Remarks by Lieutenant General David Petraeus, Former Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq to the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Subject: "Iraq's Evolving Forces"

Moderator: Anthony Cordesman

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Gen. Petraeus: Well thanks very much, Tony. It's really great to be with you all this morning, especially a day after a great win by the Redskins and, I might add, three days after Army beat Air Force at Air Force for the first time since 1977. (Applause.) I should not applaud that in the interest of jointness, and with a former secretary of Defense here. Dr. Schlesinger, thanks for being here today. You honor us with your presence. And I saw former secretary of the Army Brownlee here as well somewhere. Sir, thanks also not just for being here, but for the tremendous support you gave us. He called me personally back in -- I guess it was May of 2004, right before taking -- going back to Iraq for the third time and taking over the -- what came to be known as the Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq, pledged anything, and he delivered. And it was hugely important as we tried to take that mission forward.

It's great to see so many others here also, a lot of others who were over there, comrades in arms -- some wearing a uniform, some not. But all served and helped to get Iraq moving again and headed in the right direction. I'm even privileged to have my brother-in-law, Bill, here. He'll remain anonymous so he can ask me that soft-ball question we agreed on after the presentation!

And let me thank CSIS, lastly, for assembling such a wonderful crowd and helping me celebrate my birthday today. Thank you. (Applause.) I opened the card my wife sent me off with last night. It was a pinata theme. She wished me a "smashing birthday" with my friends at CSIS. And indeed, there are a lot of friends here.
But like the readiness data on U.S. and Iraqi security forces, my age is classified. And I'm sure that my aide will be happy, though, to provide you an unclassified characterization, if you ask him, and he can report on our morning run this morning.

But today, what I am going to do is provide, of course, an unclassified description of what has transpired with the Iraqi security forces, the focus being most of all, of course, on the last 17 months or so since last June -- early June of 2004, when, as I said, I assumed command as the first commander of the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq and later in the fall became dual-hatted as the NATO Training Mission-Iraq commander as well.

I should note that I gave up command, handed off to a great West Point classmate, Lieutenant General Marty Dempsey, who had also commanded in Iraq as the division commander, 1st Armored Division. He has been in command since the 8th of September, but we certainly cross-leveled information this weekend, when I realized just who CSIS had assembled. And so it is generally up-to-date information that I'll be presenting to you today.

This slide shows you the two logos, if you will, the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq. Again, those are the two hats that are worn by the individual who heads those two missions.

Two other interesting photos on here:

Here is the minister of Interior and the minister of Defense. He's a Shi'a Arab -- and a Sunni Arab. They've been great partners. I'll show you another photo of them more recently, right after they voted in mid-October in the referendum. They took office with the new government back in the mid-spring of this past year and have really been quite admirable servants of Iraq and serving all of the people of Iraq, even though they come from different groups.

Also, one of the tanks of the 1st Tank Battalion of the Iraqi 1st Mechanized Brigade. I'll talk some about their armored vehicle program and the recent progress in that regard as well.

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I did want to show a couple of images. These are recent images, and this -- again, the minister of Defense, the minister of Interior. You can see the purple index finger there that shows that they voted in the mid-October constitutional referendum, when the referendum was in fact approved, the constitution.
You see an Iraqi soldier in the normal kit. I'll talk about the equipment that has been issued to them. You can see U.S. Kevlar, U.S. body armor, U.S. other kit, and then the weapons, the Warsaw Pact -- still, and I'll explain why that continues.

In the center here, you see some of the now 49 Cadillac Gauge armored security vehicles that are being used by the mechanized brigade of the Iraqi special police -- a very good vehicle, the same one used by U.S. Military Police, carries about a little less than a squad of special police and is working very well for them in Baghdad. They'll get about another 14 of those on this contract.

You see here the -- one of the elements of the Iraqi special operations brigade fast-roping -- and this was actually a demonstration; they would normally do that at night -- you see a graduating class from the Baghdad Police Academy. This is the Iraqi counterterrorist force -- again, in another demonstration -- very, very highly trained, an excellent force already double the size of our own special mission unit, and out on ops almost every night.

And then this interesting one -- I just saw the other day it came in -- it belies somewhat the notion that Baghdad is, if you will, chaos. I'm not going to, in the least, diminish the security challenges in that city, but you have moments like this where you have -- this is a traffic policeman here in his uniform, and in the foreground, you can see his two sons. And they're proud of what their dad does for Iraq, and obviously their folks got them uniforms, complete with the hat and the shirt and all the rest of that and even pistols on their hip with a lanyard. I hope that they're not live pistols. But again, an image, I think, that conveys some of the other reality to that which is often seen, which maybe of the sensational attack of the day, which often is what captures much of the news.

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Well, here are the missions -- the tasks, if you will, of these two organizations. Again, MNSTC-I -- as the Multinational Security Transitioning Command Iraq is termed, the acronym -- much, much larger than the NATO training mission, but I'll describe what the NATO training mission is doing, and it is of real substance as well.

Our tasks were to help the Iraqis, and we underscored the word help because we very, very much believed in what Lawrence of Arabia wrote back in the famous 27 articles, in 1917, when he was out helping Arabs, where he discussed about helping them, rather than doing it for them. And we took that to heart right from the very beginning. That particular quote has been in just about every brief that we've given to anyone, and it is one again that we subscribe to.
But these are the major elements of our missions:

Literally, helping the Iraqis organize their forces, designing the overall force structure.

Literally, making up what are called tables of organization and equipment, who gets what weapons, who gets how many vehicles, what radios, all of the elements that make up a unit and designing that, and that's a huge amount of work. And there now is in fact a very well-defined force structure for the short term, the midterm and the long term.

The equipment effort, an enormously task; I'll show you the numbers on that. That is one useful metric, and it has really delivered tremendous quantities of weapons, vehicles, ammunition and so forth. And again, I'll show you that in a moment.

We've helped them rebuild hundreds of border forts, hundreds of military bases, small and large; some as large as to hold an entire Army division, others as small company or battalion outposts. Police academies, military academies, military training centers, branch schools, all of the facilities, if you will, even the ministry buildings themselves, battalion, brigade, division ground forces headquarters and so on, and all the pieces and parts that link them together.

And I'll talk briefly about some of that, but that has been an enormous task, and it has gone quite well, especially since some of the challenges of intimidation last fall and winter mitigated somewhat up in Nineveh province, in particular.

Helped them train. Now, you'd say, gosh, they had a big army; they'd done quite a bit of operations in the past. And indeed they did, and indeed they have. And there's quite a bit of experience out there, but not all of it was with what we would know as rigorous training. And, in fact, one anecdote illustrates this, I think, very powerfully. And I was up talking to the man who is now the commander of the Iraqi mechanized division -- at that time, it was a brigade, and he came up and hugged me and thanked me for all that we'd done to help them train. And he was so pleased with this revolutionary new training technique that we'd introduced them to. And I looked around, and I didn't see anything that was all that breathtaking. There were some people doing basic marksmanship, some other doing drills, exiting and entering vehicles, and some others pulling maintenance. And so I asked him what is it that is so remarkable, in your mind? And he said well, this idea of shooting live ammunition; this is really something. And I said well, what do you mean? He said well, you know, when you shoot real bullets, you can see where they actually go and how your aim is and so forth. And it dawned on me then -- and he confirmed later -- that they shot very, very little in the past, and, in fact, that explains to some degree what we have sometimes termed the "insha'Allah" school of
shooting, believe it or not, which is put the weapon up over your head, pull the trigger until the magazine runs dry and "insha'Allah" -- God willing -- it hits the target. So there are some cultural challenges here, and that illustrates some of those, I think, in a pretty vivid manner.

And then a very important program -- what are now called the transition teams. These are 10-man adviser teams. They start with a battalion when it enters training. They help the leaders, the officers, noncommissioned officers establish their training program. They take the unit when the soldiers are added through basic training, then through some advanced training and then they go into combat with them. Those 10-man teams are real heroes. Our country should be very, very proud of them. They are with every single battalion, brigade headquarters, division headquarters, ground forces headquarters, even in the ministries, the joint force headquarters and so forth, and they're helping enormously. And I'll show some of the tasks that they take on and why they are so important later in the briefing.

And by the way, this was the first commander of the first battalion, first brigade, first intervention force, and this was outside Najaf last -- in August of 2004, when they became the first units committed to combat on behalf of Iraq.

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Well, here's the bottom line up-front for you. The Iraqi security forces are in the fight; they are fighting for their country. They are, as this notes, increasingly leading that fight. And I will show that quantitatively, how that is tracked with some of these measures of progress. I'll show you how the numbers, if you will, of trained and equipped -- and again, that's the key; it's not just that they are -- went through training, it's that they completed it, they're still serving, and they have the basic equipment necessary for their task.

We have focused increasingly on police, and now more and more on logistical and combat support unit development. So we're talking about engineers; artillery will be coming. A variety of the logistical support elements -- there are transportation battalions, for example, now; there are military police, and a variety of other skill sets that are needed beyond just those of infantry, which was the initial focus.

And now, increasingly, the main effort is becoming institutional capability. So we're really raising it up now -- the battalions, the brigades, the divisions -- that process is all moving along quite well. And the focus now is on ensuring that the pieces that must support these battalions, brigades and divisions are strengthened so that the capability and capacity, for example, of the two ministries -- Defense and Interior -- are at the level required so that soldiers are paid on time,
contracts are paid, and a variety of other obligations -- equipment is purchased in accordance with the right requirements, and so forth -- all of that very heavy duty stuff that, again, a former Defense secretary could spell out in spades. But that is in fact what the civilian advisers and our -- now our advisers who are joined with them, all under MNSTC-I, are helping to do.

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Now, I'd like to talk through a variety of measures of progress. I know that at various times different elements of these measures have been shown and have been discussed here in Washington. And so when I was talking to General Dempsey on Saturday, what we thought would be useful would be to try to get all of these out and just walk through each of these. And that's what I'll do in turn. Again, looking at how are just the sheer numbers coming along, talk about the amount of equipment that has actually been put in the hands of soldiers and police. The infrastructure construction -- I'll give you a couple of examples of that. Unit generation -- how are we coming building battalions, brigade headquarters, and so forth. The rigorous readiness assessment that's been developed and has been briefed a couple of times.

I'll show you what the elements of that are and walk you through that and then give you the unclassified characterization of that; discuss what is perhaps even more important than that -- this addresses it -- but that is the idea that Iraqis are in fact taking over battlespace from U.S. and other coalition forces and show you where that has taken place, in an unclassified way; then talk about another great example, which is how are they doing in the actual operations. I talked about back in August in Najaf the first Iraqi units -- in August of 2004 the first Iraqi units actually contributing at all, although they're really committed, basically after Muqtada al-Sadr had surrendered and left the Imam Ali shrine, but still did contribute. We'll walk through Fallujah and then look at a more recent one, Tall Afar, and then talk about some subjective measures, which frankly can be as important as all the others, because if they're not right, they can undermine the more objective measures of progress.

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Well, here's the current number of trained and equipped. This is actually now about a little over a week old. Every two weeks a new number comes out. This shows how it's broken down between the Ministry of Interior forces and then the Ministry of Defense forces here.

You can see the various elements that make this up -- really, again, all the elements that you would think of in any nation's forces. That would be on the Interior or Defense side. Obviously, a substantial number of police -- and I'll talk about the SWAT
teams and the province emergency response units. This is the public order battalions and the police mechanized brigade that are out there -- I showed you the vehicles that they were in -- the police commandos, these units. And I highlight these because back in the summer of 2004, we realized that to defeat an insurgency requires more than just individual police. As important as they may be, it is units with cohesion, with organization, with a chain of command, with structure and fairly robust combat power that are needed to stand up against something as brutal as the insurgents in Iraq.

If you think about what it was that combatted the mafia in Italy eventually, it was not individual police; it was the Carabinieri; it was, again, units, it was -- projected judges and all the rest of that. And that's the type of challenge, and more so, that of course the forces of the Ministry of Interior in Iraq are facing.

There's a very, very good emergency response unit built on the model of the Hostage Rescue Team of the FBI -- quite a sizable organization, several hundred now, goes through a great deal of specialized training, already serving police.

Border enforcement getting a great deal of additional emphasis. There's even a highway patrol now.

And then this is their version of the Secret Service, which is increasingly taking on the mission of protecting their senior leaders, their so-called Tier 1 target officials, the president, vice presidents, prime minister and so forth.

That was done largely by U.S. Navy SEAL -- exclusively by Navy SEALs, gradually has transitioned to a mix, and now a number of SEALs have come off that, although there are still some there and also some contract mentors.

On the Army side, of course you have regular combat units; that's the bulk of those numbers right there. Very, very good special operations force brigade. Well over a thousand in that organization, with a commando battalion, a counterterrorist force like our own special mission unit, and some other specialized elements in that, including a robust headquarters that does a lot of the intelligence development. And they do a great deal of their own operations, although our special forces are embedded with them and assist them.

And now increasingly, as I mentioned, the focus on combat support and then service support; in other words, those elements that directly support infantrymen in a fight, and then those that provide the logistical enablers to them. Medics are another element that I should have mentioned earlier. All of those efforts ongoing. And then, of course, the institutional training
base, if you will, and that is the basic training battalions, non-commissioned officer schools, the military academy, the staff college, center for lessons learned, eventually, and so forth.

Small air force. By the way, three U.S. C-130s in that that they are flying, although there are still U.S. Air Force mixed in with them. And then really quite a good navy operating out of Umm Qasr as well.

So again, grand total, 211,000. I suspect it's actually already more than that. They're growing pretty rapidly. And as with the run-up to the 30 January elections earlier this year, and the mid-October referendum, there's a push on -- literally the timing for a lot of this is designed to ensure that as many units and individuals are on the street for the elections, in this case mid-December, as possible. And I think that that will approach 230,000 by mid-December, which would put them at about a hundred thousand more trained and equipped than were on the streets or on the rolls back in the elections of 30 January this year.

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This depicts that for you, if you will. You can see again if you go back to the end of January, here, again, about 130,000 -- and I think, again, they'll approach 230,000 by mid-December. There's, for example, about 15 battalions, combat battalions, alone, of the police and the army that are in training right now, a number of which will be out of training well before that and into the force and helping with those mid-December elections.

I do want to point out one thing here. This did not begin with the Multinational Security Transition Command by any means; it started back in the CPA days; Paul Eaton on the CMAT side, on the military side, and then some civilian advisers on the police side got all of this going.

And we built on the foundation that they laid when it was all pulled together under the Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq in early June when that was formed, and then, of course, we added in the NATO training mission in the fall -- all coming along.

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Just so -- people ask, you know what does the training consist of? Well, this is what it consists of, and it has gotten better, and we've tweaked it and increased the rigor and done a variety of other things like that. Our -- if you will, the Iraqi basic training is roughly the length of U.S. training, for example. Actually, now it is a five-week common corps course, and then typically, say for an infantryman, it's another eight weeks
added on to that. So it ends up being 12, 13 weeks for an infantryman. And then the other skills, depending on what additional training they need, will take a little more a little less then that. You can see very, very good training that's provided for the special operations forces and then the same for the -- their small air force and the navy.

Up on the police side, we've already lengthened the police training from eight to 10 weeks. The rigor in that -- I'll talk about in a second -- has changed very substantially. There are also courses for people who are already serving, who were previous academy graduates, graduates of the several-year academy. So they had a transition program that they had to go through. And I'll talk about the variety of specialized training courses that are offered, and now, there are even refresher training courses, so that periodically, throughout a year, the police go back, re-qualify with weapons, get refreshers on perhaps advanced techniques and identifying improvised explosives, perhaps something on human rights, treatment of detainees, those types of things, whatever the concern is at that moment. And you can see the other courses that are here. Many of these build on already serving police training.

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This is just one example for you. This is actually the academy in Jordan, but frankly the same thing has happened in Iraq. The Baghdad academy in fact is even bigger than this. It can now hold 4,000 students at a time. The Jordan academy holds 3,500 at its full capacity. You can see where it was in November. The individuals in charge of the program at that time gradually help build it to. This is really a photo from a few months back, because it has continued. They continue to add additional areas for practical exercises. There's one called IED Alley. There's a model checkpoint. There are model -- there's going to be a model police station and so forth.

It started out relatively focused on what one might call a Balkans model, which is what in fact the CIVPOL, the international police advisers and trainers were familiar with.

That was the basic assumption at that time. Over time, to confront the insurgency, there were substantial changes made in the training. You can see it became much more hands-on. Still do emphasize these important qualities right here, but added a lot more practical survival skills. The course at the time was focused just on shooting a pistol. The challenge in Iraq is much more than that which can be handled by a pistol; so AK-47s were added to the mix and also added to the armaments of the police station.

So as I mentioned, added two weeks -- gradually getting Iraqi instructors doing more and more of the teaching. That's true
throughout Iraq. In fact, the academy in Hillah, the biblical Babylon, has actually transitioned completely to Iraqi control. The one in Sulimaniyah is close to that. Others are very much close to that -- the one that has been restarted in Mosul. And in Baghdad, again, the number of Iraqi instructors increased dramatically. Had a lot of drama at various times with those types of issues down there. Most of those resolved, although there's still the potential for those out there because of the challenges with the ministry development that I'll talk about later on, and just the sheer bureaucracy that we have to work through sometimes.

Next slide.

These are specialized courses, and I'd like to walk through these a little bit. You can see here Iraqi instructors. By the way, the staff college has Iraqi instructors. We actually made a deliberate decision -- that was a NATO mission, by the way; and with the NATO hat, we made the decision to train the Iraqi instructors, take a few extra months, get them in the front of the classroom, rather than starting out with coalition or NATO instructors in the front because that makes the transition much more difficult. Two courses running now -- the junior and the senior course. You can see the number that are in training. This opened in -- toward the end of September.

The military academy started in its present incarnation in January. It is based on a Sandhurst model -- the U.K., not surprisingly -- it's a British-led model. We sort of favored West Point, but, you know, they were in charge of that one, so we acceded -- and actually, it made a great deal of sense because they do need officers, and the one-year model, we think, is more than adequate if they come in with the right civilian education up-front. You can see the number of students who are in there right now. That continues to increase. It will get to about 1,000 steady state. So that'll be a substantial course.

And now you can see the start of noncommissioned officer academy courses as well. And the squad leader, platoon sergeant courses will soon be joined by a first sergeant's course, and then even a sergeants major academy so that this very important element of any military -- its noncommissioned officer corps -- is developed and strengthened and achieves the level of training, professional military education that it really needs. And here's an interesting one -- what we found to enable them to really discharge their responsibilities, particularly at the ministry level, that there actually needed to be assistance with contracting. And in fact our lawyers and a variety of Army Contracting Agency individuals and civilians have helped teach that over time.

Now these are the various combat support and then combat service support. Think of these as the individuals who directly
support the infantry in a fight, if you will. And you can see quite a bit of emphasis on the intelligence. A lot of those are human intelligence collectors, recon and surveillance soldiers.

By the way, when they graduate, they get a laptop, a cell phone, a digital camera and an old, beat-up used car, which they can use for their missions.

Engineers, of course, very important -- the engineer school is up and going. The military police school.

And there's also a logistical school, in addition to a separate bomb disposal school, also a separate medical school.

But you can see very substantial numbers here going through those courses, a variety of length for them. A lot of these are the follow-on to the common core basic-training courses. But you can get some sense of the complexity of this overall endeavor as you go through this.

On the police side, in addition, again, to the basic courses that we talked about earlier, an officer course that will be starting soon, you can see these specialized courses that have been ongoing for quite some time and greatly adding to the skill sets of the Iraqi police.

I'd like to highlight this here. Some 28 provincial SWAT teams have been trained. Of course, there are 18 provinces, so clearly a couple of the larger provinces have more than one of those teams, also specially equipped for their tasks. And they have proven to be very, very important.

I'll talk about the importance of the concept of backup for police in a station that comes under attack. If they don't know that there's someone going to back them up, who's coming to the rescue, obviously they're not going to hang tough. We saw that back in the November time frame was the most recent case, I think, of one where they -- once they realized that nobody was coming to the rescue, they went out the back door. That has not happened -- we know of, in any case, since, at the least, 30 January, the elections, from which the Iraqi security forces took an enormous lift. And they got another boost out of the mid-October election -- referendum as well.

You can see this specialized course as well, which is brought on each time as they approach -- and you say, "Well, what is that?" Well, it's force protection. It's how to search. It's traffic control point techniques and so forth.

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Equipment. Now we've chosen this date right here because it was a few weeks after MNSTC-I was stood up. We had our data collection all starting to get online, and it was the transition of sovereignty for the country. So we used that as a baseline, and you can see what's been delivered to the soldiers and the police since that time. And I think you can see it's very, very substantial.

I can tell you there is no shortage of ammunition in Iraq. That is, indeed, 340 million rounds of ammunition. And that is a big change over last summer, frankly.

Kevlar helmets -- again, enormous number of those that have gone out there.

These are heavy machine guns, not light machine guns. These are so-called PKMs.

You can see the number of radios that's gone out, AK-47s, body armor. This is the same body armor that was issued to our soldiers. In fact, we now buy from the Defense Logistics Agency, I might add, because in fact it delivers on time, where we want it, in the quantities agreed upon, at a reasonable price. We've negotiated well in that regard, I think. And again, it is basically the same stuff that our soldiers have, including the uniforms, even Gortex parkas, Kevlars and so forth. And that was something that we did change to over time, with MNSTC-I, as we worked our way along on some of these various issues.

A lot of vehicles -- I'll talk about the armored vehicles in a second -- and then large numbers of uniforms.

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I just want to give you one snapshot of just one element of the reconstruction effort. And again, this is just one of those. There are many, many others. There -- you could put one up that would be military bases. You could have military academies, training academies, police stations, highway patrol stations and so forth.

But just on border force, because border control is so important, you can see the effort and that now, out of about 258 or so forts, that 163 are actually -- in fact, it's more than that, because this one, again, is about three weeks old. They'll update this one about every month. You can see a number of others that are under construction. Most of these are renovations, a few are new ones as well.

And by the way, the strategy here has been to push gradually down. This is where the big fighting is right now, the recent offense of al Qaim-Husaybah, and that's where the Marines and the
Iraqi forces and the Iraqi special units are operating. And they've gradually pushed their way down here and pushed their way up here, with border forts, while the Iraqi and coalition forces push their way out the Euphrates River Valley. And I'll show you in a moment the number of forces, for example, that are in Fallujah, Iraqi forces, and how this has really changed, again, over the course of about, oh, the last 10 months or so, to the point that it's -- there's now about 18 Iraqi battalions in that area, the equivalent of about two divisions, just in Anbar province, at this point.

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I just wanted to show training academies. Again, this is on the Interior Ministry side, a similar slide with even more, frankly, on the military side. But it gives you (an) idea, again, the number of basic police training academies that are out there. The capacity is roughly 8,000 at a time in these 10-week basic courses. There are also some that are being used for advanced training. There are border academies, as you can see, a special police academy, even a mechanized police academy up at Taji there, and the highway patrol academy, also at Taji -- again, just to give you some sense of the amount of training infrastructure that has been established and had to be established in order to carry out the training appropriately.

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I want to talk -- just to show you now, as we switch gears to generation of forces -- now we're talking about combat battalions. And this is just a subset of the army forces. These are what used to be called national forces. I have not -- deliberately not put in the Iraqi National Guard, former Iraqi National Guard, which Prime Minister Allawi incorporated into the regular army around November or so of last year. If those were added in, there would be more -- even at that time there would be some more, although again the assessment process with them had really not taken place yet.

So if we focus just on what at that time were called regular army, intervention force, special operations forces or mechanized forces, you can see that back in 1 July of '04 there were only six battalions, and all of them were in training. That's what the blue means on these slides that you'll see. And these are two of the big training bases right here. There's another very large one here. Other large ones here and here. By the way, each of these one, two, three, four, holds an entire division.

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And these are -- just again, that same category. So again, we don't have in the dozens and dozens of Iraqi national guard,
which now are assessed, have been brought up to standard, and so forth; in some cases given additional training. But as you can see, just a real proliferation of battalions. And green means they are actually operational, conducting operations and in the fight. And more importantly, notice that all of these are operating in the so-called Sunni Triangle area. Even those operating out of An Numiniyah are working up just southeast of Baghdad at what used to be a very tough area until about probably seven or eight months ago when the police commandos and the army moved in there and eventually established a full-time presence. So that's what's out there now. And you can see, if you track this slide over time -- and there are some that are in here -- I saw Puneet Talwar in here, by the way, earlier, from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made visit after visit over there. He will remember this slide when there were certainly none out in Anbar province. You can see now, for example, in Fallujah alone there are two full Iraqi army brigades, and they -- in fact, some of them have their own area of operation. An increasing number in the Ramadi area, although that includes this base that's now been built at Habbinya, which also will eventually be a division-minus base; there will be a division headquarters there. And many of these actually have pushed out the Euphrates River Valley. Some of these have pushed down as well.

This is an old slide -- again, three weeks old, or it would be classified, if it were current. You can also see the number of forces up in Nineveh province -- very important area. This is, again, just the regular army forces -- originally regular army. There's another entire Iraqi national guard division up there that's doing a very, very good job.

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Special police. On 1 July '04 last year, there were no police commando battalions, public order battalions, or mechanized battalions in training.

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This is the number that is out there now actually in operations. Plus added a category of special border forces in there, which were created particularly for the Syrian border southwest of al Qaim, Al Walid, Trebil, this corner right here, which is a really key area. Again, you can see these forces, almost all operating up in the Sunni Triangle area. These are the deployable elements of the police. And you can also see, by the way, on there the emergency response unit, battalion-minus size, hostage-rescue-team-like organization. By the way, this illustrates -- I'll talk about this unit. I'm going to talk about the various levels -- level two, and so forth, level one, level two, level three, in a moment. The emergency response unit's a level- two unit. That means it's in the lead, but it is not judged fully independent, and the reason is because it still does
get some small amount of assistance from coalition advisers, even though it does all of its operations fully independent and develops its own intelligence or gets it from the Ministry of Interior. But among the things with which they get help are moving through traffic control points, actually. They're located in the greater Baghdad International Airport complex, and their advisers take them as far as the checkpoint, move them through there, tell them to have a good operation, and then stay there and meet them when they come back.

Next slide.

Here is the Transition Readiness Assessment -- the TRA. It is essentially the same as, say, the USR, the Unit Status Reports that those from the U.S. Army are familiar with.

It looks at level of personnel fill and then the qualification. It looks at the hardware for command and control -- the coms, and so forth. And then also the software, if you will; the training of the staffs and the commander training against their mission essential task list; their ability to sustain themselves; their level of equipment; and then its -- level of its maintenance, and then a subjective evaluation of the leadership. Leadership being particularly critical in Iraqi units, which, as you know, has generations of Iraq that were really in the mode of taking orders from above in the Saddam era, and truly a generational challenge for that country.

All that together adds up to the assessment of a unit, and that is -- these are then assessed as level 1, 2, 3, 4. Four just means that it's in their formation stages and the basic training. But all three of these are in the fight to varying levels. Level 3 means that they are fighting alongside; they're literally embedded with our units -- perhaps a company of theirs is with a company of ours, but not yet conducting independent operations the way a level 2 unit which, in the lead, is the assessment. And that means that they can do this on their own, basically, but with some support. Now, typically, that support is some form of logistics, especially if you move into the Anbar province area, where the sustainment capability of the Ministry of Defense is very limited, to understate that, probably -- one of those elements that we are helping them to develop. But again, they can do these tasks right here. And as I'll show you in a moment, a level 2 unit -- the reason this is so important is because it is at this level that Iraqi units can take on their own area of operations, and therefore allow coalition forces to move elsewhere or eventually move home.

Fully independent -- you've heard a lot of discussion about this. This is a very, very high bar for Iraqi units, and will be for some time because it means not just that they can operate on their own -- because all of the level 2 can operate on their own. That is not the question about operating. The issue here is the
sustainment piece, typically. So "fully independent" means just that. It means they don't need anything whatsoever from the coalition. And again, at the stage of development of some of the support apparatus, that is very, very rare indeed.

Again, all this -- there's also a projection that is in the coalition reports on when those units can assume security responsibility, and I'll show you where they are -- what has been assumed so far.

Next slide, please.

Here's an unclassified characterization of the Transition Readiness Assessment right now. This means, again, nearly 120 are in level 1, 2 or 3. That means they're fighting at varying levels. But what's really important is these 40 right here -- over 40 -- that are in the lead or better.

And for those of you who are really tracking this carefully -- and maybe some of the Pentagon who were there a month or so ago when I briefed them -- you'll notice that has indeed nudged up, and that has been a steady improvement over time, over the course of the last six or seven months that we've actually had the Transition Readiness Assessment, very substantial in fact. And again, that is critical because that's the level at which the Iraqi forces can take on their own area of responsibility and allow coalition forces to focus out there. That is very, very critical, and that's where we should focus.

Next slide.

This is in fact -- this is again dated because -- just for classification reasons -- but this is where they were on the 24th of October. Twenty four of their battalions had assumed their own battlespace. That is very, very significant, and there is increasing focus on this, as you might imagine, because this is in a sense the proof that that unit -- that level 2 unit can in fact operate as we assess it. You can see where most of them are -- actually, interestingly, in Baghdad, nine battalions. A great deal of effort was put into the division there by the 1st Calvary Division, then commanded by Major General Pete Chiarelli, who's going to return to Iraq as the Multinational Corps-Iraq commander, and then by the 3rd Infantry Division under Major General Glenn Webster. They have sustained that, built on that.

The advisers then joined all their forces and so forth. Even some units in Anbar province that have their own area, again more in the Eastern Anbar area than certainly out in the West, but Iraqi forces out here now as well. Very fine division down in the Multinational Division Center-South area, eight of its battalions with their own area; and even a number of battalions in the Multinational Division North-Center area.
There are elements, actually, that have had their own area in Mosul. They were actually redeployed elsewhere, and there are projections of units when they'll take over areas there and down in Multinational Division Southeast. But again, a very important data point there; 24 battalions that, as of a couple of weeks ago, had actually assumed their own area of responsibility.

Next slide.

Okay. I talked -- if you think back, first to August of '04, the Battle of Najif, you'll recall Muqtada al-Sadr's militia was hunkered in the shrine of Imam Ali. That was the first time in which Iraqi forces were moved in, but as I mentioned earlier, in that case, they really didn't get into the fight until after the surrender of Muqtada al-Sadr and after his forces had -- those that were left had left the shrine without their weapons.

The Iraqi forces then did move in. They did some very good post-surrender operations that netted in one case, for example, in one night alone, three dump trucks full of weapons and equipment, but again, not directly involved in the fighting, although they were prepared to. Had they had to go into the shrine, they were going to do that mission.

So Fallujah is the first real test -- the battle of Fallujah in November, the first introduction of Iraqi forces. They had five battalions -- the coalition had roughly nine -- three full brigades, with a lot of combat multipliers.

But as you can see, in this case, in most situations, the Iraqi forces were moving behind or at best with coalition forces, tended to then secured ground that had been already cleared by coalition forces, although they certainly did continue on and took a number of killed and wounded throughout this operation, and did a lot of work in the flanks and reconnaissance and surveillance.

The commandos were in the lead at a variety of times, the emergency response unit. But by and large, this was the characterization of the Iraqi forces in that operation.

Next slide.

Then about nine months later, September, Tall Afar, up in western Nineveh province, west of Mosul, you can see, as was briefed back then, Iraqi forces actually outnumbering the coalition combat power. And this is the size of the force that not just in the city of Tall Afar itself, although you can see very much again the number of Iraqi battalions -- that's this symbol here -- to coalition battalions; even in the city itself, they very much outnumbered -- but also there are other operations out in the surrounding areas conducted during that same time. And
some of these forces, then, have subsequently redeployed down to the southwest, to assist on the shoulder of the operations in Anbar province.

Here is the real important fact. That is, they started to do independent operations. They did control their own battle space in these -- and they had their own command and control, in many cases, during this period. And I'll show you a comment of the armored cavalry regiment commander, the U.S. commander, H.R. McMaster, in a second.

Next slide.

Okay, what about some of the other measures, if you will, the intangibles, the -- those other factors that are so critically important but less easy to measure? Well, there's an oath out there. There's also a soldier's creed. There's an NCO creed. These may seem insignificant, but I can tell you that anybody who's been in the brotherhood of the close fight knows that this type of intangible is crucially important.

There has been commitment now to a code, if you will, of ethics and so forth that all professional militaries embrace, and professional police.

This commitment -- very, very important. In fact, recently the Ministry of Interior reached out to attract, for example, Sunni Arabs for the public order battalions that were about to be formed. The recruiting effort on the military side for Sunni Arabs has been ongoing for six months or so and was helped enormously by a fatwa, put out by some Sunni Arab imams after the 30 January elections, that announced that it was the duty of Sunni Arab males to serve in their country's military forces.

That was very important because back in that period of November through about February, the intimidation of those Sunni Arabs serving in the military, and in the police as well, was very substantial. It caused some big problems. And that has helped to repopulate, if you will, to ensure the important diversity in the Iraqi forces. The work's not all done yet, but there's -- the key is the recognition and the commitment to it, and it has moved forward now for some six to eight months or so.

There have been problems with corruption, particularly in the Ministry of Defense and the previous minister. That's the bad news. The good news is the Iraqis pressed charges against those individuals alleged to have committed crimes. They have presented those. They'll be heard in the Iraqi court system. And more importantly, the incumbents took some very, very important lessons from that, put in new controls and then established much greater transparency and openness in the way they're doing
business, which will help everybody involved, including the advisors, to make way together.

Next slide.

Here is that oath I talked about. The important intangibles.

Next slide.

Some other initiatives: it is Iraqis now, in fact, who are doing just about all the military basic training. I think they're doing all of it, in fact, and, in fact, the -- what started out as contractors. then transitioned to coalition, then gradually transitioned to an Iraqi basic training company, then a battalion, now is about to become an entire basic training brigade. I talked about -- I showed you the other courses, the noncommissioned officer courses, the branch schools, as we call them in our military -- again, the vast majority of those being taught by Iraqis, and that is key. Same with the specialized training -- gradually transitioning that. Talked about the transition of responsibility in the police academies. And now even building an Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, again, with -- complete with branch schools, military academy, staff college, center for lessons learned, center for ethics and leadership, and so forth.

Critical: commissioned and noncommissioned officer courses must inculcate the professional ethics into all they're doing. The NATO mission is playing a big role in this. I'll show you a slide on that in a second.

Also critical: treatment of all Iraqis, treatment of detainees and, again, respecting those who don't just come from your own tribe, political party, ethnic group or sect. And I mentioned these being established as well.

Again, these -- we'll attempt to get at these softer sides, but equally important elements of the development of a professional military and the professional police.

Next slide.

I talked about the transition teams. Again, these are the 10-man adviser teams that are out there with each Iraqi battalion brigade headquarters, division headquarters and above, and they go all the way up -- actually, the size that the ground forces, the joint headquarters and the ministry considerably larger than 10 men -- but they're out there. They are very, very important in performing these tasks right here, helping to continue the training of the Iraqi units when they're not in combat, and they go through a cycle of train, fight, leave, train, fight leave as they work their way through that. They're out there on the
battlefield with them as required. They can link to coalition support if there's a need for, for example, close-air support, air medevac emergency, logistical resupply and so forth. Very, very important elements in the strategy. General Casey has made this point repeatedly here and of course in Iraq, and has pushed this forward aggressively, and it is bearing fruit. In fact, it is really identified now as the main effort so that over time, gradually coalition forces can shift to a support role. And again, those 24 battalions that I talked about earlier have, in fact, transitioned, taken over control of their area of responsibility, and that's what -- is the plan and the hope for all the rest of the area as well.

There are also partnership programs. Each Iraq battalion has a coalition partner. Each brigade headquarters, division headquarters as well. They link with the transition teams, the advisers, and provide additional assistance to the units who are in their area.

Next slide.

The NATO mission. They are helping enormously in three different operation centers in Baghdad: Defense, Interior, and the National Joint Operations Center. They provide a lot of out-of-country training. There have been a couple of hundred. Now these are important individuals. They're all field-grade officers, general officers, and so forth, and they're provided a good deal of equipment. You can see some of the numbers here. And that does not include the arrival, I believe this weekend, of a ship with 77 T-72 tanks that were donated by Hungary, and 36 BMP-tracked armored personnel carriers donated by Greece. They were refurbished some months -- over a period of months -- paid for by Iraq, I might add, the refurbishment. The systems were donated themselves. That is enough equipment for an entire additional Iraqi brigade -- two tank battalions and a mech brigade -- and will help enormously. And they should be on the streets, as well, by the elections in mid-December.

The Iraqi training command. I talked about the Training and Doctrine Command, all these various structures. Some of them have actually come into being; the rest are designed. And that includes this center right here at a place called Ar Rustamiyah on Southeast Baghdad. This is the headquarters of the Iraqi Staff College. It's also the -- that's the same base in which the Iraqi Military Academy is located. And you can see just a couple of data points there. The lead nation for that, by the way, is Italy. They have carried the junior and senior staff college effort forward, and they are also, and have been taking on -- the war college will be the next one to develop, and that will be sometime next year.

Next slide.
Now, I talked about ministry capability being absolutely crucial. But it was recognized some months back that we can develop all the battalions, brigades, divisions and ground forces, and police, and so forth, in the world, but they've got to be supportable and supported by the ministries of the Defense and Interior to ensure eventual self-reliance and transition to complete Iraqi control. So when the new ambassador came in, he sat with General Casey. One of the assessments that was done was of the ministries.

There was a decision that all of that effort should be combined under MNSTC-I, that the civilian character of the adviser effort would be retained -- one is a British adviser to the Ministry of Defense, British civilian, U.S. ambassador on the Ministry of Interior -- but that there would be unity of effort given the huge resources that MNSTC-I can bring to bear, and so about 2,000 people all told substantial budget from Congress in the supplemental and a lot of capacity, if given the mission, to help thicken the effort that was ongoing.

So that all took place. There was an assessment of the systems. We're at the point now there where, when I talked to Marty Dempsey on Saturday, they're now cross-leveling military assets in to help with some of those tasks. And it's particularly interesting that because of the number of Reserve officers that are in the MNSTC-I headquarters -- we had, for example, the vice president from Goldman Sachs with us, enormous capability, very talented officer; that's the type of officer who can help enormously in this mission and will in fact do that.

There's now an action plan in the early beginnings of the assessment tool, all of which will guide this process -- 18 key processes -- I'll show you the eight core priorities in a second -- but to get at these issues of budgets, training the civil service. This is particularly important because, as you all need to reflect and realize, the fourth Iraqi government in 18 months will take office in the early part of next year. Remember, there was the Iraqi government that was in place prior to transition, the Allawi government after transition, the Ja'afari government now, and of course, there will be elections in mid-December and a new government after that.

So getting a core of really trained civil servants who will stay and provide the stability through these transitions looms very large in importance, and there's a good deal of effort going into that.

Next slide.

These are the eight core processes. Again, look at this, and you get some sense of the complexity and the challenge that we're taking on, but these very, very important systems that have to be established.
I want to talk a little bit about the logistical side of the military as well, again, to give some sense of the complexity of what's going on out there. But to establish a full logistical capability you have to start off with having a national depot, and that has actually been created at Taji, an enormous base, north of Baghdad. That's where supplies that come through Baghdad International Airport, through the two ports down in the South, to the location to which they're moved; they are then put into various warehouses, cataloged, put on computer databases, and of course, we literally had to assign numbers for every part. So again the sense of complexity here, I hope, is coming out to you.

They are then pushed forward to eight or nine regional support units that are these very large bases that I talked about, and then they either go forward to a base -- a smaller base support unit, or they can go directly by Iraqi or coalition trucks to the actual battalion itself that might be in the fight and moving their assets through the headquarters and support company that each battalion is building. So you can see the echelons, if you will, of this support. You can see, again, the challenges of helping build all this.

And for example, the corps support command of the multinational corps is doing a great deal of work to help develop -- there's three transportation battalions out there now, for example; there's a battalion that will become a brigade at the Taji National Depot, with experts and warehousing, databasing, and all the different classes of supply and so forth.

So a good bit of effort going on to this and -- into this, and this is in fact the type of effort that will enable units to move from level two to level one, to be truly independent.

A lot of talk about vetting of police. And some six months or so ago, a pretty rigorous process went into place, put in there by the Iraqis, with some assistance, but that enables them to check, for each of the recruits, whether there's a criminal record or whether they were high-level Ba'athists. They do a written test. This is a very interesting evaluation here, done by some contractors. And it has washed out as many as a quarter to a third of those who apply. It's basically an assessment of the suitability of an individual for police duty -- of course, a medical and physical test -- and then and only then are they accepted and then scheduled for slots at either the major academies in Baghdad or Jordan, or the slightly smaller academies that I showed you on the slide earlier.

Next slide.
This puts it all together, if you will, talking about what is required for effective Iraqi security forces. And of course it is not just training and equipping -- great strides made there. It's not just the adviser effort, the transition teams and the partnership piece. It's all these other elements here as well.

And I'd like to highlight these, because, again, these are the critical aspects of an environment that can again support effective Iraqi security forces: obviously, competent leadership, these institutions in place that can support -- that means ministerial capacity and capability -- and of course a political environment in which all this can move forward and Iraqis can feel that they are serving a country they're proud of and serving all Iraqis in that country.

This is a quote from Colonel H.R. McMaster. He was the commander of the Armored Cav Regiment during the operation in Tall Afar. And I think it's a revealing quote. Those who know him know that he is quite forthright in his statements, and some will also know that he wrote quite a seminal work on the Vietnam era. He's got a doctorate in military history.

Next slide.

Some recent initiatives -- talked about the ministry development mission, merging these Iraq reconstruction management office adviser teams on the Interior and Defense Ministry sides with MNSTC-I and making way together on that one.

Very, very important, the development of short-, mid- and long-term plans. Again, if you don't know where you're going to go, if you don't know where you want to be five, six years from now, you will not take the steps right now, of course, to get there by then.

To give you an example, if you want a West Point graduate in the Iraqi armed forces, you've got to start right now to get him out graduating in five years from now. He'll have to probably go to language training; may require some additional education in English and other skills; then enter, of course, West Point; four years there; graduate. So you get the timing of some of this.

And it's very, very important, again, to know what you want the ultimate force structures to look like, and those now have been agreed with the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense. Same what you want to look like in the 18-month to, say, two-year time frame, and again, there's agreement on that. And of course, the short term, which is what we tend to focus on -- how many battalions today, tomorrow? How many trained and equipped? How much more equipment delivered? But again, it's about knowing what you want to look like down the road that enables you to make the
decisions now and guides the processes that can produce what you want 18, 24 months, five years from now.

Talked about the logistics structure enough, probably.

Big effort to help the Ministry of Interior consolidate control of the ports of entry. There are a number of different Iraqi bureaucracies that each have elements at these ports of entry. I'm talking about the official border crossings. Very, very important to get a tighter grip on those because, of course, the foreign fighter problems are very substantial, not necessarily in terms of numbers, but in terms of the impact that they have because, of course, it is they who are the ones who are typically willing to blow themselves up and take others with them.

That is going on. The Department of Homeland Security is helping; four border support teams in there. These are truly armies of one or armies of three, if you will -- three-man teams that have a transformational impact on these crossings when they're located there. Very, very helpful.

Talked about the border forts and the border strategy.

And then the armored assets and all the effort ongoing in that regard. What I would mention there is that there are two Iraqi mechanized brigades already, one on the army side that actually has one additional battalion -- it's got three mechanized battalions and a tank battalion -- and I talked about the arrival of the ship of 77 T-72 tanks and the BMPs that will enable them to form an additional brigade and get it out there by the elections.

On the police side, three battalions. They have both some Warsaw Pact armored vehicles that were given to them by Jordan, and now 49 of 63 Cadillac Gage armored security vehicles -- top of the line -- that are doing very, very well for them.

We ordered, sometime back, a number of wheeled armored personnel carriers. Right now there's about 100 South African Revas (sp), they're called. They have sort of a boat hull shape. Works very well against the IED threat that has become so important over there. Carries an entire squad. And a handful have already arrived. They should get about the rest of the 100 before the end of the year, and then there will be additional purchases of either those or some others that are being tested over there right now. Additional number of BMPs were given to Iraq, already committed; others that have been purchased and will be delivered. The first 114 humvees just arrived at that Taji national depot just in the past couple of days. They have armor kits on them. There are others that are fully up-armored that are already on order, hundreds of those as well. Finally, there's 600 armored
vehicles that the Iraqis ordered from Poland that are due in. And there are contracts at nine different Iraqi base support unit locations throughout the country to put, basically, locally constructed armor on the vehicles.

Next slide.

A couple of myths out there. I talked about the challenges that have existed, I mean culturally throughout the region, frankly: cronyism, taking care of one's tribe, and so forth. Part of business, I guess. But the Iraqi government, again, took their experiences to heart, realized they've got to crack down on this; they have now. And in fact, that will help the resources get to work for the Iraqi people. Remembering that this is a very centrally planned economy. All the resources that flow in, they are very substantial -- hundreds of millions of dollars a week from oil exported mostly through the south, but that is coming in, but it all has to flow to the people through the ministries. And so it's very important, again, the capacity and the capability of those ministries be assisted.

There's a reason that it started out with Warsaw Pact equipment that was actually made before MNSTC-I stood up, but it's a sound reason, and that is that it's suitable. AK-47s are great weapons. They're very affordable compared with the alternatives. They shoot 762mm ammo that they have tons of. They know how to operate them. I walked into a police academy class one time, basic academy. They were just starting into a block of instruction on the AK-47. In fact, it was a U.S. MP sergeant -- this was about a year ago -- teaching it. And we decided just to do a test and see how many in the group could tear down and put together an AK-47 in less than 45 seconds. And once they found out that there was a CG's coin that went to the winners, every hand went up, and in fact, everyone that we tested, about four or five, passed that test. They can use it. It works very, very well.

On the other hand, our bringing in, as I mentioned, vehicles, and so forth, from both the United States and from other countries, based on what is best for them. And a key issue here is whether or not it can be maintained, and making sure that the technology is not so sophisticated that it requires months, or even longer, of training on a variety of computerized diagnostics, turbines and so forth.

A lot of training going on outside the country. Somewhere around this number on a daily basis, to be sure. The bulk of that -- the vast majority -- over 3,000 in Jordan either at the police academy or at a special ops training facility; both providing superb training, and both have developed very, very well over the course of the past year or so. But there are others out all over the country. There's actually one out in Fort Leavenworth at the Command & General Staff College, the post in which I'm located.
They're sprinkled throughout U.S. courses, other courses in the U.K., Australia, a variety of NATO schools and so forth. So they are taking advantage of this. But the offers are, in fact, balanced because they do cost them money in many cases, and then it takes time to pull a unit out of the fight, assemble it, get airlift for it, get it over there, and the question is, is this better training than could be provided in Iraq. And given the investment in the training infrastructure in Iraq -- the shoot houses, the ranges, the live-fire facilities and all the rest -- the answer oftentimes is no.

And they are certainly fighting across sectarian lines. I mentioned the effort earlier to ensure that the Iraqi forces represent the population at large. There are certainly some units, particularly some of the police public order battalions, that do not -- that are very, very heavily Shi'a. But the Ministry of Interior has long committed to ensuring that a proper mix, as with the police commandos and military, and so forth, is achieved.

Next slide.

Okay, the way ahead -- I talked about the criticality of institutional capability and how that has quickly become the main effort. So we're not just now generating -- we'll certainly generate more police, soldiers, small units, and so forth. That will continue. Increasing effort on the service support and combat support side, but also now shifting to place greater emphasis on assisting the ministers and the ministry staffs. And then finally, helping to develop truly national institutions that can help keep this country together, develop a sense of national identity, and so forth.

So what is the equation for Iraqi self-reliance? Well, it's leaders, it's that institutional capability and it is, of course, continued force generation.

Next slide.

So here's the bottom line -- the last substantive slide here -- again, they're in the fight, and they're increasingly leading it. The generation on track, and you saw the new main effort.

Huge progress over the course of the last 15, 17 months in which I've focused, which built on that work that was done prior to that during the CPA days by some great individuals, and established the foundation on which we built, and clearly still much work ahead.

Next slide.
We occasionally use as a metaphor the idea of the Mesopotamian stampede. I had envisioned, frankly, sort of a nice, orderly cattle drive when I was discussing this with my staff the first time, and the cattle I guess are either the tasks or the security forces or what have you; and the idea of just keeping them moving, getting up some momentum, keeping them all together and getting to Cheyenne or whatever the destination is for this particular endeavor.

And the staff came back and said, well, you may think it's an orderly cattle drive, but we think it's a stampede. And in fact, they produced this great Frederick Remington print called "The Stampede." A lot of great Iraqi and coalition outriders out there. And I can tell you there is very substantial momentum in this effort. The herd has gotten stronger and stronger and stronger. The role of the Iraqi outriders has obviously increased, where many of them are now leading elements of this. But it's tough terrain, it's rocky, it's raining cats and dogs, there's lightning bolts out there, there's bad guys out on the perimeter trying to shoot at the cattle and shoot at us and shoot at our Iraqi colleagues -- and of course, there's some even inside the herd that may get weak or faint-hearted. We talk about if some will fall behind. If they're important, we'll go back and get them. Some will actually get out ahead. We'll catch up with them.

But this is the idea. This captures this sense that there is, again, huge momentum in the Iraqi security force development mission. And the key is to keep it moving, keep it headed in the right direction, continue to build the strength and build the capacity of those to support this endeavor, again, from the institutions.

And with that, I'd say thank you very much, and I'll be happy to take your questions. (Applause.)

**MR. CORDESMA**n: Ladies and gentlemen, I think that we've had a remarkably thorough briefing, and we also have a very tight time scale, since we have to end by noon.

A lot of the questions I've received on cards have been answered. I'm not sure we really have the time for gathering more.

But I've clustered these into groups, and perhaps one of the most striking groups is how much your experience in Iraq and in Kosovo is going to influence your approach to your new command.

**There have been other questions about:**
How would you change the values and the career paths for U.S. officers? Do we need to retain people longer on special tours? How will it affect the training of U.S. officers and NCOs?

And one question, which sort of pushes the envelope, as to whether the General Staff College has any courses on counterinsurgency or guerrilla-type warfare, and it quotes a(n) article as saying that the Staff College had no courses.

So if I can put all of those together into one question --

**GEN. PETRAEUS:** Okay. Thanks, Tony.

Well, let me start off with the last one first. The Command General Staff College, which I'm the commandant -- there's actually a brigadier general who's the deputy commandant, Jim Warner, who really oversees that effort -- but there are very much courses on counterinsurgency. There's a core portion of the course, and then there's a variety of electives -- core courses generally in the first three months or a little less -- there's a minimum of 18 hours, if you provide -- if you take rigorous counting rules, that are explicitly about counterinsurgency and stability ops. And those were added in -- just in the last year or so. So I think the information on which that quote was provided or based clearly was dated.

Beyond that, though, all of the other core course elements -- so when you talk about ethics and leadership, the case studies have to do with typically counterinsurgency topics. In fact, I think that's actually out of an article that discussed a lieutenant colonel named Nate Sasserman, a great Army football player, was a battalion commander, has some real challenges over there, and in fact retired from the Army after his tour in Iraq and made some very tough calls. And the students out there agree that there was one that went over the line, by the way.

But that article already has become a huge topic of discussion, as have earlier case studies about similar situations in Iraq.

The other course elements -- again, the electives, a very substantial number on a whole variety of different topics that are all related, again, to counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures -- the scenarios for the exercises are very much keyed to ongoing -- what's called the contemporary operating environment. And that's true of other elements of the command that I'm privileged to lead now, the Combined Arms Center.

The center, for example, oversees doctrine, new counterinsurgency FM. An interim field manual went out over the course of the last year. They're already working on the second edition, reaching out to counterinsurgency experts -- in fact, in
this town as well, Andy Krepinevich; John Nagl, who wrote that wonderful book "Eating Soup With a Knife," from a quote from T.E. Lawrence, as well. And then after he served as a major out in Ramadi, he added a new chapter to it that was titled "Spilling Soup on Myself" -- wonderfully self-effacing officer, Rhodes scholar and a brilliant example now, lieutenant colonel.

So the doctrine side, great deal of effort in that regard, and then a variety of other subjects that are -- that have been introduced in the past year or so.

In the leader-development realm, the Commander General Staff College is just one example, but in the basic courses, the advanced courses for our officers and our non-commissioned officers, similar changes made. And in fact, we just recently sent out an operation order to all of those different branch schools and centers that discussed the importance of the addition of cultural awareness training, and that is also being done.

The training aspect, collective training, if you look at the National Training Center, which some of you have visited -- I look around the world -- when they visited it, there was a big tank battle in what's called the Central Quarter. It's not anymore. It is not your father's -- your grandfather's NTC. It now looks like Western Anbar province, and they will have as many as 500 or more Iraqis -- Iraqi-Americans -- out there as role players, representing everything from Iraqi security forces to local officials, to imams, to you name it out there, and again, fulfilling all the roles that our soldiers will find in a scenario. They've added nine or so villages out there that are as close as we can make them to Iraqi villages, and so enormous changes was made in that regard. The Joint Readiness Training Center, same changes have been made down there. And I had actually -- always had something called the low-intensity conflict phase anyway.

And then we have the Center for Army Lessons Learned, again, also under CAC. This organization has really blossomed in recent years. It has people out collecting lessons and tactics, techniques and procedures on the battlefield, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, at the training centers and so forth. It then feeds that back in the form -- very quickly. And in this digital age, of course, they can capture them, and they just push them right out right away. And that has been very, very effective in helping officers and non-commissioned officers, who are going to deploy, to profit from the experiences of others who have been interviewed by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. Even the Military Review, which was out there, our professional journal, they have a counterinsurgency writing contest they're about to announce.
So again, enormous changes throughout our Army in terms of its doctrine, its training, its leader development and the way that we're capturing all of that.

Even the Defense Language Institute, which is under CAC as well, as you might imagine, quite a shift in the emphasis on certain languages over others. And they, by the way, provide interpreters to the U.S. units that go through the National Training Center in these rotations so that they can interact with the Iraqi role-players who are on that particular training battlefield. So big, big changes that have been made in that regard.

Keeping key people in particular positions longer. I think all you have to do is -- actually is ask my wife -- (laughter) -- about three-and-a-half years or less, four-and-a-half deployed; one year in Bosnia, and then the better part of two and a half (years) in Iraq. Ask General Casey's wife; he's been over there now -- I think it's approaching 17 months or so, and I believe that he will stay longer. So I think there is a commitment, and I think that there's also -- folks have responded in the right way to those requests.

Efforts to retain officers and non-commissioned officers. There's a great deal of work going on that. We had an officer from the 101st, by the way, who volunteered. She went back with the Multinational Security Transition Command. She also had been deployed for the better part of three of her first four years in the Army. We contacted the Army's Human Resources Command and said, hey, how about something that would really give her a break, develop some potential for the future, invest in this great young captain so that there's a dividend down the road? And they showed enormous flexibility in allowing her to go to graduate school before commanding the company. She'll still come back out, do company command, and obviously the Army will get its return on the investment. But that type of thinking is ongoing, and there is a commitment already to send a couple of hundred extra officers to graduate school, starting in the coming year.

So I think there's quite a bit of sensitivity to the points that you mentioned there, Tony, and looking at all of these various issues because there clearly is a recognition what our soldiers and their families are being asked to do.

MR. CORDESMAN: General, thank you very much.

I have quite a stack of questions here. We have already sort of gone over the formal time. And the next time we have General Petraeus here for a week, I will save these questions and ask all of them. But let me ask just very quickly two questions which were asked in quite a number of different forms.
The first one was, how real and how successful have the efforts been to ensure that Iraqi units really are integrated in terms of tribal background, ethnicity and religion, and ensure, as they're put into the field, they are not Kurdish, Shi'ite, or somehow otherwise ethnic forces?

**GEN. PETRAEUS:** It is a mix. And as I mentioned, the Sunni Arab intimidation in the period of November through February was a challenge. Forces that were generated during that time obviously would have a much higher Shi'a mix than would the representation of the population. And so that was the reason that I highlighted the commitment of the two ministers and really the Iraqi government to making sure that, where necessary, they redress that.

That was the genesis of an outreach to Sunni Arabs, some several thousand of which were recruited during the period that started about probably five or six months ago. Again, it then takes several months for those to go through the training pipeline, get the advanced training, take their post-graduation leave, and then move into units. But that has been ongoing. And as I mentioned, they actually held recently a class of the public order battalions that was going to expand those units units until they had additional Sunni Arabs signed up to join them, and also some -- Christian, by the way, as well, and then others, like the Azeris, Iraqi Kurds and so forth.

So I think they recognize it, which is really the key. They know the importance of it. They know the challenges that they have out there to address it. And they are continuing to work on that.

**MR. CORDESMAN:** Ladies and gentlemen, I apologize. There are a lot of excellent questions here, but we have also had, I think, a really excellent and remarkably thorough briefing. So on your behalf, I think we'd all like to thank General Petraeus for what I think has been one of the greatest insights into what's happening in Iraq that I can remember in recent presentations. Thank you very much.

**GEN. PETRAEUS:** Thanks, Tony. (Applause.)

END.