposed received 92% of their authorized equipment. They were expected to reach 96% by the end of November, falling short of the goal of reaching 100% by that time. They were supposed to be fully equipped by the end of December. These figures, however, were at least as misleading as those for manpower. Much of the equipment was too light or inadequate for the missions the force now had to perform and much was missing or unaccounted for.

The National Police also continued to have problems with unprofessional and criminal behavior in some units. To combat these problems there were ongoing efforts to review each unit and make changes in personnel or send units to be retrained as the need arose.

The Department of Defense status report for August touched on the problems involved, although it scarcely fully addressed them.

Organized into a National Police Headquarters, two National Police Divisions, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade, and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU), the National Police are charged with maintaining law and order while an effective community police force is developed.

The National Police Headquarters provides command and control, staffing, equipping, training, and sustainment for these National Police Forces. It also commands the two training and professional development academies at Camp Solidarity and Camp Dublin.
Unprofessional and, at times, criminal behavior has been attributed to certain units in the National Police. This behavior and the decrease in public confidence in these forces has been the impetus for a National Police reform program. Each unit and its leaders will be assessed by a joint (Coalition and Iraqi) committee. Substandard leaders at all levels will be removed and units will undergo retraining.

The U.S. Government is committed to helping the Government of Iraq create an MOI that reflects the diversity of the Iraqi people. The goal is to create ethnically integrated units at the national level, while still allowing local police to reflect the ethnic composition of the communities in which they serve.

The former Police Commandos, now part of the National Police, are becoming increasingly diverse. The former Public Order Battalions, also now part of the National Police, tend to be disproportionately Shi’a, due to a lack of Sunni participation when these units were being formed in preparation for the January 2005 elections.

Merging the National Police Commandos and the Public Order Battalions into one National Police force has helped produce a more representative National Police. Recruiting initiatives targeting Sunnis have improved the diversity. Unlike the National Police, local police forces tend to be of the same ethnic mix as the communities in which they live and work.

The National Police payroll is significantly larger than its authorized end strength. There are currently more than 29,000 National Police on the MOI payroll, but it is unknown how many of these have been trained and equipped. Absenteeism among National Police units generally follows the same pattern as in the military. Leave policies and immature personnel management policies account for 30%-40% of personnel not present for duty. Absenteeism in the IPS is difficult to quantify because shift schedules preclude PTUs from ascertaining which police officers are absent and which are simply off duty.

The DBE payroll is also larger than its authorized end-strength, with 25,832 DBE personnel on the MOI payroll. It is currently unknown how many untrained DBE personnel are on the rolls and how many of the trained and equipped border personnel have left the MOI. As with the other personnel issues, an effective personnel management system will help resolve these reporting and accountability deficiencies.

The Iraqi National Police was not immune from the problem of militia infiltration. The New York Times reported in October 2006 that one unit had been withdrawn from the streets and a training program had been set up to improve the others.

Iraqi Police Service

The situation was far worse with the 120,000 men authorized the regular police and the additional 144,000 men authorized for the Facilities Protection Service. Most regular police were too lightly equipped, have massive desertions, and whose remaining elements often serve sectarian and ethnic – not national – leaders.

By August 2006 the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) claimed it had trained and equipped approximately 113,800 Iraqi Police Service (IPS) personnel, an increase of 12,600 over the three months prior.

The fact remained, however, that no one knew the real numbers and such claims bordered on the absurd. Although the US claimed the force was expected to reach the targeted strength of 135,000 by December 2006, it was clear that there would continue to be major shortages in some areas and excesses in some others. The real world personnel situation was radically different from the largely meaningless totals of “trained and equipped” reported in MNF-I press releases.
The DoD quarterly report for August 2006 was not explicit about the problems in these forces. It did, however, provide enough additional detail to raise major questions about a 12-18 month time period:

The lack of PTTs means the US only has “limited observations of the IPS (Iraqi Police service)” in 13 of 18 provinces. This means that US and MNF-I have no real system for rating effectiveness and capability of the IPS in most of Iraq. (p. 45)

The section on IPS recruiting and vetting indicates some progress has been made, but admits that “There is currently no screening process to ascertain militia allegiance” and “currently, no method exists to track the success rate of these or other police officers.” (p. 45)

The progress reported on equipping the IPS ignores the fact that the equipment supplied does not include protected vehicles and leaves the police underarmed compared to threat forces. (p. 45)

The section on IPS leadership describes the training program, not actual leadership. (pp. 45-46)

There is no meaningful reporting on progress in removing failures in senior leadership.

The DoD quarterly report also noted acute problems with the Facilities Protection Service and that these include the fact their uniforms look enough like police uniforms to help compound the problems in identifying real police from sectarian attackers and criminals. (p. 48). These uniforms have since been changed, but the differences between various force elements are difficult for ordinary Iraqis to track, particularly since no branch of the ISF has yet proved reliable or free of sectarian and ethnic bias. In short, the majority of Iraqi police forces remained as much a part of the problem as the solution.

The US had finally been able to embed a US advisory team in every police station and facility in Baghdad. This, however, was largely a reaction to the failures in Operation Together Forward. In broad terms, the “year of the police” still lacked adequate US teams to serve with Iraqi forces, and looked far more like the “two to three years of the police,” beginning in 2007. As the Department of Defense quarterly report for August made clear, there was still no meaningful database on where the men trained and equipped for the regular police actually are, or on the effectiveness of individual units.

The August report also described other problems:

The MOI does not currently have an effective personnel management system. As a result, it is unknown how many of the forces trained by CPATT are still employed by the MOI, or what percentage of the 146,000 police thought to be on the MOI payroll are CPATT trained and equipped.

CPATT estimates attrition to be at least 20% per year going forward. The MOI reports paying death benefits for more than 6,000 police officers since the fall of the Ba’athist regime in May 2003. In addition to the overall number of police in Iraq, there are some issues with distribution of the police among the various provinces.

For example, by the end of the year, Diyala Province will have recruited its authorized force, but will not have trained the entire authorized number. In the case of Diyala, the provincial leadership has resisted sending 100% of the force to training due to security concerns and the reluctance to take its police off the streets. Anbar, Basrah, and Ninewah may also miss their training targets for the same reason. Rather than let training seats go unfilled, other provinces were permitted to send some of their untrained personnel to training. As a result, those provinces will have more than the authorized force trained in their provinces.

…More than 230,000 MOI employees have been screened by the Iraqi Police Screening Service, which checks fingerprints against Ba’ath Party records and Saddam-era criminal records. Of these, 5,300 were reported as possible derogatory matches, and 74 have been dismissed. There is currently no screening process to ascertain militia allegiance.
This did not mean that some important aspects of the police development effort were not improving. By July 24, 2006, 71,324 police recruits had passed through the 10-week basic course. Those recruits with prior experience attended the three-week Transitional Integration Program (TIP), in lieu of the longer program. Originally only officers trained during the Saddam regime were eligible for the TIP program, but in July it was extended to include those that lacked formal training, but had at least one year of experience on the force. In addition to the TIP program the Officer Transitional Integration Program was designed to train officers for leadership and supervisory roles in the IPS. By August 2006 41,051 officers had graduated from the TIP and OTIP programs.

In an effort to ensure that MOI personnel were committed to the new regime more than 230,000 MOI employees were screened by the Iraqi Police Screening Service. The process checked fingerprints against records of Ba’ath Party membership and Saddam-era criminal records.

Unfortunately, the new screening process did little to affect the number of desertions, still let in many unqualified men, and there was no test for checking on possible militia allegiance. In addition to the fingerprint checks over 54,000 police candidates were tested for literacy. Of these candidates 73% passed and were enrolled in basic training.

While the full details are unclear, Colonel Ahmad Taha Hashim, the head of internal affairs at the Iraqi MOI admitted in an interview published in Al Zaman newspaper on Sep 27th that the MOI had investigated and dismissed more than 1300 police officers some with high ranks. He said some of them were leaking information to outside entities and had criminal record. Furthermore, some of them were demanding bribes from applicants of up to $600 in return for a job in the police force, as well as rehiring ex-convicts into the service and issuing fake IDs. According to Col. Hashim the personal investigating this case constantly receiving death threats, in fact 6 of his personal body guards and 16 other officers had been killed in the past few month.

Some of the applicants told the newspaper that brokers with connections to government officials at the recruitment centers bargained with recruits to provide them with the endorsement necessary to be admitted into the force for bribes. Col. Kareem confirmed the story to ABC and the number was actually 1,500 police personal dismissed and investigated on charges of corruption and human rights violations. When he was asked about reports that an additional 7000 were being investigated, he replied this was exaggerated but did not deny the additional numbers were substantial.

The US reported that the “trained and equipped” strength of the Iraqi police had reached a total force of 188,200 by November 15, 2005. This included 24,400 National Police, 28,800 other MoI forces, and 135,000 regular police. It practical terms, however, the US provided no readiness and capability reporting, and no data on actual manning. It was also clear that the IPS continued to be poorly equipped. Much of the equipment they were supposed to have was not delivered or was somehow lost. At best, they were equipped with AK-47s, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, body armor, high-frequency radios, small and medium pick-up trucks, and mid-sized SUVs.

In Baghdad, and the nine other key cities, IPS personnel were supposedly equipped at 99% of their authorized equipment by the end of June 2006. They were expected to be fully equipped by mid-August. Overall, however, in the 18 provinces the IPS was only
equipped at a 66% rate by June, and were not expected to be fully equipped until the end of the year. 

Combat effectiveness remained poor and Local police did not always respond aggressively when militias carried out sectarian or ethnic attacks. Col. James Pasquarette, commander of the Army’s 1st Brigade Combat Team in Baghdad, felt the need send out letters to every police officer and official in his area, warning they would be fired if they did not combat militias, and threatening their detention if they cooperated with them. 

The assessment of local police forces before they had to hold their own ground was not always reliable. In one case in the small town of Saba al-Bor, north of Baghdad, the local force had been considered a model unit until two weeks after the US pulled out of the town. It was overrun by Sunni insurgents; armed Shi’ite retaliated in return. The police force disintegrated, the police chief fled after being shot at, and the new chief said he could account for only 24 of his 150 policemen. 

**Department of Border Enforcement and Department of Ports of Entry**

As of early August 2006, the Coalition had funded the construction of 258 border forts throughout nine Iraqi provinces. Projections called for an additional three forts located in the Anbar and Sulaymania provinces to be built by the end of September. The forts were seen as critical to ensuring the Iraqis’ ability to assume responsibility for 3,161 kilometers of Iraq’s borders. According to US Army Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I commanding general, responsibility for border protection would initially follow a tiered approach, wherein border police on the perimeter would be backed up by the Iraqi Army, who would be backed up by Coalition forces. As of August 2006, there were 25,951 border police assigned to border forts throughout Iraq.

The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) had 23,900 trained and equipped personnel by August 2006 an increase of 1,800 since May of 2006. These personnel were organized into 5 regions, 12 brigades, 38 battalions and the staff for 258 border forts. The DBE forces were trained in three academies each with the capacity to train approximately 800 recruits at a time. Once again, however, no data were available on actual manning, equipment, or effectiveness.

Coalition teams continued to support the DBE by mentoring and training border units in fall 2006. Supplying the DBE and the Ports of Entry (POE) were given priority in receiving equipment and this in addition to the cross-leveling of personnel managed to raise most units to TRA Level 2 by August. Furthermore, of the 14 land POEs in Iraq, 13 were functional by August 2006. The DBE and POE were expected to have 28,360 trained and equipped personnel by November 2006.

The DBE and POE were supposed to be equipped with AK-47s, medium machine guns, body armor, medium pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, generators, and radios. The DBE had received 81% of their authorized equipment by August and were expected to be at 97% by the end of the month, falling short of the goal of being 100% equipped by this time. By the end of September the goal of being fully equipped was expected to be achieved. The POEs were expected to be fully equipped by the end of December 2006. Such estimates, however, were not supported by equipment audits or any system to show how much equipment was combat capable and remained on-hand.
Other MOI Programs

The Center of Dignitary Protection (CDP), was reported to be fully manned, trained and equipped as of August 2006. The CDP included 600 personnel trained for Protective Security Details (PSDs) to provide security for Iraq’s governmental leaders. In June an Iraqi training team took over responsibility for training future PSD personnel.

In addition to the regular MOI forces, an estimated 145,000 personnel served in the Facility Protection Service (FPS) working directly for the 27 ministries. The FPS forces were used as security guards for governmental buildings and compared to other MOI forces were minimally trained and equipped.

As the Department of Defense status report for August noted, however, the FPS uniforms looked similar to those of the IPS leading Iraqi civilians to confuse the two forces. Mistakenly identifying FPS forces as IPS forces undermined the reputation and thereby the capability of the better trained IPS forces. This situation was supposedly corrected by issuing new uniforms, but the real world impact was uncertain. Furthermore, corruption, theft, and favoritism were common. Many elements operated on tribal, ethnic, and sectarian lines and there was significant insurgent infiltration.

MOI Capacity Development

By August, logistics continued to be a significant concern, being the only essential system still assessed as ineffective by the transitional readiness assessment (TRA). Vehicle maintenance continued to be of particular concern. During the summer a Director General for Logistics and staff were put into place. A 6-month vehicle maintenance contract for the National Police and Baghdad IPS was agreed upon. For the MOI forces a US$950,000 vehicle spare parts contract was implemented and a US$350,000 one for the National Police.

From April to June an average of US $20,266,121 was required for logistical life support coming to a total of $60,798,363. By December an MOI National Storage and Maintenance Facility started in June 2006 was expected to be completed. Additionally one of the seven LDI storage warehouses was transferred to Iraqi control as a test case in August 2006.
Critical Failures in Support from Parallel Development of the Criminal Justice System

One further major problem limiting progress in shaping the ISF was the lack of an effective criminal justice and prison system, both of which are essential for both true progress in creating an effective police force and establishing local security and trust in the government. The Department of Defense status report for August summarized the strengths and weaknesses in progress to date as follows:

The Coalition continues to provide administrative support as well as technical and legal assistance in drafting legislation.

...The Coalition has helped the Government of Iraq improve the judicial system in several areas, including building or renovating courthouses, expanding the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI), and improving security. The CCCI, for example, now has 12 panels operating throughout Iraq. It processes, on average, 118 insurgency-related cases each month. Due to the limited capacity of the 11 panels outside Baghdad, the Baghdad CCCI is the primary facility for hearing insurgency cases.

Poor security for judges and judicial facilities, an insufficient number of judges, and an inadequate court infrastructure undermine advancements in the rule of law in Iraq. Judges are subject to intimidation and in many areas are afraid to prosecute insurgents. The U.S. Government, through the U.S. Marshals Service, responded by providing secure housing, personal security details, courthouse protection, and personal protection firearms to some members of the Iraqi judiciary. In Baghdad, the Coalition has provided facilities for 22 judges to reside in the International Zone. Working in conjunction with MNF-I, the U.S. Marshals Service has begun training an Iraqi Marshals Service. The U.S. Department of Justice, along with the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense, is proceeding with plans for the renovation and construction of Iraqi courthouses and other related court facilities, including witness protection buildings. As of July 21, 2006, approximately 20 projects to improve judicial capacity have been completed, and 13 more are under way. Five additional projects are planned.

The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that Iraq needs 1,500 judges, yet only about 740 judges are currently serving. The Iraqi Ministry of Justice’s (MOJ) Judicial Training Institute has enrolled a new class of 180 students (40 judges and 140 prosecutors) in a 2-year program to train new judges and prosecutors. When this class graduates in the fall of 2007, there will still be a significant shortfall in judges. To help address this need, the Iraqi Chief Justice recently nominated 200 lawyers to serve as investigative judges. If these judges are confirmed, the number of judges will rise to 940. By the fall of 2007, approximately 980 judges will be serving in Iraq, an increase of 32%, but still well short of the requirement.

...The MOJ is responsible for imprisoning convicted criminals and insurgents in Iraq. MOJ prisons generally meet international standards, but are already at maximum capacity. As a result, many detainees spend time in MOI or MOD facilities, which generally fall short of internationally accepted standards. To address this issue, the U.S. and Iraqi governments are funding construction of seven new MOJ prison facilities, one each in Basrah, Khan Bani Sa’ad, Nasiriyah, Dahuk, and Baladiyat, and two in Rusafa. Work has stopped at Khan Bani Sa’ad and Nasiriyah due to problems with the primary contractor. Bridge contracts have been awarded to local Iraqi contractors to provide site security and to perform some continuing construction work. The Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers anticipates that contracts will be issued to a new contractor in September and that both facilities will be completed in April 2007. Construction at the two Rusafa facilities has been delayed due to a title dispute between the Ministers of Justice and Interior. The title dispute is currently in litigation in the Iraqi courts. Dahuk, a 1,200-bed facility in the Kurdish region, is scheduled for completion in February 2007. Construction at Baladiyat was completed and the prison facility there has been activated and is currently in use by the Iraqi Corrections Services. Upon completion in mid-2007, all of these facilities will add a
combined 4,800 beds. Even with these additions, however, projections show another 20,000 beds will ultimately be needed. Thus, the Government of Iraq must address insufficient bed space, enactment of custody transfer laws, abuses in MOI and MOD detention facilities, and the need for more guards and trained supervisors. The Government of Iraq also faces the problem of prisoner-detainees awaiting adjudication/resolution of the charges against them. The MOI and MOD are believed to be detaining between approximately 2,000 and 10,000 people in pre-trial status, many in crowded, substandard facilities.

Iraq did not have an effective criminal justice system or rule of law in much of the country, courts often failed to act or were corrupt even when they were present, and much of the real justice system operated on a local tribal, religious, or militia level. Like the lack of political conciliation, effective governance, and a government presence in the field, the ISF faced problems that went far beyond its own capabilities. These problems were particularly critical in the case of the police that often had to try to operate in a legal vacuum.
X. Operational Developments: Summer and Fall 2006

Everything stays very dynamic in this type of environment, and it’s clear that the conditions under which we started are probably not the same today. And so it does require some modifications of the plan. Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, October 19, 2006

Important as the force development problems outlined in this report are, they are an argument for patience, honesty and transparency, and adequate time and resources. It is important to note that Iraqi forces often fought hard and with great courage in spite of the overall developments in the force development effort. They had a number of tactical successes in spite of these problems and pressures, and the growing sectarian and ethnic tension and rising number of clashes.

**Iraqi Operational Successes**

These operational successes during in the late summer and early fall of 2006 included the following examples:

- **July 29:** Iraqi Security Forces detained an Iraqi police colonel who had allegedly been involved in numerous illegal and insurgent activities in the Al Kut province.

- **July 30:** Iraqi and Coalition soldiers detained two terrorists and discovered bomb-making materials south of Baghdad. Elements of the 2nd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division and Coalition forces captured Baghdad’s third highest most-wanted terrorist during an operation in Adhamiyah. He was believed to be the leader of criminal elements responsible for roadside bomb attacks on Iraqi and Coalition troops, as well as sectarian murders and kidnappings. That same day, soldiers from the 2nd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division found a cache of 18 82mm mortar rounds in a trash can in Adhamiyah. Meanwhile, soldiers from the 3rd Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division and Coalition forces freed an Iraqi man help hostage in Tikrit.

- **August 2:** Iraqi National Police and Coalition forces captured eight suspected terrorists during a joint operation in the Doura neighborhood, near the center of Baghdad. The soldiers detained seven suspected terrorists, and seized weapons, bomb-making materials, and propaganda, as well as two vehicles.

- **August 6:** Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division detained six terror suspects and seized a large cache of weapons during a raid on the Al Hassana’n Mosque in southwest Baghdad. The cache included four PKC machine guns, 13 AK-47 assault rifles, two rocket-propelled grenade launchers, three rocket-propelled grenades, four rocket-propelled grenade fuses, five 60mm mortar rounds, a 60mm mortar tube, a box of mortar cartridges, a flare gun, various bomb-making materials and terrorist propaganda.

- **August 7:** Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, along with Coalition troops, searched a group of 20 buses at a checkpoint in Iskandariya, uncovering 13 AK-47 rifles, 36 magazines of Ak-47 ammunition, two RPK machine guns, four 9mm pistols, a 45-caliber pistol, a sniper rifle and two hand grenades. One suspected terrorist was detained in connection with the weapons.

- **August 8:** Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division foiled a kidnapping attempt by two men northwest of Baghdad. At a checkpoint, the soldiers heard noises coming from the trunk of a stopped vehicle. Upon inspection, they discovered a man, tied up and beaten, in the trunk. The two kidnapper were detained for questioning.

- **August 16:** Iraqi Security Forces captured a known terrorist cell leader during a raid in the Rasheed District of Baghdad. The individual, known to have been a former Ba’ath Party member, was suspected of the leading a terrorist cell in the Doura neighborhood of Baghdad.

- **August 20:** Iraqi Security Forces conducted simultaneous raids on three objectives in Baghdad, capturing two insurgent leaders. Both men were believed to control death squads in the Al Doura,
Al Sahha, and Abu D’Shair districts. The insurgents were captured without incident. Iraqi soldiers of the 5th Special Troops Company, 9th Iraqi Army Division detained five more terror suspects the same day during a permissive entry of the Al Fadly Mosque north of Baghdad.

- August 23: Iraqi police and Coalition forces thwarted an attack on a Mosul police station. After a terrorist dressed as a policeman injured six officers when he detonated his suicide bomb vest, two other attackers opened fire on the station. Iraqi Police and Coalition forces engaged the attackers, killing them both.

- Iraq soldiers from the 9th Iraqi Army Division seized a large weapons cache while searching the Al Nida Mosque in northern Baghdad. The cache consisted of 20 AK-47 assault rifles, 55 Ak-47 magazines, a PKC rifle, and 600 PKC rounds.

- September 3: Iraqi Police killed, Sadam Shihab Ahmad, one of the most wanted insurgents in the city of Rawah during a counterinsurgency operation. Ahmad was suspected in the beheading of an Iraqi police officer earlier in the year, and was believed to play a key role in other insurgent activities.

- September 2-4: During counterinsurgency operations in the restive Al Anbar province, ISF and Coalition soldiers detained 30 confirmed insurgents and 38 suspected insurgents. A cache of 120mm rockets, 155mm rockets, and 122mm rockets was also discovered during the course of operations.

- September 10: Iraqi police conducted a raid on a known terrorist hideout north of Musayyib, finding a large weapons cache and detaining one terror suspect. Upon searching the residence, police found 300 hand grenades, a bag of high-explosive pellets, and two tanks prepped for use as IEDs.

- September 14: Iraqi Army units liberated a man who was being held and tortured by members of an illegal armed group in the Ad Diwaniyah area of Baghdad during an early-morning raid. The man was immediately treated by medical personnel.

At the same time, the drift toward ethnic and sectarian conflict, and civil war forced significant changes in the operations of both Iraqi and MNF-I forces, and increased the pressures and demands on Iraq’s new and still maturing units.

These trends presented new operational problems that were steadily compounded by the draft towards full-scale civil war, and the lack of underlying progress towards political conciliation made it more difficult to develop unified forces and create popular support for either counterinsurgency operations or efforts to control the militias and other sectarian and ethnic forces.

The Battle for Baghdad

The new Iraqi government did cooperate with the MNF-I in making efforts to arrest the drift towards civil war, and use the Iraqi forces to perform this mission. The key operation to achieve this goal during the summer and fall of 2006 was an effort to bring security to Baghdad. Iraq

Prime Minister al-Maliki announced this operation on June 14, 2006. It was called Operation Together Forward, or Amaliya Ma’an ila Al-Amam in Arabic. The original plan relied very heavily on Iraqi forces and consisted of steps like increased checkpoints and patrols, curfews and enforcement of weapons bans in targeted areas of the city. US troops were to hold cleared areas for 60 to 90 days, during which infrastructure and economic reconstruction would start. It also included a three-day reassessment of all Iraqi brigades.
A Failed Initial Plan and Iraqi Effort

The size and complexity of the security situation meant that *Amaliya Ma’an ila Al-Amam* would take months to complete, and other major problems soon emerged. The Iraqi government was in control of both US and Iraqi military operations in Baghdad, and US troops had to seek Iraqi government approval to act in the capital, giving the government the possibility to take into account its delicate political position. The Prime Minister complained in October 2006 that he had not been informed about an American-backed raid to capture the suspected leader of a Shi’ite death squad. Gen. Caldwell’s response was that the raid had been led by Iraqi forces and concerned a suspect whom the Iraqi authorities had given prior approval to capture. “Notification was made to the government of Iraq, but it’s apparent that it didn’t make it to the prime minister,” Caldwell said.

Iraq’s national unity government and MNF-I did devise a Baghdad Security Plan, comprised of three principal components:

- **Stabilizing Baghdad zone by zone.** Four Iraqi Army battalions, two Coalition brigades and five military police companies will be redeployed to Baghdad, resulting in more than 12,000 additional forces on the city's streets. The National Police will simultaneously undergo intensive retraining, with each brigade to be subjected to a three-day assessment period, with its leadership evaluated and, if necessary, replaced. Each brigade will subsequently receive additional training focused on countering violent sectarianism before redeployment. Over the last 10 days this approach began to be implemented in five areas of Baghdad—Doura, Ghazaliyah, Rashid, Almeriya and Mansour. In coming weeks other districts will be added.

  Iraqi government and Coalition forces are adopting new tactics to stem sectarian killings. Increased checkpoints and patrols are being used to deny freedom of movement and safe haven to sectarian killers. The leaders of the death squads are being targeted. Security forces have started to work with cross-sectarian neighborhood committees. These and other new tactics will drive toward the goal of achieving security neighborhood by neighborhood. As each district of Baghdad is secured, operations will expand into contiguous zones over coming weeks and months.

- **Disrupting support zones.** Even as Iraqi and Coalition forces concentrate on securing specific neighborhoods, they will continue to conduct targeted operations in other zones that are staging areas for the violence. This includes targeted raids and other operations on areas outside of Baghdad’s center, where planning cells, car-bomb factories and terrorist safe houses are located. This will degrade the ability of the terrorists and death squads to mount offensive operations into the areas we are working to stabilize.

- **Undertaking civic action and economic development.** One of the most tragic elements of the increasing violence in Baghdad is that it has robbed the Iraqi people of the sense of normalcy they desperately seek after living under crushing tyranny for more than three decades. In the immediate aftermath of Iraq’s liberation, the entrepreneurial spirit of the Iraqi people was demonstrated as Baghdad’s shops overflowed with consumer goods prohibited under the previous regime. However, the increasing violence in the streets of Baghdad has forced many Iraqis to close their shops for fear of their safety.

This plan, however, read far better than the actual practice. Iraqi forces were not up to the job, and the civic action and economic development efforts faltered and often failed. Some units performed well. However, significant numbers of Iraqi forces failed to deploy, and others were badly manned, lacked leadership from their officers and NCO, and played only a pro forma or static role. At least some allowed insurgents and militias to operate in their areas, refused to engage them, or provided support to sectarian or ethnic factions.
The operational plan was also flawed because success to a large degree depended on political conciliation and building trust in the new government, and on the ability to control or disband militias and other sectarian and ethnic forces, and not simply attack “terrorists” or insurgents. Disrupting support zones had some success in the case of neo-Salafi Sunni groups, but little in the case of Shi’ite militias or more mainstream Sunni security forces.

The first month of the operation did not result in the projected decreases in the number of attacks. There were an average of 23.7 attacks per day over Baghdad’s 10 districts, virtually identical to the 23.8 daily average for the month prior to the operation. When Prime Minister al-Maliki visited the United States in July 2006, he and President Bush announced adjustments to the Baghdad Security Plan including the key addition of increasing security force levels in the city, and further adjustments in tactics and procedures. The two primary foci of the new security operations were to reduce sectarian violence by de-legitimizing illegally armed groups and to establish the Iraqi Security Forces as the dominant security presence.

These failures forced the US to take over much of the effort. This “Phase II” of the operation began on August 7, 2006. The MNF-I Commanding General said on August 30 that he was pleased with the operation’s progress, but also stated that it would take a long time to bring security to Baghdad’s neighborhoods. US intelligence assessments of this operation’s impact were classified as of September 2006, but according to the State Department, the daily murder rate in Baghdad was reduced by 46% from July to August as a result of Operation Together Forward. However, as noted above these dramatic results would be cast in doubt by the narrow definition of murder used by the US. Other results of the operation were that 33,000 buildings were searched, over 700 weapons confiscated and 70 individuals detained by the end of August.

In late October 2006, the US military said it had committed 15,600 troops to the operation, compared with 9,600 Iraqi Army troops and 30,000 Iraqi policemen serving in support roles. In practice, American troops led 95,000 house searches, Iraqi regular forces often failed to perform their missions, and many police units were ineffective or passive.

In short, the ISF largely failed and the limited successes that did occur took place because the US provided a substantial increase in both its troop presence and its efforts to reform and stiffen the ISF units operating in the Baghdad area. As time went on, the Iraqi government and MNF-I claimed a number of limited tactical successes in given districts of the city, although they did not demonstrate the ability to deal with sectarian forces or control a city of over five million.

During the end of the summer of 2006, the Baghdad neighborhood of Doura, in the Rashid District, became one of the main focuses of US engagement as part of Operation Together Forward. One of the capital’s most violent neighborhoods, Doura was the subject of “intelligence-driven precision operations” meant to clear the area of violent elements and establish join Coalition-Iraqi police patrols to protect area residents. The US Army’s 4th Brigade Combat Team was working closely with the Rashid District Council and local religious leaders to initiate a series of public works on the district of 1.8 million to empower the citizenry and help revitalize the community.
By August 18, Colonel Michael Beech of the 4th Brigade Combat Team announced that the murder rate in Doura had dropped from an average of 20 per week to only one murder in the preceding 10 days. After three weeks spent searching 3,700 homes, Col. Beech further announced that Doura was now securely under the protection of Iraq’s 6th National Police Brigade. Beech placed specific police companies in each of Doura’s subdivisions to establish a community effort, in an attempt to facilitate the process of Doura inhabitants coming to recognize the police as trusted protectors.

As of late August, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense reported that the crime rate in Doura had been reduced by 80%. Tribal leaders and imams in the Rashid districts also met to sign an agreement forsaking violence, and renouncing protection for tribal members who engage in sectarian violence. This last measure was seen by many as a positive step, at least at a formal level, in moving away from sectarian agendas to a unified solution within the district.

On August 25, US Army Col. Robert Scurlock, stated that the two weeks prior had experienced a 41% decline in violent attacks across Baghdad. On August 13, Scurlock’s combat team had moved into Baghdad’s restive Amriyah neighborhood, in an operation similar to that in Doura. That same day, in a meeting in Washington with Donald Rumsfeld, Iraqi Deputy President Adil Al-Mahdi told journalists that 70% of Iraq had been effectively secured. Still, as of late August, the number of violent deaths in Baghdad hovered at about 2,000 per month.

By mid-September, Iraqi and Coalition forces had searched 52,000 buildings in the Doura, Amriyah, Ghazalia, Shula, and Adhamiya neighborhoods. According to US Army Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, spokesman for MNF-I, at a September 14 press briefing, these searches resulted in the seizure of 32 weapons caches and more than 1,200 illegal weapons. Ninety-one individuals with suspected links to insurgents, terrorism, or sectarian violence were also detained during the course of the searches.

Caldwell said that Iraqi and Coalition troops had conducted 10 combat operations in the week leading up to the press briefing, centered on southwest Baghdad, in order to keep violence from returning to these neighborhoods. He also announced that Coalition and Iraqi forces were now expanding these security operations into three more neighborhoods: Risalah, Khadra, and Shaab.

As of early October, the battle of Baghdad was still very much a work in progress. It was clear that Iraqi forces still presented major problems at every level, still had high absentee rates and serious leadership problems, and that the Maliki government still had failed to make major moves towards conciliation and demonstrate it could support security operations by deployed an effective government presence into secured areas. At the same time, Iraqi forces were getting better, some areas were more secure, and the operation was not a failure.

By late 2006, however, it was all too clear that US and Iraqi forces had not succeeded in curbing the overall level of violence in Baghdad, defeating the insurgents in any lasting way, or breaking up the militias. The overall number of armed attacks on US soldiers and Iraqis in the capital had increased by 43 percent since midsummer.

Maj. Gen. William Caldwell noted an 11% decrease in violence in the neighborhoods where sweeps had been focused. Individual accounts of Iraqis in these neighborhoods corroborated this improvement. But this positive development was more than offset
by more attacks in other parts of the city. Caldwell said the military expected the level of violence to keep rising during the remainder of Ramadan.cccxxxv

The first three weeks of the holiday saw an average 36 violent incidents per day in Baghdad, compared to 28 per day since mid-June, when Operation Forward Together first began.cccxxxvi The Health Ministry reported 2,700 Iraqi civilians killed in the city in September 2006, 400 more than in August and nearly as many as in July.cccxxxvii

Caldwell also said that the operation had not succeeded in keeping neighborhoods peaceful once they were cleared of insurgents or militias. “We’re finding insurgent elements, the extremists, are pushing back hard. They’re trying to get back into those areas” where Iraqi and US forces had targeted them before. “We’re constantly going back in and doing clearing operations.”cccxxxviii

Part of the problem was the ineffectiveness of some Iraqi units deployed to Baghdad for Operation Forward Together. According to US military officials, several Iraqi battalions deserted rather than follow orders to go to Baghdad. Sending them to the capital was tantamount to demobilizing them, despite the extra pay that US officials offered to persuade reluctant troops to come to their aid in Baghdad.cccxxxix, ccxl At the end of October 2006, only two of the six additional Iraqi battalions that US commanders requested had been sent to the capital.cccxli

Chairman of the JCS Gen. Peter Pace acknowledged in October 2006 that senior US commanders were puzzled by the failure of the plan to train and equip Iraqi forces to curb violence. Pace said other factors driving violence needed to be examined. He also admitted that US troops were unable to stop sectarian violence: “You cannot have enough men under arms 24-7 to stop the hatred killings.”cccxl Phillip Carter, an embedded adviser with the 101st Airborne Division in Baquba, also questioned the viability of the strategy focused on building up Iraqi forces to replace Coalition troops:

“...In theory, security should have improved with the development of capable Iraqi Army and police units. That did not happen. This is the central paradox of the Iraq war in fall 2006: we are making progress in developing the Iraqi Army and police, yet the violence gripping the country continues to worsen. This paradox raises fundamental questions about the wisdom and efficacy of our strategy, which is to ‘stand up’ Iraqi security forces so we can ‘stand down’ American forces. Put simply, this plan is a blueprint for withdrawal, not for victory. Improving the Iraqi Army and police is necessary to prevail in Iraq; it is not sufficient. (...) This means many more embedded advisers like myself (are necessary), working in tandem with teams from the State Department and other agencies, supported by combat forces only when force is necessary...”cccxlii

US commanders in October said that the Baghdad campaign had so far only covered the “clear” and “hold” phases, with little infrastructure reconstruction.ccxliv

The Government Introduces Baghdad Neighborhood Committees

The al-Maliki government responded in ways that partially bypassed the entire ISF development effort. It introduced a new security plan on October 2, 2006, after being criticized for its mishandling of the security situation, especially the escalation of sectarian killings. This plan included forming committees of Baghdad neighborhood leaders to try to ease sectarian tension.

Local political leaders, tribal sheiks, clerics and members of the security forces would monitor every Baghdad neighborhood. They would not have control over security forces, but instead function as arbitrators for local disputes, identify dangers and collect
intelligence for the security forces, and act as a bridge between them and the civilian population. Another task was to set up checkpoints "with Iraqi authorities." They reported to a 'central commission for peace and security," which would in turn work with security forces. The plan was apparently meant to improve trust in and cooperation with the police, although details of the plan at first remained vague.

The plan did gain broad support in parliament among the major Sunni and Shiite political blocs, despite the fact that it appeared to conflict with Shiite politicians’ plan to set up armed neighborhood watches.

The United States also endorsed the plan. Gen. Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad issued a joint statement, describing the plan as “a significant step in the right direction." The idea of neighborhood watches was at odds with the imperative to abolish militias, but was seen as expedient by some military officials.

**Securing Anbar Province**

The uncertainties in the battle of Baghdad were compounded by developments in other parts of Iraq, many of which revealed similar weaknesses in some aspects of Iraqi forces. These problems became especially clear in Anbar Province in western Iraq – the area most dominated by the Sunni insurgency.

In August 2006, Col. Peter Devlin, a senior Marine Intelligence officer at the Marine headquarters in Anbar Province, prepared a report on the province’s security situation and requirements to improve it. Parts of his assessment were leaked by the *Washington Post*, and several military officials familiar with the document disclosing additional material. While a number of senior officers did make it clear that they felt his assessment might understate the potential for future success, none disagreed with its basic conclusions.

Devlin’s assessment stated that without the deployment of an additional US division, “there is nothing Multinational Force-West can do to influence the motivation of the Sunni to wage an insurgency.” Several parts of the assessment are consistent with the views of some Marine officers who were interviewed in the field in July 2006. Lt. Col. Ronald Gridley, XO with Regimental Combat Team 7, pointed to his regiment’s recommendation that additional troops be allocated to its section of Anbar. Even a battalion or two, Gridley said, would have impact.

Develin warned that the Sunnis in Anbar province had generally lost faith in the national government and feel marginalized to a degree that “their greatest fears have been realized.” The report describes Al Qa'ida in Mesopotamia, which is predominantly made of native Iraqis, as an “integral part of the social fabric” of Anbar.

He also warned that even successful attacks on low-level insurgents had little practical value, since losses were limited and the men involved could be easily replaced, and because insurgents could easily hide or disperse. He noted that as long as the insurgent had the support of the people, or could broadly intimidate them, that insurgency could not be defeated.

At the same time, he stated that the addition of troops could increase the number of border posts and the number of raids along smuggling routes. Another approach could be to focus on the towns and cities along the river west of Baghdad, as well as the roads
from Falluja towards Syria. Extra troops could also assist in nation-building tasks. On the other hand, more troops could also increase the perception among Iraqis of the United States as a heavy-handed occupier.

The practical problem in responding to Devlin’s caveats was that the US was already increasing its deployments to deal with Baghdad and Iraqi forces remained weak. About 30,000 US forces were stationed in Anbar, a region that borders on Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and is about the size of Louisiana.

Iraqi forces also lacked the strength and capability to solve the problem. Two Iraqi divisions were already in Anbar, with an authorized strength of 19,000 men. The Iraqi units, however, were at least 5,000-7,000 troops short of their authorized strength and hundreds more are AWOL. Together with the practice of giving monthly leaves, these problems produced a day-to-day strength of the two divisions of 50% and 35% respectively.

Iraqi force performance remained erratic. As was the case in Baghdad Province, some forces fought and some could only provide limited support. Battalions and units identified as being in the lead ranged from combat capable to virtually inactive. Iraqi forces generally could not plan or execute without substantial US support, and often did no better than US units in attracting local support and HUMINT. While Iraqis as a whole might support the ISF, the Iraqis in the field often saw them as tied to other sects and ethnic groups.

This did not mean that some Iraqi forces did not succeed. Some Iraqi units did show the ability to go out into the field and the ability to work with local and tribal leaders. Moreover, local volunteers continued to join the ISF. Iraqi force development still have great potential, but it was clear that it could take several more years to make effective, and that much depended on Sunni belief at the local and national level that the Iraqi government would serve Sunni as well as Shi’ite and Kurdish interests.

Marine Maj. Gen. Rick Zilmer, commander of the troops in the region, said his forces were sufficient to fulfill the primary mission of training Iraqi forces, but not enough to also defeat the insurgency in Anbar. Marine Brig. Gen. Robert Neller, deputy commanding general of Multinational Force West, also said in November that the training effort was making progress, but commented on an Iraqi police officer’s request for more US forces: “Let’s be honest with each other. There are not enough Marines, Iraqi army or police to cover all this ground. And I can’t tell you there will be more Marines coming.”

In mid-November 2006, Neller said that many police officers in Anbar province had not been paid for three months, because the central government did not provide security forces there with the necessary funding. “That’s why people in Anbar think the government in Baghdad doesn’t want them to succeed,” Neller said. “Sometimes I wonder if the government in Baghdad wants them to succeed.” The government’s response to such allegations was that the reason for the lack of funding was police corruption in Anbar province that the government was unwilling to subsidize.

**Co-opting Tribal Leaders in Anbar**

In September 2006, the leaders of 25 out of ca. 31 tribes in Anbar province agreed to unite in the fight against the insurgency. It remained unclear, however, how quickly and
forcefully they would confront Al-Qa'ida and other insurgent elements. One of the tribal
leaders, Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaiq al-Rishawi, estimated that the 25 tribes counted
30,000 young men armed with assault rifles willing to fight against insurgents, whose
number the Sheik put at about 1,300. He also demanded weapons, equipment and tactical
help for Anbar’s tribes from an Iraqi army brigade. According to US military sources, the
tribes in the area had fought Sunni insurgents in the past, but had never coordinated their
actions that fight. The initial government response from Baghdad was grateful, but
avoided specific commitments. The agreement was denounced shortly afterwards as
“pure nonsense” by other tribal leaders from Anbar. The week after the
announcement, however, seemed to confirm the tribal leaders sincerity in fighting the
insurgency; armed tribesmen seized four men at a mosque in Ramadi they believed to be
Al Qa'ida fighters. Their bodies were later found in a dumpster. Meanwhile, Marine
Corps commandant Michael W. Hagee described security in Anbar as improving, but said
the province was nonetheless still hazardous.

“The security situation has changed very greatly since we went in there. Now, it’s still very dangerous.”
Gen. Michael W. Hagee, Marine Corps commandant.

Securing Ramadi

One additional problem with Operation Forward Together was that Coalition and Iraqi
efforts concentrated on securing Baghdad over the summer, and the pacification effort in
other parts of the country had to get by lower troop numbers. This put more strain on ISF
forces as well as those of the MNF-I, and most of the forces supposedly “in the lead”
already faced serious problems in manning levels and real-world mission capability.

One example was Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province. Although the Iraqi government
had authorized a police force strength of 3,000, there were only about 300 trained and
equipped policemen in August 2006. About 2,000 Iraqi troops and several thousand US
soldiers were also stationed in the city of 300,000. In comparison, about 12,000 US and
Iraqi troops were employed to rid Fallujah of insurgents, a city about half the size of
Ramadi.

US Army Col. Sean MacFarland, commander of the brigade responsible for the Ramadi
area, openly admitted to the low priority given to the city as a result of the troop
requirements for the Baghdad offensive, saying that Baghdad, not his area of operation,
was currently the main effort: “I’m trying to take the heat off Baghdad.” Part of the
security problem in Ramadi may actually have been the retaking of Fallujah, when
insurgents were pushed out of the city and partly relocated to nearby Ramadi.

The political process in the province was also hampered by the high level of violence,
which had killed four of 31 members of the Anbar Provincial Council in the past months.
Insurgents had tried to kill Anbar's governor, Maamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani, 30 times.
Employees going from one part of the government compound to another had to sprint in
order to avoid sniper fire.

Politics on a national level also slowed down progress. Anbar was the only province not
to receive its share of the 2006 budget for development and reconstruction projects. All
other provinces have received about 10 - 40% of their share of the money. While al-
Awani alleged that the Shiite-dominated central government wanted to weaken his
government, politicians in Baghdad said they wanted better guarantees that the provincial
administration was stable enough to safeguard the money. A Ramadi bank had recently been robbed of more than $6 million in central government funds.

The US military did, however, feel that MNF-I and ISF efforts had been more successful in some other parts of Anbar province, both in terms of security and reconstruction, for example in Fallujah and several towns in the Euphrates valley.\textsuperscript{ccls}

\textbf{ISF Operational Successes and Human Intelligence}

One area where MNF-I experts did feel that ISF forces became more successful was HUMINT. For example, Operation Sidewinder, executed on August 1, 2006, was seen as a success in terms of Iraqi Security Force operational capabilities, as well as growing ISF HUMINT capabilities.

The mission was carried out by Iraqi soldiers assigned to the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade, 1\textsuperscript{st} Iraqi Army Division, and was a cordon and search operation to interrupt “anti-Iraqi forces” activity in Sadiquiyah. According to US Marine Sergeant Brian A. Richmond, a rifleman who provided support to the Iraqi forces, the Iraqi soldiers were able to gather more intelligence from the local citizens than he believed Coalition troops could have.\textsuperscript{cccxi} In a counterinsurgency operation where HUMINT serves as a key ingredient to success, Iraqis’ growing ability to obtain information and tips indicates possible growing trust from the public, which Coalition trainers have sought to establish through increased emphasis on professionalism.

Other ISF successes in obtaining actionable Human Intelligence in the late summer and early fall of 2006 included:\textsuperscript{cccc}

- Jul 31: A tip from an Iraqi citizen led a patrol of the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade, 6\textsuperscript{th} Iraqi Army Division and Coalition soldiers to a munitions cache in east Baghdad. The soldiers discovered 18 60mm rounds with fuses installed. It reportedly took the soldiers less than 15 minutes from the time the tip was called to locate the cache.
- August 9: Operating on a tip from local citizens in Muqdadiyah, Iraqi soldiers from the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade, 5\textsuperscript{th} Iraqi Army Division and Coalition forces four terror suspects after searching a building in the northern part of the city. The search also revealed a vehicle-born IED factory, three vehicles that matched the description of cars used in an attack on an Iraqi police checkpoint earlier in the week, and one rocket-propelled grenade launcher.
- August 20: A women in Karkh who claimed to have been kidnapped previously entered the office of the Iraqi Army’s 6\textsuperscript{th} Division and led soldiers from the 5\textsuperscript{th} Battalion to a house where she said another kidnapped victim was located. The soldiers rescued the woman, unharmed, and arrested the two kidnappers. That same day, in Baghdad, a tip from a citizen led soldiers from the 5\textsuperscript{th} Special Troops Company, 9\textsuperscript{th} Iraqi Army Division to a permissive entry of the Al Fadly Mosque, where they discovered a cache of weapons and detained two five suspected terrorists.
- August 21: An Iraqi citizen in Baghdad led soldiers from the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade, 6\textsuperscript{th} Iraqi Army Division to a house in the Adhamiyah neighborhood where kidnap victims and weapons were kept. One victim was rescued, along with the discovery of a cache of rocket-propelled grenades, propellant charges, grenades, and rifles.

On September 3, 2006, Iraqi authorities announced that a top Al-Qa’ida leader who had been in custody since June 19 had yielded valuable intelligence, including information leading to the capture of 20 terrorist leaders. In the weeks leading up to this announcement, Iraqi army and national police units conducted over 80 missions specifically targeting Al-Qa’ida in Iraq. During these operations, it was reported that 49 terrorists were killed, while Iraqi forces detained 225 more who had been connected with
bombings, kidnappings and murders, as well as facilitating movement of foreign fighters, weapons, explosive materials, and funding into the country.\textsuperscript{ccclxiii}

Figure 10.1 shows the rise in actionable tips to Coalition and Iraqi forces, as reported by MNF-I as of August 2006. The data show fluctuation on a weekly basis, but an overall upward trend since March 2006.

![Figure 10.1](image)

Note: Data includes tips reported to multiple sources.
Source: MNF-I, as adapted from: US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress, p. 39; Note: +/-5% margin of error.

**Other Operational Developments**

The scale of the problems Iraqi forces had to deal with becomes even clearer from a detailed timeline of the major daily interactions between ISF forces and what some now call “anti-Iraqi” actors:

- **July 1, 2006:** In the aftermath of a powerful bomb attack that killed over sixty people in a marketplace, US and Iraqi forces arriving to provide assistance were pelted with rocks by civilians, the *New York Times* reported. Female Sunni MP Taysir al-Mashhadani was abducted in Baghdad, apparently by a Shi’ite militia. Sunnis accused the Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi security forces of complicity, since Iraqi patrols were apparently nearby but did not attempt to intervene.

- **July 2, 2006:** Iraqi military forces with more than 50 vehicles and backed by US helicopters moved to surround the Ur neighborhood northeast of Baghdad in an attempt to locate and free abducted Iraqi MP Taysir al-Mashhadani. The MP and her bodyguards remained missing. Iraqi National Security Advisor Mowaffaq al-Rubaie released a “most wanted” list of 41 known insurgents, based on data compiled by the security forces over the previous nine months. A suicide car bomb in Kirkuk killed a police officer and wounded two others. Two policemen were killed in a car bombing in central Baghdad. Police clashed with militias in several neighborhoods around Baghdad, apparently following a police entry into a Sunni mosque early in the morning, resulting the killing and wounding of an undetermined number of security forces and militiamen.
July 3, 2006: The “bullet-riddled” bodies of five Iraqi policemen were found near a sanitation plant in Mandali near the Iranian border. Two soldiers and two policemen were wounded in an attack by a suicide car bombing in Baghdad. Four police officers and three civilians were killed by a car bomb in Mosul. The bodies of five Iraqi soldiers were recovered in Baquba, and a police officer’s body was recovered in Kirkuk one day after he had been captured amidst a gunfight with insurgents. A joint patrol of Iraqi police and army troops raided a farm compound west of Kirkuk and freed a police officer and a soldier who had been kidnapped on July 1. Coalition forces announced that Iraqi soldiers had raided a farmhouse west of Baghdad, capturing 14 al-Qa’ida foreign fighters.

July 4, 2006: Allegedly out of fear that Iraqi forces won’t be able to provide security in the Muthanna province following its handover from British and Australian troops later in July 2006, the province’s Governor Mohammad Ali Hassan and Police Chief Mohammad Najim Abu Kihila were made to resign by the provincial council. The resignations occurred after 300 recently fired policemen stormed the provincial council and attacked council members to protest the loss of their jobs. The provincial council doubted the ability of Iraqi forces to secure Muthanna province independently. Three policemen were killed and three other wounded by a roadside bomb in eastern Baghdad. Gunmen dressed in security force uniforms kidnapped Raad Hareth, the Iraqi deputy electricity minister, and his 11 bodyguards on the outskirts of Baghdad, but all were released that evening with no explanation.

July 5, 2006: US and Iraqi troops carried out a raid on the Saddam Hospital in Ramadi, which Coalition military spokesman Maj. Gen. William Caldwell said was being used as a haven for insurgents. Caldwell also noted that, due to a rise in the number of vehicle-borne bomb attacks, Iraqi security forces were being trained in “new techniques” to deal with them and were raiding suspected car bomb “factories.” Iraqi forces were also continuing operations in the search for abducted Sunni MP Taysir al-Mashhadani with “little success.” In Kirkuk, a roadside bomb killed a security force member protecting oil facilities. A police officer was killed in Mosul when a suicide car bomb detonated near the police station.

July 6, 2006: In an afternoon news conference, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said that the Facilities Protection Service, a branch of the security forces created to protect government buildings and installations, was “filled with criminals and murderers.” “It didn’t really protect the ministries,” he acknowledged. “On the contrary, it turned into a partner in the killing.” Insurgents wounded two police officers in an attack on the Ramadi hospital that Iraqi and US forces had raided and secured the previous day. A Mahdi militia commander, Adnan al-Unaybi, was arrested by Iraqi and US forces around Hillah, 60 miles south of Baghdad.

July 7, 2006: Iraqi forces supported by US aircraft conducted an early morning raid on the Sadr City area of eastern Baghdad that US and Iraqi spokesmen said killed or wounded about 30 fighters and capturing an unidentified “extremist leader,” apparently a commander of the Shi’ite Mahdi militia. No Iraqi force or US casualties were reported. The raid was part of the ongoing search for kidnapped Sunni MP Taysir al-Mashhadani, abducted July 1. An Iraqi army officer said that American officials had given Iraqi forces a list of people to be arrested in the Sadr City raid.

July 8, 2006: A roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi police patrol wounded one officer in Baghdad.

July 9, 2006: Major Qahtan Adnan Abdul-Razzaq, an Iraqi army intelligence officer, was shot while driving in Karbala. A police officer was killed in in a drive-by shooting in Karbala. One policeman was killed in eastern Baghdad when gunmen fired on a patrol. Iraqi forces cordoned off the Sadrain Mosque, a center of radical Shi’ite Mahdi militia supporters, in Zafraniya southeast of Baghdad and the national police searched the mosque, detaining 20 people and confiscating six AK-47s. The Mosque described as a stronghold of the radical Shi’ite Mahdi militia. The Los Angeles Times reported on confidential Iraqi government documents that detail more than 400 investigations of Iraqi police corruption and brutality, including participation in insurgent and sectarian militia-led violence. Individuals of all police ranks within the Interior Ministry have been implicated in corruption and other violations. Prominent Sunni leaders criticized the Iraqi forces “for their inability to control violence” and links to Shi’ite militias after gunmen went on a killing
spree in the western Jihad district of Baghdad inhabited mainly by Sunnis. A military cordon was
established in the city shortly afterward.

- **July 10, 2006:** Five policemen were injured by a roadside bomb in central Baghdad. A roadside
bomb in Hilla killed a police officer and wounded four civilian bystanders. Soldiers and police
enforced a daytime curfew and kept the al-Jihad neighborhood of Baghdad cordoned off in the
aftermath of an anti-Sunni killing spree by gunmen the preceding day, while violence against
civilians by gunmen continued. Locals expressed concerns about the loyalty and capabilities of the
military and police: “The security forces are not capable of maintaining security.”

- **July 11, 2006:** Britain’s defense secretary said British, Australian, and Japanese troops would
hand over control of the southern Muthanna province to Iraqi security forces on Thursday July 12.
The Maysan and Dhi Qar provinces were also being slated for coalition force withdrawals. In an
address at CSIS in Washington, DC, US Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad reported that Iraqi
security forces have increased over the past year from 168,000 to 265,000. He also claimed that by
the end of summer 2006 about 75 percent of counterinsurgency operations would be led by Iraqi
units and acknowledged that the security clampdown in Baghdad that started about one month
previously had not met expectations that it would reduce violence.

- **July 12, 2006:** US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, speaking to US troops in Iraq, said that
267,000 Iraqi security forces were “trained, equipped, and gaining combat experience,” but that
US forces would have to remain as the Iraqis’ “enablers” “for some period of time.” Iraqi Prime
Minister al-Maliki told the parliament that he was optimistic that there are enough security forces
to defeat the insurgents. US Gen. George Casey, the senior American commander in Iraq, said that
additional US troops might be needed in Baghdad to help quell the recent upsurge in sectarian
violence.

- **July 13, 2006:** British and Australian troops officially handed over security responsibilities for the
southern province of Muthanna to the Iraqi government and its security forces. Iraqi Prime
Minister al-Maliki said it was “an important step toward the goal of full Iraqi responsibility for all
18 provinces by the end of next year.” British Maj. Gen. John Cooper, commander of British
forces in southern Iraq, said his forces had trained and equipped 2,000 policemen and 1,000
soldiers to be based in the province. One police officer was killed and two others wounded in
clashes in Baghdad between security forces and Shi’ite militiamen. A “postal policeman” was
killed in a drive-by shooting in Baghdad. Gunmen stopped a car with four policemen from
Karbala at a fake checkpoint in Baghdad and killed them. In Mosul, gunmen killed an off-duty
police officer at a car-repair shop.

- **July 14, 2006:** Gunmen attacked a checkpoint south of Kirkuk, killing 12 Iraqi soldiers.

- **July 15, 2006:** A suicide bomber attacked a convoy of Interior Ministry commandos, wounding
two while killing two civilians.

- **July 16, 2006:** A roadside bomb west of Kirkuk detonated as a convoy of Iraqi Army troops
passed. Two soldiers and the Second Battalion commander Riyad al-Danouk were injured.

- **July 17, 2006:** Three Iraqi troops were killed at a checkpoint in Mahmoudiya, a town south of
Baghdad, as gunmen stormed the town market and proceeded to kill some 50 mostly Shi’ite
civilians. Afterwards, Iraqi soldiers raided a nearby house, arresting two suspects and confiscating
grenades and other weapons. Iraqi Shi’ite politicians walked out of a parliament session to protest
the Iraqi security forces’ inability to stop the violence.

- **July 18, 2006:** Iraqi National Security Adviser Mouwafak al-Rubaie reported that a Jordanian
militant, Diyar Ismail Mahmoud alias Abu al-Afghani, believed responsible for the killing of two
captured US soldiers in June, had been killed in a clash with Iraqi security forces. Al-Rubaie also
claimed that Iraqi forces had captured four leaders of the Omar Brigade, an al-Qa’ida in Iraq
affiliated group. Police arriving at the scene of a major car bombing in the town of Kufa, south of
Baghdad, were pelted with rocks and had to fire shots into the air to disperse the angry mob. In
Kirkuk, six policemen were killed and one was injured by a roadside bomb. Gunmen wearing Iraqi
army uniforms robbed a bank in western Baghdad. A police officer in Baqubah was killed on his
way to work. Associated Press reported that 617 Iraqis, including 90 police and soldiers, had been killed since the beginning of the month and 1,850, including 267 security forces, had been killed since the new government took power on May 20. In statements published by an Iraqi newspaper, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mouwafak al-Rubaie said that “we do not have any concrete evidence of Iran’s direct involvement” in supporting insurgents and militias, while “there is no doubt the Syrian role in Iraq is a negative one” because it allowed foreign fighters to enter Iraq.

- **July 19, 2006:** An Interior Ministry General, legal adviser Fakhir Abdul-Hussein, was shot dead outside his home in the Mansur district of Baghdad. Many lawmakers said that a civil war in Iraq had already begun in the wake of sectarian attacks that killed 120 people over the previous two days. The Iraqi Interior Ministry, seeking to curb kidnappings by men in uniform, ordered its units to report their operations and told Iraqis to demand identification from law enforcement officials before complying with their orders. Four Iraqi police commandos were killed by a roadside bomb in southern Baghdad. One police officer was killed in a gun battle with insurgents outside the Yarmouk Hospital.

- **July 20, 2006:** In a bid to reduce violence and promote reconciliation, the Defense Ministry issued a call to enlisted soldiers and officers below the rank of major from the Saddam Hussein-era military to go to recruiting centers and return to service. Five Iraqi troops were wounded by a roadside bomb near Karbala. British forces in Basra arrested an Iraqi police captain for alleged terrorist activity. A roadside bomb in eastern Baghdad killed one policeman and injured five, along with several civilians. A police officer in Fallujah was kidnapped and killed, while a police officer in Tikrit was killed while manning a checkpoint. Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki fired security officials in Mahmudiya in the aftermath of the July 17 massacre of Shi’ites by gunmen in the marketplace. US and Iraqi forces surrounded the towns of Hawija and Riyadh, just west of Kirkuk, in an operation to drive out al-Qa’ida suspected of numerous recent killings. Iraqi National Security Adviser al-Rubaie appeared on al-Sharqiyah TV and said, “The Iraqi armed forces and the multinational forces jointly carry out 35 operations daily against terrorism, rebellion and the enemies of Iraq. Ninety per cent of these operations are carried out jointly by the Iraqi and multinational forces. Part of them is carried out by the Iraqi command backed by the multinational forces. Only 10 per cent of them are carried out without the knowledge of the Iraqi security forces.”

- **July 21, 2006:** According to the *New York Times*, the US military tallied 92 Iraqi police officers and soldiers killed and 444 wounded in the first four weeks of the Baghdad security operation launched on June 14. Daily attacks in Baghdad increased during that period from 23.8 to 25.2; the average number of daily attacks was approximately 24 in June and 34 in July. According to the US military, the Baghdad operation utilized 42,500 Iraqi security personnel and 7,200 US troops. Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman Maj. Gen. Abdul Aziz Mohammed Jassim said “one of the biggest problems the security problem faced was armed groups posing as police and army units.” A weekly Friday ban on daytime traffic in Baghdad was extended to run from 11AM to 7PM, with the nightly 9PM to 6PM curfew remaining in effect. Iraqi security forces, supported by a US helicopter, counterattacked against Shi’ite gunmen in Mahmudiya in a clash that left three policemen, four soldiers, and between five and eleven gunmen dead. The US military called the action an “effective suppression of an apparent death squad” that “shows exactly how security forces are working together to stop the violence.” Sunnis rallied in front of a Baghdad shrine to demand that the Iraqi government replace the predominantly Shi’ite army battalion stationed in their neighborhood. General John Abizaid, head of US Central Command, said that the Baghdad security plan had not achieved the hoped-for results and that additional US troops would redeploy to Baghdad to help quell sectarian violence. Top US commander in Iraq General George Casey was meeting with Iraqi Defense Minister Abdel Kader Jassem al-Obeidi on a new plan to improve Baghdad security.

- **July 22, 2006:** The Iraqi government committee on national reconciliation met for the first time in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Much of the time was spent debating whether Iraqis who had killed coalition troops would be pardoned. Three Iraqi soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb in Falluja. In Baqubah, a bomb killed three police officers and wounded five. In Mussayib, a gun battle between coalition forces and Shi’ite militiamen left one Iraqi soldier and 15 militants dead. Another soldier was killed in Mussayib when a bomb exploded at his house. Police killed three
gunmen in Mosul. A roadside bomb in Kut killed one soldier and injured four others. A police officer was shot to death in Amara.

- **July 23, 2006:** Dozens of civilians were killed in bombings in Baghdad and Kirkuk, as well as shootings in various regions, as sectarian violence continued.

- **July 24, 2006:** In an interview with BBC, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, traveling for meetings in Britain and the US, denied predictions that foreign coalition troops would be in Iraq for decades, insisted that Iraq was not entering a civil war, and promised continued progress in the independent capabilities of the Iraqi security forces to secure the country. Police fought a running gun battle with gunmen in the streets of Baghdad, resulting in four officers killed and 36 wounded. Three roadside bombs in Baghdad wounded two soldiers and three policemen. A suicide bomb attack on an Iraqi Army convoy in Mosul killed five Iraqi troops and wounded four.

- **July 25, 2006:** A roadside bomb in Baghdad killed one policeman and injured three. Another roadside bomb in Mosul wounded three police officers on patrol. Gunmen killed a police officer in a drive-by shooting in Baghdad, and another policeman was killed as he headed for work in the town of Ishaqi. Expected topics of meetings included improving the Baghdad security plan and progress on force development. Three police officers died and 14 were wounded in clashes with gunmen in three different Baghdad districts. US President Bush and Iraqi PM al-Maliki met in Washington, DC and gave a press conference confirming that about 4,000 additional Iraqi and 4,000 additional US troops would be deployed to Baghdad in an effort to quell sectarian violence.

- **July 26, 2006:** Gunmen kidnapped police brigadier Abdullah Hamood, director of residency office of Baghdad. A roadside bomb wounded a policeman in Mosul. In Baquba, a police officer was killed and one was wounded in a gun attack on their patrol. A raid by Iraqi security forces near Balad, north of Baghdad, resulted in the death of one insurgent and the capture of three others. Gunmen wearing police uniforms kidnapped 17 people from a central Baghdad apartment building hours after Bush and Maliki’s announcement of renewed Baghdad security efforts.

- **July 27, 2006:** Two police men were killed and two were wounded by a roadside bomb in Tikrit. In Debes, northeast of Kirkuk, a policeman and a soldier were killed when their patrols fired on each other. A police officer was shot to death in Mosul. One soldier died and an army lieutenant was injured in an attack by gunmen in Kirkuk. A high-ranking police general’s body was found blindfolded, handcuffed, and bullet-riddled in eastern Baghdad, one day after he was kidnapped.

- **July 28, 2006:** Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Shi’ite SCIRI political party, said full control for security should be handed over to Iraqis and criticized the plan to add more US troops to the Baghdad security operation, calling for “handing over the security dossier to the Iraqi apparatus and stopping the interference in its work.”

- **July 29, 2006:** The *New York Times* reported that Shi’ite militias had been “staking out” morgues in Baghdad to kill or kidnap Sunnis when they go to search for missing relatives. The Shi’ite militias were allegedly receiving tips from government facilities protection personnel with links to militias when Sunnis were arriving.

- **July 30, 2006:** Iraqi deputy prime minister Barham Salih and national security adviser Mowaffaq al-Rubaie said in a news conference that Iraq was a “frontline” in the global war on terrorism and therefore should receive more economic and military assistance for fighting international terrorists on its own soil. Interior Minister Jawad Bolani vowed to eliminate corruption and extremist political influence in the police forces with new investigative initiatives. Two police officers in Baghdad were wounded by a roadside bomb, while another bomb killed a police officer in Baqubah. Four policemen were killed by insurgents on the road between Kirkuk and Tikrit. In the town of Hawija, four policemen and a lawyer were beheaded at a roadblock. According to the *Los Angeles Times* report, over 3,000 police have been killed and 3,000 more wounded since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.

- **July 31, 2006:** The Iraqi Interior Minister faced calls for dismissal due to the poor security situation in Baghdad. Gunmen in military uniforms kidnapped an estimated 25 people from a mobile phone shop and a chamber of commerce in the upscale Baghdad district of Karradah. Four
Iraqi soldiers were killed and six were wounded in a car bomb attack in Mosul. Col. Fakhri Jamil Salman, a senior intelligence officer, was killed in a drive-by shooting in Baghdad. Police found the bodies of two officers who had been kidnapped the previous night, while a third remained missing. An Iraqi officer was killed in an explosion in Iskandariya.

- **August 1, 2006:** 23 Iraqi soldiers were killed and 20 more were wounded by a roadside bomb while traveling in a bus between Tikrit and Baiji. The Iraqi government immediately imposed a curfew on the region as authorities searched for the perpetrators. A car bomb exploded in front of the al-Rafidein bank in the Karrada district of Baghdad, where security force personnel collect their paychecks at the beginning of each month. Iraqi police reported eight civilians, three soldiers, and three commandos killed in the attack. One police officer was killed in a bomb attack in Muqdadiya, while a roadside bomb in Kirkuk killed two policemen and wounded one more.

- **August 2, 2006:** Two off-duty police officers were among those killed by a roadside bomb in Hawija. A policeman on patrol was killed by a bomb in Mosul. Ahmed Abdel Hussein, chief of the traffic police in Baquba, was shot and killed with his bodyguard. Two soldiers were wounded when a bomb exploded near their patrol in Diwaniya. The Iraqi army announced that it had arrested 28 “suspected insurgents” in the past 24 hours. Fifteen insurgents and three police officers were killed in a clash in the town of Madaen. Another four police were wounded in the wounded. Two traffic police were killed by gunmen in the town of Khalis in Diyala province. Iraqi and US forces swept Anbar University in Ramadi for insurgent presence. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani announced that he expected Iraqi forces to take control of security in all 18 provinces of the country by the end of 2006.

- **August 3, 2006:** In testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, CENTCOM commander John Abizaid said sectarian violence in Iraq was “probably as bad as I have seen it,” with civil war a distinct possibility, and that the “operational and tactical situation in Baghdad is such that it requires additional security forces, both US and Iraqi.”

- **August 4, 2006:** Three policemen were among ten killed by a suicide car bomber who drove into a crowd at a soccer match in the town of Hadhar, south of Mosul. Another nine police were wounded in the attack. A senior police officer and his two bodyguards were killed by a car bomb in Mosul. A police officer and four militants were killed in clashes between security forces and insurgents in the city.

- **August 5, 2006:** A police officer was killed in the Sunni Adhamiya district in northern Baghdad. The Iraqi Defense Ministry announced that 64 suspected insurgents had been detained in operations across the country since the previous day.

- **August 6, 2006:** Iraqi troops clashed with Shi’ite militiamen near Sadr City in Baghdad and two soldiers were wounded. Two policemen were killed and five were wounded when gunmen ambushed their patrol in southern Baghdad.

- **August 7, 2006:** Six Iraqi soldiers were killed and 15 were wounded in a dawn attack on their checkpoint at Balad Ruz, southeast of Baquba. A police officer was killed along with a civilian in a bomb attack at a market in Khan Bani Saad near Baquba. US and Iraqi troops raided a “suspected death squad” in Sadr City, eastern Baghdad, resulting in two deaths and 18 injuries. Two policemen were killed in a drive-by shooting in Mosul. A suicide bomber drove a truck packed with explosives into a police commando headquarters in Samarra, killing 10 troops. Four Iraqi police officers were killed in an ambush in Sadr City. About 4,000 US troops, including the 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, were deployed in Baghdad to bolster security.

- **August 8, 2006:** Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki condemned the joint US-Iraqi raid in Sadr City the previous day, saying such violent operations could undermine his efforts to promote national reconciliation. The bodies of seven Iraqi troops were found near the Iranian border. The Iraqi Army’s 4th Division was given lead responsibility for security in the northern Iraqi provinces of Nineveh, Salahuddin, and Tamiir. Forward Operating Base Dagger near Tikrit was transferred to the Iraqi military. Five of the army’s 10 divisions had taken the lead security role in their areas of operations, and 48 of 110 US bases had been transferred to Iraqi control.
August 9, 2006: The Baghdad morgue reported that it had received 1,815 bodies in the month of July. Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. William Caldwell reported that over the previous week, US and Iraqi troops had “conducted operations against 10 death squads throughout Baghdad” and uncovered 222 roadside bombs. An Iraqi army colonel, Qasim Abdul Qadir, was shot and killed on his way to work in Basra. Police arrested two people in the act of planting a roadside bomb in Kirkuk.

August 10, 2006: A policeman was shot to death in Fallujah. Two policemen were killed by a roadside bomb in Hawija, southwest of Kirkuk. Four police officers were killed and seven were wounded in a roadside bomb and mortar attack in Baquba. Three police commandos were killed and three were wounded in clashes with gunmen in southern Baghdad. Police and gunmen fought in western Baghdad. US and Iraqi troops sealed off the southern Baghdad neighborhood of Dora to quell a spate of killings there. House-to-house searches resulted in 36 arrests and the uncovering of several weapons caches.

August 11, 2006: A police officer was shot dead in Mosul.

August 12, 2006: Two gunmen were injured and detained by police after participating in an attack on a police station in Mahmudiya. In Baquba, seven policemen were wounded by a roadside bomb and a police captain was killed by gunmen.

August 13, 2006: Three police officers were wounded by a roadside bomb in Baquba. A colonel of the Oil Facilities Protection security organization was gunned down at a gas station in Tikrit. The governor of Mosul narrowly escaped assassination, while one of his bodyguards was wounded in the attack by gunmen. Four policemen were wounded during a clash with insurgents in Hilli. 30 suspected insurgents, including 16 allegedly planning to kill relatives of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, were arrested in a series of Iraqi military and police operations during which six policemen were killed.

August 14, 2006: A bus carrying police recruits was hit by a roadside bomb on the main road between Baghdad and Baquba, killing one and injuring 10. Nine Iraqi troops were wounded by a suicide car bomb attack.

August 15, 2006: One policeman was killed and two others wounded by a roadside bomb in Baquba. Three police officers were wounded by a roadside bomb in Huwayder, north of Baquba. A police lieutenant, Fadhil Uthman, was shot dead in Baquba. The Iraqi Defense Ministry announced that security forces had detained 48 suspected insurgents in the previous 24 hours. In Muqdadiya, 50 miles northeast of Baghdad, three bakers who supplied bread to the Iraqi army were killed by gunmen. A former Iraqi army officer was shot dead on a highway near Dujail. Two roadside bombs in Samarra wounded three Iraqi police commandos and destroyed one of their vehicles. In Karbala, Iraqi troops clashed with Shi’ite militia men loyal to hardline cleric Mahmoud al-Hasani after searching a mosque for weapons. After the clash, Karbala authorities imposed a vehicle curfew in the city. Three Iraqi soldiers were killed and four wounded by a roadside bomb in Jbala, near Mussayib. British forces were conducting training missions for Iraqi personnel in the Maysan province in preparation for the process of handing over security responsibilities in the province in September.

August 16, 2006: Police fought with insurgents in Mosul, killing six and wounding seven. A roadside bomb killed one police officer and wounded three in Baquba. Iraqi forces backed by British troops fought attacks on government buildings by armed gangs in Basra, resulting in one dead and five wounded policemen. Iraqi security forces maintained a blockade around Karbala following clashes with Shi’ite militants the previous day. Two policemen were wounded by a roadside bomb in Kut. Gunmen assaulted an Iraqi Army checkpoint near Hilla, causing the soldiers to flee, and the gunmen stole their weapons.

August 17, 2006: A suicide car bomb targeting Kurdish security forces killed five guards on a road in Sinjar, northwest of Mosul.

August 18, 2006: Two policemen were killed and two more among the wounded when gunmen attacked police watchtowers in Baquba. Authorities set a curfew on the city following the attack.
The police officers were wounded in a bomb attack in the Mansour district of Baghdad. An Iraqi soldier guarding oil fields was shot to death in Balad, north of Baghdad. The Iraqi government announced a two-day vehicle ban in parts of Baghdad ahead of a major Shi’ite religious festival that had previously been targeted by insurgents.

- **August 20, 2006:** Fadhil al-Magsusi, a colonel in the Facilities Protection Service, was killed by gunmen in Basra. Two off-duty members of the Interior Ministry Intelligence Service were killed by gunmen in Basra. Iraqi troops arrested two suspected death squad leaders in southern Baghdad.

- **August 21, 2006:** The Iraqi army announced that it had arrested 103 suspected insurgents across the country in operations in the previous 48 hours. Two policemen were injured by a roadside bomb in Iskandariya, south of Baghdad. The US military reported the “most successful recruiting drive yet” for police in Anbar province, taking in 500 new officers for a 30 percent increase in the region’s police force.

- **August 22, 2006:** One of the Anbar province governor’s bodyguards was killed in a drive-by shooting in Ramadi. Gunmen killed a police major and wounded his driver in an attack on his car in Baquba.

- **August 23, 2006:** Two policemen were killed in a series of shootings in Baquba. Eight policemen were wounded by a suicide bomber wearing a police uniform in Mosul. Three traffic police were among six people wounded by a roadside bomb in Fallujah. A police officer was killed by gunmen in Al-Hay, a small town south of Kut. The Iraqi army reported killing one insurgent and arresting 29 in operations across the country in the previous 24 hours.

- **August 24, 2006:** Two policemen were among nine people wounded by a suicide car bomb attack on a police station in eastern Baghdad. Four police officers were wounded in a car bomb attack on their patrol in northern Baghdad. Two policemen were killed and three were wounded by a roadside bomb in Baquba. Police Colonel Hussein Abdul Wahid, head of police patrols in eastern Baghdad, was the target of a car bomb attack on his motorcade, which injured five of his bodyguards but missed him. Four policemen were wounded, along with a civilian, by a car bomb in Baquba that they had been lured to by a false tip. Two police officers were wounded by a roadside bomb in Mosul. Police in Mosul said they arrested Abdul Rahman al-Aathari, the head of al-Qa’ida-linked groups in Mosul. Three policemen were killed by gunmen at a Balad checkpoint. Two policemen were wounded by a roadside bomb in Baghdad. Three policemen were among six people wounded by a roadside bomb in Baquba. Two top US generals, CENTCOM commander John Abizaid and commander of US forces in Iraq George Casey, said that the revamped Baghdad security operation was causing a reduction in violence and that they were “very optimistic that the situation will stabilize.”

- **August 25, 2006:** A car bomb in the Zeyouna district of Baghdad wounded five policemen. Three Iraqi soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb in Buhriz, north of Baghdad. A car bomb in Baquba killed three policemen. South of Baquba, a police officer was killed and four more wounded by a roadside bomb. A policeman was killed and another was wounded in a gun attack on their patrol.

- **August 26, 2006:** Sunni Iraqi MP Tayseer Najah al-Mashhadani, abducted by Shi’ite gunmen on July 1, was released unharmed to the Iraqi Prime Minister’s office. Looters ransacked a military base in Amara that British forces had vacated for Iraqi troops.

- **August 27, 2006:** Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki declared in an interview that “Iraq will never be in a civil war” and that the “violence is in decrease and our security ability is increasing,” on a day when a series of attacks claimed some 50 lives across the country.

- **August 28, 2006:** Approximately 20 Iraqi troops were dead after fighting with Shi’ite militiamen in Diwaniya, south of Baghdad. A suicide car bomb attack on the Interior Ministry in Baghdad killed 16 people including 13 police and wounded 62, 47 of them policemen. A police officer was killed and two were wounded by a roadside bomb in southern Baghdad. Gunmen killed three policemen and a former Iraqi army officer in separate attacks in Mosul. Two gunmen with a bomb in their car were arrested by police in Mosul. The Iraqi army announced that it had arrested 26 suspected insurgents in the preceding 24 hours countrywide. US military spokesmen revealed that
about 100 mostly Shi'ite troops from the southern Maysan province refused to deploy to Baghdad, apparently due to unwillingness to confront fellow Shi'ites.

- **August 29, 2006**: One policeman was killed by a roadside bomb in Kirkuk.

- **August 30, 2006**: A bomb attached to a bicycle exploded in a crowd of men outside an army recruitment center in Hilla, killing 12. Nadia Mohammed, a Justice Ministry director general, and her driver and two bodyguards were killed by gunmen in the western Baghdad Nafq al-Shurta area. Five policemen were among 21 people wounded by a car bomb at a petrol station in Baghdad. A crowd of men turned away from an army recruitment center in Samawa fought with police in a clash that killed one civilian and wounded nine people, including five policemen. Police battled insurgents in Mosul, wounding four civilians. The commander of US forces in Iraq, Gen. George Casey, said he envisioned Iraqi forces being capable of standing with minimal Coalition support in 12 to 18 months.

- **August 31, 2006**: Retired Lt.-Gen. Wajeeh Thirar Hneyfish, commander of an Iraqi air force base under Saddam Hussein's regime, was killed in Ramadi by unidentified gunmen. Four police commandos died in a bomb attack on their patrol in Baghdad. According to Iraqi television reports, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said that Iraqi forces would take full control of the Dhi Qar province in September and suggested that by the end of the year Iraqis would be “running all but Baghdad and the violent Sunni region of Anbar.” One member of the oil ministry’s security service was killed and another was wounded by gunmen in a northeastern part of Baghdad.

- **September 1, 2006**: A Saddam regime senior intelligence officer was found shot to death near Dujail, outside of Baghdad. A roadside bomb in central Kirkuk seriously injured three policemen. Three police officers in Baghdad’s southern Dora district were killed by a roadside bomb. In Numaniya, south of Baghdad, gunmen stormed a police officer’s house and killed him. Figures compiled by the Health, Defense, and Interior Ministries tallied 769 Iraqi civilians killed in August, a drop of 28 percent (the July total was 1,065)

- **September 7, 2006**: After a ceremony today, the Iraqi government will officially take control of its major air, sea and land-based military commands by standing up the Iraqi Joint Headquarters. The relationship between Iraqi and Coalition forces will be spelled out in a formal agreement that provides the Iraqi military authority to employ its forces as needed, while the Coalition continues to assist in training, equipping and supplying.

- **September 11, 2006**: At least 13 Iraqi army recruits have been killed and one wounded in a suicide bomb attack on their minibus in Baghdad, officials said. The attack happened near the Muthenna recruitment centre which has been targeted by insurgents in the past. Describing Iraq as one of the most violent conflict areas in the world, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has warned that there is a "grave danger" of breakdown of the Iraqi State and "potentiality" of civil war.

- **September 12, 2006**: In Kerbala, gunmen shot dead a former security officer, Colonel Abbas al-Nuaimi, while he was in police custody for Saddam-era crimes. In Baghdad, one policeman was killed and nine people, including three policemen, were wounded by a roadside bomb. Another Baghdad policeman was gunned down while he was leaving for work. In Mosul, gunmen killed a police captain. The Iraqi army killed two insurgents and detained 84 others in operations conducted across Iraq during the last 24 hours, according to the Defense Ministry.

- **September 13, 2006**: Two car bombs targeting police killed 22 people, wounding another 76. The first killed 14 outside Baghdad's traffic police headquarters, a second targeted police guarding an electricity station in the east of the city. Two mortar shells landed on al-Rashad police station in southeastern Baghdad, killing a policeman and wounding two others. Another two policemen were killed when two mortar rounds landed near their station in Baghdad's eastern neighborhood of Mashtal. Three others were injured.

- **September 14, 2006**: The deputy prime minister said the government would propose a law next month to disband militias. Interior Ministry forces killed the number-two leader of al Qa'ida in Iraq, Abu Jaafar al-Liby, in Baghdad along with four militant and captured two others alive, in an operation carried out in the past few days. The Iraqi army killed three insurgents and arrested 14
during the last 24 hours in different cities. Nine people were killed and 26 wounded when a car bomb went off near a police patrol in central Baghdad. Gunmen killed a traffic police Colonel in Baghdad. Ten people were wounded and one killed in clashes between protesters and guards in Diwaniya. The protesters were demonstrating against U.S. forces’ storming of an office of followers of Moqtada al-Sadr.

• September 16, 2006: In Baghdad, two Iraqi soldiers were killed and three wounded by a bomb. A suicide car bomb killed one civilian and wounded 22 outside a well-fortified police station in southern Baghdad. Iraqi police killed four members of the Albu Baz tribe along with a gunman who attacked them on Friday after they clashed in the city of Samarra. The Albu Baz tribe blamed al Qa’ida militants for the attack. Police killed two insurgents after they repelled an attack by them on a checkpoint south of Kirkuk. Two policemen were wounded in the attack. Three policemen were wounded when their vehicle was struck by a roadside bomb in Mosul. Police found 47 bodies around the capital Baghdad. The Interior Ministry described plans to fortify exit and entry points into Baghdad to better control access to the capital.

• September 17, 2006: 24 bodies, tortured and shot dead, were found in different areas of Baghdad. Two policemen guarding electrical infrastructure were killed and three wounded by a roadside bomb in Baquba. Gunmen killed two policemen in Taji. Two Iraqi soldiers and a civilian were wounded by a roadside bomb in central Baghdad. Two policemen were wounded when a roadside bomb went off near their patrol in northern Baghdad.

• September 18, 2006: Fourteen bodies, tortured and shot dead, were found in different districts of Baghdad. Three border guards were killed and six wounded by a roadside bomb near Kut. Three civilians were wounded by a roadside bomb in Mosul. A man and a child were wounded by several mortar rounds fired at a police station in Mosul. Four policemen were killed when insurgents ambushed them in Mosul. In Tal Afar, a bomber killed himself and 21 others, all but two of them civilians; 19 people were injured. In Ramadi, a car bomb killed 13 police recruits and injured 10. Basra police said they found the body of a counterterrorism unit police officer who had been kidnapped several days ago Iraqi army killed two insurgents and arrested 36 suspected insurgents during the last 24 hours in different parts of Iraq. The Iraqi army with Anbar province tribal leaders killed 27 insurgents during the last week.

• September 19, 2006: A policeman was killed and six people, including four civilians, were wounded by gunmen in Baquba. A bomb attack in Ramadi at the Al-Hurriyah police station killed 13 people. 17 more bodies showing signs of torture and execution were found around Baghdad. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said that Iraq is in danger of sliding into civil war and its government and the international community must do more to pull it back from the brink. Parliament again delayed debate of a bill on federalism after a fresh wave of violence killed 50 people.

• September 20, 2006: 35 bodies were found in the last 24 hours in Baghdad. A suicide truck bomb at the entrance of an Iraqi police base killed four police officers, wounding 11 more in southern Baghdad. Three civilians were also wounded. A roadside bomb wounded one Iraqi soldier in Mahaweel. Hameed al-Hilaly, a member of Kerbala's governorate, escaped a third assassination attempt in Kerbala. Two of his bodyguards were wounded. The Iraqi army detained 45 suspected insurgents in the last 24 hours. The Iraqi government has named General Amir Amed Hassun as special envoy on counterterrorism to coordinate with his US and Turkish counterparts.

• September 21, 2006: The Iraqi army arrested 67 suspected insurgents in the past 24 hours throughout Iraq. Police killed a suicide bomber in Tal Afar. Insurgents killed six policemen and wounded two others in western Baghdad. Gunmen killed three policemen in Baquba. A bomb killed three policemen guarding a local power grid and wounded four in southern Baghdad. Gunmen wounded a policeman and two civilians in western Baghdad. A roadside bomb killed two Iraqi soldiers and wounded four in Diwaniya. Iraq formally regained control of Dhi Qar province. A total of 38 bodies were recovered by police in Baghdad in the past day.

• September 22, 2006: Gunmen shot and killed one civilian and wounded two policemen in Kirkuk. One civilian was killed and five people, including two policemen, were wounded by a bomb in Latifiya. Two policemen were killed while defusing a bomb in Iskandariya. Police found 10
bodies, including those of two women, in different parts of Baghdad. Most bore signs of torture and had been shot. Police found two bodies, one beheaded, in a western part of the city of Mosul. Police found a woman's body dumped on the side of the road in the small town of Taza.

**September 23, 2006**: The Iraqi army captured a regional leader of the al Qu'ida-linked Ansar al-Sunna group, along with two aides, in a village near the town of Muqadiya. Gunmen killed police Colonel Ismail Jihayan, deputy head of the Salahadeen province police headquarters, in Tikrit. Men at a checkpoint beheaded nine people, including some policemen.

**September 24, 2006**: Today is the start of Ramadan. Iraqi army troops have captured the head of the 1920 Revolution Brigades and seven of his associates in Diyala province. Parliament agreed to set up a committee of 27 members to draft amendments to the constitution, which will also allow a law to create autonomous regions after 18 months. The members of the committee will be named on Tuesday. It will have 12 members from the ruling Shi'ite religious bloc, five ethnic Kurds, four from the main Sunni Arab bloc and smaller numbers of others. The corpse of an Iraqi soldier who had been shot dead was found on Sunday on the main road between Baiji and Haditha. A total of six bombs targeted at police killed 11 people and wounded 35.

**September 25, 2006**: The Iraqi army arrested 73 suspected insurgents during the last 24 hours in different parts of Iraq. The Iraqi army arrested Zuhair Kasar Saleh, a leader of the Ansar al-Sunna militant group, and a number of his associates in Abu Ghraib district in western Baghdad. British forces have killed Omar Farouq, a top lieutenant of Osama Bin Laden in south-east Asia, in Basra. Police found 19 bodies in different cities today, including the decapitated head of police lieutenant Sameer Hazim, who was kidnapped on Sunday. 5 bombs incidents involving security forces killed 3 civilians and wounded 19 policemen and 9 civilians. Clashes between gunmen and police killed a civilian and wounded three policemen in Mosul. Gunmen kidnapped Abdul Kareem al-Talgani, the mayor of al-Zuhoor district in northern Baghdad, and wounded three of his bodyguards. President Talabani said he would like to have U.S. military bases in his country for an extended period.

In August 2006, Iraqi army and police units partnered with Coalition forces in 140 operations, killing 17 insurgents and detaining 300 suspects.
XI. Looking Ahead

There is no way to summarize Iraqi force development in simple terms, particularly because so much depends in the near term on whether Iraqi efforts at political reconciliation, effective governance, and a government presence in the field do or do not succeed. The ISF development effort cannot succeed without major progress in all of these areas, any more than they can succeed without the creation of effective Iraqi forces and Iraqi popular belief that MNF-I forces will leave as soon as possible and Iraq will be truly sovereign.

The one critical punch line that does emerge from this analysis, however, is that there is no near term prospect that Iraqi force development will allow major reductions in MNF-I forces, and that ISF force development can only succeed if the MNF-I provides active combat support well into 2008 and major advisory and aid support through 2010. Every element of ISF development still requires years of effort and support, and any successful policy towards Iraq that offers serious hope of avoiding massive increases in sectarian and ethnic violence, and continued insurgency, requires an honest recognition of this fact.

The US can only do more harm to Iraqi force development if it continues to exaggerate Iraqi capability, attempts to expand Iraqi forces even more quickly, and transfers responsibility before Iraqi forces can do the job. As in Afghanistan, the US can only win in Iraq if it is willing to fight a "long war." Rushing Iraqi forces in, and American forces out, is a strategy where "exit" is given far higher priority than success. It may provide a cosmetic rationale to disguise failure and defeat, but not prevent it.

To put it bluntly, the US government and Department of Defense must stop lying about the true nature of Iraqi readiness and the Iraqi force development. As this report describes in detail, there are many very real successes. The nearly meaningless metrics of success the US has adopted, however, can easily lead the US to choose the wrong options in Iraq, continue to fail to provide adequate resources, and encourage US and allied withdrawals because of political decisions made for the wrong reasons. Like all elements of strategy, Iraqi force development needs to be based on honesty and realism, not "spin," false claims, and political expediency.

---

7 Michael Gordon, “Iraq goal on security seems very distant,” International Herald Tribune, October 26, 2006, p.1


xxix Robert Burns, “Rumsfeld OKs Increase In Iraqi Forces,” Washingtonpost.com, October 31, 2006
xxx ABC News, November 2, 2006
x ABC News, November 2, 2006
xi Doyle McManus and Julian E. Barnes, “Pliable ‘Benchmarks’ Set For Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, October 27, 2006
xvii “Pace Group To Put Forth Iraq Strategy Alternatives By Mid-December,” Inside The Pentagon, November 9, 2006, p.1
ii Julian E. Barnes and Doyle McManus, “Resistance To Deadlines For Iraq Is Weakening,” Los Angeles Times, October 31, 2006, p.1
xiii Reuters, “Text – Q&A excerpts from interview with Iraqi PM,” October 26, 2006
xiv Reuters, “Text – Q&A excerpts from interview with Iraqi PM,” October 26, 2006
xv Reuters, “Text – Q&A excerpts from interview with Iraqi PM,” October 26, 2006
xvi Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer, “Iran, Its Neighbours and the Regional Crises,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2006

Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer, “Iran, Its Neighbours and the Regional Crises,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2006

Kim Murphy, “Kurds, Sunni Arabs Clash in North – a Small Echo of Larger Dispute,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 2006


Solomon Moore, “U.S. Fatalities In Iraq Rise Amid Crackdown,” Los Angeles Times, October 4, 2006


ABC News, November 2, 2006


Iraq Official Estimates Civilian Toll At 150,000,” Los Angeles Times, November 10, 2006


\[4\] “Kidnappers Using Victims As ‘Suicide’ Bombers,” USA Today, September 22, 2006, p.4
\[9\] Rick Jervis and Jim Michaels, “U.S. Forces Caught In Crossfire On Streets Of ‘Capital Of Death’,” USA Today, October 23, 2006, p.1
\[10\] Robert Lowe and Clarie Spencer (eds.), “Iran, Its Neighbours and the Regional Crises,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2006
\[12\] Rick Jervis and Jim Michaels, “U.S. Forces Caught In Crossfire On Streets Of ‘Capital Of Death’,” USA Today, October 23, 2006, p.1

Nancy A. Youssef, “Iraqi Police Give In To Militia Intimidation,” Miami Herald, October 3, 2006


“Your man or his?” The Economist, October 5, 2006.

Solomon Moore, “Iraq Army Battles Shites,” Los Angeles Times, August 29, p.1


Jim Michaels, “Colonel Walks Baghdad 'To Make People Believe',” USA Today, August 22, 2006


Nancy A. Youssef, “Iraqi Police Give In To Militia Intimidation,” Miami Herald, October 3, 2006


Jim Michaels, “Iraq Tries To Crack Down Carefully On Militias,” USA Today, August 28, 2006, p11


Kim Murphy, “Kurds, Sunni Arabs Clash in North – a Small Echo of Larger Dispute,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 2006
clvi Kim Murphy, “No Easy Answer To ‘Kurdish Question’,” Los Angeles Times, October 27, 2006, p.1
clxiii “Your man or his?” The Economist, October 5, 2006.
clxxxviii The Advisor, Publication of the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq, August 19, p.5


Jim Michaels, “Colonel Walks Baghdad ‘To Make People Believe’,” USA Today, August 22, 2006

Jim Michaels, “Colonel Walks Baghdad ‘To Make People Believe’,” USA Today, August 22, 2006


Rick Jervis and Jim Michaels, “U.S. Forces Caught In Crossfire On Streets Of ‘Capital of Death’,” USA Today, October 23, p.1


cclvii Jim Michaels, “Colonel Walks Baghdad ‘To Make People Believe,’” USA Today, August 22, 2006


cclxiv Jim Michaels, “Colonel Walks Baghdad ‘To Make People Believe,’’” USA Today, August 22, 2006


cclxxii Nathan Hodge, “US, Iraqi forces move to shore up Baghdad security,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 August, 2006

cclxxiii “$800 M Reported Stolen From Iraq In Corrupt Arms Deals,” Boston Globe, October 23, 2006


cclxxxiii US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, August 2006 Report to Congress, p. 57


Presentation by W.J. Kearney, Development Manager for Security Sector Reform, Armor Group Services Ltd. at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC on October 2, 2006


Ammar Karim, “Gunmen Kill 19 Irais From Cop Academy,” Washington Times, October 30, p.1


Rick Jervis, “Hard-Won Turf Is Easily Lost in Transfer To Iraqis,” USA Today, October 30, 2006, p.10


These data were obtained from the “Iraqi Security Forces/In Brief” section of The Advisor, Publication of the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq. Issues: August 12, 2006 – September 16, 2006.


Rick Jervis, “U.S. Troops Often Need Iraqi Approval To Act,” USA Today, October 11, 2006, p. 8


Michael Gordon, “Iraq goal on security seems very distant,” International Herald Tribune, October 26, 2006

Michael Gordon, “Iraq goal on security seems very distant,” International Herald Tribune, October 26, 2006, p.1


Solomon Moore, “Iraqis Plan A Team Effort To End Violence,” Los Angeles Times, October 3, 2006

S. Moore, “Iraqis Plan A Team Effort To End Violence,” Los Angeles Times, October 3, 2006


K. Murphy, “Tribes Heed Call to Join Battle for Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, October 5, 2006


These data were obtained from the “Iraqi Security Forces/In Brief” section of The Advisor, Publication of the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq, Issues: August 5, 2006; August 12, 2006; August 26, 2006.
