Iraqi Force Development: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job?

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Executive Summary

Experts disagree on many aspects of the Iraq War, including the ways which America’s strategic mistakes led to the initial failures in creating effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces. Failures occurred in spite of the fact that the US had spent well over $5.8 billion to develop these forces by May 2005, and the President had to request another $5.7 billion to accelerate their development. There is broad agreement, however, among virtually all analysts who have examined the way in which the US went to war in Iraq, and dealt with its Coalition allies and Iraqi exile groups, that the US did not properly prepare for stability and nation building operations, and failed to anticipate the threat of terrorism and insurgency.

The Department of Defense not only ignored the risk of terrorism and insurgency, it did little to realistically plan to create stability. It had no clear plans to secure government offices and maintain the process of governance. It was not organized and manned to provide local security and prevent looting, or seize exposed arms depots. The original office charged with reconstruction – the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) -- was never given significant manpower and financial resources, and its head – General Jay Garner – was initially given a three-month appointment. The US planned to inherit stability, not achieve it, and to begin major force reductions within a few months following Saddam’s fall. The preservation or creation of effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces was never a serious part of the pre-war, wartime, or immediate postwar US planning effort.

It is also clear that the US and Coalition were slow to react as terrorism and insurgency became serious problems, and underestimated the scale of Iraqi resentment and hostility that occurred as a result of the invasion and the problems that followed. For all of these reasons, the Coalition efforts to shape, train, and equip Iraqi military and security forces need to be put in historical perspective. It was not until the spring of 2004 that the effort to create the Iraqi forces that both Iraq and the Coalition needed gained real urgency, and until then no guidance was given to shape the training program to meet the needs that were evolving in the field.

For most of the year following Saddam’s fall, the broad goal was to spend several years shaping a military designed to defend Iraq’s borders. For much of that time the training was of so low priority that it was left to an uncoordinated effort by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that lacked US support for more than the creation of regular police forces tailored to deal with civil crime.

This occurred even though it was becoming clearer and clearer that the insurgency was rapidly becoming more serious, and that much more effective Iraqi forces would be needed. The transfer of power to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) in June 2004 did succeed in giving added legitimacy and Iraqi leadership to the nation building effort. At the same time, it created new problems. It brought new Ministers of Defense and Interior to office in half-formed offices and disrupted plans to disband the various party militias. Tensions between the new ministers made many problems worse, as did their lack of administrative experience and drive—moreover, new tensions developed with the
Ministry of Finance. These problems were increased by a major turnover in lower ranking personnel.

Progress occurred in the late fall and early winter of 2004. Coalition and Iraqi forces showed in November 2004 that they could cooperate in winning win major battles. The battle of Fallujah in November 2004 was a particularly striking example of a tactical victory that took place while Iraqi forces were only beginning to deploy significant strength. The loss of the city deprived Sunni insurgents and terrorist groups of their major sanctuary inside Iraq. At the same time, Fallujah still remained a troubled city more than six months later. Many of its citizens had not returned. Rebuilding was slow and far behind the original plan to restore the city, and insurgents was still sporadically active. The evacuation of hundreds of thousands of residents had added to hostility against the Coalition and government, and had disrupted part of the effort to register Sunni voters before the January 30th election.

At the same time, even the best Iraqi forces were just beginning to develop any real effectiveness, and many continued to have major readiness, leadership, equipment, training, and readiness problems. Corruption and desertions were still major problems, particularly among the various elements of the IPS.

As might be expected, basic force numbers did not change radically between December and January 2005. Iraq did, however, take major steps to restructure its forces like merging the National Guard into the Army.

Equally significant, this was the period in which Iraq held its first true legislative election in decades. During months leading up to the election, insurgents had made repeated efforts to keep Iraqis from going to the polls and voting. They failed – some 58 percent of registered Iraqis voted on January 30, 2005. This election turnout gave a sense of legitimacy to the Iraqi government, and a combination of a large and visible Iraqi security presence and relative security of most polling places reinforces this position.

An estimated 130,000 Iraqi Security forces deployed on election day, January 30, 2005. While it was 150,000 Coalition troops that provided the core of the security effort, Iraqi forces did provide the inner two rings of security for over 5,200 polling sites. Not a single polling site was penetrated, and several Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members gave their lives while stopping suicide bombers on election day.

The performance of ISF forces was particularly striking since there was no approved election security plan until 10 days prior to the election. In fact, if some local ISF commanders had not acted to create plans on their own initiative, the operation could not have been nearly so successful.

Still, Iraqi force development remained very much a work in progress during the run-up to the October 15, 2005 referendum on the constitution, and events showed how much any success interacted with the course of the insurgency and Iraqi politics. The seeming pause in insurgent and terrorist activity after the January election was followed by a sharp increase in violence, particularly in major bombings and suicide attacks by Sunni insurgent groups that were clearly targeted at trying to prevent Iraqi Sunnis from joining the government and government forces, and at dividing Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurd.
In some cases, this triggered new problems in Iraqi forces and new desertions. By May 2005, Arab Sunni Islamist insurgent attacks had driven sectarian and ethnic tensions to new highs, and created a growing risk that the struggle between the Arab Sunnis, and the Arab Shi’ites, Kurds, and other Iraqi minorities could become a broader form of civil war.

In addition, there were serious problems in Iraqi politics and governance that affected the force development effort. The new Iraqi government took nearly two months to agree on a Presidency Council and Prime Minister, and took from February 1st to May 8th to fully select a cabinet and choose a defense minister. The 55 members of the new committee to draft a constitution were not named until May 10th and then included only one Sunni.

New problems arose as some of the supporters of the incoming government called for major new purges of the government and the Iraqi security forces to eliminate all "Ba'athists," including many whose only "crime" had been to go along with Saddam Hussein's regime to survive. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that some of the most effective Iraqi units were largely Shi’ite and Kurd in character, including special police and security units in the Ministry of Interior. These units could sometimes be as ruthless as they were effective, and compounded Sunni fears and resentments.

The good news was that they helped lead some Sunni clerics and politicians to call for Sunnis to join the armed forces and police. The bad news was that Sunnis began to accuse government forces of excessive force, targeted killings and disappearances, and deliberately attacking Sunni targets. Nevertheless, the Iraqi force building effort continued to gather momentum in spite of the problems in governance and the new surge of terrorist and insurgent activity.

Both the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior did, however, continue to stress the importance of developing forces that would maintain a rule of law, and respect for human rights – even in the face of a major counterinsurgency campaign. They also stressed the need to fight corruption, and change the past culture of Iraq’s military and police forces to stress professionalism and promotion by merit.

No analysis of Iraqi force developments can ignore the fact that there is still a long list of political, military, and economic uncertainties that will shape the outcome of the insurgency and the success of the Iraqi force building effort. This includes the outcome of the December 15, 2005 election, the efforts to shape an inclusive government, and dealing with all of the issues raised by the new constitution. Iraqi internal politics are a major uncertainty, and it is too soon to predict how well Iraqi forces can or cannot supplement and eventually replace Coalition forces. The nation building aspects of the "war after the war" remain a struggle in progress, and there still is no way to know whether the light at the end of the tunnel is daylight or an oncoming train.

The key point is that Iraqi forces can help create the conditions for “victory,” but neither they nor the Coalition forces can defeat the insurgency. Victory or defeat will ultimately be determined by the Iraqi political process and has already become an Iraqi responsibility. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency require political and economic, as well as military, solutions. At least as much depends on Iraqi capability to build on the foundation provided by outside aid, and to create the right kind of political and economic context for military success. Serious problems have emerged from the inability of the
Iraqi Government to follow up on US and Iraqi military and security efforts and to establish effective governance at both the central government level and in the field.

Iraqis must work out a form of power sharing that can include Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, Kurds, Turcomans, and Iraq’s smaller minorities. The politics of ethnic and sectarian tension and rivalry cannot be resolved by force in any stable or lasting way. Only the Iraqis can bridge the gaps between Sunni and Shi’ite, Arab and Kurd, and various Shi’ite factions. Only Iraqis can find the proper way of sharing the nation’s oil wealth, and find the right balance between a secular and religious state.

This analysis documents positive trends, but also shows that Iraq, the US and its allies, and the world can “lose” the struggle in Iraq as well as win it. Such a defeat is not probable, but it is possible. There is no one variable that could produce such a “defeat,” and there is no agreed definition of what “victory” or “defeat” mean. A “defeat” could take the following forms:

- A war of attrition whose cost and casualties eventually meant the Bush Administration lost the public and Congressional support necessary to go on fighting.
- The open failure of US efforts to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces and any ability to phase down the US and MNF presence at an acceptable rate.
- A large-scale Iraqi civil war -- where some combination of Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite, Arab versus Kurd, secularist versus theocrat, or struggle for authoritarian rule made continuing the Coalition presence purposeless or untenable.
- The collapse of effective Iraqi governance because of divisions between Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurd.
- The creation of a religious state without the pluralism and tolerance critical to a US definition of victory.
- The creation of open or de facto divisions in Iraq that allied the Iraqi Shiites with Iran and created the equivalent of a Shi’ite crescent divided from the Sunni part of the Arab and Islamic world.
- The continued failure of US aid and Iraqi economic development to meet the needs and expectations of the people and the destabilizing impact of long-term, large-scale unemployment.
- The failure to meet popular expectations regarding personal security, reductions in crime, availability of key services like water and electricity, and education and medical care.
- Demands by an Iraqi government that US forces leave on less than friendly terms.
- Domestic US political conditions that lead to the enforcement of some “exit strategy” that made the US leave before a stable Iraq can be created.
- The isolation of the US from its regional and other allies, most remaining members of the Coalition and the support or tolerance of the UN.

The variables in this list are interactive and can combine in a wide range of ways to produce different real-world scenarios for “defeat.” Furthermore, the cases on this list are simply the key candidates; there are many more scenarios that might possibly occur.

"Winning" is equally hard to define. Iraq will be unstable for at least the next 5-10 years, and what appears to be "victory" could become a "defeat" if later political and economic upheavals created a hostile regime, chaotic country, or state with a theocratic or strong man regime so far from democracy that it made our current fight futile. The most likely “best case” outcome is now the kind of "victory" that produces an unstable, partially
dependent state, with a unified and pluralistic regime but one that is scarcely an American client.

In any case, Iraq, the Coalition, and friendly outside states can only succeed if they recognize that the level of progress required to produce any meaningful definition of “success” or “victory” in all of the necessary areas will be a matter of years, if not a decade. No matter how impatient policymakers may be, history still takes time. It is certain that there will be reversals, even if the ultimate result is success.
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I. Introduction

Iraqi force development remained very much a work in progress during 2005, and events showed how much any success interacted with the course of the insurgency and Iraqi politics. The course of the fighting was far less reassuring from April on than during the period immediately after January 30th. The seeming pause in insurgent and terrorist activity after the election was followed by a sharp increase in violence, particularly in major bombings and suicide attacks by Sunni insurgent groups that were clearly targeted at trying to prevent Iraqi Sunnis from joining the government and government forces, and at dividing Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurd.

In some cases, this triggered new problems in Iraqi forces and new desertions. By May, Arab Sunni Islamist attacks had driven sectarian and ethnic tensions to new highs, and created a growing risk that the struggle between the Arab Sunnis, and the Arab Shi’ites, Kurds, and other Iraqi minorities could become a broader form of civil war.

There were serious problems in Iraqi politics and governance that affected the force development effort. The new Iraqi government took nearly two months to agree on a Presidency Council and Prime Minister, and took from February 1st to May 8th to fully select a cabinet and choose a defense minister. The 55 members of the new committee to draft a constitution were not named until May 10th and then included only one Sunni.

Iraq's governance deteriorated in some areas at both the central and local levels during this interregnum. Tensions grew between the largely excluded Sunnis and the now dominant Shi’ites and Kurds, and there was a surge in the infiltration by foreign Islamist extremists.

New problems arose as some of the supporters of the incoming government called for major new purges of the government and the Iraqi security forces to eliminate all "Ba’athists," including many whose only "crime" had been to go along with Saddam Hussein's regime to survive. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that some of the most effective Iraqi units were largely Shi’ite and Sunni in character, including special police and security units in the Ministry of Interior. These units could sometimes be as ruthless as they were effective, and compounded Sunni fears and resentments. The good news was that they helped lead some Sunni clerics and politicians to call for Sunnis to join the armed forces and police. The bad news was that Sunnis began to accuse government forces of excessive force, targeted killings and disappearances, and deliberately attacking Sunni targets.

Top US officials like Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were concerned enough to come to Iraq to warn against such purges and the risk of broadening ethnic and sectarian conflict, and to stress the need for effective governance. Senior US officers like General George Casey, the US Commander in Iraq, warned of the need for effective governance and for inclusion of as many Sunnis as possible. US Commanders also made it clear that they felt the insurgency would continue to last for several more years, that developing effective Iraqi forces would take over a year, and that MNF forces would probably been needed in significant numbers through 2006.

Much depends on Coalition and Iraqi success in creating effective Iraqi forces that are the visible element of security operations that Sunnis and other Iraqis see on a day-to-day
basis. The lack of highly visible Iraqi forces, and the fact that US occupiers have both won virtually every past victory and still dominate most security activity, have so far tended to sustain the image of a nation where fighting is done by foreigners, non-Muslims, and occupiers.

Many Coalition and Iraqi Interim Government tactical victories have so far produced a costly political and military backlash. Even successful military engagements can lead to the creation of as many new insurgents as they kill or capture. The lack of popular support means that many existing insurgents disperse with their weapons or bury their weapons and supplies for later retrieval.

Many Iraqis have seen and still see US and Coalition-dominated military actions as actions by “occupier” forces; they are a source of constant propaganda and fuel conspiracy theories. Real and imagined civilian casualties, collateral damage, and the impact on civilians and shrines that these engagements cause remain a constant problem. All of these points reinforce the need to create larger and more effective Iraqi forces as soon as possible, and to give them full force protection and counterinsurgency capability.

At the same time, Iraqis also do not want their own military constantly visible in the streets, or militias and other unofficial forces that often support hardline interpretations of Islam and/or enforce their own selfish interests. Most ordinary Iraqis also see crime as much more of a day-to-day threat than insurgents. This raises serious issues about how the new Iraqi military, security, and police force treat their own population. One of Jalal Talibani’s first acts in becoming Iraq’s new president in April 2005 was to offer an amnesty to Iraqi Sunni insurgents. This followed up on a more limited offer of insurgent by then Prime Minister Ayad Allawi in 2004. Such acts of political inclusion are as critical to Iraqi success in defeating the insurgents as the effectiveness of Iraqi forces.

Some Iraqi forces – including commando units – do continue to use far more brutal methods in searching for, interrogating, and dealing with other Iraqis than Coalition forces are permitted to use. These abuses include their treatment of Iraqi detainees. Moreover, there are indications that some Coalition forces encourage Iraqi forces to do this, and use them as proxies for actions they are not allowed to take. At a minimum, US and other Coalition forces operating with Iraqi units sometimes stand by and allow such activities to take place. Such actions are particularly division when largely Kurdish or Shiite units operate in Sunni areas.

Counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations are necessarily brutal and violent; war is war. They also, however, are also battles for the hearts and minds of both the people where the war is fought and of the enemy. The effectiveness of Iraqi forces is heavily dependent on their winning such support and not mirroring the actions of Saddam Hussein’s forces and regime. As similar US errors at the Abu Ghraib prison compound demonstrated all too clearly, excessive force and interrogation methods quickly become counterproductive and self-defeating even if they produce short-term results. The Coalition, US, and MNSTC-I efforts to give the new Iraqi military, security, and police forces human rights training and the kind of respect for the rule of law necessary to win hearts and minds are vital to success. The same is true of NATO training efforts and those of other countries.
The political dimension and impact of military, security, and police operations is not one that either Coalition or Iraqi commanders and forces can afford to ignore, even in the heat of battle. The primary purpose of Iraqi operations is to reforge a nation; not defeat an enemy. The efforts of the Iraqi government and MNSTC-I to create effective police and security forces in parallel with creating effective military forces are absolutely critical to nation building, political legitimacy, effective government, and the effort to eventually create a true civil society.
II. The Importance of the Initial Failures in Grand Strategy and Strategic Assessment: The Background to the Effort to Create Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces

It is equally important that the US, its Coalition allies, and all the nations interested in stability operations, nation-building, and peace making learn from the mistakes made before, during, and after the battle to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Experts disagree on many aspects of the Iraq War, including the ways which America’s strategic mistakes led to the initial failures in creating effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces. Failures occurred in spite of the fact that the US had spent well over $5.8 billion to develop these forces by May 2005, and the President had to request another $5.7 billion to accelerate their development. There is broad agreement, however, among virtually all analysts who have examined the way in which the US went to war in Iraq, and dealt with its Coalition allies and Iraqi exile groups, that the US did not properly prepare for stability and nation building operations, and failed to anticipate the threat of terrorism and insurgency.

This should not have happened. It is clear to anyone who participated in the process that the interagency studies conducted before the war led to many warnings from serving officials and military, ex-officials and military, intelligence officers, and area experts that nation building and instability could present major risks. This included intelligence warnings that Saddam Hussein’s regime was preparing for insurgency and resistance if Coalition forces defeated Iraq’s regular military forces and forced the regime out of Baghdad and to give up overt power.

While it may be years before the full record is declassified, the Bush Administration had ample strategic and tactical warning of what might occur, much of it coming from interagency efforts led by the State Department. It seems to have chosen to disregard such warnings because some senior policy officials believed their vision of Iraq was far more correct than the warnings they were given.

There are also strong indications that the Administration ignored the portions of previous USCENTCOM war plans that called for stability operations and much larger force levels than the Administration choose to deploy, and that the policy cluster in the Department of Defense chose to ignore much of the advice it was given by the State Department and intelligence community when the Department of Defense was given operational authority for stability operations in late 2002 and early 2003.

The Department not only ignored the risk of terrorism and insurgency, it did little to realistically plan to create stability. It had no clear plans to secure government offices and maintain the process of governance. It was not organized and manned to provide local security and prevent looting, or seize exposed arms depots. The original office charged with reconstruction – the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) -- was never given significant manpower and financial resources, and its head – General Jay Garner – was initially given a three-month appointment. The US planned to inherit stability, not achieve it, and to begin major force reductions within a few months following Saddam’s fall. The preservation or creation of effective Iraqi military, security,
and police forces was never a serious part of the pre-war, wartime, or immediate postwar US planning effort.

It is also clear that the US and Coalition were slow to react as terrorism and insurgency became serious problems, and underestimated the scale of Iraqi resentment and hostility that occurred as a result of the invasion and the problems that followed.

*Early Warning of the Need for Effective Iraqi Forces and True Interoperability: The Polls Before the Transfer of Power*

The US not only initially failed to properly assess the growth of terrorism and insurgency during the first year following the fall of Saddam Hussein, but as the insurgency rose and became steadily more effective, the US failed to react by treating the Iraqi forces it was creating as serious partners. It failed to promptly restructure its force goals and its training and equipment effort for Iraq military, security, and police forces.

The end result was a growing asymmetry in interoperability between US military forces and the new Iraqi forces as the insurgency took hold. As the data in the following chapters make brutally clear, the US initially failed to provide minimal facilities and equipment such as body armor, communications and vehicles. While the US training teams and US commanders in the field made steadily better efforts to organize and train Iraqi forces to protect themselves, the US as a whole concentrated on manpower numbers and then left Iraqis out in the field to die.

The seriousness of this problem is all too clear when one considers the impact of less serious shortfalls in equipment in US forces. It is clear from the Congressional and media reaction to the discovery that the US was slow to uparmor Humvees and trucks for its ground forces in December 2004. At the same time, it is striking that the resulting debate over the equipment issued to US and Coalition forces failed to ask what equipment was being provided to Iraqi forces, although they had been a prime target of the insurgents and terrorists since late summer of 2003.

Polls consistently showed from June 2003 onwards that the number one concern of Iraqis was personal security for themselves and their families, and that crime was an even larger concern than terrorism or insurgency. Concerns over jobs, medical care, and education came next, and politics lagged significantly behind. It should have been clear from the start that creating effective Iraqi police for local security and to fight crime were as critical as creating Iraqi security forces to take over counterinsurgency missions, and removing or minimizing the signs of the Coalition as “occupiers.”

The patterns in the earlier polls may be summarized as follows:

- First poll conducted in Iraq in August 2003 by Zogby International, revealed that just over 50 percent of Iraqis felt that the U.S. will “hurt” Iraq over the next five years and that a slightly higher number thought “democracy is a Western way of doing things and it will not work here.” Some 31.6 percent felt that Coalition Forces should leave within six months; 34 percent said within one year; and 25 percent within two years. In addition, just fewer than 60 percent felt that Iraq should determine its political future alone and without the help of the Coalition.

- Some of these findings were substantiated by a poll conducted in May 2004 by BBC, ABC News, the German network ARD and NHK in Japan. Among these: while more than half said that life was better a year ago under Saddam, “only 25 per cent expressed confidence in the US/UK occupation forces and 28 per cent in both Iraq’s political parties and the CPA.”

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USA Today/CNN/Gallo polls published in April 2004 revealed further developments in Iraqi perceptions of U.S. policy, presence and operations. Among these was that “53 percent say they would feel less secure without the Coalition in Iraq, but 57 percent say the foreign troops should leave anyway”, while 71 percent of the respondents identified Coalition troops as “occupiers.”

In the 29 April 2004 USA Today poll cited earlier, many Iraqis considered American troops to be arrogant and insensitive:

- 58 percent said [Coalition Forces] soldiers conduct themselves badly or very badly;
- 60 percent said the troops show disrespect for Iraqi people in searches of their homes, and 42 percent said U.S. forces have shown disrespect toward mosques;
- 46 percent said the soldiers show a lack of respect for Iraqi women; and
- 11 percent of Iraqis say Coalition Forces are trying hard to restore basic services such as electricity and clean drinking water.

US/Oxford polls show 78 percent of Iraqis had no confidence in Coalition forces in October 2003 and 81 percent in June 2004 – and this figure included the Kurds.

“Disbanding” Iraqi Forces

In practice, the US initially did little to create the kind of Iraqi forces that Iraqis wanted and the Coalition needed. The CPA announced that it was dissolving the former regime’s military and security forces on May 23, 2003, and plans to create a new set of national self-defense capabilities for Iraq. This decision, however, did little more than recognize a fait accompli.

US forces had shattered much of the Republican Guard force and regular army in the south. Coalition airpower used some 18,000-guided air-to-surface munitions, and thousands of unguided weapons, most against military targets. Imagery of Iraqi military facilities shows that many were essentially destroyed during the fighting, and others were looted, re-looted, and looted again – often to the point of being totally unusable.

Most of the regular forces dependent on conscripts had collapsed because of mass desertions; the heavier units in the regular army were largely ineffective and suffered from both desertions and massive looting. The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units had been defeated in the field and were too politicized to preserve. Additionally, much of the Iraqi police vanished during the collapse of virtually every aspect of governance. Few facilities survived intact, most equipment was looted, and what remained was generally unsuited to the needs of forces that could serve a post-Saddam Iraq.

No one who did not overfly Iraqi military and police installations and bases after the war, or who has actually walked through some of their remains, can appreciate just how badly looted they were. With a few exceptions, like some of the facilities at Taji, the armed forces not only were gone, they had nothing to come back to. The police that did return often had empty buildings with no arms, furniture, communications, or vehicles. Moreover, many facilities simply did not suit a democratic and volunteer force. Barracks and other facilities paid minimal attention to the needs of enlisted men and other ranks.

Saddam fell from power on April 9, 2003, and the Iraqi military, security, and police forces had largely disintegrated by mid-April 2003. The decision to formally disband the
Ba'ath Party was taken on May 16, 2003 -- more than a month after the fall of Saddam Hussein and the virtual disintegration of Iraqi forces. Ambassador Paul Bremer did not Bremer issue Order No. 2, the Dissolution of Entities, which “abolished” the Iraqi army along with the security forces and several other ministries, until March 23, 2003.

Ambassador Bremer, the former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), described this situation as follows in early 2005. He stated:

Recently some Monday morning quarterbacks have questioned the Coalition’s decision to “disband” Saddam’s army and bar senior Ba’athists from government jobs after we liberated Iraq. These were the right decisions. They served an important strategic purpose and recognized realities on the ground…. Conservative estimates are that Saddam’s security and intelligence forces killed at least 300,000 of their fellow countrymen…. During my time in Iraq, Iraqi citizens from all over the country, from every sect, religion and ethnic group, repeatedly praised the de-Ba’athification and disbanding of Saddam’s security forces as the Coalition’s most praiseworthy decisions…. There was a practical side to our decision, too. By the time Baghdad and Tikrit fell, the Iraqi army had already disbanded itself. There was not a single organized Iraqi military unit intact after mid-April 2003…In many military bases at Liberation not a single brick was left standing on another. No base was usable without major repairs.”

**Disbanding the Corrupt and Incapable**

Force quality is also a key issue. Many Sunni Iraqis talk about the competence of Iraqi forces, and how well they would have performed if they had been preserved and recalled. Anyone who watched Iraqi forces operate during the Iran-Iraq War, however, became aware of the deep ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraqi forces, and that the regime often punished competence and professionalism rather than rewarded it.

The uprisings following the Gulf War triggered a continuing series of purges in the Iraqi military that lasted until Saddam’s fall, while a vast number of promotions inflated the ranks of senior officers and filled slots with loyalists and incompetents. The security services grew in size and ruthlessness, the regular police were kept largely a passive tool of the regime, and promotion of all the military, security, and police forces increasingly became a matter of loyalty. Regular military forces became tied down in garrison duty along the Iranian border and opposite the Kurdish security zone in the North and declined sharply in capability. Units like the Republican Guards and security forces were used to attack the Kurds, and in an enduring low-level civil struggle with the Shi’ite resistance in the south.

The “culture” of the Iraqi military was a key problem. Junior officers were trained not to show initiative and others failed to actively support their men or “lead forward.” Aggressive and active mid-rank officers were seen as a threat by their superiors. Non-commissioned officers had little status or training and were not the key partners of their offices. Conscripts were given minimal training and support and sometimes were subjected to harsh conditions. The active army of 1980-1988 had become a politicized, barracks-oriented force by 2003. Illiteracy, poor physical condition, and appointment by nepotism and favoritism were common in both the military and police. Tests and exams were minimal. Men who supposedly had training were often passed or promoted because of influence or to avoid “shaming” a failure. Poor officers stayed on indefinitely.

As one senior US expert put it, “The police ranked 11th out of Iraq’s 11 security services, and had minimal pay, training, and equipment. They feared any form of interference
with government activity, and were largely passive and station-bound. Investigations and prosecution had to be paid for by complainants coming to the station, and follow-on investigations and prosecutions could become corrupt bidding contests between opposing sides, followed by feuds and revenge. Corruption, favoritism, and nepotism were endemic. The lack of a retirement system also meant many older police stayed on indefinitely and “phantoms” stayed on police lists after their death to pay their widows.”

The end result was that far too many of the military, security, and police personnel that served under Saddam lacked the training, leadership, and motivation to act as the kind of military, security, and police forces Iraq needed in the post-Saddam era. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, speaking on this issue, commented that “…the units that existed—previous to the invasion are not ones that were trained in the type of skills that we necessarily prize, to include a respect for the lives of civilians and civilian property.”

There were still some outstanding Iraqi leaders and force elements in each service, but the vast majority were poorly trained, lacked effective leadership and organization, and were designed more to protect the regime – at the cost of corruption, self-interest, and inertia – and not the nation. The services were vastly overstaffed with senior officers who were used to getting privileges, but not to leading and taking initiative.

**The “De-Ba'athification and De-Saddamization” of Iraqi Forces**

Nevertheless, the decision in May 2003 to abolish the Ba’ath Party and then to remove former regime officials; disband military, security and police personnel; and remove other supporters – including many teachers -- as parts of a postwar “de-Ba’athification” program had serious effects. Many Iraqis felt (and still feel) that Ambassador Bremer and the CPA chose to carry out “de-Ba’athification” in sweeping and all-inclusive ways that included large numbers of middle ranking Level 3 and Level 4 Ba’ath members, and excluded many Iraqi’s who had had no choice other than to go along with Saddam’s regime or join the Ba’ath Party. It sent the message that they were being excluded from a role in the new Iraqi, and since so many ordinary jobs -- like that of teacher -- were included in “de-Ba’athification,” this reinforced Iraqi fears and concerns.

The decision also helped further alienate Arab Sunnis. Ambassador Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, seems to have made this decision after limited consultation with Washington. Certainly, it was clear to Iraqis at the time that the US and CPA were reacting to pressure from Shi’ite exile groups like the one led by Ahmed Chalabi, and many saw this as a sign that Sunnis would no longer have a major role in governing Iraq. Certainly, the end result was to further alienate an already hostile Sunni leadership, and largely exclude – rather than co-opt – senior Iraqis in both the military and security services.

One senior leader of the effort to create effective Iraqi forces effort puts it this way,

> The disenfranchisement of the Sunnis through the process of de-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the Police Force and the Army was a mistake. The Sunnis, in particular, were left with nothing and without hope having been the ruling elite. Opinion on the Army is very much divided but my own view is that we should have put what we could in cantonments – no matter how smashed up they were -, fed them, provided tentage, generators whatever – purged the upper ranks and run a subtle info ops campaign that did not show then as comprehensively
outmaneuvered and defeated but one that had eventually surrendered. All very easy with hindsight of course but relevant in relation to what we might do in future conflicts.

These problems were compounded by the near-collapse of the Iraqi economy, the looting of most military and police facilities, mass desertions of the military and police during and immediately after the war, and the loss of the government and military jobs upon which many Sunnis depended. The CPA was then slow to offer former military and security officers retirement or pay, and slow to make good on the offer. There was little understanding that the impact would be far worse in the Sunni areas were such jobs, government investment, and military industries virtually dominated the local economy.

In the process, the CPA and Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) disbanded all of the special security and intelligence services, and excluded many competent former Ba’ath and career military and police officers and personnel from eligibility for the new military and security services. This included many innocent Iraqis who had simply gone along with the former regime to survive or because of the very national threats that developed during the Iran-Iraq War. While the overall manning of Iraqi leadership cadres consisted of timeservers, uniformed bureaucrats, and men seeking their own advantage, there were still many in these cadres that had served with honor in previous wars. It also seems to have been conducted in a way where Arab Sunnis were much more likely to be purged, or blocked from jobs, because of connections to the Ba’ath than Arab Shi’ites and involved at least some corruption on the part of the Iraqi officials involved.

The end result was a legacy that created serious and interrelated problems when it came to creating post-war military, security, and police forces:

○ Most of Iraq’s pre-invasion police came back after the invasion, but far too many were timeserving instruments of regime security with little training and competence and who were largely passive. Its security forces were much better trained and equipped, but largely active instruments of regime repression. They did not go along to get along; they were key parts of the problem, but they were both the only forces trained for counterinsurgency and counterrorism and largely Sunni elements trained to be insurgents once excluded from power. The end result was that untrained police had to support the military, while trained ex-intelligence and security personnel were pushed into becoming insurgents.

○ The armed forces had many elements that were effective and were not regime loyalists, and that could later be recruited into the police and security forces. They had effectively disintegrated during the war, so they were a pool of talent to draw upon – rather than a disbanded force – but they were keys to creating effective forces, avoiding a Sunni-Shi’ite split, and avoiding driving another group of skilled manpower into the insurgency.

○ De-Ba’athification blocked the US teams developing the military, security, and police forces from recruiting many of the most experienced leaders and military personnel for much of the first year of the occupation. Some of the best and most qualified personnel could not be recruited.

○ This, in turn, ensured there were few stable unit elements with proven leaders and personnel, and no amount of training and equipment can substitute for experienced leadership and the level of unit integrity that creates mutual loyalty among those assigned. Essentially, the US and Iraqi government ended up emphasizing sheer throughput in terms of numbers of personnel going through a grossly inadequate training system without bothering to give them any place to go.

○ The near collapse of much of Iraq’s economy following the invasion, coupled to the disbanding of the armed forces and much of the government, put tremendous pressure on young men to join the armed forces, security forces, and police regardless of their personal goals and ambitions. It then placed them in a society undergoing political, economic, and social turmoil – as well as a society
experiencing a growing insurgency. Inevitably, large numbers of men joined for all the wrong reasons, often had no incentive to take risks, did not take training and discipline any more seriously than they were forced to, focused on family and local problems, and had little reason to be loyal. Some became informers or supporters of the insurgency.

It is interesting to note, however, that current Iraqi military and police officials and officers seem to be less critical of the “disbanding” of the military and security forces by the CPA than other Iraqis. They have lived with the real-world shortcomings in Saddam’s forces and acknowledge that the war, desertions, and looting left few units and facilities intact, and that most were not worth preserving. Many do, however, blame “de-Ba’athification” for failing to retain key personnel or anticipate would happen to those with no political and career options.

Many of the Iraqis involved in creating Iraq’s new forces also acknowledged that Shi’ite exile elements in the interim government had considerable responsibility for the pressure they put on the CPA to take a hard line stand on De-Ba'athification – and did not simply blame US officials. Such Iraqis also felt that the Interim Government made a major error in not reaching out to Ba’ath and Sunni elements who had had to go along with Saddam’s regime, and in allocating positions in fixed shares to Shi’ite Arabs, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs, rather than trying to create a national government.

The Initial Ideological Approach to Creating Iraqi Military, Security and Police Forces

The US did more than fail to plan for an effective effort to secure the country or to develop effective Iraqi forces before or during the invasion. It failed to deal with the risk, and then with the reality, of a growing insurgency effort for nearly a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This is in many ways due to the fact that a relatively small group of “neoconservatives,” rather than the interagency process, dominated planning for the stability and nation building phases following the fall of Saddam Hussein, and that the Department of Defense was put in charge of the operation.

Part of the reason for this failure is that the problem of dealing with the Iraqi Army and security forces was handled largely by ideologues that had an unrealistic grand strategy for transforming Iraq and the Middle East. Their strategic assessments of Iraq were wrong in far more important ways than their assessment of the potential threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

They were fundamentally wrong about how the Iraqi people would view the US invasion. They were wrong about the problems in establishing effective governance, and they underestimated the difficulties in creating a new government that was legitimate in Iraqi eyes. They greatly exaggerated the relevance and influence of Iraqi exiles, and greatly underestimated the scale of Iraq’s economic, ethnic, and demographic problems.

They did not foresee the impact of the war on America’s overall structure of alliances and world opinion. They fundamentally misread the linkages between the invasion of Iraq, the Arab-Israel conflict, and the fighting in Afghanistan. They did not foresee its impact on the Middle East and the Islamic world, the resulting decline in support for the war on terrorism, or the risks that Islamists inside and outside Iraq could become part of an insurgent threat. They failed to see that Iraqi Shi’ites might welcome the Coalition as
liberators, but not as occupiers, were almost certain to divide into factions, and could present another insurgent risk.

They saw military action by the Department of Defense as a workable substitute for effective coordination and action by all the agencies of government. Above all, they failed to see the importance of serious stability operations and nation building; they did not plan effectively for the risk of insurgency; and they assumed that they were so right that America’s allies and the world would soon be forced to follow their lead.

The end result was that they had no practical grand strategy beyond Saddam’s fall, and their strategic assessments were slow to improve thereafter. Many “neoconservatives” wasted a year after the Coalition’s apparent military victory, living in a state of ideological denial. The US effectively occupied Iraq as proconsuls, rather than rushing to create a legitimate government and effective Iraqi military and security forces. US aid efforts faltered in a mix of uncoordinated, ideologically driven plans to make the Iraqi economy “American,” and bureaucratic fumbling. They failed to rush aid in where it might have bought acceptance and stability – a fault only corrected much later when the US military implemented effective emergency aid as part of its Commander’s Emergency Relief Program (CERP), and the State Department and Defense Department restructured aid plans to provide quick reaction funds and reprogram money to meet urgent needs.

No analysis of the successes and failures in creating effective Iraqi forces can ignore the impact of these failures. What realism there is in the present US approach to the “war after the war” in Iraq was thrust upon the “neoconservatives” managing the Iraq War after the all of Saddam Hussein. Ironically, to the extent the US may be evolving a workable approach to a grand strategy, that evolution has been shaped largely by the people that “neoconservatives” chose to ignore in going to war in the first place. The adaptation to the political and military realities in Iraq has come from military, State Department, and intelligence professionals.

**Problems in the Culture of the US Military**

The US military, however, must share part of the blame. The US military talked “asymmetric war,” but it planned and organized for conventional war. It entered the Iraq War focused on conventional combat, high-technology warfare, and short wars in which the use of decisive force was assumed to produce decisive results.

At almost every level, it lacked training in grand strategy in any practical terms. It failed to learn from the lessons of being unprepared for conflict termination in the Gulf War of 1991, and the practical problems of nation building in Bosnia and Kosovo. Its leadership largely saw stability operations, nation building, creating security, and dealing with local military and security forces as secondary missions that diverted and locked down scarce military resources.

The US military never planned for an effective occupation of the country and never planned for extensive civil-military operations or to create the kind of area expertise, military police, and human intelligence (HUMINT) resources it might need. It focused on the military dimension of battle, and forgot the fundamental principle that all victory is ultimately political in character. In doing so, it seems to have ignored or put aside at least
some of the prior contingency planning by USCENTCOM, the command with real expertise in the area.

While some senior US officers in Washington did warn that massive occupation forces would be needed, this seems to have been more to argue for large war fighting forces or as a counter to the enthusiasm of ideologues than the result of detailed analysis and planning. In general, the military, as well as the civilians, did not plan for successful conflict termination or stability operations, and it focused on early withdrawal rather than the range of missions that might occur.

US officers indicate that the operational plan called for rapid withdrawals from Iraq after Saddam’s fall – with some plans calling for a rapid reduction to 30,000 troops – rather than for an effective stability and security effort. It is also all too clear that the US military did not plan either to provide US forces training and equipment for counterinsurgency missions, or to provide the kind of training cadres and facilities necessary to help Iraqi forces.

The US military – like most of the world’s militaries – focuses on its own priorities and force developments. Its exceptional level of professionalism and technology, however, often has the negative effect of making it reluctant to cooperate fully with allies and to develop true interoperability. When it does, it tends to do so only with proven, highly professional partners like Britain and Australia.

Some US field commanders did see the need to establish “interoperability” with the Iraqis, particularly in gaining local political support, HUMINT, translation skills, etc. A few saw early on that the counterinsurgency, security, and police missions required a different kind of interoperability that would make the development of Iraqi forces critical to nation building, security, and counterinsurgency missions. The US military culture was not prepared for such interoperability at the start of the occupation, however, and it took roughly a year of developing insurgency to make senior US military commanders in Washington and the Gulf region understand the essential importance of allies. In the process, they repeated many of the mistakes made in Vietnam and Lebanon – forgetting, if they ever knew – the lessons of those operations.

At a different level, the top leadership of the US military failed to establish effective links to the civil occupation authority in the Office of Reconstruction & Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) before, during, and immediately after the fighting that toppled Saddam Hussein. It then tolerated, if not encouraged, the poor relations between Bremer, the CPA, and General Sanchez and the field commanders for the year that followed. The lack of interagency cooperation in Washington had its mirror image in the field, made worse by two leaders who proved unable to develop an effective working relationship on a personal or staff level.

It is fair to argue that the fundamental failure of the interagency process to coordinate the efforts of the Department of Defense with those of the State Department and other civilian agencies lies with the President, his National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. There is no question, however, that the military did not see the need for “jointness” at the civil-military level in the field, that this inevitably complicated virtually every aspect of the effort to create effective Iraqi forces and to link
the effort to create them to the effort to create effective Iraqi governance, and to implement key aspects of the US aid program.

**Failures at the US Advisory and Civilian Assistance Level: The Problem of the Security Forces and Police**

Other kinds of failures took place at a different level on the civilian side of the aid process, and failures that contributed to training the wrong kinds of forces and support for the insurrection. The Bush Administration made the task of the CPA and aid officials extraordinarily difficult by failing to create any meaningful plans for nation building before or during the war, failing to create effective civilian structures to assist in nation building and recruiting suitable personnel in advance, and by failing to develop and budget anything approaching a meaningful aid program.\(^4\)

Stability operations require strong and effective police forces even in climates where there is no political instability or terrorist and insurgent threat. In practice, almost all of Iraq’s elite police and law enforcement functions were part of the security services the regime used to protect itself and repress the Iraqi people, and were totally decoupled from the regular police. The regular police were corrupt, passive, badly undertrained and educated, and often physically incapable or overage. As a report by the Inspector Generals of the State Department and Department of Defense notes,\(^5\)

Three levels of police existed under the previous regime: Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Assistant Officers, and Officers. At the most basic level, NCOs possessed little formal education, normally only completing primary school. When hired, they were trained within their provincial area in an unstructured program that could last up to three months. Standards and length of training varied widely from province to province. Upon graduation, NCOs were responsible for most of the daily contact with Iraqi citizens. NCOs were the first responders to calls for service and were responsible for dealing with disputes and for the maintenance of public order.

At the mid-grades, Assistant Officers completed secondary school education, usually from the Police High School, and then underwent on-the-job training. They were normally assigned to various administrative functions within the Iraqi Police Force. They would only respond to serious crimes and only in a supervisory capacity. Their duties usually consisted of administrative work for the Officer corps. Officers were also secondary school graduates, but were further educated at the Police Professional College in Baghdad, undergoing a three-year course of instruction. Upon graduation, the Officers received the equivalent of a Bachelor's degree in police science; however, the curriculum was steeped in military doctrine and training. After graduation, the academy Officers were posted around the country and normally served in the assigned region for the rest of their careers. Traditional training in leadership, management, and command and staff functions was not institutionalized.

…even more than the military, the Iraqi police during the Saddam Hussein era were perceived to be corrupt and brutal implementers of oppression. Accordingly, an early decision of the CPA was to cashier police officers closely tied to the former regime. Other members of the IPS abandoned their duties or were casualties of the conflict. Only about 30,000, mostly low-ranking police remained on duty as a residual force—a number clearly insufficient to enforce law and order even had stability been established…

The Iraqi police initially were seen as a minor aspect of the security mission, and largely in terms of training a police force with a respect for the rule of law and human rights. The Iraqi police largely deserted in April 2003 during the fighting. Many voluntarily returned to duty during May 2003, but the CPA made no real effort to vet them or review their
performance. The CPA’s Director of Police was tasked with providing rush training to get as many police on the streets as quickly as possible with no real vetting.\textsuperscript{16}

It took the Coalition well over a year to realize that the police and security forces were critical to stability, and any form of effective Iraqi governance and reconstruction. The Coalition sometimes found itself reacting to an Iraqi lead in creating elite counter-insurgency security forces, and training the regular police for a combat mission that went well beyond ordinary police work. Even then, priority was given to the military although the police and security forces involved substantially more manpower, and no defeat of the terrorists or insurgents could be secured without their lasting presence.

A study by the Inspectors General of the Departments of State and Defense indicates that,\textsuperscript{17}

The deficit of policemen was only one of the myriad problems that confronted Coalition planners after the June 2004 transition from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). More vexing is the growth of terrorism and insurgency that continue to challenge both Coalition military forces and the nascent Iraqi military and police forces. Faced with this situation, Coalition officials perceived a primary objective should be the fastest possible creation of a sizeable police force.

… As a result of the conflict in 2003 and the ensuing state of chaos and looting, much of the IPS infrastructure was destroyed or badly damaged. Many of the IPs who served during the Saddam Hussein era abandoned their positions, were casualties of war, or were cashiered.

… Consistent with the CPA goal of erasing troublesome aspects of the Hussein regime, command and control of the remnants of the police force were decentralized. This further diluted cohesion and effectiveness of the residual force…The CPA decision to cleanse the political system of Hussein sympathizers—notably, the ‘de-Ba’athification’ effort—effectively decapitated the IPS of its standing leadership. Even though some former police officers have been reincorporated into the force, it was necessary to start almost from scratch to build a new police force. The result was a ‘bottom-up’ approach with primary emphasis on minimal basic training.

…On May 2, 2003, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA—the predecessor of the CPA) called for police in Baghdad to return to work. Coalition force commanders made similar announcements for secured areas outside the capital. In June 2003, the CPA and MOI issued a directive that all police officers had to return to work no later than July 3. Those failing to do so were subject to immediate termination. According to International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) officials, about 38,000 had returned to the IPS as of July.

…To bolster the force, an additional 30,000 police were recruited by Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF–7) and the Major Subordinate Commanders (MSCs). The driving objective was to get “boots on the ground.” In doing so, the CPA enunciated minimal requirements for entry into the IPS…Subsequently, to meet MNSTC–I training quotas, two patterns of recruiting evolved. Iraqis did most of the recruiting in the Baghdad area. Coalition forces (working through the major subordinate commands or MSCs) were in charge of recruiting in the rest of the country. Iraqi recruiters appear to have enforced minimum requirements as enunciated by CPA, while the MSCs sent to JIPTC some recruits who did not meet those minimum standards.

…the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took the first steps to assist the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in developing an Iraqi Police Service (IPS) that would be a respected force based on public trust and confidence. Creating this force from the brutal and corrupt remnants of the Saddam regime police would probably have required dissolution of the entire force and slow rebuilding into a force that echoed the new democratic ideals of Iraq. The security situation, however, dictated rapid infusion of police into the cities and governorates, a requirement that mandated an accelerated training program. To optimize required quantity and equally important quality, CPA designed a program based on the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP) “Kosovo” model that would give police recruits eight weeks of training. They planned to complement the eight-week basic program with a structured on-the-job training program guided by an experienced mentor.

In order to meet the capacity required, two academies were established: the Baghdad Public Safety Academy (more recently renamed the Baghdad Police College) and an academy in Jordan, outside Amman, the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC). Several regional academies were subsequently added. The basic training instructional program consisted of two distinct, but integrated, components: academy training and field training. New police recruits would spend two months at one of the academies, training in modern policing methods. New cadets would receive 320 standardized hours of intensive education in modern policing techniques. The basic course would include academic and practical training in firearms (pistols), defensive tactics, and emergency vehicle operation. The academic instruction also included policing in a democracy, constitutional framework, human rights, use of force, police ethics and code of conduct, gender issues, community policing, traffic accident management, etc.

For recruits who completed the academy courses, the concept prescribed subsequent participation in a structured field training program, focusing on the practical application of the coursework and seeking further development of proactive, service-oriented policing skills. During this probationary period, newly graduated cadets were to be paired one-on-one with a senior Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Field Training Officer (FTO), who would function as a mentor. International Police Advisors (later renamed International Police Liaison Officers (IPOs)) would oversee the program. The concept consisted of four phases conducted over a six-month period involving daily, weekly, and monthly evaluations by senior IPS FTOs.

The CPA plan relied upon building a foundation in the classroom, but also counted on the structured and mentored training that was to occur in the months following graduation. In March 2004, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was established, and an initial Field Training Coordinator Program was implemented locally in Baghdad. Unfortunately, the deteriorating security environment, coupled with a dearth of experienced IPS and insufficient numbers of International Police Liaison Officers (IPOs), precluded full implementation of the mentoring program.

At the outset of the CPA effort to build IPS capacity, the assumption—even to some extent, the reality—was that training could be molded within a rapidly stabilizing political and security environment. The unexpected virulence and scope of subsequent terrorism and insurgency induced changes in the program, but such modifications… lagged the ‘street reality’ in Iraq.

A CPA decision to decentralize command and control of the IPS has had unintended consequences. Decentralization was consistent with the intent to disperse political power. Commendable in concept, the emerging result within the IPS is a pattern of fiefdoms, subject to political machinations. An example of this political maneuvering is the situation of competing chiefs of police in Najaf where one responds to the provincial governor, the other to the MOI.

Pay problems have been an equally troubling result of decentralization. Under the CPA designed system, much of the central government’s funding is allocated to the provincial governors. Thereafter, the monies are sub-allocated to respective elements, such as the police. Accordingly, each provincial chief of police controls his share of sub-allotted funds. Allegations of mismanagement and corruption in the disbursement of pay for IPs, equipment purchases, etc., are credible.

In practice, a great many men were rushed into service with minimum vetting, inadequate training and equipment, a failure to reorganize the regular police to make them functional, and no controls on corruption and “phantom” personnel. Coordination between the Department of State and Department of Defense training efforts, and the newly forming Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense was poor at best. The flow of Coalition aid was grossly inadequate, and Iraq did not have a budget to make the new force work. The police were not properly trained, equipped, or facilitated for
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions, and little serious effort was made to add the elite forces needed for these missions because of the fear they would end up being the same kind of repressive tools of the regime that they were under Saddam Hussein. It was not until April 2004 that the Coalition fully recognized that the field training that was originally planned could not deal with the insurgency and terrorism, and even then the Coalition was, “reluctant to increase the length of basic training because of the urgent need to build IPS capacity and get policemen on the streets.”

State Department, USAID, and Department of Justice aid efforts were organized around the idea that regular police forces should be created as soon as possible to replace reliance on outside forces and the armed forces. The US Congress also pressed hard to keep the US military role in training paramilitary forces to a minimum, largely as a legacy of problems in Latin America and elsewhere during the Cold War. This reflected a legitimate concern with the human rights abuses that can occur when military or paramilitary forces become involved in police functions.

According to the GAO, it was not until May 2004, that a national security presidential security directive was issued that gave CENTCOM the responsibility of directing all US government efforts to organize, train, and equip Iraqi security force, which led to the Multi-National Security Training Command-Iraq, operating under MNF-I, being given a clear lead on all Coalition efforts.

In several critical instances, the US did not listen to its own advisors in the field, even as the problems of crime, terrorism, and insurgency continued to grow. According to research by Robert M. Perito, the Department of Justice sent a team from its International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICTAP) to Iraq in May 2003. It also focused on creating a conventional police force, not the problems of terrorism, insurgency, and mass organized crime. It did recognize that the Iraqi police could not function effectively, and called for the deployment of some 6,600 international police advisors, with 360 police trainers in a police academy, and a total of a 2,500 man international police force organized into 10 units to support coalition military forces in reaching stability and training Iraqis.

A Bush Administration review of these recommendations, however, felt such requirements were exaggerated and they were largely put aside. Similarly, the White House deferred a State Department recommendation for a 1,000-person team until fall – by which time the insurgency had become a serious problem. Action then had low priority. US police advisors were obtained on a contract basis from DynCorp for a 500-person force, were precluded from actual police action, and did not begin to arrive until the spring of 2004. There were only 283 deployed in June 2004, and the rise in attacks discouraged both US recruiting and any allied presence.

Ultimately, a small 6-person Department of Justice team was asked to remain under the direction of Bernard Kerik, the former police commissioner of New York, working for the Ministry of Interior in isolation from the efforts in the Ministry of Defense. The US team not only had responsibility for creating a virtually new Iraq Police Service (IPS), but Iraq’s firemen and emergency response forces, and border police – a total of roughly 100,000 men. Equipment deliveries were also slow and inadequate: Only about half the short term requirement for weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment had actually be delivered by June 2004.
Some other aspects of the police training effort were more effective, although it should be stressed that such efforts initially trained police only for operations in a permissive environment, where even serious organized crime was not seen as a threat. (Some estimates put the level of criminal violence as so high that it killed some 10,000 Iraqis between April 2003 and April 2004.) The training efforts did not include effective vetting, provide proper equipment, get rid of large numbers of incompetent officers, or adapt from failures. Many illiterate, physically weak, overage, and corrupt personnel were retained. The US and its allies also lacked the language skills, area skills, and manpower to perform such training functions, and could not discriminate easily between civilians, criminals, and insurgents. This sometimes led to the killing, wounding, and detention of innocent Iraqis when US and other Coalition force did perform such functions.

A further major problem developed over time because the small Iraqi border force had never been effective, and border security had always been the function of the military, security, and intelligence forces. Most of Iraq’s some 240 border “forts” were looted and abandoned during the Coalition advance, and most of the 614-man force deserted along with customs and other border officials.

There was no planning to deal with this situation, and only one man from the Department of Justice Police advisory team could initially be assigned. The Department of Homeland Security was forced to rush in a team to provide a few days of training for immigration and custom procedures to a 30-person US military team. Many of the US military involved in immigration training had only about three hours of formal instruction and no language or area skills. As the insurgency developed, priority was given to military and police training and efforts to create an effective, new Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) under the Ministry of Interior did not begin until the late spring of 2004.

The US police advisors did succeed in developing a training course for the Iraqi police called the Transition and Integration Program (TIP). This was a three-week course for rehired police that came back into service in large numbers in May-June 2003. It was administered by US Military Police and gave some 30,000-40,000 limited training by December 2004, although a large part of the training was more in human rights and the rule of law than modern police work. It is also not clear how many of those credited with attending the course actually attended.

In December 2003, a Department of Justice approved program began to function at the Jordan International Police Academy in Jordan, based to some extent on a much longer sixteen week course developed for the Kosovo Police Service School. The eight-week course pushed some 2,500 recruits through every month, and did so with minimal vetting and examination of qualifications, and sometimes graduating personnel that neither met course standards or fully attended the entire course.

They then received no follow-up training, and efforts to create a field training program using DynCorp’s police advisors were not put into practice because of the rising security threat. The end result was that 120,000 men were recruited back into the police, at least 30,000 of which were either unqualified or simply took pay (if they actually existed), and the government then had to offer retirement and other incentives to get rid of many of the police who had been so rapidly recruited. One result was a $60 million buyout program to
cut the size of the police force by 25 percent -- a program that came to involve an additional element of favoritism and corruption.\textsuperscript{24}

This inadequate approach to nation building would have been unworkable at any time, and was little more than a disaster when there already were major threats to the police from militias, insurgents, organized terrorists, and large criminal elements. The transition to stability requires well-armed and well-protected security forces in large numbers that can coordinate directly with the military and handle serious threats. Trying to create regular police forces is a recipe for disaster or constant reliance on the military -- a lesson that became brutally clear in the Balkans and Afghanistan long before the US became involved in Iraq.

Creating additional light guard forces like the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), was treated as a low level task that was as important in terms of employing Iraqis as creating effective units. The police and the bulk of the security forces were given grossly inadequate training, equipment, facilities, transport, and protection, and with a lack of the kind of structured leadership and emphasis on “unit integrity” necessary to equip police units to protect themselves and fight.

The end result was to waste nearly a year until police and security force training were better integrated with the military training effort and the US military advisory team was given responsibility for planning the kind of security and police force Iraq needed—the kind of forces which the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and US civilian advisors were incapable of planning and creating. It then was to leave General Petraeus and the Iraqi government with a legacy of vast numbers of men with few real qualifications, the wrong kind of training, and that had been recruited without proper vetting and often without proper regard to even elementary qualifications like physical condition and literacy.

**Problems in Governance and Iraq’s Economy and Society**

Another set of problems that contributed to the difficulties in creating effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces involved governance and economic and societal factors.

Effective security efforts require effective governance at every level. They require coordination at the central government level to ensure they are properly financed, given clear direction, and that coordination takes place between the ministry leading the armed forces (Ministry of Defense) and the police and paramilitary security forces (Ministry of Interior). Effective planning and direction must take place at the regional and local levels, and more importantly, there must be local government to support, give direction to, provide effective services, and win the support of the local people.

Police and security forces can never be effective by themselves. They must serve a local government and the local population to win popular support, or they find themselves isolated and locked into a fortress and defensive mentality. They also are inherently vulnerable. They have to move, they have families, and they have relatives. In most cases, they are local. Leaving such forces vulnerable and unsupported has two major effects: it leads to constant desertions and turbulence within local forces, resulting in alliances with threat elements for self-preservation, corruption to try to buy security and
status, and to cases where the security and police forces use excessive violence without really knowing who the enemy is.

In practice, there still is no effective governance in much of Iraq, and serious efforts to address these problems only began to be solved after the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) took power in June 2004. Coordination problems still exist within ministries, and between the defense, interior, and finance ministries. The central government cannot give effective direction and leadership, implement policy or react effectively to local requests, and above all move money and resources on anything like a timely basis.

Many regional and local governments are weak or ineffective. In many cases, the local government serves its own interest, and in high threat areas, the local government often simply does not function or will not confront the insurgents or other threats. Insurgent sympathizers have penetrated the government at many levels, corruption is common, and senior officials are often unwilling or reluctant to replace incompetent or corrupt subordinates until they fail so conspicuously that they create major security problems.

All of these problems were made worse, however, during the first year of Coalition occupation. The “green zone” mentality of the CPA, and its focus on Baghdad, meant that there was little effective leadership and help at the regional and local level. Some State Department and other civilians did outstanding personal work, but the US civilian teams in the field were far too small to help compensate for the lack of effective local government, or to provide the US military with the kind of support they needed in any part of the nation building and aid process. In terms of local governance and local police and security operations, the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime left a vacuum that US civilians were not available to fill and that the US military was not trained to deal with.

Criticizing Iraq forces – particularly the police and security forces – for failing to perform under these conditions is both unfair and misses virtually every relevant lesson for nation building.

**The Iraqi View: Failure to Foresee Insurgency, Not Postwar Disbandment, is the Key Problem**

There is no way to comprehensively survey Iraqi defense officials and officers, but discussions with a number of officials and officers in 2004 do provide further insight into the problems that occurred during the initial stages of the US and Coalition effort to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces. These Iraqis are less critical of the “disbandment” and “de-Ba’athification” of the military and security forces by the CPA than outside Iraqis. They acknowledge that the war, desertions, and looting left few units and facilities intact, and that most were not worth preserving.

Some did blame “De-Ba’athification” for failing to retain key personnel or to anticipate would happen to those with no political and career options. Many of the Iraqis involved did feel, however, that Shi’ite exile elements in the interim government had considerable responsibility for the pressure they put on the CPA to take a hard line stand on De-Ba’athification – and did not simply blame US officials. Such Iraqis also felt that the Interim Government made a major error in not reaching out to Ba’ath and Sunni elements who had had to go along with Saddam’s regime, and in allocating positions in fixed
shares to Shi’ite Arabs, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs, rather than trying to create a national government.

In general, the Iraqi officials and officers involved in creating Iraqi forces saw the most serious problem behind the lack of effectiveness of Iraqi forces until late 2004 as the result of a failure on the part of the CPA and US military to anticipate the threat of a major insurgency, and to train and equip regular military, security, and police force for this mission.

They stressed that the initial goals in creating new Iraqi military and security forces were to avoid the abuses of the past and to avoid creating a threat to democracy. As a result, the pace and scale of the military effort was slow to the point of reaching only token levels. The military was being shaped as a light border defense force which would only emerge with anything approaching serious capabilities long after the Iraqis finished drafting a constitution and had successfully created a new democratic government.

Similarly, the development of police and security forces was placed under the Ministry of the Interior and little coordination took place with the military effort under the Ministry of Defense. Security forces were given minimal paramilitary and intelligence elements, and most were initially assigned to low-grade facility protection forces like the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) – the predecessor to the National Guard. The ICDC was recruited locally with minimal attention to manpower quality and given minimal equipment and facilities.

Iraqi military and security forces were developed and deployed by each of the five major division areas under the Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I), to meet the priorities and security needs of the MNSTC-I, rather than a new, sovereign Iraqi government. This led to a lack of any cohesive follow-up to the initial training efforts, and an inevitable dependence on MNF-I forces for equipment and all forms of serious combat, service, and logistic support.

Iraqi police forces were created and recruited with minimal coordination and seen as little more than “beat cops” that required token training and equipment. In general, they were not shaped to deal with looting and Iraq’s rapidly growing crime problems, much less the problem of security.

They were created on a “helter-skelter” basis -- with little equipment and training and minimal facilities. Much of this effort occurred at local levels with little attention to manpower quality, and the Ministry of the Interior often had no serious picture of the strength of given local police forces, much less any picture of their quality and leadership.

Many police were chosen by local leaders more as a matter of patronage than as part of an effort to create effective forces, and corruption and favoritism were rampant. Vetting was little more than a “by guess and by God” effort, and little attention was paid to past training, education, and physical condition – problems that were equally serious in the ICDC/National Guard.

At a technical level, the Iraqis involved in these efforts feel that the US was far too slow to provide anything like adequate numbers of experienced personnel; to see that the police and security effort had to be coordinated with the military effort, and to understand
that the mission was counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and not building conventional military and police forces. They note that most initial cadres had no knowledge of how to deal with Iraqis or a different culture, that the high levels of rotation meant that personnel did not have the necessary on the job training and personal contacts, and that US and MNSTC-I constantly changed focus and were different in each of the five major operational areas under MNSTC-I control.

**The Legacy**

The end result of these complex forces is that the US-led Coalition initially tried to restrict the development of Iraqi armed forces to a token force geared to defend Iraq’s borders against external aggression. It did not try to create police forces with the capability to deal with serious insurgency and security challenges. As time went on, it ignored or did not give proper priority to the warnings from US military advisory teams about the problems in organizing and training Iraqi forces, and in giving them the necessary equipment and facilities.

The US failed to treat the Iraqis as partners in the counterinsurgency effort for nearly a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and did not attempt to seriously train and equip Iraqi forces for proactive security and counterinsurgency missions until April 2004 – nearly a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein and two-thirds of a year after a major insurgency problem began to emerge.²⁵

Moreover, the US did not react to the immediate threat that crime and looting presented throughout Iraq almost immediately after the war, and which made personal security the number one concern of the Iraqi people. It acted as if it had years to rebuild Iraq using its own plans, rather than months to shape the climate in which Iraqis could do it.

**The Importance of Creating Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces**

It is still unclear what the outcome of the US-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq will be, and whether a stable, unified, and pluralistic Iraq can emerge out of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. Iraq’s political process, unity, and inclusiveness remain uncertain. A major insurgency continues to threaten Iraqi nation building, along with pervasive, violent crime. Without substantial progress at both the political and force development level, serious civil conflict is still a serious possibility. Moreover, outside Islamic extremists present a major threat, and states as diverse as Iran, Turkey, and Syria either support elements of the insurgency or are potential threats to Iraq’s stability.

More than two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, Iraq suffers from deep and growing violent divisions between its Shi’ite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, and other minorities. The divisions among its Shi’ite majority remain serious, as well as the divisions over how secular and how Islamic Iraq’s government and society should be. Tribal and other local divisions further threaten the country.

Governance is weak at the central and local level. The transfer of power back to a sovereign Iraqi government, and elections, have helped give the government enhanced legitimacy, but elections do not substitute for the ability to govern, an effective rule of law or the ability to protect the population and ensure human rights.
The collapse and looting of the government during and immediately after the war destroyed much of the structure of governance that existed under Saddam Hussein, and the US-led Coalition was slow to make effective efforts to replace it. Iraq’s elections have had value, but its newly elected officials lack experience, unity, and a common agenda for action. Iraq is a demonstration that elections held in nations without real political parties, experienced leaders, a stable economy and a middle class present massive problems in creating an operating government – compounded in this case by parties based more on sectarian and ethnic faction than any practical program for governing.

Economic instability adds to Iraq’s problems with security and governance. Massive outside aid, high oil prices, and a legacy of revenue from the regime of Saddam Hussein have still left Iraq a relatively poor state, and much of its economy and industry have collapsed – creating levels of direct and disguised unemployment ranging from 30 percent to 60 percent, depending on the age group and governorate involved.

**The Five Key Elements of Victory**

The end result is a situation where there are five key elements to any kind of “victory” in Iraq, both for the Iraqi people, and for the US and its Coalition allies:

- Establishing a pluralistic Iraqi government capable of both governing and providing security to the people of Iraq, and finding a new balance of political power acceptable to Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, the Kurds, Turcomans, and other minorities. This means effective governance at the local, regional, and national level.

- Creating effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces capable of bringing security to the entire country, of eventually replacing all Coalition forces, and capable of conducting effective operations while winning the support of the vast majority of the Iraqi people.

- Providing effective aid, debt and reparations relief, and Iraqi economic reform efforts that – coupled to effective security – move the nation onto the path to stable economic development where wealth and economic growth are distributed in ways that meet the needs of all of Iraq’s people.

- Developing a new national consensus that legitimizes Iraq’s post Saddam government and social structure, and that can find a “golden mean” between the different goals and expectations of its different ethnic and religious elements.

- Finding a new balance of relationships with Iraq’s neighbors that will ensure that they do not threaten Iraq, or interfere in its affairs, while making it clear that Iraq no longer poses a threat to any neighboring state.

**“Tipping Years” to Build Effective Forces**

Building effective Iraqi military, security, and police and security forces is only one of these five elements, but it is an element that is critical to the creation of a legitimate government in Iraq and to establishing the stability and security vital to Iraq’s political and economic development. In many ways, it is the precursor to legitimacy, political stability and success, and economic recovery and development.

It is also a process that will take years, and may well take a decade to complete. US and Coalition efforts to build such forces are still very much a work in progress, and it may be years before the full history of these efforts becomes public and there short-term and ultimate success are apparent. Many of the details of US and other Coalition efforts
remain classified, and the views of Iraqis are very difficult to determine. Enough is known, however, to raise major questions about the initial US approach to the task, and describe some aspects of this effort as a tragic failure.

There is still a serious risk of failure at the political, economic, and security levels, and even serious civil war or the emergence of a failed state.

At the same time, many of the initial mistakes the US and Coalition made after the fall of Saddam Hussein have been corrected. Important changes have taken place, and these changes have become far more promising since June 2004. They may well prove to be the key to giving Iraqis the security they need for nation building.

No one can yet talk about “tipping points,” or claim victory at this point in time. In fact, the period between 2005 and the end of 2007 are likely to be “tipping years” that test Iraq’s political development and cohesion as well as how successful Iraq’s new forces are and the adequacy of US and other Coalition plans to strengthen them. It may also take a decade to give Iraq all of the military and police capabilities it needs—provided that the political and economic conditions are created to make this possible.

Military history also warns that force development is a history of successes and reversals, not some smooth evolution to success. That said, there is real hope and the possibility that the successful development of Iraqi forces may provide major lessons for future efforts at coalition building, nation building stability operations, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism.
III. Coalition Training and Equipment Efforts: The Failures of 2003

For all of these reasons, the Coalition efforts to shape, train, and equip Iraqi military and security forces need to be put in historical perspective. It was not until the spring of 2004 that the effort to create the Iraqi forces that both Iraq and the Coalition needed gained real urgency, and until then no guidance was given to shape the training program to meet the needs that were evolving in the field.

For most of the year following Saddam’s fall, the broad goal was to spend several years shaping a military designed to defend Iraq’s borders. For much of that time the training was of so low priority that it was left to an uncoordinated effort by the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that lacked US support for more than the creation of regular police forces tailored to deal with civil crime.

This occurred even though it was becoming clearer and clearer that the insurgency was rapidly becoming more serious, and that much more effective Iraqi forces would be needed. A GAO report, issued in June 2004, summarizes Coalition reporting on the growth of the insurgency, its impact on the nation building and stability effort, and on the need for more Coalition (and Iraqi forces) as follows:

According to U.N. reports, the security situation in Iraq began to deteriorate in June 2003. Reports from the U.N. Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq show that attacks against international organizations and the multinational force began to increase during June and July 2003. The U.N. Secretary General reported that the overall security situation had deteriorated dramatically by the end of August 2003, a month marked by the bombing of the Jordanian embassy on August 7, the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, and the killing of an important Shi’a leader on August 29.

By September 2003, according to the U.N. Secretary General’s report, Iraq had entered a new phase. All international organizations and contractors, as well as Iraqis cooperating with the CPA, were potential targets of deliberate, direct, and hostile attacks. The assessments of contractors and nongovernmental organizations with whom we met generally agreed with the U.N. assessment of these security trends.

Various U.S. and U.N. reports and data indicate that violence escalated sharply against the coalition, Iraqis cooperating with the coalition, international organizations, and international civilian aid groups and contractors in October-November 2003 and again in April-May 2004. CPA data show an extended increase in certain significant insurgent activities during those two periods, with the level of the attacks in April-May 2004 exceeding the level of attacks during October-November 2003. In April 2004, Sunni insurgents fought the multinational force in Fallujah, Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit, while a radical Shi’a militia attacked the force in the southern cities of Karbala, Kut, Nassiriyyah, Kufa, Najaf, and Basra, as well as in part of Baghdad.

According to CPA data, the number of significant insurgent acts against the coalition declined soon after the early April escalation but then rose again in May, with the number of attacks in May exceeding the number of attacks in April.

DOD data on the number of U.S. military personnel killed or wounded due to hostile action in Iraq generally support U.N. and CPA assessments of the security situation since the declared end of major combat operations…initial increases in U.S. military casualties in June-July 2003 were followed by much more significant increases in October-November 2003 and April-May 2004. While the number of significant insurgent acts against the coalition increased from April to May, the number of U.S. military casualties declined.

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Overall, according to U.N. and U.S. reports, the nature of the attacks against the coalition and its partners changed significantly from the summer of 2003 through the late spring of 2004 in terms of their targets, source, location, sophistication, and effectiveness. In general, the insurgents’ targets expanded to cover almost all foreign groups operating in Iraq, whether military or civilian personnel, as well as Iraqi security forces and Iraqi political leaders viewed as collaborating with the occupation. Further, the group of insurgents grew from former regime loyalists to include foreign terrorists, Sunni Islamic extremists, and, most recently, Shi’a radicals. The areas of instability expanded from Baghdad, the Sunni Triangle, and to a lesser extent the Kirkuk and Mosul areas that were already very unstable due to ethnic and political tensions, to include majority Shi’a areas in the south.

According to State Department public opinion polls, the majority of Iraqis remain extremely concerned about the security situation in their country. The State Department reported in early January 2004 that about 62 percent of residents in five Iraqi cities named safety and security as their greatest worry. According to a late January 2004 State Department report, Iraqis tended to fear general street crime and low-grade explosions as the greatest threats to self and family. This poll also showed that most Iraqis see the greatest threat to their country’s security to be sectarian or ethnic conflict and large-scale attacks. In a later polling report published in mid-June 2004, the State Department reported that security remained the most urgent issue for residents of five Iraqi cities.

…the Secretary of Defense said in early May 2004 that there will be uncertainty in Iraq and increased attacks against the coalition, Iraqis, and the United States during the period leading up to the elections.

…In April and May 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense said that the multinational force was engaged in combat and a continuing war in Iraq, rather than peacekeeping as had been expected. The increase in attacks has had a negative impact on the presence and operations of international military and civilian personnel in Iraq. It has led to an increase in U.S. force levels and to a decrease in freedom of movement for international civilians working to rebuild Iraq and assist in its political transition.

As a result of the increase in violence during April 2004, the United States and the United Kingdom decided to increase their overall force levels in the country. The United States decided to maintain a force level of about 138,000 troops until at least the end of 2005, keeping about 33,000 more troops in Iraq as of May 2004 than the 105,000 troops originally planned. On May 24, 2004, the President said that if military commanders determine that they need more troops to fulfill the mission, he would send them. The following week, the United Kingdom announced that it would send an additional 370 troops to southern Iraq in response to the increased violence, bringing its total troop contribution to the multinational force to about 8,900 military personnel. This figure includes 170 engineering personnel who would deploy for 3 months to help fortify U.K. military bases and facilities in Iraq against the increased threat of mortar and rocket attacks.

…During April 2004, the United States redeployed forces from Baghdad and northern areas of Iraq to cities in the south that had come under the control of a radical Shi’a militia. The United States did so because Iraqi security forces and at least one contingent of the multinational force would not or could not fight the insurgents. For example, according to a CPA official, Iraqi police in the cities of Karbala, Najaf, and Kut collapsed in April when a radical Shi’a militia overran the cities and took control of police stations. Moreover, according to a USAID report, after heavy fighting in the city of Kut, a non-U.S. contingent of the multinational force withdrew from the city as the militia overran it.

The deteriorating security situation has also adversely affected the operations of civilian organizations in Iraq. The dangerous environment has led many to halt operations completely or to reduce activity by severely restricting staff movement around the country. No systematic data exist on the effect of these restrictions on efforts to assist in Iraq’s political transition and reconstruction. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that the efforts overall have been scaled back.
In general, international civilian staff have had increasingly little contact with the Iraqi people, and Iraqi staff working for the coalition, including interpreters, have been increasingly threatened for cooperating with foreign organizations. Many important reconstruction efforts had to at least temporarily cease operation. Civilian organizations that continue to operate in the country face increased security measures for their personnel and compounds in the country. The following examples show the effect of the security situation on the operations of the CPA and supporting U.S. agencies, reconstruction contractors, international organizations, and nongovernmental aid organizations.

- Due to the unsafe security environment, the CPA and its supporting U.S. agencies have had difficulty staffing their operations, opening offices throughout the country, and providing protection for U.S. civilian personnel as they travel around the country. U.S. agencies, particularly USAID, had difficulty in attracting and retaining personnel because security concerns. In addition, according to a CPA official, as the security situation worsened during 2003, the CPA abandoned plans to fully staff offices throughout Iraq to assist in Iraq’s political transition and reconstruction and instead established a much smaller field presence. Further, the CPA established stringent security measures that U.S. government staff had to follow in traveling outside the Green Zone, the coalition’s “safe area” in Baghdad, thereby making it difficult for them to move around the country. In late February 2004, the Department of Homeland Security decided to stop sending teams of customs investigators to assist CPA. They could no longer do their jobs because it had become too dangerous for them to move around the country. CPA officials also stated that they were concerned about the safety of their Iraqi employees, particularly their interpreters, as insurgents had increasingly targeted them for cooperating with the coalition.

- In an April 17, 2004, document, the CPA administrator stated that lack of security is the key obstacle to reaching reconstruction objectives. Referring to the entire reconstruction program, the administrator stated that a worsened security situation would mean that projects would take longer to complete and that the kinds of projects undertaken and their costs would change to an unknown extent. Our review of selected electricity projects showed that the security situation delayed the implementation of key projects, thereby contributing to the CPA not meeting its objective of providing 6,000 megawatts of electrical generating capacity to the Iraqi people by its original goal of June 1, 2004. In late March 2004, the CPA Inspector General reported that that rising security concerns were a significant cost driver for CPA activities and contractor projects, representing at least 10 percent to 15 percent of total costs.

- The United Nations and its programs have faced significant setbacks as a result of the deteriorating security situation. Most importantly, after the attacks on the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad in August and September 2003, the U.N. Secretary General redeployed all U.N. international personnel from Baghdad, Basra, and other area offices to neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Kuwait, where they have continued to support assistance operations inside Iraq. As of late 2004, the United Nations had not allowed most of its international personnel to return to Iraq. Although Iraqi staff continued some U.N. programs, the United Nations had to scale down or delay both ongoing activities and new initiatives. The United Nations sent three separate assessment teams to Iraq during the first half of 2004 to assist Iraqis in assessing options for forming an interim government and in preparing for national elections. The dangerous security situation forced these teams to restrict their travel around Iraq during the first half of 2004, thereby limiting their interaction with Iraqis during important political discussions about the country’s future.

- In discussions during the fall of 2003 and the spring of 2004, nongovernmental organization representatives stated that the deteriorating security situation has forced numerous nongovernmental aid organizations to reduce or shut down operations in Iraq. In response to the dangerous security environment, many nongovernmental organizations and contractors that we interviewed have hired private security to provide protection for

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their staff and compounds. In addition, one representative emphasized his view that as more international workers leave Iraq, insurgents will increasingly focus their efforts on killing Iraqi nationals who are seen as collaborators. U.N. officials and documents have expressed concern that the lack of security could threaten Iraq’s transition toward a democratic government. According to a U.N. assessment, the lack of security may lead to major disturbances that could undermine the administration of the elections, alter the established timetable, and compromise the overall credibility of the process. By mid-April 2004, the multinational force had begun to consider how it could provide security, logistical, and other support for the elections, but the United Nations and others had not yet developed a specific plan for important tasks such as the registration of political parties, voters, and candidates or the number and locations of polling sites.

Since June 2003, the security situation has become more dangerous for international military and civilian personnel operating in Iraq and for Iraqis who work with them. Instead of engaging in post-conflict nation building, the United States and its partners have been rebuilding the country in a wartime environment. They have attempted to combat a growing insurgency through military, economic, and political measures. The deteriorating security situation, however, has generally hindered the implementation of economic reconstruction and political transition efforts.

Planning for the Wrong Forces and the Wrong Mission

In spite of such warnings, and the developments discussed in Chapter III, the Coalition continued to concentrate on providing the wrong forces for the wrong mission. Planning for Iraqi military, security, and police forces still focused more on ensuring that they would not be a challenge to the new democratic Iraq that the CPA expected to create than on creating forces that could be effective in dealing with meaningful threats.

Virtually all of those interviewed regarding the effort to shape Iraqi forces during 2003 cite major organizational problems, and a lack of meaningful priorities, coordination and resources. One senior advisor, with extensive prior experience in working in such international efforts describes the situation as follows:

The CPA was, by some margin the most dysfunctional organization I have ever encountered – and I’ve worked in the UN! No one could doubt the energy, commitment and engagement by principals, managers and workers, but it was sorely lacking in any organizational rigor, central control, and clear lines of authority and responsibility. The vacuums created by CPA dysfunctionality were inevitably filled with bureaucracy, endless committees, the inept, the displaced, and those brought out of retirement. We should not underestimate how much further on we would be in Iraq if we had been organized from the beginning with a reasonably coherent organization managing the post conflict phase and equipped with the right people. This may be a harsh judgment but one that is necessary if we are to avoid making the same mistakes in the future. The CPA was, of course, created in a hurry but only because the realization that the scale and magnitude of the task was beyond a retired three-star general and the ninety days he had predicted he would be on the ground. Some of the consequences, I suspect, was that our engagement with the Iraqis suffered horribly, the info-ops campaign was a near disaster, and the political and military intent were never really synced and then executed in any meaningful sense. Clearly, personalities played a part in all of this, as did the omnipresent Washington desire for exceptionally long screwdrivers. We all have our views on the policy errors and cock ups - as each have their advocates and antagonists (e.g., disbanding the Iraqi army, extent of de-Ba’athification, enough troops for the job, funding mechanisms, war-fighting versus counter insurgency campaigns etc.) - but the one thing coherent, well-led organizations can do is retrieve, recover, and stabilize the consequences of poor policy decisions. Poor organizations find this next to impossible and end up living with the legacy rather than addressing the outcome.

It was very apparent that the internal conflict going on between the Departments of Defense and agencies within the Department of State - INL[State Department Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement] in particular had an appalling reputation - and others had a substantial effect on our ability to make progress. Influencing the agencies in Washington in-order to achieve success in Baghdad was critical, but throw in the time difference, inexperienced staffers, [and] the sheer weight and magnitude of the challenges being faced and it is of little wonder that for every minor success there were any number of frustrations and inefficiencies that were left unresolved. Interestingly, when allowed to fester for a while they inevitably grew in complexity until they attracted attention and then you would begin to get the appropriate attention. This would start with a torrent of e-mail from Washington. That is fine – the key was ensuring that you were not responding to some minor staffer eager for information to feed the machine but to someone who could act on your requirements.

The key lesson has to be that you must take proper consideration of what the most appropriate organization is needed to manage the inherent complexity of somewhere like Iraq. The policy-and decision-making processes need to be put in place, and the functional areas, exact roles, and clear lines of authority need to be established. Considerable frustration was caused by visitors who would come into theatre, take a look, identify a problem or two (a particularly easy task in Iraq), and then leave. They would leave the difficult part-identifying, resourcing and implementing the solution-to others.

The initial goal the CPA set for the Iraqi army was to create three light motorized divisions that were designed for border defense (over a period of several years). These were to be built slowly from the ground up and gradually become heavier, mechanized divisions, with a vaguely defined longer term goal of creating 6-9 divisions over a period of 5 years or more.

The police were still treated as a secondary mission with little understanding of the growing scale of crime, much less the problems the police faced in dealing with well-organized terrorism and insurgency. The security and civilian intelligence services were initially seen as a potential political threat and as elements that had to be kept weak and free of any taint of the repression of the past regime. The key to developing military forces was to keep them subordinate to the new civilian authority and democratic system the US hoped to create, and that they would not repeat the past mistake of creating large, corrupt, expensive, and political military forces.

Time was not yet seen as a critical issue, nor was the need to bring Iraqi forces on-line with any speed. Unlike the previous Iraqi forces, the new Iraqi military was to be lean with the appropriate leadership, and driven by well-trained officers and cadres of NCOs. They were to grow at a pace dictated by manpower quality, and they were to have the incentives, pay, facilities, and career structure necessary to create a relatively moderate-sized force in a functioning democracy. Furthermore, several members of the Interim Government, including Ahmed Chalabi, continued to oppose an effort to create effective military forces of any kind and continued to make efforts that slowed down the US effort in the months to come.

Providing the Equipment and Training Effort with Too Little, Too Late

The first efforts to create Iraqi military forces began in July-August 2003, and the Coalition formally established the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) in August 2003, and made an initial IRRF Appropriation in November. This effort was led by Walter Slocombe, who became Iraq’s de facto Minister of Defense, and Major General Paul D. Eaton, who became the commanding general of the Coalition
Military Assistance Training Team. General Eaton arrived in Iraq only weeks after the CPA officially disbanded the old Iraqi military forces in May 2003.

The US/MNSTC-I effort relied heavily on training in Jordan and using Jordanian officers. In addition, an NCO academy was set up in Iraq. The goal was to create US-trained and equipped battalions that would become cadres that could train other Iraqi forces. Eventually, three Iraqi light motorized brigades would be created which could grow to three divisions over time.

The team on the ground did all it could with the resources and guidance it was given. In practice, however, every aspect of the actual program faced massive political and material problems. There was no plan to build on, and only minimal staff was provided. General Eaton was initially given a team of five and a facility with little equipment and no air conditioning.

Facilities were also a key problem. As has been noted earlier, the Iraqi barracks and facilities left intact by the fighting were looted – lacked wiring and plumbing – and would not have been acceptable even by the standards of Saddam’s conscript forces. Suitable facilities had to be built or reconditioned virtually from scratch, and getting the proper material not only involved formal contracts, but then ran into delivery problems compounded by the growing violence, sabotage, and theft in the country. As a result, facilities became the initial limiting factor.

Initial Equipment Difficulties

These problems were compounded by equipment supply difficulties. The US issued competitive bids for the equipment for the three initial motorized battalions modeled largely on US Army tables of equipment and organization (TO&E). They were to have a mix of shoot, move, and communications capabilities that could grow rapidly to a three-division force, and gradually become heavier over time. It should be noted, however, that the request for proposals was geared to providing light forces to screen a border. No attempt was made to develop TO&Es tailored to serious counterinsurgency warfare, and this meant steady follow-on efforts to provide better and heavier equipment in virtually every area.

The winner -- the Neur Corporation -- was selected in a “blind” evaluation with almost unanimous support. The winning company, however, was said to have ties to a relative of Ahmed Chalabi and the award was contested. Given the lack of priority for effective Iraqi forces, the award was rescinded and the contract was then held up. As a result, the US team had to improvise, building on existing contracts and finding any vehicle possible to get the required services and equipment.

Training and Force Development Coordination Problems

Equally significant, the training mission for the army was kept separate from training for the security and police forces. This was done to create new security and police forces that would be typical of those in a Western democracy, but it meant that the training teams and methods for the police did not prepare them for terrorism and insurgency, and much of the recruiting and training mission was left to local authorities. The largest elements of the security forces were created as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and Facilities Protection Service (FPS), which were little more than a mix of poorly trained and
equipped security guards, locally recruited with minimal regard to qualifications and loyalty, and could not cope with serious criminal activity, much less terrorism and insurgency. The FPS were so unsuited to the mission of defending against insurgency, terrorism, and serious crime that the State Department and Department of Defense stopped counting them as part of Iraqi security forces in September 2004.27

Still further problems existed. The Interim Iraqi Government placed the regular military under the new Minister of Defense and the central government controlled security and police forces under the new Minister of the Interior. There was little coordination and poor cooperation between these Ministries, the Ministry of Finance, authorities in the governorates, and local authorities – many of which created their own security and police forces at the local level. Moreover, the US and Coalition efforts to create national forces took place at a point where the CPA was still negotiating to persuade the various Shi’ite and Kurdish factions to integrate their militias into the regular military and security forces, and disband the rest – an effort that had real promise under the CPA, but was never properly implemented after the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004.

The fact so little manpower and resources were available for training also meant that much of the mission of creating Iraqi forces also took place at the field level. In practice this meant that each of the five MNF-I regional commands took a different approach to what each saw as a relatively low priority mission. They shaped Iraqi forces around the needs and perceptions of that command rather than as part of a coordinated plan or one designed to have them eventually take over the security mission, and located Iraqi forces where it was convenient to the MNF-I command element – rather than deploying them where they were most needed to establish sovereignty and control.

Throughout this period, the efforts to shape the Iraqi police forces lagged badly behind the efforts to shape the military forces. A combined assessment of the CPA effort to develop the Iraqi police by the Inspector General of the Department of State and the Inspector General of the Department of Defense summarizes the nature and impact of the CPA effort as follows:28

Perhaps even more than the military, the Iraqi police during the Saddam Hussein era were perceived to be corrupt and brutal implementers of oppression. Accordingly, an early decision of the CPA was to cashier police officers closely tied to the former regime. Other members of the IPS abandoned their duties or were casualties of the conflict. Only about 30,000, mostly low-ranking police remained on duty as a residual force—a number clearly insufficient to enforce law and order even had stability been established.3 Consistent with the CPA goal of erasing troublesome aspects of the Hussein regime, command and control of the remnants of the police force were decentralized. This further diluted cohesion and effectiveness of the residual force.

… In June 2003, the CPA and MOI issued a directive that all police officers had to return to work no later than July 3. Those failing to do so were subject to immediate termination. According to International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) officials, about 38,000 had returned to the IPS as of July.

To bolster the force, an additional 30,000 police were recruited by Coalition Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF–7) and the Major Subordinate Commanders (MSCs). The driving objective was to get “boots on the ground.” In doing so, the CPA enunciated minimal requirements for entry into the IPS. Subsequently, to meet MNSTC–I training quotas, two patterns of recruiting evolved. Iraqis did most of the recruiting in the Baghdad area. Coalition forces (working through the major subordinate commands or MSCs) were in charge of recruiting in the rest of the country. Iraqi
recruiters appear to have enforced minimum requirements as enunciated by CPA, while the MSCs sent to JIPTC some recruits who did not meet those minimum standards.

…During the time of the CPA, such an approach was both inevitable and, perhaps, appropriate. In the wake of the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, no Iraqi policy makers were in a position to make authoritative decisions. The CPA decision to cleanse the political system of Hussein sympathizers—notably, the ‘de-Ba‘athification’ effort—effectively decapitated the IPS of its standing leadership. Even though some former police officers have been reincorporated into the force, it was necessary to start almost from scratch to build a new police force. The result was a ‘bottom-up’ approach with primary emphasis on minimal basic training.

Overall, there is little consensus on how to train Iraqi police. One exception is the universal agreement that the eight weeks devoted to the basic course is insufficient time to produce a capable policeman. Thus, there is tacit consensus that the training program to date has not created an effective IPS. (There is no consensus on how long a time would be required to achieve the desired results.)

As this assessment was being conducted, MNSTC–I and CPATT leaders were planning to lengthen the basic training course to 10 weeks. This seems to be an appropriate step, but the IG Team makes no recommendation as to the optimum time required for such training.7 At the outset of the CPA effort to build IPS capacity, the assumption—even to some extent, the reality—was that training could be molded within a rapidly stabilizing political and security environment. The unexpected virulence and scope of subsequent terrorism and insurgency induced changes in the program, but such modifications have lagged the ‘street reality’ in Iraq.

Adjustments in the training course have been and are being made. During this assessment, the JIPTC staff completed a CPATT-directed revision of the basic curriculum to include more ‘hands on,’ self-protection exercises. Other IPS in-country academies are adopting these changes. IP personnel and MOI officials strongly support the adjustments and the shift in emphasis.

A CPA decision to decentralize command and control of the IPS has had unintended consequences. Decentralization was consistent with the intent to disperse political power. Commendable in concept, the emerging result within the IPS is a pattern of fiefdoms, subject to political machinations. An example of this political maneuvering is the situation of competing chiefs of police in Najaf where one responds to the provincial governor, the other to the MOI.

Pay problems have been an equally troubling result of decentralization. Under the CPA designed system, much of the central government’s funding is allocated to the provincial governors. Thereafter, the monies are sub-allocated to respective elements, such as the police. Accordingly, each provincial chief of police controls his share of sub-allotted funds. Allegations of mismanagement and corruption in the disbursement of pay for IPs, equipment purchases, etc., are credible. Re-centralization of control is not the total answer to these issues—especially to corruption—but the IG Team concludes that tighter MOI control is desirable.

As is the case with many aspects of Iraqi force development, the mistakes made early in the effort had a major and lingering effect. In some cases, this legacy may take years of additional effort to correct.

**Shifts During October 2003 to Spring 2004**

In October 2003, the MNF-I created a four-phase plan that took a more serious approach to creating Iraqi forces. The phases were:29

- To provide mutual support and create the conditions by which the Iraqis could take over.
- Give local Iraqi forces the security responsibility for the surrounding area.
- Slowly increase Iraqi force responsibility to larger and larger geographic regions.
- Provide a strategic overview while the Iraqis assumed the national security missions.

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The US decided to triple its planned rate of initial build-up for Iraqi military forces, although the mission of the army still focused primarily on border defense and not on counterinsurgency warfare. This decision was made in November-December 2003, and largely as a result of the steady increase in insurgent attacks.

This ongoing increase in the insurgency led to further US action in January 2004, when Major General Karl W. Eikenberry was sent to survey the situation and subsequently recommended possible changes. General Eikenberry did not actually arrive in Iraq, however, until January 2004.

It was only in February 2004 – nearly a year after Saddam’s fall – that the Eikenberry mission helped give building up Iraqi military forces for the counterinsurgency mission the priority it needed. The assessment in the Eikenberry Report also led other aspects of the mission to be greatly expanded and escalated. The US also acted upon its recommendation that a Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) be generated and subordinated with the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) under the umbrella organization that became known as the Office of Security Transition.

As a result, shaping the structure of the police, border forces, and other security forces was finally made part of the US military training and equipment mission, and the necessary emphasis was placed on integrating the development of military, security, and police forces. Up until that time, the creation of the police, border forces, and other security forces had remained under the Ministry of the Interior. Much of the effort within the Ministry had been left largely to individual programs and uncoordinated efforts – some of them highly regional. There was no real top down direction for the effort until March 2004 when CPATT was created and a Commanding General Brigadier Andrew Mackay appointed to command it. His first assessment – as part of what was known as the Police Working Group – set up by Sanchez to try and get concurrent planning ahead of Washington prevarication over the Eikenberry report made for bleak reading. It assessed that the Coalition effort had the following status and issues:

- Facing strategic failure in delivering an effective police force
- Current emphasis is on quantity not quality
- Not clear what an ‘effective’ policeman is
- We need to reverse the situation in time for elections
- Introduce ability to manoeuvre police forces around Iraq
- Ensure quality over quality – will take time though
- Police and border infrastructure very poor
- Communications for police and border very poor
- Introduce broad range of policing capability/specialist courses
- Accelerate training output but not at the cost of quality
- Substantially involve Iraqi’s more
- Entire funding/resource situation needs major overhaul

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○ Build a police counter insurgency force
○ Substantially reform Ministry of Interior
○ Ensure CPA conduct justice and prison reform concurrently

And, it concluded that:
○ No centralised coordination or control either within the CPA or the MoI. 1 year has been wasted
○ No overall policy, no vision, no real control. Organise element of mission needs urgent attention
○ Running out of time – we need IPS to counter the insurgency and be ready for the elections
○ Supplemental budget needs to be harnessed – not a single statement of requirement has yet been made
○ Expect opposition from CPA who view this as a civil not military function

*The Washington Problem*

The US Congress must accept some blame for failing to create procedures that allow time-critical expenditures on security aid. Yet, as officers like Major General Charles H. Swannack, the commander of the 82nd Airborne, pointed out in interviews, the CPA sometimes made it as difficult to use US aid funds to train and equip Iraqi security forces as did the Congress, and commanders sometimes had to use CERP aid when they should have had all the funds they needed.32

It is also impossible to ignore the fact that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs were slow to act on many aspects of the advice of the Coalition training mission, slow to task General Eikenberry, and then slow to act upon his report. Until April 2004, the US failed to recognize the need to treat the Iraqis as full partners in achieving security in Iraq and to make meaningful efforts to train and equip them effectively to perform counterinsurgency missions and more conventional warfare.

The US issued National Security Presidential Directive 36 in May 2004. This directive placed the US assistance to Iraqi military and police forces under the control of CENTCOM, and gave high-level policy direction to the force development effort. The timing, however, was awkward because the transfer of authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) was scheduled for June 2004, and was about to create an interregnum of several months in many Iraqi efforts as a new government and new (and inexperienced and sometimes feuding) ministers took over. Moreover, the $1.8 billion in Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) appropriation in November 2003 was not actually allocated to the security sector until the fall of 2004.33

The situation was then complicated by the transition of power from the CPA to a sovereign interim Iraqi Government, and the appointment of new Iraqi Ministers of Defense and Interior – which became a serious source of disruption and coordination problems for several months.

Given this background, it is surprising that General Eaton was able to give his successor, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, as good a start and as good a mix of capabilities as he did. By June 2004, the Iraq Army had many of its initial training facilities and barracks
ready, and had trained some 1,500 officers for a force of three light divisions – most were trained in Jordan. It had also trained some 3,500 NCOs.

The problems did not lie with the military and civilians who were actually trying to build Iraqi forces in the field. They occurred at the highest policy levels.
IV. Failing to Deliver an Adequate Training and Equipment Program Through the Tenure of the CPA and Mid-2004

The transfer of power to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) in June 2004 did succeed in giving added legitimacy and Iraqi leadership to the nation building effort. At the same time, it created new problems. It brought new Ministers of Defense and Interior to office in half-formed offices and disrupted plans to disband the various party militias. Tensions between the new ministers made many problems worse, as did their lack of administrative experience and drive—moreover, new tensions developed with the Ministry of Finance. These problems were increased by a major turnover in lower ranking personnel.

These problems were particularly serious in the case of the Ministry of the Interior. One of the leaders of the Coalition effort to create effective security and police forces notes that,

Another major weakness of the campaign was the inability to build the necessary institutional capacity...in 2004...there were three ministers of interior. The first barely left a mark. The second, Samir Sumaiday, was outstanding. He immediately set about redesigning the organizational structure of the MoI, sorted out functional areas of responsibility and created a C2 structure that got away from the Iraqi instinct of trying to ensure that all decision-making was centralized. He was however only there for about 10 or so weeks and the progress we were beginning to make was astonishing.

He then fell victim to the political maneuvering that occurred within the CPA over the formation of the IIG during the course of the transition at the end of July. Another Sunni minister was put in because it was felt that he had a larger and more substantial political constituency. Unfortunately the pace and progress begun by Sumaiday then ground to a halt and remained so throughout 2004. We all watched the inevitable train crash occurring but the political imperative won out despite the consequences of a highly dysfunctional Ministry of Interior. Building institutional capacity within the MoI was clearly critical if we were to have a functioning police force a fact lost in the politics of it all.

As for the Coalition effort, the administrative changes were more consistent and positive. Ambassador Bremer and General Sanchez had a poor relationship that seriously hurt civil-military cooperation between the CPA and US Command in Iraq. Interviews and press reports indicate that their successors, Ambassador John Negroponte and General George Casey, developed far better relations, and cooperation in strengthening Iraqi military; security and police forces improved strikingly when they took over in June 2004.

One press report indicates that they met in Washington in April 2004 to try to avoid the deep tensions, and civil-military friction, that had affected their predecessors -- General Sanchez and Ambassador Bremer. According to this report, they assembled a red team when they arrived in Baghdad which began to meet on June 28, 2004, and which created a four-phase plan based on (1) integrating the political, military, and economic assistance efforts, (2) building up the Iraqi security forces, (3) rebuilding Iraq's ruined economy, and (4) instituting a two-part communications strategy to show the insurgents could not offer Iraq a meaningful future and try to alienate the Iraqi people from the insurgents.34

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A more formal level, the Bush Administration made its first real effort to define responsibility for managing the Iraqi force development process, although it did so well over a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. The US issued National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36) that clearly defined the responsibilities for U.S. Government operations in Iraq after the June 28, 2004, termination of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The key portions of the directive stated that:

“Commander, USCENTCOM, under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. . . . The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission, shall direct all United States Government efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. At the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission . . .”

In order to implement NSPD–36, the Department of Defense created the Multinational Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) under the overall direction of Commander, Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF–I). MNF–I's Civilian Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) was assigned the responsibility of managing the Iraqi Army (IA) training program, which included Special Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force. The MNF–I’s Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) was assigned the responsibility of managing the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) training program.

The Period from June 2004 to the Fall of 2004

It is difficult to track just how successful such efforts to restructure the creation of effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces were once the decision was taken to create the kind of forces the new Iraqi government needed. The data that are available, however, strongly argue that changes in US policy did not mean rapid changes in implementation, and that the flow of resources remained far too low during much of 2004.

Certainly, the Coalition effort still concentrated more on quantity than quality, and -- as it becomes all too clear in later chapters -- produced grossly inflated numbers of men and forces that lacked the qualifications, motivation, training, equipment, facilities, leadership, unit continuity and integrity, and follow-on advisory support to be effective. According to DOD updates, Iraqi Security Forces totaled about 219,000 personnel as of June 18, 2004. These included approximately 7,000 Iraqi Armed Forces, 36,000 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), 84,000 police officers, 18,000 Department of Border Enforcement staff, and 74,000 Facilities Protection Service (FPS) personnel.

The structure of Iraqi forces as of May 2004 is shown in Figure 1 below, and it is important to note that overwhelming emphasis was still being given on forces with little or no value in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and dealing with serious crime. Moreover, only 7,000 men out of 219,000 were in the armed forces (3.2 percent), and 110,000 were in the poorly trained, equipped, and facilitated FPS and ICDC (50 percent) The FPS was so weak and ineffective that it was later dropped from the totals for Iraqi forces. The ICDC was so weak that it was first reorganized into the Iraqi National Guard
in June 2003, and when that proved ineffective, merged into the Iraqi Army in January 2005.

**Figure 1:**

**Controlling Authority and Mission of Iraqi Security Forces in May 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Force Element</th>
<th>Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Iraqi Armed Forces</td>
<td>The regular army and other services will provide the military defense of Iraq when fully operational, including defense of the national territory and protection and security of critical installations, facilities, infrastructure, lines of communication and supply, and population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>Iraqi Civil Defense Corps</td>
<td>Perform security and emergency service that directly supports coalition operations to provide security and stability. Complements the police force but designed to perform operations that exceed the capacity of the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
<td>Provide primary civil law enforcement for public safety, security, and order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>Monitor and control the movement of persons and goods to, from, and across the borders of Iraq. Includes Iraqi Border Police charged with border and customs enforcement and immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>Guard and secure individual ministry and municipal facilities against vandalism and theft. These guards are hired and equipped by individual ministries and can vary greatly in capability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Progress in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces**

The US government has only issued limited data on its efforts to train and equip Iraqi forces during this period. The material available from unclassified US sources during the time of the CPA omits critical details on the nature of the training Iraqis received, and provides little data on the portion that actually went through academy and received significant military training. It provides only limited data on the flow of US aid to the Iraqi army and security forces, and US reports often use unrealistic metrics to report on how the equipment effort actually met Iraqi requirements.

The reporting systems on the overall progress of the US effort in Iraq that the US adopted after the end of the CPA also disguised the details of many serious problems in the security and aid efforts that were revealed in previous reporting. The reporting no longer distinguished construction and non-construction expenditures by category, no longer

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reported the number of serious incidents occurring by day and week, and began to omit any data on equipment transfers either in terms of absolute numbers or relative to requirements.

US officials and officers justified these shortfalls in reporting in three ways:

- The first, and least convincing, explanation was that their mission focused on the future and past reporting wastes time focusing on the past.
- The second was that they lacked the resources to provide such reporting -- which was tantamount to saying they lack the resources to develop adequate data and trend analysis to manage their programs and ensure they are effective.
- The more convincing explanation is that the debate in Washington over how many troops are on the ground, equipped, or trained has focused on the wrong issues and misleading numbers: As one senior officer intimately involved with the effort to create Iraqi forces has put it, “The real issue is how many will actually fight, how well they will fight, and who they will fight for.”

The end result, however, was that US reporting on the development of Iraqi forces, like US reporting on the insurgency and terrorism, lacked the transparency to provide a clear picture of what was happening and to establish serious credibility. The US adopted a public relations approach that seemed to be “no new news but good news.”

Yet, the data the Coalition and US did provide are still adequate to show that there were serious problems in the effort to train and equip the Iraqi security forces through the fall of 2004. The data that describe progress through September 2004 document a major failure on the part of the US, and particularly on the part of the CPA and Department of Defense, to develop effective Iraqi military, security, and police capabilities on a timely basis.

**Progress at the Time the CPA Went Out of Business at the End of June 2004: The CPA View**

The CPA made the following claims about its progress in creating security and effective Iraqi forces when it gave sovereignty back to the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004:

- The Iraqi government announced a new law allowing it to impose emergency security measures to combat terrorism.
- The initial battalion of the Iraq Intervention Force (IIF) deployed into Baghdad at the end of June.
- The IIF was being established, trained and equipped for urban counterinsurgency operations.
- All three battalions of the first IIF brigade were scheduled ready by the end of July.
- At the end of June, 41 of 45 battalions of the Iraqi National Guard (formerly the Iraqi Civil Defense Corp) were manned above 75 percent strength.
- Iraqi forces had begun joint patrols throughout Iraq with Coalition and Iraqi police forces.
- Efforts were underway to recruit six additional 400-man public order battalions as part of the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force.
- With these additions, the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force would total nine public order battalions and two counterinsurgency battalions.
- A total of 5,502 new IPS recruits had completed the eight-week training course.
Five classes, or over 3,411 students, had graduated from the Jordan Academy.

Four classes, or 2,091 students, had graduated from the Baghdad Public Safety Academy.

Approximately 25,000 IPS personnel who served as police under the former regime had completed a three-week Transition and Integration Program taught by the Coalition.

IPS officers were also being taught basic criminal investigation, criminal intelligence, and dignitary protection by Coalition advisors.

The Iraqi Air Force was to be given two Seeker reconnaissance aircraft to conduct surveillance of the borders and oil facilities, and was rushing procurement of 14 more.

None of these claims said anything about force quality, and it is more than a little ironic that Department of Defense public relations efforts after early 2005 stressed that Iraq had only one deployable battalion in July 2004.

**Progress at the Time the CPA Went Out of Business at the End of June 2004: The GAO View**

The CPA’s reassuring statements contrast sharply with both the historical background provided in previous chapters and the reporting by the General Accounting Office (GAO) during this period, although the GAO analysis was based largely on MNC-I reporting. The GAO report only received limited attention at the time, but it remains the most authoritative picture of what was actually happening to Iraqi forces at the time sovereignty was transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government:

The multinational force is also organizing, training, equipping, mentoring, and certifying Iraqi security forces so that it can transfer security responsibilities to them and eventually draw down the multinational force...The multinational force’s security transition plan calls for a four-phased transfer of security responsibilities from the multinational force to effective

As of March 26, 2004, Iraq had about 203,000 security personnel of greatly varying capabilities. Of these forces, only the Iraqi Armed Forces are specifically mandated for the military defense of Iraq, while the others are intended exclusively for civil law enforcement and protection duties. However, according to senior DOD officials and multinational force documents, these security forces, especially the Iraqi Police Service and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, were insufficiently trained and equipped for these duties. During the escalation of violence that occurred during April 2004, some of these security forces collapsed. The multinational force has taken action to address training and equipping problems, but it is unclear how this will affect the long-term plan to shift security responsibilities to Iraqi forces.

Since the fall of 2003, the multinational force has developed and refined a plan to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces in four phases. In October 2003, a multinational force document outlined the security transition concept, including (1) an initial phase, called mutual support, where the multinational force establishes conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces; (2) transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area assume responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where Iraqis are responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to strategic over watch, where Iraqi forces on a national level are capable of maintaining a secure environment against internal and external threats, with broad monitoring from the multinational force.

Transition through these phases is contingent on decreasing threat capability, increasing Iraqi security capability, and the ability of civil administration to exercise control of Iraqi forces. According to the multinational force document, transferring control for local security to Iraqis should allow the multinational force to reduce the number of troops devoted to stability operations
and reduce the number of forward operating bases. This would allow the multinational force to focus on offensive operations against coalition opponents.

…The multinational force began to shift responsibilities to Iraqi security forces in February 2004, earlier than planned, citing the growing capability of these forces. In Baghdad, for example, the coalition forces withdrew to bases outside of the city, giving Iraqi forces greater responsibility for security within the city. According to State Department public-opinion polls published around that time, about 20 percent of Iraqis said that the multinational force was very effective at keeping law and order on the streets, and one-third believed the force was very effective in protecting Iraqis from major threats and civil war. Furthermore, Iraqis preferred that more security responsibilities be transferred to their own police and army. In a later polling report published in mid-June 2004, the State Department said that Iraqis viewed the multinational force as part of the security problem, not the solution. According to the report, Iraqis were confident that Iraqi security forces would be able to maintain security without the multinational force.

Iraqi security forces include more than 200,000 members of the armed forces, police, and other agencies of the Ministry of Interior. These forces have varying missions and capabilities, but most are not trained or equipped to engage well-armed insurgents. The CPA and multinational force reported problems in training and equipping these forces in 2004. …According to senior DOD officials, these forces performed poorly in the crises in Fallujah and southern Iraq in early April 2004.

…As of May 2004, the multinational force was responsible for training, equipping, mentoring, and certifying all Iraqi security forces, such as the Iraqi Armed Forces and the Iraqi police. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 states that after the transfer of power, Iraqi security forces would fall under the command of appropriate Iraqi ministers, and welcomed the continued development of a security partnership between the sovereign government of Iraq and the multinational force. According to an annex to the resolution, the Iraqi Armed Forces will be responsible to the Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense, while the other security forces will report to the Ministry of the Interior or other government ministers. The resolution states that the government of Iraq has the authority to commit Iraqi security forces to engage in operations with the multinational force. According to the resolution, the multinational force and Iraqi government are developing various coordination mechanisms to achieve unity of command of military operations when Iraqi security forces operate with the multinational force.

The total number of Iraqi security forces as of March 26, 2004, just prior to the insurgent activities of early April, was 203,000—approximately 86 percent of the goal set by the multinational force.3 Of these forces, the Iraqi Armed Forces is the only force specifically trained and equipped for the defense of Iraqi territory and population. However, in March 2004 this force experienced the greatest shortfall in personnel, with only 8 percent of the troops needed.

Although the other Iraqi security forces existed in greater numbers, they were not intended to fight a pitched battle against well-armed insurgents. Iraqi police officers are tasked solely to uphold general law and order through such activities as performing criminal investigations, arresting suspects, and questioning witnesses. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers are trained for constabulary duties, such as setting up traffic control checkpoints, patrolling and cordoning off streets, performing crowd control, providing convoy security, and other civil functions. Members of the Facilities Protection Service are trained to guard Iraqi ministry buildings and other fixed sites. According to CPA officials, they are effective exclusively in locations already controlled by local military and law enforcement personnel. For example, according to a CPA official, Facilities Protection Service guards at a fixed site would be overrun by an enemy force that contained more than 10 to 20 insurgents, or one that had numerous heavy weapons, without prompt help from the multinational force.

According to the President, senior DOD officials, and multinational force commanders, Iraqi security forces responded poorly to a series of anti-Coalition attacks in April 2004. In western and central Iraq, insurgents attacked the multinational force in Fallujah, Baghdad, Ar Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit, while a radical Shi’a militia launched operations to dislodge multinational
forces and occupy cities from Baghdad to Basra in the south. In particular, units of the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police Service, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps refused to engage the enemy.

According to DOD officials, the 2nd Battalion of the Iraqi Armed Forces refused to engage insurgents and support the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force in Fallujah. One problem cited included the belief of the soldiers, reinforced by briefings during their training, that they would never be used as an internal security force. Weak battalion leadership and insufficient or poor equipment were also mentioned as contributing factors. According to a CPA official, Iraqi police forces in Fallujah, Najaf, Karbala, and Kut collapsed. The number of police officers dropped by 2,892 during the week of April 17 to 23, according to the CPA weekly assessment. These declines resulted from officers being killed in the line of duty; sent for retraining and reintegration; or removed from the Iraqi Police Service for actions supporting the insurgency. According to a CPA official and an assessment by the multinational force, the Iraqi Police Service was overwhelmed due to disorganization, insufficient training and equipment, and weak mentoring. However, CPA also said the police forces are civil law enforcement units and are not intended to withstand guerilla attacks. Nonetheless, in other locations they stood up to the attacks. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units also collapsed during April, with soldiers staying home, declaring a neutral stance, or resigning throughout central and western Iraq. According to the multinational force interim assessment, desertion was most prevalent between April 2 and April 16. During this time, up to 12,000 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers did not show up for duty."

The assessment also found that Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units were not sufficiently equipped or trained for high-intensity tasks, such as engaging large numbers of insurgents. Furthermore, lack of equipment and poor training resulted in general fear and disillusionment among personnel. Additionally, better-equipped and better-trained battalions in northern and southern Iraq held together during the crises of mid-April, although they did not face the same level of threat. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers were also susceptible to intimidation or sympathy for anti-coalition fighters. Finally, soldiers were less likely to carry out their duty when their home township was under insurgent pressure, leading to the collective desertion of units from the troubled towns.

The multinational force is taking steps to assess and respond to the various problems of the Iraqi security forces and is considering how these forces can provide security during Iraq’s upcoming election process. As of late May 2004, a new team of senior military officers was assessing every unit in the Iraqi security forces. This team will oversee the accelerated training of Iraqi soldiers, police, and other security personnel.

In April 2004, the multinational force began a new reconstitution program for police officers that had deserted in Najaf and Karbala and scheduled senior leadership and additional specialized courses for the end of May. In addition, it planned to begin implementing its equipment distribution plan, define the equipment requirements for the entire Iraqi Police Service and the Department of Border Enforcement, and better inform major subordinate commands about which equipment they would receive and when. Further, the multinational force planned to start institutionalizing a monthly report and certification plan for police stations.

…According to a Department of Justice (DOJ) official, in an effort to support the multinational force training program for the Iraqi Police Service, DOJ and its components have developed a number of specialty courses designed to transition the fundamentals of basic training into operational and investigative capacity. The specialty courses are designed to build investigative directorates in the areas of intelligence analysis, counterterrorism, organized crime, basic criminal investigation, post-blast investigations, and fingerprinting. Teams of personnel and experienced contractors from many DOJ components are currently deployed or are preparing to deploy to provide training in support of this initiative.

…According to an implementation order published in April 2004, the multinational force is pursuing multiple courses of action to rebuild the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. It will also develop and rebuild battalions with new equipment scheduled to arrive throughout May 2004. However, a CPA official with access to CPA contracting information stated that Iraqi Civil Defense Corps equipment would probably not make it to Iraq until June or possibly July 2004. The multinational
force will also review the criteria for recruitment and possibly change recruiting practices to stop commissioning entire battalions from the same area.

The multinational force also plans to ease de-Ba'athification standards and invite experienced and capable former soldiers and officers to join the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. The multinational force expects some 4,000 to 5,000 Sunni to be incorporated into the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in this way. The training program will begin concentrating on developing and mentoring leaders at all levels of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. Furthermore, all major subordinate commands will permanently embed training teams within Iraqi Civil Defense Corps battalions. These teams will perform refresher training and mentoring, and provide direction until battalion leadership is fully developed and capable of assuming command.

Given the poor performance of the Iraqi security forces during April 2004, it is unclear what level of security they will be able to provide during the period leading up to Iraq’s national elections, which are currently scheduled to be held by the end of January 2005. As of mid-April 2004, the multinational force was considering what sort of security and other support it would provide during the election process. According to a planning document, the extent of this support will depend on the ability of the Iraqis, international organizations, and contractors to provide for security and other support tasks. The document stated that the multinational force expected some areas to be under the local control of the Iraqi security forces by the time elections take place. The document did not acknowledge, however, the poor performance of Iraqi security forces during early April 2004.

Effective Iraqi security forces are critical for transitioning security responsibilities to Iraq. However, Iraqi security forces proved unready to take over security responsibilities from the multinational force, as demonstrated by their collapse during April 2004. Of these forces, only the Iraqi Armed Forces are specifically mandated for the military defense of Iraq, while the others are intended exclusively for civil law enforcement and protection duties. The multinational force identified problems in the training and equipping of the Iraqi forces as reasons for poor performance.

Although the multinational force is beginning to address these problems, it is unclear what impact April’s security collapse will have on the plans for transitioning Iraq’s security to Iraqi security forces or the extent to which these forces will be capable of providing security during the Iraqi election process. What is clear, however, is that the development of effective Iraqi security forces will continue after the transfer of power to an interim Iraqi government.

Too Little and Too Late in Getting Resources to the Iraqis

It is unclear how serious a problem that funding, and the ability to actually obligate and spend money, was during this period. One legacy of the CPA was that Iraq’s total defense budget for 2004 was only $101 million and its justice budget was only $151 million, although Iraq’s actual defense budget for 2004 became $450 million. There is, however, an unexplained category called “additional security projects” that was raised from $500 million to $1 billion in March 2004.

Other CPA reporting also showed how slow the flow of resources to Iraqi forces really was:

- The weekly status reporting issued by the Department of Defense as of 13 July 2004 confirmed the fact that the actual flow of US aid to Iraq, and its impact on the Iraqi security, still remained almost glacially slow. As of 13 July, the US had only actually spent $220 million out of the $2.976 million apportioned for security under the FY2004 aid program of $18.4 billion.

- CPA reporting as of June 29, 2004 showed that obligations for non-construction security procurement were about 25 percent of goal, and commitments were around 50 percent. The figures for construction tasks were far more favorable and almost totally misleading. They
indicated that the $749 million was obligated and $1,003 million was committed, to meet a goal for 1 July 2004 of $749 million.

○ The CPA status report issued on 6 July 2004 showed that obligations for non-construction security procurement were about 30 percent of goal on 30 June 2004, and commitments were around 60 percent. The figures for construction tasks were far more favorable, but almost totally misleading. They indicated that the $825 million was obligated as of 30 June 2004, and $985 million was committed, to meet a goal for 1 July 2004 of only $749 million. Yet, virtually every report on Iraqi security efforts indicates that facilities remain grossly inadequate.

○ The status reports as of July 13th were less detailed than previous statements, but showed that the CPA 2207 Report called for $3.243 billion in FY2004 aid funds for construction and non-construction projects for security and law enforcement. While $1.507 billion of this total had been obligated, only $220 million had actually been spent. The CPA 2207 Report called for $1.038 billion in FY2004 aid funds for justice and public safety, but only $300 million had been obligated and only $14 million had been spent.

**Force Status Data**

Additional sources of data that the US made available on the status and readiness of Iraqi forces in the summer of 2004 helped make the list of “achievements” claimed by the CPA less than credible:

○ As of 26 June 2004, the US reporting summarized in the final CPA status report showed a net average increase in the number of significant insurgent attacks using improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and improvised rockets over the period since September 2003. They were averaging over 40 per day and the total number of incidents of all kinds was far higher. The US had reported the capture or killing of many Iraqi foreign and domestic insurgents, but no decline in the total number of active insurgents since its first meaningful estimates in July 2003. It could not characterize the leadership or membership of either domestic or foreign insurgent groups with any precision, or the level of actual Al Qa'ida central influence and control.

○ The Iraqi Interim Government was experiencing critical loyalty and performance problems in critical areas like Baquba in late July. Some reports indicated the top four security officers in the new government security forces had to be removed during fighting with insurgents during this time.

○ The CPA went out of business just as the first battalion of the Iraq National Task Force division began to deploy to Baghdad, and as the new Iraqi government overrode its plans to leave the Iraq Civil Defense Corps as a largely passive defense force and converted it to a National Guard. The Iraqi police were just beginning to acquire serious counterinsurgency capabilities in the form of nine public order battalions and two counterinsurgency battalions as part of an Iraqi Police Service (IPS) civil intervention force.

○ The efforts to create an effective Iraqi Police Service (IPS) remained a near-disaster. The 120,000 man force reported in some US documents had at least 25,000 totally unqualified personnel, and training was more of a myth than real.

○ In early August 2004, defections were reported to remain a major problem, and the police and security forces were reported to be including 30,000 more names on their rosters than they could actually account for. The British officer in charge of CPATT, Brigadier General Andrew Mackay, referred to the fact that many police left without sending in resignations or having their departure reported as “ghosts.”

○ As of July 30, 2004, the central Iraqi police office dealing with the key problem of kidnapping still had almost no office equipment, no phone of its own, no air conditioning, no computers, and a
small fraction of an authorized staff far too small to do the job. There were 42 officers assigned to a task that the head of the section estimated required 1,000. By June 2004, the new Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE) was supposed to have a strength of some 18,000. Priority had been given to the police, however, and it only had 255 men who had actually been trained as a rapidly improvised new border patrol academy.

**Manpower and Training Status**

The CPA never standardized its public reporting on the status of Iraqi training, and its data always implied a much higher level of training than actually took place. A later study by MNSTC-I showed that the CPA reported an increase in total Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) strength from some 90,000 in October 2003 to roughly 200,000 in January 2004. The CPA continued to report figures of over 200,000 through April 2004, although this was a rough estimate of the total manpower claimed to be “on duty” and had nothing to do with training and equipment, or even audits of actual personnel as distinguished from authorized levels.

The training data on the Iraqi security forces were also altered in ways that disguised the level of training in most services in the CPA reporting issued from April 2004 onwards. This was done by implying that training under the Ba’ath regime, or limited on the job training under the Transition Integration Program (TIP), was adequate. This kind of reporting was so misleading that the entire manpower reporting process had to be restructured after Iraqi forces failed to perform in Fallujah and Sadr City in the spring of 2004, and the MNF-I issue a new set of totals based on “trained” manpower in May 2004. This figure was closer to 130,000 than the peak figure the CPA issued in February 2004, which was close to 210,000. It still, however, ignored major quality, vetting, and training problems, and the fact much of the manpower involved was too weakly equipped to carry out anything but the most limited missions.

The end result was yet another reappraisal of such numbers in August 2004. This lead the MNSTC-I to create a new category called “trained and equipped.” The total for such manpower was only 96,000 in September 2004, a massive contrast to the CPA reporting over 200,000 some 10 months earlier, and the peak of some 160,000-170,000 reporting for “trained” manpower in August 2004.

**The Overall Status of ISF Manning and Training Efforts**

The problems in emphasizing quantity over quality are illustrated by the fact that the final status reports of the CPA used different types of training data for each report. For example, the data issues on 25 June 2004 shows that only 5,857 out of 88,039 Iraqi police had serious academy training, although another 2,387 were in the training pipeline. The CPA report issued on 6 July 2004 did not provide the same detail on training data in previously reports, but did indicate that only 3,411 students had graduated from the Jordanian Academy and 1,674 students had graduated from the Baghdad Public Safety Academy. Even these students had courses lasting less than a fifth as long as similar training in the US and Europe. The figures for the Department of Border Enforcement showed that only 255 of the 18,248 officers had postwar academy training, with an additional 25 in training.
The CPA went out of business before the Civil Defense Corps was transformed into the National Guard, but its final reports stated that only 2,362 out of 39,128 men were “in training.” It should be noted, however, that the other 36,762 had completed their initial training and were with units conducting follow-on training or security operations with Coalition Forces. Some of these ING units were some of the first ones the Coalition formed and trained, and some had been training and operating for nearly a year by this time.

The CPA’s final report on the status of the Iraqi Army for July 6 showed that 10,222 men were said to be in service, of which 2,316 were “in training.” The data for the Facilities Protection Service showed an active strength of 74,069. No data were provided on what portions were regarded as trained and only 77 were reported to be “in training.”

Most of this training, however, was little more than at the “boot camp” or token level. An investigation by the GAO—based largely on the work of Coalition advisors to the Iraqi police—described it as follows:16

The multinational force and CPA had problems training and equipping the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in late March 2004. While some police training occurred at academies in Jordan and Baghdad, according to an official from the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (State/INL), the prevailing security situation has prevented CPA and State/INL police trainers from moving freely across the country and establishing additional training facilities.

As a result, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for temporary police training in their areas of responsibility. State/INL provided the commanders with a temporary curriculum, the Transition Integration Program. The full curriculum is 108 hours long and provides basic police training in such subjects as basic human rights, firearms familiarization, patrol procedures, and search methods. According to a State Department official, the various major subordinate commanders had wide latitude in terms of training police and did not uniformly adopt the Transition Integration Program. They were free to establish their own curriculum and requirements for police, which varied in depth and scope. Training could last between 3 days and 3 weeks.

According to a State/INL official, some commanders required trainees to undergo class and field training, while other commanders only required officers to wear a uniform. According to a multinational force interim assessment from May 2004, the Iraq Civil Defense Corps also lacked proper training. It stated that investment into training the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units varied among the multinational divisions and that the units in the western and center-south major subordinate commands in particular were the least prepared for combat. Furthermore, the training was not sufficient for high-intensity tasks.

One CPA official agreed with this, stating that the training for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps did not prepare it to fight against well-armed insurgents with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, for example. The assessment also noted that the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units contained too many inexperienced officers and soldiers.

**Progress and Problems in Creating an Effective Police Training Effort**

As has been touched upon earlier, the US created a Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) in March 2004 under military command and the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I group that later became the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). This put the police training and organization effort under a general officer – Brigadier General Andrew Mackay - supported by a civilian Deputy from the ICITAP team of the Department of Justice.

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Unlike the team training the military, the CPATT had both civilian and military elements. The Department of Defense now had primary responsibility for security operations in Iraq, including training of security forces, but the Department of State had overall responsibility for security assistance in nation building operations within the US government – in part because of past cases where US military training of police forces.

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) had the most the institutional experience in training police forces and had been tasked with developing an appropriate training program for the Iraqi Police Service for the CPA and before the rise of the insurgency led to need for a military focus on counterinsurgency and the issuing of NSPD-36. As a result, the Department of Defense and Department of State continued to share responsibility for the development of the Iraqi Police Service.

Views differ over how effective these initial efforts were, the scale and nature of the problems involved, and how effective cooperation was between the civilian and military elements of CPATT. Work by Robert M. Perito provides a highly critical picture of the problems in the efforts to create an effective Iraqi Police Service (IPS). The 120,000-man force reported in some US documents had at least 25,000 totally unqualified personnel, and training was more of a myth than real.

Moreover, it was not until June 2004 that a MNSTC-I “troop to task” study began to define the size and nature of the force that was really required, and set a goal of 135,000 men. This was a major increase over the a prewar strength of 58,006 men for the IPS authorized for the General Director of Police under Saddam Hussein, and it rapidly became a moving target as the rise of the insurgency made it clear that more and more specialized elements and security forces were needed.

In practice, terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime had already long made this impractical. Whatever Iraq might have been with proper stability operations and nation building, it was now a nation involved in low-level insurgency and civil war. The police had to be able to fight to survive -- much less give ordinary Iraqis security – and had to coordinate its operations with the military.

Others feel that the police and security advisory effort was beginning to accomplish what it could in the face of major resource and bureaucratic constraints and laid the groundwork for the more effective efforts that followed. One senior advisor within CPATT provided the following inside view of what was happening at this time, and a significantly more positive picture of the progress that began in the spring and summer of 2004:

…it took the best part of a year for Washington and CJTF-7 to realize that the planning and progress for SSR – as it related to the police - was woefully inadequate and that the limited individual training that had been introduced was not going to produce a police force of any real effectiveness. The counter insurgency campaign was also beginning to take real shape and there was a realization that decisive remedial action had to be taken if the Iraqi Police and Border Police were going to be built into an effective force.

Additionally US International Police Advisors were deploying into theatre but with no real sense of what their task or purpose would be. The plan was to have 500 of these individuals in theatre and there was a recognition that they could have real value but they would have to be coordinated and commanded by the military within CPATT if they were to be of any enduring utility.
By the time therefore that Eikenberry had visited, compiled his report and the police working group had been put together the counter insurgency campaign had moved on pace and there was a growing urgency to fulfill the CPATT mission. CPATT were required therefore to bring all of these disparate and different strands together and try and weld it all into a coherent organization that would Organize, Train, Equip and Mentor the Iraqi Police and Border Police.

On the command and control side CG CPATT worked, initially, directly to Gen Sanchez. Gen Sanchez, at that point, had not received formal direction from DoD to proceed with the setting up of CPATT although it was clearly gathering a head of steam within Washington. The police working group was primarily his means of getting ahead with some concurrent planning ahead of the formal direction arriving. That subsequently arrived in the form of a memo from Rumsfeld that directed that CENTCOM take on the Organize, Train, Equip and Mentor mission for the IPS and Border Police.

With the formal direction received the Command and Control arrangements began to take shape although it was a chaotic and particularly fractious birth. The original plan saw CPATT coming into existence at the beginning of April 2004 but as events unfolded around Iraq it was patently obvious that we should just get on with it and as a result CPATT was formally established on 08 March 2004. CPATT established itself in a former kitchen which crammed in about 10 military and civilian officers. As CPATT expanded we stuck desks into the corridor.

Essentially CMATT was resubordinated from the CPA to CJTF-7 but with its CG being told to form an OSC (Office of Security and Cooperation), which then commanded both CMATT and CPATT. The organizational model had both CPATT and CMATT sharing the same central staff – all of whom were CMATT one day but OSC the next and therefore responsible for CPATT staff functions as well. Numerous frictions were caused by the speed of this re-organization.

CPATT was also in a separate part of the building from CMATT and MG Eaton which had its benefits in that we just got on with the Organize, Train, Equip and Mentor mission with minimum interference. Gen Sanchez, to all intent and purposes continued to have CPATT working directly to him as he really did understand what was required. Another aspect worth highlighting was that the ‘policy’ ownership issue became a real bone of contention without anyone really understanding that there was no ‘policy’. The issue was, of course, military control over a civil function but given the lack of progress it was inevitable that the military would have to take on the task of rebuilding the Iraqi police and border force.

A compromise on policy was eventually hammered out that had the head of CPATT Brigadier General Andrew Mackay reporting to two bosses. The CG of the OSC (eventually to become MNSTC-I with LTG Petraeus arrival in June 2004) and the 3* US civilian head of the MoI within the CPA. The involvement of the latter allowed everyone to state that policy direction of a civil function was coming from a civilian. Not surprisingly none was ever forthcoming – it hadn’t up until then - and it was therefore developed by the military and civilian officers within CPATT.

The command and control arrangements were eventually made more coherent with the arrival of LTG Petraeus who changed the name of the organization to MNSTC-I On transition at the end of July 2004 CJTF/7 itself changed and became MNF-I (Multinational Force-Iraq)¹ and took the Corps (MNC-I: Multinational Corps-Iraq) and MNSTC-I under command…

¹ After reorganization the structure looked like this:
Brigadier General Andrew Mackay reported:

…the re-organization and subsequent aligning of functions and responsibility in the creation of CPATT was a particularly brutal and fractious period. It should and could have been avoided but was absolutely necessary if progress in rebuilding the Iraqi Police Force was to be made. Too much time had been lost. Security Sector Reform is, in reality, a nascent concept and one that many people do not understand well yet the lessons from Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan were all ignored or perhaps they were lessons that had never been gathered in the first place. Convincing Washington of the virtues of quality over quantity was not easy either. The statistics being bandied about gave a false impression of what was being achieved. We did try to come up with coherent Measurement of Effectiveness but that system was only maturing as I left. There was too much concentration on the OA (Operational Analysis) effort on intelligence and info ops rather than measuring success and, as a result, were not able to articulate the considerable progress that they were actually making………..on the formation of CPATT my clear intent was to try and have the Iraqi Police and Border Force in some kind of shape to ensure the delivery of the elections in January 2005. This was, I think, achieved but by the skin of our teeth. We managed to get just enough equipment fielded, just enough training conducted, just enough mentoring into the right places and just managed to plug the various organizational or institutional capacity holes in the Ministry of Interior. To be sure the prime deliverer of the elections were the coalition forces but the Iraqi police and border police stood alongside them on election day and should, rightly, take significant credit for being there.

An American expert, who participated in a later phase of the CPATT effort, made the following points -- some of which highlight issues that a report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense and Department of State found had left an important legacy that still had a major impact on the Iraqi police and security services in mid-2005. They note that the Coalition and CPATT were very slow to provide the Iraqi police with weapons, equipment, and training they needed to operate and survive in a counterinsurgency campaign. They also highlight tensions between the Department of Defense and Department of State whose merits are hard to judge at a distance, but which struck a number of both US and British advisors as significant:

I started to recommend back in February 2004 that JIPTC modify its curriculum to place more emphasis on paramilitary training as opposed to women's rights, human rights, etc. That type of training is not unimportant for democratic policing, but it is useless if the policeman is dead. Unfortunately, the police trainers--particularly from Western Europe--were adamant about the need to train Iraqis in community and democratic policing.

When I departed in March 2005, JIPTC still did not provide firearms training to IPS recruits on anything but 9mm pistols--not terribly effective against AKs, RPKs and RPGs. The reason constantly given by JIPTC/INL management as to why the level of firearms training had not been increased was that DOS/DynCorp had contractual issues in getting the berms built to handle the firing of AK-47s. In my view this was inexcusable and reinforced a pattern of significant mismanagement of JIPTC by DOS--instances that I could detail in another venue.

… That is not to say ICITAP was perfect, but they did indeed establish and run the police training through the spring of 2004 with INL providing only funds and DynCorp providing the construction/logistics. In a political move, DOS muscled ICITAP out of the directorship of JIPTC in the spring of 2004.

When the ICITAP director and founder of JIPTC returned to Kosovo, DOS installed their own director... who so horribly mismanaged JIPTC that the UK was considering pulling their contingent…(The director) was subsequently relieved--or "promoted" in DOS speak--and a new INL director was installed. LTG Petraeus had pushed for (the director's) removal and was rebuffed by then-INL director ... Eventually, it took GEN Casey to weigh in to get (The director) removed.
…one of the significant lessons that should be learned from this effort is that a lack of unity of command and competing bureaucratic aspirations SIGNIFICANTLY hampered the IPS training and, in my view, cost lives unnecessarily. DOS is not primarily a law enforcement organization and while they contract out for police mentors through INL in various countries, DOJ/ICITAP actually is responsible for police academies. There should only be one agency responsible for law enforcement training and the Department of Justice would seem the logical choice since they maintain far more requisite knowledge in this area. INL is simply an anachronism that seeks to keep DOS "relevant" in areas where they have little expertise. What really needs to happen is a change in the funding authorizations to allow DOJ to directly fund international law enforcement training. At the moment ICITAP is dependent upon funds from INL and so the golden rule is in effect--they who hold the gold, rule.

In any case, the creation of new Iraqi security forces and police forces was anything but ideal. Paramilitary and gendarmerie-like forces were what Iraq really needed, and special elements like the Emergency Response Unit, Civil Intervention Force, and SWAT teams were vital. The Minister of the Interior’s creation of a Special Police Commando Unit – led by his cousin a former Iraqi intelligence officer and with a large number of members of the Republican Guard – was more questionable, but the unit did have considerable effectiveness. 52

**Manning and Training Issues in Mid-2004**

Data provided by the Department of Defense and Department of State in June 2004 provide additional insights into what was happening to Iraqi military, security, and police forces as of mid-2004:

- As of 25 June 2004, the CPA reported that only 5,857 out of 88,039 Iraqi police had serious academy training, although another 2,387 were in the training pipeline. No figures were made available for how many could be said to have the necessary equipment, transportation, communications, and facilities. The figures for the Department of Border Enforcement showed that 255 had postwar academy training out of a total of 18,248, plus 25 in training.

- Another study of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) showed a total force of 79,876 as of July 1, 2004, with 50,000+ untrained, 7,000 academy trained, 18,000 TIP trained, and 450 field trained. The goal was then to create a force of 85,000 by January 1, 2005, with 38,000+ untrained, 19,000 academy trained, 28,000 TIP trained, and 10,000 field trained. The goal was to create an Emergency Response Unit with high end SWAT units, Public Order Battalions with maneuver capability, counterinsurgency police regiments, highway patrol units, leadership courses, and a specialist training academy. This same plan called for the completion of the full range of IPS training facilities, including an Iraqi Police Academy, by July 2005.

- The same report indicates that the Iraqi Border Police (IBP) had 8,200 men with 400 academy trained, and the goal was then to create a force of 8,200 by January 1, 2005, with 1,800 academy trained.

- Brigadier General Andrew Mackay, the CG of CPATT, reported that only 87,000 men and women of 120,000 on the payroll could actually be accounted for. Only 6,000 police recruits out of the totals shown had police academy training as of early August 2004, with another 21,000 taking a “three week” course that was sometimes more than a week shorter. At least 60,000 men were serving in police related functions with no training. 53 The eventual goal, was a minimum of eight weeks of training.

- According to Perito, even as late as December 2004, the 90,000 men in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) called “available for duty” included 48,000 rehired officers with no more training than the three-week Transition and Integration Program (TIP) training discussed earlier, plus 18,000
rookies trained at the eight-week course in Amman. Other data provided in a background brief to the press indicated that it took until the end of 2004 to train 20,000 police.

- No figures were provided for trained manpower in the new National Guard, although 2,362 out of 39,128 were said to be “in training.” The same was true for the Iraqi Army. A total of 10,222 men were said to be in service, of which 2,316 were “in training.” The data for the Facilities Protection Service showed an active strength of 74,069. Once again, no data were provided on what portion was regarded as trained and only 77 were reported to be “in training.” The service has since been dropped from the State Department’s updates.

- Previous reporting by the CPA showed that the July 13th totals for trained manpower were almost meaningless for the Iraqi National Guard, where most men shown as “trained” were actually figures for the output of the token training program conducted for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps – when the force had a different name, role and mission. For most men involved, the total training program for most new recruits to the National Guard lasted all of two weeks, and the first week is largely orientation. There also were serious problems in paying the National Guard, and skimming off part of their pay was common at the command level. Many of those who were paid got less than $145 a month out of a pay scale that calls for a minimum of $170.

- Training in urban warfare, providing reconnaissance assets and other special equipment, were only beginning, and the few meaningful details that have been made public are not reassuring. For example, the CPA reported as it went out of business that it had decided to give the new Iraqi air force two Seeker reconnaissance aircraft to conduct surveillance of the borders and oil facilities and was rushing procurement of 14 more.

- Brigadier General James Schwitters, the US commander of the coalition training team assisting the army, stated in early August that only 3,000 of the men in the army could be regarded as trained.

It should be noted that there were special conditions in Iraq that cannot be blamed on the US effort to organize and fund the facility, equipment, and training effort. For example, both the CPA and post-CPA manpower totals were somewhat misleading because some 25-33 percent of men were on leave, in training, or absent dealing with family and pay issues at any given time, but this was a fact of life in Iraq. Many Iraqis were in mixed units and had to get home to give their families their pay as well as deal with family issues.

**Equipment Issues in Mid-2004**

The data the US provided on the equipment holdings of Iraq’s forces reflected continuing problems, although they were no worse than the overall US reporting on every aspect of the aid effort. From the start, the Department of Defense and CPA failed to provide meaningful metrics of actual progress and success, as distinguished from metrics of money spent, buildings contracted for, peak power generation capacities, etc. One of the most glaring of these failures was the inability to provide data on the progress in equipping the Iraqi security forces and giving them proper facilities – a failure matched by what may well have been the most avoidable problem in the early stages the US aid effort.

**Equipment Status Under the CPA**

According to a multinational force-planning document, units were still awaiting basic initial deliveries of uniforms, helmets, body armor, vehicles, radios, AK-47 rifles, RPK machine guns, ammunition, and night vision equipment. This was a time when a CPA
official claimed that most, if not all, of this equipment was currently flowing into the region.

A multinational force assessment noted that Iraqis within the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps felt the multinational force never took them seriously, as exhibited by what they perceived as the broken promises and the lack of trust on the part of the multinational force. Yet, initially these forces were not trained, equipped, or intended for offensive and active counterinsurgency missions. Equipment shortfalls are more than statistics. They are a measure of how many Iraqis were being put into the field without the essential equipment and facilities needed to function and survive.

These problems help explain why the Department of Defense reported the following desertion and manning problems in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps from 2-16 April: Northeastern Iraq, including the cities of Baquba and Tikrit - about 9,100 to about 6,100, or 30 percent; Baghdad and surrounding area-about 6,200 to about 3,200, or 49 percent; Central-southern Iraq, including Karbala, An Najaf, and Al Kut - about 3,500 to about 2,500, or 30 percent; Multinational Division-Center South Western Iraq, including Fallujah - about 5,600 to about 1,000, or 82 percent.58

The Equipment Effort at the End of the CPA

It is striking that it took the US government until 13 July 2004 to provide reporting on efforts to equip the Iraqi forces in anything approaching a systematic form, and that the entire system had to be revised again in August and September of 2004. This new reporting still did not provide any insights into facility problems that were still a critical weakness for virtually every element of the Iraqi security and police forces. The data also had serious category and definition problems that understated the seriousness of the CPA and CJTF-7 failure to provide effective support to the Iraqi police, security forces, and military:

○ They reported on requirements in terms of the goals set by the CPA before the transfer of power, and not on the new requirements set since April 2004. As a result, they sharply exaggerated the adequacy of the equipment for every element, and especially the National Guard, Special Forces elements, and the police.

○ The figures for weapons did not reflect the fact that current plans did not recognize the need for heavier weapons that only became part of the program once the decision was taken to create heavier forces and a mechanized brigade.

○ The figures for vehicles were based on very limited requirements, and did not reflect the need for armored/protected vehicles. The figures set for the Facilities Protection Service, covered a force of security guards with the mission of guarding and securing individual ministry and municipal building against theft and vandalism, and counting them sharply understated actual need for any kind of serious counterinsurgency/counterterrorism environment. This became a source of embarrassment in US reporting on Iraqi forces and they were not counted in the totals after August 2004.59

○ The figures for communications were generally outdated, and did not reflect the understanding that much better systems are needed if the Iraqi forces are to play an active role in counterinsurgency. As a result, some holdings were reported as zero, although limited communications are in place. The Iraqi Special Operations Forces, however, did operate with interim equipment that was adequate and often directly from the Coalition, when operations required it. The US command in Iraq feel their overall effectiveness has not been hampered by a
lack of communications equipment during operations regardless of what the equipment data reflect.

A GAO report issued in June 2004 made the following comments about the equipment effort at this time, and again reflected the analyses and complaints of the advisors in the field:

Providing equipment for Iraqi forces also posed problems. According to DOD officials, both the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps were poorly equipped in late March 2004 due to significant delays for provisioning all Iraqi security forces. According to CPA, these delays were related to several factors, including delays in contractor delivery and performance, delays in allocating and releasing the funding, and a shortage of experienced contracting officials in Baghdad. The Iraqi Police Service was beset by continued delays in equipment provisioning and a lack of awareness of equipment, funding, and contracting status. According to data from the CPA’s Provost Marshal’s Office, as of March 28, 2004, the Iraqi Police Service was operating with 41 percent of its required patrol vehicles, 63 percent of its required uniforms, 43 percent of its required pistols, 21 percent of its required hand radios, 7 percent of its required vehicle radios, and 9 percent of its required protective vests.

In March 2004, equipment provisioning for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps was months behind schedule. According to a CPA official, no Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units possessed body armor, and many were using Saddam-era helmets for protection. According to a multinational force planning document, as of April 23, 2004, units were still awaiting the delivery of uniforms, helmets, body armor, vehicles, radios, AK-47 rifles, RPK machine guns, ammunition, and night vision equipment. A CPA official stated that most, if not all, of this equipment is currently flowing into the region. A multinational force assessment noted that Iraqis within the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps felt the multinational force never took them seriously, as exhibited by what they perceived as the broken promises and the lack of trust of the multinational force.

Another report on the Iraqi Police Service provides more tangible figures. It shows that the IPS needed 3,329 more radios and 100 more police radio base stations. Plans called for one pick up truck or SUV per 3.5 officers, but the IPS had 268 out of the 3,356 pickup trucks needed and 27 out of 305 SUVs. It had one water truck out of 20 required, and one fuel truck out of 20 required. Body armor and basic weapons deliveries were still in progress.

Another measure of the scale of the IPS police equipment effort was that the Coalition had now identified a requirement for 553 police stations, 26 headquarters, 15 training academies, and 18 Joint Coordinating Centers. The Iraqi Border Police needed 85 stations, and there was an additional requirement for 87 customs and training posts. The total facilities cost was now $182 million.

**Militia and Civilian Disarmament Issues**

The United States and the Coalition made other mistakes during this period, although many of the problems in Iraqi force development during this period were also the result of mistakes and political pressure coming from Iraqi interim officials and leading Iraqi political figures in various exile movements. For much of the first year of the occupation, there was more talk about disarming Iraqi civilians and Iraq’s Shiite and Kurdish militias.. It was not until February 2004 – five months before it was disbanded – that the CPA really staffed the effort to disarm the major militias that had been key elements of the resistance to Saddam, and it only reached key agreements and began to implement them in May 2004 – when it was beginning to go out of business.
According to a GAO report, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) developed a transition and reintegration strategy for disbanding or controlling the militias in late May 2004. CPA Order 91, which was issued in early June 2004, was intended to provide legal authority for implementing a transition and reintegration process. It declared militias outside of central government control, declaring them illegal except as provided by the order and law.61

The CPA’s transition and reintegration strategy took three major approaches disbanding or controlling militias operating outside the control of Iraq’s central government: (1) recruiting militia members into officially recognized Iraqi security forces, (2) retiring some militia members with veterans’ benefits, and (3) reintegrating others into Iraq’s civil society and economy through education, training, and job placement.

On June 5, 2004, the CPA announced that nine parties that maintained militias had agreed to develop and implement transition and reintegration plans. The parties were the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Iraqi Islamic Party, Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq/Badr Organization, Iraqi National Accord, Iraqi National Congress, Iraqi Hezbollah, Iraqi Communist Party, and Da’wa.

They then included roughly 100,000 former resistance fighters. The key militias involved included the Kurdish Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) militia that claimed some 41,000 men, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK militia), that claimed 31,000. Together, they were known as the Pesh Merga, and had a nominal strength of some 72,000 men. They also included the Badr Corps with a nominal strength of 16,000-16,500, and six other militias: the Iraqi Hezbollah (not affiliated with the Lebanese Hezbollah), the Iraqi Communist Party, the Iraqi National Accord (INA), the Iraqi National Congress (INC), elements of Al Dawa (the Jafari faction), and the Iraqi Islamic Party – the only Sunni militia.

In spite of the short time involved, the CPA was able to get an agreement in early June 2004 from all nine of these militias to disband or integrate into the Iraqi forces. This agreement did not cover all militias. Several smaller militias were not contacted because they were small, difficult to contact, or politically less important. Some militias have decided to continue hostile operations against the Coalition rather than take part in the transition and reintegration process.

The agreement did, however, cover about 100,000 former resistance fighters, with phased draw-down agreements reached with six of the nine militias while the remaining three claimed to have already disbanded their fighting organizations. The CPA estimated that about 90 percent of these individuals would complete the transition and reintegration process by January 2005 – the rest would complete the process by October 2005. The CPA estimated that out of this total, about 60 percent of the militia members would transition into Iraqi security services—such as the Iraqi Armed Forces, Iraqi Police Service, or the Internal Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The Kurds agreed to transform the Pesh Merga into three elements that would still provide them with some element of security while serving the interest of the government: mountain rangers to guard the borders, a counterterrorism force, and a rapid reaction force. The other militias were to disband and either receive veterans benefits or join the Iraqi military, Civil Defense Corps (ICDC and predecessor of the National Guard), or
police. CPA Order 91 also established penalties for those who did not implement the agreement, which effectively banned any leaders and political movements that did not participate in the Iraqi political process.

Both the CPA plans, and this agreement, were coordinated with the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and Ministerial Committee for National Security. The Ministry of Labor and Social affairs and other Iraqi agencies (e.g., the Foreign Ministry, the Iraqi Intelligence Agency and Ministry of Education), came together in a body called the Transition and Reintegration Committee that was to administer the process after the transfer of authority, and in fact began to do so in late May of 2004.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs was critical to implementing one of the most innovative elements of the program: treating those in the militias opposing Saddam as if they were veterans in the Iraqi army. For example, militias with 15 years of service became eligible for pensions and those wounded with disabilities were treated as if they were soldiers. This was to be part of a $205 million program in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to provide a nation-wide job training and placement program that included significant funding for veterans and to ease the impact of both employment problems and the tensions growing out of the break up of Iraq’s regular forces.

The CPA developed phased plans to disband the militias (busing was part of the recruiting efforts, primarily of the IAF – there was no plan to move militias in mass) and plans to integrate those who wanted to join the Iraqi forces to enter the military, ICDC, and police. Quotas were established by province and city for those who wanted to join the ICDC, and broader quotas for the police – largely because the Ministry of the Interior simply did not know the short-term employment needs of local police forces.

The CPA office asked for $9.7 million for a staff of international experts and Iraqis to manage and coordinate this effort. This request was still pending when the CPA disbanded in June, though it had explicit support from the Prime Minister and the National Security Advisor. Some progress was made with elements of militias like the Badr Corps – each of the four Arab militias with T&R plans had a complete schedule for moving their designated members through IAF recruiting, and, indeed, had had at least one group of former fighters processed through the recruiting stations in Baghdad, Basra, or Mosul before the CPA went out of business (some, such as the Badr Corps, had several). Such arrangements were not needed for the Pesh Merga, as there were Pesh Merga Transition Offices (established by the CJTF – 7) in Iraqi Kurdistan that assisted with transition efforts there.

There were some weapons recoveries, but they were limited and fell behind the goals originally set. For example, the CPA set a ceiling of $1.5 million for a MANPADS weapons buyback program using funds seized from the Iraqi government, but only found it useful to commit $610,000, and had only expended $320,000 at the time it ceased to exist. The pattern of attacks as of early August 2004 indicated the program had had little or no impact.

The team the CPA put together was able to achieve a great deal in its negotiations, but the effort began too late to be implemented while the CPA was still in power, and the new Iraqi government failed to implement it. As part of the transfer of power, the Ministry of
Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs all gained new Ministers and none gave implementing the CPA’s plans any serious priority.

The new Minister of Defense resisted any effort to integrate any militia in a movement with a religious character into the armed forces, and the new Minister of Finance did not implement the Prime Minister’s decision to fund the $9.7 million program recommended under the CPA. Even more seriously, the new minister of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs cancelled the nation-wide job training and placement program, effectively eliminating one of the key aspects of the Veterans program for either the militia personnel who qualified or those in the Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein.

The situation grew steadily worse as it became clear that Sadr’s Mehdi Army posed a threat to the Shi’ite and other militias operating in the south and the east, and the insurgency steadily grew in strength. It became clear that CPA Order 91 was effectively dead, and that the Iraqi Interim Government could not afford to take action against leaders and parties simply because they maintained militias. The fighting against Sadr then further reinforced the reluctance of such militias and parties to comply.

As a result, the militias continued to be a serious potential problem, and one that became all too apparent in June 2005, when senior ministers endorsed using militias like the Pesh Merga and the Badr Brigade against Sunni insurgents. Ethnic and sectarian militias present a continuing risk that ethnic and sectarian forces could trigger civil fighting. By the early summer of 2005, some Sunni groups were charging that such militias were detaining and killing Sunnis – compounding the risk that the insurgency might take on the form of a more serious civil war.

This situation has continued to degenerate, and the militias present a serious problem if the Iraqi political process collapses and Iraq moves towards civil war. The largely ethnic (Kurdish Pesh Merga) and sectarian (various Shi’ite factions) units in the military and security forces are sources of considerable tension when they operate in Sunni and mixed areas and sometimes use excessive force or violate human rights. Ex-militia forces are a major problem in the Shi’ite south. They sometimes bypass or ignore the official police, act as Shi’ite religious enforcers, and clash with other Shi’ite factions. They could help divide Iraqi forces along ethnic and sectarian lines if Iraq’s political process fails and they increase the risk of serious civil war.

The one positive development since these efforts has been that the near collapse of Sadr’s militia, following fighting in the south in late 2004, seems to have removed any immediate threat his militia will pose to the Iraqi government and MNF-I. Unfortunately, efforts to disband and disarm the remaining militias may at best be an administrative fiction until the Kurdish, Shi’ite, and Sunni groups involved become convinced that the new government is legitimate, will serve their interests, and can provide true security.

If these groups should agree to demobilize, the legal basis for such a program remains in place. Moreover, converting a substantial part of the Pesh Merga to a border security force might help deal with the most serious problem Iraq faces, which is to integrate the Kurds into a federal system where they are truly part of an Iraqi nation but still feel secure. Converting and disbanding the Shi’ite militias should also become progressively easier if the Iraqi government demonstrates that the Shi’ite majority has finally achieved a fair share of power and the nation’s wealth.
The fact remains, however, that massive amounts of arms will almost certainly continue to be hidden or be readily available, given the number of arms already disbursed among Iraq's population. Moreover, reconstituting or creating new militias will be all too easy if ethnic and sectarian differences become violent, and Lebanon and the Balkans are clear warnings that “national” military, security, and police forces can suddenly fracture along partisan lines and become instruments of civil war.

**The HUMINT Problem**

The problems in creating effective Iraqi forces greatly complicated the difficulties the US had in obtaining the intelligence it needed to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. The US initially tried to use the same technical intelligence means it brought to the theater to deal with Iraq’s regular military forces as it did to deal with the rising threat of insurgency and terrorism. While such systems could be adapted to provide information of great value, they could not provide the level of political detail, situational awareness, and other information that could only come from human sources and networking with Iraqis.

The US then tried to develop effective human intelligence (HUMINT) largely on its own, relying on the interface between Iraqis and US officers and intelligence experts, rather than creating a partnership with the Iraqis in which Iraqis played a major role in the intelligence collection and analysis effort.

The US initially tried to create a network of informers and local contacts and carry out analysis on its own, rather than create effective Iraqi intelligence collection and analysis, and rely on Iraqis due to its lack of area and language skills and understanding of local political and tactical conditions. While the situation had improved by mid-2005, Iraqi intelligence was still in its early formative stages, training and equipment was limited, and senior Iraqi ministers and officials saw the Iraqi effort as weak and badly needing additional US support. Iraqi battalions and field units did seem to be developing better HUMINT and networks of informers, but the overall structure was very weak at the brigade headquarters level and all higher levels.

Iraqi operations had to depend heavily on Coalition inputs, and effective training was just beginning to be developed and put in place. Deep divisions existed within the new Iraqi government over how much various elements of the new Iraqi intelligence efforts could be trusted. This led to serious tensions over the new national intelligence service and even ministers in the newly elected government charged that the US and CIA were still controlling the service and would not turn it over to Iraq. The functional problem had become a political one, fueling all of the endemic conspiracy theories about US motives and intentions.

Creating such “partner” organizations is anything but easy, and creates a host of political and security problems. At the same time, one of the critical lessons of Vietnam was that the US and its outside allies simply could not create intelligence networks with the scale and access necessary to substitute for effective national intelligence, security, and police efforts, and that language, access, and local expertise are critical elements of HUMINT in dealing with insurgency and terrorism on a national scale. The US simply did not have the capability in terms of expertise and access to suddenly improvise a largely autonomous HUMINT effort as a substitute for partnership with an intelligence
organization run by local allies. It needed Iraqi help and was far too slow to create the kind of help it needed.
V. The Fall of 2004: The Effort to Train Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces Slowly Begins to Gather Momentum

As summer faded into fall, the reorganization of the training and equipment effort that had begun in the spring of 2004 did begin to gather momentum and to have more effect. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-1) began to get the manning levels it needed to be effective. It also was now organized into three key elements dealing with the military, security, and police forces, and with senior US and British commanders. These three elements included:

○ Military

  - CMATT - Coalition Military Assistance Training Team: Organizes, trains, and equips the Iraqi Armed Forces. During operations, provides ongoing mentoring and advising to Iraqi leaders at all levels of command. Assists the MoD leadership in developing accession sources and leadership programs across all services of the Iraqi Armed Forces. End state is the development of an Iraqi Armed Forces capable of planning and conducting unilateral operations in order to maintain security within Iraq and defend its sovereignty.

  - JHQ - Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team: Mentors and assists the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in order to become capable of exercising effective national command and control of the IAF, contributing to the IAF capability development process and, in partnership with coalition forces, contributing to improving the internal security situation within Iraq.

○ Police

  - CPATT - Civilian Police Assistance Training Team: Organize, train, equip and mentor the Iraqi Civilian Police Forces and Department of Border Enforcement forces and monitor, advise and certify the Facilities Protection Service forces in order to develop capable and credible Iraqi security forces.

Creating More Effective Core Forces

Various elements of the Iraqi Army and National Guard were also slowly becoming more active. Small elements of Iraqi combat forces became active in a number of high-threat areas like Samarra, Sadr City, Najaf, Fallujah, and Mosul. Chronologies of these operations are provided in the Operational Readiness sections.

The total number of capable forces remained small, however, and the total manpower in mission-capable units was far lower than figures for total ISF manpower and training manpower in Figure 2 below might indicate. The core force of combat-capable Iraqi units, however, still consisted of only six army and Intervention Force battalions with an authorized strength of roughly 700 men each (total of 4,200 men). Six more army and Intervention Force battalions were supposed to be ready by the end of October (for a total of 8,400 men), but the State Department Iraqi Military Forces Update report issued as late as November 3, 2004 indicated that only 3,987 army and Intervention Force soldiers were active.

Looking back at these data, only six battalions were operational in the fall of 2004, and those had limited combat capabilities and were dependent on US support. Regular Army
and Iraqi Intervention Forces reported as fully trained and equipped totaled 6,323, but this figure included several hundred men at the brigade level and higher headquarters, and included a number of AWOLs that were subsequently dropped from the rolls and which can be seen in subsequent reports.

Nevertheless, the few combat elements that were given enough training and equipment to make them combat-ready began to play a larger role. More importantly, the Coalition advisory team placed more and more emphasis on leadership and unit integrity, and less and less emphasis on sheer numbers. It pressed harder to reward effective leaders and remove weak ones. It also attempted to compensate for the lack of trained units and cadres by stiffening weak units with officers and enlisted men until they could function, rather than on replacing weak units with new units that might be just as weak. This emphasis on leadership and unit integrity is scarcely a new lesson of warfighting, but is a critical warning of the dangers of focusing on throughput and end-strength, rather than meaningful capability.

Two Iraqi Army battalions, a commando battalion, a counterterrorist force, and two National Guard battalions were active in the fighting in Najaf in October 2003. Approximately 2,000 Iraqis were involved in the operation in Samarra, and another 2,000 Iraqi soldiers fought in Fallujah. These troops still lacked the experience, armor, and heavy weapons to take lead roles in combat without substantial US support, and some elements presented problems, but they steadily improved their performance over time.

This core force increased steadily in the fall of 2004, and the groundwork was laid for creating a much larger Iraqi force structure. The Coalition had trained an additional twelve battalions of Regular Army and Intervention Forces by the end of December, bringing the total of these battalions to 18. In addition, six brigade headquarters and three division headquarters had been formed. Command and control mechanisms within the Army had improved, with one division establishing a command post in Fallujah to assist in the command and control of Iraqi forces that were operating under the operational control of the Multi-National Force. The total number in those 18 battalions and higher headquarters totaled 9,660, indicating that a number of units were operating at low strength.

The Ministry of Defense implemented a system to recruit and train former Army soldiers, and the first replacements from that pool began flowing into units by the last week of December. This proved to be a more viable replacement system, but still had serious problems. The goal was to have 27 battalions (18,900 men) ready for the Iraqi elections at the end of January. Due to infrastructure delays at two separate locations, however, the training of five battalions of the Regular Army was delayed two to four weeks. A total of five battalions were slated to complete their initial training in February.

The training and equipment effort began to go beyond creating infantry units, and a mechanized brigade was being created. At this point, the unit was planned to consist of 50 T-55 tanks, 48 BMP-1s, 57 MTLBs, and 36 Spartans. The unit was titled the 1st Mechanized Brigade, and 259 soldiers of the first battalion were in training. These men were being trained to handle 10 MTLBs in the near future. There were plans for additional battalions, and the MNSTC-I hoped to have the one battalion ready for the elections.

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Major progress was being made in the construction and repair of military facilities. More than one billion dollars had been spent, or was under contract, in this effort by October 2004. There was a joint command headquarters operating and Iraqi military officials regarded it as a high status appointment. Five major bases for brigade-size forces, to include three with divisional headquarters, had been built. Police stations were being renovated, and a total of 41 border forts were completed, including 27 in the north. Roughly 300 were then planned.

The Iraqis had also developed a concept for their own training command, modeled on a NATO-developed design. The goal for the command was to eventually oversee seven basic training centers, several branch training centers, officer military Academies, and other officer professional development schools to include a staff college. While fully implementing this plan was planned to take at least two years, important initial efforts were underway, and the very fact such a plan existed was a sign of progress.

**Manning, Training, and Equipment of the Overall Mix of Iraqi Forces by Major Force Element**

Total active strength went down as largely incapable forces were omitted from the count, but the total of forces with meaningful mission capability increased. While the US Government continued to provide only limited details as to the progress made in training and equipment, and provided no breakouts on the number and adequacy of bases and facilities, the Department of Defense did report enough data on Iraqi manpower, training and equipment as of late September 2004 to provide the quantitative breakout shown in Figure 2.
## Figure 2

**Iraq Manpower, Training and Equipment as of September 22, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Manning Required</th>
<th>Manning Actual</th>
<th>Untrained</th>
<th>Training In</th>
<th>Training Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>12,699</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,910</td>
<td>4,789</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>61,904</td>
<td>41,461</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,189</td>
<td>39,272</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Intervention Force</td>
<td>6,584</td>
<td>7,417</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,489</td>
<td>1,928</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Special Ops Forces</td>
<td>1,967</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Force</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>98,366</strong></td>
<td><strong>62,822</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,832</strong></td>
<td><strong>46,990</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Weapons Required On-Hand</th>
<th>Vehicles Required On-Hand</th>
<th>Communications Required On-Hand</th>
<th>Body Armor Required On-Hand</th>
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<td>Army</td>
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<td>2,298</td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>20,949</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>68,760</td>
<td>2,142</td>
<td>11,209</td>
<td>62,032</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Intervention Force</td>
<td>8,850</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>1,789</td>
<td>6,584</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Special Ops Forces</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>605</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Force</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>409</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>103,983</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,252</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,983</strong></td>
<td><strong>92,096</strong></td>
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These data reflected a far greater rate progress that had existed as late as June 2004, and some $1.8 billion in additional IRRF funds were allocated to the security sector in October 2004. At the same time there were still major problems in the Iraqi forces counted in these totals as of September 2004:

- The manpower totals did not reflect the fact 25-33 percent of men were on leave or in training at any given time. Many men were in units deployed a considerable distance from their home, and had to travel to give their families their pay and deal with family issues.

- Figures for training had a somewhat uncertain meaning since they included all men trained or in training, but their training was sometimes limited or did not prepare them for demanding aspects of their mission. At the same time, US experts involved in the training process felt that the numbers reported as “trained” did indicate that those counted had at least completed their initial training and were equipped sufficiently to conduct security operations. For many of those reported, the level of their actual training also exceeded basic training because of prior experience or experience in the field. Some had already participated in combat, to include those in the National Guard. Although National Guard initial training is only three weeks, Coalition units were working closely with many National Guard units to develop their capabilities. The short initial training of these units was not, in many cases, a good indicator of their capabilities.

- The total armed forces, however, had only 55 percent of the weapons authorized for their prior force structure, half of authorized total of 4,421 vehicles, 28 percent of communications, and 46 percent of body armor.

- The weapons data shown only included small arms and light crew served weapons, and did not reflect Iraqi and US plans to create heavier forces with armor.
Some armor was being delivered; including at least 35 reconditioned Iraqi tanks, armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and armored personnel carriers (APCs) and 50 armored cars from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The MNSTC-I had been promised armor for more Iraqi mechanized units from Jordan and the United Arab Emirates that was slowly delivered.

The DoD stated totals for communications equipment were misleading, because: “Some radios are on-hand, but they are interim capability only.” US advisors feel that civilian and other radios bought as part of the CERP program are adequate, and communications are much better than statistics show.

The Army had 12,699 actives trained or in training, out of which was then a 27,000 man-authorized force, and its manpower, equipment, and training effort can be summarized as follows:

- Of active strength, 4,789 were defined as trained (3 weeks for former military and 8 weeks for new recruits; the vast majority went through the 8 week course). This total was roughly 18 percent of authorized strength and 38 percent of men actually on duty.
- Equipment holdings, as of mid-September, were 65 percent of authorized weapons, 77 percent of vehicles, 29 percent of communications, and 30 percent of body armor.
- Training was sufficiently limited so new forces normally needed 6-8 weeks of working with US forces. There were exceptions, where units were rapidly formed out of experienced army personnel, and some company and battalion-sized MoD and MoI, fought well.
- The Iraqi commandos formed by the MoD had proven to be a well-trained and effective source of manpower.

The Iraqi National Guard was Iraq’s largest force, but most of it was not a “combat ready” force, even in terms of local security duty. Its status can be summarized as follows:

- It had 41,461 actives vs. requirement for 61,904. Claims that 39,272 were trained and 2,189 were in training ignored the fact that basic training was limited and generally did not prepare most forces for more than limited counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions. At the same time, follow-on training with Coalition forces did help prepare them for such operations, and many units gained experience by conducting “framework operations,” which played a significant role in the counterinsurgency conflict.
- 40 of the 44 National Guard Battalions were operating in some way with Coalition forces throughout the country -- although most in very limited security missions. All except those in the Fallujah-Ramadi area were carrying out joint operations with Coalition forces on a daily basis.
- There were some effective, combat ready elements, but only of battalion size or smaller.
- Equipment holdings, as of mid-September, were 55 percent of authorized weapons, 34 percent of vehicles, 4 percent of communications, and 38 percent of body armor.

The Iraqi Intervention Force was being trained as a counterinsurgency force, but was still being formed. It had 7,417 men active for a force with an authorized strength of only 6,584:

- DoD reported that 29 percent (of authorized strength) had been trained in the 14-week initial training program.
Equipment was 37 percent of authorized weapons, 26 percent of vehicles, 86 percent of communications, and 41 percent of body armor, indicating that all of those trained had been equipped.

The creation of specialized counterterrorism/counterinsurgency elements was underway, and by September, some of these units had conducted operations with Coalition forces in Najaf.

Iraqi Special Operations Forces was another specialized counterinsurgency force whose development was underway. This force was then more combat experienced and proven than any other force in Iraqi service, but had 651 men active for a force with an authorized strength of 1,967:

- DoD reported that 88 percent of actives had some training, and that 29 percent of the fully authorized force was trained and fielded. It stated that the force would grow once the conditions for doing so are in place and properly set.
- Equipment included 67 percent of authorized weapons, 37 percent of vehicles, 10 percent of communications, and 37 percent of body armor, indicating that equipment levels were becoming more sufficient for those who were trained and conducting operations with the exception of communications. Interim communications (which often refers to equipment provided by Coalition forces) were available when required.
- The new Civil Intervention Force and Emergency Response Unit, which were other key elements in the counterinsurgency plans developed by Allawi, were just beginning to form. Both of these forces were conceived by the Coalition between April and June. The Civil Intervention Force had not yet begun training. The Emergency Response Unit had started training with roughly 25 percent of the force having completed initial training and conducting operations.

The Iraqi Air Force and Coastal Defense Force were still only token forces. The Department of Defense reported that the Air Force then had zero percent of authorized weapons, 12 percent of vehicles, zero percent of communications, and zero percent of body armor.

**Equipment Holdings**

The data summarized in Figure 2 revealed there were still massive shortfalls in weapons, vehicles, communications, and body armor relative to the planned requirement. The data showed Iraqi forces only had about 40 percent of their minimum weapons needs, less than one-third of the minimum number of vehicles, about 25 percent of the necessary communications gear, and about 25 percent of the necessary body armor.

At the same time, the data summarized in Figure 2 showed that the mix of weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment authorized in MNSTC-I plans now generally kept pace with the schedule for training and expanding Iraqi Security Forces. Individuals and units had the equipment they needed to continue their collective (unit-level) training and conduct security operations in an environment where they were needed.

- The regular military had about two-thirds of the minimum requirements for weapons, about half the necessary vehicles, 20 percent of the necessary body armor. All of this equipment was new or reconditioned. The Iraqis did complain about the ambulances provided in the fall of 2004, but MNSTC-I has acquired or ordered new ambulances to replace those that were judged unsatisfactory.

The new Iraqi Intervention Force and Iraqi Special Operations Force were still in development. However, the Iraqi Intervention Force Brigade that had completed training was equipped, and the
Iraqi Special Forces soldiers who were conducting actual operations were equipped. Equipment was on order for the remainder, evident by the fact that all three brigades of the IIF are now trained and equipped.

- The air force and coastal defense force were still hollow forces with little meaningful capability. However, there were equipment plans for both forces, and both forces were developing initial capabilities in September.
- The security forces and police had about 40 percent of their minimum weapons requirements, and a third of their authorized vehicles. They have only about 25 percent of the necessary body armor, and their crippling communications shortfalls are even worse than that of the Iraqi military.

These figures again show that far too many Iraqis were being exposed to insurgent and terrorist attack without having the weapons and protection they needed to perform their missions and survive. They do reflect some positive trends, but it is not possible to put them in perspective.

**Iraqi Minister of Defense Briefing — September 22, 2004**

The US was not the only source of information on the problems in the force development effort. The Iraqi Minister of Defense gave a briefing in Washington on September 22 where he discussed problems that he perceived in the training and equipment effort. He did note that some $1.7 billion had been spent to augment the Iraqi forces. Additionally, he highlighted the fact that Iraqi pilots were beginning to use two Seeker light reconnaissance aircraft to cover the border areas and that it was the first role the Iraqi Air Force had played.

He also stated, however, that the police and Border Enforcement forces were corrupt, frequently did not show up for work, and have many loyalty issues. The minister labelled them “70,000 men filled with corruption.” He repeated that the National Guard and Army had elements with the same problems and that some would be purged due to their loyalty to Sadr or their unwillingness to fight. The minister declared that past training efforts had failed to screen and ensure loyalty.

Furthermore, the minister highlighted the fact that the vehicle pool for the military and security forces consisted mostly of 3,000 vehicles transferred from former civilian ministries like Agriculture. Problems with equipment extended to the weaponry the Iraqi security forces employed. They lacked armor and heavy weaponry. The minister attributed this largely to the CPA’s fear that the weapons would be turned over to hostile forces.

**Resources as of September and October 2004**

The data on US expenditures to support the force development effort presented in US reporting on the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) as of October 2004, indicated that the US had dispersed $798 million for its Security and Law Enforcement Program at a rate of only $8 million a week. It should be noted, however, that the lag between the receipt of goods or services and payment for them was sometimes months long, and affected the time when the payment actually showed up in the accounting system. These totals also ignore expenditures made under the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).
The true total for such spending was higher, because the figures just quoted only cover the FY2004 program. Some $51.2 million had previously been allocated to the Iraqi army in PL-108-11 April 2003. At the urging of the US Embassy, an additional $1,808.6 million out of the FY2004 total funding for the Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program (IIRP) was reprogrammed to “security and law enforcement” in September 2004.

Unfortunately, the way in which the US government reported on such aid expenditures in Iraq continued to make it almost impossible to reconcile the various reports coming out of the Department of Defense and Department of State. For example, the Inspector General of the CPA reported on October 30, 2004 that, “As of March 2004, the US had obligated about $58.5 billion to stabilize the security situation in Iraq: About $57.3 billion for the US military operations and $1.2 billion for Iraqi security forces.” Embassy and MNSTC-I officials also report that accounting and corruption were serious problems both on a project basis and in areas like CERP.

To put such reports in broader perspective, the original program level for all aspects of publicly identified security expenditures in the $18.4 billion FY2004 aid program was $3,235 million. This was raised to a $5,045 million program for the FY2004 fiscal year because of reprogramming on September 30, 2004 ($1,808.6 million was reprogrammed to “security and law enforcement”).

In any case, these figures illustrate the slow pace of the US effort to create effective Iraqi forces at the time, although they also reflect the disparity between a large Coalition force presence in Iraq and the initial buildup of Iraqi Security Forces, and the problems in trying to rapidly create effective Iraqi forces in a country with poor infrastructure, limited administrative capabilities, and wracked by an insurgency.

**Operational Readiness at the End of 2004**

Operational readiness remained very low, but Iraqi forces had begun to play a somewhat stronger role in the counterinsurgency campaign. The following chronology records operational progress, and setbacks for the Iraqi security forces:

- **September 2004**—Prime Minister Allawi and President Bush both state that there are 100,000 fully trained and equipped Iraqis providing security in Iraq. NATO ambassadors agree to send 200 trainers to help rebuild the Iraqi army. The First Infantry Division arrests a senior commander of the Diyala Province’s Iraqi National Guard, alleging that he maintained ties to insurgents. The end manning goal of the Iraqi National Guard increases from 41,000 to 61,900 as does the end manning goal for Border Enforcement, from 16,300 to 32,000. The end manning goal for the Iraqi police increases from 90,000 to 135,000.

- **September 6, 2004**—7 US soldiers and three Iraqi soldiers are killed by a car bomb outside of Fallujah.

- **September 10, 2004**—The Fallujah Brigade disbands without having secured the city. A small riot breaks out as people leave a mosque. Iraqi police fire into the crowd killing two people and injuring five. Aides to al-Sadr claim that the dead and injured were unarmed.

- **September 14, 2004**—12 policemen are killed in Baquba by a drive by shooter. 47 Iraqis are killed and 114 are wounded by a car bomb outside a military recruitment area. The recruits were forced to stand outside blast absorbing concrete barriers. The ensuing crowd curses the US and blames US warplanes for the attack. Elements associated with Abu Musab Zarqawi claim credit for both attacks.

- **September 17, 2004**—13 are killed by a suicide car bomb near a police checkpoint in Baghdad.
September 18, 2004—A suicide car bomb kills 19 and wounds 67 more in Kirkuk. The bomber targeted a crowd of young men seeking employment with the Iraqi National Guard.

September 19, 2004—A car bomb aimed at a joint Iraqi-US patrol near Samarra kills one Iraqi soldier, one Iraqi civilian, and wounds seven others.

September 21, 2004—An insurgent abandons a car loaded with explosives near the Iraqi National Guard recruiting center in the Jamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad. No one was hurt.

September 22, 2004—The Iraqi National Guard center in the Jamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad is hit by a suicide car bomb that kills at least 11 and wounded an unknown number. Recruits had gathered around the center and were apparently the target.

September 23, 2004—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testifies that since May 1, 2003, 721 Iraqi personnel have died providing their country with security.

September 25, 2004—Seven Iraqi National Guard applicants die in the Jamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad at the hands of insurgents. A US army soldier faces 25 years in jail for his part in the death of an Iraqi National Guardsmen in Adwar in May. An Iraqi police captain, Salman Turki al-Shamani, is killed by insurgents near Baquba.

September 26, 2004—Two suicide car bombers try to drive into a base used by US Marines and Iraqi National Guardsmen in Karma, near Fallujah. When challenged, they detonate the cars. No injuries are reported.

October 2004—The Highway Patrol and the Dignitary Protection service are established with end Manning goals of 1,500 and 500 men each.

October 1, 2004—3,000 US and 2,000 Iraqi forces launch an assault on the approximately 500 militants controlling the city of Samarra, an area 60 miles north of Fallujah. Estimates now indicate that the Iraqi security forces will need to number some 346,700 men, double the estimate from October 2003.

October 4, 2004—General James Jones, NATO’s commander, announces that up to 3,000 NATO troops could be involved in the training of Iraqi security forces. US and Iraqi forces take Samarra, killing 100 militants. Iraqi units fight with distinction and capture 24 suspected foreign fighters. Three car bombs, two in Baghdad and one in the west, kill at least 26 people and wound more than 100 others. Iraqi security forces fight a gun battle in downtown Baghdad after one of the blasts. One of the suicide bombers rams a recruiting center for Iraqi plainclothes policemen.

October 5, 2004—An estimated 3,000 US and Iraqi troops begin a campaign designed to wrest control of insurgent-held areas of the Babil Province. Iraqi Special Forces play a prominent role in the subsequent raids.

October 6, 2004—A suicide bomber drives an explosives-laden vehicle into an Iraqi checkpoint at the Iraqi national guard encampment near Anah, 160 miles northwest of Baghdad. Approximately 1,200 members of the 202nd Iraqi National Guard, 7th Army Battalion, and 1st Ministry of Interior commando battalion are designated to stay in Samarra. The governor pledges to send 1,500 additional police officers.

October 9, 2004—11 Iraqi National Guardsmen are killed and six others injured during an insurgent attack on the National Guard compound located in Karabilah, near the Syrian border. NATO declares its commitment to sending 300 military trainers to Iraq after stiff resistance, especially from France. The program is unlikely to be in place until the end of the year.

October 10, 2004—Iraqi National Guardsmen assist in a border operation that results in the deaths of two insurgents or smugglers. At least 10 Iraqis die in explosions near the oil ministry and police academy.

October 12, 2004—in Ramadi, a joint force of US and Iraqi troops arrests a Sunni cleric, Sheik Abdul Aleem Saidy, and his son. Iraqi police in Sadr City continue buying heavy weapons from al-Sadr’s militia forces.

October 15, 2004—A suicide car bomber narrowly misses a unit of Iraqi police on patrol, killing 10 bystanders.
○ **October 19, 2004**—Four Iraqi national guardsmen are killed and 80 are injured in a mortar attack 80 miles north of Baghdad. Insurgents unsuccessfully try to assassinate Col. Mohamed Essa Baher, the commander of the 507th Iraqi National Guard Battalion. Baher had identified a financier allegedly a part of the Zarqawi terror network the day before the attack.

○ **October 23, 2004**—Three minibuses filled with 49 Iraqi recruits for the 16th Iraqi Army Battalion, 7th Army Brigade are ambushed by insurgents dressed as Iraqi police. All 49, as well as 3 accompanying civilians, are killed. The ambush takes place as the recruits leave a training base in Kirkush, 15 miles from the Iranian border and northeast of Baghdad. This is the single most deadly insurgent ambush to date. Several Iraqi National Guardsmen are killed by a car bomb at a checkpoint south of Samarra. At least four are killed. Another car bomb kills between 10 and 16 Iraqi policemen at a checkpoint outside of the Marine base in Al Asad in the Anbar Province.

○ **October 25, 2004**—An Iraqi national security aide declares that up to 5% of Iraq’s security forces are most likely infiltrated by insurgents.

○ **October 26, 2004**—Prime Minister Allawi blames the US and its Coalition allies for the massacre of the 49 Iraqi army recruits. Iraq’s interior minister, Falah al-Naqib, announces a new campaign to rid the police force of corrupt and ineffective members. The militant group, the Army of Ansar al-Sunna, claims responsibility for the murder of 11 Iraqi National Guardsmen it had captured on the road between Hilla and Baghdad.

○ **October 28, 2004**—Two senior Iraqi police officers are killed near Latifiya, south of Baghdad, allegedly by the Army of Ansar al-Sunna.

○ **October 30, 2004**—Iraqi police officers allegedly fired indiscriminately on civilians after an attack on an American convoy south of Baghdad. Reportedly, the police direct their fire on three minibuses and three vans, killing 14 and wounding 10.

○ **November 2, 2004**—A car bomb intended for an Iraqi security convoy kills four Iraqi civilians and wounds 12 Iraqi National Guardsmen in Mosul. NATO begins its first eight-week training course for security personnel at its Joint Warfare Centre in Norway. Nineteen mid to high-level officials from the Iraqi military, Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior attend.

○ **November 3, 2004**—Three decapitated bodies of Iraqi National Guardsmen are found underneath the 14th of July Bridge in Baghdad. A group calling itself the Brigades of the Iraqi Honorables claims responsibility for killing the three men. Ansar al-Sunna posts pictures of another decapitation on the Internet, claiming that the victim is Maj. Hussein Shanoun, an officer in the new Iraqi army.

○ **November 6, 2004**—More than 15 Iraqi police officers are killed by a series of closely coordinated assaults against police stations in Samarra. In addition, an Iraqi National Guard Commander, Abdel Razeq Shaker Garmali, is among those killed in Samarra.

○ **November 7, 2004**—Insurgents launch an attack against a police station in the town of Haditha, taking 21 policemen hostage. The insurgents kill all of them execution-style. In another attack on a police station in the town of Haqlaniya, insurgents kill the head of security in western Iraq, Brigadier Shaheer al-Jughaifi. Unknown gunmen kill Iraqi police Col. Abdul Adim Abed in the Mualmeen neighborhood of Baquba. The director of security in Sulaimaniyah, Brigadier Sarkout Hassan Jalal, claims that Islamic militants regularly smuggle recruits from Iran into Iraq and on to Fallujah and other “hotspots.” The Iraqi government declares a state of emergency for 60 days with the exception of the northern Kurdish regions. The declaration coincides with the beginning stages of an assault on the restive city of Fallujah. Iraqi commandos from the 36th Iraqi Commando Battalion supported by US Marines take control of Fallujah’s main hospital just prior to the declaration.

○ **November 8, 2004**—The battle for Fallujah begins. Approximately 10,000 US troops and 2,000 Iraqi forces confront 3,000 to 5,000 insurgents. Iraqi commandos seize a hospital and a railway station. The hospital was the focal point of erroneous casualty reports following the first assault on Fallujah.

○ **November 9, 2004**—Two police stations in Baquba are attacked. One police officer is killed and eight are wounded. Reportedly, the police stand their ground and fight well. Elsewhere, a suicide car bomb strikes an Iraqi National Guard base north of Kirkuk, killing at least three. Prime Minister Allawi visits Camp Fallujah and gives a speech in front of the assembled Iraqi forces. The prime minister’s speech is met with praise and cheers.

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○ **November 10, 2004**—Insurgents loot and strip an Iraqi National Guard base in the town of Hammam al-Alil. The National Guard battalion stationed there falls apart when attacked, leaving the base, armory and all, to the militants. Two members of the Iraqi security forces are reported killed in action in Fallujah. Prime Minister Ayad Allawi places Maj. Gen. Abdul Qader Mohammed Jassim, the Iraqi ground forces commander in Fallujah, in control of the Western Anbar province until a civilian authority can be appointed. In Fallujah, the 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade of the Iraqi Intervention Force begins operations against the insurgents in Fallujah on its own and controls one part of the city by itself. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade aids US forces in bringing the Hydra Mosque under control. The 4th Battalion, 1st Brigade, and the Iraqi Police Service’s Emergency Response Unit see action. The 5th Battalion, 3rd Brigade helps US forces subdue insurgents in the Al Tawfiq Mosque. The 6th Battalion, 3rd Brigade mans vehicle checkpoints with US forces in the heart of Fallujah.

○ **November 11, 2004**—An Iraqi police vehicle and an American convoy are attacked by a suicide car bomber in central Baghdad. Nineteen people are killed. In Mosul, reports indicate that insurgents openly roam the streets and repeatedly attack police stations and government facilities. The insurgents, numbering between 400 and 500, split into groups of 15-20 to carry out attacks. Several police stations are burned to the ground despite pleas from imams via mosque loudspeakers. Insurgents seize control of six to seven police stations for the better part of an hour. When they are repelled, the fighters seize vehicles, weapons, body armor, radios, and uniforms. One senior police officer, the brother of Mosul’s police chief, is shot dead in his front yard. Fighters attack the Iraq Media Network. Brigadier General Carter Ham, commander of Task Force Olympia, states that he has never seen the level of command and control exhibited by the insurgents prior to today. Ten Iraqi National Guard troops die in the fighting. In response, US soldiers and members of the Iraqi National Guard raid southern portions of the city. In Fallujah, US and Iraqi forces seize control of 70% of the city. A total of nine Iraqi security force members are wounded.

○ **November 12, 2004**—The 1st battalion of the new Iraqi army encounters stiff resistance in the Jolan section of Fallujah. Brigadier Abdul Hussain Mahmoud Badar arrives in the Maysan province to take command of the Iraqi National Guard 73rd Brigade. Badar flees the same day, having been verbally threatened by individuals who claimed to be actively involved in the insurgency.

○ **November 13, 2004**—Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Allawi declares Fallujah liberated. Insurgents launch two attacks on an Iraqi National Guard base near Mosul, killing two guardsmen and wounding 21.

○ **November 14, 2004**—A total of six Iraqi military personnel are reported killed and more than 40 wounded in the fighting in Fallujah. Reports indicate that Iraqis are taking over the screening process for police recruits and are firing thousands for incompetence or inaction. Iraqi sources state that such competence or corruption in the police led to the death of the 49 recruits last month. Reports indicate the firing of the police chiefs in both Samarra and Mosul following waves of insurgent attacks. The same reports state that Iraqi military officials have raised the recruiting age from 17 to 20, require a letter of approval from a local community council for each recruit, require that recruits must have a family member in the service to be eligible, and that committees will be sent to recruits’ neighborhoods to investigate their morality.

○ **November 15, 2004**—Insurgents attack two police stations in Baquba. Elements are believed to have belonged to Saddam Hussein’s intelligence apparatus. It appears that there are a few foreign fighters, mostly Syrians, mixed in. Fighting continues in Mosul. The Iraqi Interior Minister reports that in one unidentified Iraqi city, a wounded Iraqi police officer was taken from his bed, dismembered, and that his remains were strung up in the city square.

○ **November 16, 2004**—Militants fight with National Guardsmen from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the northern Mosul neighborhood of al-Ta’nim. Three guardsmen are hurt and at least two insurgents are killed. US officials state that between 1,000 and 2,000 insurgents have been killed in Fallujah, with an additional 1,000 detained.

○ **November 17, 2004**—Brig. Gen. Carter Ham states that Mosul is back under US and Iraqi control. Insurgents fire mortar rounds on the al-Ahrar police station within the city. The Iraqi Interior Ministry states that it is investigating reports that 31 security force recruits may have been kidnapped in Rutbah. The Iraqi police in Karbala indicated that they believed that they may have been taken. NATO unanimously agrees to increase the number of military trainers in Iraq from 65 to approximately 400. These trainers require around 1,600 supporting staff and will not serve in a combat role. Reports indicate that new personnel will be in place in the next six weeks.

○ **November 18, 2004**—Militants detonate a car bomb in Baghdad outside the emergency Yarmouk police station in the west of the city. Two civilians die. Reports indicate that insurgents in Baghdad are lining one
November 19, 2004—A suicide car bomber rams an Iraqi police checkpoint in Maysalon Square in east Baghdad. The attack kills five police officers and wounds four others. Elsewhere in Baghdad, worshippers outside a mosque protest the assault on Fallujah. Some of the protesters set fire on Iraqi National Guardsmen who subsequently return fire. A police convoy traveling through the city is hit by a suicide car bomber, killing one policeman and a bystander and wounds five others. In Fallujah, the commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force states that the assault had “broken the back of the insurgents” in the city. He reports that 51 US troops and eight Iraqi troops had been killed and that an additional 425 US troops and 43 Iraqi troops were wounded. He states that approximately 1,200 insurgents were killed, 25-30 civilians were being treated for injuries, and that he knew of no civilian deaths caused by the fighting. Insurgents attack a police station in Muqdidiya with mortars, killing a police officer. In Mosul, reports indicate that residents are growing uneasy with the presence of Kurdish National Guardsmen in the city.

November 20, 2004—Unidentified assailants kill an Iraqi National Guard recruit in a drive by shooting near Baquba. He was on his way to a training center when he was attacked. Iraqis find the bodies of eight Iraqi policemen some 15 miles west of Mosul. US forces reportedly detain three Iraqi National Guardsmen who were working for the insurgency. Reports indicate that approximately 15 Iraqi Army troops were killed in the last 24-36 hours.

November 21, 2004—Militants attack a convoy ferrying Iraqi National Guardsmen in Ramadi. The insurgents kill nine guardsmen and wound an additional 17. In Mosul, US troops discover the bodies of nine Iraqi soldiers who had been shot execution style. Attackers kill the police chief and his driver in the town of Khalis. An Internet statement from a group purportedly affiliated with Abu Musab Zarqawi appears claiming that the group had killed 17 Iraqi National Guardsmen from Kisik.

November 23, 2004—Approximately 5,000 US, British, and Iraqi troops launch an offensive dubbed Plymouth Rock in locales south of Baghdad in an effort to pacify the restive area. Reports indicate that the main elements involved are Iraqi SWAT forces supported by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The campaign begins with early morning raids in the town of Jabel in the Babil province which net 32 suspected militants. Elsewhere, interim defense minister Hazem Sha’alan tells reporters that he cannot provide safety for voters in candidates in the upcoming election. He states that Iraqis don’t understand elections and that they are not aware of the candidates. Sh’alan accuses a “vile coalition” within interim Prime Minister Allawi’s government of obstructing the flow of funds to former soldiers’ pensions and to the new Iraqi army. In Baghdad, insurgents attack the deputy chief of Baghdad’s Major Crime Unit, Col. Ziyaa Hamed’s, car. In Baquba, gunmen attack a convoy carrying Iraqi security forces, killing three of them. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld states in a press briefing that, though Iraqi forces took part in a supporting role, they performed well in recent operations in Fallujah.

November 24, 2004—Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi attends the graduation of 2,500 troops of the Iraqi Intervention Force at the Numaniyah military base near Kut, south east of Baghdad. The graduates will form the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Intervention Force and are specially trained in counterinsurgency tactics. US Lt.-Gen. David Petraeus states that they will be operational within two weeks and that the 3rd Brigade should be ready by the end of December. In Mosul, militants attack Iraqi Gen. Rashid Flaih, the head of the Iraqi commando unit in the city. Flaih is unhurt.

November 25, 2004—US troops and Iraqi National Guardsmen launch raids on suspect buildings in the west side of Mosul. Reports indicate that some 11 dead Iraqi soldiers were found in and around Mosul. They were bound and shot in the back of the head. Iraqi Minister of State, Qasim Dawood, states in a press conference that Colonel Fawas Armoot was chosen as Ramadi’s police chief. Dawood declares that soldiers in Fallujah have discovered a rudimentary chemical and biological weapon facility that was being run by insurgents. The minister states that Iraqi police have captured five foreign terrorists, Libyan, Tunisian, and Syrian, trying to cross the border into Iraq.

November 26, 2004—US troops and Iraqi National Guardsmen continue to conduct operations in Mosul. The forces raid one mosque run by an imam who is suspected of being an insurgent leader. The Iraqis perform well though they encounter no enemy fire. Two executed Iraqi soldiers are dumped at a busy traffic circle in downtown Mosul. US forces believe that soldiers are being kidnapped at taxi stands when they return home on leave.
November 27, 2004—Three Iraqi police officers die in a bombing attack. The location of the attack remains unclear.

November 28, 2004—Iraqi police detain two men and a vehicle packed with explosives in the Al-Jadriya neighborhood of Baghdad. In Baquba, militants fire mortars at the Al-Wahda police station, wounding a police officer. Militants storm a police station in Samarra, stealing several police vehicles and looting the armory. Iraqi police fail to confront them. US and Iraqi forces launch land and amphibious raids to the south of Baghdad, killing 17 militants and capturing 32. In Basra, British and Iraqi troops surround the headquarters of the southern regional Iraq National Guard after Brigadier General Daaa al-Kadhimi refused to step down as commander in favor of Salah al-Maliki.

November 29, 2004—A car bomb near Ramadi explodes, killing four Iraqi police officers and wounding three others. Three Iraqi National Guardsmen are injured as well. In a separate attack in Baghdad, 120 miles northwest of Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonates his car at a police checkpoint, killing seven Iraqi police and National Guardsmen. The blast injures an additional nine security personnel. Brig. Gen. Kadhimi continues his standoff in Basra. Reports indicate that at least 50 pro interim government or security force personnel have been killed in Mosul in the last 10 days. The police chief states that no police are on active patrol because the city remains too dangerous. The US and Iraqi National Guard strike a deal with Mosul police to move back in to several of the police stations that were seized or looted during the beginning of the Fallujah campaign. The police agree to man some of the more dangerous stations by mid-December. Reports indicate that Iraqi security forces have abandoned Tal Afar. The governor of Najaf, Adnan al-Zurufi, announces that his security chief has been arrested by police in connection with a plot to assassinate the governor and several other top regional officials.

November 30, 2004—In the Babil Province south of Baghdad, Iraqi and US forces captures 14 suspected militants and discovers three arms caches. Near Iskandariyah, the Iraqi SWAT team and the Iraqi Specialized Special Forces capture several high value suspects in separate operations. In Najaf, the 11th US MEU commander declares that Iraqi security forces have formally assumed control of the entire province and have the ability to conduct limited operations on their own.
VI. The Status of Iraqi Forces in November 2004

Further progress occurred in the late fall and early winter of 2004. Coalition and Iraqi forces showed in November 2004 that they could cooperate in winning major battles. The battle of Fallujah in November 2004 was a particularly striking example of a tactical victory that took place while Iraqi forces were only beginning to deploy significant strength. The battle is reported to have killed some 1,200 insurgents and led to the capture of nearly 2,000 -- at the cost of 54 American and eight Iraqi lives. While Iraqi troops played a limited role in the fighting, they did attack key targets like mosques, and fought effectively in the limited engagements where they were employed.

The loss of the city deprived Sunni insurgents and terrorist groups of their major sanctuary inside Iraq. At the same time, Fallujah still remained a troubled city more than six months later. Many of its citizens had not returned. Rebuilding was slow and far behind the original plan to restore the city, and insurgents was still sporadically active. The evacuation of hundreds of thousands of residents had added to hostility against the Coalition and government, and had disrupted part of the effort to register Sunni voters before the January 30th election.

At the same time, even the best Iraqi forces were just beginning to develop any real effectiveness, and many continued to have major readiness, leadership, equipment, training, and readiness problems. Corruption and desertions were still major problems, particularly among the various elements of the IPS. It is also difficult to track overall progress in creating more effective Iraqi forces during the fall and winter of 2004. The data the US made public on Iraqi force development after September 2004 were cut back to the point where they no longer indicated how quickly the problems in equipment delays reported in early September were being corrected. All detailed equipment delivery data were deleted from the weekly status report.

The same was true of the amount of detail data on trained manpower. Reporting by force element was largely eliminated from public US reporting by the Embassy, Department of Defense, and Department of State. The only heading in the Weekly Status Report became “Trained/On-Hand.” This figure had more value than previous totals, however, since it reflected the trained manpower that actually remained on duty, and avoided the problem of reporting those who were trained and were not on duty for whatever reason.

**Numbers of Active, Trained/Equipped/Authorized Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces as of Late November 2004**

Some useful data were made available by MNSTC-I, although such data still did not provide the level of detail needed to distinguish between the total number of men trained and equipped, and the much smaller numbers of men with fully adequate training and equipment for counterinsurgency and combat missions. They also did not provide any detail on the rate of increase in cadres of fully trained officers and NCOs.

The MNSTC-I data show total Iraqi manpower by force element as of November 18, 2004, are summarized in Figure 3 below.
### Figure 3

**Iraqi Military and Security Forces as of 11/18/2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force element</th>
<th>Current strength</th>
<th>On Duty, Trained And Equipped</th>
<th>Total Authorized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>87,133</td>
<td>47,342</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commando Battalions</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>2,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
<td>16,237</td>
<td>14,593</td>
<td>29,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Force</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>1,091</td>
<td>3,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard*</td>
<td>43,318</td>
<td>41,409</td>
<td>61,904 (for 65 battalions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Force</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention Force</td>
<td>6,584</td>
<td>1,816</td>
<td>6,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>16,634</td>
<td>4,507</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Force</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>175,812</strong></td>
<td><strong>113,437</strong></td>
<td><strong>271,681</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24,437)</td>
<td>(7,080)</td>
<td>(36,328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(151,375)</td>
<td>(106,357)</td>
<td>(235,353)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**On Duty Versus Trained and Equipped**

Graphic comparisons make it easier to understand the level of progress that was now being reported by MNSTC-I. Figure 4 shows the numbers of police and Border Enforcement personnel on duty, and how many of those on duty were reported to be “trained and equipped” as of November 18, 2004. Figure 5 shows the numbers of special operations, Intervention Force, and conventional army troops who are on duty and how many of those on duty that are fully trained and equipped as of November 18, 2004.
Figure 4
Iraqi Security Forces—Manning vs. Trained/Equipped as of 11/18/04


Figure 5
Iraqi Armed Forces—Manning vs. Trained/Equipped as of 11/18/04

Lack of Meaningful Equipment Reporting

While data on the overall progress of the equipment effort were limited, MNSTC-I did release a general statement about the equipment delivered to the Iraqi security forces in November 2004. The military reported distributing 5,400 Kalashnikov rifles, 16,000 sets of body armor, 1,900 9mm pistols, approximately 1,000 machine guns, 44 armored personnel carriers, and four T-55 tanks. Exactly which forces received what armaments was not made clear.

In another statement on November 13, 2004, MNSTC-I indicated that it had delivered 2,919 AK-47 assault rifles, 4,210 helmets, 107 PKM machineguns, 832 RPK machineguns, 7,850 sets of body armor, 11,000 field jackets, 50 Glock pistols, 100,000 RPK/PKM machinegun rounds, 2,400 9mm pistol rounds, 300,000 AK-47 rounds, 600 tactical vests, 30 computers, 300 kneepads, 50 radios, 15,763 pairs of running shoes, 20 holsters, 20 Walther 9mm pistols, 1,300 army t-shirts, and 19,782 desert combat uniforms since November 1.

These delivery rates were far higher than the rates reported during the spring, summer, and early fall of 2004.

Key Iraqi Force Components

MNSTC-I also provided useful data on Iraq’s developing force structure and type of training and equipment in key elements of the emerging Iraqi forces in November 2004 that remained current through late December 2004. The MNSTC-I summarized Iraqi force developments as follows:

- **Special Police Commando Battalions**: The Special Police Commando Battalions represent the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s strike-force capability. The commandos – ultimately to be comprised of six full battalions – are highly vetted Iraqi officers and rank-and-file servicemen largely made up of prior service Special Forces professionals and other skilled servicemen with specialty unit experience.

  All members of the unit are chosen based on loyalty to Iraq and its new democratic model. The unit focuses primarily on building raid operations, counter-terrorist missions including anti-airplane hijacker, kidnapping and other similar missions.

  The force resembles more a paramilitary army-type force complete with heavy weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, and 9mm Glock pistols. The commando battalions give the MOI a high-end strike force capability similar to Special Forces units and was quickly stood up to capitalize on previously existing skill sets in Iraq.

- **Iraqi Police Service Emergency Response Unit**: An elite 270-man team trained to respond to national-level law enforcement emergencies. Team members undergo a robust eight-week specialized training course spawned from the current wave of anti-Iraqi forces actions.

  The mission of the emergency response unit is to provide a national, high-end, rapid-response law enforcement tactical unit responsible for high-risk search, arrest, hostage-rescue, and crisis response operations. The emergency response unit is the predominant force for national-level incidents calling for a DELTA/SWAT capability and will only be used in extreme situations by local and national authorities.

  The $64.5 million effort is part of a larger mission to create nationwide law enforcement, investigative and special operations capability within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to counter terrorism and large-scale civil disobedience and insurgencies throughout Iraq. The capability will

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eventually include a Counterterrorism Investigative Unit and Special Operations Unit. Volunteers for the force must first complete the standard eight-week basic training course or three-week transition integration program course for prior service officers before entering the specialized emergency response unit training modeled after the U.S. State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives’ training programs.

Of the total force, 235 eligible candidates received rigorous instruction based on the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Crisis Response Team training program while the balance of 35 recruits are part of the Special Operations Explosive Ordinance Team, based on the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Explosive Incident Countermeasures training course.

Team members receive instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordnance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets, weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also have an opportunity to receive supplementary training in hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counterterrorism task force coordination.

- **Iraqi Intervention Forces**: The Iraqi Intervention Force is the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi army. Ultimately to be comprised of nine battalions, organized into three brigades, forces negotiate the standard eight-week basic training all Iraqi soldiers go through learning basic soldiering skills such as weapons, drill and ceremony.

  Soldier discipline and physical training skills: After graduation, IIF battalions spend several weeks and months in intensive “military operations in urban terrain” follow-on training – otherwise known as “MOUT” training. In this period, soldiers work through instruction in the art of street fighting and building clearing operations typical of anti-insurgent operations in cities and towns. Units work in close coordination with other IA battalions and will be completely stood-up to the nine-battalion force by early 2005.

- **Iraqi Special Operations Force**: The Iraqi Special Operations Force – the Iraqi Armed Forces’ high-end strike force resembling U.S. Special Forces units – continues training and operations in the country with multinational force assistance.

  Consisting of two trained battalions, including the 36th Commando Battalion – an infantry-type strike force – and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion, the force has been involved in many operations throughout the country fighting anti-Iraqi forces with great distinction while continuing the stand-up effort of the unit. The force will add a third “support” battalion to its ranks in the coming months. Training is conducted at an undisclosed location.

  “Selection” for the force begins in the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi army units already operating in the country much like typical multinational Special Forces’ recruiting efforts in their own countries. Outstanding recruits successfully negotiating the vetting process, including exhaustive background checks, skill evaluations, and unit evaluations along with literacy, psychological, and physical tests, are run through various team-building and physical events meant to lean down the recruit pool. The selection process runs roughly 10 to 14 days.

  The Iraqi Special Forces undergo intense physical, land navigation, small-unit tactics, live-fire, unconventional warfare operations, direct action operations, airmobile operations, counterterrorism, survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training. Special Forces soldiers are an army’s unconventional warfare experts, possessing a broad range of operational skills. The unit was formed based on a conversation between the Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and multinational force personnel to give the Iraqi Armed Forces a high-end strike force in its ongoing security mission against anti-Iraqi forces operating in the country.

- **Iraqi Army**: Iraqi army soldiers negotiate the standard eight-weeks of basic training including basic soldiering skills instruction in weapons, drill and ceremony, soldier discipline, and physical training. Units negotiate advanced follow-on infantry, land navigation, and other operational training after graduation before deployment.
The Iraqi army will ultimately be comprised of 27 battalions of infantry – including nine special Iraqi Intervention Force battalions – and three transportation battalions. The army will be organized into nine brigades and three divisions. The bulk of the force is slated to be in place by early 2005. Plans to create heavier and better armored forces are still in flux, but there are now 259 soldiers in the 1st Mechanized Brigade, preparing to train with 10 MTLB armored personnel carriers. These vehicles were drawn from a pool of over 300 armored vehicles that the Iraqis intend to make ready as the unit grows.

- **Iraqi Coastal Defense Force**: The Iraqi Coastal Defense Force is the Iraqi Armed Forces’ naval component. Ultimately to number just more than 400 servicemen, the force also includes a land-based Coastal Defense Regiment resembling western-type “Marine” infantry forces. Land and sea based forces negotiate IAF eight-week basic training courses before moving on to follow-on training and sea training for the boat crews.

  Boat crews learn the basics in seamanship before moving on to instruction in advanced seamanship, towing, gunnery, sea rescue, chart reading, navigation, anti-smuggling operations, and rigid inflatable boat integration and small boat drill instruction. Training is put in the context of a democratically based maritime sea force.

  Primary duties include protecting the country’s roughly 50-mile coastline from smuggling and foreign fighter infiltration operations as well as the port assets at Umm Qasr in Southern Iraq and oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The force patrols out to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf with five 27-meter long Chinese-made patrol boats and various other support craft.

- **Iraqi Air Force**: The Iraqi Air Force has begun to fly light reconnaissance missions. All Iraqi Air Force pilots and maintenance personnel negotiate comprehensive one to four-month “conversion courses” largely comprised of familiarization instruction. The Iraqi Air Force is not yet assigned C-130s, but does have plans to obtain them.

  The training brings air force recruits up to speed on current Iraqi Air Force aircraft as well as serving to augment prior skills. The air force actively recruits from prior-service personnel pools in the country – officially sending personnel to training after the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s vetting and screening process clears recruits for duty. Training is almost entirely conducted in the United Arab Emirates and Jordan by multinational force partners. After “conversion course” training is completed, trainees go to assigned squadrons in Iraq for follow-on training comprised of advanced instruction and specific operational training.

  The Iraqi Air Force is initially slated as a six-squadron force of various-make light reconnaissance aircraft and various support aircraft including C-130 transport planes and other helicopter craft with operations mainly centered on supporting Iraqi Security Force operations on the ground, infrastructure reconnaissance, and border security missions. The majority of the force is scheduled to be operational by Fall 2005.

**Continuing Problems in Training the Police Forces**

Progress was still much slower in creating effective police forces than in creating military forces. While some aspects of criminal activity did drop over time, sporadic terrorism and high levels of criminal activity continued to be a major problem in the 12-14 governorates where the threat was not high enough to be characterized as an active insurgency.

**Warnings in a Senate Staff Report**

One of the best insights into these issues is provided in a draft staff report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Iraq – Lessons in Stabilization and Reconstruction, November-December 2004.” The report found many of the same problems the GAO report referenced earlier found in the spring of 2004. It made the following key points:

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The civilian-military structural gap is particularly damaging in the effort to re-build the Iraqi police and security forces. At the International Police Training Academy in Jordan, the staff members found confusion and frustration with the lack of communication and coordination between the civilians and military. The State Department, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) which funds the U.S. police training assistance programs for the Iraqis had minimal interaction with the Department of Defense/CENTCOM team that has the policy lead in development of Iraq’s police and security forces. Moreover, neither State nor Defense appears to be in charge of coordinating efforts with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, which is the “customer” for which the newly trained police forces are produced.

The cadets receive eight-weeks of training, but leave the academy without a uniform, weapon, or any idea of whether, or where, in Iraq they will be employed. This has provoked questions about the number of Iraqi police actually trained. There also are no minimum standards imposed in vetting cadets or in certifying the capabilities of the newly trained Iraqi police and no identification of cadets who might excel and should be trained further. Civilian contractors who run the Academy cannot hire security guards or order the military to provide security escort for the cadets on the return trip across the border to Iraq. Sadly, a number of cadets have been killed on the journey back, victims not only of the insurgents, but in some measure, of the civilian-military institutional gap.

Confused Roles and Responsibilities: The Iraqi Ministry of Interior, responsible for Iraq’s police forces, has no single U.S. counterpart agency. While there is a U.S. Embassy Advisor to the Ministry of Interior, no single U.S. agency appears to have responsibility for the full spectrum of the Iraq police force development. State/INL, the FBI, Treasury, CENTCOM and various contractors all have a role. The State Department, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) which funds the U.S. police training assistance programs for the Iraqis, had minimal interaction with the Department of Defense/CENTCOM team that has the policy lead in development of Iraq’s police and security forces. The International Police Training Academy in Jordan is not clearly directed by CENTCOM, although it is run by CENTCOM contractors, under the direction of INL, with a Deputy Commander from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Moreover, it is unclear which office is responsible for coordinating with other donor nations providing police training such as Germany, the UAE, Jordan, Canada, Finland, and Hungary.

Overlapping Funding Sources: Assistance funding takes a circuitous route from State/INL to CENTCOM, to contractors who actually implement the police training program. The Police Academy was set up under a Bilateral Agreement between State/INL and the Government of Jordan, using Circular 175 authority delegated to INL by the Secretary of State. CENTCOM and the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPAT) in Baghdad are, however, the source of funds for INL support of police training. For 2005, funds are expected to be provided directly to INL from the IRRF. Yet, some instructors for the Academy are apparently under the Department of Justice and others under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) including active DHS Agents from the Border Control/ Customs agency to teach border police. A number of DynCorp private contractors who were supposed to handle follow-on and on-the-job-training in Iraq were diverted to support the training requirements of the Police Academy. CENTCOM has directed the Academy to increase output of Iraqi border police cadets, but there apparently was insufficient funding under the contract for additional staff and insufficient numbers of border police cadets recruited to be trained.

Inadequate Vetting/Quantity vs. Quality: Staff members were told that anyone in Iraq can be a police cadet. Personnel vetting processes for the police forces are inconsistent and uncoordinated. There are no uniform selection criteria and potential cadets are usually only subject to minimal screening. Staff members were told that there is no list or database of people eligible for training or trained for the police forces. There is so much pressure to get more Iraqi cadets that the quality of the candidates has been virtually ignored. There are three basic methods for getting Iraqi cadets: 1) those who volunteer; 2) those who are recruited directly by the military at training centers around the country; and 3) referrals by the chief of police, tribal chief or other authorities in the provinces. There are no women in the Academy classes. All Kurds, Shi’a and Sunni are trained together although not all, particularly Kurds, speak Arabic.
Staff members were told that some cadets have arrived at the academy illiterate and with unrealistic expectations. For one class, early in the program, out of over 700 former senior Iraqi Border Control/Customs agents nominated by the Ministry of Interior to be trained, 259 were illiterate, lacked basic skills and/or did not want to stay at the Academy. They thought they were going to be in hotels, with time to relax in Jordan. One was over 80 years old. The cadets are not allowed to go out of the facility to enter Jordan unless it is work related as an escorted visit. There are an estimated 32,000 Iraqis expected to be trained at the Academy by December of 2005. An estimated 16 countries are providing the training with a total of 322 instructors. Student capacity total for the facility in Jordan in November 2004 was at 3600, but Academy officials indicated they could use more instructors. There are currently an estimated 2.6 instructors per class. An estimated 8,297 police officers had been trained as of November 10, 2004 out of an expected 11,000 goal. The problems have been too few recruits with the right skills as well as recruits who leave for personal or other reasons.

**Inadequate Training** - Several officials the staff members talked to expressed concerns about the substance of training provided to the Iraqis and the security and reliability of the police cadets trained. In classes on explosives countermeasures, cadets are taught to defuse a bomb by learning how bombs are made. Some expressed fears that insurgents have infiltrated the cadets and are being taught how to attack better. Thus, there is hesitation on what types of training the Iraqi cadets should receive.

In training, the cadets are not trained on the use of AK-47s, the most common weapons used in Iraq, but on pistols as the facility has constraints on the size of the shooting range protective barrier. There also are limited amounts of other personnel security-related equipment for training and staff members were told that equipment ordered has not been delivered for months. After the staff visit, a new curriculum with greater emphasis on personnel security was reportedly implemented in December 2004.

The Jordanians provide instructors, language assistance and a Cadet Command Brigade that implements, mentors, drills and provides discipline for the Cadets. Defense Department contract instructors could not do all the discipline in Arabic for the cadets and the Jordanian Brigade facilitates training significantly. A senior Jordanian police officer noted that “very few” of the Iraqis selected for training would qualify for police training under the Jordanian system, which involves extensive tests and screening.

**Inadequate Follow-up:** Once trained, it is not clear what happens to the graduates. There is no differentiation in cadets who excel to allow them to specialize after they complete the basic course and no team building for units to learn to operate together in the future. Cadets are sent back to Iraq with no job or certainty that they can perform police functions.

Iraqi police cadets are given a basic eight week training course at the Police Training Academy in Jordan, but leave the Academy without a uniform, a weapon, other equipment or any plan for follow-up to ensure they are integrated into and become productive elements of the new Iraqi police force. Those interested in continuing as police officers simply show up at neighborhood or municipal police stations once they return, at which time they may or may not be given work. The contractors hired by the military cannot even hire civilian security guards to protect the cadet graduates returning to Iraq. The day after the staff members visit to the Academy, there were press reports of the kidnapping of between 30-60 returning police cadets who had been transported by bus to the border by Police Academy officials. The Academy apparently had requested security escort but it had been denied reportedly due to operations in Fallujah. Staff members asked, but failed to learn from CENTCOM or Embassy officials the true fate of these cadets. A number of other cadets have been killed on the journey back into Iraq from Jordan, in many respects, victims not only of the insurgents, but in some measure, of the civilian-military institutional gap.

**Evaluating Improvements in Police Training:** There have been some improvements reported over the past six months. The numbers of police trained reportedly are rising. Some officials indicated cadets are more confident when they leave, but there is no way to evaluate these claims or measure performance. Improvements were not evident from reports of the wholesale disintegration of the Mosul police force in November. State Department/INL is trying to develop a
follow-on evaluation capability for the Police Training Academy in Jordan and get a better assessment of how many police trained have been hired in each province and their capabilities. The contractors running the Police Academy, however, are not responsible for such continuity. There also appeared to be no recognition of the need for more consistency between military and civilian police training curriculum in Baghdad and Jordan.

**Duplicating Efforts by Civil Defense Force/Civil Intervention Force:** The roles of the new Iraqi Civil Defense Force and new Civil Intervention Force, both under the Ministry of Interior, are not clear. Both units are expected to be more closely related to military units than to civilian police forces. These forces are being established under CENTCOM, but the Defense Department has not coordinated this effort or integrated it with the civilian police force. State Department personnel recognized that State does not have the experience or expertise to provide aid, training and equipment for these new forces. State Department’s office of Diplomatic Security / Anti-terrorism Assistance program (DS/ATA) does dignitary protection, but has no plan for transitioning this responsibility to the new Iraqi Civil Defense or Civil Intervention Forces or even a clear vision of the objective of these forces. There also is an Emergency Response Unit being trained with both military and civilian applications. It is not clear if the future of these forces will be with the military or if there will be a transition back to civilian oversight. In addition, there are questions about who will fund this organization in the future.

Some of the U.S. and other foreign advisors involved feel this criticism was too demanding. CPATT noted that the problems in creating effective police and security forces were, if anything, considerably more challenging at this point than the problems in creating a military force focused purely on military missions. One such advisor put it this way:

> The SSR project for the police and border police was the biggest of its kind in the world: Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan all pale into insignificance beside it. The Police in Iraq had been only third or fourth in the pecking order under Saddam and they had all but disappeared, the police stations had all been ransacked and the Ministry of the Interior was dysfunctional to say the least. There was no real capability to speak of and absolutely no ability to maneuver properly trained and equipped police around Iraq.

> The IPS had 80,000 people in uniform and of those 12-15,000 had received some form of formal training (four weeks). The payroll though had about 120,000 individuals on it. The training program was designed for democratic policing not for counter insurgency operations. The Baghdad Police Academy was to produce 1,000 policemen every other month and another Academy was being built in Jordan, to produce 2,000 every other month. In the midst of this we introduced the ‘Qualifying Committee’ that was essentially a redundancy program aimed at about 30,000 police. We set ourselves the aim of capturing the biometric data of every single police and border officer. We recognized that unless we did so we would never bring the police numbers under control nor would we get the payroll sorted out. We worked out that we needed $60m and went ahead and got it a week before transition.

> We had to accelerate the police training program markedly, as well as its recruitment. In addition, we had to accelerate the training program for existing police officers. We had to identify a broad range of specialist courses too (organized crime, forensics, intelligence and so on) as well as trying to shape the Ministry of the Interior – by utilizing the Organize element of the mission - into a more coherent and effective organization. We had to harness what ended up as being a $2 billion funding program and begin the acquisition process.

> We had to organize 300 international police advisors (that number rose every month), as well as 80 international police trainers, to act as mentors. Incoming agencies that were going to assist with the specialist training programs -such as the FBI, ATF and DEA had to be harnessed, brought under command of CPATT and pointed in the right direction. We had to look at the Border Police; where we were going to build 100’s of border forts and main crossing points and what they would consist of including the necessary technology. We had to look at the 80,000-strong Facilities
Protection Service, who were to protect infrastructure and buildings. We had to buy 45,000 AK-47s, 90,000 pistols, 180,000 uniforms, 15,000 vehicles and refurbish 450 police stations.

We also had to factor in 10 percent for losses, which were needed to replace casualties and destroyed infrastructure and equipment. We also had to create some maneuverability into the police force after they proved unable to deploy from Baghdad, following the US recapture of the Najaf police stations. To do this we created nine Public Order Battalions, two Special Police Regiments (equipped with light armor – we just went ahead and purchased STRYKER) a 250 man Emergency Response Unit and a 5,000-strong highway patrol organization.

Interestingly we also got on with what became known as the Baghdad policing plan. The DCG MNF-I essentially got me in told me there was no plan – some 12 months on – for policing in Baghdad and that we needed to come up with one. This did not require professional police officers – we had some very able Iraqi officers who could articulate what was required we just had to write the plan, identify the resources and get on with implementation.

Clearly this all took time

Few advisors felt, however, that many of the points made in the senate staff report were not valid at the time. A number of the Iraqis involved also felt such comments provided a good picture of the problems seen from Iraqi side. They point out that if anything, such criticism may have understated some aspects of the problem because the MNF only reported on the police trained by the US and Coalition and many local police and security forces were locally recruited, and not integrated into the national/Coalition effort.

**The Critical Importance of Effective Police Forces**

These points highlight an issue that some who focus primarily on Iraq’s military forces tend to ignore. The insurgency may be the greatest threat to the government, but crime has been, and is, a constant day-to-day threat to ordinary Iraqis even in the more secure provinces. White-collar crime and official corruption threaten their livelihoods. Theft and looting not only threaten their economic well-being, but also help cause the break down of essential services like water and electric power. Violent crime, kidnappings and extortion threaten their lives and those of their families, as well as their economic well being.

In areas where the insurgency is active, crime is often linked to insurgency and former regime elements in the insurgency have become particularly good at establishing contacts with criminal elements and paying them to carry out acts of crime and sabotage. In the 10-12 provinces where there is relative safety from insurgent attacks, crime remains endemic and often interacts with local ethnic, sectarian, and tribal violence, as well as police corruption. The failure of the police also encourages local militias and vigilante groups, creating local rivals to the government.

For most Iraqis, as for most human beings throughout the world, governance is measured in terms of the ability to provide security and essential services. Iraqis, however, are particularly sensitive to the problems caused by police corruption and violence after decades under Saddam Hussein, and are even more sensitive to the use of military forces in urban areas and civil affairs.

Saddam’s heritage of using military force to repress the people is particularly important in Shi’ite and Kurdish areas, but almost all Iraqis had reason to fear those elements of the military, like the Special Republican Guards and special security services personnel in
military uniforms. The presence of Coalition military as “occupation” forces have compounded these fears and concerns.

As has been discussed earlier, the Coalition’s slow beginning ensured the police effort lagged behind the military effort, and the impact lingered through late 2004, and will play out for some years to come. The fact that the following chapters document real progress in this effort does not mean that anyone can ignore the lessons that delayed a critical aspect of Iraqi force development.

As Brigadier General Mackay noted:

We …made the big mistake of making the Police a second or even third priority task, in the same way that we had done in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. As had happened there, a capability gap emerged between the military, who saw policing as “mission creep”, and the indigenous forces, who were incapable of doing anything. That vacuum was filled by organized crime, which, in turn fuelled the insurgency; insurgents need to be funded from somewhere and organized crime did just that. Our ability to withdraw from theatre is in direct proportion to the effectiveness of the institutions we have built because, in the absence of law and order, the military have to remain in order to provide security.

The creation of effective police forces was never a luxury that could wait on defeating the insurgents. Giving Iraq stability, and giving the Iraqi government full legitimacy, meant that the Iraqi police had to become as visible as possible and not the Iraqi military. This meant, however, that Iraqi police forces had to have the paramilitary support necessary to operate in moderate threat areas, and the competence necessary to establish a the rule of law with proper regard to human rights. The police have to be perceived as relatively honest and effective, reluctant to use violence, and as free of local tribalism and special interests as possible.

As the following chapters show, creating such a force remained a difficult challenge even when far more resources were made available. Progress does not mean miracles. Creating far more effective vetting and training programs cannot suddenly change the police. The police must change their very “culture.” They must become proactive, select and promote on the basis of merit, reduce corruption, and respect human rights and the rule of law. This will take time, and there will be some significant police corruption, problems, and abuses for at least the next five years, and probably for the next decade. Yet, such progress is vital. Building up the best possible police and security forces -- and giving them the training, equipment, and facilities to deal with organized crime and low-level insurgent violence – is critical to Iraq’s future.
VII. End of 2004 as a Benchmark: Trends in the Progress of Iraqi Security and Military Forces in December 2004

One of the ongoing problems in assessing the progress in creating Iraqi security forces is that MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and US reporting on these developments has kept changing over time. As has been discussed earlier, the positive side of these changes is that the initial counts of “on duty” manpower, which exaggerate quantity without regard to quality, were replaced by counts of “trained” manpower after the Eikenberry assessment, and desertions in Fallujah and Sadr City in the spring of 2004. These, in turn, were replaced by still more realistic counts of “trained and equipped” manpower in the early fall of 2004, following a new assessment of Iraqi capabilities by MNSTC-I.

None of these methods of counting Iraqi strength reflected combat readiness or mission capability, which is the purpose of creating Iraqi forces. It was not until the spring of 2005, when the MNSTC-I developed a still further Iraqi Security Force Unit Capability rating system -- with four levels of readiness, based on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment, equipping, and leadership -- that either the Coalition or the Iraqi government began to measure mission effectiveness.

Data provided by the MNSTC-I do, however, provide a set of 2004 benchmarks for comparing future progress, although the data cannot be conveniently provided on an exact end of year basis because of reporting problems and changes in the categories being reported. If nothing else, such data show that significant changes were occurring in Iraqi efforts and that the force development effort was gathering further momentum by the end of the year.

Manning at the End of 2004: A Statistical “Snapshot”

Figures 8 through 9 illustrate the status of the Iraqi security and military forces through December 2004. These figures are based on Coalition reporting to the UN Security Council, issued on December 6, which provides a better picture of the difference between trained and untrained Iraqi security and military forces than the US Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Reports, issued after September 2004. It should be noted, however, that the numbers for the forces under the Ministry of the Interior are generally unreliable, as some data were provided by local chiefs of police, whereas military force numbers were reported by Coalition commanders.

- Figure 6 shows the numbers of National Guard, army, and special operations forces that trained or on hand compared to the numbers required in December 2004.
- Figure 7 shows the number of police and Border Enforcement personnel that were trained or on hand compared to the numbers required. It is important to note that those troops listed as trained/on hand were not all fully trained or equipped. Despite repeated assaults on police stations and National Guard posts, and attacks on officers and Guardsmen headed home on leave, the total numbers of police and National Guardsmen had increased slightly. The numbers for the army, special operations, and Border Enforcement, however, had decreased, as more demanding standards were applied to “trained and equipped” manpower and low-grade manpower was eliminated or deserted.

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Figures 8 and 9 show the composition of the Iraqi military and security forces as of December 6, 2004. The military was overwhelmingly dominated by National Guardsmen while police made up the largest proportion of the security forces. It takes time to order equipment, receive it, distribute it to large numbers of forces going through training, train units, and to provide bases for units that have completed training. The fact remains, however, that the slow beginnings in trying to create effective Iraqi forces mean that the progress in the manning of both the military and security forces remained well below the required strength necessary to meet the mission need, and similar problems still existed in terms of a force quality.

**Figure 6**

*Iraqi Military Forces Trained/On Hand vs. Required as of 12/06/04*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trained/On Hand</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Ops</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>3428</td>
<td>27000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>40115</td>
<td>61904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIF</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>6,584</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7**

**Iraqi Security Forces Trained/On Hand vs. Required as of 12/06/04**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trained/On Hand</th>
<th>Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>50,798</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Police</td>
<td>18,599</td>
<td>29,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8
Iraqi Military Forces by Force Element as of 12/06/04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Special Ops</th>
<th>Intervention Force</th>
<th>Guard</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Coastal Defense</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>2062</td>
<td>40115</td>
<td>3428</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9
Iraqi Security Forces by Force Element as of 12/06/04

Police  Emergency Response  Border Patrol  Highway Patrol  Dignitary Protection
43627  168  14593  370  484

Source: 6 December 2004 report by the United States on behalf of the Multinational Force pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546. These numbers include those on hand. The report to the UN did not include numbers for the Highway Patrol and Dignitary Protection Service. These numbers were taken from the 1 December 2004 Iraq Weekly Status Report available at www.defendamerica.mil. ‘Emerg. Resp.’ stands for Emergency Response Unit. ‘Dig. Protect’ stands for the Dignitary Protection Service.
**Manning at the End of 2004: Force Trends**

Figures 10 through 14 expand the end-of-year statistical “snapshot” shown in the previous figures to portray the trends in Iraqi force development:

- Figure 10 shows the levels of manning in both the Iraqi Army and Iraqi National Guard from December 2003 to January 2005. The army’s manning levels were erratic throughout 2004. They consistently fell towards the end of 2004 but saw an upsurge to 7,598 in January 2005. What would appear to be a significant drop in the Intervention Force’s manning levels from January 12th to January 19th is more likely the result of reassigning forces as opposed to desertion or dropout.

- The forces listed as part of the IIF January 12th were re-designated as part of the regular Iraqi army as of January 19th. The National Guard’s manning level has remained relatively constant, though it is important to note a decrease in over 6,000 Guardsmen between December 2004 and January 2005. The number of trained and equipped soldiers dropped in November, but has gone up as more units have completed their training.

- Reports from Fallujah and Samarra continued to indicate that small units of both the army and National Guard fought well. It also appeared that the quality of both the Guardsmen and soldiers was slowly improving. In one instance on January 18, 2005, four suicide bombs rocked Baghdad within 90 minutes. Yet, the loss of life was far less than it could have been because of Iraqi action. Col. Mike Murray, commander of the US 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry, stated that all of the bombers failed to reach their designated targets. He stated, “Out of four car bombs in Baghdad...in every case there was an Iraqi soldier either from the Iraqi army or the Iraqi national guard or an Iraqi policeman that prevented that car bomb from getting to its intended target.” The challenges to retain Army soldiers remains a concern.

- Figure 11 shows the levels of manning in both the Iraqi police and Iraqi border enforcement from December 2003 to January 2005. Police manning levels steadily decreased from the peak in June 2004 (92,227) until late November 2004 when the numbers slowly began increasing once more. The drastic drop in the numbers of police needs to be kept in perspective. While police units were frequently overrun, failed to report for duty, or joined the insurgency, newer reports indicate that some units in Samarra fought tenaciously when attacked. It should be noted that the Justice Department training team has been administering the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) since May 2003 and they claim that 400 women are employed as police officers in Iraq. The levels in the manning of the Border Enforcement Agency remain erratic and it is unclear as to how many individuals are actually out on patrol.

- Figure 12 depicts the stated manning goals of the Iraqi Army in contrast with the actual manning levels of the army over the previous year. The manning end goal of the Iraqi Army has steadily dropped since the peak estimation of 40,000 in December 2003. In May 2004, the total required dropped by 5,000 and it dropped by a further 8,000 in July. The drop in the requirements for the army is likely caused by further specialization within the Iraqi military and security forces with regard to missions and roles. The Iraqi Intervention Force and the Iraqi Special Forces were created as separate entities with specific missions and the police and National Guard generally confront insurgents with US backing unless they are massed in some large force like in Fallujah. When they are in static positions, the army tends to have a larger role.

- Figure 13 contrasts the manning goals of the Iraqi National Guard with the actual manning levels of the Iraqi National Guard over the last year. Iraqi National Guard requirements increased slightly in May 2004 and July 2004 before skyrocketing in September 2004 with an increase of over 20,000 in the end goal strength as a result of the
comprehensive review of Iraqi Security Force requirements that Ambassador Negroponte undertook in the fall of 2004.

○ The National Guard was “merged” with the army on January 6, 2005, in an effort to create a larger, more cohesive, and more effective military force, although experts involved in the US training effort cautioned that it requires synchronization of effort to train, equip, base, and to integrate training resources such as trainers and training locations. As one expert put it, “One should not expect a constantly increasing generation of force given the complexity of the task and the requirement to use Coalition forces (i.e. those who sometimes conduct operations) to assist with the training process. The Coalition spent considerable time and effort to improve the capabilities of ING battalions, something this report overlooks because it focuses so much on the alleged weakness in the initial training program without any focus on the follow-on training the Coalition provides to ING units. Some 42 battalions of ING are conducting operations at the squad to battalion level (as of early January 2005). They are on the street, and elsewhere, providing security — often with strong effect. Some units are not as strong as we would like, but others are doing better than expected.”

○ Lastly, Figure 14 illustrates the stated manning goals of the Iraqi police in contrast with the actual manning levels of the Iraqi police over the last year. Police manning actually exceeded early estimates of the required numbers. Subsequent decreases are, in part, a result of Iraqis taking a larger role in the candidate screening process. The Iraqi Interim Government, while slow to do so, has begun to fire police that fail to show up for work, police that cooperate with insurgents, and police that are blatantly corrupt.

It should also be noted, however, that the insurgent campaign of intimidation and attacks also affected police manning levels. Since October 2004, manning seems to be slowly increasing, but it is nowhere near the estimated 135,000 that are needed. The requirements for police manning increased dramatically in May 2004 and then increased in September 2004 as a result of the review undertaken by Ambassador Negroponte.

Taken together, these figures show trends that reflect progress in strengthening the force elements most critical to giving Iraqi forces the capability to deal with insurgents, terrorists, and serious criminals. They do not show how many men actually served in units that stood and fought, or that had proper training, equipment, and facilities. They do, however, show that Iraqi forces had come a long way since June 2004, and that a major effort was now underway to overcome the legacy of the earlier failures.
Figure 10
Levels of Iraqi Military Forces Over Time, 12/03-01/05

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>Guard</td>
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<td>17800</td>
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<td>Army</td>
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<td>4789</td>
<td>4507</td>
<td>2713</td>
<td>2713</td>
<td>7,598</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIF</td>
<td>1473</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1794</td>
<td>2894</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIF &amp; Army</td>
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<td>5678</td>
<td>6717</td>
<td>6301</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>13,482</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Breakouts of the numbers of National Guard on duty but not trained are not available prior to February 23rd, in May and June, and are not available after September 27th. The Army figures include only those soldiers considered trained and equipped. This figure uses the Iraq Weekly Status Reports released first by the Department of Defense and now the Department of State, available at [http://www.defendamerica.mil](http://www.defendamerica.mil) as well as information provided by MNSTC-1. For consistency, the figure uses the reports that appear at the end of each month. There are no available numbers for March and April, and only the IIF and Army numbers are available for August. This figure does not include the Iraqi Air Force, Civil Intervention Force, Highway Patrol, or Iraqi Navy.
Figure 11
Iraqi Security Forces Over Time, 12/03-01/05

Note: There are no data for Iraqi security force levels for March, April, and August 2003. From February 2003 on, the Border Police include the entire manpower for the Department of Border Enforcement. This figure uses the Iraq Weekly Status Reports released by the Department of Defense, available at http://www.defendamerica.mil, as well as data provided by MNSTC-1. For consistency, the figure uses the reports that appear at the end of each month. Gaps in data reflect unavailable numbers.

The row for police (above) shows two different types of data: The numbers for police up until 23 February reflect police reported as being on duty. The numbers since 23 February reflect the number trained and equipped and from 27 October the total numbers reflect those trained and equipped either through the 8-week or 3-week program. Thus, the drop in numbers is not as significant as it first appears.
Figure 12
Trends in Iraqi Army vs. Required Total over Time as of 01/05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Army Manning</th>
<th>IIF Manning</th>
<th>IIF &amp; Army</th>
<th>Total Req'd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22-Dec 03</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,473</td>
<td>4390</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Jan 04</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>6,717</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-Feb 04</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>6301</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-May 04</td>
<td>6,702</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Jun 04</td>
<td>6,702</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Jul 04</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>33,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Sep 04</td>
<td>4,789</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>33,589</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Oct 04</td>
<td>4,507</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>33,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Nov 04</td>
<td>2,713</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>33,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Dec 04</td>
<td>2,713</td>
<td>2,894</td>
<td>5607</td>
<td>33,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-Jan 05</td>
<td>7598</td>
<td>5884</td>
<td>13482</td>
<td>30785</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Weekly Status Report available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/la/iraq_stat.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/la/iraq_stat.html), [http://www.defendamerica.mil](http://www.defendamerica.mil), and inquiries to MNSTC-1. These numbers include those in training and on hand up until July when numbers indicating those trained/equipped became available. The graph utilizes the figures available at the end of each month. Months have been omitted when data were not available. The “total required” column lists the total number of soldiers required by the army up until the creation of the Intervention Force. Following the creation of the Intervention Force, the “total required” column includes the soldiers needed by the regular army and the Intervention Force.

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Figure 13
Trends in Iraqi Guard vs. Required Total over Time as of 01/05

Source: Weekly Status Report available at http://www.defenselink.mil/la/iraq_stat.html and http://www.defendamerica.mil. This graph includes those in training and on hand, as breakouts are unavailable. It utilizes the figures available at the end of each month. Months have been omitted when data were not given.
Figure 14
Trends in Iraqi Police vs. Required Total over Time as of 01/05

Source: Weekly Status Report available at http://www.defenselink.mil/la/iraq_stat.html, http://www.defendamerica.mil, and data provided by MNSTC-1. The numbers for police up until 23 February reflect police reported as being on duty, not those on duty and trained, as breakouts are unavailable prior to February.
**Understanding the Manpower Trend Data**

Ironically, some of these trends conceal positive developments that had the affect of cutting total manpower, or lowering the rate of manpower increase. Far too many men had been recruited or retained at all ranks during the first year of occupation that lacked the proper physical capabilities, ability to absorb training, and sometimes literacy. Many were poorly vetted or recruited for political purposes. Others were corrupt, failed to lead, or were cowardly. These men now had to be phased out or dismissed, sometimes including senior officers. As a result, the build up of manpower was in some ways more impressive than the figures shown might imply.

At the same time, these trends in total manpower numbers disguised other significant problems.

- Recruit quality remained a problem, as did the quality of the output of those training courses that accepted low-grade entrants. Facilities, training, and equipment had improved, but many recruits had limited literacy, no experience with vehicles and modern technology, and little experience with disciplined or structured work experience. The level of education and work experience Iraq had before the Iran-Iraq War was long gone, and even many recruits with military backgrounds under the regime of Saddam Hussein were loosely organized garrison forces, conscripted into service, and with little meaningful operational experience.

- The facts of day-to-day life in Iraq created additional difficulties. Iraqis lived in a social structure and cash economy and one where forces had to visit their families to transfer money and provide services that simply are not as yet available at a local level. Social contact was an important fact of Iraqi life, and families were vulnerable and subject to intimidation in many areas. This often led units to have 10-15 percent of their manpower outside the unit. MNSTC-I reported that in an effort to combat the limits of a cash only economy, a fourth company was added to the battalion structure to give increased scheduling flexibility (so that Iraqi soldiers can get the cash home) and to improve readiness.

- Motivation remained a major problem. From the start, recruiting relied heavily on the fact so many young men could not find any other job. This inevitably meant much of the recruitment base had a limited incentive to fight or take high risks, and such problems were compounded by the fact the proper leadership, facilities, equipment, training and reinforcement capabilities were often lacking. Some insurgents and terrorists may seek martyrdom. When the system fails the man, the man cannot be blamed for failing the system.

- The ethnic and religious makeup of the Iraqi military and security forces was an additional concern. The stated MNSTC-I goal was to create an army that is at least 30 percent comprised of Sunni Muslims, yet reports indicate that Shi’ites and Kurds did much of the fighting in 2004. Data are not available on the current ethnic and religious mix of the Iraqi forces is unknown. But both US advisors and Iraqi officers felt more still has to be done to create religiously and ethnically diverse forces in such a way that no group feels disenfranchised or threatened.

- The improvements in the vetting and training problems made in virtually all elements of Iraqi forces in 2004 could only be implemented slowly, and great caution was needed in removing incompetent, incapable, or corrupt personnel. The risk of a political “backlash” in the form of hostility against the Iraqi government or Coalition was all too real, as was the risk of providing new recruits to the insurgency. Changing a manpower “culture” based on favouritism and corruption could not be done quickly, and new retirement and severance payment options had to be developed and implemented. Vetting and training
facilities remained limited in size, and in many cases, any form of manpower could serve some useful purpose—even if this was a token deterrent or minor security function.

- Corruption and favoritism remained a problem, particularly in the police. Incompetent and inactive officers sometimes were left in office until a major scandal or failure occurred. Selection and promotion was still beginning to be carried out on a merit basis and according to the rules, and large numbers of officers and personnel still lacked the kind of training that could change the “culture” of Iraqi forces that had developed under previous regimes. Significant numbers of local police were still appointed outside the new system the Ministry of Interior and MNSTC-I were trying to establish, and CPATT still lacked all of the manpower and resources it needed to be effective.

- No amount of vetting and training can substitute for experience in combat or crisis. Large numbers of men were being put into new units without experienced leaders, and without any history of unit cohesion. These units lacked cadres of MNSTC-I and MNF-I advisors to help them through the transition, and lacked the equipment and support to outmatch the weapons and equipment in the hands of terrorists and insurgents. Police units in particular often had to be deployed in highly vulnerable and poorly protected posts in urban areas or isolated from immediate support. The recruiting, training, and equipping programs were gathering real momentum but did not, by themselves, produce combat units

**Equipment: End of 2004 and Beginning of 2005**

The US weekly status reports on Iraq no longer reported equipment deliveries in terms of total numbers delivered to date or relative to total requirement by the end of 2004. The MSTC-I did, however, report total equipment deliveries per month. It reported on December 5th that total deliveries for November 2004 included:

- 44 Panhard M3 armored personnel carriers, 4 T-55 heavy tanks, 19 MTLBs, and 4 Comp Air 7SL aircraft.
- More than 2 million RPK/PKM machine guns rounds, 1.2 million 9mm pistol rounds, 2.8 million AK-47 rounds, 450,000 12 gauge shotgun rounds, 999,000 5.6mm rounds, 48 shotguns, 1,000 9mm pistols, nearly 1,000 PKM and RPK machineguns, 1,150 smoke and riot grenades, 1,900 9mm Glock pistols, 5,400 AK-47 assault rifles, 20 Walther pistols, 78 rocket propelled grenade launchers, 16,000 sets of body armor, 7,400 helmets,
- Two 2-ton trucks, 14 ambulances, 10 GAZ heavy transport trucks, 15 Chevy trucks, 4 Dodge Durangos, 52 Chevy Lumina police sedans,
- 200 vehicle and handheld radios, 150 night vision goggles, some 11,000 field jackets, 3,000 cold weather jackets, 2,000 mattresses and beds, 40,000 desert combat uniforms, 11,000 pairs of running shoes, 300 kneepads, 600 tactical vests, 1,000 holsters, 9,500 t-shirts, 1,200 binoculars, 1,000 handcuff sets, 20 blunt trauma suits, 1,450 compasses, 132 GPS positioning systems, 800 "MAG" lights, 750 whistles, 4,150 hats, 344 first aid kits, 2,000 canteens, 1,500 police shirts, and 2,000 police uniforms.\(^4\)

If one looks at total deliveries between July 1 and December 1, 2004, they included more than 69 million rounds of ammunition with another 148 million rounds stored in twelve ammunition sites throughout Iraq. They also included 70,000 pistols, 49,000 AK-47s, 1,700 heavy PKM machine guns, 84,700 sets of body armor, 5,700 vehicles, 54,000 helmets, and 20,000 radios.\(^5\)
What Such Equipment Trend Data Mean

Some of these figures may seem mundane and trivial, but a careful reading shows a more rapid rate of delivery was taking place, and that the mix of equipment reflected a considerably better effort to meet the overall needs of Iraqi forces. The problem is that there is no way to relate such data to prior shortfalls, ongoing losses, or total current needs. It is also unclear whether equipment was being provided in the form that gave Iraqi the feeling they had what they needed to fight and survive, and that they would eventually get what they needed to operate as independent forces.

Progress took place in other areas. Some steps could be carried at very little cost while also boosting Iraqi security and military force confidence. One simple example was that of the ski mask. Providing security and military force members with a ski mask allowed them to obscure their identity from insurgents and their sympathizers or informers. The insurgents were less likely to discover the identities of the policemen and soldiers, and insurgents found it harder intimidate and/or threaten their families, enhancing confidence and effectiveness of Iraqi forces. MNSTC-I reported that as of mid-2005, ski masks were issued to some forces.

Likewise, providing Iraqi forces with the tool needed to sight their aging AK-47s helped to improve their shooting accuracy and reduce instances of collateral damage.

On the other hand, this list of deliveries again reveals how lightly armed and equipped most Iraqi forces were as the end of 2004, and raises further questions about the level of equipment shortfalls tolerated during 2003 and the first half of 2004. Iraqi forces were still being created with little more than the most basic equipment.

Americans who evaluate the performance of Iraqi forces at this time, and the lessons for future training and support efforts, should remember that this was the period when an even more intense US debate began over uparming Humvees and trucks, and providing heavy armor. Iraqi forces in the field were still being given little or no protection by US and Coalition equipment standards. It was already clear that if Iraqi forces were to stand on their own, demonstrate the true sovereignty and legitimacy of Iraq forces, and phase out Coalition forces, they must have the equipment to both operate with reasonable safety and decisively outgun and outmaneuver insurgents and terrorists.

Another emerging concern is that weapons supplied to the Iraqi military could be used against Coalition forces, or by the factions in civil fighting if the Iraqi political process fails. The make-up of the Iraqi military still reveals the fractious nature of the state, rather than present the appearance of a unified national force. In the north, forces are primarily Kurds, Sunnis in the west, and Shiite in the south. With continuing wrangling over the content of the constitution, units that are largely ethnic or sectarian, and divided sectarian and ethnic allegiances among military personnel, the threat of an all-out civil war or military coup remains real, and has made the Pentagon increasingly uncertain about equipping the Iraqi military with heavy weaponry. Weapons ending up in the hands of insurgents remained a threat, and a concern.

This concern was compounded by the continuing role of ethnic and sectarian militias inside and outside Iraqi forces, the existence of police, and increasing insurgent efforts to provoke full-scale civil war.
A provision in the Iraqi Constitution allowing for regional security forces complicates matters further. Article 9 of the August 28 draft of the constitution holds that “Forming military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is banned.” However, Article 18 establishes that “The regional government shall be in charge of all that's required for administering the region, especially establishing and regulating internal security forces for the region such as police, security and guards for the region.” The evolution and possible expansion of these regional forces are central to U.S. concerns. Heavy weaponry provided to the Iraqi National Army could foreseeably wind up in the hands of these regional, ethnic, or sectarian forces – forces like the Badr Corps in the south. The stockpiling of U.S.-supplied arms by potentially competing forces could add to sectarian tensions, as well as the possibility of civil war.

**Facilities at the End of 2004**

The US Department of State reported on the number of reconstruction projects that were underway as of December 2, 2004. The report listed 88 border posts, 17 police stations, and 16 military bases for the Iraqi security and military forces that are being built. Like most US reporting, however, it is impossible to know the extent to which such claims of progress relate to the requirement, how many survive the insurgency, and how many are really adequate once completed. Project reporting that is not related to valid objectives and requirements, and where there is no evaluation of the value of what is delivered, is essentially meaningless.

This is important because so many facilities for the police and security forces had been grossly inadequate and under-equipped in the past, and many were still extremely vulnerable to insurgent attack and impossible to isolate or protect in the densely populated areas where they are located.

Once again, Iraqi forces suffered from a dual standard. Many were still being deployed without anything approaching the physical security of their Coalition allies. However, regular Army and IIF facilities were becoming better protected, as were many ING and police locations. Some ING were also co-located on Coalition forward operating bases. Police stations were often difficult to harden due to their physical location relative to other structures and roads in the area, but US experts report that efforts to provide better force protection to police stations were well underway.

**Spending at the End of 2004**

The Department of Defense weekly status report still showed relatively low levels of FY2004 aid spending as of December 8, 2004. The total apportionment for security and law enforcement was now shown as $5,045 million. A total of $4,278 million was committed, $2,930 million was obligated, and $961 million had been spent. This was less than 20 percent of the total apportionment months after the FY2004 year ended.

Part of these problems, however, were the result of the way the money was appropriated and allocated. A total of $1,800 million of the $5,045 million was not appropriated until October 2004. MNSTC-I reports that several hundred million of that amount had to be spent in FY2005 because it was designated for the INL police trainers and advisors. As a result, the amount obligated was adequate relative to the money actually available, and the amount spent was actually 30 percent of the $3,200 billion set aside in the IRRF.
Operational Readiness at the End of 2004

As might be expected, various insurgent groups made Iraqi forces more and more of a target as Iraqi forces increased in strength and came to play a larger role in securing Iraq. The Operational Readiness section provides detailed chronology of Iraqi clashes with insurgents since June 2004. It is all too clear that insurgents made steadily greater effort to prevent and break up the successful development of Iraqi military, security, and police forces.

This chronology also shows that the new and inexperienced Iraqi forces were often vulnerable and lacked the experience to be effective. Military forces do not simply need training and equipment, they need leadership and experience at the unit level and to develop a sense of identity, mutual trust, and unit integrity. This can take years in normal military practice, and US and Western military history is filled with examples of problems that occurred when new units were created without large cadres of proven leaders and other ranks.

The Challenge of Deploying New Forces into Combat

It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the new Iraqi forces often lacked operational readiness, and there were many occasions on which Iraqi forces failed to perform their missions. These failures were the almost inevitable result of insurgent attacks, a lack of leadership and integrity on the part of some Iraqi officers, and a lack of experience and dedication on the part of Iraqi enlisted men.

The failure of the Iraqi police forces in Mosul during and after the battle of Fallujah in November 2004, was one example of such problems. Nearly 75 percent of some 4,000 Iraqi forces deserted when insurgents attacked on November 12, 2004, in the midst of the US-Iraqi attack on insurgents in Fallujah. The ranks of Iraqi National Guard units dropped from 1,100 to 300 men in a matter of hours, and two companies – some 200 men – abandoned all of their equipment. The 106th Iraqi National Guard Battalion did well, but another battalion virtually disintegrated.

MNSTC-I reported that their commander Brigadier General Mohammed Keri Barhawi was wounded twice, attacked many times while serving as the police chief in Mosul, and that his forces only disintegrated after repeated attacks, intimidation, and, at times, lack of Coalition support. A senior observer commented as follows:

Opening up two fronts in April 2004 against insurgents in Fallujah and then Moqtada Militia in Baghdad simultaneously was very unfortunate. The new Iraqi Army either fled or rebelled and almost disintegrated overnight – we were far too optimistic and when you look at how their deployment was managed you can only wince. To then allow an inconclusive ending to Fallujah and the obvious festering implications to coalesce which included the ability of insurgents in Fallujah to sustain the overall insurgency campaign was another major error.

There were Iraqi failures to deal with this situation at the command level. Gen. Babakir Shawkat Zebari, the top Iraqi general, refused to admit the scope of the problem at Fallujah. On December 26, 2004, he stated, “Not a single soldier ran away from the battlefield [in Fallujah]. It was not a difficult battle. Fallujah was cleaned and the number of our martyrs [or fatalities] was only seven.” To not recognize problems and setbacks within the Iraqi security and military forces compounds the problem by failing to learn from past mistakes.

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Somewhat similar failures occurred in Samarra, although at a lower level. Some 2,000 Iraqi troops did join the US forces fighting to retake the city in October 2004, but only after some 300 men out of a 750-man battalion deserted before the fighting even began.85

**Progress In Spite of Setbacks**

At the same time, two senior US officers made statements about the level of progress Iraqi forces had achieved by the end of 2004 that help put these problems in a more balanced perspective. In a December 6, 2004 interview, Lieutenant-General David Petraeus, the Commander of MNSTC-I, was questioned about problems in training the Iraqi security and military forces. When pressed as to whether the problem with the security forces was low morale, infiltration, cowardice, leadership, or intimidation, Petraeus replied, “It’s probably all of the above.”86

Petraeus made it clear, however, that he felt Iraqi security forces were improving despite setbacks like the dissolution of the Mosul police force in late November. He stated:

> This is a rollercoaster that we are riding. You have to realize that every day there are going to be bumps, sometimes explosions, sometimes real plunges and the idea is to make darn sure you have got your eye on the horizon and you are still climbing with the rollercoaster over time. And I think that’s the case.87

US General John Abizaid, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, gave a press conference on December 6, 2004, and highlighted what he considered the achievements and problems within the Iraqi security and military forces.

He expressed concern over the level of militant activity and the apparent dissolution of the police force in Mosul. When asked whether the Iraqi forces could assume more of the security missions by the Iraqi national election date, Abizaid replied:

> Iraqi security forces aren’t as mature as they need to be for the security environment that’s going to exist in the next several months. That doesn’t mean that they are not fighting and dying—they are. I think the mid-level chain of command has got to be developed at brigade and division levels in order for the armed forces to develop firmly.

> Over time, they will get better. Their equipment is coming in; their organization is developing. I think the Army and National Guard units are going to be challenged over the next several months by an awful lot of fighting. They know it. We know it and what we’ve got to do is not risk their development by committing them at the wrong time to combat operations.

> In places where there is lots of intimidation like Mosul, it’s clear that the police are not holding together to the degree we would like them to, so, all these things taken into account make it pretty clear to me that it’s a good move for commanders in Iraq to get additional forces to get through the election period. This is the single most important political event that’s going to take place in Iraq since [sic] its liberation.88

General Abizaid’s comments came five days after Iraqi National Security Minister Dr. Qassim Dawood stated that security of the polling centers during the election would be the responsibility of the Iraqi security forces, and of Iraqi society more broadly, and that the US forces would only be called on if the centers faced a major attack.89 The US Department of Defense indicated that US troop levels would rise to 150,000 in Iraq to help provide security for the national election.

Abizaid was, however, positive about the progress in creating Iraqi forces, and the impact they would have in taking over from US and other Coalition forces:

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“It’s an intangible action that I’m not so sure I can predict. When do you reach the tipping point where Iraqi security forces are capable of standing alone without our backup? It will be awhile. I wouldn’t want to make a prediction on when that’s going to be.”

“If Iraqi forces are capable of conducting more combat operations independently, the same levels of U.S. forces won’t be necessary.”

“You come to a point where the combat multinational portion of the force becomes secondary to the training effort.”

When Gen. Abizaid was asked about the post-election environment in Iraq, he stated, “…If the circumstances are such that, as in Afghanistan, the political process leads to better security…and if the Iraqi security forces start to gel in terms of leadership and seasoning in important areas around the country – which I think will happen – then we can talk about reshaping [US] forces.”

Abizaid made it clear that the goal for US forces would be to take on the training of Iraqi security forces as their main mission with providing general security as a secondary mission, one to be undertaken on a lesser scale and when the Iraqis ask for assistance. He also commented that if Iraqi force developed moved to the point where training became the primary mission of the US forces in Iraq, the US might use less conventional forces and utilize “embedded” trainers and more special operations troops.

The following chronology records operational progress, and setbacks for the Iraqi security forces:

- **May 23, 2003**—Paul Bremer issues Order No. 2, The Dissolution of Entities, dissolving the old Iraqi armed forces.
- **September 12, 2003**—US troops of the 82nd Airborne Division accidentally kill ten Iraqi policemen in the city of Fallujah. Fallujah’s residents promise a wave of violence against US troops.
- **October 2003**—Estimates indicate that the Iraqi security forces will number some 170,000.
- **October 9, 2003**—A car laden with explosives slams into a Baghdad police station. Ten Iraqis are killed.
- **October 27, 2003**—The headquarters of the Red Crescent and three Baghdad police stations are hit in the same day by four coordinated suicide bombs. 43 die and more than 200 wounded in the bloodiest day since the fall of Hussein’s government.
- **November 2003**—Estimates for the necessary manning of the Civil Defense Corps rise from 25,000 to 40,000 troops. Estimates for the necessary manning of the Border Police rise from 11,800 to 25,700.
- **November 4, 2003**—US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld states that over 100,000 Iraqi security forces have been trained.
- **December 14, 2003**—17 Iraqis are killed when a suicide car bomber runs into a police station near Baghdad.
- **January 25, 2004**—Iraki policemen in Ramadi are attacked on two separate occasions. Seven Iraqi police die.
- **January 31, 2004**—9 Iraqis are killed and 43 others wounded when a suicide bomber runs his car into a police station in Mosul.
- **February 10, 2004**—55 Iraqis are killed and approximately 65 are wounded when a car bomb explodes outside a police station in Iskandariya. Many of the dead were applying for jobs as policemen. When the Iraqi police chief, Ahmed Ibrahim, arrives, the gathered crowd nearly riots while chanting anti-American slogans.
February 11, 2004—A gathering of Iraqi Army recruits are attacked in central Baghdad by a suicide car bomber. 47 are killed and at least 50 more wounded.

February 14, 2004—Approximately 70 insurgents stage a daring raid on the headquarters of both the police and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps in Fallujah in a bid to free many of their cohorts. Up to 70 prisoners escape and a number were seen fleeing with the insurgents. 15 policemen and four Lebanese and Iranian insurgents were killed.

February 23, 2004—A car bomb detonates outside of a Kirkuk police station, killing at least ten and wounding more than 35 Iraqis.

March 9, 2004—Two American CPA officials and their Iraqi translator are killed intentionally by Iraqi policemen 70 miles south of Baghdad. These are the first American civilian deaths in Iraq.

March 23, 2004—In Kirkuk and Hilla, 11 Iraqi policemen are shot and killed in two separate attacks.

April 2004—Available Iraqi Army forces drop from 5,600 to 2,400. The available Civil Defense Forces drop from 34,700 to 23,100.

April 5, 2004—US Marines lay siege to Fallujah following the murder and desecration of four American security contractors in the city. Several Iraqi battalions refuse to fight in either Fallujah or Sadr City.

April 21, 2004—Several suicide bombs explode outside of a number of police facilities in the area of Basra. Crowds assault the Coalition forces trying to reach the wounded with stones. At least 68 are killed by the bombs.

April 30, 2004—The siege of Fallujah ends at the urging of Iraqi politicians. The Fallujah Brigade, a cobbled-together militia led by former Iraqi army officers, is formed to rid the city of foreign fighters.

May 7, 2004—Four Iraqi police officers are killed when their squad car is ambushed by insurgents in Mosul.

June 6, 2004—A police station and military base around Baghdad are bombed—21 Iraqis are killed in the attacks.

June 10, 2004—Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army takes control of a Najaf police station in direct violation of the ceasefire agreement between Sadr and the US. Sadr’s forces free the prisoners and loot the station.

June 14, 2004—Multiple suicide bombings aimed at Iraqi police kill dozens of civilians in Baghdad.

June 17, 2004—41 are killed and approximately 142 are injured when suicide car bombers detonate outside a military recruitment center and a city council building in Baghdad.

June 24, 2004—Sunni insurgents launch a series of coordinated attacks on Iraqi security forces in Fallujah, Baghdad, Mosul, Ramadi, and Baquba. At least 70 Iraqis are killed.

July 2004—The Civil Defense Corps disbands and is replaced by the National Guard. The Intervention Force is established with an end manning goal of 6,600. The Special Operations Force is established with an end manning goal of 1,600 troops. The Coastal Defense Force is established with an end manning goal of 400 as is the Air Corps, with an end manning goal of 500.

July 16, 2004—Australia deploys the Iraqi Army Training Team consisting of 50 soldiers with the task of training a full brigade of Iraqi soldiers.

July 28, 2004—A car bomb kills 70 Iraqis outside of a police recruiting center in Baquba.

August 2004—US marines arrest the Al Anbar Province’s police chief, on charges of corruption.

○ **September 2004**—Prime Minister Allawi and President Bush both state that there are 100,000 fully trained and equipped Iraqis providing security in Iraq. NATO ambassadors agree to send 200 trainers to help rebuild the Iraqi army. The First Infantry Division arrests a senior commander of the Diyala Province’s Iraqi National Guard, alleging that he maintained ties to insurgents. The end manning goal of the Iraqi National Guard increases from 41,000 to 61,900 as does the end manning goal for Border Enforcement, from 16,300 to 32,000. The end manning goal for the Iraqi police increases from 90,000 to 135,000.

○ **September 6, 2004**—7 US soldiers and three Iraqi soldiers are killed by a car bomb outside of Fallujah.

○ **September 10, 2004**—The Fallujah Brigade disbands without having secured the city. A small riot breaks out as people leave a mosque. Iraqi police fire into the crowd killing two people and injuring five. Aides to al-Sadr claim that the dead and injured were unarmed.

○ **September 14, 2004**—12 policemen are killed in Baquba by a drive by shooter. 47 Iraqis are killed and 114 are wounded by a car bomb outside a military recruitment area. The recruits were forced to stand outside blast absorbing concrete barriers. The ensuing crowd curses the US and blames US warplanes for the attack. Elements associated with Abu Musab Zarqawi claim credit for both attacks.

○ **September 17, 2004**—13 are killed by a suicide car bomb near a police checkpoint in Baghdad.

○ **September 18, 2004**—A suicide car bomb kills 19 and wounds 67 more in Kirkuk. The bomber targeted a crowd of young men seeking employment with the Iraqi National Guard.

○ **September 19, 2004**—A car bomb aimed at a joint Iraqi-US patrol near Samarra kills one Iraqi soldier, one Iraqi civilian, and wounds seven others.

○ **September 21, 2004**—An insurgent abandons a car loaded with explosives near the Iraqi National Guard recruiting center in the Jamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad. No one was hurt.

○ **September 22, 2004**—The Iraqi National Guard center in the Jamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad is hit by a suicide car bomb that kills at least 11 and wounded an unknown number. Recruits had gathered around the center and were apparently the target.

○ **September 23, 2004**—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld testifies that since May 1, 2003, 721 Iraqi personnel have died providing their country with security.

○ **September 25, 2004**—Seven Iraqi National Guard applicants die in the Jamiya neighborhood of western Baghdad at the hands of insurgents. A US army soldier faces 25 years in jail for his part in the death of an Iraqi National Guardsmen in Adwar in May. An Iraqi police captain, Salman Turki al-Shamani, is killed by insurgents near Baquba.

○ **September 26, 2004**—Two suicide car bombers try to drive into a base used by US Marines and Iraqi National Guardsmen in Karma, near Fallujah. When challenged, they detonate the cars. No injuries are reported.

○ **October 2004**—The Highway Patrol and the Dignitary Protection service are established with end manning goals of 1,500 and 500 men each.

○ **October 1, 2004**—3,000 US and 2,000 Iraqi forces launch an assault on the approximately 500 militants controlling the city of Samarra, an area 60 miles north of Fallujah. Estimates now indicate that the Iraqi security forces will need to number some 346,700 men, double the estimate from October 2003.

○ **October 4, 2004**—General James Jones, NATO’s commander, announces that up to 3,000 NATO troops could be involved in the training of Iraqi security forces. US and Iraqi forces take Samarra, killing 100 militants. Iraqi units fight with distinction and capture 24 suspected foreign fighters. Three car bombs, two in Baghdad and one in the west, kill at least 26 people and wound more than 100 others. Iraqi security forces fight a gun battle in downtown Baghdad after one of the blasts. One of the suicide bombers rams a recruiting center for Iraqi plainclothes policemen.

○ **October 5, 2004**—An estimated 3,000 US and Iraqi troops begin a campaign designed to wrest control of insurgent-held areas of the Babil Province. Iraqi Special Forces play a prominent role in the subsequent raids.

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October 6, 2004—A suicide bomber drives an explosives-laden vehicle into an Iraqi checkpoint at the Iraqi national guard encampment near Anah, 160 miles northwest of Baghdad. Approximately 1,200 members of the 202nd Iraqi National Guard, 7th Army Battalion, and 1st Ministry of Interior commando battalion are designated to stay in Samarra. The governor pledges to send 1,500 additional police officers.

October 9, 2004—11 Iraqi National Guardsmen are killed and six others injured during an insurgent attack on the National Guard compound located in Karabilah, near the Syrian border. NATO declares its commitment to sending 300 military trainers to Iraq after stiff resistance, especially from France. The program is unlikely to be in place until the end of the year.

October 10, 2004—Iraqi National Guardsmen assist in a border operation that results in the deaths of two insurgents or smugglers. At least 10 Iraqis die in explosions near the oil ministry and police academy.

October 12, 2004—In Ramadi, a joint force of US and Iraqi troops arrests a Sunni cleric, Sheik Abdul Aleem Saidy, and his son. Iraqi police in Sadr City continue buying heavy weapons from al-Sadr’s militia forces.

October 15, 2004—A suicide car bomber narrowly misses a unit of Iraqi police on patrol, killing 10 bystanders.

October 19, 2004—Four Iraqi national guardsmen are killed and 80 are injured in a mortar attack 80 miles north of Baghdad. Insurgents unsuccessfully try to assassinate Col. Mohamed Essa Baher, the commander of the 507th Iraqi National Guard Battalion. Baher had identified a financier allegedly a part of the Zarqawi terror network the day before the attack.

October 23, 2004—Three minibuses filled with 49 Iraqi recruits for the 16th Iraqi Army Battalion, 7th Army Brigade are ambushed by insurgents dressed as Iraqi police. All 49, as well as 3 accompanying civilians, are killed. The ambush takes place as the recruits leave a training base in Kirkush, 15 miles from the Iranian border and northeast of Baghdad. This is the single most deadly insurgent ambush to date. Several Iraqi National Guardsmen are killed by a car bomb at a checkpoint south of Samarra. At least four are killed. Another car bomb kills between 10 and 16 Iraqi policemen at a checkpoint outside of the Marine base in Al Asad in the Anbar Province.

October 25, 2004—An Iraqi national security aide declares that up to 5% of Iraq’s security forces are most likely infiltrated by insurgents.

October 26, 2004—Prime Minister Allawi blames the US and its Coalition allies for the massacre of the 49 Iraqi army recruits. Iraq’s interior minister, Falah al-Naqib, announces a new campaign to rid the police force of corrupt and ineffective members. The militant group, the Army of Ansar al-Sunna, claims responsibility for the murder of 11 Iraqi National Guardsmen it had captured on the road between Hilla and Baghdad.

October 28, 2004—Two senior Iraqi police officers are killed near Latifiya, south of Baghdad, allegedly by the Army of Ansar al-Sunna.

October 30, 2004—Iraqi police officers allegedly fired indiscriminately on civilians after an attack on an American convoy south of Baghdad. Reportedly, the police direct their fire on three minibuses and three vans, killing 14 and wounding 10.

November 2, 2004—A car bomb intended for an Iraqi security convoy kills four Iraqi civilians and wounds 12 Iraqi National Guardsmen in Mosul. NATO begins its first eight-week training course for security personnel at its Joint Warfare Centre in Norway. 19 mid to high-level officials from the Iraqi military, Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior attend.

November 3, 2004—Three decapitated bodies of Iraqi National Guardsmen are found underneath the 14th of July Bridge in Baghdad. A group calling itself the Brigades of the Iraqi Honorables claims responsibility for killing the three men. Ansar al-Sunna posts pictures of another decapitation on the Internet, claiming that the victim is Maj. Hussein Shanoun, an officer in the new Iraqi army.
○ **November 6, 2004**—More than 15 Iraqi police officers are killed by a series of closely coordinated assaults against police stations in Samarra. In addition, an Iraqi National Guard Commander, Abdel Razeq Shaker Garmali, is among those killed in Samarra.

○ **November 7, 2004**—Insurgents launch an attack against a police station in the town of Kirkuk, taking 21 policemen hostage. The insurgents kill all of them execution-style. In another attack on a police station in the town of Haqlaniya, insurgents kill the head of security in western Iraq, Brigadier Shaher al-Jughaifi. Unknown gunmen kill Iraqi police Col. Abdul Adim Abed in the Mualem neighborhood of Baquba. The director of security in Sulaimaniyah, Brigadier Sarkout Hassan Jalal, claims that Islamic militants regularly smuggle recruits from Iran into Iraq and on to Fallujah and other “hotspots.” The Iraqi government declares a state of emergency for 60 days with the exception of the northern Kurdish regions. The declaration coincides with the beginning stages of an assault on the restive city of Fallujah. Iraqi commandos from the 36th Iraqi Commando Battalion supported by US Marines take control of Fallujah’s main hospital just prior to the declaration.

○ **November 8, 2004**—The battle for Fallujah begins. Approximately 10,000 US troops and 2,000 Iraqi forces confront 3,000 to 5,000 insurgents. Iraqi commandos seize a hospital and a railway station. The hospital was the focal point of erroneous casualty reports following the first assault on Fallujah.

○ **November 9, 2004**—Two police stations in Baquba are attacked. One police officer is killed and eight are wounded. Reportedly, the police stand their ground and fight well. Elsewhere, a suicide car bomb strikes an Iraqi National Guard base north of Kirkuk, killing at least three. Prime Minister Allawi visits Camp Fallujah and gives a speech in front of the assembled Iraqi forces. The prime minister’s speech is met with praise and cheers.

○ **November 10, 2004**—Insurgents loot and strip an Iraqi National Guard base in the town of Hammam al-Alil. The National Guard battalion stationed there falls apart when attacked, leaving the base, armor and all, to the militants. Two members of the Iraqi security forces are reported killed in action in Fallujah. Prime Minister Ayad Allawi places Maj. Gen. Abdul Qader Mohammed Jassim, the Iraqi ground forces commander in Fallujah, in control of the Western Anbar province until a civilian authority can be appointed. In Fallujah, the 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade of the Iraqi Intervention Force begins operations against the insurgents in Fallujah on its own and controls one part of the city by itself. The 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade aids US forces in bringing the Hydra Mosque under control. The 4th Battalion, 1st Brigade, and the Iraqi Police Service’s Emergency Response Unit see action. The 5th Battalion, 3rd Brigade helps US forces subdue insurgents in the Al Tawfiq Mosque. The 6th Battalion, 3rd Brigade mans vehicle checkpoints with US forces in the heart of Fallujah.

○ **November 11, 2004**—An Iraqi police vehicle and an American convoy are attacked by a suicide car bomber in central Baghdad. Nineteen people are killed. In Mosul, reports indicate that insurgents openly roam the streets and repeatedly attack police stations and government facilities. The insurgents, numbering between 400 and 500, split into groups of 15-20 to carry out attacks. Several police stations are burned to the ground despite pleas from imams via mosque loudspeakers. Insurgents seize control of six to seven police stations for the better part of an hour. When they are repelled, the fighters seize vehicles, weapons, body armor, radios, and uniforms. One senior police officer, the brother of Mosul’s police chief, is shot dead in his front yard. Fighters attack the Iraq Media Network. Brigadier General Carter Ham, commander of Task Force Olympia, states that he has never seen the level of command and control exhibited by the insurgents prior to today. Ten Iraqi National Guard troops die in the fighting. In response, US soldiers and members of the Iraqi National Guard raid southern portions of the city. In Fallujah, US and Iraqi forces seize control of 70% of the city. A total of nine Iraqi security force members are wounded.

○ **November 12, 2004**—The 1st battalion of the new Iraqi army encounters stiff resistance in the Jolan section of Fallujah. Brigadier Abdul Hussain Mahmoud Badar arrives in the Maysan province to take command of the Iraqi National Guard 73rd Brigade. Badar flies the same day, having been verbally threatened by individuals who claimed to be actively involved in the insurgency.

○ **November 13, 2004**—Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Allawi declares Fallujah liberated. Insurgents launch two attacks on an Iraqi National Guard base near Mosul, killing two guardsmen and wounding 21.

○ **November 14, 2004**—A total of six Iraqi military personnel are reported killed and more than 40 wounded in the fighting in Fallujah. Reports indicate that Iraqis are taking over the screening process for police recruits and are firing thousands for incompetence or inaction. Iraqi sources state that such
competence or corruption in the police led to the death of the 49 recruits last month. Reports indicate the firing of the police chiefs in both Samarra and Mosul following waves of insurgent attacks. The same reports state that Iraqi military officials have raised the recruiting age from 17 to 20, require a letter of approval from a local community council for each recruit, require that recruits must have a family member in the service to be eligible, and that committees will be sent to recruits’ neighborhoods to investigate their morality.

- **November 15, 2004**—Insurgents attack two police stations in Baquba. Elements are believed to have belonged to Saddam Hussein’s intelligence apparatus. It appears that there are a few foreign fighters, mostly Syrians, mixed in. Fighting continues in Mosul. The Iraqi Interior Minister reports that in one unidentified Iraqi city, a wounded Iraqi police officer was taken from his bed, dismembered, and that his remains were strung up in the city square.

- **November 16, 2004**—Militants fight with National Guardsmen from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the northern Mosul neighborhood of al-Ta‘nim. Three guardsmen are hurt and at least two insurgents are killed. US officials state that between 1,000 and 2,000 insurgents have been killed in Fallujah, with an additional 1,000 detained.

- **November 17, 2004**—Brig. Gen. Carter Ham states that Mosul is back under US and Iraqi control. Insurgents fire mortar rounds on the al-Ahrar police station within the city. The Iraqi Interior Ministry states that it is investigating reports that 31 security force recruits may have been kidnapped in Rutbah. The Iraqi police in Karbala indicated that they believed that they may have been taken. NATO unanimously agrees to increase the number of military trainers in Iraq from 65 to approximately 400. These trainers require around 1,600 supporting staff and will not serve in a combat role. Reports indicate that new personnel will be in place in the next six weeks.

- **November 18, 2004**—Militants detonate a car bomb in Baghdad outside the emergency Yarmouk police station in the west of the city. Two civilians die. Reports indicate that insurgents in Baghdad are lining one particular street with police uniforms in an effort to intimidate future recruits. Shelling and sporadic fighting continues in the southern outskirts of Fallujah. In Mosul, a mortar attack in the western portion of the city wounds five Iraqi soldiers. Iraqi commandos, backed by US troops, prepare to storm rebel-held parts of the city. Two Iraqi National Guard officers are publicly beheaded in the city by a group claiming allegiance to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

- **November 19, 2004**—A suicide car bomber rams an Iraqi police checkpoint in Maysalon Square in east Baghdad. The attack kills five police officers and wounds four others. Elsewhere in Baghdad, worshippers outside a mosque protest the assault on Fallujah. Some of the protestors fire on Iraqi National Guardsmen who subsequently return fire. A police convoy traveling through the city is hit by a suicide car bomber, killing one policeman and a bystander and wounds five others. In Fallujah, the commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force states that the assault had “broken the back of the insurgents” in the city. He reports that 51 US troops and eight Iraqi troops had been killed and that an additional 425 US troops and 43 Iraqi troops were wounded. He states that approximately 1,200 insurgents were killed, 25-30 civilians were being treated for injuries, and that he knew of no civilian deaths caused by the fighting. Insurgents attack a police station in Muqidiya with mortars, killing a police officer. In Mosul, reports indicate that residents are growing uneasy with the presence of Kurdish National Guardsmen in the city.

- **November 20, 2004**—Unidentified assailants kill an Iraqi National Guard recruit in a drive by shooting near Baquba. He was on his way to a training center when he was attacked. Iraqis find the bodies of eight Iraqi policemen some 15 miles west of Mosul. US forces reportedly detain three Iraqi National Guardsmen who were working for the insurgency. Reports indicate that approximately 15 Iraqi Army troops were killed in the last 24-36 hours.

- **November 21, 2004**—Militants attack a convoy ferrying Iraqi National Guardsmen in Ramadi. The insurgents kill nine guardsmen and wound an additional 17. In Mosul, US troops discover the bodies of nine Iraqi soldiers who had been shot execution style. Attackers kill the police chief and his driver in the town of Khalis. An Internet statement from a group purportedly affiliated with Abu Musab Zarqawi appears claiming that the group had killed 17 Iraqi National Guardsmen from Kisik.

- **November 23, 2004**—Approximately 5,000 US, British, and Iraqi troops launch an offensive dubbed Plymouth Rock in locales south of Baghdad in an effort to pacify the restive area. Reports indicate that the main elements involved are Iraqi SWAT forces supported by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The campaign begins with early morning raids in the town of Jaballa in the Babil province which net 32
suspected militants. Elsewhere, interim defense minister Hazem Sha’alan tells reporters that he cannot provide safety for voters in candidates in the upcoming election. He states that Iraqis don’t understand elections and that they are not aware of the candidates. Shi’ala accuses a “vile coalition” within interim Prime Minister Allawi’s government of obstructing the flow of funds to former soldiers’ pensions and to the new Iraqi army. In Baghdad, insurgents attack the deputy chief of Baghdad’s Major Crime Unit, Col. Ziyaa Hamed, car. In Baquba, gunmen attack a convoy carrying Iraqi security forces, killing three of them. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld states in a press briefing that, though Iraqi forces took part in a supporting role, they performed well in recent operations in Fallujah.

- **November 24, 2004**—Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi attends the graduation of 2,500 troops of the Iraqi Intervention Force at the Numaniah military base near Kut, south east of Baghdad. The graduates will form the 2nd Brigade of the Iraqi Intervention Force and are specially trained in counterinsurgency tactics. US Lt-Gen. David Petraeus states that they will be operational within two weeks and that the 3rd Brigade should be ready by the end of December. In Mosul, militants attack Iraqi Gen. Rashid Flaih, the head of the Iraqi commando unit in the city. Flaih is unhurt.

- **November 25, 2004**—US troops and Iraqi National Guardsmen launch raids on suspect buildings in the west side of Mosul. Reports indicate that some 11 dead Iraqi soldiers were found in and around Mosul. They were bound and shot in the back of the head. Iraqi Minister of State, Qasim Dawood, states in a press conference that Colonel Fawas Armoot was chosen as Ramadi’s police chief. Dawood declares that soldiers in Fallujah have discovered a rudimentary chemical and biological weapon facility that was being run by insurgents. The minister states that Iraqi police have captured five foreign terrorists, Libyan, Tunisian, and Syrian, trying to cross the border into Iraq.

- **November 26, 2004**—US troops and Iraqi National Guardsmen continue to conduct operations in Mosul. The forces raid one mosque run by an imam who is suspected of being an insurgent leader. The Iraqis perform well though they encounter no enemy fire. Two executed Iraqi soldiers are dumped at a busy traffic circle in downtown Mosul. US forces believe that soldiers are being kidnapped at taxi stands when they return home on leave.

- **November 27, 2004**—Three Iraqi police officers die in a bombing attack. The location of the attack remains unclear.

- **November 28, 2004**—Iraqi police detain two men and a vehicle packed with explosives in the Al-Jadriya neighborhood of Baghdad. In Baquba, militants fire mortars at the Al-Wahda police station, wounding a police officer. Militants storm a police station in Samarra, stealing several vehicles and looting the armory. Iraqi police fail to confront them. US and Iraqi forces launch land and amphibious raids to the south of Baghdad, killing 17 militants and capturing 32. In Basra, British and Iraqi troops surround the headquarters of the southern regional Iraq National Guard after Brigadier General Diaa al-Kadhimi refused to step down as commander in favor of Salah al-Maliki.

- **November 29, 2004**—A car bomb near Ramadi explodes, killing four Iraqi police officers and wounding three others. Three Iraqi National Guardsmen are injured as well. In a separate attack in Baghdad, 120 miles northwest of Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonates his car at a police checkpoint, killing seven Iraqi police and National Guardsmen. The blast injures an additional nine security personnel. Brig. Gen. Kadhimi continues his standoff in Basra. Reports indicate that at least 50 pro-interim government or security force personnel have been killed in Mosul in the last 10 days. The police chief states that no police are on active patrol because the city remains too dangerous. The US and Iraqi National Guard strike a deal with Mosul police to move back in to several of the police stations that were seized or looted during the beginning of the Fallujah campaign. The police agree to man some of the more dangerous stations by mid-December. Reports indicate that Iraqi security forces have abandoned Tal Afar. The governor of Najaf, Adnan al-Zurufi, announces that his security chief has been arrested by police in connection with a plot to assassinate the governor and several other top regional officials.

- **November 30, 2004**—In the Babil Province south of Baghdad, Iraqi and US forces captures 14 suspected militants and discovers three arms caches. Near Iskandariyah, the Iraqi SWAT team and the Iraqi Specialized Special Forces capture several high value suspects in separate operations. In Najaf, the 11th US MEU commander declares that Iraqi security forces have formally assumed control of the entire province and have the ability to conduct limited operations on their own.
December 2, 2004—Iraqi National Security minister Dr. Qassim Dawood states that securing the polling centers for the Iraqi election will be left to the Iraqi security forces and Iraqi society as a whole. He declares that the US forces will only be called upon if a polling center faces a major insurgent attack.

December 3, 2004—Gunmen shoot and kill sixteen Shi’ite Iraqi police officers, laying siege to a police station in the Baghdad neighborhood of Saydiya. Sources believe that the area harbors militants who fled Fallujah prior to the US and Iraqi attack on the city. In a separate attack at the other end of the city, insurgents ram a suicide car bomb into a crowd outside of a Shi’ite mosque, close to a nearby police station. 14 die and a gun battle ensues between the Iraqi police and the insurgents who fire on the police station. In Mosul, three police stations are attacked, though no immediate casualty reports are available. An Iraqi National Guard captain is assassinated in Karbala.

December 4, 2004—A suicide car bomber kills at least 18 Kurdish militiamen when he rams his car into their bus in Mosul. More than 16 are wounded. Another suicide bomber rams a police station in Baghdad near the Green Zone. The attack kills eight officers and wounds more than 38. Gunmen attack a police station in the Ghazaliya neighborhood in Baghdad. Another police station is attacked by militants in Samarra. Both attacks are repulsed, with two officers wounded in Samarra.

December 5, 2004—Insurgents ram a suicide car bomb into an Iraqi National Guard checkpoint near Bayji and follow the explosion up with small arms fire. Three Guardsmen are killed and 18 are wounded. In Samarra, gunmen attack an Iraqi army patrol, killing one soldier and wounding four more. Two Iraqi National Guardsmen are killed and four are wounded in Latifiyah in an insurgent attack.

December 6, 2004—A statement from the US Customs and Border Protection officers and their Iraqi counterparts indicates that they caught more than 40 terrorists arming insurgents within Iraq. The statement reveals that the officers, working closely with Iraqis, broke up an Iraqi smuggling ring.

December 7, 2004—A roadside bomb explodes south of Baghdad, killing three Iraqi National Guardsmen and wounding an additional 11. General John Abizaid, commander of US CENTCOM, declares that the indigenous forces will not be able to secure the country for the January election and that more US troops will temporarily be needed. He suggested that there would be more embedded US trainers and that more special operations forces might need to be created.

December 8, 2004—The police chief of Samarra’s home is attacked by insurgents. Reportedly, the police chief resigned following the attack. Unconfirmed reports state that a police station within the city was overrun by insurgents. In Ramadi, militants detonate a bomb near a police station. No injuries are reported. One Iraqi policeman claimed that half of Ramadi’s policemen had failed to report for duty because of threats and intimidation.

December 9, 2004—NATO formally agrees to increase its training staff in Baghdad from 60 officers to 300. Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands agree to contribute forces. France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Spain, and Luxembourg refuse. The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, states adamantly that no Germans will go to Iraq. A US-backed Iraqi National Guard patrol is ambushed in Mosul. The casualties are uncertain though it is believed that at least one Guardsman is killed.

December 10, 2004—Militants try to attack an Iraqi National Guard patrol in Samarra with mortars. The attack leaves the Guardsmen unscathed but kills two civilians. In Baquba, four Iraqi national Guardsmen are injured when a roadside bomb explodes by their patrol car. Insurgents attack them with small arms after the explosion.

December 11, 2004—Insurgents ambush a police patrol car on a road between Baiji and Tikrit. Two officers die and three are wounded. One of those killed is reportedly Brig. Gen. Razzaq Karim Mahmud, a senior police commander. In the town of Hit, militants attack a minibus carrying a contingent of Iraqi National Guardsmen. Seven Guardsmen are killed.

December 12, 2004—Reports indicate that more than 160 bodies, many members of the Iraqi National Guard, have been found in and around Mosul since November 12th. South of Baghdad, 72 suspected militants are seized by US Marines and Iraqi security forces near the Euphrates River. Insurgents attack a police station near Mahmudiyah. Iraqi National Guardsmen and Iraqi police successfully repel the attackers and suffer no losses. They uncover a car bomb across the street from the station and US forces detonate it. Officials attribute recent success by Iraqi forces in the area to the removal of a senior
December 14, 2004—In central Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonates a bomb at an entrance to the Green Zone. Three Iraqi National Guardsmen die and 12 people are wounded. The bombing is the second attack on the same entrance in two days and comes a day and a year after Saddam Hussein’s capture. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al-Qaeda in Iraq group claims responsibility for both attacks. US and Iraqi forces continue to fight insurgents in northern Mosul and in the western Anbar province. Two Iraqi National Guardsmen are killed and five wounded in a battle with insurgents near Dijail. In Samarra, Iraqi police report that three children were killed in the crossfire during a firefight between US forces and Iraqi forces and insurgents.

December 16, 2004—A roadside bomb explodes in western Baghdad, killing three Iraqi National Guardsmen. The Iraqi Minister of Defense, Hazim Al-Shaalan, orders the Iraqi forces to secure the churches and places of worship for the coming holiday.

December 18, 2004—Militants in Samarra fire mortar rounds at an election office located in a youth center. One Iraqi dies and eight others are evacuated to a hospital by members of the Iraqi National Guard who respond to the attack. Elsewhere in Samarra, Iraqi commandos seize bomb-making material and take into custody three insurgents during a raid. In Mosul, Iraqi National Guardsmen engage militants in a gun battle in the western part of the city, killing three insurgents.

December 20, 2004—A driver throws a hand grenade at a police station in Karbala. No injuries are reported and the driver is arrested.

December 21, 2004—A suicide bomber detonates his explosives at a U.S. military base mess tent near Mosul, killing 22 and wounding 72 more. The attack hits a dining hall where US soldiers, Iraqi National Guardsmen, and Iraqi civilians are having lunch. 3 Iraqi security forces personnel are killed. The suicide bomber is believed to be a Saudi allied with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi named Abu Omar al-Mosuli, and apparently he had acquired an Iraqi military uniform. After the attack, indigenous insurgent groups claim that the suicide bomber was not affiliated with Zarqawi and was a native Iraqi. Najaf’s police chief, Ghaleb al-Jazaeri, states that an Iraqi in custody confessed to having received training in a camp in Syria under the supervision of a Syrian military officer. The Iraqi reportedly took part in a bombing in Najaf in early December which killed 54 people. Syria denies having trained any insurgents.

December 23, 2004—141 Iraqi police officers graduate from six specialty training courses given at the Adnan Training Center. The one to two week courses are designed to bolster the regular eight week training courses and focus particularly on basic criminal investigation, supervision, executive leadership, and kidnapping/hostage rescue.

December 25, 2004—In Mosul, a roadside bomb explodes, destroying an Iraqi National Guard bus. Five Guardsmen die and three are wounded. Reportedly, Iraqi civilians threw rocks at the burning vehicle after the attack.

December 26, 2004—Col. Yassin Ibrahim Jawad, a high-ranking police officer, is killed in southern Baghdad. Gen. Babakir Shawkat Zebari states that the bombing of the mess tent in Mosul was not perpetrated by a member of the Iraqi military or security forces. He further states that President Bush’s criticisms of Iraqi forces, primarily that some would not fight and that some had deserted, were erroneous.

December 28, 2004—Insurgents attack and destroy the Um Kashifa police station near Tikrit. 12 Iraqi police officers are killed. In a separate attack near Tikrit, militants attack a police checkpoint killing one officer and wounding two others. Police checkpoints south of Tikrit are attacked, killing five Iraqi police officers and wounding three more. 13 Iraqi police officers are shot execution-style at one of the stations. US Maj. Neal O’Brien, spokesman for the 1st Infantry Division, states that despite the attack, the Iraqi security forces in Tikrit are performing quite well. One soldier cites nearly 2 ½ months of relative quiet in the city as proof. An Iraqi employed at the city hall states that 25 members of the Iraqi National Guard resigned after the attacks. An elaborate ambush on Iraqi National Guard troops takes place south of Baquba. It starts with a roadside bomb that wounds three Iraqi National Guardsmen near the Maffrak traffic circle in the Mualemen neighborhood. A second roadside bomb is found and a disposal team comes to remove it. A suicide car bomber then drives through the security cordon, killing a civilian and 26 others. Insurgents in Baghdad detonate a car bomb near the home of Maj. Gen.
Moudher al-Mula, an Iraqi National Guard commander, in an assassination attempt. He escapes unhurt, though several bystanders are killed. In a separate attack in the western Baghdad district of Ghaziliya, insurgents lure Iraqi police officers into an explosive-laden home and then blow up the house, killing seven police officers and wounding two others. In Mosul, militants fire from a mosque at a joint US-Iraqi military patrol, wounding one Iraqi National Guardsman. Near Samarra, five Ministry of the Interior commandos are wounded by an IED.

- **December 29, 2004**—Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim Al-Shaalan announces that the Iraqi National Guard will be incorporated into the Iraqi Army on the anniversary of Army Day on January 6, 2005. He states that forces totaling a division in size will all be graduating on that day. An Iraqi official states that Iraqi security forces have captured a key member of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization in the city of Mosul. Abu Marwan allegedly directed attacks in the city and was responsible for purchasing weapons and training the various terrorist cells.

- **December 31, 2004**—Five Iraqi National Guardsmen are wounded near Baiji when a car bomb explodes near their patrol vehicle. Two civilians are killed.

**Progress in Other Areas**

The behavior of Iraqi forces did show that they became more effective when they were given the proper leadership, organization, training, equipment, facilities, and when they had effective backup from the Coalition or other Iraqi security forces. Some fought well in demanding battles and engagements, and even less combat-capable forces like the police seemed to be taking hold in the areas where insurgent and terrorist attacks were less frequent.

The same chronologies in the Operational Readiness section, and various reports from the media and MNSTC-I, reflect significant successes and progress in a number of areas between September and December 2004:

- The MNSTC-I began deploying five mobile training teams to each of the MNF's six subordinate commands on November 28, to assist in training Iraqi bridge and division staff officers. All trainers were formerly instructors at the US Army Command and General Staff College or Combined Arms Service Staff School.

- The Iraqi Army’s 1st Mechanized Brigade received another six T-55 heavy tanks and 27 multi-purpose armored vehicles (MTLBs), which are personnel carriers with heavy machine guns, at the Taji Military Training Base north of Baghdad on December 6, 2004. It now has 10 T-55s and 37 MTLBs, and will be steadily expanded to include refurbished T-72s, which will replace the current T-55s. The brigade is scheduled to be operational by the summer of 2005. The brigade is being built up in three phases of roughly 1,000 men each, drawing on the manpower in Iraqi armored and mechanized units before the invasion. It will have all the capabilities of a full mechanized brigade, including infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, and logistics and support. The first phase is due to be complete before the end of 2004, the second by February 2005, and the final phase by May or June 2005.

- UAE donated Panhard M-3 armored vehicles to the Iraqi Army (Jordan had previously donated over 80 APCs earlier in the year).

- As of December, MNSTC-I announced the mechanized brigade could grow to a full division. The present force development plans call for three infantry divisions plus various support battalions.

- The Iraqi Army began company level training with the Egyptian Army’s 3rd Division, Northern Command at the Mubarak City training facility near Alexandria.

- Two battalions from the Iraqi Intervention Force conducted operations in Najaf. These same two battalions plus another conducted effective combat operations in Fallujah together with
two regular battalions, an Army Commando Battalion, a Police Emergency Response Unit, and Shewani Special Forces trained by 1” MEF. These forces constituted 2,700 Iraqis at their peak.

- Iraqi security forces formally assumed local control of security operations in Najaf Province on November 30, 2004.
- The Army had a total of 18 battalions (Regular Army and Intervention Force) that had completed initial training. Although most of these were not at full strength, many soldiers in these units had fought effectively and were “combat ready,” with many being “combat proven.” The Ministry of Defense had developed a “direct recruiting” program, whereby it was recruiting and training former soldiers with plans to integrate them into existing units to address Manning shortfalls.
- Sixteen National Guard battalions conducted operations effectively at the company level or above, with a number conducting operations effectively at the battalion level. Many Iraqi National Guard (ING) units conducted combat operations. Current plans are to expand the National Guard from its previous authorized strength of 45 battalions and six brigades to 6 Division HQs, 21 Brigade Commanders, and 65 battalions.
- National Guard units were slated to begin advanced training in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in January 2005, with the goal of creating 10 trained companies of 50 men each by the end of 2005.
- 72 men in the special Counterterrorism Task Force of the Special Forces graduated from a 12-week training course on December 3, 2004.
- Over 34,000 former police had been trained in the three-week Transition Integration Program. Over 18,000 police had been trained in the 8-week Academy program of instruction. Capacity at the 8-week academies in Jordan, Baghdad, and other regional academies was graduating nearly 3,000 new police per month and was poised to graduate over 4,000 per month by early March. The 8-week program was being taught at five different locations.
- The Iraqi Police Service graduated 1,423 officers from the eight-week course at the Basic Police Training course at the International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan, on December 16, 2004, and 140 officers from four advanced courses at the Adnan Training facility on December 9th. (Prior service officers attend a three-week course.)
- The 8-week police curriculum had been revised so training would better prepare students for the environment in which they would operate, with increased training on survival skills in an insurgency environment, force protection, combatives, and shooting AK-47s as well as pistols. In addition, police stations were being hardened and additional equipment was being issued to police to make them more capable in their operating environment.
- The border forces also began to play a more active role. The numbers of trained border enforcement personnel reflect training done by major subordinate commands (divisions). Capabilities among border enforcement personnel varied widely. However, MNSTC-I established a centralized program of instruction for border personnel, presently at the Jordanian Police Academy with Dept. of Homeland Security instructors. They will move this instruction to Iraq in the near future. In addition, MNSTC-I has started to train some border personnel as units, and has deployed a small number of these to the border to conduct operations as units.
- By the end of December, the Coalition had trained and equipped six Public Order Battalions and three Special Police Battalions trained to operate with mechanized (wheeled) vehicles.
- MNSTC-I had also helped the Ministry of Interior (MoI) equip and employ Police Commando Brigades. These newly formed commando units are designed to provide a high-end police and counterinsurgency capability. These battalions successfully conducted
offensive operations in Baghdad, Fallujah, Samarra, Mosul, North Babil, and other areas with favorable outcomes. The Coalition had provided equipment to one full Brigade and in mid-December was in the process of equipping a second full brigade, while a battalion of a planned third brigade was being formed. These forces have proved of great significance as have the newly trained Public Order Battalions, three of which had begun operations, and several emergency response units operating effectively at the provincial level.

- The Coalition had also trained, equipped, and helped to employ a small national-level Emergency Response Unit capable of conducting offensive counterinsurgency operations.
- MNSTC-I also began training and equipping provincial level SWAT Teams that will be capable of providing backup support to police when under attack.

Like the previous chronologies, these events show that progress was slow and anything but steady. They are further warning that force development is inevitably slower and more difficult than commanders and policymakers want. Nevertheless, there was progress.
VIII. The Run Up to Elections: Iraqi Security and Military Forces in January 2005

As might be expected, basic force numbers did not change radically between December and January 2005. Iraq did, however, take major steps to restructure its forces like merging the National Guard into the Army.

Equally significant, this was the period in which Iraq held its first true legislative election in decades. During months leading up to the election, insurgents had made repeated efforts to keep Iraqis from going to the polls and voting. They failed – some 58 percent of registered Iraqis voted on January 30, 2005. This election turnout gave a sense of legitimacy to the Iraqi government, and a combination of a large and visible Iraqi security presence and relative security of most polling places reinforces this position.

An estimated 130,000 Iraqi Security forces deployed on election day, January 30, 2005. While it was 150,000 Coalition troops that provided the core of the security effort, Iraqi forces did provide the inner two rings of security for over 5,200 polling sites. Not a single polling site was penetrated, and several Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members gave their lives while stopping suicide bombers on election day.

The performance of ISF forces was particularly striking since there was no approved election security plan until 10 days prior to the election. In fact, if some local ISF commanders had not acted to create plans on their own initiative, the operation could not have been nearly so successful.\(^92\)

This lack of violence did, however, lead some US and Iraqi officials and officers to be overoptimistic about the political and military impact of the elections. General John P. Abizaid, commander of US forces in the region, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2005. Abizaid rhetorically asked “Why didn’t [the insurgents] put more people in the field [on election day]? They threw their whole force at us, and yet they were unable to disturb the elections. I think that the voting in Iraq, the political process that’s going on … have driven those numbers [of insurgents] down.”\(^93\)

It was easy to forget that elections are merely the prelude to governance, and that all of Iraq’s important political problems were still ahead of the new government. It was also easy to forget that part of the reason was that Coalition forces shut down much of the road traffic and movement on election day and made security measures more effective. Furthermore, a short-term decline in activity after a surge in such activity before the elections did not mean the insurgents were defeated, and the insurgents soon developed new tactics.

**Manning Levels in January 2005**

Figures 15 through 18 illustrate the status of the Iraqi security and military forces as of January 19, 2005. These graphs are based on the Iraq Weekly Status Reports made available by the State Department since September.

- Figure 15 shows the numbers of National Guard, army, Intervention Force, and special operations forces that are trained or on hand compared to the numbers that are required. Between December 1, 2004 and January 19, 2005, the National Guard suffered fairly substantial manpower losses. That being said, the Intervention Force has exceeded its goal.

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end strength and its numbers increased significantly during the same time period. The first significant troop increase in the new year was the graduation of 670 Iraqi intervention Force soldiers from the Taji Military Training Base on January 18, 2005. The army experienced moderate growth.

○ Figure 16 shows the number of police and Border Enforcement personnel that are trained or on hand compared to the numbers that are required. It is important to note that those troops listed as trained/on hand are not all fully trained or equipped. Both the police and the Border Enforcement personnel have been slowly increasing.

○ Figures 17 and 18 show the composition of the Iraqi military and security forces as of January 19, 2005. The military is still overwhelmingly dominated by National Guardsmen while police make up the largest proportion of the security forces. There has been a fairly significant rise in the number of Iraqi Intervention Force troops.
Figure 15

Iraqi Military Forces Trained/On Hand vs. Required as of 1/19/05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trained/On Hand</th>
<th>Required</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Ops</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1,967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
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<td>61,904</td>
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<td>IIF</td>
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<td>6,360</td>
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Figure 16
Iraqi Security Forces Trained/On Hand vs. Required as of 1/19/05

Figure 17
Iraqi Military Forces by Force Element as of 1/19/05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Element</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Special Ops</td>
<td>674</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intervention Force</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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Figure 18
Iraqi Security Forces by Force Element as of 1/19/05

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Emergency Response</th>
<th>Border Patrol</th>
<th>Highway Patrol</th>
<th>Dignitary Protection</th>
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<tr>
<td>55,059</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>14,786</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>484</td>
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Total Iraqi Manpower: Debate Over Total Numbers

Total Iraqi manning levels became an area of considerable political controversy during this period, and a key focus of the Senate confirmation hearings for Condoleezza Rice’s nomination as Secretary of State. On January 18, Rice stated that there were 120,000 trained Iraqi troops. Several senators questioned that number, with one Democrat – Senator Biden – saying that he believed that the number of trained Iraqis was much closer to 4,000.

The truth lay in between, and had little to do with total manpower numbers of any kind. There were certainly far more than 4,000 trained troops equipped for some form of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism mission. The army and the Intervention Force accounted for more than double that figure. The only way to arrive at an estimate near 4,000 was to only count the Iraqi Army, which had a total of 4,159 men as of January 11, 2005. The Civil Intervention Force had another 2,862 men, the Emergency Response Unit had 205, the Bureau of Dignitary Protection had 484, the Intervention Force had 9,159, and the Special Operations Force had 674. This was a total of 17,000 men and did not count any of the 40,063 men in the National Guard. While the Guard was just being integrated into the Army – January 6, 2005 – it did have a total of nearly 45 battalions and some had moderate effectiveness.

Moreover, even the least trained and lightest Iraqi forces had some value in terms of local security, and many could replace Coalition forces in areas like checkpoint duty. The ability to operate directly and independently against insurgent and terrorist forces is only one measure of whether a force is well-enough trained and equipped to play a useful role.

That said, it still was disingenuous to state that there were 120,000 adequately trained and equipped Iraqi troops. If one looks at the numbers provided by the State Department in the Iraq Weekly Status Reports, one can determine that that figure could only have been arrived at if all of the Iraqi police were considered “troops.” That in itself would be an inaccurate designation as many police received only three weeks of training that did not approach the level of training the army receives.

Even if the police were counted as “troops,” an estimate of 120,000 trained troops failed to take into account the fact that the National Guard had fought erratically at best and been unreliable at worst. MNSTC-I reported that several units in Baghdad, north of Baghdad, and in the Ninewa Province performed well. By the end of 2004, there may not even have been the equivalent of 12,000 reliable, well-trained, well-equipped Iraqi troops that could engage serious insurgent resistance. There were only one or two battalions with any track record of operating on their own without extensive US support, and Iraq’s first mechanized battalion did not become operational until mid-January 2005.

Some reporting coming out of the military provided equally misleading data on the Iraqi order of battle. According to some US military assessments, there were approximately 69 Iraqi army battalions operating in the country at the end of the year, and the US military hoped to have 130,000 Iraqi forces – not just soldiers, but army, Guard, police, etc.— by the January 30th election date.

The Embassy report on the end of the year status of Iraqi forces showed, however, that these “army” battalions were largely low grade National Guard Battalions. In fact, the
Army had a total of 21 battalions, many of which were inexperienced and lacking in combat effectiveness, and it did not plan to deploy more than six more battalions before the elections. The Army – as distinguished from the National Guard – only built up to around 4,700 men by the end January 2005, and even if the National Guard was counted in the total for the Army, the total would be around 45,000 men.99

**Equipment at the Beginning of 2005**

As of January 21, 2005, MNSTC-I reported that individual elements of Iraqi military forces had the following major combat equipment, and it is again interesting to note substantial progress having been made in comparison to the progress achieved in early December:

- The Iraqi Navy had five 100 ft patrol craft and 34 smaller boats.
- The Iraqi Air Force maintained three squadrons with nine reconnaissance aircraft and three US-supplied C-130 transport planes. At least two of the reconnaissance planes are Seabird SB71-360 Seeker aircraft. There is a fourth squadron made up of two UH-1 helicopters. The squadron will receive 14 more UH-1s as well as 4 Bell Jet Ranger helicopters, and should be operational by the end of January.
- There now was one mechanized battalion with a tank company and transportation battalion. The tanks seem to be T-55s and T-72s. The battalion is listed as operational and the necessary equipment and training to form a full-mechanized brigade will be provided by summer 2005.
- Iraq’s Mechanized Police Brigade was on patrol with 50 BTR-94 armored vehicles.

These developments reflected further progress towards the heavier forces needed to deal with a serious insurgency, but scarcely the kind of progress that could as yet produce the kind of Iraqi forces capable of independent operations and replacing Coalition forces.

Moreover, Iraqi forces by now had cost some $1.71 billion out of the $1.91 billion in ongoing funding for security forces – a high price for such lightly equipped units. (At the same time, only $1,208 million in US FY2004 IRRF II aid for security and law enforcement had so far been dispersed out of a total of $5,045 billion that had been apportioned, although the MNSTC-I reports that disbursement rates were accelerating and that approximately $300 million was disbursed between December 2004 and January 2005.)100

**Problems with Equipment Procurement within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense**

The integrity of the Iraqi Defense Ministry also came into question in two separate incidents.

- One incident revolved around the death of two US contractors and questions over the involved contract. Dale Stoffel, a consultant with CLI USA Inc., had negotiated an agreement with Iraqi officials to repair and renovate a number of Soviet-era armored vehicles including tanks and APCs. Stoffel became concerned that the officials would not honor the contract nor pay him for work already completed. He raised his concerns with the US Department of Defense and the Pennsylvania congressional delegation.101

Six days after returning to Iraq, Stoffel and Joseph Wemple were found shot to death ten miles outside of a US military base in Taj. Photos of their possessions were posted on an insurgent website.
The US Department of Defense launched an investigation and the Iraqi government denied complicity in the deaths of the two contractors. Whether elements within the Ministry of Defense were involved or not, the story gathered wide US attention and may have discouraged some companies from bidding for contracts in Iraq. Nevertheless, it did not paralyze Iraqi MOD procurement activity. In January 2005, Deputy Defense Minister Ziad Cattan signed a $20 million arms deal with the Polish state-owned weapons manufacturer Bumar PHZ.102

In the second incident, the issue was a sizeable transfer of funds from the Iraqi Central Bank by the Ministry of Defense. Reportedly, $300 million in US currency was removed from the bank and put aboard a plane bound for Lebanon.

Mishal Sarraf, and aide to Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim al-Shalaan, asserted that the money was used to buy armored vehicles for Iraqi personnel, including tanks and APCs. There was no public bidding for the contracts and the entire Iraqi cabinet did not vote on the deal. Sarraf stated that the arms deal had been approved by the defense minister and by three other senior Iraqi officials, one of whom was Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. The aide further stated that the arms dealers could not be named because it would endanger their lives and that the deal was concluded quickly so as to rush the vehicles to Iraqi forces as quickly as possible.103

Critics challenged this explanation and leveled charges of corruption. Mowaffak al-Rubaie, then the Iraqi national security adviser, said he was unaware of the deal. He stated, “I am sorry to say that the corruption here is worse now than in the Saddam Hussein era.”104 The director of the Iraq Revenue Watch, Isam al-Khafaji, stated, “That’s the tragedy of Iraq: Everyone runs their business like a private fiefdom.”105

It should be noted that no wrongdoings were confirmed and that the Iraqi government flatly denies any charges of corruption. One of the leading critics of the Defense Ministry, with regard to the arms deal, was Ahmed Chalabi, a controversial member of the Iraqi National Congress who was running for a seat in the Iraqi parliament. Chalabi and Shalaan were enemies, and it is possible that the charges are politically motivated. Shalaan vowed to arrest Chalabi and turn him over to Interpol, although nothing actually happened.106

Some Iraqi soldiers in the field, however, also complained about the level of funding and equipment that they received from the Ministry of Defense. One Iraqi colonel with the Iraqi Army’s 305th “Tiger” Battalion—a unit given control of parts of Baghdad by the US—stated that the ministry was so disorganized that it did not even know what parts of the city the unit controlled. Furthermore, the colonel stated, his unit received approximately $133 a month, not enough to even supply the unit with paper.107 How widespread the colonel’s complaints about the ministry were among the Iraqi forces was unclear.

Facilities

The Coalition reported that there was roughly $1.91 billion in ongoing construction and reconstruction projects for Iraqi Security Forces as of January 19, 2005; and over $1.71 billion of that money has already been committed. The projects included four multi-brigade installations, hundreds of police stations and border forts, numerous headquarters and barracks, a number of training centers, and many operating bases.

Such plans did, however, present the problem that Iraqi forces were being constantly redeployed to meet changing requirements. There often was little notice of future deployment and facility needs and in some cases, MNSTC-1 would get requirements for deployment of a unit like a 1,200 Special Police Command with something like a week’s notice.108
**Operational Readiness**

As the chronology below shows, Iraqi forces continued to perform erratically and to have operational problems in spite of their performance during the election. Some units had massive desertions, or broke under pressure, and this led to further debates in the US and elsewhere over their current and potential effectiveness. USCENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid addressed these ongoing concerns about the Iraqi forces in an interview in late January 2005:

> There’s this debate, obviously, in Washington going on right now about the failure of Iraqi security forces, and I would say they’re far from failure. It’s a generational effort. It’s not one that’s going to happen within the next month…. I see failure in some places, but more successes than failures. So they’ll ultimately be successful.¹⁰⁹

The Iraqi army commander, General Babaker Shawkat Zebari, echoed Abizaid’s outlook on the progress of Iraqi units in training. He stated:

> God willing, during this year, our units will be fully armed, trained and have enough soldiers. After all this is finished, I am very optimistic that the Iraqi army will be able to protect the territories and border. [If the forces continue to improve] We will be able to protect Iraqi cities and villages within six months.¹¹⁰

General Babaker also stated at that time that he expected Iraqi forces to number around 150,000 by summer of 2005. He expected that the US would withdraw its troops from the cities and withdraw to one or two major bases by the end of 2005.¹¹¹ Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi was more cautious, but stated that he had been speaking with US officials in Baghdad about ways to speed up the training and equipping of Iraqi soldiers. He said that such acceleration would allow the Coalition forces to slowly leave, but he reiterated that he would adhere to a “conditions-based withdrawal” as opposed to a “calendar-based withdrawal.”¹¹²

US military officials reported that there were 129,000 Iraqi military and security personnel working with 140,000 election workers and 7,000 candidates to secure the polls during the vote.¹¹³ Though insurgents mounted over 200 attacks and killed 44 Iraqis during the elections, Iraqi forces are widely regarded as having performed admirably and 8 million voters were able to cast their ballots. In at least one case, an Iraqi guarding a polling station wrestled a suicide bomber away from the site at the cost of his own life.

The Iraqi Minister of the Interior gave a press conference following the election detailing the reported successes of the Iraqi forces. Three terrorists were captured in Baghdad, 3 in Kirkuk, 7 in Thi Qar, 7 in Wasit, 129 in SaLaden and 39 in Nineveh. The minister acknowledged that there were 7 attacks by insurgents during the election that directly targeted Iraqi police.

In any case, the Iraqi order of battle that could be deployed in independent operations, or in intense clashes, remained a small number of battalions. Even these units generally lacked service support and logistic capabilities, had light weapons and few – if any – armored or heavily protected vehicles. The issue was not one of total manpower, or even how many Iraqi forces could serve some purpose in undemanding duties, it was rather that the functioning order of battle – meaningful units active in the field -- still remained
small. The following chronology records operational progress, and setbacks for the Iraqi security forces:

- **January 1, 2005**—Militants claiming loyalty to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi release a video showing the execution of five Iraqis believed to be Iraqi border guards. The insurgents warn that the same fate will befall any Iraqis who join the military and security services.

- **January 2, 2005**—22 Iraqi National Guardsmen die north of Baghdad in the city of Balad when their bus is hit with a car bomb. Four Iraqi police officers die in an ambush in Samarra and another is wounded. Insurgents shoot and kill the police chief in the town of Jebala. Reports indicate more than 1,000 Iraqi military and security force members have died since September.

- **January 3, 2005**—A car bomb detonates outside Iraqi Interim Prime Minister Allawi’s political party headquarters, killing three police officers. Four Iraqi National Guardsmen die in a suicide car bomb explosion in Dijail, near the site of the bombing of the Iraqi National Guard bus the day before. In Tall Afar, one Iraqi police officer dies and two are injured when an explosion occurs while they investigate a decapitated body. Insurgents had booby-trapped the body with explosives. Six Iraqi National Guardsmen die in Tikrit when two roadside bombs explode. In Baaji, insurgents kill a police major and captain in a drive-by shooting.

- **January 4, 2005**—Iraqi police backed by US forces conduct a large raid in Diali. Iraq forces claim to have captured “an important terrorist.” Some suggest that it is Abu Musab al-Zarqawi but US forces fervently deny this. In Baghdad, a suicide truck bomb explodes, killing eight Iraqi police commandos while wounding at least 60 other people. Near Baquba, three Iraqi National Guardsmen die in a bomb attack.

- **January 5, 2005**—At least two newly-graduated Iraqi police are killed when a suicide car bomber rams his vehicle into a crowd of people. At least eight other people are killed and 44 wounded. Insurgents kill Col. Khalefeh Ali Hassan, security chief for Iraq’s Independent Election Commission, in a drive-by shooting in Diyala Province. A suicide car bomber tries to strike a joint US-Iraqi military convoy in western Baghdad but succeeds only in killing Iraqi civilians.

- **January 6, 2005**—Iraq celebrates Army Day, the 84th anniversary of the founding of the army in 1921.

- **January 8, 2005**—In Ramadi, Col. Jassim al-Kharbeet, a member of the police force, is killed by gunmen. In the Anbar province, Brig. Abid Ahmed al-Assafi is assassinated by militants.

- **January 10, 2005**—Gen. Amer Nayef, the deputy police chief of Baghdad, and his son, Lt. Khaled Amer, are assassinated by insurgents in the al Dora neighborhood of southern Baghdad. Also in the southern part of the city, a suicide bomber rams his vehicle into the main gate of the al-Mada’en police station, killing three Iraqi police officers. Reports indicate that the attacker’s car was painted to resemble a police car or might have in fact been a stolen one. In Samarra, the city’s deputy police chief, Brig. Mohammed Mudhafar Al-Badri, is killed in a drive-by shooting. A suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle in front of the entrance to an Iraqi security forces base in Rubai’a, 105 miles northwest of Mosul. Four Iraqi security personnel die. In Basra, a suicide bomber attacks a police station. In a coordinated attack, another bomber targets a police internal affairs office in Basra. The ensuing blasts kill only the bombers.

- **January 11, 2005**—Insurgents detonate a car bomb near a police station in Tikrit. Six Iraqi policemen die. In Mosul, insurgents attack a US-Iraqi convoy delivering heaters and supplies to a nearby school. The attackers detonate a car bomb close to the convoy and fire weapons from a mosque. Three Iraqi soldiers die and six are wounded.

- **January 12, 2005**—In Mosul, militants detonate a car bomb next to an Iraqi National Guard patrol. The attack kills two Guardsmen and wounds two more. An Iraqi soldier discovers a weapons cache in Kadasia while on joint patrol with US soldiers. The uncovered munitions would have provided enough explosives for 35 IEDs.

- **January 13, 2005**—Insurgents in Baqubah detonate a roadside bomb as an Iraqi police patrol passes. Six officers are wounded and one dies. Militants kill an Iraqi National Guard captain in Qaim.

- **January 14, 2005**—38 Iraqi prisoners escape from the Abu Ghraib prison. Iraqi guards almost immediately recapture 10 of the detainees. The prisoners managed to loosen their bonds and overpower them.
the nearby police and guards, fatally shooting one police officer. The Iraqi authorities set up checkpoints in the Sa‘alam neighborhood of western Baghdad to try and apprehend the prisoners. It is believed that two Egyptians are among the escaped. Reportedly, Iraqi police officers may have facilitated their escape as the prisoners were moved at night and with little security—conditions that are extremely unusual. Three Kurdish troops die fighting against insurgents alongside Iraqi National Guard forces in Mosul. Militants detonate a car bomb outside a Shi‘ite mosque in Khan Bani Sa‘ad. Four Iraqi policemen die in the blast along with three civilians. A bus carrying 15 Iraqi National Guardsmen on their way to a US base is ambushed near the western city of Hit. The Guardsmen are abducted by unknown assailants and the bus is burned. Iraqi soldiers and multinational forces arrest two suspected insurgents and uncover a bomb making plant during a raid in Dulaiyih. The raid uncovers 500 kilograms of ammonium nitrate and 55 gallons of diesel fuel, ingredients used in the powerful car bombs made by insurgents.

- **January 16, 2005**—Gunmen assassinate an Iraqi police captain and two government auditors in Kut. Militants dressed in Iraqi police uniforms open fire on Shi‘ite political candidate Salama Khafaji’s car in central Baghdad. She is unharmed and the attackers flee. The Iraqi Defense Ministry releases a statement declaring that Iraqi forces killed 35 insurgents near Fallujah over the weekend. An Iraqi National Guard commander in Baquba states that a majority of the city will go to the poles to vote in the January 30th elections. Approximately 900 Iraqi soldiers assigned to the 8th Brigade, 3rd Division graduate from basic military training. The soldiers were trained at the Al Kasik Military Training Base and will join the 3rd Division in pre-election patrols in the Ninewa Province.

- **January 17, 2005**—Insurgents ambush a bus in Buhruz carrying Iraqi soldiers with rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, killing at least seven soldiers. In Baiji, a suicide car bomber rams a checkpoint. Seven Iraqi police officers die. Reportedly, guerrillas attack Iraqi police stations in Sharqat and Dawar. A spokesman for Interim Prime Minister Allawi states that a man, Izz al-Din Al-Majid, captured in early December by Iraqi security forces was trying to unify Ansar Al-Sunna, Jaysh Muhammad, and the Islamic Resistance Army, three insurgent groups.

- **January 18, 2005**—Four suicide car bombs explode in Baghdad within 90 minutes. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claims credit for all four bombs. One bomber detonates in vehicle near the al-Alahi hospital in central Baghdad, killing five Iraqi policemen. Another bomber targets a control point south of the Baghdad International Airport. Two Iraqi security guards die and three are wounded. Reportedly, another bomb was headed for an army garrison and the final bomb was destined for a bank where police officers tend to congregate. Col. Mike Murray, commander of the US 3rd Brigade, 1st Calvary states that all four bombers failed to reach their intended targets because of the efforts of the Iraqi military and security forces. 12 miles north of Hilla, insurgents detonate a car bomb, killing one Iraqi policeman and wounding two others. In Tikrit, militants launch several attacks which kill five Iraqi policemen and wound four others. Another Iraqi policeman dies near Baqubah and three more are wounded during a mortar attack on a police station. The 204th Iraqi army battalion conducts several raids that net Hashim Mehdi Hussein Al Tai and Ahsan Abd Ali Khadthim Al Obaydi in Khalis. Reportedly, the two men were the primary leaders of the Khalis insurgency. 670 Iraqi Intervention Force soldiers graduate from training at the Taji Military Training Base. Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi states that he has been talking to US commanders in the field about ways to speed up the training and equipping of Iraqi soldiers. In her confirmation testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former National Security Adviser and future Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice states that there are 120,000 fully trained and equipped Iraqi soldiers.

- **January 20, 2005**—An Iraqi police official estimates that 250 suicide attackers with 150 car bombs are prepared to strike during the Iraqi elections. His estimate was based on a series of interrogations of captured insurgents. Militants try to seize the Al Salam Hospital in Mosul, but Iraqi forces prevent them from doing so. Hospital workers and patients flee the scene.

- **January 21, 2005**—Insurgents lob grenades at an Iraqi police river patrol in northern Baghdad. Four officers are injured. In Hit, 15 militants storm a police station, order the policemen out, steal their equipment and two police cars, and then blow up the building. No officers are injured. Iraqi Intervention Force soldiers repel insurgent attacks on the Mosul train station. Reports indicate that $300 million in American currency was taken from Iraq’s Central Bank and put on a plane for Lebanon earlier in January. Critics claim that there is no indication why this money was sent and for what purpose. Aides to Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim al-Shalaan state that the money was rushed to arms dealers in an effort to quickly supply Iraqi forces with the equipment needed to fight the insurgency. The aides refuse to list the names of the dealers, citing concerns for the dealers’ safety. Iraq’s national security adviser was unaware of the transfer and it is unclear whether the money came from Iraqi or American sources.

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• **January 22, 2005**—Gunmen ambush and kill Muwthana Salman, an Iraqi intelligence officer, in Baqubah. US military and Iraqi police forces arrest one of the top insurgent suspects. Retired four-star Army general Gary E. Luck, sent by the Pentagon two weeks ago to assess the training efforts in Iraq, states that the US must speed up the training process while bolstering the Iraqi security and military forces.

• **January 23, 2005**—An insurgent group led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi posts a video on the Internet showing an Iraqi National Guard colonel being shot in the head. The colonel had been kidnapped in Mosul. Reports indicate that the US may be attempting to bring back much of Saddam’s former army in an effort to bolster the fledgling Iraqi military and security forces.

• **January 24, 2005**—The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior announces that it has made several significant arrests of insurgents in and around Ramadi. Among them is Abu Omar Al Kurdi, the man Iraqi government officials claim was behind 75% of the car bombs in Baghdad in 2003. The Iraqi government states that he is a top bomb maker and recruiter, and was one of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s top men in the Baghdad area. General Babakir, head of the Iraqi military, states that he foresees Iraqi military and security forces numbering 150,000 by summer 2005. Additionally, he foresees US troops pulling out of the cities and operating only one or two major bases by the end of 2005.

• **January 25, 2005**—Four Iraqi policemen from the Muthana station are gunned down in the Rashad neighborhood of Baghdad by insurgents. Reportedly, the gunmen pointedly ask if the individuals are police before they start firing. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a police colonel and his 5-year-old daughter are shot to death while driving. In the southeastern portion of the city, gun battles between insurgents and Iraqi police kills three officers.

• **January 26, 2005**—Two car bombs target Iraqi security and military forces. One bomb explodes outside of a police station in the town of Riyadh, killing three Iraqi police. Insurgents detonate the second bomb outside of the mayor’s office in the same town. Two Iraqi soldiers die. In Baquba, militants launch assaults on the offices of the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Iraqi Patriotic Gathering Alliance. The resulting battle kills one Iraqi policeman.

• **January 27, 2005**—In Sinjar, 17 miles southwest of Mosul, a suicide tractor bomber detonates his vehicle outside of the offices of the Kurdish Democratic Party. Four Iraqi soldiers and a guard die in the explosion. Nine soldiers and three guards are wounded. In Baquba, a suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle as an Iraqi police convoy passes by the Diyala provincial governor’s office. An Iraqi police lieutenant dies in the attack and three other officers are wounded. The bombing takes place at the same time the governor was expected to arrive for a Peace Day meeting. The meeting was aimed at bringing together Ba’ath figures, insurgents, and interim political figures to discuss options for making the elections peaceful and successful. The governor is unhurt. Militants launch rockets at the home of Deputy Interior Minister for Police Affairs, Maj. Gen. Hikmat Moussa. No one is hurt by the attack. Insurgents detonate a roadside bomb targeting Iraqi police on patrol near the Al-Shaab Stadium in the eastern part of Baghdad. The explosion fails to injure anyone. Commander of the Iraqi Army, Gen. Babaker Shawat Zebari, states that if the Iraqi military and security forces continue to improve, he believes that they will be able to protect major Iraqi urban areas in six months.

• **January 28, 2005**—A suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle outside of the al-Dora police station in southern Baghdad, killing four people and wounding two more.

• **January 30, 2005**—The Iraqi elections take place. 44 people are killed in insurgent attacks, but the number of casualties and attacks is far below the expected number. One Iraqi policeman, Abdul Amir, is killed in Baghdad when a suicide bomber walks up to him outside of a polling station and detonates his explosives. Reportedly, Amir wrapped his arms around the bomber and dragged him away from the polling station before he could utilize his explosives.

• **January 31, 2005**—Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih announces that the Iraqi government has arrested Anab Mohammed Hamid al-Qus, reportedly an Iraqi military adviser to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who ranked third in his organization and who helped finance attacks in Baghdad.

• **February 1, 2005**—The US deploys another Customs and Border Protection team in Iraq to help secure its borders.

• **February 2, 2005**—Militants stop a convoy of Iraqi army recruits near Kirkuk and force 12 of them to lie in the street. The gunmen shoot the recruits and then run their bodies over.

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February 3, 2005—Five police and one National Guardsman are killed in an insurgent attack on a road south of Baghdad. Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard B. Myers, states that 40,000 of the reported 136,000 Iraqi security forces are adequately trained and equipped to go almost anywhere and confront almost any threat. The rest, he stated, were only fit for policing the calmer parts of southern Iraq. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, testifies that Iraqi units experience up to 40% absenteeism and that 1,342 Iraqi police and soldiers had died since June 2004.

February 5, 2005—In Basra, a roadside bomb explodes, killing four Iraqi National Guardsmen on patrol. Two Iraqi soldiers die in an explosion in Samarra. An insurgent group posts a video on the Internet depicting the murder of seven Iraqi National Guardsmen.

February 6, 2005—Gunmen attack a police station in Mahawil. 14 insurgents, 5 Iraqi National Guardsmen, and 17 Iraqi police die. Iraqi security forces announce that they had captured Khamis Masin Farhan, a former Iraqi general, on December 20th in Baiji. Iraqi officials maintain that he assisted in a number of insurgent attacks.

February 7, 2005—Iraqi police officers and National Guardsmen note an increase in tips from the general public concerning the insurgency in the week following the election.

February 8, 2005—In Baquba, a car bomb explodes outside of the provincial police headquarters, killing 15 recruits and wounding 17 more. In Mosul, a suicide bomber detonates his explosives inside the grounds of the Jumhouriy Teaching Hospital. 12 Iraqi policemen die and four others are wounded. Witnesses say the bomber called police over to him prior to detonating his explosives. A group affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claims credit for the hospital bombing.

February 9, 2005—A suicide bomber in Baghdad detonates his explosives in the middle of a crowd outside of the Iraqi National Guard headquarters at the Muthana airfield. 22 people die and 30 are wounded. Three police officers die in Baghdad during a firefight in the Ghazaliya neighborhood. Iraqi security forces claim that they have captured a militant involved in beheadings in and around Mosul.

February 10, 2005—Four Iraqi policemen die in Samarra when a roadside bomb explodes. A police colonel, Riad Al-Yawi, attached to the Oil Ministry is abducted by gunmen loyal to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in southern Baghdad. Police and insurgents wage a fierce battle in the town of Salman Pak, southeast of Baghdad. 10 policemen and 20 insurgents are killed. At least 65 policemen are wounded. Police capture two Saudis and three Iranians. An Iraqi army driver is shot dead in Balad.

February 11, 2005—Four bodies, believed to be Iraqi policemen, are found in Haswa, south of Baghdad. In Baquba, a police officer dies in a drive-by shooting.

February 12, 2005—A suicide car bomb targeting an Iraqi National Guard patrol detonates, killing 13 and wounding 40 in Balad Ruz. It fails to injure any Guardsmen. A group affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claims credit for the attack. In Mosul, the bodies of six Iraqi National Guardsmen and six Kurdish security Guards are dumped in separate parts of the city.

February 13, 2005—Iraqi troops recover the bodies of three US servicemen killed in a Humvee accident at the Isaki Canal. They weld a tool themselves to recover the bodies and brave freezing water temperatures.

February 14, 2005—Reportedly, 10,000 Iraqis arrive at one military base looking to enlist. Half pass the recruiting test.

February 15, 2005—Iraqi officials state that Iraqi security forces had captured two brothers who served as Iraqi intelligence agents in the Hussein regime. Sabah Nouri Milhim and Riyah Nouri Milhim were captured sometime in January and are suspected of training, supplying, and financing insurgents in Fallujah and Baghdad. It is believed that they had a large role in the countless attacks on Iraqi security forces in Baghdad.

February 17, 2005—In Samarra, four Iraqi police officers die in two separate attacks. One attack was reportedly an unsuccessful assassination attempt on a police captain. In Baghdad, a suicide bomber kills an Iraqi National Guardsman. In a later attack, Guardsmen shoot and kill another would-be suicide bomber before he can detonate his explosive vest. The attacks occurred in the Mansour district. Elsewhere in Baghdad, Ghazi Houshi, an Interior Ministry intelligence officer, is gunned down in the Dawra neighborhood. In Baquba, gunmen fire on an Iraqi police patrol, killing one officer. Two
insurgents die in the fight. In Mosul, a police station is fired upon, wounding the commander and killing his driver.

- **February 18, 2005**—Gunmen in Diyala assassinate an Iraqi National Guard officer and four civilians. Najaf city police chief, a visible opponent of the insurgency, Ghalib Jazaeri states that his two sons, members of the police force, had been kidnapped and murdered in Karbala. He states that he is worried that his force has been infiltrated by insurgents. The responsibility for providing security in several parts of Baghdad is turned over to the Iraqi 305th “Tiger” unit.

- **February 19, 2005**—In Baquba, a car bomb detonates at the National Guard headquarters, killing one Guardsman.

- **February 20, 2005**—US and Iraqi security forces launch simultaneous raids and set up checkpoints in the cities of Ramadi, Hit, and Haditha. The Iraqi National Guard reports that nine men were arrested for connections to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A US Marine Corps spokesman states that while some of the insurgents in Ramadi had come from Fallujah prior to the assault on the city, most were common criminals. US soldiers and Iraqi police detain 17 suspected insurgents and seize weapons in a raid in Baghdad. The Iraqi interim government reports that an Iraqi battalion had captured Jaffa Sadaq Fette, the leader of a 100-man cell who profited by transporting Iraqis out of the country for insurgency training and then transporting them back in. He was captured February 3rd in Balad. 267 Iraqi police begin parols in Samarra to try and quell the restive city.

- **February 21, 2005**—A suicide bomber drive his vehicle into a crowd of people gathered outside the Interior Ministry’s Rangers Battalion headquarters in the Qadisiyiyah neighborhood of Baghdad. Trainees and volunteers finish a drill as he strikes. At least two die and seven are wounded. Iraqis say that it is the third or fourth time that crowds have been targeted outside the complex.

- **February 22, 2005**—In western Baghdad, Iraqi police shoot and kill an insurgent attempting to plant an IED near a Shi’ite Mosque. The incident occurs in the Ghazaliya neighborhood.

- **February 24, 2005**—Insurgents detonate a suicide car bomb at the police headquarters in Tikrit. 10 Iraqis are killed and 35 more are injured. The bomber wore a police uniform, indicating either that it was stolen, sold on the black market, or that the bomber had infiltrated the force. In Qaim, four Iraqi National Guardsmen are killed by two roadside bombs. In Kirkuk, a roadside bomb kills two policemen and injures three. Khattab Omar Arif, the leader of the city’s emergency police, states that the bomb was intended for him and instead killed the men guarding him.

- **February 26, 2005**—In Nibai, one Iraqi army soldier is shot dead and an Iraqi policemans is killed in Baquba.

- **February 27, 2005**—In the Musayyib district, insurgents try and disrupt an Iraqi army raid with a car bomb. One Iraqi soldier is killed and three are wounded. 12 suspects are captured.

- **February 28, 2005**—Insurgents launch the single deadliest attack to date, detonating a suicide car bomb outside of a Hilla city government office where police recruits were waiting to get physicals. The explosion kills at least 127 and wounds more than 150. A separate car bomb explodes in Musaayib—no details are available. In Mosul, a firefight between insurgents and Iraqi commandoes leaves four civilians dead and a group of insurgents blow themselves up after they are chased down and surrounded by Kurdish forces and Iraqi police. In Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers fight a contingent of Sudanese militants following an attack on an army convoy. The battle takes place in the al-Battaweet district. 22 militiants are detained and at least two are killed.

- **March 2, 2005**—A suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle near an army recruiting center in the Salihiyah neighborhood of Baghdad. Six soldiers die and 28 are wounded by the blast. This is the third time the center has been targeted in a year. The third attack produced the fewest casualties and it is believed that the blast walls were successful in protecting the site. A second car bomb explodes two hours later in the Jadriya neighborhood of the city. The second blast targeted an Iraqi military convoy, killing seven and injuring two.

- **March 3, 2005**—Col. Mou’ness Saeed, chief of the al-Mouqdad station in Kirkuk, narrowly dodges an assassination attempt. Gunmen target him in a drive-by shooting, but he escapes unharmed. Insurgents detonate two car bombs near the Ministry of the Interior in Baghdad, killing five police officers and wounding seven others. In Baquba, a suicide car bomber targets the chief of the emergency police in the
Diyala province, Mudhafar Shahab Jiburi. The bomber detonates his vehicle outside the headquarters of the Iraqi emergency police, killing one person and wounding 12 others. Jiburi escapes unharmed. A previously unheard of Iraqi insurgent group, the Saladin Al Ayobi Brigades of the Islamic Front of Iraqi Resistance (JAME) pledges to stop targeting Iraqi security forces and civilians and to concentrate on US forces.

- March 4, 2005—Col. Ghaib Hadab Zarib, the al-Budair police chief, is shot to death outside his home by gunmen. US Army officials announce that Cpl. Dustin Berg, an American National Guardsman, will be court-martialed for the November 2003 murder of Iraqi police officer Hussein Kamel Hadi Dawood Dubedi. 15 decapitated bodies are found in an old military base between Latifiya and Karbala. The dead include women and children. It is believed that the men were part of a group of Iraqi soldiers kidnapped some time ago.

- March 6, 2005—Reports indicate that most of the violent neighborhoods in Baghdad, including the Adhamiya neighborhood and Haifa Street, have been turned over to Iraqi forces in the weeks following the election. A reported ten neighborhoods are in the care of the Iraqi Army’s 40th Brigade. The Iraqi forces hope to control all of the city by December 2005.

- March 7, 2005—Militants bomb Mohammed Jasim’s, a major in the Iraqi National Guard, house in Balad, killing his family. Jasim claimed credit for capturing or killing most of the insurgents that had been neutralized in the area. Two Sudanese men were taken into custody for questioning in connection with the attack. In Basra, insurgents detonate a roadside bomb while an Iraqi police convoy passes. Two police officers are killed and five more wounded in the attack. In Habbaniya, a town within the Sunni Triangle, a suicide bomber drives his car into an Iraqi Army base. The driver is believed to be Sudanese. The bomb kills two officers, a civilian, and wounds 15 people. 20 bodies are found near Qaim, close to the Syrian border. It is unclear if the men were Iraqi soldiers or policemen. Investigators believe the killings occurred on March 5, toward the end of the Marine-led Operation River Blitz which focused on the towns of Ramadi, Hit, Hadita, and Qaim. In al-Habbaniya, a suicide car bomber attacks a joint US-Iraqi checkpoint on the road to a US military base. No casualties were confirmed. Shoqayer Fareed Sheet, a former Iraqi police lieutenant, confessed to a special Iraqi antiterrorism unit, al-Theeb, or “the wolf,” that he had tortured and killed 113 Iraqi police officers, Iraqi soldiers, and Iraqi civilians and had provided Iraqi Sunni insurgents with information.

- March 9, 2005—Insurgents park a garbage truck packed with explosives close to the Sadr Hotel in central Baghdad. A firefight breaks out between the hotel’s armed guards and the insurgents minutes before the truck is detonated. An Iraqi police officer is killed and more than 40 other people are wounded. A group affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claims credit. In Basra, insurgents detonate a roadside bomb while an Iraqi police convoy passes. Two police officers are killed and five more wounded in the attack. In Habbaniya, a town within the Sunni Triangle, a suicide bomber drives his car into an Iraqi Army base. The driver is believed to be Sudanese. The bomb kills two officers, a civilian, and wounds 15 people. 20 bodies are found near Qaim, close to the Syrian border. It is unclear if the men were Iraqi soldiers or policemen. Investigators believe the killings occurred on March 5, toward the end of the Marine-led Operation River Blitz which focused on the towns of Ramadi, Hit, Hadita, and Qaim. In al-Habbaniya, a suicide car bomber attacks a joint US-Iraqi checkpoint on the road to a US military base. No casualties were confirmed. Shoqayer Fareed Sheet, a former Iraqi police lieutenant, confessed to a special Iraqi antiterrorism unit, al-Theeb, or “the wolf,” that he had tortured and killed 113 Iraqi police officers, Iraqi soldiers, and Iraqi civilians and had provided Iraqi Sunni insurgents with information.

- March 10, 2005—In southeastern Baghdad, gunmen attack and critically wound Iraqi Interior Ministry police official Gen. Abdul Karim Raheem while he is in his car. Col. Aiyad Abdul Razaaq, who was driving to work in the same general part of Baghdad, is hot to death. He was the chief deputy of the Jisdia police station. In central Baghdad, the chief of the al-Salihya police station, Col. Hamad Ubeysi is shot to death in his squad car. Shoqayer Fareed Sheet leads al-Theeb to a mass grave at the Wadi Egab Cemetery where 31 bodies, believed to be members of the Iraqi security forces, are found. In Baghdad, gunmen kill top police official Lt. Col. Ahmed Obais who was being driven to work by a driver and his bodyguard.

- March 12, 2005—Militants ambush three Iraqi policemen in Mosul’s Sukar district. The officers were driving to a friend’s funeral. All three were shot to death.

- March 14, 2005—Ramzi Hashim, a Mosul man, is arrested by the Najaf police. Police chief Ghalib al-Jazairi states that they captured him in a hotel plotting a major attack. The police believe that he was involved in the August 2003 bombing at the Imam Ali Mosque that killed SCIRI head Ayatollah Mohammed Baq al-Hakim. Iraqi officials announce that they have in their custody Marwan Taher Abdulraheem and Abdulla Mahder Abdulrasheed. The two men were arrested in Tikrit on February 8. Marwan is a former Saddam bodyguard and officials believe that Abdulla was helping to fund the insurgency.

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March 15, 2005—A car bomb in Baghdad wounds an Iraqi policeman. There are no further details reported.

March 16, 2005—In Baquba, a car bomb is detonated by insurgents at a checkpoint manned by Iraqi Army soldiers, killing two soldiers and wounding five more.

March 20, 2005—A suicide bomber walks into police headquarters in Mosul and detonates his explosives. Two people are killed, including Walid Kashmoul, the chief of Mosul’s anti-corruption operations. Three Iraqi police officers are wounded when a roadside bomb explodes in Kirkuk. In Baquba, gunmen open fire on a police station, killing four Iraqi officers and wounding two others.

March 21, 2005—Insurgents try to assassinate Mosul’s provincial police chief. The attack is a failure and 17 militants die. No Iraqi security force casualties are reported.

March 22, 2005—Iraqi officials state that 85 insurgents died earlier in the day when Iraqi commandos, assisted by US air and ground support, overran an insurgent training camp located in swamps near Tharthar Lake in the Sunni Triangle. The commandos were part of the 1st Police Commando Battalion. The 85 killed insurgents were the most killed in any one battle since the offensive against Fallujah. Among the dead insurgents were Iraqis, Sudanese, Algerians, Moroccans and others. Seven Iraqi commandos were killed and five were wounded. Reportedly, the camp was part of the Islamic Army of Tikrit which, in an unusual act, distributed leaflets announcing that they had sustained 11 casualties in the assault in the swamps. Insurgents attack Iraqi soldiers in Kirkuk, but, according to Iraqi officials, they fight them off. No casualties are reported.

March 23, 2005—US and Iraqi forces conduct raids south of Mosul near Tal Afar. Iraqi officials announce that Iraqi security forces had disrupted a plot to attack the National Assembly the previous week during its meeting in the Green Zone.

March 24, 2005—11 Iraqi policemen of the 2nd Iraqi Special Police Commando unit are killed when a suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle at a checkpoint in Ramadi. In Mosul, Iraqi police mistake three Iraqi army officers and two Iraqi police officers for insurgents. They open fire, killing all five men. US and Iraqi forces continue raids near Tal Afar, seizing 13 suspected insurgents and several weapons. Militants shoot and kill the commander of an Iraqi Army brigade in Basra, Maj. Gen. Salman Muhammad, as he drives from a friend’s funeral in Baghdad.

March 25, 2005—Reports cast doubt on the Iraqi claim that police commandos killed 85 insurgents in March 22nd’s major raid. Exact casualties remain unknown, but US and Iraqi officials assert that the Iraqis, in their first major lead operation, performed well. A suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle in Iskandariya close to an Iraqi Army convoy. Four soldiers die and nine soldiers and civilians are wounded. In Fallujah, US and Iraqi forces impose a curfew after an Iraqi policeman is shot to death. Reports today indicate that Iraqi commandos admitted that the attack on the terrorist training camp in the swamps on March 22nd was not as successful as it first seemed. Most of the insurgent casualties reported were caused by American helicopter gunships. Iraqi commandos confirmed that the dead insurgents were mostly foreign Arabs. A Filipino and an Algerian were found among the dead, allegedly along with Chechens, Saudis, and Afghans.

March 27, 2005—A militant group claiming to be Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq releases a video depicting the apparent shooting death of an alleged employee of the Ministry of the Interior. The murdered man identifies himself as Col. Ryadh Katie Olyway just before he dies. An Iraqi Ministry official confirms that a Col. Olyway worked for both the Ministry of the Interior and the Oil Ministry, but could not verify the identity of the man in the video. Guards outside of the Ministry of Science and Technology in Baghdad open fire on protesters who were demanding better pay. One protester is killed.

March 28, 2005—Militants detonate a roadside bomb near an Iraqi police patrol in southwestern Baghdad. Three people are wounded and one is killed. The chief of the Balat al-Shouhada police station in southeastern Baghdad, Col. Abdul Kahir Fahad, is gunned down while being driven to work.

March 31, 2005—Joint Iraqi and US raids in Mosul and Tal Afar begin. In Tuz Khurmatu, insurgents detonate a car bomb at an Iraqi Army checkpoint designed to protect visitors to a Shi‘ite shrine. Several civilians die and eight Iraqi soldiers are wounded.

April 1, 2005—In Balad Ruz, an Interior Ministry commando is killed during a raid in the Daniya section of the city. Elsewhere in the city, police chief Col. Hatem Rashid Mohammed is killed by
insurgents while getting into his vehicle. Joint Iraqi and US raids continue in Mosul and Tal Afar. Raids have netted eight insurgent suspects and multiple weapons. At a Baghdad mosque, a group of 64 Sunni Arab imams and religious scholars issue an edict encouraging Sunni Arabs to join the Iraqi army and police. The edict was signed by Ahmed Hassan al-Taha, an imam who has been a strong critic of the occupation, but not Harith al-Dari, the leader of the association of Muslim Scholars.

- **April 2, 2005**—In a bold attack, between 40 and 60 insurgents launch an attack on Abu Ghraib prison from all sides, utilizing car bombs, mortars, RPGs, and small arms. The insurgents attack the part of the prison controlled by the Iraqi security forces in an apparent attempt to free an unknown quantity of prisoners. US forces call in reinforcements and repel the attack which lasts for approximately 45 minutes. In Khan Bani Saad, insurgents detonate a car bomb at a police station, killing five, including three policemen, and wound three more Iraqi police.

- **April 3, 2005**—The body of a Kurdish police officer who had been shot to death is found in Mosul.

- **April 4, 2005**—During a joint search operation, Iraqi forces are attacked by insurgents in Diyala province. US air and ground assets from the US Army’s 42 Infantry Division move in to help once they are attacked. One Iraqi soldier is killed during the hour-long battle.

- **April 5, 2005**—General Jalal Mohammed Salah, the commander of an Interior Ministry mechanized armored brigade, is kidnapped in Baghdad. In Amiriya on Baghdad’s western outskirts, insurgents detonate a car bomb as an Iraqi military convoy passes by. No military casualties are reported, but several civilians are hurt. In Tal Afar, a bus filled with around 50 Iraqi soldiers is hit by an explosion from a roadside bomb. Three Iraqi soldiers are killed and more than 44 are wounded. The soldiers were on their way to distribute pay to their families.Reportedly, Iraqi soldiers believe that the attackers knew they were coming. Several trucks with mounted machine guns were protecting the bus before the explosion.

- **April 7, 2005**—Iraq’s president, Jalal Talabani, takes office and offers an amnesty to insurgents, possibly even insurgents who have killed Iraqi security force members. The amnesty is seen as much broader than the one posed by the former interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi. In Mosul, insurgents launch a bomb attack on an Iraqi army patrol. Three soldiers are killed and 20 more wounded. The patrol issues a statement claiming to have captured 7 attackers. In Basra, Maj. Mahmoud Hassan al-Yassiri, and Iraqi army officer, is killed when gunmen burst into a restaurant where he is eating with a colleague and shoot him in the head.

- **April 9, 2005**—In Mosul, an insurgent car bomb kills two Iraqi policemen. Press reports indicate that claims of abuse had been lodged against members of Iraq’s security forces by other Iraqis.

- **April 11, 2005**—US soldiers and approximately 500 Iraqi soldiers conduct sweeps dubbed Operation Vanguard Tempest in the Al-Rasheed district in Baghdad. The sweeps net some 65 suspected militants. The district is suspected to be a hub of insurgent activity.

- **April 12, 2005**—The Iraqi government claims that it has captured Fadhil Ibrahim Mahmud al-Mashadani. Mashadani, reportedly, aided insurgent attacks and was a high ranking Ba’athist in the Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi government had posted a $200,000 reward for information leading to his capture. In Baghdad, Maj. Gen. Tareq al-Baldawi, the deputy interior minister, is attacked in the Hay al-Adel district. He escapes unhurt. US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visits Iraq and states that the US will not leave until the Iraqi security forces are capable assuming full control of the country.

- **April 13, 2005**—Insurgents in Kirkuk detonate a bomb close to 12 Iraqi security force members who are defusing a roadside bomb. All 12 are killed. In Baghdad, gunmen attack Col. Naji Hussein, a Ministry of the Interior official, as he drives through the al-Dora district. Hussein is wounded by small arms fire.

- **April 14, 2005**—US soldiers and Iraqi soldiers arrest 17 suspected insurgents in western Baghdad and seize weapons, US currency, and bomb-making materials. Insurgents detonate two car bombs nearly simultaneously near an Iraqi police convoy. Most of the casualties are civilians. The exact number of hurt or killed Iraqi police is unknown. Approximately two hours later, US and Iraqi forces destroy a follow-on car bomb near the same site. Elsewhere in the city, gunmen kill 1st Lt. Firas Hussein while on his way in to work. Hussein was reportedly working for Iraq’s intelligence service. In Mahaweel, a suicide bomber detonates a briefcase full of explosives in a market. Four Iraqi policemen die and several civilians are wounded. In Kirkuk, militants assault the Al-Adala police station, killing three.
Iraqi policemen and wounding two others. In Baquba, Iraqi forces take into custody 27 suspected militants.

- **April 15, 2005**—Insurgents attack an Iraqi military convoy in Baghdad. Exact casualties are unknown. In the city’s Talbiya district, a roadside bomb detonates near an Iraqi army convoy, killing one civilian and wounding three others. Reports indicate that 50 Shi’ite prisoners may have been taken by Sunni militants demanding that all Shi’ites evacuate the town of Madain. Civilians are reported fleeing the area.

- **April 16, 2005**—Reports indicate that the kidnapping in Madain may be a response to an earlier kidnapping of 20 Sunnis from a nearby town. In Baquba, insurgents bomb a restaurant. 10 police officers are killed. In Kirkuk, militants shoot and kill a policeman and an Iraqi army officer. Near Hilla, a suicide car bomber plows into an Iraqi police patrol, killing four officers.

- **April 18, 2005**—Iraqi security forces, numbering some 2,000 police and soldiers and reinforced by US helicopters, receive a tip that leads them to a weapons cache. The arrest several suspected militants and uncover a bomb-making plant and a firing range. 10 insurgents wearing Iraqi military uniforms appear at Lt. Gen. Adnan Qaragholi’s home. When invited inside, the shoot and kill Qaragholi, an advisor to the interim defense minister, and his son, Iraqi army Capt. Alaa al-Din. The insurgents left their uniforms at the scene of the shooting. The public information officer for the Iraqi police in Mosul, Brig. Gen. Younis Mohammad Sulaiman, is killed by gunman on his way to work. Iraqi security forces take control of Madain City, finding no Shi’ite hostages or prisoners. They arrest ten suspects and seize an unknown quantity of weapons. The Shi’ite bloc that forms the majority in the new Iraqi government announces plans to pursue a drastic purge of Ba’athists in the Iraqi security and military forces. US and Iraqi officials state that this policy could do much to damage the forces that have been created and send many of the best intelligence and military officers over to the insurgency.

- **April 19, 2005**—A suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle, a green Kia minibus, near a group of Iraqi security forces and recruits at the Adhamiya Palace in Baghdad. Two Iraqi army soldiers and two recruits are killed. Eight soldiers are wounded and approximately 30 recruits were hurt. Maj. Gen. Adnan Thabet reportedly suggests that the incident in Madain had more to do with local tribal politics than anything else. He suggests further that the media and several political parties turned the incident into a crisis. In Basra, two Iraqi policemen are killed and six hurt by the detonation of a roadside bomb.

- **April 20, 2005**—50 bodies are found in the Tigris River. Some Iraqis believe that these bodies are the hostages that were reported taken in Madain, yet Riadh Sakhi, a policeman, states that it appeared as though several of the victims, which included two school girls, had been in the water for weeks and may have washed up as a result of the spring thaw. Reportedly, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani claims to have the names of both the kidnapped and those who committed the crime in Madain. Reports indicate that the bodies of 19 Iraqi National Guardsmen are found in a soccer stadium in Haditha. The men were part of a six minibus convoy headed to Haditha on the 19th to check reports of armed militants. When ambushed, four buses managed to escape but two were left behind. The Iraqis that escaped returned to the site with US reinforcements but found nothing. Reportedly, the Iraqis in the six minibuses were badly outnumbered by the insurgents who were armed with grenade launchers. The Guardsmen that were left behind were taken hostage and then executed. In Ramadi, two suicide car bombers detonate their vehicles in the center of the city, close to an Iraqi checkpoint. The attackers failed to injure anyone. In Sadr city, militants kill policeman Ali Talib in a drive by shooting. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a roadside bomb kills an Iraqi policeman and injures two others.

- **April 22, 2005**—The prison director for the Nineveh Province, Col. Khalid Najim Abdallah, is killed in Mosul by insurgents who stop his car.

- **April 23, 2005**—Reportedly, insurgents detonate a car bomb near and Iraqi National Guard convoy as it passes the village of Zaydan, close to Abu Ghraib prison. Nine soldiers are killed, and 20 more are injured. 314 Iraqi Army soldiers graduate in Tikrit. In an attack on a joint US-Iraqi convoy traveling a street close to the road to Baghdad International Airport, a suicide bomber wounds seven Iraqi soldiers and three US soldiers. A roadside bomb in Yusufiyah kills an Iraqi National Guardsman. Three Iraqi soldiers are wounded by an IED that strikes their convoy in Mosul.

- **April 24, 2005**—Militants detonate two car bombs at the checkpoint entrance to the Iraqi Police Academy in Tikrit. Six police are killed with an additional 35 wounded. Most of the wounded were Iraqi police.
April 25, 2005—Join t Iraqi and US sweeps around Baghdad net 41 insurgents and an unspecified quantity of weapons. 10 of the milita nts are suspects in the shooting down of a civilian MI-8 helicopter.

April 26, 2005—The Staff Judge Advocate team from the US 3rd Infantry Division begins providing human rights training to the 1st Iraqi Army Brigade.

April 28, 2005—In Basra, Iraqi soldiers apprehend six insurgents armed with explosives and various sundry weapons. Militants detonate a bomb in a heavily populated part of east Baghdad as police officers in two pickup trucks drove by. Two officers die and two more are wounded. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a Ministry of the Interior official, Lt. Col. Alaa Khalil Ibrahim, is shot dead on his way into work. Militants detonate a bomb near a joint US-Iraqi convoy, killing two Iraqi soldiers and wounding 12 others.

April 29, 2005—Iraqi police successfully prevent three suicide bomber attacks near Salman Pak. One police officer is killed and five others are wounded. In the Al Dora district of Baghdad, Iraqi officers safely detonate an IED near the Al Dora police station. In Baghdad, four suicide car bombers strike in the Azamiyah section of the city. 15 Iraqi soldiers die and 30 are wounded in attacks on an Iraqi army patrol, on a police patrol, and two on barricades close to the headquarters for the Interior Ministry’s special forces. All told, more than 10 car bombs explode in Iraq today, yet reports indicate that most of the bombers were unable to reach their intended targets. In a separate attack in the city, militants shoot at a police patrol, wounding one officer. Not far from Basra, an IED detonates near an Iraqi border guard patrol, killing one Iraqi soldier and wounding two others.

April 30, 2005—Militants shoot at an Iraqi police patrol in Mosul, wounding two officers.

May 1, 2005—Following a suicide bomb targeting the funeral gathering of Kurdish Democratic Party official Sayid Ahmed Wahab in Tal Afar, US and Iraqi forces clash with insurgents. No casualties are reported. In the Nahrwan area of Baghdad, six Iraqi policemen are killed in an insurgent ambush on their checkpoint. Several of the 18 militants are killed as well.

May 2, 2005—Insurgents target an Iraqi commando convoy in the al-Huriyah neighborhood of Baghdad. Two commandos are wounded and the commander of Baghdad’s commandos, Maj. Gen. Rasheed Aflayeh, escapes unharmed. In the Zayouna neighborhood, a car bomb explodes close to an Iraqi police patrol, killing two officers. Insurgents detonate a car bomb near an Iraqi army convoy in the al-Tarmiyah portion of the city, wounding an Iraqi soldier and a police officer. In the southeastern Baghdad neighborhood of al-Rustumiya, 30 insurgents attack an Iraqi police checkpoint. Five police officers die and an unknown number of insurgents. A suicide bomber detonates his truck at a checkpoint south of the city. The blast kills eight soldiers and wounds 20 more.

May 3, 2005—An Iraqi soldier and policeman die in fights in Baghdad. In the western portion of the city, roadside bombs explode close to Iraqi police patrols, hurting four officers. In Ramadi, a joint Iraqi-US checkpoint comes under fire from insurgents. 12 militants are killed and two Iraqi soldiers are wounded. In Samarra, militants shoot and kill three Iraqi policemen following a series of police raids on suspected insurgent-held areas. In Shurqat, an Iraqi soldier is killed. No details are released.

May 4, 2005—The Army of Ansar al-Sunna claims credit for a suicide bombing in Erbil that targets an office of the KDP political party where more than 300 people were waiting to get approval to apply for Iraqi security jobs. More than 60 are killed and more than 150 injured by the blast. Reports indicate that the suicide bomber seems to have mingled among the recruits before detonating his explosives. Ansar al-Sunna had struck recruits previously in Erbil in February 2004. In Baghdad, a car bomb explodes in the Dora area, killing nine Iraqi soldiers and wounding three others.

May 5, 2005—Nine Iraqi police officers die in insurgent ambushes on what appears to have been a convoy. Six die in the Sayidiya district and three close to Sayidiya Square. A suicide bomber detonates his vehicle outside of the frequently attacked army recruiting station outside the Al-Muthana Airfield in Baghdad. 13 Iraqi soldiers die and seven are wounded. Maj. Gen. Salman Hakim Moussa, an Interior Ministry official, escapes a suicide bomber who detonates his vehicle outside of his home in western Baghdad. One Iraqi police officer dies in the attack and six others are wounded. Reports released today indicate that Iraqi security forces had captured Ayman Sabawi, an alleged supporter of the insurgency and half brother of Saddam Hussein in Tikrit.

May 6, 2005—in northeastern Tikrit, a suicide bomber rams a 45-person bus carrying Iraqi police officers to work. Seven officers die and three are wounded. Lt. Gen. Naiser Abadi, deputy chief of staff
for Iraq’s armed forces, states that he doubts the rumors that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was injured and recovering in a Ramadi hospital are true. US forces reportedly were investigating the rumors.

- **May 8, 2005**—In the Rawa area, US and Iraqi forces capture 54 militants and kill six more in a firefight after information gleaned from a captured Zarqawi aide, Ghassan Muhammad Amin Husayn al-Rawi, directs them to the region. They seize bomb making material and two large stashes of weapons. The US military reports that Iraqi forces captured Ammar al-Zubaydi, an alleged aide to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, on May 5th. Reportedly, Zubaydi is responsible for multiple bombing attacks, including a number of attacks in Baghdad on April 29th and the April attack on the Abu Ghraib prison. Those attacks killed 23 Iraqi troops and wounded 31. Press releases state that he was planning to assassinate a senior Iraqi official, that he had stolen hundreds of rockets and cases of ammunition from facilities in Yusifiya in 2003, and that he had helped Abu Omar al-Kurdi, another suspected Zarqawi aide captured in December.

- **May 9, 2005**—Two Iraqi policemen are killed and six are wounded when a suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle at a police checkpoint in southern Baghdad. Reports state that militants had detonated 135 car bombs in April, more than any other month since the invasion. The same reports indicate that Iraqi police had seized 10 vehicles in 10 days packed with explosives that were to be used in bombings.

- **May 11, 2005**—In Hawija, a suicide bomber detonates his explosive vest amongst a crowd that had lined up to join the Iraqi army. The suicide bomber managed to slip by security. 20 are killed and another 30 are wounded. In Baghdad, insurgents detonate a car bomb outside of a police station in the al-Dora neighborhood, killing civilians and wounding eight Iraqi police officers. In a separate car bomb attack on an emergency police patrol, four police officers are injured. The attack occurs at Jordan Square in the Yarmuk area of the city. In Jamiya, insurgents attack an Iraqi army patrol, killing three Iraqi soldiers. A suicide bomber detonates his vehicle near a police station in the Dawra area, killing civilians but no Iraqi policemen. In the Mansour district, militants gun down two police officers.

- **May 12, 2005**—Iraqi Army Brig. Gen. Ayad Imad Mahdi is shot to death by gunmen as he drives to work in western Baghdad. An Iraqi Interior Ministry employee, Col. Jamal Ahmed Hussein, is killed on his way to work in the al-Amin neighborhood. Reportedly, Polish and Iraqi soldiers seize a cache of weapons and arrest 29 suspected militants in the Wasit province in a mission dubbed ‘Operation Cobweb.’

- **May 13, 2005**—Reports released by the Iraqi government state that Iraqi forces had captured Saif Aldin Mustafa Nuaimi and Abdul Qadir Ashur Jaburi, two men allegedly affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization, on April 15th. Jaburi, Nuaimi’s father, is accused of raising money for Zarqawi’s group while Nuaimi is an alleged bomb maker. In Baghdad’s Adil district, gunmen open fire on an Iraqi police patrol, killing two policemen and wounding three more. In Baquba, insurgents detonate a car bomb, killing two Iraqi National Guardsmen and wounding five more.

- **May 14, 2005**—The bodies of 10 Iraqi soldiers are found in western Ramadi. Two Iraqi police officers are killed in a clash in Samarra. Iraqi Army soldiers detained 58 suspects in Miqdadiya.

- **May 15, 2005**—In Iskandariya, Iraqi police find 11 bodies, four of which had been beheaded. At least three of the dead are Iraqi soldiers. A suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle next to an Iraqi police patrol in Baghdad, killing four people. It is not clear how many officers are killed/wounded. Militants throw grenades at an Iraqi police convoy in the western part of the city, killing one officer.

- **May 16, 2005**—In Baghdad, an unidentified Iraqi general working for the Defense Ministry escapes an assassination attempt when his guards open fire on a car that pulls up next to his. The vehicle was flush with weaponry. Elsewhere in the city, Defense Minister Sadoun Dulaimi announces that, due to complaints over Iraqi security force raids by Iraqis citizens, Iraqi forces would no longer be able to raid mosques and places of worship. Insurgents detonate a car bomb in a market within the city. When Iraqi troops investigate, militants detonate a follow-on car bomb, killing nine Iraqi soldiers. Unidentified Iraqis dressed as Iraqi Army soldiers bind, blindfold, and shoot eight civilians in the Al-Sha’ab area of Baghdad. Four more are found in the Ur neighborhood close to a mosque. In Baquba, insurgents detonate a roadside bomb, killing five Iraqi soldiers and wounding seven more. Iraqi officials announce that they captured a Mosul-based bomb maker, Salim Yussef Ghafari Huseyn, last week.

- **May 17, 2005**—An Interior Ministry official, Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Khammas, head of criminal intelligence, is killed by gunmen in a drive-by shooting as he leaves for work.
May 18, 2005—A US military official states that 126 car bombs had been detonated or disarmed since February 27, 2005. Iraqi forces are attacked in central Baghdad. They return fire, killing four militants. Further details are unavailable.

May 19, 2005—Reports indicate that the US 1st Cavalry Division had received over 100 allegations of abuse by Iraqi military forces by the time they left Iraq in February, spanning back six months.

May 21, 2005—Reports indicate that at least three Iraqi policemen are killed overnight.

May 22, 2005—Iraqi Army and Interior forces, in conjunction with Coalition troops, conduct a series of raids in the Abu Ghraib district, termed ‘Operation Squeeze Play,’ capturing a number of suspected insurgents. The Iraqi units involved include two battalions from the 3rd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, two battalions from the 1st Brigade 1st Iraqi Intervention Force, and three battalions from the 2nd Brigade Special Police Commandos.

May 23, 2005—In Mosul, a member of the Iraqi security forces dies when the bomb he was attempting to diffuse detonates. Operation Squeeze Play continues, with Iraqi and Coalition forces having netted some 400 suspects. Militants detonate a car bomb in north Baghdad next to a café popular with Iraqi police. Five people are killed, though it was not immediately clear if any were police officers. Maj. Gen. Wael Rubaie, an Iraqi security official, is shot to death as he drives into work in Baghdad. In the largest combined action to date, Iraqi and US troops sweep the area near Abu Ghraib prison and the road to Baghdad’s airport. 300 people are detained. A famous Iraqi police commando, Abdul Waleed, appears on Iraqi state television in a music video and threatens to cut off the arms of insurgents.

May 25, 2005—1,000 Iraqi and US troops begin an offensive as a follow up to Operation Matador in the Anbar province. This Operation New Market uncovers a weapons cache and a clash between US Marines and insurgents. Iraqi Defense Ministry officials announce the capture of an associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Baquba. Captured on the 24th, Iraqi forces describe him as Zarqawi’s ‘secretary.’ In the Baghdad neighborhood of al-Dora, insurgents detonate a car bomb that kills eight police commandos.

May 26, 2005—Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr announces that insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been wounded in an assault. Jabr announces that 40,000 Iraqi security forces will be stationed in Baghdad to help root out insurgents. In Western Baghdad, a suicide taxi bomber kills two police officers.

May 28, 2005—Two suicide car bombers detonate their vehicles at a checkpoint in the city of Sinjar. Four Iraqi soldiers die and 35 people are wounded.

May 29, 2005—Operation New Market ends. A total of 12 insurgents were killed and 30 were detained. Numerous weapons were seized, including 300 82mm high explosive mortars. Operation Lightning, a sweep against insurgents in Baghdad using between 13,000 and 20,000 Iraq forces and 7,000 US forces, begins.

May 30, 2005—In Hilla, police commandos demonstrate in front of the Interior Ministry. The ministry discovered that the units had formed unofficially and then had forged documents in an attempt to appear government sanctioned. During the demonstration, a suicide bomber mingles with the crowd and then detonates his explosives. When the crowd begins to run, a second bomber runs with them and then detonates his explosives. 31 are killed and 108 wounded. A provincial police chief, Maj. Gen. Qais Hamza, vows revenge for the bombings. An Iraqi Air Force plane crashes in the Diyala province, killing an Iraqi aviator and a US pilot.


For all the weakness events still exposed in Iraqi forces, no element of the Iraqi security forces had been overrun since the elections, although more than 175 were killed per month in combat in the late spring. More broadly, major shifts were taking place in the scale of the training and equipment effort, and gathering momentum in the deployment of Iraqi forces. Moreover, once it finally took shape, the new Shi’ite and Kurdish-dominated government approached the problem of the insurgency and Iraqi force development with more realism than many initially feared.

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Key figures like President Jalal Talibani, Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari, Defense Minister Sadun al-Dulaimi, and Interior Minister Bayan Baqir Jabr Sulagh al-Zubaydi made it clear that they were committed to taking a strong stand to deal with the insurgency and to creating effective Iraqi forces. The new Ministers of Defense and Interior may have lacked experience, but were more committed to practical solutions than most of their predecessors, were more willing to cooperate with each other and other ministers, and accepted the need to give Iraqi force building the time necessary to develop effective and inclusive forces. As Ali Dabbagh, a Shi‘ite member of the new National Assembly, put it, "It is true the Iraqi security forces are not qualified enough to face these waves of terrorism, but with the cooperation of the multinational forces, the security situation will improve…and we can see it improving now."114

Other Force Developments

There were other force developments worth noting. A Department of Defense analysis of the state of Iraqi Security Forces, current as of January 21, 2004, stated that:

- **Operations**
  - In 2004, Iraqi forces fought alongside Coalition forces in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah, Baghdad, North Babil, Mosul, and a host of other locations. In Fallujah alone, Iraqi forces had lost eight of their members and had more than 40 wounded. Well over a thousand others had now lost their lives.
  - Although Iraqi forces had endured casualties in many of their operations, had been attacked multiple times each day, and had suffered losses through brutal intimidation attacks, there was no shortage of volunteers; in fact, basic training courses are ongoing for more than 4,400 former soldiers to bring under strength Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention units additional forces.

- **Ministry of Defense**
  - Before the election. The IIG Minister of the Interior In January 2005, the Minister of Interior laid out his vision for a ‘regular police’ force of 79,000. These regular police would be supplemented by the specialized police force (i.e., Public Order Battalions (POB) and Special Police Commando Units) of 50,000, plus a mechanized brigade of 6,000. Altogether, these forces would total 135,000. In contrast, MNF-I regarded the POB, Commandos, and the mechanized brigade to be additional to the Coalition-proposed regular IPS force of 135,000. 115
  - In less than a year, Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Forces had grown from one operational battalion to 21 battalions, with six more scheduled to become operational over the next month. With the incorporation of the Iraqi National Guard into the Army on Army Day, 6 January, the total number of battalions conducting operations was now 68.
  - Iraq’s Muthanna Brigade, originally organized and trained by the Iraqis to provide local security, now had three battalions in operations, including one each in Baghdad, Fallujah, and North Babil, and one more in training.
  - Iraq’s Navy was now operational, with five 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels, and a naval infantry regiment that had recently completed training.
  - Iraq’s Air Force had three operational squadrons equipped with nine reconnaissance aircraft that operated day and night, and three US C-130 transport aircraft. One more
squadron, comprised of two UH-1 helicopters (to be followed by 14 more and by 4 Bell Jet Rangers from the UAE), was standing up.

- Iraq’s Special Operations Forces now included a Counter-Terrorist Force and a Commando Battalion, each of which has conducted dozens of successful operations.
- Iraq’s first mechanized battalion became operational in mid-January, along with a tank company and a transportation battalion.
- Iraq’s two Military Academies reopened in mid-October and each graduated a pilot course of new lieutenants, 91 total, in early January 2005.

○ Ministry of Interior

- The Iraqi Police Service had over 55,000 trained and equipped police officers, up from 26,000 six months ago.
- Five basic police academies were now operational; together, they produced over 3,500 new police officers from the 8-week course each month, a course recently modified to better prepare the new police officers for the challenging environment in which some may serve.
- Iraq’s Mechanized Police Brigade recently completed training and began operations in mid-January, using fifty BTR-94 wheeled, armored vehicles.
- Seven Police Commando battalions were now operational, with one more in training and additional battalions planned.
- Six Public Order Battalions were operational, with six more planned.
- Iraq’s National Police Emergency Response Unit was now operational.
- Iraq’s First Special Border Force Battalion was operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar Province.
- Five provincial SWAT teams had been trained and fifteen more were scheduled for training over the next six months.

The Department of Defense report did reflect the usual favorable spin, and ignored serious problems in the development of the police forces and in creating effective staffs and operational capabilities in the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Finance. Nevertheless, a comparison of these milestones with the similar data in the previous chapter reveal improvements over a period of less than two months. It is also clear that the insurgency did not have as much impact on Iraq’s elections and political process as the insurgents desired.

○ force commenced operations 18 August 2004, with the flights of two SB7L-360 Seeker reconnaissance aircraft intended to protect infrastructure facilities and Iraq’s borders. The SB7L-360 Seeker is a single-engine, two-man, high-visibility aircraft that is fitted with high-resolution surveillance systems. It is capable of providing live observation feedback to ground forces and additionally carry digital video recording hardware and other reconnaissance technology. Their missions are coordinated with Iraqi and Coalition force efforts on the ground and will eventually include operations all over the country.

○ The Iraqi Military Academy had started operating again, with two pilot classes slated to graduate from two different locations in early January.

This list of developments reflects the growing impact of MNSTC-I’s growing emphasis on mission capability, leadership, and the creation of effective unit elements with a
matching emphasis on unit integrity during the course of 2004. Force totals are debatable in terms of numbers, and misleading as a comprehensive picture of developments in force quality. It is clear from this list of “end of year” accomplishments that Iraqi forces had come a long way since the end of 2003.
IX. Iraqi Military and Security Forces: Spring and Summer 2005

Iraqi force development remained very much a work in progress during the first eight months of 2005, and events showed how much any success interacted with the course of the insurgency and Iraqi politics. The course of the fighting was far less reassuring from April on than during the period immediately after January 30th. As Chapter XII discusses in detail, the seeming pause in insurgent and terrorist activity after the election was followed by a sharp increase in violence, particularly in major bombings and suicide attacks by Sunni insurgent groups that were clearly targeted at trying to prevent Iraqi Sunnis from joining the government and government forces, and at dividing Sunni, Shi’ite, and Kurd.

In some cases, this triggered new problems in Iraqi forces and new desertions. By May, Arab Sunni Islamist insurgent attacks had driven sectarian and ethnic tensions to new highs, and created a growing risk that the struggle between the Arab Sunnis, and the Arab Shi’ites, Kurds, and other Iraqi minorities could become a broader form of civil war.

There were serious problems in Iraqi politics and governance that affected the force development effort. The new Iraqi government took nearly two months to agree on a Presidency Council and Prime Minister, and took from February 1st to May 8th to fully select a cabinet and choose a defense minister, The 55 members of the new committee to draft a constitution were not named until May 10th and then included only one Sunni.

Iraq's already weak governance deteriorated in some areas at both the central and local levels during this interregnum. Tensions grew between the largely excluded Sunnis and the now dominant Shi’ites and Kurds, and there was a surge in the infiltration by foreign Islamist extremists.

New problems arose as some of the supporters of the incoming government called for major new purges of the government and the Iraqi security forces to eliminate all "Ba'athists," including many whose only "crime" had been to go along with Saddam Hussein's regime to survive. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that some of the most effective Iraqi units were largely Shi’ite and Kurd in character, including special police and security units in the Ministry of Interior. These units could sometimes be as ruthless as they were effective, and compounded Sunni fears and resentments. The good news was that they helped lead some Sunni clerics and politicians to call for Sunnis to join the armed forces and police. The bad news was that Sunnis began to accuse government forces of excessive force, targeted killings and disappearances, and deliberately attacking Sunni targets.

Top US officials like Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld were concerned enough to come to Iraq to warn against such purges and the risk of broadening ethnic and sectarian conflict, and to the stress the need for effective governance. Senior US officers like General George Casey, the US Commander in Iraq, warned of the need for effective governance and for inclusion of as many Sunnis as possible. US Commanders also made it clear that they felt the insurgency would continue to last for several more years, that developing effective Iraqi forces would take over a year, and that MNF forces would probably be needed in significant numbers through 2006.

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Nevertheless, the Iraqi force building effort still slowly gathered momentum in spite of the problems in governance and the new surge of terrorist and insurgent activity.

**The Manning Levels of Iraqi Military and Security Forces Following the Election**

The manpower data on Iraqi forces shows considerable progress, although such data are not easy to analyze. They do not provide a basis for assessing how many forces were largely Shi’ite or Kurdish and how many were more broadly “national” in character. The reporting format used in the Iraq Weekly Status Report changed again in early 2005, and eliminated reporting on the 12 individual military and security force branches in favor of six more general categories. The impact of this new reporting system is shown in Figure 19, which compares the resulting manpower totals to the two previous systems used by the CPA and MNF.

MNSTC-I stated that public reporting continued to evolve to properly reflect the focus of the mission at a given time, and explained the shifts shown in Figure 20 as follows:

Numbers of “trained and equipped” Iraqi Security Forces have been reported since last August [2004]. This metric represents an evolution in itself. In the early days of ISF reporting, numbers of forces “on duty” were reported, often without regard for the training or equipment status of that force. At the time, just getting some police visibly onto the streets was deemed critical to public order. After it became apparent that the number of forces on duty wasn’t really indicative of their capability, subsequent reports added the training status. In late summer 2004, MNSTC-I started reporting on how many soldiers are both trained and equipped. Then – as now – that is a valuable metric, but must be considered within a broader context. Focus now is shifting to numbers and capabilities of units. Standing by themselves, the number of units similarly doesn’t tell the whole story of ISF capability. The transition readiness assessment system will help in more accurately defining the capability of the ISF. Transition Teams (assigned to all battalions) will provide solid overall capability assessments of the units already fielded. For security reasons, though, that data – like U.S. readiness reports – will not be publicly provided.

Given this background, the data in Figure 20 are important for several reasons:

- They show the problems in the earlier reporting systems, which focused on quantity rather than quality, and produced exaggerated expectations as well as major credibility problems for the CPA and MNF.
- They show a sharp rise in manpower that did have meaningful training and equipment between from under 96,000 in August 2004, to 186,000 in June 2005, and over 172,000 in early August 2005.
- They show the impact of the Eikenberry, MNSTC-I, and Luck assessments in improving the approach to training and equipment Iraqi forces.
- They show a clear plan did exist for expanding the Iraqi manpower pool through July 2006, and from 168,000 men in June 2005, to 200,000 in September, 230,000 in December, and 270,000 in July 2006.
- They show the importance of merging the regular military and National Guard in giving Iraqi military forces the total strength they needed, and need, to be effective.
- They reflect a balanced emphasis on police and security forces that was becoming significantly more effective than the sheer manpower numbers indicate because many low quality men were being dropped or retired, while higher quality manpower was being recruited and trained.

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They exclude a major amount of additional manpower with some value in light security missions such as the Facilities Protection Force, Oil Security Service, and Electricity Security Service.

One has only to contrast the figures for "trained and equipped" manpower against the kind of manpower data described in earlier chapters to see that the Iraqi force development program made serious progress just between the beginning of 2005 and the middle of the year. At the same time, Figure 20 makes it equally clear that Iraqi forces still had a long way to go, and that much would depend on taking a consistent approach to executing Iraqi force development plans.

**Equipment: Summer of 2005**

US-funded contracts began to flow into Iraq during mid-to-late 2004. As of July 20, 2005, a DOD report showed that the Iraqi Army was at 60 percent of its total authorized equipment, including more than 100 percent of AK-47 requirements. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), as provided for by Public Law 109-13, is meant to further enable MNF-I to meet critical requirements.

US-funded procurement had equipped infantry units primarily with former Warsaw Pact weapons and vehicles. The Ministry of Defense, using its funds, had also sought US-standard vehicles such as HMMWVs and M-113 armored personnel carriers. Mechanized forces were being trained using T-55 and T-72 tanks, BMP-1s and MTLBs. At the time of the report, ISOF was equipped with M4 carbines, M9 pistols, night-vision devices, M24 sniper systems, M240 machine guns, 12 gauge shotguns, 50-caliber machine guns, global positioning systems equipment, and surveillance equipment.

The summer of 2005 also brought some initial progress in terms of equipping the new Iraqi army with armored personnel carriers and tanks:

On 29 July 2005 the Swiss government approved the sale of 180 M113 armored personnel carriers to the United Arab Emirates. The UAE planned to transfer the 180 APCs, from a Swiss army surplus, to Iraq as a gift. This requires an end-user certificate from the Iraqi government stating that the vehicles are actually bound for Iraq. The RUAG armaments group must submit the certificate to the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). The Swiss military equipment law prohibits the export of arms to war zones. As the APC's country of origin, the USA must also confirm that it approves of the deal.

The M113A1 is a lightly armored full tracked air transportable personnel carrier designed to carry personnel and certain types of cargo. The M113-family was developed from M59 and M75 which were designed by FMC (Food Machinery Corp.) in the late 1950’s. The vehicle is capable of: amphibious operations in streams and lakes; extended cross country travel over rough terrain; and high speed operation on improved roads and highways.

By August 2005 Iraq's first armored brigade was trained and in the field, with 77 Soviet-designed T-72 tanks donated to Iraq by Hungary expected to arrive in Iraq soon. Defense Solutions announced 27 July 2005 that it would deliver the first five rebuilt T-72 Main Battle Tanks to the Iraqi Army. Iraqi Staff Major General Mahmood Ayoub Bashar accepted these tanks on behalf of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense during his attendance at program review meetings held at the HM Currus Combat Vehicle Technique Company (Currus), Gödöllő, Hungary.

Currus participated in the refurbishment project under a subcontract to Defense Solutions. These tanks were part of the total of 77 T-72s being rebuilt under a contract between Defense
Solutions and the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. The T-72 tanks were originally donated to Iraq by the Government of Hungary. Defense Solutions performed this work under a US State Department license.

The T-72s will be the main combat power of a new Iraqi Armor Division being created with the assistance of the U.S. Army.
Figure 19
The Development of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces: Part One – Historical Perspective

Source: MNSTC-I
Figure 20

The Development of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces: Part Two – Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

Source: MNSTC-I
**Detailed Manpower Trends**

The manpower strength of Iraqi forces in the spring of 2005 are shown in more detail in Figure 21, along with the growing strength of Iraqi combat battalions. It should be stressed that the force goals listed as authorized strength represented a moving target, and had to change to respond to developments in the insurgency and the actual level of success achieved in creating Iraqi force. The various totals for “trained and equipped” for different force elements include personnel with very different levels of training and equipment, and the figures for authorized manpower represent the personnel authorized in May 2005, rather than a stable end goal. That said, any careful reading of these data, and comparison with the force developments described in previous chapters, shows that they reflect massive progress over the previous year.

Ministry of Defense reporting in May 2005 noted the following progress in developing more effective forces.

- The data on the Iraqi Army show regular force strength of over 28,000 men and 34 battalions by May 2005, versus one operational battalion in July 2004.
- The Iraqi National Guard was being merged into the Army in a way that would eventually double its force strength and lay the ground work for creating a national army that could defend the country as well as fight insurgents.
- Mechanized forces were active and expanding.
- Special operations forces were rapidly reaching strength of 3 battalions, and nearly 2,000 men. These forces were being trained by MNF Special Forces and at elite elements, with many of the same training programs being used in the West.
- The Iraqi army was beginning to get the mix of combat support, service support, logistics, and training it needed to operate independently and as a self-sustaining force.
- The Iraqi air force was still in formation but expanding to strength of six squadrons.
- The Iraqi navy was awaiting decisions on procuring major patrol boats, and becoming more than a token force.

Similar trends affected Ministry of Interior forces. The security and Special Police Forces – some of the most effective Iraqi units in Iraqi forces – continued to gather strength. At the same time, a trained regular police force was slowly beginning to emerge, along with the mix of supporting elements necessary to deal with an ongoing insurgency:

- The core “trained and equipped” manpower in the police was now up to over 57,000 out of 98,881 on-hand and rapidly expanding.
- The civil intervention force now had almost all of the manpower trained needed for its Public Order Brigades, and was rapidly developing a light mechanized brigade that could deal with insurgent attacks.
- Similar progress was taking place in creating the Special Police Command brigades and Emergency Response (ERU) units.
- Progress was being made in creating effective border forces.
- The full Dignitary Protection force was trained, equipped, and active.
If one looks at the overall force strengths in Figure 21, Iraq had a combined total of 100 operational battalions as of May 2005 – 80 in the Army and National Guard and 20 in the Police – plus the Army counterterrorist force and the Police Emergency Response Unit.

Furthermore, Iraqi manpower and force strength continued to improve through the late spring and summer. By early August, the total number of Iraqi military, regular police, and police units that could honestly be described as “trained and equipped” had risen from 96,000 in September 2004, to over 172,000 in early August 2005. The Ministry of Defense forces portion of this total had reached 78,500 men, with 77,700 in the army, 100 in the Air Force, and 700 in the Navy. The Ministry of Interior forces totaled 93,800, with 63,500 in the police and Highway Patrol, and 30,300 in security units and other forces.\textsuperscript{121}

Iraqi and MNF-I plans called for total Iraqi manpower to rise to 230,000 forces by the end of December of 2005, and 270,000 by mid-2006.\textsuperscript{122} This involved maintaining a good balance of military, regular police, and police units. Plans called for about 85,000 military in the MOD by December, and 145,000 special police and police in the MOI.

The 85,000 in the military was to include about 83,000 in the Army (including the “national” forces originally envisioned, along with the former National Guard; also including combat support, service support and training units). The remaining manpower was to include the Special Operations Forces and the Air Force and Navy. About 100,000 of the personnel in the MOI were to be station/traffic/patrol police; in addition, nearly 20,000 more will be in the Special Police and the Emergency Response Unit. The rest included the Border Forces, the Highway Patrol and Dignitary Protection.

By June 2006, the total number of men in Iraqi Security Forces (military, regular police and police units) was planned to reach approximately 270,000. The MOD was to have about 90,000, and the MOI about 180,000 – provided that there was no change in the currently planned level of regular police.

These manpower increases were to lead to continuing increases in the number of combat battalions. In July 2004, just after the Iraqi resumption of sovereignty, neither the Iraqi military nor the Iraqi police had any battalions that could be deployed nationally. Given the plans current in early August 2005, the numbers of combat battalions in the MOD were total around 106 by December 2005, with slightly under 30 additional battalion equivalents in the MOI. In addition, Iraq was to have 35 brigade and ten division headquarters providing command and control of MOD forces. Of these headquarters elements, some would be relatively mature, but at least a small number of each would still be relatively “young” or inexperienced.

Much of the Iraqi force generation effort was to shift to giving Iraqi combat forces the combat support and combat service support units they need. By December 2006, Iraq planned to field four Motorized Transportation Regiments (working on the goal of one per division). Iraq also planned to generate six bomb disposal companies (with the goal of one per division). In addition, nearly 70 Headquarters and Service Companies were to have been generated (although some equipment shortages will remain). The goal for these Headquarters and Service Companies is one per battalion.
By June 2006, the number of MOD battalions was planned to reach 114. The number of the MOI battalions was to remain unchanged, although their training will have been improved through recently initiated advanced programs.
### Figure 21

**Iraqi Active Manning and Force Development Plans in May 2005**

#### Ministry of Defense

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Element/Component</th>
<th>Operational as of May 2, 2005</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Expected 100% Operational Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manpower Battalions/Squadrons</td>
<td>Manpower Battalions/Squadrons</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Army (Combat)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular &amp; IIF</td>
<td>28,215</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former ING</td>
<td>39,961</td>
<td>44/-</td>
<td>56,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized/Armor</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>1+/-</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>69,114</td>
<td>79/-</td>
<td>94,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Operations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support, Service Support, and Training Units</td>
<td>3,091</td>
<td>2/-</td>
<td>5,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Air Force</strong></td>
<td>183</td>
<td>-/3</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi Navy</strong></td>
<td>521</td>
<td>-/2</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>74,159</td>
<td>83/5</td>
<td>103,390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ministry of the Interior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>On Duty As of May 2, 2005</th>
<th>Trained &amp; Equipped</th>
<th>Trained &amp; Equipped As of July 31, 2005</th>
<th>Total Authorized</th>
<th>Expected 100% Operational Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police</strong></td>
<td>98,881</td>
<td>57,135</td>
<td>67,500</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>Nov 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force Public Order Brigades</td>
<td>5,455</td>
<td>4,181</td>
<td>5,774</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>July 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Mechanized Brigade</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>July 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,845</td>
<td>8,131</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Mar 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Police Commando Battalions</strong></td>
<td>11,845</td>
<td>8,131</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>Mar 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emergency Response Units</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>Dec 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement</td>
<td>18,779</td>
<td>15,583</td>
<td>19,156</td>
<td>28,360</td>
<td>Aug 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>July 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>May 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>138,085</td>
<td>87,786</td>
<td>96,600</td>
<td>176,881</td>
<td>Aug 06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Embassy Baghdad
**The Meaning of a Constant Stream of Volunteers**

Manpower quality was improving, but there were ongoing questions about motivation and loyalty. Recruiting and retention standards were being raised, as were the standards for promotion. Vetting was being improved overall, although reliable personnel data were often lacking a war-torn society. In cases like the police, screening examinations adapted from Western police vetting and testing methods were also being applied for the first time in Iraq’s history.

Recruiting did not become a problem in spite of daily insurgent attacks on Iraqi forces. Insurgents stepped up their attacks on the military and security forces after the election, and singled out Shi’ites for attack in events like the religious festivities surrounding the Shi’ite holiday of Ashura. Even so, the US Department of Defense issued an update on February 16, 2005 that stated that between 8,000 and 10,000 Iraqis had shown up at an airfield in southern Iraq to join the army in one day.

Both Iraqi and US experts agree that the elections did increase the number of Shi’ite and Kurdish recruits that actually supported the new government. Many of the Iraqis who joined the military, security, and police forces did so because they believed in Iraq’s new political process and that Iraqi forces should take over from the Coalition. Much of the total stream of volunteers, however, had little to do with loyalty or patriotism. Serious nationwide unemployment problems continued to exist, and pay continued to be a major factor driving such enlistments. Privates in the Iraqi army earned about $333 a month while corporals could earn approximately $543. These were large salaries for an average Iraqi. It was also not clear what the end goal of many volunteers was, and how strong their ties were to given sects and ethnic groups versus a belief in a unified Iraq. No breakouts are available by sect and ethnic origin, but Kurds were often motivated more to defend “Kurdistan” than Iraq, and Shi’ites to defend Shi’ite power. The number of ex-ethnic and sectarian militia Shi’ite and Kurdish who joined some branch of the military, security, and police forces also raised questions about the ultimate loyalty of such volunteers.

The fact that Sunni clerics and politicians began to call for Sunnis to join the Iraqi security forces helped make them more national in terms of composition, but many who joined did so in an effort to counterbalance Shi’ite and Kurdish power. Sunni volunteers seemed to be even more motivated by money than Shi’ite and Kurdish volunteers, and at least some Sunnis left or deserted after getting training and became insurgents.

Yet, progress was being made towards creating truly national forces. In the late spring of 2005, three of Iraq’s army divisions had a Shi’ite commander, three a Sunni, one a Turcoman, and three a Sunni Kurd. The number of Sunnis volunteering had increased, and officer and NCO training was having some success in creating a leadership core trained as “national” forces.

**Equipment Levels in the fall of 2005**

Unclassified US government reporting on the status of plans to equip Iraqi forces continued to be erratic during 2005. The Iraq Weekly Status Reports continued to lack the detailed breakouts of the equipment effort that were a part of the earlier reporting.
efforts, and there was no way to relate the data MNSTC-I provided on deliveries to total requirements or requirement by force element.

At the same time, the past reporting of percentages of equipment relative to unit requirement presented problems because there was no definitive force structure for the ISF to which the Iraqis adhered. By the fall of 2004, the Iraqi government had a tendency to create new units that were not part of the regular army force structure, such as the Al Muthana Brigade or "Defenders of Baghdad," and change the equipment mix.

The regular police still had little equipment standardization and often had serious equipment shortfalls at least through April 2005. Unlike the Army and elite security services, the regular police also lacked an efficient system for securing equipment and weapons and tracking actual equipment holdings -- including weapons, ammunition, and explosives.

Since there was no force plan agreed to by both the Iraqi government and MNSTC-I, there was no way to hold the Iraqis accountable for adhering to a given force mix. Other MNSTC-I reporting indicated that some 30,000 of the police and security forces in Figure 21 were not actually trained, but were waiting to be trained.

There were continuing reports of inadequate equipment and facilities. For example, Chief of Staff, General Richard Myers was told at one police training site in the Jordanian desert during a visit that some recruits use water bottles as simulated weapons during exercises because actual weapons were in short supply. Iraqis often complained about the flow of equipment during a visit in June 2005, and press reports continued to surface that equipment was being stolen and diverted.

In July 2005, Iraqi MOD and US military officials confirmed that they had uncovered a massive scheme to provide Iraqi security forces with substandard equipment that wasted some $300 million over the course of more than a year. According to these officials, at the heart of the scheme was former CPA appointed weapons buyer and former exile Ziad Tareq Cattan. Cattan was supposed to have flown across the globe dispensing money to furnish Iraq’s forces with weapons with little oversight.

Reports indicate that Cattan frequently charged a 10 percent ‘finder’s fee’ for each contract he negotiated and dispersed kickbacks to Iraqi MOD buyers, even though the various helicopters, armored personnel carriers, and machine guns he acquired were defective, cheap imitations, or extremely worn. Cattan maintained his innocence and asserted that the Coalition so closely monitored the program that such a high level of corruption would be impossible.

US officials do concede that problems arose because the MNF-I often bought equipment without consulting the Iraqi government, or informing it of the details of such purchases. This allowed MOD officials to claim that they made purchases out of ignorance, although in most cases such purchase clearly involved serious corruption. Several of the Coalition officials interviewed, however, indicate that the Secretary General of the MoD in the Interim Iraqi Government tolerated high levels of corruption and inefficiency, and that it was not until the new government took office in April 2005 that serious efforts were made to eliminate gross inefficiency and corruption in areas like military equipment purchases. One example they cited was that the MoD staff deliberately sabotaged the air
conditioning in the Ministry to get kick backs from the service workers that repaired the equipment.

Nevertheless, the flow of equipment had begun to reach the point where most of the previous shortfalls in basic equipment had been overcome, and some units were getting advanced weapons and equipment. MNSTC reporting does provide useful data on total equipment deliveries during the period, as well as weekly reports that show shorter-term deliveries for part of the period.

Figure 21 shows major equipment deliveries between July 2004 and May 2005. Figure 22 summarizes the unclassified data available on weekly deliveries. Both Figures show that most weekly equipment deliveries were relatively light weapons and unarmored vehicles, although Iraqi forces now had extensive communications gear and were getting steadily more sophisticated equipment such as sniper rifles, night vision goggles, GPS systems, and X-ray vans.

This progress continued into the summer. A report by the Department of Defense in late July described the Iraqi army equipment effort as follows:128

Equipment shortages have been reduced as equipment procured with U.S.-funded contracts began to flow into Iraq during mid-to-late 2004. The Iraqi Army now has 60 percent of its total authorized equipment, including more than 100 percent of AK-47 requirements. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), as provided for by Public Law 109-13, will further enable MNF-I to meet critical requirements. Furthermore, although there is variance in the rate of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion among the Iraqi Army, rates have diminished significantly and are now around one percent for some divisions. Still, units that are conducting operations and units that relocate elsewhere in Iraq experience a surge in absenteeism.

U.S.-funded procurement has equipped infantry units primarily with former Warsaw Pact weapons and vehicles. The MOD, using its funds, has also sought U.S.-standard vehicles such as HMMWVs and M-113 armored personnel carriers. Mechanized forces are being trained using T-55 and T-72 tanks, BMP-1s and MTLBs. The ISOF is currently equipped with M4 carbines, M9 pistols, night-vision devices, M24 sniper systems, M240 machine guns, 12 gauge shotguns, 50-caliber machine guns, global positioning systems equipment, and surveillance equipment.

---

The Iraqi Navy currently has approximately 500 trained sailors on duty. It is equipped with five Predator Class Patrol Boats (PB), 24 Fast Aluminum Boats (Duel Outboard Engines), 10 rigid-hull inflatable boats, and various small arms and night vision devices. The Iraqi Navy will further equip themselves with six Al Faw Class Patrol Boats (the first of which was delivered in July 2005) and two Off-Shore Support Vessels. With some exceptions, the responsibility for logistical support of the Iraqi Navy has been handed over to the Umm Qasr Base Support Unit (BSU). Maritime and Riverine Advisory Support Team (M&R AST) members provide advice and assistance to both the BSU and the Iraqi Navy Logistics Department in order to cultivate a cooperative working relationship.

---

The Air Force currently has over 100 personnel and has a fleet of 9 helicopters (4 UH-1H and 5 Jet Ranger), 3 C-130s, and 8 single-engine propeller-driven observation airplanes (6 CompAir turboprop aircraft and 2 Seeker piston aircraft).

---

The IPS uses a variety of equipment, including Chevy Luv and Nissan pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, AK 47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor. The goal is for each police officer and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment.

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The Quality of Equipment Deliveries

Opinions differ of the adequacy of this equipment in giving Iraqi forces the equipment they needed to stand on their own against the best armed insurgents and insurgent ambushes. A number of US advisors, Iraqis, and outside observers feel that the Coalition was far too slow to provide the kind of armor and protected vehicles that Coalition forces had found to be vital for their survival. In fact, Iraqi forces felt so strongly about the need for added armor that some army, National Guard, and elite police elements started reconditioning abandoned armor in various weapons depots, or “requisitioned” armor taken from the Iranian exile forces in the Iranian People’s Mujahideen.

The MNSTC-I was seeking armor from a variety of sources, including other Arab countries and Eastern European countries that operated the same kinds of Soviet bloc weapons the Iraqis were familiar with and could maintain and sustain. For example, deliveries of Hungarian T-72s were underway to the army, and armored Land Rovers were being delivered to the police.

At the same time, some MNSTC-I experts argue that the lighter equipment shown in Figure 22 was what the Iraqis needed for most counterinsurgency and counterterrorist missions, and can actually maintain and support. One MNSTC-I expert put it this way:

... light forces are often more versatile and essential in a counter-insurgency (assuming they have the right weapons, body armor, Kevlar helmets, etc.), but would also point out that we are providing heavy forces to the Iraqis. A mechanized division is already in the military force structure plan and an additional motorized division is being considered. The Iraqi Army already has one armored and one mechanized battalion in operation; another mechanized battalion is in training. The police forces have two mechanized battalions operating under a brigade headquarters; a third battalion is in training. The latter, in fact, will be provided U.S.-made Armored Security Vehicles, superb wheeled armored vehicles made by Cadillac Gage and used by our own Military Police. In addition, numerous APCs are now on hand. Up-armored HMMWVs are on order and other wheeled armored vehicles are either on hand or on order.

A heavier force, whether for force protection or for defense against invasion, also costs more. The Iraqis can’t really afford to purchase, operate and maintain such a force – even with the multiple billions of dollars we are providing. Given fiscal constraints that will last for several years, Iraq has to consider opportunity costs before committing to the addition of more heavy forces. The Iraqis might decide that the additional motorized division being considered might better be traded for less-expensive light forces. They could instead decide to spend that money on much-needed infrastructure protection forces, which may be even more important strategically.

It should not be expected that the Iraqi military will eventually look like the American military nor that an American-like military will be needed to defeat the insurgency.

These views have some validity and do recognize the fact that Iraqi forces did need protected vehicles. At the same time, they do not refute the fact that providing nothing but light firepower, and protection in the form of body armor, has presented significant operating problems for Iraqis that have come up against well-armed insurgents.

Figure 22 also contains a highly diverse mix of civilian vehicles that is likely to create future maintenance problems. Certainly, many Iraqi officers feel their equipment is too light and too vulnerable, and see a dual standard in the Coalition’s steady uparming of its equipment. This helps explain why some Iraqi units have taken armor and weapons seized from People’s Mujahideen (MEK) forces, and others have reconditioned abandoned armor taken from equipment dumps.
It should also be noted that the quality of the facilities for security force trainees and fully graduated soldiers remained erratic. While some Iraqi bases and forts were decently furbished, others remained in an appalling state of disrepair. For instance, in July 2005 the 5th Brigade of the Iraqi Army, the unit tapped to guard the Green Zone, was stationed in a filthy hangar at the Muthana airfield with insufficient water supplies for showering, a non-existent sewage system, and only occasional electricity. Garbage heaps were abundant and the conditions had eroded morale, with some Iraqis considering quitting. Other soldiers could not understand why the US could not seem to fix what seemed to be simple problems and viewed the conditions as a sign of disrespect. Fortunately, air conditioned tents and a row of showers were under construction at the end of July 2005.\textsuperscript{129}

As of October 2005, deliveries of up-armored vehicles to the ISF remained very limited. To date, the US Army only had one contractor up-arming Humvees. Priority has been given to supplying vehicles to America troops, with back-orders extending to the early months of the war. Multi-National Security Transition Command initiative to deliver 1,500 armored Humvees to the Iraqis was not even slated to start until December, and most would be built in the summer of 2006.

As Figure 22 shows, Iraqis were better equipped with smaller items such as grenade launchers and machine guns. Yet Iraqi troops in some of the most dangerous areas of the country were still manning posts without flak jackets, sometimes sharing vests with other soldiers on somewhat of a timeshare basis. And Iraqi troops continued to patrol heavily booby-trapped streets in pickup and flatbed trucks.\textsuperscript{130}

**Beginning to Create Logistics and Support Capabilities**

Iraqi forces were also beginning to develop the capability to support, maintain, and sustain their equipment. MNF-I and Iraqi forces had created plans to develop base support units or BSU to support the equipment Iraqi forces were getting, and the creation of motorized transport units to provide the necessary supplies with both transport assets and the firepower to protect themselves. The latter units -- such as the 3rd Motor Transportation Regiment -- were beginning to become active in the spring of 2005, and the plans for BSUs can be summarized as follows:

- Three major BSUs were to be created to cover the entire country, each to support forces within a 200-kilometer radius. These include one at Kasik in the North (turnover date of August 2005), Tajji in the center (turnover date of September 2005), and Tallil in the south (turnover date of June 2005).

- Smaller standard BSUs were to be created throughout the country to support operations within a 65-kilometer radius. These included facilities at Kirkuk (turnover date of June 2005), KMTB (turnover date of July 2005), Habbaniyah (turnover date of November 2005), Rustamiyah (turnover date of July 2005), Biap (turnover date of September 2005), Numaniyah (turnover date of May 2005), and Umm Qasr (turnover date of March 2005).

Iraqi forces still had a long way to go before they could provide their combat units or "teeth," with the proper mix of combat and service support, major combat unit structures and headquarters, logistics, and other facilities. They still tended to be all "teeth" and no "tail." They had, however, now begun the journey and one that offered real hope that they might be able take over much or most of the combat mission from Coalition forces within a few years.
**Figure 22**

Total Equipment Deliveries to Iraqi Forces: July 2004-May 2005

(As of 1 June 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ministry of Defense Forces **</th>
<th>Ministry of Interior Forces</th>
<th>Issued in Late Week</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>5,665 (1,434)</td>
<td>4,874</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>10,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>10,537 (6,933)</td>
<td>13,514</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24,051</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKM Machine Guns</td>
<td>6,595 (2,706)</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47s</td>
<td>87,740 (36,718)</td>
<td>67,294</td>
<td>3,070</td>
<td>155,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>15,160 (6,721)</td>
<td>125,139</td>
<td>6,240</td>
<td>140,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>193,983,724* (23,431,226)</td>
<td>111,690,813*</td>
<td>3,567,880</td>
<td>305,587,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms</td>
<td>280,267 (92,521)</td>
<td>281,301</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>561,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmets</td>
<td>87,250 (45,7272)</td>
<td>5,633</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>92,883</td>
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<tr>
<td>Body Armor</td>
<td>80,761 (40,903)</td>
<td>87,343</td>
<td>7,410</td>
<td>168,104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 100 million rounds of ammunition prepositioned in 11 sites in Iraq.

** Figures in parenthesis show amounts delivered to National Guard before merger with the army.

Source: US Embassy, Baghdad.
## Figure 22 - Part One

### Typical Weekly Flows of Equipment Deliveries to All Iraqi Forces in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Week Ending</th>
<th>Jan. 8</th>
<th>Jan. 15</th>
<th>Jan. 22</th>
<th>Jan. 29</th>
<th>March 19</th>
<th>March 26</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,770</td>
<td>3,459</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>3,310</td>
<td>320</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM Machine Guns</td>
<td></td>
<td>153</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper rifles</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols/handguns</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body armor</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>5,839</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>2,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helmets</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,957</td>
<td>3,659</td>
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<td>1,213</td>
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<td>A-Back Scatter</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Ray Vans</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chevy Luminas</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chevy Trailblazers</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevy LUV trucks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up-Armored Humvees</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMPs</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landcruisers</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nissan pickup trucks</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nissan Cabstars</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-ton trucks</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ½ ton trucks</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulances</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Water trailers</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-55 Recovery Vehicles</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehclies (Unspecified)</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile generators</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Detector Systems</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Night vision goggles</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Positioning Systems</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>.42</td>
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</table>

Source: Adapted from various editions of the MNSTC-I, Advisor; data provided by MNSTC-I J-4.

Note: Reports did not indicate supplies delivered between February 5 and March 12, 2005.
### Figure 22 – Part Two

**Typical Weekly Flows of Equipment Deliveries to All Iraqi Forces in 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Week Ending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>2,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPKs</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKM Machine Guns</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper rifles</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols/handguns</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body armor</td>
<td>7,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmets</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Positioning Systems</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Back Scatter</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Ray Vans</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashok Leylands</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevy Luminas</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevy Trailblazers</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevy LUV trucks</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Up-Armed Humvees</td>
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<td>T-55 Recovery Vehicles</td>
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<td>Vehicles (unspecified)</td>
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<td>Nissan pickup trucks</td>
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<td>Nissan Cabstars</td>
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<td>5-ton trucks</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 ½ ton trucks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulances</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water trailers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile generators</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night vision goggles</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Detector Systems</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition (million rounds)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from various editions of the MNSTC-I, Advisor; data provided by MNSTC-I J-4.
**Figure 22 – Part Three**

**Typical Weekly Flows of Equipment Deliveries to All Iraqi Forces in 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>May 21</th>
<th>May 28</th>
<th>June 4</th>
<th>June 11</th>
<th>June 18</th>
<th>June 25</th>
<th>July 9</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK-47</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,615</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKM Machine Guns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sniper rifles</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols/handguns</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>5,094</td>
<td>2,320</td>
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<td>Smoke Grenades</td>
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<td>Rocket-Propelled Grenades</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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<td>6,060</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>750</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Helmets</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Back Scatter</td>
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</tr>
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<td>X-Ray Vans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashook Leylands</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevy Luminas</td>
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Source: Adapted from various editions of the MNSTC-I, Advisor; data provided by MNSTC-I J-4.
### Figure 22 – Part Four

**Typical Weekly Flows of Equipment Deliveries to All Iraqi Forces in 2005**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Week Ending</th>
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<td>Pistols/handguns</td>
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<td>Rocket-Propelled Grenades</td>
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<td>Weapons (unspecified)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Body armor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helmets</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-Back Scatter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Z-Back Scatter Vans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>X-Ray Vans</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashook Leylands</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevy Luminas</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevy Trailblazers</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LUV trucks</td>
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<td>Landcruisers</td>
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<td>5-ton trucks</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Computers</td>
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</table>

Source: Adapted from various editions of the MNSTC-I, Advisor; data provided by MNSTC-I J-4.
## Figure 22 – Part Five

**Typical Weekly Flows of Equipment Deliveries to All Iraqi Forces in 2005**

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<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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</table>

Source: Adapted from various editions of the MNSTC-I, Advisor; data provided by MNSTC-I J-4.
Vetting and Training in the Summer and Fall of 2005

Iraqi forces got steadily better vetting and training in 2005. It is unclear exactly how men and women had as yet been screened the improved vetting process, but MNSTC-I indicated that it could do a better job of checking Iraqi recruits against Ba’ath and other political party records. Iraqis now checked the criminal record of the recruit as well. Yet there remained work to be done. On September 20, 2005, Iraqi National Security Adviser Dr. Mouwafak al-Rubaie admitted that security forces continued to be infiltrated by terrorist elements: “Our Iraqi security forces in general, police in particular, in many parts of Iraq, I have to admit, have been penetrated by some of the insurgents, some of the terrorists as well.” He went on, however, to assure that “We are putting in place a very scrupulous, very meticulous vetting procedure in the process of recruiting a new batch of police and Iraqi army, which will, if you like, clean our security forces as well as stop any penetration in future from the insurgents and terrorists.”

MNSTC-I sources reported that all Iraqis now underwent basic training in the Iraqi military and the author’s visits to the various training centers involved showed that Iraqis now much of the training and were developing their own training curricula. There was still some corruption and favoritism in selection of recruits, but much of the problem occurred before actual selection, and the vetting and screening process was becoming more professional once recruits were selected. Military and police units had begun to get serious screening and police recruits had to pass written screening tests modified from those used by US police forces. MNSTC-I stated:

Training – of all forces, but especially police forces – undergoes constant analysis in light of operational experience. The course length and curriculum of the Transition Integration Program has been standardized in all of the Iraqi police academies. The length of basic training for police recruits has been increased by 25 percent by adding two weeks of regional training on threats and other conditions in the new policeman’s area of responsibility. Training at all police schools is now much more likely to be led by an Iraqi and to be “hands on” training instead of simple academic instruction.

MNSTC-I had personnel training the staffs of brigades and divisions as well as Iraqis involved in reconnaissance and surveillance activity. It was deeply engaged in a variety of mentoring programs within ministries and had programs in place for the navy and air force. MNSTC-I was directly involved in training the SWAT Teams and other specialized counterinsurgency and protection forces for each province and now offered a variety of police training courses ranging from case management to forensics.

The progress taking place is illustrated by the following milestones:

- 4,516 Iraqi police officers graduated in May from basic courses in Al Kut, Sulaymaniyah, Al Hillah, Jordan, and Baghdad.
- 157 Iraqi officers graduated in May from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility.
- The first 213 recruits for the Iraqi Navy’s Direct Recruit Replacement program (DRR) began training for anti-terrorist operations and oil terminal security at the end of May.

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121 Iraqi police officers graduated in June from advanced and specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility. 58 graduated from a Basic criminal investigation course, 29 from a Critical Incident Management course, 18 from a course on Counterterrorism Investigations, and 16 from Executive Leadership courses.

As of early June 2005, 32,500 police recruits had completed the eight week new recruit training program and 36,000 police with previous training had completed the three week Transitional Integration Program.

The command of the Kirkuk Military Training base was transferred from MNSTC-I to Iraqi Brig. Gen. Abd Zaid.

More generally, the systematic creation of formal training programs for each of the individual elements of Iraqi forces is summarized in Figure 23. By now, the training programs had become large enough in scale, and sufficiently institutionalized to have real impact. As Figure 24 shows, these basic training programs were now supplemented by specialized training programs for each element of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces.

Creating an Officer Corps

The noncommissioned officer corps is often referred to as the “backbone” of any army. Efforts to create this backbone in the ISF are underway, with both Coalition and other actors from the international community playing a role. Lt. Gen. Petraeus has emphasized the importance of developing an NCO class that operates with a sense of professionalism and leadership. Competitive pay, the recruitment of an all-volunteer force, and the institution of a merit-based system of promotion are all steps to achieving this end. MNF-I has incorporated Iraqi officers at various levels of operational and tactical command in order to assist in the creation of organic, hands-on leadership capabilities.

Officer training has been conducted primarily in Iraq and in neighboring Jordan, but there have also been officer exchange programs to military colleges in the US, Italy, the UK, and Australia. The NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) is also helping to build the Iraqi Security Forces with training and advisory support to middle- and senior-level leaders at locations such as the National Joint Operations Center, Ministry of Defense Headquarters Joint Operations Center, and the Iraqi Staff College.

- March 11, 2004 – The Iraqi Civil Defense Force graduated 116 noncommissioned officers from the first Primary Leadership Development Course conducted at Camp Muleskinner. Fifteen U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command drill sergeants from Fort Sill, Okla. led the trainees through a 113-hour program of instruction that focused on leadership, communication skills, maintenance, professional skills, military training and military studies. Fifteen U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command drill sergeants from Fort Sill, Okla. led the trainees through a 113-hour program of instruction that focused on leadership, communication skills, maintenance, professional skills, military training and military studies.

- June 18, 2004 – More than 400 Iraqi army senior non-commissioned officers graduated from the Kurkush Military Training Base’s NCO Academy Senior NCO course at the Iraqi army training base 70 miles east of Baghdad, according to Office of Security Transition officials. The 421 graduates represent the fourth class to graduate.

- February 2005 – All 26 NATO Allies agreed to contribute to NATO’s training of the ISF, either in Iraq, outside of Iraq, through financial contributions, and/or by donations of equipment. NATO has declared that the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) has reached initial operating capability.

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○ September 27, 2005 – NATO inaugurated an officer academy on the outskirts of Baghdad on Tuesday, boosting its share in training Iraqi security forces. The 26-member alliance will shift the bulk of its training mission in Baghdad’s heavily fortified international zone to the academy in the suburb of Rustamiya some 20 km (13 miles) south. Rustamiya was due to be operational around the start of 2005 but suffered from shortfalls in staff and funds.

**Ministry of Defense Training**

By the summer of 2005, CMATT had all of the advisors it was authorized, and was broadening its missions to help the Iraqis make the eventual transfer to Iraqi funding, and deal with issues like plans, providing intelligence, and add the necessary sustainment and support capabilities. Ministry of Defense Forces received both general and specialized training: Iraqi Army recruits underwent four weeks of cadre training and eight weeks of basic training.

The MNF-I summarized this progress as follows in July 2005.\(^\text{133}\)

Training for the individual soldier is divided into two areas: training for new recruits and training for former soldiers. Training for new recruits takes a total of nine weeks and has usually been conducted at the Iraqi Training Brigade (ITB) in Kirkush. Training for former soldiers lasts three to four weeks and has usually been conducted in divisional locations with graduates generally being assigned to the division that trains them. All personnel receive standard infantry-style training; selected soldiers receive specialized training in Army Military Occupational Specialties, such as Signal, Administration, Supply, Armor, Transport, Maintenance and Military Police.

Membership in the Iraqi Special Forces Brigade requires additional training. All Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) soldiers undergo a three-week Assessment and Selection course. Iraqi Counter Terrorist Forces (ICTF) soldiers receive 12 weeks of training in Jordan on Close Quarters Battle (CQB), Planning, and Leadership before they conduct Direct Action missions. ISOF soldiers undergo rigorous training emphasizing small unit tactics, counterterrorism, and unit self-reliance. Improved qualification and vetting standards minimize absenteeism and the risk of insurgent infiltration. The Brigade’s chain of command and officer cadre are assessed as being very effective. ISOF elements have been conducting operations for the past year. They have played crucial roles in major combat operations along side of, and sometimes independently of, Coalition forces.

A small number of Army personnel attend advanced training with NATO and U.S. Army schools.

MNF-I has also implemented, in partnership with the MOD, a program to embed Military Transition Teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. These teams provide Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to MNC-I identifying areas of progress and shortcomings, ultimately leading to those individual units being ready to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. These assessments take into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units’ operational readiness focused on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership.

It is useful to place these readiness assessments in perspective. The first Iraqi Army infantry battalions finished basic training in early 2004 and were immediately required in combat without complete equipment. They had inadequate time to develop unit cohesiveness, staff proficiency, and a leadership chain of command that is fundamental to a military unit. Ministry of Defense forces did not perform well in Fallujah—several battalions collapsed. Absent-without-leave (AWOL) rates among regular army units were in double digits and remained so for the rest of the year.
Although such problems have not been entirely solved, they have been addressed in large measure because of the ability to put to good use the security sector funding from the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund (IRRF) as provided for by Public Law 108-106. Equipment shortages have been reduced as equipment procured with U.S.-funded contracts began to flow into Iraq during mid-to-late 2004.

The Iraqi Intervention Force received the same training as the Iraqi Army, with an additional five weeks of Urban Operations training. Former soldiers who sought enlistment in the army of IIF underwent three weeks of Direct Replacement Training, followed by unit training. The Iraqi National Guard (ING) had previously been trained largely by the major subordinate commands (MSC) and the training of the ING varied by unit, but now was being integrated into the army training program.\textsuperscript{134}

The Iraqi Special Operations Force was divided into the Commando Battalion and the Counter Terrorist Task Force. The Commando Battalion was trained in small unit tactics and experiences other training similar to US Rangers’. This training was administered by US Special Forces and included advanced training in facilities like “shoot rooms.” The Counter Terrorist Task Force was specially selected and assessed and then subjected to a 13 week Special Operator Course. Air Force training varied by specialty anywhere from 1-6 months. Some of this training (the C-130 crews) was done in the US. The Navy recruits underwent eight weeks of basic training and were then relocated to Umm Qasr for specialized training.\textsuperscript{135}

MNSTC-I’s overall training concept had advanced to the point where it could stress “total force development” for the leadership of the Iraqi armed forces, with a clear career path for training both officers and NCO.

- Basic officer training took place in a 12 month program at the Iraqi Military Academy at Zahko, using a program Iraqi officers had adapted from the one British forces used at Sandhurst. Promotion led to training at a company commander’s course, which was to go into operation in October 2005. The next promotion meant attending a Junior Staff College that was to open in September, and then attendance at a Senior Staff College that was to open that same month. Promotion to top ranks meant attending a National Defense College, which was to open in 2006.

- The NCO training program was in development, but former Iraqi NCOs underwent a three week general training course, followed by 3-6 weeks of branch training. Promotion then involved a 4 week squad leader course, and a platoon sergeant course that was to open in August 2005. A 8-12 week first sergeant’s course was to open in 2006, followed my a 4-8 week warrant officer and sergeant major course at a new academy scheduled to open in March 2006.

These programs would take years to fully train the leadership of Iraqi forces, and many officers and NCOs would serve for sometime without such training, but the very fact such a program existed and had started to operate showed significant progress.

\textit{Ministry of Interior Training}

The vetting and training of the Iraqi Police Force (IPS) continued to lag behind that of the military, in part because of a slower start and more constant changes, and in part because of a lag of resources In spite of efforts to strengthen CPATT, it only had about 70 percent of the advisors it was authorized in June 2005, and had staffing problems in getting civilian and other experts in key areas like intelligence, budgeting, manpower, and plans.
A report by the Inspector General of the Department of State and of the Department of Defense, found the following continuing problems in the vetting and training effort as of end-April 2005. While such problems are scarcely unexpected given the heritage of Saddam Hussein and the mistakes made by the CPA, they provide an import set of insights in to the practical problems that occur in trying simultaneously create a force and fight a war, and the lessons that should be learned for the future.  

*Much of the planning and execution of the IPS training program has been done by Coalition military leaders without sufficient input from Iraqi officials. One high-ranking official in CPATT told the IG Team that “. . . until recently, Iraqi views were given absolutely no consideration. They (the Iraqis) still do not have a deciding vote.” Another stated, “We are not learning our lessons. We still develop great ideas and plans, and then lay them on Iraqis.”*

*During the time of the CPA, such an approach was both inevitable and, perhaps, appropriate. In the wake of the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, no Iraqi policy makers were in a position to make authoritative decisions.*

...Overall, there is little consensus on how to train Iraqi police. One exception is the universal agreement that the eight weeks devoted to the basic course is insufficient time to produce a capable policeman. Thus, there is tacit consensus that the training program to date has not created an effective IPS. (There is no consensus on how long a time would be required to achieve the desired results.)

*...The eight-week training course yields a maximum 320 hours of training time. To accommodate an increase in the hours spent on counter-insurgency training and self-defense skills without increasing overall course length, some classroom subjects were eliminated, while other subjects were reduced. Courses on democratic policing principles are critically important to the mission and should not be eliminated or reduced.*

*Currently, the basic course does not include night training. As the Coalition adapts its training plan to deal with the insurgency, it must prepare the IPS to conduct operations in the dark. The enemy is using the cover of darkness to plant improvised explosive devices and conduct other night time operations. Experts agree that police tactics, patrolling, and intelligence gathering activities during day light hours are markedly different than the tactics employed at night.*

The Team observed a lack of discipline among the basic recruits at several of the training sites. This was not the case at those facilities conducting specialized training for the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) and the Public Order Brigades (POB). As practiced in the specialized training programs, the use of properly trained Iraqi drill instructors would facilitate discipline and help to create a sense of esprit-de-corps among the cadets. While it is recognized that Iraqis are family and tribal oriented, the training programs must foster a sense of esprit-de-corps and teach teamwork.

*...As this assessment was being conducted, MNSTC–I and CPATT leaders were planning to lengthen the basic training course to 10 weeks... At the outset of the CPA effort to build IPS capacity, the assumption—even to some extent, the reality—was that training could be molded within a rapidly stabilizing political and security environment. The unexpected virulence and scope of subsequent terrorism and insurgency induced changes in the program, but such modifications have lagged the ‘street reality’ in Iraq.*

Adjustments in the training course have been and are being made. During this assessment, the JIPTC staff completed a CPATT-directed revision of the basic curriculum to include more ‘hands on,’ self-protection exercises. Other IPS in-country academies are adopting these changes. IP personnel and MOI officials strongly support the adjustments and the shift in emphasis.

*...trainees allegedly have been selected more on a basis of favoritism than on capability or potential.*

*...In the Baghdad area, applicants learn of recruitment via word of mouth. In light of the relatively good pay prospects, this simple system attracts more than enough applicants. Many simply show up at police stations or at the Baghdad Police College (BPC). The IG Team observed recruiting*
and selection (a sequentially seamless process) at the BPC. After passing through elemental
security screening, aspirants are admitted into the walled facility on a first-come, first-served
basis. If, as frequently is the case, more show up than can be processed on a given day, identifying
data is taken on those who are turned away. They are given numbers (again, in order of their place
in the line) and told when to return to be among those first admitted.

Once admitted to the facility, the process is very basic. On entry into a classroom setting, each
applicant is given an identifying number that corresponds to his or her file. The first step is a timed
written test, designed and administered by an American contractor. Iraqis proctor the test. Results
are machine graded in the presence of an IPS official. Since responding to questions involves
understanding the written material, the test presumably establishes basic literacy of the person
being examined. Applicants who do not achieve the minimal threshold score are called forward by
number, courteously escorted off the premises, and dismissed.

A second stage in the process consists of an interview and physical examination. At BPC, the
processing observed by the IG Team covered all of the minimum standards prescribed by the
CPA.

The physical exam appears especially cursory. At the time of the IG Team’s observation, most
applicants appeared to be in their late teens to early 20’s and fully functional without any physical
handicaps. However, a physician stated he did not have sufficient time to complete a thorough
medical examination of so many applicants in such a short time (70 students on the day in
question). Consequently, the examination consisted of completing a medical history questionnaire,
checking applicants’ eyes for squinting, and verifying a steady pulse. The doctor then pronounced
the applicant fit or unfit. There was no testing to determine physical stamina, dental review, or
body checks for even readily detectable identification marks such as scars or tattoos. The doctor
also told the IG Team that a considerable number of students appeared to suffer some form of
mental problems, hard to diagnose during the interview process. Elsewhere in the country, MSCs
recruit and select candidates to fill available training slots as directed in a monthly “fragmentary
order” (FRAGO). The MSCs use various recruiting tools including recommendations from the
command’s recruiting unit, IPLOs, serving IPS personnel, and from other reliable sources in a
given community. These Coalition recruiters are encouraged to accept all recruits who are
sponsored by local officials.

Despite the written test, attrition statistics show that illiterates make it into basic training. Less
frequent are cases of those with easily detectable physical or mental impairment. Some cadets
clearly are older than the established age limits…Occasionally, trainees are separated when
information is revealed about past criminal behavior or allegations of involvement with the
insurgency. Other common causes for dismissal from training are infractions of discipline, illness
or inability to adjust (normally homesickness). The team was advised at JIPTC that a surprising
number of students arrive with drugs that are confiscated during in-processing. These instances
support a widely shared perception that screening of IP candidates is at best superficial, sometimes
inconsistent.

To date, all those going to JIPTC for basic training have been recruited and selected by the MSCs.
Even though the processes used by the MSCs theoretically are the same as those used by the Iraqi
recruiters, the MOI apparently does not have a sense of commitment to those trainees who enter
training via the MSC route.

… Many police chiefs and their deputies are accustomed to the IPS culture that prevailed during
the Saddam Hussein era. Old habits and methods (e.g., reliance on forced confessions, taking the
initiative only when directed, and rigid delineation of responsibilities) work against effective and
efficient policing.

The need for attention to these aspects is self-evident. In instances where good leadership is
present (often provided by Coalition military personnel or International Police Liaison Officers
(IPLOs), IPs perform satisfactorily and stand their ground in the face of attacks. The absence of
such leaders correlates closely with instances in which IP stations have been overrun, often with
shocking casualties among ill-prepared and ill-led policemen.
Senior IP officers interviewed by the IG Team were outspoken in identifying insufficient numbers (and quality) of officers as a major weakness within the IPS. They urged restoration of the former ‘police college’ system, preferably with a three-year curriculum, such as that at the Baghdad Police College (BPC) that predated the Saddam Hussein era. MNSTC–I and CPATT are moving ahead to restart officer training at the BPC, although present plans are for a six-month course rather than the more extended course favored by the Iraqis. In a free-form discussion with the Chargé d’Affaires, IPLOs were equally vocal in identifying leadership development as a major weakness in the present training program.

…Critics within CPATT and among some instructors assert that the MOI’s selection of Candidates (for advanced training) appears to be based more on cronyism and loyalties than on merit. For some attendees, the courses are regarded as a reward, not as a serious professional commitment. The IPS major general at Adnan Palace is among those who urge incorporation of more rigorous testing as courses progress. He believes that is the only way to get and keep the students’ attention.

…Inducting criminals into the IPS is a continual concern. Even more troubling is infiltration by intending terrorists or insurgents. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that such persons indeed are among the ranks of the IPS. This underscores the need for the most rigorous possible review of each applicant’s records. To gain an understanding of the vetting process, the IG Team met with Iraqi police cadets and instructors, International Police Trainers (IPT) at various police training academies, officials of the MOI and Coalition authorities. All Iraqis interviewed suggested that vetting performed by Coalition forces is not as thorough as what could be done by the MOI. The IG Team was told that, especially early in 2003, only a cursory background check, if even that, was conducted before policemen were trained or entered the force.

In terms of policy, several IPS interviewees expressed reservations about aspects of Coalition vetting. For example, they contended that no Iraqi would recruit or employ a candidate who had tattoos. In their culture body tattoos are indicative of a person who has a criminal record or at least a propensity to violate societal norms. Likewise, the longer-term prospects for female members of the IP are problematic. In some areas, notably in Kurdistan, women are accepted members in both the police and military. In most other regions, it is likely that female IPs will be relegated to supporting roles, at best as administrative staff.

It is widely contended that the vetting process is stymied by the lack or inaccessibility of personnel or police records. As with recruiting and selection of trainees, vetting is especially difficult if carried out by non-Iraqis. Indeed, the Coalition’s ability to conduct thorough background checks on IPS personnel is severely limited. Use of polygraph techniques is impracticable, given the numbers of candidates to be processed. Effective communications across language and cultural barriers is an issue too.

…The problem starts with a relative shortage of mid-level leaders and managers. Many police chiefs and their deputies are accustomed to the IPS culture that prevailed during the Saddam Hussein era. Old habits and methods (e.g., reliance on forced confessions, taking the initiative only when directed, and rigid delineation of responsibilities) work against effective and efficient policing.

The need for attention to these aspects is self-evident. In instances where good leadership is present (often provided by Coalition military personnel or International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs), IPs perform satisfactorily and stand their ground in the face of attacks. The absence of such leaders correlates closely with instances in which IP stations have been overrun, often with shocking casualties among ill-prepared and ill-led policemen.

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Chargé d’Affaires, IPLOs were equally vocal in identifying leadership development as a major weakness in the present training program.

These comments must be kept in perspective. The report also found that real progress was being made, that Iraqi forces were becoming more effective, and that the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior was taking over more and more of the burden of planning and managing the development and training of the Iraqi police and security services. It also found that the CPATT was now strong enough to have a major impact, and was working closely with the new Minister of the Interior and his staff.

The training program had reached the point where large numbers of Ministry of the Interior forces now had serious training. While the program still had defects, Iraqi Police Service did give new eight weeks of serious training at the Police Academy, and the program involved significant counterinsurgency training. Those officers who served and continue to serve received specialized training and sustainment training. Advanced police training took place at the Adnan Palace Complex, where specialized police training had been taking place since mid-2004, and is administered by a wide range of US law enforcement agencies.

There were over 500 individuals from the Coalition training Iraqi police officers. A little less than half of these trainers worked from the JIPTC in Amman, Jordan, while the rest operated directly in Iraq. Civil Intervention Force recruits underwent five weeks of specialized training, while the Special Police Commandos got three weeks of specialized training.

Moreover, as the report by the Inspector General notes, a major effort was underway to train those Iraqi police officers with past service that had been retained by the new government:137

One of the challenges of building a viable police force was to retain the veteran policemen who served during the Saddam Hussein era. This group must be retrained with the objective of instilling modern police techniques, respect for human rights, and democratic policing principles. To achieve this goal, CPATT implemented an in-service training program called the Transition Integration Program (TIP). The program also incorporates attention to applicable Iraqi criminal law and procedures to be observed for arrest and detention. Additionally, the TIP was designed to accomplish several other key tasks:

- Identify existing IPS personnel who were academically, intellectually, or morally unsuitable;
- Identify potential leaders within the IPS; and
- Identify potential IPS instructors and field training officers.

TIP training takes place at Coalition forward operating bases (FOBs) and at some of the regional academies. The course is three weeks long and covers 126 hours of instruction. Course subjects include: (1) the philosophy and role of the IPS, (2) prohibitions against torture, (3) police ethics and values, and (4) the code of conduct. About one third of the course time is devoted to firearms instruction on 9mm and AK–47 weaponry.

As of late April this year, 35,526 IPS veterans had completed the TIP program. The program, however, is not without its critics. For example, the Chief of Police at al-Hilla would like to replace the three week TIP course with a longer in-service course that would encompass map reading, hostage rescue, night tactics, etc. As in the case of basic training, the argument is for hands-on training as opposed to the more theoretical approach of the present TIP program.

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… the TIP program is a worthwhile and value-added endeavor. By definition, TIP training is for in-service IPs, and satisfies one of the MOI’s objectives. Many policemen who have attended the course appear to be well motivated and dedicated to the concept of a rule of law regime at the service of Iraqi citizens. The TIP training imparts skills directly relevant to those objectives…

Members of the Emergency Response Unit got eight weeks of specialized training with follow-on mentoring by Coalition advisors. The recruits for the Department of Border Enforcement received four weeks training at the Academy along with specialized training. The Highway Patrol officers underwent three weeks of TIP training and eight weeks of Academy training. Lastly, the Bureau of Dignitary Protection’s training program consisted of three weeks of initial training, 2-3 weeks of advanced training, and final follow-on mentoring by US contractors and Navy SEALs.\textsuperscript{138}

Figure 25 shows the overall pattern of these efforts as of the end of May 2005. There is no doubt that they did not approach the level of training in Western security and police forces, that many training programs would have been longer if the police was not under so much pressure from the insurgency, and that gaps still remained in the effort. At the same time, it is clear that CPATT had made massive progress since the spring of 2004 and done so in the face of considerable obstacles, and many of the problems the Inspector General of the Department of State and of the Department of Defense had found in April 2005 were already being addressed at that time, and substantial further improvement had been made by the summer of 2005.\textsuperscript{139}

The MNF-I summarized the level of police and security force vetting and training as follows in late July,\textsuperscript{140}

Training – of all forces, but especially police forces – undergoes constant analysis in light of operational experience. The course length and curriculum of the Transition Integration Program has been standardized in all of the Iraqi police academies. The length of basic training for police recruits has been increased by 25 percent by adding two weeks of regional training on threats and other conditions in the new policeman’s area of responsibility. Training at all police schools is now much more likely to be led by an Iraqi and to be “hands on” training instead of simple academic instruction.

…Some 62,000 trained police were on duty as of late June 2005. To date, over 35,000 police recruits have completed the 8-week basic police classroom training, and more than 35,500 veteran police have received the 3-week Transition Integration Program (TIP) training. Over 13,500 police personnel have completed specialized training, such as fingerprinting, explosive ordnance disposal, investigations, and counterterrorism. New police academy graduates do not receive the originally envisioned field training by International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) due to the current security situation, so new police receive informal mentoring from veteran Iraqi police.

Police are recruited through a combination of methods depending on the stability of the province in which they live. In stable provinces, recruiting is done by MOI, community leaders, IPLOs, and Multinational Force Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). In areas where insurgents are more active, the MSCs play a larger role in recruitment. The Iraqi police advertise for recruits via radio, posters, police stations, and employment centers. Most recruiting is done from the local population, with the goal of matching the ethnic composition of the local area; however, all police must commit to serving anywhere in the nation if necessary.

Police recruits undergo a physical fitness test, medical examination and background check; increasingly, more sophisticated vetting tools are being developed and employed. Vetting is performed by the MSCs and, on a more limited basis, by an assessment tool developed by an MNSTC-I contractor that screens for literacy, cognitive, and suitability characteristics.

MSCs have increasingly engaged Iraqi Police Service Chiefs in the review of the police candidate.
rosters. The MOI and MNSTC-I’s Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) are working closely together to conduct training and deploy IPS in-processing teams (vetting teams). These in-processing teams will deploy to Al Kut, Basrah, Al Hillah, and Mosul police academies. This process should be complete by November 2005, and thereafter police candidates will be vetted by MOI. The MOI Qualifying Committee has received information on 120,000 MOI employees, and a final screening process has been completed on 90,000 of them. The work of the Qualifying Committee to weed out “ghost employees” (who are being paid but not working) and other police who do not meet minimal standards is ongoing.

The rate of absenteeism, AWOL, attrition, and desertion in the IPS varies by province. Most police units have experienced a decrease in absenteeism as the number of trained police has increased. The exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. Effectiveness of the Iraqi police officer cadres and the chain of command varies by province and the experience level of the chain of command. The P3 teams are focusing their efforts on developing capability at the provincial police headquarters and MOI in a top-down approach.

**Embedded Advisory Teams: The Importance of the Luck Mission**

A major advance in training took place in Iraq's forces once they were deployed. The US began to embed large training teams in each Iraqi unit until it demonstrated it could stand on its own. This reform seems to have been at least partly a result of the review of US strategy and operations in Iraq made by retired four-star General Gary Luck had made in January 2005.

The Department of Defense stated at the time that the purpose of General Luck’s mission was "to provide some assessment of how we're doing" in training and fielding Iraqi security units. Other reports have suggested that Luck’s mandate may have been far more wide-ranging, extending to an evaluation of the entire US strategy in Iraq. Other reports indicate that by late 2004, the US was also seeking to find some way to largely extract US forces from the counterinsurgency mission by the end of 2005 or early 2006, but the Defense Department has denied this.

In her Senate confirmation testimony, Condoleezza Rice described General Luck’s mission and the progress of Iraqi security forces as follows:

> We think that, among those people, there clearly continue to be questions about on-duty time, that is, people who don’t report for duty. And so this is being looked at. We are trying to provide for some of these units mentors who can help, trying to provide leadership from the Iraqis themselves that can help these people. But this is the reason Gary Luck has gone out, at Secretary Rumsfeld’s direction, to take a hard look at the training program to see what General Petraeus…what he’s been able to achieve; to work with the Iraqis to address some of these problems of leadership and morale and desertion in the armed forces and in the police forces; and to look at some of the equipping of the police forces.

The full results of the Luck mission have not been made public. Reports and interviews indicate, however, that Gen. Luck was satisfied with the progress Lt. Gen. Petraeus had made, and his report focused on providing teams of Coalition advisors to train and fight with new Iraqi units as they deployed. One unattributed defense official was quoted as saying, “Luck’s assessment in general is that he feels the commanders have a plan, Petraeus is having an impact, and these forces have a good crack at becoming more and more capable over time.”

At the same time, the Luck mission emphasized the need to go beyond formal training and equipment programs, and to put an Iraqi face on the security and military missions, and to embed US training elements in the new Iraqi forces to help them as they built up.
the leadership experience and unity integrity necessary to operate effectively on their own.

The result was a plan for utilizing embedded US troops as "advisors," as opposed to having entire US units jointly patrolling with Iraqi troops is likely to lower the US profile and quell a degree of the anti-American sentiment. At the same time, such advisers would have the ability to call for US air support and backup forces and would have access to US intelligence.

An early report on the Luck mission in the New York Times summarized its conclusions as follows:

Luck… endorses a plan by American commanders in Iraq to shift the military’s main mission after the Jan. 30 elections from fighting the insurgency to training Iraq’s military and police forces to take over those security and combat duties and become more self-reliant, eventually allowing American forces to withdraw…The aim would be to double or even triple the number of trainers now at work with Iraqi security forces, up to as many as 8,000 or 10,000, though General Luck has not mentioned a specific number. A senior defense official who has been briefed on General Luck’s initial conclusions and recommendations said the plan would draw on a mix of officers and senior enlisted troops from Army and Marine units already in Iraq.

Many commanders say that providing more trainers is meant to bolster the Iraqi will to fight, help train officers who would lead, curb desertion and provide Iraqi forces with the confidence that American units would back them up - in some cases fighting alongside them if needed, military and Pentagon officials said. Two American advisers have died fighting with Iraqi units. But the training would follow a step-by-step approach that would take months if not years, proceeding at different paces in different parts of the country, depending on the troops’ performance. American forces would work closely with Iraqis in the most dangerous parts of the country, but would still take the lead combat role there.

The development of Iraqi forces has since reflected a major effort to provide such training and in-unit or "embedded" US cadres. Gen. John Abizaid indicated in an interview in late January 2005 that he felt that close relationships between US forces and indigenous troops made efforts in Afghanistan more successful than those in Iraq. He commented that embedded advisers could foster a similar relationship, likely improving efforts to strengthen Iraq forces.

The program did begin awkwardly. The Iraqis were not consulted when MNF-I and MNSTC-I came up with advisory teams and requested forces in December and January. When they did discuss the program with the Iraqi Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defense accepted the program, but the Minister of the Interior initially balked. It took some persuasion to get him to agree to a test case with four police stations.

One problem was finding enough advisors. An Army Reserve Unit from Rochester, New York, the 98th Training Division, had been the main body from which advisers have been drawn. Reportedly, as of February 24, 2005, there were 45 training teams assisting Iraqi units and advising their leaders. The actual quality of the training, however, has differed significantly by trainer and adviser. According to some reports, Iraqi units trained by the Vinnell Corporation and the US National Guard have been less effective than forces trained by the US Army Special Forces. However, US sources reported in mid-April 2005, that there already were some 2,000 US military advisors working directly with Iraqi forces.
In March 2005, US officials were still engaged in determining the number of embedded American advisers needed to improve Iraqi leadership and overall capabilities. General Abizaid stated that that decision lay with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Referring to the numbers of advisers needed in Iraq, Abizaid commented, “We’re trying to figure out how much augmentation will be required.”

Since that time, however, the number of advisors has steadily increased, and this has led to changes in the way Coalition manages the advisory effort. In March 2005, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I, the operational HQs under Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)) became responsible for all operations, and all Iraqi Army units were placed under their tactical control. In addition, the Coalition transition (advisory) teams that worked with those units were almost all placed under Corps control as well. This was always the case with former ING units, but now the transition teams in regular army and intervention force units were largely placed under the control of Corps.

The MNSTC-I essentially became an assistant, albeit a very major one, to the Iraqi Joint HQs and Ministry of Defense for fulfilling the role of “force provider.” Its function became to recruit, train, equip, base, and sustain. As a result, it did not get operational reports on the units once they have completed their training and start to conduct operations, or closely track when and where they are assuming battle space. That was MNC-I’s responsibility. It did receive information from MNC-I on their manning, equipment, and basing status in order to assist the JHQ in addressing the needs of these units.

MNF-I and MNSTC-I have worked together with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the interior to implement the program at all levels of Iraqi force development. They use a system where MNSTC-I shapes the training effort and creation of new unit elements and then transfers them to MNF-I operational command. One the units become active they get embedded Coalition advisory teams as they actually become operational that stay until the unit demonstrates it has effective leadership and unit cohesion in actually performing its mission. The desired training levels before and at the time of this transition are shown in Figure 26.

By the early summer of 2005, virtually all Iraqi army units and advanced MoI units had at least 10-man teams of Coalition advisors. There were still serious shortages in the number of advisors assigned to support units and headquarters units, and to Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior officials at every level down, but combat and major support units not only had the training teams they needed, but a partner unit of Coalition forces to work with until they were capable of independent operations.

New Iraqi units were being deployed into the field with stronger cadres of Coalition advisors, including teams that average at least ten men per battalion, brigade and division headquarters, special force elements, and combat support, service support, and logistic units. Such advisory teams stay until such units demonstrate they have the leadership and committed manpower to operate on their own.

Military commanders called this a development “a sea change in methods.” It builds on the lessons learned in Afghanistan and addresses the problems caused by the lack of mid-level Iraqi leadership in all elements of Iraq’s forces, the lack of a history of unit integrity
and morale, and the lack of experience at all levels in creating an effective team and fighting force.¹⁵³

In contrast, efforts to provide such teams for regular police force units lagged in spite of major efforts by CPATT, largely due to a lack of resources and problems in support from agencies in the US like the Department of Homeland Security, but many regular police units either had such teams or were acquiring them. Once again, the report by the Inspector General of the State Department and Inspector General of the Department of Defense provide important insights into the level of progress in April 2005 that are supported by interviews with CPATT advisors and others who served in Iraq:

A strong mentoring program is integral to the concept of training Iraqi police. Initially, this was to be the function of IPLO field training officers, each working closely with a small number of policemen who had received basic training. This concept would mirror a model that worked satisfactorily in Bosnia and Kosovo. INL contracted with DynCorp to provide the IPLOs. The first 24-member contingent arrived in Iraq during November 2003. Most IPLOs are retired policemen. By March 2005, this number had risen to about 500. INL has proposed funding for an additional 400 IPLOs. In actuality, the mentoring program in Iraq has not materialized as planned. The security situation is so precarious that any post-training mentoring is, at best, intermittent. There have been periods during which the IPLOs were unable to move beyond the confines of their quarters. Consequently, IPLO interaction with Iraqi policemen is largely with instructors/supervisors at the BPC and regional academies or during periodic visits to police stations.

To accomplish the latter, the IPLOs must rely on Coalition military forces for transportation and security. The military police (MP), who provide that logistical assistance, act as additional mentors once on site. As the security situation has evolved, so has the work of the IPLOs. IPLOs now devote much of their time and attention to assessing police stations and units. There, the IPLOs gather data on equipment status and availability, discipline problems, and reports of incidents involving the IPS. This is documented in Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMR), which are derived from the Facility Assessment Forms prepared by MPs and IPLOs. In theory, this information will enable the MOI to more effectively manage both personnel and material resources of the IPS.

Lines of authority and responsibility for mentoring are not well defined. As the contract administrator, INL has administrative responsibility for the IPLO program. This includes providing life support (e.g., food and lodging, basic security, etc.). CPATT provides operational control. However, Coalition military officials tend to rely on MPs for the mentoring function. Consequently, the IPLOs are sometimes underutilized.¹⁵⁴

The problems involved in embedding sufficient advisors in the police are illustrated by the fact the number of IPLOs assigned by districted to each region as of May 1, 2005. Region I - Baghdad (98), Region II – Tikrit (94), Region III – Mosul (30), Region IV – Ramadi (34), Region V – Babylon (43), Region VI – Basrah (24), with the CPATT command staff (9), National Assets Bureau (75), Administrative Bureau (26) and various other areas (63). It is, however, important to note that the IPLOs ran even higher risks that the advisors embedded in regular Iraqi Army and security units. For example, on March 9, 2005, a massive suicide truck bomb targeted the al-Sadeer Hotel in Baghdad. Thirty-five IPLOs were injured; the most serious casualty with the loss of an eye.¹⁵⁵

It is unclear how much progress had been made by the summer of 2005, but the Department of Defense described the process in these areas as follows in late July 2005:¹⁵⁶

Police Partnership Program (P3) teams are partnered at the provincial levels with the police to help
identify areas of progress and shortcomings to determine when these forces will be able to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. In lieu of the TRA, police partnership assessments look at factors that are more tailored to the tasks of a police force. More than half of provincial police headquarters currently are assessed to have control in their province.

This focus on embedding advisory cadres to develop effective leadership and unit integrity formal training is a key lesson of the MNF-I and MNSTC-I effort. It reflects an underlying reality of military history that transcends cultures and the conditions of particular wars. Soldiers, security personnel, and police are not cars or transistor radios. They cannot be turned out of training centers like a product. They must either be transitioned into effective and proven units, or transitioned into some structure that can substitute for that leadership and experience.

Regardless of the quality of training and equipment, and the political and ideological conditions shaping a war, men who are thrust into combat or high risk operations only function well if they have proven leaders they feel that they can trust. Their primary motivation also ultimately comes to be how they feel about the other men in their units, how important the approval of their peers is in crisis and combat, and how confident they are that their unit will do everything possible to support and protect them.
**Figure 23**

**MNSTC-I Training Program for Iraqi Forces by Force Element**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
<td>Former Academy Graduates: 3 Week Transition Integration Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Recruits: 8 Week Academy; 2 Week Integration Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mid-Careers: Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order and Mechanized Police</td>
<td>5 Week Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commandos</td>
<td>3 Week Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>4 Week Basic; 4 Week Advanced Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>4 Week Academy and Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>3 Week TIP Training, and 8 Week Academy Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>3 Week Initial Training, 2-3 Week Advanced Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow-on Mentoring by US Contractors and Navy SEALs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Regular Army</td>
<td>Cadre: 4 Weeks; Basic &amp; Small Unit Training: 8 Weeks, Additional Skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Collective Training varies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Guard</td>
<td>Basic Training: 3 Weeks; Collective Training: 4 Weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Intervention Force</td>
<td>Cadre: 4 Weeks; Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Operations Training: 5 Weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Force</td>
<td>Direct Recruit Replacement Training: 3 weeks for former soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Special Ops Force</td>
<td>Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit Tactics and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commando Battalion</td>
<td>Ranger-type training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Terrorist Task Force</td>
<td>13-week Special Operator Course</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Duration/Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Varies by specialty: 1-6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>8 Week Basic Followed by Specialized Training at Umm Qasr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 24**

Specialty Training Courses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Development and Education</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff College Instructors</td>
<td>24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Academy Graduates</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Cadets</td>
<td>296*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracting Capacity Course</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Support Courses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combat Service Support Courses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomb Disposal</td>
<td>192*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Officer</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor Training</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table of Police Training Courses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Police Course (Thru 31 May)</th>
<th>Total Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Criminal Investigation</td>
<td>1,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Controls</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Crimes and Kidnapping</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior, Mid-Level, and Senior Management and Leadership</td>
<td>937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement and Criminal Intelligence</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews and Interrogations</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Hazard Awareness and Post Blast Investigation</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interrogation Techniques</td>
<td>22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Terrorism Investigations</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Incident Management and Incident Command System</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAT (13 of 20 Teams)</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignitary Protection, Motorcade Escorts, and Site Security</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In Training **OJT

Source: MNSTC-I, June 2005

Figure 25
Training at Police Academies as of 5/29/05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8-Week Academies</th>
<th>Total Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad Police College</td>
<td>12,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Int’l Police Training Center</td>
<td>17,138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Total Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sula\yaniyah</td>
<td>1,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kut</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Asad</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkuk</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hillah</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basrah</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>2,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,987</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIP Academies</th>
<th>Total Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MND-Baghdad (Karada)</td>
<td>1,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-CS (Karbala/Babil/Al Hillah/Babylon)</td>
<td>6,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-SE (Basrah/Diwaniyah)</td>
<td>7,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-W (Al Quadrasiyiah)</td>
<td>4,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-W</td>
<td>4,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MND-CN (Kirkuk/Tikrit/Al Sulaymaniyah)</td>
<td>11,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,802</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 26**

Transition Team Training Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONUS</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Taji</th>
<th>Camp Victory</th>
<th>Link-up with MSCs &amp; Iraqi Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>10-45 days + travel</strong></td>
<td><strong>10 days + travel</strong></td>
<td><strong>10 days</strong></td>
<td><strong>2-5 days</strong></td>
<td>First 24 Hours:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Tasks:</th>
<th>Live-Fire Training:</th>
<th>General Officer and senior Iraqi briefings</th>
<th>Warlock installation and training</th>
<th>Specific tactical situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Commo</td>
<td>Convoy TCP/ECP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV Combat Lifesaver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Building</td>
<td>Individual Equipment Issue</td>
<td>Situation briefings</td>
<td>Make-up training</td>
<td>Security measures and support procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi METL Tasks:</td>
<td>Acclimatization</td>
<td>Interaction with Iraqi units and Transition Teams in the field</td>
<td>Team planning &amp; prep</td>
<td>Status of Iraqi unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOUT ECP/TCP</td>
<td>Cultural Orientation</td>
<td>Linkup with sponsors, interpreters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Orientation</td>
<td>Cultural Orientation</td>
<td>Cultural Orientation</td>
<td>Draw, test, prepare team equipment</td>
<td>First week: Joint training plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Force Developments**

Many of the more detailed aspects of Iraqi force development also showed an increased rate of progress. The MNSTC-I reported on the status of Iraqi force developments as of March 12, 2005 noted that,

> On 1 July 2004, for example, there was one "deployable" or "national" battalion available to the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense (i.e., a unit that could be moved to a trouble spot anywhere in the country). Now there are 52 such battalions and 96 battalions conducting operations in total, in addition to regular police, border guards, and other security force elements. All told, there are more than 142,000 trained and equipped Iraqi police, soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

A large portion of these 52 battalions did consist of National Guard units that had been merged into the Army in January, and which had originally been formed for the local mission of supporting the police within a given province. These units now had a national mission as part of the army and the early results were mixed. When National Guard units had previously told they were going to Fallujah in November 2004, AWOL rates then climbed to 70 percent in some units.  

Nevertheless, the increase in trained and equipped manpower continued at a rapid rate throughout the rest of the spring and summer. By the end of July 2005, the number had risen to 172,300: With 78,500 military and 93,800 police and security forces. The military now included 77,700 Army, 100 Air Force, and 700 Navy. The regular police and highway patrol totaled 63,500, and the security forces totaled 30,300.

**Ongoing Force Developments**

The MNC submitted a report to the UN on April 10, 2005, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1546. This report provided data submitted by MNSTC-I as of May 14, 2005. Coupled to other reports from the Iraqi government MNSTC-I, Iraqi force developments had reached the following status as of early August 2005:

- **Operations:**
  
  - **Iraq was now operating its own joint command centers, and was bringing modern computerized operations centers into operation in areas like Baghdad.** The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior developed and operated a joint command center during Operation Lightning.

- **Ministry of Defense:**

  - **Command and staff structure:** Iraqi forces now operated a full command and staff structure. The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces was a four star officer, General Babakir. He had a three star deputy: Lt. General Abadi. There were three joint commands: Training Command, Support Command, and Special Operations Command, headed by Brigadier General Najh Hashim. There were also three single service commands: Army Commander (Lt. General Abdul Qadr), Navy Commander (Commander Jawad), and Air Force Commander (Major General Kamal). The Joint staff include Personnel (M1), Intelligence (M2), Operations (M3) Logistics (M4), Plans (M5), Communications (M6), Training (M7), and Comptroller (M8). There were two major Staff divisions: Staff Judge Advocate and Surgeon General.

    - **The Iraqi Ground Forces Headquarters** was opened in a ribbon-cutting ceremony in Baghdad on May 15, 2005 by General Abdul Qadir Jassim, Iraqi Ground Forces commander.
Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Forces: With the incorporation of the Iraqi National Guard into the Army, the total number of battalions conducting operations was now 80. The Iraqi army had gone from one battalion in July 2004 to 27 battalions of infantry in January, which included nine special Iraqi Intervention Force battalions and three transportation battalions. The total rose to 37 battalions in June, with four more in formation. In addition, 43 National Guard battalions were being merged into the army, and these forces were undergoing a major upgrading in terms of vetting and retention, training, and equipment.

As is discussed in Figure 26, Iraqi military forces now had a detailed order of battle with clear force goals. The merger of the Army and National Guard had created a 10 division order of battle, and as is shown in this figure, overall manning of the combat elements of this force was now relatively high.

Creating a 10-division force: As is discussed in Figure 27, Iraqi military forces now had a detailed order of battle with clear force goals. The merger of the Army and National Guard had created a 10 division order of battle, and as is shown in this figure, overall manning of the combat elements of this force was now relatively high.

The final brigade of the three Division Regular Army graduated on April 20th, and brought the number of operational combat brigades to 99.

Iraq’s first mechanized battalion became operational in mid-January, along with a tank company and a transportation battalion; the remaining elements of a mechanized brigade were being trained and equipped by the summer. The 1st Mechanized battalion, 1st Iraqi Army Brigade began operations in the Abu Ghraib area south of Baghdad, and an Iraqi mechanized unit began joint duty with US armored forces in provided security for movement through insurgent areas, in late April 2005.

MNSTC-I was working to complete the 2nd mechanized infantry battalion of the 1st mechanized brigade, which was to be equipped with BMPs, by the summer of 2005. The rest of the armored division was projected to be trained and equipped by the end of 2005 and another mechanized division with wheeled armored vehicles was planned for 2006. Other units were acquiring light armored vehicles from the UAE, Jordan, Eastern Europe, and other services. The equipment confiscated from the MEK was being made available to Iraqi units, and some units were getting armor from the various equipment dumps left over from the war. Iraqi units had ceased to wait and had begun to improvise.

The Iraqi 7th Division was being readied for deployment in the West. It was being deployed because the locally recruited National Guard units would or could not deal with the insurgency. The end result has been to disband all of the existing units in Al Anbar, make the former Defenders of Baghdad into the 1st Brigade, and create two new brigades for a force designed to deal with the most hostile area in Iraq.

The Iraqi Intervention Force was becoming the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi army. It had been organized after the fighting in Fallujah and designed to defeat anti-Iraqi forces in Iraq with primary focus on urban areas, and to assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment in which MOI security forces can maintain law and order. It was organized as the 1st division and was ultimately to be comprised of nine infantry battalions and three armored battalions, organized into three brigades, and to acquire a full range of support units. Its armored forces had BMPs taken from MEK units, and were to acquire some 77 refurbished T-72s provided by Hungary. The division became operational in January, and had a total of 170 US advisors embedded by June.

Its forces negotiated the standard eight-week basic training all Iraqi Soldiers go through learning basic soldiering skills such as weapons, drill and ceremony, Soldier discipline, and physical training skills. After graduation, IIF battalions spent several weeks and months in intensive “military operations in urban terrain” follow-on training – otherwise
known as “MOUT” training. In this period, Soldiers worked through instruction in the art of street fighting and building clearing operations typical to anti-insurgent operations in cities and towns. Units worked in close coordination with other Iraqi Army battalions and were scheduled to a completely stood-up nine-battalion force during 2005.

- *Iraq’s Special Operations Forces included a Counter-Terrorist Force and a Commando Battalion*, each of which had conducted dozens of successful operations. The unit was formed based on a conversation between the Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and multinational force personnel to give the Iraqi Armed Forces a high-end strike force in its ongoing security mission against anti-Iraqi forces operating in the country.

- Special Forces soldiers were the army’s unconventional warfare experts, possessing a broad range of operational skills. The forces consisted of two trained battalions, including the 36th Commando Battalion – an infantry-type strike force – and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion. The force had now been involved in many operations throughout the country fighting anti-Iraqi forces with great distinction while continuing the stand-up effort of the unit. The force was to add a third “support” battalion to its ranks in the coming months.

- The Iraqi Special Operations Force – the Iraqi Armed Forces’ high-end strike force resembling U.S. Special Forces units – continued training and operations in the country with multinational force assistance. Training was conducted at an undisclosed location. “Selection” for the force began in the Iraqi National Guard and Iraqi army units already operating in the country, much like typical multinational Special Forces’ recruiting efforts in their own countries. Outstanding recruits successfully negotiating the vetting process, including exhaustive background checks, skill evaluations, and unit evaluations along with literacy, psychological, and physical tests, were run through various team-building and physical events meant to lean down the recruit pool. The selection process ran roughly 10 to 14 days.

- The Iraqi Special Forces underwent intense physical, land navigation, small-unit tactics, live-fire, unconventional warfare operations, direct action operations, airmobile operations, counterterrorism, survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training.

- *One Motorized Transport Regiment was already in service, and plans exist to create a Motorized Transport Regiment for each division*. This was part of an overall plan to fully staff divisional and brigade headquarters, add combat and service support units, and give Iraqi units the ability to operate independently in the field and end their dependence on base support and Coalition forces for such operations.

- *Other new forces completed their training and would be ready to assume full-time duty between the end of March and June 2005.*
  - Three more Iraqi Army battalions.
  - Several former Iraqi National Guard battalions.

- *Oil security battalions:* The Ministry of Defense was seeking to create 16 new infrastructures -- or oil security battalions -- with an authorized strength of 727 men each, the strength of other army battalions. These Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIB) were being created to defend pipelines and other oil infrastructure at the direction of Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi. They were a response to the fact that the oil infrastructure in the Kirkuk-Bayji area alone had been struck 14 times between March and June 2005.

  Four battalions already existed, but lacked manpower, training, and equipment. The others were to be formed by local/direct recruiting, and given suitable vehicles, AK-47s and light machine guns, GPS, night vision goggles, radios and other necessary equipment. Chalabi had approved a $35 million, 3-month plan to train the necessary
trainers, and equip the first four SIB battalions. Part of the plan was to bring the personnel into the military, but the $35 million did not cover the same equipment as the regular Army. The plan called for training the first 4 battalions trained starting in mid-July and going on through October, and to assess funding needs for the remaining battalions.

Iraq’s 600-man Navy operated with five 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels, and a naval infantry regiment that recently completed training. Boat crews learned the basics in seamanship before moving on to instruction in advanced seamanship, towing, gunnery, sea rescue, chart reading, navigation, anti-smuggling, operations, and rigid inflatable boat integration and small boat drill instruction. Training was put in the context of a democratically based maritime sea force.

Primary duties included protecting the country’s roughly 50-mile coastline from smuggling and foreign fighter infiltration operations as well as the port assets at Umm Qasr in Southern Iraq and oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The force patrolled out to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf with five 27-meter long Chinese-made patrol boats and various other support craft.

The force also included a land-based Coastal Defense Regiment resembling western-type “Marine” infantry forces with an active strength of 100 men and building up to a strength of 300. Land and sea based forces negotiate IAF eight-week basic training courses before moving on to follow-on training and sea training for the boat crews.

The US Department of Defense described the Iraqi Navy’s progress as follows in late July 2005:

The Iraqi Navy is currently executing operational missions that include border and waterway protection from smuggling and infiltration, and site protection of port and oil assets in the Persian Gulf. The force patrols out to the 12-mile international water boundary in the Persian Gulf using 27-meter patrol boats, rigid-hull inflatable boats, and other support vessels. The Iraqi Navy currently has approximately 500 trained sailors on duty. It is equipped with five Predator Class Patrol Boats (PB), 24 Fast Aluminum Boats (Duel Outboard Engines), 10 rigid-hull inflatable boats, and various small arms and night vision devices. The Iraqi Navy will further equip themselves with six Al Faw Class Patrol Boats (the first of which was delivered in July 2005) and two Off-Shore Support Vessels. With some exceptions, the responsibility for logistical support of the Iraqi Navy has been handed over to the Umm Qasr Base Support Unit (BSU). Maritime and Riverine Advisory Support Team (M&R AST) members provide advice and assistance to both the BSU and the Iraqi Navy Logistics Department in order to cultivate a cooperative working relationship. It is anticipated (based on progression along the CTF-58 assessment program) that the Iraqi Navy will assume point defense responsibilities of the oil terminals by September 30, 2005. Assumption of the waterside mission (the afloat defensive screen) is dependent on the acquisition and initial operational readiness of the six Al Faw class.

The Iraqi Navy Training Department currently conducts all of its own training, assisted by the M&R AST. All members of the Iraqi Navy received their initial training in Kirkush. Following basic training, they were trained on mission-focused technical skill sets: ship handling, marlin spike seamanship, navigation, engineering, weapons handling, small boat operations, shipboard damage control, etc.

In June, the Iraqi Navy began interoperability training with their Predator patrol boats and an amphibious transport ship. The Iraqi Navy signed the Iraqi Navy Transition Roadmap on the USS Normandy. The roadmap lays out plans to develop

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the Iraqi Navy to defend its coastal waters, to give it the capability to perform integrated sea operations, shore support, boarding-and-search operations, point-of-defense of oil terminals, and an overall command and sustainment program.

- *Iraq’s Air Force had three operational squadrons.* One additional squadron was stood up in late January-early February. It had nine reconnaissance aircraft, a helicopter squadron, and three C-130 transport aircraft.

All Iraqi Air Force pilots and maintenance personnel negotiated comprehensive one to four-month “conversion courses” largely comprised of familiarization instruction. The training brings air force recruits up to speed on current Iraqi Air Force aircraft as well as serving to augment prior skills.

The air force actively recruited from prior-service personnel pools in the country – officially sending personnel to training after the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s vetting and screening process clears recruits for duty. Training was almost entirely conducted in the United Arab Emirates and Jordan by multinational force partners. After “conversion course” training was completed, trainees went to assigned squadrons in Iraq for follow-on training comprised of advanced instruction and specific operational training.

The Iraqi Air Force was initially slated to be a six-squadron force of various-make light reconnaissance aircraft and various support aircraft including C-130 transport planes and other helicopter craft with operations mainly centered on supporting Iraqi Security Force operations on the ground, infrastructure reconnaissance, and border security missions. The majority of the force was scheduled to be operational by Fall 2005.

The US Department of Defense described the Iraqi Air Force’s progress as follows in late July 2005:

Like the Army and the Navy, the Iraqi Air Force is conducting operational missions while equipping and training. The Iraqi Air Force’s counterinsurgency missions focus on aerial observation/surveillance and air transportation. The Air Force currently has over 100 personnel and has a fleet of 9 helicopters (4 UH-1H and 5 Jet Ranger), 3 C-130s, and 8 single-engine propeller-driven observation airplanes (6 CompAir turboprop aircraft and 2 Seeker piston aircraft). There are 19 Iraqi C-130 personnel currently being trained in the United States. Language training and flight training are being conducted at Al Ali Air Base. Crews have previously trained in Jordan on the UH-1H and Seeker.

- *Command centers were being created for Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and joint operations.*

- *Iraq’s two Military Academies* reopened in mid-October and each graduated a pilot course of new lieutenants, 91 total, in early January 2005. The new year-long military academy course was underway based on an Iraqi modification of the course at Sandhurst. Britain had taken the lead in shaping the program at the academy, and Italy was taking the lead in creating staff colleges. A senior command defense college was being developed.

○ *Ministry of Interior*

- *Five basic police academies were operational:* together, they produced over 3,500 new police officers from the 8-week course each month, a course recently modified to better prepare the new police officers for the challenging environment in which some may serve. Several other regional academies were under construction.

- *Police operations were being steadily modified to deal with the insurgent threat.* Suicide bombings and other attacks had led to a steady rise in the number of AK-47s and PKM machine guns issued to the police, and increases in the issue of body armor.
· *Iraq’s Mechanized Police Brigade* had completed training and began operations in mid-January, using fifty BTR-94 wheeled, armored vehicles. One additional Mechanized Police battalion was in training. The 8th Mechanized Police Brigade (MPB) was a paramilitary, counterinsurgency Iraqi police unit that would deploy to high risk areas using light armored personnel carriers. The MPB was planned to comprise three battalions.

The MPB was planned to be able to deploy as a company, battalion or even a brigade-level force. The brigade will be stationed in Central Iraq. The Russian made personnel carrier, known as “BTRs,” were used to transport Iraqi Security Forces across Iraq. With a three man crew, each carrier was capable of transporting up to 10 officers. The BTR has twin 23mm cannons and a 7.62 machinegun.

The MPB could serve as outer cordon security for military and other strike missions. The BTRs provided the members of the 8th MPB safe transport to high risk areas with lethal fire power capability.

· *Iraqi police mechanized units were starting to receive delivery of armored security vehicles and began training with them in mid-March 2005.* Logistics units at the division level and a brigade each for logistics, signals, MPs, and engineering were scheduled to stand up by 2006. Vehicle plans included a battalion of Cadillac Gage ASD armored security vehicles, and two battalions of BTR-94s, and a range of additional procurements were under study. According to MNSTC-I, uparmored HMMWVs were on order as of summer 2005.

· *Civil Intervention Force (CIF).* As of July 2005, there were three main CIF elements: the ERU, the 8th Mechanized Police, and the Public Order Brigade (POB).

Each type of CIF received different training. The ERU personnel received a four-week basic and four-week advanced Crisis Response Training (CRT) course. Selected individuals went through a five-week Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training course. The 8th Mechanized Brigade received a six-week training course. Selected personnel attend an Operator and Maintenance course at Taji for the Armored Security Vehicles. Lastly, the POB receives a six-week training course at Numaniyah Training Base.

The CIF used a variety of equipment: Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK-47 assault rifles, PKC light machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor. The 8th Mechanized Brigade uses BTR armored personnel carriers with 23mm cannon. Each battalion and member is currently equipped with all mission-essential equipment.

The SPTTs embedded with the 8th Mechanized Brigade and the battalions of the Public Order Brigade submitted a TRA at least monthly on the same areas as do the Army Military Transition Teams. The SPTTs focused their efforts on mentoring the cadres with the least experience. Most recruiting is done from the local population, with the goal of matching the ethnic composition of the unit with that of the area in which it is deployed.

The first three Public Order Battalions were brought into the ISF without CPATT-developed training. The 4th Public Order Battalion completed training last month. Each battalion was equipped with all mission-essential equipment. These units were to be fully trained and equipped by the fall of 2005. Notably, the ERU has a miniscule AWOL/attrition rate. The 8th Mechanized Brigade has a moderate rate, and the Public Order Battalions experience AWOL and attrition rates that are inversely proportional to their pay and training. Candidates for CIF are recruited from the surrounding police stations and provinces.

As with other police units, the exact extent of insurgent infiltration is unknown. A vetting process is used to screen out foreign elements. The effectiveness of the Iraqi police
officer cadres and the chain of command varies by province and the experience level of the chain of command.

- *Nine Police Commando battalions were operational.* The Special Police Commando Battalions represented the Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s strike-force capability similar to Special Forces units. The commandos were highly vetted Iraqi officers and rank-and-file servicemen largely made up of prior service Special Forces professionals and other skilled servicemen with specialty unit experience. While some reports stated that, “All members of the unit were chosen based on loyalty to Iraq and its new democratic model,” it initially was largely Shi’ite and was often criticized for excessive force in dealing with Sunnis.

The police commando force was however, being expanded to develop a strength of 27 battalions, with 4 more battalions in training. The units focused primarily on building raid operations, counter-terrorist missions including anti-airplane hijacker, kidnapping and other similar missions. The force resembled a paramilitary army-type force complete with heavy weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, and 9mm Glock pistols.

- *Nine Public Order Battalions were operational,* and three were commencing training.

- *Iraq’s National Police Emergency Response Unit was operational,* and its elements had conducted operations in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul. It was an elite 270-man team trained to respond to national-level law enforcement emergencies. The mission of the emergency response unit was to provide a national, high-end, rapid-response law enforcement tactical unit responsible for high-risk search, arrest, hostage-rescue and crisis response operations.

The $64.5 million effort was part of a larger mission to create a national-level law enforcement investigative and special operations capability within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to counter terrorism and large-scale civil disobedience and insurgencies throughout Iraq.

It capabilities were to eventually include a Counterterrorism Investigative Unit and Special Operations Unit.

Volunteers for the force first had to complete the standard eight-week basic training course or three-week transition integration program course for prior service officers before entering the specialized emergency response unit training modeled after the U.S. State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms’ training programs.

Of the total force, 235 eligible candidates received rigorous instruction based on the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Crisis Response Team training program while the balance of 35 recruits are part of the Special Operations Explosive Ordinance Team, based on the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Explosive Incident Countermeasures training course. Team members received instruction on terrorist incidents, kidnappings, hostage negotiations, explosive ordnance, high-risk searches, high-risk assets, weapons of mass destruction, and other national-level law enforcement emergencies. Officers also had an opportunity to receive supplementary training in hostage negotiation, emergency medical procedures, and counterterrorism task force coordination.

The emergency response unit was the predominant force for national-level incidents calling for a DELTA/SWAT capability and was only used in extreme situations by local and national authorities.

It is interesting to note that the report on the Iraqi police and security services by the Inspector General of the State Department and Inspector General of the Department of Defense provides a different view of this force from the MNF-I.\(^{165}\)
The ERU is a Coalition-initiated capability that has not been sanctioned or supported by the Iraqi government. As a result ERU members are not on the MOI payroll, nor do they have police credentials or weapons authorization cards. There are currently three ERU companies, with a fourth serving as a headquarters company. Despite non-sponsorship by the MOI, elements of the ERU have successfully participated in several high-level missions with remarkable results. Like the POBs, the ERU companies train and deploy as a unit. Camaraderie, morale, and esprit-de-corps are high, despite severe pay issues. Nevertheless, given the lack of sponsorship, attrition is a problem.

The ERU units have no element responsible for gathering, analyzing and disseminating intelligence. Students interviewed by the IG Team stated that the ERU relies on US Special Forces for operational intelligence. This intelligence data is filtered through the MOI, an unwieldy and time consuming process. Formal sponsorship and integration of the ERU within existing IPS structures would serve to alleviate this problem.

- *Iraq’s First Special Border Force Battalion* was operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar Province; the Second Battalion completed training in early February and has begun its deployments, and a third completed training in March.

- *Five provincial SWAT teams had been trained and fifteen more were scheduled* for training over the next six months. Provincial Special Weapons and Training (SWAT). These Provincial SWAT teams have been formed by some governors and provincial police chiefs. In addition to standard police basic training, the provincial SWAT teams receive four weeks of training consisting of Human Relations and Police Conduct, Firearms Training (with AK-47 assault rifles and Glock pistols), Mechanical Breaching (e.g., multiple entry, multiple rooms), and Specialty Training – Sniper Training, Offensive Driving, Intelligence, and Surveillance. Recruits are drawn from existing IPS officers selected by IPLOs assigned to the province of origin. These forces mainly use Chevy Luv pickups, AK-47s and Glock pistols. These forces are first trained to a basic level and are receiving additional practical skills training. Currently, new SWAT personnel are recruited only as replacements for existing SWAT teams. An increase in specialized training is required. The Provincial SWAT team assessments are included with the Provincial Police TRAs.

- *The Provincial Emergency Battalion units* are formed by the local Chiefs of Police without Coalition Forces’ involvement. To date, CPATT has not conducted training for these units and has not provided equipment or supplies. If these units join a recognized MOI unit, then they would receive full training and supplies.

- *Iraqi Highway Patrol (IHP)*: The IHP had about 1,400 members trained and on duty in late July 2005. IHP officers attend a 21-day training program that covers basic policing, driving skills, convoy escort, and weapons qualification with pistol, rifle, and machine gun.

  IHP officers used a variety of equipment: Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK-47 assault rifles, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor.

  The IHP did not have a TRA at this time. The goal for recruiting was a minimum of 300 cadets monthly until a force of 6,300 was built. All IHP patrolpersons and officers graduated from the four-week IHP Academy. The equipment goal was for each patrolperson and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment. The IHP began working with the U.S. Military Police Brigade in Baghdad in July 2005 to develop individual and squad skills and defined goals.

- Other:
Members of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq were now helping to advise and train the Iraqi staffs of the National Joint Operations Center, the Ministry of Defense Operations Center, and the Ministry of Interior Operations Center, as well as the Armed Forces Joint Headquarters and Ministry of Defense.

NATO trainers were also assisting the cadre of the Iraqi Military Academy and NATO trainers will help Iraq reestablish its Staff College and War College in 2005. A number of NATO nations were already providing equipment for Iraqi Security Forces and of training opportunities in NATO countries, with many additional offers extant.

The Bureau of Dignitary Protection's protected and safeguarded high level government officials and visiting dignitaries. The MOI does not recognize the BDP. As of April 2005, 395 candidates had completed training. There is no requirement for members of the BDP to be policemen or to have previously received basic police training. BDP agents have no arrest powers, nor do they carry police credentials or weapons’ permits. Students undergoing BDP training generally are selected from the guarded dignitary's family and/or tribe. Based on this selection criterion many of the trained BDP personnel were replaced after the April 2005 change in government leadership. Incumbents to office selected their own trusted agents and relatives to serve in this capacity.

Near-Term Goals

No decisions had been taken about the longer-term structure of Iraqi forces, and how it should eventually be transformed from a counterinsurgency force to a national defense force. These include key decisions as to the extent to which is should establish more heavy armored forces, and a large air force or navy.

MNSTC-I experts cautioned against investing in heavier forces before it was clear they were needed. An MNSTC-I advisor put it this way:

A heavier force, whether for force protection or for defense against invasion, also costs more. The Iraqis can’t really afford to purchase, operate, and maintain such a force – even with the multiple billions of dollars we are providing. Given fiscal constraints that will last for several years, Iraq has to consider opportunity costs before committing to the addition of more heavy forces. The Iraqis might decide that the additional motorized division being considered might better be traded for less-expensive light forces. They could instead decide to spend that money on much-needed infrastructure protection forces, which may be even more important strategically.

The new Minister of Defense agreed with many of these comments, and it was clear that the future financing of Iraq's forces had become a serious consideration in making such choices.

In other areas, Iraq and the MNF-I set the following near term goals and priorities:

- Better intelligence,
- Improving the institutional capability of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior,
- Strengthening the police,
- Improving border defense and security,
- Creating an effective army command structure,
- Strengthening national counter-terrorist forces,
- Transitioning detainee operations to Iraq,
- Securing the national electrical and oil infrastructure,
Integrating Iraqi counter-insurgency planning and execution,
Force protection, and
Establishing a process of continuous transition from Coalition to Iraq forces.

The Iraqi government and MNF-I were now focusing on both creating the kind of balanced Iraqi forces that could stand on their own in fighting the insurgency and transitioning operations from Coalition to Iraqi forces. The command guidance that emerged out of these priorities was to build an army, not just combat battalions, with suitable logistics and institution training. It was to finish manning, training, equipping, and basing the 7th Division (2 brigades and a division headquarters), standard the various infantry battalions, create new forward operating bases in the west and northwest, add special forces as enablers, and fund infrastructure security requirements.

The Iraqi government and MNF-1 also sought to fund new reconnaissance aircraft, develop better support for the Emergency Response Units, man existing Public Order Battalions at 750 men each, and improve existing forces while new elements were being generated. Special emphasis was being put on improving combat service support functions by adding motorized transport regiments, and standardizing headquarters and service companies. Divisional signal companies were being developed, as were intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (IS&R) capabilities.

One other change that illustrated the growing role of the Iraqi government in shaping Iraqi force plans and force development was a new set of goals for the Iraqi police service – although such plans were scarcely without problems:

As Iraqi officials articulate positions on IPS issues, an emerging concept is the development of a ‘third force’—a capability between orthodox police and internal security military units. Consistent with this objective, the MOI enthusiastically embraces the preparation of the Public Order Brigades (POB). An MOI initiative, Special Police Commando Units and an IPS mechanized brigade are now operative. CPATT conceived the POB program and is engaged in training the Special Police Commandos.

At the same time, the MOI has not claimed ownership of the CPATT-trained Emergency Response Unit (ERU), the Bureau of Dignitary Protection (BDP), or even the SWAT teams that have performed well in operations in Mosul and elsewhere. MOI attitudes relative to these units are reflected in frequent failure to pay IPs serving in those units. The IG Team concludes that, as the Iraqis eventually assume responsibility for IPS training, the status of these Coalition-conceived units may languish

**Operational Readiness**

As has been touched upon earlier, there was a slow increase in the level of Iraqi military, security, and elite police unit activity during the spring and summer of 2005, and improvements in areas like intelligence and counter-IED operations. Many of these activities are listed in the chronology below. At the same time, there were still significant problems with the new combat elements of various forces, and readiness and desertions remained serious issues. The following chronology shows level of operational progress and setbacks that Iraqi forces experienced during this period:

- **June 1, 2005**—Near Buhriz, a suicide bomber detonates his explosives at a checkpoint, killing two Iraqi soldiers.

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○ June 2, 2005—Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr announces that Operation Lightning has brought control of all roads into and out of Baghdad under Iraqi control. Jabr states that 700 suspected insurgents had been detained and that 28 had been killed. The Interior Ministry releases figures that show that insurgents killed 20 Iraqi civilians a day on average over the past year and a half. Approximately 12,000 civilians were killed by insurgents over the time period. In Mosul, two motorcycles rigged with bombs explode next to a coffee shop that is known to be frequented by police officers and which is close to a police station. Five people die and it is not immediately apparent if any were police officers. A suicide car bomber detonates his explosives next to a convoy carrying deputy chief of the provincial council, Hussein Alwan al-Tamimi, in Baquba, killing him and wounding four police officers. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia claims credit for the attack. In Mahmudiya, militants attack a police patrol, injuring one policeman. 121 police officers graduate from advanced specialty courses at the Adnan Training Facility. The courses included basic criminal investigations, critical incident management, counterterrorism investigations, and executive leadership. Command of the Kirkuk Military Training Base is formally transferred from MNSTC-I to Iraqi Brig. Gen Abd Zaid. The Iraqi Navy begins its Direct Recruitment Replacement Program.

○ June 4, 2005—Iraqi and US forces arrest a man dubbed Mullah Mahdi in Mosul, along with his brother and three other men. Iraqi officials state that Mahdi had links to Ansar al-Sunnah and Syria’s intelligence service. The same officials claim that he was responsible for all of the major attacks, assassinations, and beheadings of Iraqi security forces in the area.

○ June 6, 2005—A suicide car bomber detonates his vehicle close to an Iraqi army checkpoint near al-Daira. Six Iraqi soldiers are wounded in the attack. In the Almil neighborhood, a suicide bomber drives his vehicle into a former factory that had been converted to an Iraqi security forces base. Lacking concrete barriers, the attacker managed to get inside the facility and kill approximately three police, though estimates varied.

○ June 7, 2005—Iraqi army and US troops launch an offensive in the city of Tal Afar to eradicate insurgent activity in the area. 23 suspected insurgents are captured. Reportedly, the city is believed to house foreign fighters who have come across the close-by border with Syria. Reports differed over whether town elders requested the operation or whether the operation had been planned for some time. Three car bombs are detonated in and around Hawija within minutes of one another, killing eight Iraqi soldiers. Two Iraqi police officers are wounded by a car bomb in Baghdad. In a separate car bomb attack in the capital city, insurgents attempt to target a police convoy but kill mostly civilians. Once police officer dies. Police in Musayyab raid an insurgent hideout in Jurf al-Sakhr and seize a cache of weapons. US and Iraqi forces begin a joint assault in Tal Afar.

○ June 8, 2005—Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari and President Jalal Talabani meet with the founder of the political party that founded the Badr Brigade. Both Talabani and Jafari hail the Badr Brigade and Kurdish Pesh Merga as indispensable and legitimate forces. In Baghdad, an Iraqi commando is killed and an Iraqi police officer wounded in two separate drive-by shootings.

○ June 12, 2005—Al Qaeda in Iraq claims to have captured and then executed 21 Iraqi soldiers outside of Qaim. Though the bodies were found, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense denies that any soldiers were missing. Militants attack the home of Iraqi army Gen. Rashid Fleys, where the funeral for the mother of a top security official was being held in Baghdad. 13 people are wounded.

○ June 13, 2005—In Tikrit, a suicide car bomber attacks and Iraqi police patrol, killing two officers and wounding four. Two Iraqi police officers die in Samarra when a suicide car bomber detonates close to a joint US-Iraqi military patrol. Three more die in the city when insurgents detonate two bombs close to their barracks, drawing them out, at which point they open fire on them.

○ June 14, 2005—Militants launch a coordinated attack on a Kaanana police station using mortars and a car bomb. An unknown number of Iraqi police and soldiers are among the nine dead.

○ June 15, 2005—More than 26 Iraqi soldiers die and many more are wounded when a suicide bomber, dressed in an Iraqi army uniform, detonates his explosives in a military mess tent in Khalis. Iraqi security forces announce the capture of Abid Dawoud Salman and his son, Salman a former Iraqi general and his son a former captain, in Khalidiyah. According to Iraqi officials, Salman was an important military adviser to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

○ June 16, 2005—A suicide bomber rams an Iraqi police convoy on the road to Baghdad’s airport, killing eight officers and wounding 25 more.

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○ **June 17, 2005**—Operation Spear begins in the Anbar province in an attempt to disrupt insurgent activity.

○ **June 18, 2005**—Operation Daggar begins as a complement to Operation Spear in the Anbar province.

○ **June 19, 2005**—A suicide bomber with an explosive vest targets a restaurant just outside of the Green Zone in Baghdad. The ensuing explosion kills between 2-7 Iraqi police officers. A group claiming fealty to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claims responsibility on the Internet. In the northern part of the capital, a suicide car bomber sidles up to a police convoy and detonates his vehicle, wounding two people. In Tikrit, a suicide bomber wearing an Iraqi police uniform drives up to the gate of a US military base and detonates vehicle, killing two Iraqi soldiers.

○ **June 20, 2005**—In Irbil, a suicide car bomber rams a group of traffic cops gathered for roll call outside of their headquarters. The ensuing explosion kills 20 traffic policemen and wounds 100. Insurgents launch a coordinated attack on a US military convoy and then an attack on the Baya police station in southwestern Baghdad, utilizing small arms, two suicide car bombs, RPGs, and mortars. Approximately eight policemen are killed and 23 are wounded. One Iraqi soldier dies. Operations Spear and Daggar have resulted in 60 insurgent deaths and the capture of approximately 100 militants. 1,000 US and Iraq soldiers are involved in the two operations. In the Mansour district, militants detonate a roadside bomb, killing four Iraqi police. A gunfire erupts between police and insurgents and one policeman dies. 15 are wounded. In Nisoor Square, two car bombs detonate close to a police commando station, but there are no casualties. Near Tuz Khurmatu, insurgents detonate a roadside bomb as an Iraqi army convoy passes, killing three soldiers and wounding two more.

○ **June 21, 2005**—Iraqi and US troops begin pulling out of Karabilah, near the Syrian border, following the conclusion of Operation Spear. Several car bomb workshops were uncovered, one insurgent was captured, and an estimated 47 were killed. Insurgents had been harassing the town and had set up roadblocks. In Tuz Khormantu, Iraqi security forces reportedly prevent a suicide bomber from carrying out an attack, and the Defense Ministry announced that 11 weapons caches had been uncovered around the country. In Al Habibiya, citizens inform an Iraqi army patrol of a stockpile of arms in a nearby sewer. Iraqi security forces uncover RPGs and rounds.

○ **June 22, 2005**—A suicide car bomber detonates his explosives next to an Iraqi army patrol in the Ameriyah neighborhood of western Baghdad. No Iraqi soldiers are killed, though the attack kills four civilians. Militants detonate a roadside bomb close to an Iraqi police patrol and special operations unit. The attack near Madain kills two policemen and wounds two more officers.

○ **June 23, 2005**—In Baghdad, a suicide bomber attacks an Iraqi police patrol near a gas station in the northern-central part of the city. Three police officers are killed. Three more are killed in a suicide bombing in the Karada area of the city near an old mall.

○ **June 24, 2005**—In Samarra, five cars loaded with insurgents run interference for a suicide car bomber as he rams his vehicle into the wall outside of Lt. Muthana al-Shaker’s home. Al-Shaker is a member of the police special forces in Samarra. The attack kills multiple civilians, but fails to injure al-Shaker. Two insurgents attempting to plant a follow-on bomb for emergency services and police outside of his home accidentally set the device off, killing themselves. In Kirkuk, insurgents strap an explosive belt to a dog and detonate it when the dog wanders near Iraqi security forces. One officer is injured.

○ **June 26, 2005**—In Mosul, Iraqi security forces are targeted by Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq group. One suicide truck bomber rams a police station, killing ten policemen. In the parking lot of an Iraqi army base on the fringe of the city, another suicide bomber detonates his explosives. 16 people are killed, most of them civilians, but reports indicate some security forces personnel are among the dead. A third Mosul suicide bomber walks into the Jumhouri Teaching Hospital, detonating his explosives in a room used by Iraqi policemen charged with guarding the hospital. Five policemen are killed, including several who were sleeping. A total of 16 policemen are wounded in the attacks. Minister of Defense Daulami states that it is necessary to open a dialogue with the armed insurgent groups who wish to join the political process. In Sadiyah, militants killed six Iraqi soldiers outside of their base. In Baghdad, Al Qaeda in Iraq claims credit for the shooting death of police Col. Riyadh Abdul Karim, an assistant district police director of emergency services, in the eastern portion of the city. In the Amin neighborhood, Iraqi police seize 500 anti-personnel mines, 60 RPG rounds, several mortar rounds, and arrest seven...
suspected insurgents. Shortly after the raid, Iraqi police from the 1st Battalion, 2nd Iraqi Army Brigade discovered a car bomb and called in experts to diffuse it.

- **June 27, 2005**—In Mosul, insurgents detonate a car bomb near an Iraqi army patrol in the Al Wihda neighborhood, killing two people and wounding four. It is not clear whether the killed and wounded were soldiers or civilians. In Tal Afar, militants shoot at an Iraqi army convoy from a mosque. One Iraqi soldier and five militants die in the following gun battle. In Baghdad, insurgents detonate a roadside bomb close to an Iraqi police patrol. The attack in the northern Azamiyah neighborhood kills two Iraqis. It is not clear whether the killed were civilians or policemen.

- **June 28, 2005**—In Baquba, a suicide car bomb near the headquarters of the Iraqi security forces detonates, killing civilians. In Baghdad, militants shoot and kill two Iraqi policemen. The police chief of Kirkuk escapes a suicide car bombing attempt that kills a bodyguard and a civilian. A suicide bomber wearing an explosive belt detonates his charges in front of the main hospital in Musayyib. One policeman is killed and 17 others wounded.

- **June 29, 2005**—In Mosul, militants sporting Iraqi army uniforms shoot and kill an Iraqi police officer and two members of his family in the center of the city.

- **June 30, 2005**—Operation Sword, a sweep along the Euphrates River in the Anbar province, continues into its third day. More than 1,000 US forces and 100 Iraqi soldiers are deployed in an effort to sweep insurgents out of the western towns. According to Iraqi military officers, more than 2 tons of explosives were seized in the city of Hit and 45 suspected insurgents arrested.

- **July 1, 2005**—In the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad, a car bomb detonates in front of the offices of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s Islamic Dawa Party shortly after the departure of Interior Ministry administrative affairs undersecretary police Maj. Gen. Adnan al-Assadi, killing one civilian and injuring at least 4 armed guards stationed at the compound. It is unclear whether al-Assadi was the primary target. Two policemen are also wounded after striking a roadside bomb at a checkpoint on the outskirts of Baghdad. A drive-by shooting results in the death of an Iraqi Defense Ministry civilian employee. A battalion of the Iraqi National Guard uncovers a huge weapons stockpile including hundreds of rockets and mortar shells buried in the desert south of Karbala. Residents directed Iraqi police to a location in Ramadi where the bodies of 3 men, described by the residents as a Saudi, a Jordanian, and a Kuwaiti who were members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, had been dumped the side of the road from a truck. US and Iraqi troops complete house searches and begin foot patrols under Operation Sword.

- **July 2, 2005**—In Baghdad, a suicide bomber kills 11 and injures 22 at a checkpoint near a base of the Interior Ministry’s commando force headquarters, marking the third major attack on this location since October. Most of those killed were new recruits. In eastern Baghdad, a car bomb aimed for a police patrol unit kills 3 policemen and 8 others. An additional car bomb in Mahmudiya results in one death and 3 wounded. A series of attacks from Duluiyah to Baiji targeting Iraqi police forces kills 13 including 6 civilians. In Mosul, an area where security forces have been frequently targeted, the Medical City hospital reports to have received 12 unidentified bodies in 24 hours, most of which were victims of gunshots to the head. In response to the recent violence, al-Jaafari requests that foreign troops continue their presence until Iraqi troops are able to handle insurgent violence on their own.

- **July 3, 2005**—Two policemen are killed by a bomb intended for the vehicle of Colonel Imad Nureddin, police chief of the town of Al-Ryad. Three suicide bombers targeting Iraqi security forces launch a total of two attacks—one in western Baghdad and one in Hilla—resulting in at least 20 deaths and 59 injuries. During a news conference, Laith Kubba acknowledges that some Iraqi troops have participated in the torture and abuse of prisoners.

- **July 4, 2005**—Operation Muthana Strike, a raid of insurgent safe houses near the western end of the Baghdad International Airport by 600 Iraqi army soldiers and 250 U.S. soldiers, is carried out in the early morning hours with the arrest of 100 suspected Iraqi insurgents and foreign fighters, including several Egyptian suspects. The intended outcome was to thwart future attacks through the seizure of weapons and the gathering of intelligence through a series of detainments.

- **July 5, 2005**—Twenty miles south of Kirkuk, a suicide car bomber detonates his explosives at a checkpoint, killing one Iraqi soldier and injuring 3 others.

- **July 6, 2005**—In west Baghdad, militants shoot and kill Captain Hazim Jabbar, member of the police special commando brigade and former bodyguard to a consultant for former interim Prime Minister
Ayad Allawi. Three other police officers including 2 commandos are also killed in another neighborhood in western Baghdad. Nine other members of the police force, including a brigadier general, were injured in various locations around the city. Iraqi police reported the death of a member of the Badr Brigade, the largest Shiite militia, in an ambush in southern Baghdad. An audiotape is found on the web with a statement that Iraqi troops and police are as much an enemy as the Americans and are equally legitimate targets for violent acts. The speaker claimed to be Al-Qaida in Iraq chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

○ **July 7, 2005**—Operation Lightning is nearly complete and will be followed by three additional projects, including one that will attempt to secure oil and electricity installations and another that will involve an intelligence mission that will transition into an undisclosed third operation, according to Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr. In a raid west of Baghdad in the village of Dihab Abyad, Iraqi security forces confiscate thousands of liters of oil that were designated for sale on the black market. In various other locations in Baghdad, 4 Iraqi police are killed and 9 wounded. On a road between Baghdad and Mahaweel, security forces kill 3 insurgents attempting to plant a roadside bomb. There were no reported casualties of the security forces from this incident. The “Omar Brigade,” al-Zarqawi’s supposed newly created group, is believed to be the most organized effort yet seen to combat the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi is believed to be acerbating Sunni anger over the alleged torture and killing of several Sunni men by Iraqi police forces. According to a member of the Badr Brigade, recruits numbering in the hundreds from the Shiite group have entered the Iraqi security forces.

○ **July 8, 2005**—In Fallujah, a suicide bomber crashes into a U.S.-Iraqi joint patrol approaching the eastern exit of the city at night, destroying 1 Iraqi personnel carrier and 1 American personnel carrier. After receiving a tip from a local citizen in eastern Baghdad, police in Baghdad discover a roadside bomb and disable it before it detonates with the aid of a coalition explosive ordnance disposal team. Elsewhere in eastern Baghdad, the Iraqi police successfully capture a weapons dealer in possession of a sniper rifle, a submachine gun and three AK-47 rifles.

○ **July 9, 2005**—In the Yarmouk district of western Mosul, militants fatally shoot an Iraqi police officer in his car. Elsewhere in the city, Iraqi security forces kill 3 gunmen, and in another location find the bodies of 2 Iraqi soldiers. Gunmen in southwestern Baghdad kill Iraqi police officer Capt. Saad Muhsein Abdulmairi. An explosion occurs as an Iraqi military patrol passes through Fallujah, causing a fire to ignite in a personnel carrier. Casualties are yet unknown. Interior Minister Jaber Solagh announces the formation of the Lightning Force, a 3,000 troop strong group of specially trained and equipped anti-terrorist forces. In a desert region south of Baghdad, two suspected terrorists are arrested in booby-trapped cars and in a western area, 7 additional suspects are arrested. A further 8 suspects are taken into custody in near Mosul in Tellafar, as well as 5 others south of Baghdad in Alexandria. Operation Scimitar, the most recent offensive by U.S. Marines and Iraqi security forces in the Anbar province, is publicly announced though it officially began on Thursday 7 July. Operation Scimitar is the sixth major offensive in the province over the past several months, although its troop strength of 500 Marines and 100 Iraqi soldiers is smaller than the previous efforts which tended to employ approximately 1,000 troops.

○ **July 10, 2005**—In Baghdad, a suicide bomber wearing a belt strung with explosives targets security force volunteers outside an army recruitment center at the former Muthana airport, killing 25 and wounding nearly 50. Most of those pronounced dead are believed to have been recruits. An additional suicide bomber in a pickup truck near Mosul pulls up next to a police convoy escorting an Iraqi brigadier general and detonates his ammunition, killing 5 policemen but leaving the brigadier general unharmed. In northern Baghdad, a mortar bomb falls on a police station, injuring 2 Iraqi police and demolishing 4 police cars. A joint Iraqi and U.S. patrol question a local citizen in the Ameriyah district after noticing a black BMW parked in front of a house that is normally uninhabited. Finding him suspicious, the soldiers search the house and uncover a cache of weapons, including a bag of raw C-4 plastic explosives, an AK-47, 20 hand grenades, a machine gun, a sniper rifle, a loaded 9 mm pistol with an attached silencer, approximately 500-700 rounds of ammunition, and 4 containers believed to encase explosives. An Iraqi army unit responds to a civilian call in Baghdad and finds a rocket on an improvised launcher which they successfully disarm without casualty. Nighttime clashes in Tal Afar between Iraqi security forces and insurgents resulted in 6 deaths and at least 22 wounded.

○ **July 11, 2005**—Northeast of Baghdad in Khalis, insurgents stage an armed assault on a checkpoint, firing mortars, machine guns and semi-automatic weapons, and killing 8 Iraqi soldiers. Less than two hours later, 2 army troops are killed when their patrol passes a car bomb parked on the side of the road. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claims responsibility for both attacks in a statement released on the web, although its
July 12, 2005—In Baghdad, militants fatally shoot police Colonel Amir Mirza in a market in the Wahda district and gunmen kill a police captain outside his flat. Elsewhere in Baghdad, gunmen open fire on security guards in front of a health clinic, resulting in the death of one policeman. North of Baghdad, in two separate attacks, an Iraqi policeman and Iraqi soldier are killed. A task force Iraqi soldier dies of injuries incurred from striking a landmine on 11 July, an incident that is currently under investigation. Members of the Iraqi army detonate approximately 3 metric tons of explosives including 1,282 mines, 628 mortar rounds and 825 artillery shells that were found near oil fields in southern Iraq by Oil Protection Services. The explosives are assumed to be remnants of a 1990 plot by Saddam Hussein to prevent US troops from taking the oil fields after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Interior Ministry announced the launch of an independent investigation into the torture and death of the 10 Sunni Arabs protested by the Association of Muslim Scholars. Defense Minister Saadoun al-Duleimi announces the posthumous granting of army status to all recruits that were killed by the suicide bombing of the Baghdad recruitment center on 10 July.

July 13, 2005—in western Baghdad, an Iraqi soldier is shot and killed while driving, and in a nearby neighborhood, militants kill a lieutenant and another Iraqi soldier during a firefight. Clashes in northern Mosul result in the death of one policeman and 4 suspected insurgents. An Iraqi soldier is killed and another wounded at a checkpoint near Fallujah after being fired upon by a U.S. soldier for failing to stop properly. An additional police officer was shot to death in Basra. In Kirkuk, an explosion occurs an industrial district near passing pedestrians. Police on the scene are shot and 3 are wounded. As part of an ongoing investigation into the deaths of 10 Sunnis on 10 July, a senior Interior Ministry official acknowledges that the victims died by suffocation after being shot in a police car with its engine turned off during a day in which the temperature reached 115 degrees Fahrenheit. The official noted that the security forces responsible for the deaths would be tried accordingly. In an unrelated incident, 13 people including 12 Sunnis and one Shi’a were tortured and killed during a raid on a series of houses by the Iraqi security forces, according to a complaint issued by the Association of Muslim Scholars. An official from the Interior Ministry announced the launch of an investigation into the matter.

July 14, 2005—in Baghdad, 2 suicide bombings result in the wounding of 2 Iraqi police at a checkpoint to the Green Zone, where the government of Baghdad and center of U.S. operations are located. Police kill a suspected third bomber who had after security forces noticed wires running out of his clothes. At a checkpoint in western Baghdad near the headquarters of the Iraqi Police Major Crimes Unit, militants shoot to death 2 police officers and wound 4. Operation Scimitar is completed after resulting in the seizure of 5 weapons caches and the arrest of 26 suspected insurgents, one of whom allegedly planned an April attack on the prison at Abu Ghraib.

July 15, 2005—Twelve suicide bombers targeting Iraqi security forces and U.S. troops kill at least 33 people and wound 111 in various locations in Baghdad and northern Iraq. Among the casualties were nearly 15 Iraqi soldiers wounded at an Iraqi army checkpoint in Ash-shab, 5 soldiers wounded near Andalus Square during an assault on a convoy, 2 soldiers killed by a bomber who detonated his explosives while crashing his truck into the main gate of an army camp in Bab-al-Moadham, 5 soldiers killed in a motorcycle bomb in Al-Bayaa, 2 soldiers killed by a bomber north of Baghdad in Balad, and 2 soldiers killed and 1 wounded at a checkpoint in Al-Sharqat.

July 16, 2005—Ten miles south of Mosul, a suicide attacker detonates his explosives inside a police station, causing 6 police fatalities and 20 wounded. A suicide car bomb attack injures 4 Iraqi soldiers near an army convoy in Hawija. An additional suicide car bomber in the Baghdad neighborhood of Dora kills 3 commandos and injures 5 civilians. Northwest of Kirkuk, 3 Iraqi soldiers and 2 of their American counterparts are wounded during an attempt to disarm a bomb. Police successfully arrest a suicide bomber in Baghdad before he was able to detonate his explosives amidst a crowd of civilians mourning a large-scale suicide attack that occurred on 13 July. The detainee claimed Libyan descent.

July 17, 2005—in the New Baghdad neighborhood in eastern Baghdad, a suicide bomber kills 2 policemen and injures 7 others. Three police commandos die in a second suicide car bombing approximately 1 hour later near the Bay'a bus station in southern Baghdad. At the eastern end of the Karradah peninsula, a vehicle-borne IED kills 3 Iraqi police officers and wounds 1. The blast from the device causes damage to power lines, a water main, and 15 houses in the vicinity.

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July 18, 2005—Operation Thunder, a security sweep on the west side of the Tigris River in Baghdad, expands in its second week after resulting in nearly 50 arrests in the initial few days. Combined troops uncover several weapons caches during operations over the past 48 hours in Mosul, Tal Afar, and Zagaytan. The Mosul cache was notably large, consisting of assembled roadside bombs and bomb-making equipment, anti-tank mines, 250 hand grenades, 1,500 blasting caps and more than 10,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, as well as mortars, artillery rounds, rockets, missiles. Militants kill at least 24 police officers, soldiers, and government workers in a series of small-scale attacks: in Khadra, eight Iraqi police officers die in a gun battle with insurgents; in Rawah, a car bomb intended for Iraqi and U.S. military troops results in the death of at least one civilian; in a series of attacks in various other locations around the city, militants kill 5 Iraqi police officers, including one colonel and three civilians working for the government. North of Baghdad, a shootout between security forces and insurgents resulted in the death of one police officer in Taji, a police colonel and 3 civilians were killed in a series of attacks in Samarra, and 2 Iraqi troops were gunned down in Mosul along with Abdul-Ghani Naimi, brother of a member of the Iraqi Parliament. Iraqi soldiers continue with Operation Veterans Forward by arresting several suspected terrorists and uncovering a variety of weaponry in Tal Afar.

July 19, 2005—in the Ameriyah district and Al Dora neighborhood of Baghdad, joint operations by Iraqi police and coalition soldiers result in the arrest of four suspected terrorists, including an alleged mid-level cell leader who has ties to Ansar Al Sunna and was wanted for the sale of surface-to-air missiles.

July 21, 2005—two suicide bombings targeting Iraqi security forces kill at least 17 people. Thousands of Iraqis leave Tal Afar fearing an increased crackdown on militant action by joint U.S. and Iraqi security forces in the area. The Pentagon releases a report to Congress stating that the Iraqi security forces are not yet capable of defending their country without aid from the U.S. and coalition forces.

July 22, 2005—in a wasteland area in eastern Baghdad, 2 police officer brothers are found dead with gunshot wounds to the head and chest after being abducted from their home on Thursday. Elsewhere in eastern Baghdad, 3 policemen die after they are gunned down while directing traffic, and 7 others are killed in drive-by shootings around the city. A roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi army convoy on a highway near Latifiyah detonates, killing 2 civilians and damaging 3 civilian vehicles, but leaves the convoy intact. Militants open fire on a car in the Dora neighborhood in Baghdad carrying an Iraqi army captain Wissam Abdul-Wahab and his new wife, killing the bride and leaving the captain wounded. In Samarra, 1 soldier and 3 civilians die in a clash with insurgents.

July 23, 2005—in western Samarra, a bomb targeting an Iraqi army patrol detonates, killing 1 soldier and wounding 3 in the Al-Qal'ah area. Raids conducted by Iraqi police in Al-Yusufiyah and Al-Musayyib result in the arrest of 30 suspected insurgents, including 8 Egyptians. One policeman suffers minor injuries.

July 24, 2005—Southeast of Baghdad in the Al-Mashtel neighborhood, a truck filled 500 pounds of explosives detonates in front of the Al-Rashid police station, killing up to 40 people and wounding 25, although reports of the death toll varied. Fires from the explosion spread to 22 cars, 10 shops and a nearby building. Elsewhere in Baghdad, 2 police lieutenant colonels are fatally shot while on their way to work, 1 in Baghdad, and 1 in Kirkuk. Seven additional police are killed around Baghdad, one by mortar fire and the rest in as a result of several clashes with insurgents.

July 25, 2005—in Baghdad, Iraqi commandos open fire on a vehicle filled with explosives at a checkpoint near the Ministry of Interior compound, causing an explosion that kills 2 soldiers and injures 12. Joint U.S.-Iraqi forces conduct raids in Mosul and northwestern Tikrit, detaining 17 suspects and confiscating a variety of weaponry.

July 26, 2005—in the Al-Risalah neighborhood of western Mosul, an armed clash between police forces and insurgents results in the deaths of 2 Iraqis and 8 others.

July 27, 2005—in northern Baghdad, a suicide car bomber targeting an Iraqi army convoy kills 2 civilians and injures 10 others, including 5 soldiers. Another car bomb explodes in the Shurta al-Khamsa section of southwestern Baghdad near a group of Iraqi commandos, causing 1 death and 4 injuries. Members of the U.S. and Iraqi armies capture Ammar Abu Bara, who is also known as Ammar Hussein Hasan, the alleged terror cell leader for Mosul and trusted aid to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

July 28, 2005—Joint U.S.-Iraqi forces announce that they have detained 49 suspected terrorists during operations over the past 2 days in Mosul, Tal Afar, and Rawar. A series of 4 coordinated attacks against...
Iraqi army checkpoints on a road between Baquba and Baghdad kills 6 soldiers and injures 3 soldiers, 4 police officers and a civilian.

- **July 29, 2005**—A suicide bomber detonates his belt of explosives amidst a crowd of Iraqi army trainees in the town of Rabia, near the Syrian border, killing 44 and injuring 57. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claims responsibility for the attack. In a village west of Haditha, Iraqi security forces and U.S. Marines raid safe houses and kill 9 militants, 5 of whom are allegedly Syrian nationals. Iraqi and U.S. soldiers are attacked in Cykla while conducting a security patrol. No casualties were reported.

- **July 30, 2005**—In the Karada district of central Baghdad, a car bomb explodes in front of a mobile police checkpoint near the Iraqi National Theater, causing 3 police fatalities and wounding 20 people, some of whom were policemen. Militants attack a convoy In Kufa carrying senior advisor to the Iraqi environment minister Ibrahim Issawi, resulting in the death of one of his security guards and the wounding of 3 others.

- **July 31, 2005**—In Latifiya, an insurgent attack on the convoy of Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi kills one of his bodyguards and injures 3 others. Chalabi himself was not in the convoy. On a road between Haswa and Wahawil, a car bomb intended for the Iraqi police forces is remotely detonated, resulting in 5 deaths and 10 injuries. Militants kill an Iraqi soldier dressed in plainclothes in the Baghdad neighborhood of Iskan. Armed insurgents fire upon a group of cooks as they depart from a military base in Baquba, killing 1 and wounding 3.

- **August 1, 2005**—In the Baghdad neighborhood of Um Maalif, 22 bodies of Shiite Muslims are discovered, including one of a police colonel from Karbala. All died from apparent gunshot wounds and 2 had been beheaded, apparently by a gang of men dressed in Iraqi National Guard uniforms that raided the town during the night.

- **August 2, 2005**—In Baquba, a car bomb targeting a police patrol near Al-Haiyat hospital detonates, killing 1 policeman and 1 civilian, and wounding 7 policemen and 1 other. 4 people, 3 of them police officers, die in a suicide attack on a police checkpoint in Mosul. In northeastern Baghdad, 3 assailants ambush and kill Col. Mizhir Hamad Yousif, commander of Abu Ghraib police station, as he travels through the neighborhood of New Baghdad on his way to work.

- **August 3, 2005**—In Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonates his explosives at a checkpoint in Al-Isakhi, killing 5 Iraqi soldiers. Elsewhere in Baghdad, militants shoot and kill a police officer. Two other policemen are shot dead while driving in Baghdad. One Iraqi soldier dies in Balad when a bomber blows up a tractor. Militants attack a police patrol in Baquba and fatally shoot 2 policemen.

- **August 4, 2005**—North of Baghdad in Dujail, assailants stage an attack on an Iraqi army patrol, killing 4 troops. Iraqi security forces begin a month-long operation to protect the 544 voter registration centers nationwide that opened August 3rd in anticipation of a general election and constitutional referendum. Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari announces a new 12-point security plan that includes steps to protect infrastructure, improve intelligence, and secure borders against foreign fighters. A U.S. government liaison in Baghdad reports a new Iraqi plan to build a 10-kilometer-wide weapons-free “buffer zone” around the nation to prevent the illegal entrance of foreign fighters and weapons shipments. Iraqi security forces are arranging for the assumption of control of 5 southern cities, including Diwaniya, Karbala, Najaf, Nasseriya and Samawa. Iraqi army and Task Force Baghdad soldiers conduct 3 combat operations in southern, western and northern Baghdad, arresting 5 terrorist suspects. Iraqi army members detain 4 other suspects are in Baghdad who are under suspicion of plotting government assassinations.

- **August 5, 2005**—In Baquba, Iraqi security forces neutralize 5 IEDs and detain 45 terrorist suspects under Operation Vanguard Thunder, an undertaking targeting 150-200 suspected insurgents. Iraqi security forces and U.S. soldiers conduct a raid in Sharmiyah, arresting 39 suspected insurgents. Approximately 1,000 Iraqi soldiers and U.S. Marines conduct a large-scale operation entitled Operation Quick Strike aimed at flushing out insurgents in the western Euphrates valley, focusing on the cities of Haditha, Haqlinayah and Barwanah.

- **August 6, 2005**—In Haqlinayah, Iraqi soldiers and U.S. Marines disable 3 car bombs and discover 2 weapons caches that including bomb-making materials. South of Baghdad, a suicide bomber drove his truck into a checkpoint, killing 1 Iraqi soldier and wounding another. Nearby, at an army post, Iraqi and coalition forces thwart an insurgent attack, killing 6 militants and capturing 12. Two other attacks on nearby locations are successfully countered by U.S. and Iraqi forces and result in no casualties.

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August 7, 2005—In Samawah, clashes between protestors and police result in 1 death and 44 injuries, including 14 members of the Iraqi security forces. Demonstrators set several cars on fire, including one police vehicle parked in front of the office of the mayor. A suicide tanker bomb detonated at the headquarters of the 2nd police battalion in Tikrit kills 2 people and wounds 10. In Baghdad, 3 Iraqi soldiers in civilian clothing are killed in drive by shooting. Elsewhere in Baghdad, another Iraqi soldier is injured in an attack in the Sayidha neighborhood. Iraqi army soldiers and U.S. forces conduct a series of raids in Rawah, Fallujah, Mqadadiyeh and Baghdad, locating a variety of weapons caches, IEDs and roadside bombs and capturing several suspected insurgents without casualties.

August 8, 2005—Operation Quick Strike enters its second week as US and Iraqi forces discover 6 explosive-laden vehicles and 5 roadside bombs at two locations in Haqlinyah. The People's Mujahedeen Organization of Iran, or Mujahedeen Khalq, releases a statement accusing the Iraqi security forces of kidnapping 2 of its members. The Iraqi Interior Ministry denies having any knowledge of such an incident.

August 9, 2005—In the New Baghdad neighborhood of the Iraqi capital, armed assailants attack a police patrol and kill 5 policemen who had fallen asleep at their post. In the Dora neighborhood, gunmen shoot to death police Capt. Haider Mizhir Salih and another policeman on their way to work in the morning. A third attack in the Zayouna neighborhood results in the death of 1 police officer and the wounding of another. Militants kill a police officer and wound 2 others in a drive-by shooting in the Shuwaqa district of Baghdad. Also in Baghdad, a car bomber strikes a police patrol and U.S. convoy, killing 3 policemen and wounding 42 people, many of them policemen, as well as destroying 16 vehicles. Iraqi security forces along with Polish and American troops uncover a large weapons cache in central southern Iraq.

August 10, 2005—In Baghdad, a car bombing at a police patrol in the Ghazaliya district kills 2 police officers and 4 others, and wounds an additional 14 people including 2 policemen. 9 vehicles, 3 of them police vehicles, are destroyed as a result of the same explosion. Iraqi security forces search the RIA Novosti office in Baghdad, confiscate audio and video material and ask one translator to leave to undergo questioning. The seized material was returned later that day. Members of the Iraqi military discover a weapons cache and detain 3 suspects in Fallujah, while others uncover several IEDs during operations in Balad, Baquba, Tikrit, Hit and Raway.

August 11, 2005—In Basra, gunmen assassinate Ministry of Defense intelligence official Lt. Col. Ibrahim Khalil al-Ani while he was shopping in the Junaina neighborhood. Militants kill a police lieutenant in a drive-by shooting in the western part Baghdad. Iraqi security forces detain 3 suspected insurgents in Mosul and arrest 4 in Mosul, Raway and Tal Afar.

August 12, 2005—In Mosul, Iraqi security forces shoot and kill Mohammed Salah Sultan, also known as Abu Zubair, a lieutenant of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. He was strapped with explosives at the time of his death. A car bomb attack near a police patrol in the Dora district of Baghdad wounds 4 civilians, leaving the policemen unharmed.

August 14, 2005—In Hilla, police discover 30 mutilated bodies in a mass grave that appears to be approximately six months old. After conducting a search in which one Iraqi suspect was killed, Iraqi forces arrest 13 individuals including an Egyptian and a Sudanese. At a checkpoint on the border of the Muthanna governorate, forces arrest 3 men including one Syrian for allegedly plotting to launch a suicide attack during a demonstration in Samawa against the provincial governor, Mohammad Ali Hassan. All three suspects were found wearing explosive belts and the Iraqis were found in possession of grenades. In Kirkuk, militants attack a police patrol, killing 1 policeman and wounding 3. Two police are found dead from gunshot wounds in Samarra. Also in Samarra, police elevated security and added several checkpoints due to backlash from the death of Najim Takhi, a well-known resident and alleged member of Al-Qaeda. Several placards have been posted in various locations around the area, such as one that promises the death of 1,000 policemen as retribution for the killing of Takhi.

August 15, 2005—Gunmen stage an attack on a checkpoint, killing 4 Iraqi soldiers and injuring 3 near Bohruz. Another ambush by insurgents in the Al-Amiriyah neighborhood in eastern Baghdad results in the death of 1 soldier and the wounding of another. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a suicide attacker on a motorcycle rams into a restaurant in the Karada district, wounding 15 people, including 6 policemen. The restaurant is known to be frequented by police officers. Insurgents stage an attack on the convoy of Iraqi Vice President Aadel Abdul-Mahdi in the Dayala governorate of northeast Baghdad, killing 2 guards and injuring 3. The Vice President was not present at the time of the attack. A mortar shell injures 5 policemen and 3 civilians near the interior ministry. Four Iraqi soldiers conducting a patrol are

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fatally wounded when a roadside bomb explodes in Fallujah. Iraqi SWAT officers and American soldiers kill a suspected terrorist and arrest 16 others in joint operations conducted in Hilla. Six additional suspects are captured during similar operations in Mosul and Balad. The Iraqi army and U.S. soldiers uncover 2 weapons caches in Fallujah and detain 2 suspects.

- **August 16, 2005**—In the Sadr City area of Baghdad, gunmen fire upon a civil defense center, killing 2 police officers and injuring 2 others.
- **August 17, 2005**—In Baghdad, three consecutive car bombings within 30 minutes kill at least 43 and wound up to 90. Additional casualties include six members of the Iraqi security forces. Three suspects carrying remote controls were immediately arrested for suspicion of involvement. Near Kirkuk, six cousins and recent military graduates are shot and killed in an ambush. One policeman is shot to death in a bus station in Mosul. Six Iraqi soldiers guarding oil pipelines in northern Iraq die in a series of attacks by insurgents. Militants fatally shoot a police officer in Samarra.
- **August 18, 2005**—In Fallujah, 2 coordinated roadside bombs kill 3 Iraqi soldiers. Iraqi security forces discover IEDs in Mugdadiyah and Hawija.
- **August 20, 2005**—In western Baghdad, 2 soldiers are killed in a firefight with insurgents. Iraqi news sources report the wounding of Commander of the Iraqi Border Guards General Ali Hamdi al-Mousawi by U.S. soldiers, though the U.S. military denies this.
- **August 21, 2005**—In Samarra, a man wearing an Iraqi army uniform storms a house and kills 5 family members, missing only 1 family member, a young boy who hid when the attack began. Iraqi police officers confiscate 32 mortar rounds and 20 rockets in 2 locations in Baghdad.
- **August 22, 2005**—North of Baghdad in Tarmiyah, militants open fire on a bus carrying Iraqi policemen, killing 8 as well as 2 civilians and the bus driver. In Al-Sainiya, insurgents fire a mortar at a joint U.S.-Iraqi military base, resulting in the deaths of 5 Iraqi army soldiers. Two soldiers die and 3 are wounded as their patrol passes roadside bomb in Tulul al-Baj. Gunmen shoot and kill a senior police commander and his wife as they drove through Kirkuk. Armed insurgents kill 2 truck drivers and a guard with the special Facility Protection Security Force 50 kilometers north of Baquba.
- **August 23, 2005**—In Najaf, clashes between Iraqi security forces and supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr result in the deaths of 2 members of the Iraqi security forces and another Iraqi, as well as the wounding of 5 others. A suicide bomber in Baquba kills 1 police officer and 6 others at an emergency response coordination compound. However, conflicting reports announced that 3 additional police officers had died in the explosion and that 3 more were killed when they were mistakenly fired upon by American soldiers. Iraqi armed forces participating in Operation Hawk capture 5 insurgents in Ad-Dujayl, while 10 others are captured by Iraqi forces in Tikrit and Balad.
- **August 24, 2005**—In Baghdad, former members of Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus kill 13 Iraqi police officers, 27 civilians and a member of the American security force. Elsewhere in Baghdad, more than 30 suspected Sunni insurgents ambush Iraqi security forces as they respond to a car bombing, killing at least 15 and wounding 59. Special forces from the Interior Ministry are deployed in Najaf as approximately 1,000 demonstrators clash with followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, resulting in the deaths of 7 people and the wounding of dozens. Four bodyguards of Deputy Justice Minister Bosho Ibrahim die when their convoy is attacked by militants in Baghdad.
- **August 25, 2005**—In Baghdad, 13 are killed as large groups of insurgents attack Iraqi police checkpoints with rocket-propelled grenades, ostensibly in response to the newly drafted constitution. In various locations around Baghdad, Iraqi police hunt down attackers, killing 3 and capturing 1. Police officers also find 14 artillery rounds near the Kirkuk traffic circle. Clashes in southern Iraq between the Mahdi Army and the SCIRI, two rival Shiite Muslim groups, fill the streets. Iraqi police are not targets in this particular incident, but have been instructed not to intervene. Iraqi security forces enforce a curfew in Najaf after approximately 1,000 participate in silent protests.
- **August 26, 2005**—In Barwanah, joint U.S. and Iraqi forces arrest 6 suspected terrorists and confiscate 2 weapons caches. Another cache of Russian and Chinese weapons is found in Tuz. In Mosul, 16 suspects have been captured over the past 48 hours and one was killed in a firefight with police.
- **August 27, 2005**—In a western suburb of Baghdad, Iraqi security forces detain 3 men who admitted to kidnapping and killing Egyptian diplomat Ihab al-Sherif in July.
○ **August 28, 2005**—In Baghdad, 2 police are fatally shot during a patrol of the Al-Khadra neighborhood. Also in Baghdad, two other police are shot and killed in the Al-Jihad neighborhood. In a third Baghdad incident, 2 policemen die and 1 is wounded in after insurgents open fire on a patrol in the Al-Adil district. Gunmen ambush a checkpoint in Baquba, killing 2 policemen and wounding 1. The bodies of 3 policemen with fatal gunshot wounds are found near Fallujah in the town of Al-Therthar. Two additional policemen are found shot dead in Mosul.

○ **August 29, 2005**—In eastern Baghdad district of Azamiyah, armed insurgents shoot and kill senior Interior Ministry police officer Brig. Gen. Numan Salman Thabit while he was driving near the al-Nedaa mosque.

○ **August 30, 2005**—In western Baghdad, militants shoot and kill chief of Al-Ghazalia police station, Major Diya Hilal Taha. A lieutenant with the Iraqi special oil protection force, Mohammad Rashad, is fatally shot along with his bodyguard in Kirkuk. Two policemen are the causalities of a suicide car bomber in Samarra. 4 others were wounded.

○ **August 31, 2005**—In Kirkuk, 1 Iraqi police officer dies and 4 are wounded from a roadside bomb. The motorcade of Lieutenant Colonel Ali Keza’al, a director of intelligence in the Diyala province, is fired upon, leaving one bodyguard seriously injured, but causing no harm to the Lieutenant. One policeman is shot to death in Kerbala as he travels to work.

○ **September 1, 2005**—In Baquba, insurgents stage an ambush on a patrol, killing 2 policemen and wounding 2 others. Two mortar rounds fall on a police station but do not result in casualties.

○ **September 2, 2005**—In Baiji, a roadside bomb strikes an Iraqi military vehicle, killing 5 Iraqi soldiers and wounding 9. Two police officers are found dead in Baghdad, 1 on Al-Qanat Street and 1 near the Souk Al-Thulathaa area of Al-Zayouna district. In the Al-Jadriya area, an explosive device detonates, but no casualties are reported. A roadside bomb explodes near a police patrol on its way to Mahaweel, killing 1 policeman and wounding another.

○ **September 3, 2005**—In Baquba, insurgents kill 6 policemen in an ambush on a checkpoint. Four Iraqi soldiers die in a similar incident 30 miles north of Baquba in Adhaim. South of Baquba, 7 police officers and 2 soldiers are shot and killed. An additional 2 policemen are wounded. A firefight between Iraqi police and insurgents in Tal Afar results in one insurgent death but no police casualties.

○ **September 4, 2005**—In Siniyah, 5 Iraqi soldiers are shot and killed in a surprise attack by insurgents. 1 police officer dies and 2 are wounded as a result of a car bomb in Iskandariyah. Militants kill an Iraqi army lieutenant in Kirkuk. U.S. and Iraqi soldiers close off the town of Tal Afar as insurgent violence continues to rage.

○ **September 5, 2005**—As many as 30 gunmen in 10 cars open fire on the Iraqi Interior Ministry, resulting in the deaths of 2 policemen and the wounding of 5 others. Al Qaeda in Iraq claims responsibility in an internet statement. A raid conducted by joint U.S. and Iraqi security forces captures 50 suspected insurgents in Baghdad.

○ **September 6, 2005**—Joint U.S. and Iraqi forces stage a raid near the Syrian border, killing 2 foreign suspected insurgents and arresting 3 others. The U.S. military transfers full control of its Najaf base to Iraqi security forces. A bomb explodes near an Iraqi army vehicle in Khalidiya, triggering a firefight between insurgents and Iraqi security forces that kills 4 soldiers and 3 civilians, and injures an additional 5 soldiers. In Dhuluiya, an Iraqi army officer is shot and killed on his way home from work.


○ **September 8, 2005**—In an area west of Tikrit, 2 Iraqi soldiers guarding oil assets are the casualties of a roadside bomb. An additional 9 soldiers are wounded in the same attack. Iraqi soldiers announce the capture of 150 foreign suspected insurgents as well as 50 of their Iraqi counterparts as a result of military raids in Tal Afar. Search operations by the Iraqi security forces in Alexandria, Beiji, Mosul and Tal Afar root out 46 suspected terrorists and result in the confiscation an arms cache.

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September 9, 2005—In Rustamiyah, Iraqi security forces discover 6 unidentified bodies that had been tied up, shot, and dumped in the sewage system. Militants attack a police patrol in Baghdad, overturning one vehicle and burning another. One police officer dies and 3 are wounded in the overturned vehicle. A roadside bomb targeting a U.S. convoy kills 12 Iraqis, 7 of them policemen. In the Al-Alam neighborhood of central Baghdad, 3 police commandos and one other person die from another roadside bomb. A police colonel from the disbanded Iraqi army in Baiji is shot and killed while driving. In southwestern Baghdad, 2 guards from the government-run Facility Protection Service are critically injured after sustaining gunfire from insurgents. Elsewhere in Baghdad, 3 policemen are killed and 9 wounded from a roadside bombing in the Saydeyah district. Militants open fire on a police patrol in western Baghdad, killing 1 police officer and injuring 5. Insurgents target a separate police patrol with a roadside bomb between Yusufiya and Mahmudiyah, resulting in the deaths of 2 civilians but no policemen. In Baquba, 2 special force policemen are shot and killed by militants in an open market.

September 10, 2005—In Baquba, 4 Iraqis workers from a multi-national forces base are shot and killed on their way to work. In Khalis, an off-duty army officer is shot dead. Two off-duty police officers come under fire in Kirkuk, resulting in the death of 1 and the serious wounding of the other. Another policeman is seriously injured after being shot at while driving his superior’s car. Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari issues a decree sealing the border crossing into Syria and imposing a dusk till dawn curfew as 5,000 Iraqi forces backed by 3,500 American soldiers swept into Tal Afar in an offensive on the insurgent stronghold. Maj. Gen. Adnan Abdul Rhman, the Interior Ministry’s director of police training, is shot and killed in his home in western Baghdad as he waiting on a ride to work. The Iraqi Defense Minister announces that raids on Tal Afar will be extended to include Ramadi, Samarra, Rawa and Qa’im. Police in Kerbala discover and defuse a huge truck bomb before the start of a religious festival. A police officer approaches 2 small trucks in Mahawil and is subsequently killed as both trucks explode. Two Iraqi soldiers die from a bomb inside a house in Samarra. A car bomb targeting a police station in Al-Mashrouk kills 4 and injures 11.

September 11, 2005—An audiotape claimed by Al-Qaeda in Iraq is posted on the Internet telling insurgents to prepare for the “final battle.” Although the fighting has subsided in Tal Afar, U.S. and Iraqi soldiers continue raids, conducting a second day of house-to-house searches and battering down stone walls looking for insurgents and weapons. Joint forces worry that many insurgents have escaped through the tunnel system, which was discovered during the raids along with a bomb factory and 18 weapons caches. 90% of the population of Tal Afar fled the city before the raids and many are being housed in shelters while they wait for clashes to end. Police discover a large quantity of explosives in a truck headed for Kerbala. In Qa’im, 4 bodies, including one in an Iraqi army uniform, are discovered with their hands bound. Two policemen are wounded in Kirkuk as a bomb explodes near a police patrol guarding a main bus station.

September 12, 2005—In downtown Kirkuk, a father and son police duo are killed and 3 civilians wounded by gunfire. A roadside bomb strikes a military convoy in Fallujah, killing or wounding at least 6 Iraqi soldiers. The U.S. and Iraqi crackdown on Tal Afar continues, with joint forces announcing the killing or capture of nearly 450 insurgents as well as the discovery of 24 weapons caches and 12 booby-trapped houses during the operation so far. One Iraqi soldier dies in clashes with the insurgents in Tal Arar.

September 13, 2005—U.S. and Iraqi forces continue to battle insurgents in Tal Afar. In Baghdad, a suicide car bomber explodes as he approaches a police checkpoint, causing no casualties. A second suicide bomber at the same location is captured before his bomb is detonated.

September 14, 2005—In the Azimiyah district of Baghdad, gunmen fatally shoot 2 top police officials and 2 other police officers while they were driving. As rescuers rushed to the scene, a suicide car bomb exploded, killing 3 Iraqi soldiers and 4 policemen. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a car bomb targeting a National Guard convoy kills 2 people in the Shula district. Another suicide car bomber attacks a U.S. convoy, injuring 14 Iraqi police officers. There was no report of American casualties. An Iraqi army officer is shot dead in the Dora district. A civilian is wounded in the same incident. In the Al-Amin district, a roadside bomb wounds 3 policemen. Militants stage an attack on 2 police stations in the Karada district, critically wounding 3 police officers. Three soldiers and 3 civilians die in when a car bomb targets an Iraqi military patrol in the western Adel district. In the Aadamiah district, another car bomb aimed at a police patrol kills 2 policeman and wounds 1. Three Interior Ministry officials and 2 guards die in an attack on their convoy in the Waziriya district of northern Baghdad. 4 additional policemen who come to the scene as reinforcements are wounded by a suicide car bomber. An additional suicide car bomb attack injures 2 police officers near the Amiriyah district. Insurgents shoot
and kill a policeman south of Baghdad in Rumatha. North of Baghdad in the village of Taji, gunmen dressed in military uniforms execute 17 people from the Tameem tribe. The rise in violence in Baghdad that killed at least 152 people and injured 542 in a total of 12 attacks is attributed to the ongoing battle between joint U.S. and Iraqi forces and insurgents in Tal Afar. Al Qaeda in Iraq claims responsibility for the attacks in an Internet statement. In Tal Afar, fierce fighting escalates in the Kadistiya district. Elsewhere in Tal Afar, 2 Iraqi soldiers were seriously injured as they enter a booby-trapped house, triggering an explosion. Insurgents shoot and kill a policeman south of Baghdad in Rumatha. U.S. and Iraqi soldiers detain 8 people in Kirkuk accused of developing and setting up IEDs.

- **September 15, 2005**—In the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad, a series of bombings target Iraqi security forces. The first attack involves a suicide car bomber who kills 16 policemen and 5 civilians, and wounding 13 policemen. Shortly before noon, 2 additional suicide bombers detonate their explosives within a minute of each other and a half a mile apart, resulting in the deaths of 10 police officers and the wounding of 17. Elsewhere in Baghdad, another car bomber kills 4 police commandos and injures 12. In Kirkuk, a roadside bomb is detonated as a police patrol passes, killing 2 policemen and wounding 4, in addition to destroying the police vehicle. Gunmen open fire on U.S. and Iraqi soldiers in Ramadi, but no casualties are reported. One policeman dies and another is wounded during a firefight between insurgents and paramilitary police in the Saydiya neighborhood of Baghdad. Police discover the bodies of 8 men with their hands bound and fatal gunshot wounds to the head scattered across various location in Baghdad. All are unidentified except one who was recognized to be a policeman and whose wrists were handcuffed. In Baquba, a series of attacks by insurgents using mortars and small-arms fire kills 1 policeman and injures 3. A police major is abducted from his home and shot dead by masked gunmen in Samarra.

- **September 16, 2005**—South of Baghdad in the suburb Al-Hashwe, a car bomb detonates near a police patrol, killing 3 policemen and injuring 6. Four Iraqi soldiers are killed when roadside bomb explodes as their patrol passes in Khalidiya. A large explosion occurs within the Green Zone; no casualties are reported. Although clashes continue in Tal Afar, an Iraqi officer says that 95% of the city is now secure.

- **September 17, 2005**—In Balad, Iraqi troops thwart a 4-car attack on an army checkpoint. Two gunmen die and 2 others are arrested in the incident. Iraqi police discover 9 people in 3 separate locations around Baghdad shot dead in the head and chest. In Baquba, a suicide car bomber targets an Iraqi army patrol. One civilian dies and 17 people are injured, 3 of them policemen.

- **September 18, 2005**—In Kirkuk, a roadside bomb detonates near an Iraqi Army patrol, killing 3 Iraqi soldiers and wounding 4. The Chief of Domiz police announces the arrest of 4 suspected Al Qaeda members with suspected ties to senior Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Thawahri, and who were carrying on their person documents proving their involvement in Kirkuk and Diyala insurgent attacks. Kirkuk police capture another suspected Al-Qaeda member in a separate incident, and Iraqi security forces in Baghdad dismantle a booby-trapped vehicle without casualties. In Khalidiya, Iraqi police uncover 4 blindfolded bodies dead from gunshot wounds. Two of the dead were wearing Iraqi army uniforms. North of Baghdad, 20 bodies are found dead of gunshot wounds with their hands bound in the Tigris River. They are believed to be Iraqi security forces, although their identities are yet unconfirmed. Iraqi army troops with Coalition forces find and clear a weapons cache in northern Fallujah.

- **September 19, 2005**—South of Baghdad, 2 suicide bombers stage attacks at 2 separate checkpoints in Mahmoudiya and Latifiya on a road between Baghdad and Karbala, at a time when thousands of pilgrims are traveling to Karbala to celebrate the 12th Sh’ia imam. Ten people are killed, including 7 policemen and an Iraqi army member, and 12 are wounded. Reports indicate that 15 Iraqi soldiers have been taken hostage by unidentified militants west of Samara. A suicide bomber targets a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol near Taji. Fourteen Iraqi soldiers die in the attack. South of Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonates his explosives, killing 5 policemen and 2 civilians, and wounding an additional 13 police officers and bystanders. A bomb targeting the north oil pipeline protection forces kills 2 Iraqi policemen. In Kirkuk, Iraqi police arrest a shoot and kill a man suspected of planning to detonate a suicide car bomb. British troops storm a Basra prison to rescue 2 British commandos accused of shooting Iraqi troops, and a firefight between British and Iraqi military members ensues.

- **September 21, 2005**—After Iraqi security forces raid a militant safehouse in the Mansour neighborhood of western Baghdad, a firefight breaks out between Iraqi police and army members, and rebels hiding in the house. One police officer and 2 soldiers die along with 5 gunmen; an additional 3 policemen and 2 soldiers are wounded. Iraqi police and civilians rally in Basra in a protest against the British. West of Balad, the bodies of 19 Iraqi border guards are discovered with their hands bound and fatal gunshot wounds.
wounds to the head. 15 of the bodies are believed to be those of a group of border guards abducted on Sunday, September 18 near Samarra.

- **September 22, 2005**—Iraqi Gen Abdulaziz Mohammed announces the end to the 3-week joint U.S.-Iraqi operation in Tal Afar, noting that it has now moved into the final phase of reconstruction. On a highway between Baquba and Kanaan, militants kill a police colonel and his driver in drive-by shooting. Militants in the Zayouna area of Baghdad shoot and kill 3 Iraqi police officers and wound a fourth. A mortar attack on a police station in Samarra kills 1 police officer and injures 5. Heavy clashes between Iraqi security forces and insurgents result in the death of 1 civilian and the wounding of 3 additional civilians. There were no reports of security force casualties.

- **September 23, 2005**—Gunmen fatally shoot a policeman in Mosul. In southern Baghdad, a booby-trapped car driven by a suicide attacker explodes near a checkpoint, resulting in the death of 1 Iraqi soldier and the wounding of 4 others. Iraqi security forces arrest 10 suspected insurgents in a raid in Khalis.

- **September 24, 2005**—In Sinjar, a car bomb explodes near an Iraqi police checkpoint, killing 2 soldiers and wounding 2 policemen. An additional car bomber kills a child and wounds 2 policemen and 2 civilians at a checkpoint near Musayyib. A suicide car bomber detonates his explosives near an Iraqi army checkpoint in the Karrada district of Baghdad, killing 3 soldiers and 1 civilian, as well as wounding 3 soldiers and 2 civilians. In Beiji, 2 Iraqi soldiers and 4 civilians are wounded when an Iraqi army patrol comes under small arms fire. Gunmen ambush an Iraqi army patrol near al-Tooz, wounding 6 soldiers.

- **September 25, 2005**—In a slum in eastern Baghdad, a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol engages in a firefight with militants loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr during which at least 8 Shiite gunmen are killed and 5 are wounded. Nineteen joint forces are also wounded, including 13 commandos. A suicide bomber targets an Interior Ministry convoy in Baghdad, killing 7 Iraqi police commandos and 2 civilians when his explosives are detonated. Gunmen clash with Iraqi police in Mosul, resulting in the deaths of 2 civilians and the wounding of 3 others. No police force casualties were reported.

- **September 26, 2005**—A suicide car bomber attacks an Iraqi police checkpoint guarding government ministries, killing 6 policemen and injuring 13 others—5 policemen and 8 government workers.

- **September 27, 2005**—The Iraqi Ministry of Defense announces the start of an Coalition offensive on the insurgent stronghold of Samara, prompting the mass exodus of hundreds of Iraqi families from the city. In Baquba, a suicide bomber targets a police recruiting center, killing 12 Iraqi recruits and wounding 30. One policeman is killed and 3 others are wounded when gunmen open fire on a police patrol on a highway near the Green Zone. A roadside bomb detonates near a police patrol in Kirkuk, injuring 2 policemen and killing a civilian. Elsewhere in Kirkuk, gunmen assassinate police Major Fakhir Jalal Amin.

- **September 28, 2005**—In Tal Afar, the first Al Qaeda female suicide bomber dressed in men’s clothing detonates her explosives outside an army recruiting center, killing at least 7 and wounding 37, many of whom were signing up to join the Iraqi army. A policeman on his way to work in northeastern Baghdad is shot dead by gunmen. In the Huriya district of Baghdad, several men dressed in commando uniforms detain 6 people, all of whom were later found dead from gunshot wounds in Baghdad’s morgue. An explosion stemming from a roadside bomb on the Doura highway wounds 2 soldiers passing on patrol. In Baquba, a suicide car bomber targeting a security checkpoint kills 1 civilian and wounds 15 when his explosives are detonated. No police or military casualties were reported. Iraqi police seize a weapons cache in Mosul during a cordon-and-search operation.

- **September 29, 2005**—In the Jami’a neighborhood of western Baghdad, 2 high-ranking police officials from Balad are shot dead in a drive-by shooting. Elsewhere in western Baghdad, gunmen stage an attack on a police patrol in the Jihad neighborhood, killing 2 police officers and injuring 3. A roadside bomb explodes near the convoy of a police colonel in Kirkuk. The colonel escapes without injury but one of his bodyguards is wounded. In Khalis, gunmen fatally shoot a policeman and his brother. Militants kill 4 policemen and wound 1 in an ambush on a police convoy in Basra.

- **September 30, 2005**—In Kirkuk, police report the killing of a guard for the Housing and Reconstruction Ministry officials when gunmen attack their motorcade. Iraqi security forces arrest a woman in a Baghdad market strapped with explosives under her clothes.

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October 1, 2005—In the Shiite district of Sadr City, an Iraqi army officer is shot and killed in his car. A bomb targeting an Iraqi police patrol in Kirkuk detonates, killing 3 policemen and wounding 4. Four civilians are killed and 10 are injured. One soldier and a bus driver are killed in Baquba when gunmen open fire on their vehicle. An additional 3 soldiers are wounded. One Iraqi policeman and another Iraqi are killed upon detonation of a bomb targeting an army patrol in Dujail. In Miqadidiya, 2 Iraqi soldiers are killed and 3 are injured when they are ambushed by gunmen on their way to work.

October 2, 2005—In Baquba, militants stage an attack on a checkpoint, killing 3 Iraqi soldiers and injuring 3. Gunmen kill an Iraqi policeman in Ramadi. Iraqi police in Baquba arrest 17 suspected insurgents in a search-and-raid campaign.

October 3, 2005—In Kirkuk, militants kill 2 Iraqi police officers in an ambush on their vehicle.

October 4, 2005—A suicide bomber detonates his explosives at the main entrance of the Green Zone, killing two Iraqi police officers and a civilian, and wounding 4 Iraqi soldiers and 2 policemen. In Yusufiya, 4 Iraqi police commandos die and 14 are wounded during a firefight with militants. Operation River Gate, a mission to root out insurgents in the Anbar province near the Syrian border, is launched. It includes hundreds of Iraqi troops, and marks the most involvement yet of Iraqi soldiers with the U.S. military.

October 5, 2005—In Kirkuk, 6 security guards for the North Oil Company are critically wounded from a car bombing.

October 6, 2005—In Baghdad, a suicide bomber detonates his explosives near a police patrol by the Iraqi Oil Ministry, killing 5 police officers and 4 civilians, and wounding 4 policemen and 5 civilians. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a suicide bomber strikes a private security convoy, killing 3 civilians. No guard casualties were reported. In a third incident in Baghdad, a police officer is shot dead by militants. Insurgents kill Salem Ayoub Sillo, a local prison chief, and his driver in the Noor district of Mosul. Gunmen ambush and subsequently kill a retired brigadier-general in Kirkuk. Five Oil Ministry security guards are killed and 3 are wounded while driving in the town of Uthaim, south of Kirkuk. The Iraqi army announces plans to assign 2 additional battalions to guard the oil installations in Kirkuk. The 3 battalions already protecting the oil installations have seen an escalation in attacks. A group of approximately 30 insurgents stage a series of attacks on police checkpoints along the Mohammed Al-Qassem Highway in Central Baghdad. No casualties have yet been reported.

October 7, 2005—In an area near Al-Adheem, a roadside bomb explodes near a fuel tanker being driven by a group of security guards for a northern oil facility. When they step out of the vehicle to survey the damage, a group of armed militants stage an ambush, killing 3 guards and wounding 6. British troops seize 12 men, including several Iraqi policemen, during overnight raids in Basra. Many of those arrested include Sadr supporters and other members of militia groups. In the Ameriyah neighborhood of Baghdad, militants open fire on a taxi carrying Iraqi civil defense members, killing 2 of those members and wounding 2, as well as injuring the driver. Other separate shootings in Baghdad kill 3 policemen. Militants stage an attack on a police patrol in Kirkuk, killing 2 Iraqis and wounding 8, including 3 policemen. In Fallujah, a roadside bomb detonates by Iraqi troops and is immediately followed by an ambush by militants. Five Iraqi soldiers are killed. Operation Iron fist is completed, with an estimated total of over 50 insurgents killed. Operation Saratoga is underway in northern Iraq.

October 8, 2005—In western Baghdad, a suicide car bomber targets a police patrol, killing 1 policeman and 6 civilians, and wounding 10 policemen and 6 civilians. Other reports claimed up to 5 police casualties resulted from the explosion. Elsewhere in Baghdad, 2 roadside bombs aimed at Iraqi police and army patrols injure 4 soldiers and 1 civilian. Five Iraqi soldiers are wounded in a drive-by shooting near Hillah. In an area east of Mosul, 2 Iraqi policemen suffer gunshot wounds. Iraqi security forces with Coalition forces discover a bomb-making factory and a house containing a large amount of Al Qaeda audio/visual equipment while conducting clearing operations in Haditha under Operation River Gate. Iraqi soldiers strike several targets simultaneously to detain a total of 12 suspected terrorists.

October 9, 2005—In Samarra, insurgents disguised as policemen fatally shoot a teacher in front of students at a teacher training college. A video released by the Army of Ansar al-Sunna claims the group is responsible for the deaths of 2 Iraqi guards at an oil facility. In Saklawiya, a roadside bomb is detonated near an Iraqi army patrol. Human casualties are yet unknown. Gunmen open fire on a police vehicle in Baghdad, killing 2 police officers and wounding 1. In northern Mosul, militants shoot and kill the bodyguard of Iraqi Parliament member Hanin Mohammed al-Kadu while driving. Militants ambush a joint U.S.-Iraqi security rehearsal for next week’s vote on the Iraqi Constitution, killing 2 Iraqi troops.
October 10, 2005—Two Iraqi soldiers are killed and 2 wounded in an insurgent attack on their patrol south of Kirkuk. In western Baghdad near Al-Nusur Square, militants kill 3 policemen and wound 3 civilians in an attack on an Iraqi police patrol. Elsewhere in western Baghdad, gunmen open fire on a convoy carrying members of the Arab League delegation, killing 3 police officers and wounding 4. In a series of separate incidents in Baghdad, militants kill 1 policeman and wound 9 police. Eight police officers are wounded from an insurgent attack on a police checkpoint in the Khadimiya district of Baghdad. A bomb targeting a checkpoint near the Green Zone in Baghdad kills an Iraqi soldier, translator, and civilian, as well as a U.S. soldier. Also in Baghdad, police open fire on a suspected car bomber, causing the bomb to detonate prematurely. Four officers are wounded from the explosion. In continuing developments of Operation Saratoga, raids conducted in Kirkuk result in the arrest of 2 wanted insurgents and the confiscation of a small weapons cache.

October 11, 2005—In Baghdad, U.S. troops and Iraqi commandos detain 57 suspected terrorists and kill 2 others. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a suicide car bomber targets an Iraqi army patrol in the Amiriya district, killing more than 25 people. Early reports indicated that most of the casualties were soldiers. In Tikrit, a roadside bomb kills police Lt. Soud Abdul Kareem when it explodes near his house. Two policewomen are shot and killed while riding in a taxi in Doura.

October 12, 2005—In Tal Afar, a suicide bomber targets an army recruitment center, killing 30 Iraqis and wounding 40, nearly all of whom were waiting in line for jobs. A suicide bomber in Baghdad detonates his explosives near the convoy of Iraqi Minister of Provincial Affairs Saad Naif al-Hardan, wounding 5 bodyguards and 5 civilians, but leaving the Minister unharmed. In Baquba, a suicide bomber targets an Iraqi army checkpoint, causing injuries to 7 soldiers and 2 civilians. In the Ghazaliya area of Baghdad, joint forces seize a car being driven by a Somali suicide bomber as well as another car directly behind it carrying video equipment to document the bombing. The campaign against insurgents in the Anbar province continues, with the Iraqi Army 1st Division, also called the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), leading operations in Fallujah, Ramadi, Rawah, and Khalidiya.

October 13, 2005—Joint operations across Iraq involve raids of militant safehouses and enforcement of 10 p.m.–6 a.m. curfews ahead of this weekend’s upcoming constitutional referendum. In Mosul, police institute a temporary ban on all civilian vehicles. A Defense Ministry press release notes the arrest of 19 insurgents and the seizure of weapons and explosives in operations by the Iraqi security forces across Tikrit, Dholoeya, and Balad. It also announces the seizure of car bombs in Karbala and Saqlawiyah. A car bomb detonates in the city of Kirkuk, killing 2 policemen and wounding 2. U.S. and Iraqi forces announce that they are in the midst of Operation Sunrise II, an anti-insurgency effort launched September 15th that will continue through the referendum period in the Diyala province. Militants kidnap Said Ahmed said Kana’an Shakir, the secretary general of the Independent Turkmen Movement, and Hashim Ali, an official in the Turkmen Front, along with 9 of their bodyguards near Udaim. Gunmen shoot and kill a policeman from the Facility Protection Service in Baiji. Two mortar rounds land on the Aadamiyah police station in Baghdad, wounding 8 policemen, including Brigadier Khalid, director of the station.

October 14, 2005—In Muthanna, a masked insurgent opens fire on a police patrol using an automatic weapon. One policeman is injured but no deaths are reported. A roadside bomb east of Baghdad on the road to Baquba explodes near a police patrol, killing 4 policemen and wounding 3. In Samarra, gunmen ambush a polling station using RPGs and machine guns, injuring an undisclosed number of soldiers guarding the station. Two additional polling stations were fired upon in Baghdad. It is unknown whether the incidents resulted in human casualties. Two Iraqi soldiers and 1 policeman are wounded in a friendly fire incident in Kerbala. Reports indicate that the policemen opened fire on an army patrol when the patrol neglected to stop at a police checkpoint. A car bomb in Kirkuk injures 4 Northern Oil Company guards and 1 civilian. In Mosul, police arrest 15 insurgents as they prepare to launch an attack on polling stations.

October 15, 2005—In Baghdad, a suicide car bomber drives his vehicle into a truck carrying Oil Ministry staff, killing at least 6 people and wounding 14. Two of those killed were policemen and most of the remaining victims were from the Oil Ministry. Unconfirmed incidents were also reported in Basra and Ramadi. A roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi military convoy east of Baquba kills 3 soldiers.
and wounds 3. In Latifiyah, mortars land on a checkpoint overnight, killing 3 Iraqi soldiers and wounding 2. Two police units open fire on each other outside a polling station in the Amil district of Baghdad. Four civilians are wounded by the gunfire. In the Ghazaliya district of Baghdad, police injure 1 woman and 1 man in separate incidents in which police suspected insurgent activity. One policeman is wounded when 3 roadside bombs targeting a police patrol are detonated in the Amiriyah district of Baghdad. In Hilla, police defuse a car bomb with 12 mortar rounds. Joint U.S. and Iraqi troops engage in clashes with insurgents using mortars, rockets, and machine guns in the Ramadi province.

**Concerns over Iraqi Progress Following the Election**

In testimony before the Senate on February 3, 2005, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz acknowledged that many new Iraqi soldiers had failed to return to their posts after going home to deliver paychecks. He stated that Iraqi army units were experiencing absentee rates of up to 40 percent and that 1,342 Iraqi soldiers and police had died since June 2004. The problem of recruits going home with their paychecks had not been anticipated in the original timelines in the training plan, and delayed some training timelines dramatically.

In the same hearing, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, estimated that approximately 40,000 of the reported 136,000 members of the Iraqi military and security forces were trained and equipped to ‘go anywhere and take on any threat’ in Iraq. The rest, he acknowledged, were not yet ready for duties beyond policing calm parts of southern Iraq.

General John Abizaid, commander of CENTCOM, highlighted a different concern over the Iraqi military leadership. He stated, “There’s a shortage of trained officers that will respect the government, be loyal to the government and support the government over the long term.” Lt. Gen. Petraeus stated, “In an Iraqi unit, the leader is really of paramount importance. He sets the tone for an organization. There is really a premium on finding, investing in and strengthening good leaders.”

These warnings reflected the fact that some Iraqi unit leaders continued to be reluctant or unwilling to lead their unit into the field. In other cases, they deployed but acted like autocrats instead of leaders. Soldiers were sent on personal errands for the unit leader. Other Iraqi commanders take the view that the soldiers have to like the commander and be cajoled into accepting and completing missions. These views frustrated the US advisors and mentors that train these leaders.

The often rigid, hierarchical nature of the Iraqi chain of command presented another problem in creating effective leaders. Junior officers who exhibited promising initiative and leadership could be frustrated by the failure of higher-ups to delegate authority. Patrols and simple tasks could not be performed without the explicit order of the unit commander. US advisors worried that such an atmosphere would discourage the best soldiers and possible leaders from staying with the Iraqi military. They saw efforts to train junior officers in initiative and “leading forward” as critical, as well as efforts to create a Western-style force of well-trained and effective NCOs, but they worried about the scale and continuity of such Iraqi efforts to change the “culture” of Iraq’s forces.

In spite of major Iraqi and Coalition efforts to create mixed or "national units," observers were concerned that much of the officer corps remained more loyal to region, tribe, religion, or ethnic group than to the country. This presented the risk of separatism in the case of the Kurds and dominance in the case of the Shi’ites.
Both US experts and senior policy officials were concerned that the Shi’ite majority would purge Iraqi forces, and the Ministries of Defense and Interior. One US official in Baghdad reported that Shi’ites were indeed “clearing out political undesirables from the police and army.” To what degree this is happening and if it is widespread is unclear, but such actions would only push more armed men towards the insurgency.

The commander of MNF-I, General George W. Casey, highlighted four continuing problems in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2005. He pointed to the challenges of:174

- Providing the training, equipment, and sustainability to Iraqi forces while their force structure is in the midst of serious changes.
- Developing Iraqi forces without a system that measures their capabilities
- Enhancing loyalty and developing effective leadership in the Iraqi chain of command
- Creating police that can do their job in a violent atmosphere while respecting the rule of law.

Despite these challenges, US CENTCOM commander Gen. John P. Abizaid expressed optimism about the ultimate success of the force building effort in March 2005. He stated that “They [Iraqi forces] will get better and I think in 2005 will take on the majority of the tasks.”175

**Increasing Deployment and Activity**

In spite of the problems in the their overall readiness, Iraqi forces continued to intensify their military raids, and the number of active Iraqi units actually deployed and fighting the insurgent forces slowly continued to grow. A combination of Coalition and Iraqi raids led to significant insurgent casualties and captures, and to the deaths or capture of many mid-level fighters and some high level insurgent leaders, although most of most wanted insurgents remained elusive.176

HUMINT slowly improved, with growing support from Iraqi forces, and the capture of insurgents and terrorists helped provide additional information -- as did the capture of many of their records, diaries, and computers. US-run detention centers were nearing capacity. In January 2005, the number of captured insurgents reached the highest levels since March 2004. The US had roughly 7,900 “security detainees” in captivity in January 2005. The total then increased by another 20 percent to 11,350 by early May. Maj. Gen. William H. Bradenburg, commander of US detention operations in Iraq, declared that US and Iraqi forces were arresting an average of 50 suspected insurgents every day, with the 2005 average approaching 70 arrests per day.177

Press sources on such developments are uncertain, and sometimes conflicting, but they report that responsibility for providing security in parts of Baghdad began to be turned over to Iraqi forces in late February 2005 and in earnest in March 2005. The 305th “Tiger” Brigade of the Iraqi Army appears to have been the first unit to assume security responsibilities in parts of Baghdad in February.

In March 2005, the Tiger Brigade was joined by the 40th Iraqi Army Brigade, bringing the total number of neighborhoods in Baghdad in Iraqi Army hands to 10, including the violent Adhamiya neighborhood and Haifa Street. The commander of Iraqi forces in Baghdad, Gen. Mudhir Mawla, stated, “These operations now are being planned and
conducted 100 percent by the Iraqi forces." General Mawla recognized the significance of the gradual transfer, stating, “The plan depends on the success of the 40th Brigade in Baghdad. If we succeed in controlling Baghdad, then there will be no need for the presence of US forces. They will have bases outside of Baghdad.”

The mixed character of Iraqi performance was indicated by the fact that the US could deploy a former Iraqi National Guard unit like the 302nd Battalion to the troubled, Sadr-dominated, Haifa Road area in Baghdad and plan to deploy a force of some 10,000 Iraqis in Baghdad by late 2005 in an effort to replace US troops. The 1,000 men in the 302nd had also taken 26 casualties in 15 months of fighting -- a higher rate than most US units.

The 302nd was also one of the units that now had a 25-75 man US advisory team embedded in the unit, and was a demonstration of the effectiveness of having US forces help Iraqi units make the transition to full combat effectiveness in the field -- a shift in US training efforts that took place early in 2005 and which is described in more detail in the final chapter of this analysis. One special feature of this effort was deploying a team of US Special Forces to train a 30-man strike platoon in raids, targeting reconnaissance, and undercover intelligence.

At the same time, another such unit -- the 305th battalion -- that was deployed to Baghdad in May 2005 had lost 50 percent of its original strength to desertions since being formed in late 2003, and lost dozens more as it moved toward deployment. Its marksmanship and fire discipline remained terrible (soldiers would "cook" an entire magazine in a single poorly aimed burst), and it tended to "huddle," rather than actively patrol.

The Iraqi Army deployed units to real missions in increasing numbers, and by April, it had two areas of operation (AORs) of its own in Mosul and the Haifa Road area in Baghdad. The units performed well in providing security before the elections and in Mosul afterwards, although Iraqi battalions operated in areas near US battalions. Even in this case, however, two battalion commanders had to be replaced in Mosul, and one company commander after he hid from an angry crowd on election day.

Iraq also began to conduct independent operations in moderate to high threat areas like the greater Baghdad area. The Iraqi Interior and Defense Ministries announced on May 26 that they had launched a joint action dubbed “Operation Lightning” involving more than 40,000 Iraqi security forces in Baghdad. The troops, who manned 675 mobile checkpoints and mounted sweeps throughout the city, moved to gain control of all of the roads in and out of the city.

The US military reported that Operation Lightning led to a 38 percent reduction in vehicle-borne bombs exploding and a 23 percent increase in such bombs being detected prior to detonation. The operation decreased Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detonations by 10 percent and the number of coordinated or elaborate attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces fell by 18 percent.

Other major Iraqi operations included:

- Iraqi forces rehearsed, planned, and executed an infiltration and raid entirely on their own southeast of Mosul that yielded intelligence used to capture six insurgent suspects on May 26th.
At the end of May, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, stated on NBC’s *Today Show* that Iraqi Security Forces were conducting five operations completely on their own and without Coalition support.

Coalition forces and Iraq Security Forces uncovered approximately 50 insurgent weapons and ammunition caches in 72 hours in the Al Anbar province in early June. North of Karmah, the joint operation uncovered a series of bunkers that contained weapons, ammunition, night vision goggles, uniforms, cell phones, and living quarters. Reportedly, detainees and local residents providing tips that led to the successful raids.

In June, Iraqi and Coalition forces captured insurgent leader Mullah Mahdi in Mosul after a brief gun battle. Mahdi is believed to be linked to Ansar al-Sunna and to the Syrian intelligence service. According to Iraqi Maj. Gen. Khalil Ahmed al-Obeidi, “He [Mahdi] was wanted for almost all car bombs, assassinations of high officials, beheadings of Iraqi policemen and soldiers, and for launching attacks against multinational forces.” Despite Obeidi’s statements, the exact extent of Mahdi’s role in the insurgency is unclear.

At the same time, the government made efforts to persuade Sunni insurgent groups to give up their support for the insurgency and join Iraq’s new political process. The details of these talks are unclear. In a typical press report on such activity, Aiham Alsammarae -- a former electricity minister under the interim government -- claimed that he had been in contact with the leaders of the insurgent groups the Islamic Army in Iraq and the Mujahideen Army. Alsammarae claimed that he had met with the groups’ leaderships approximately 10 times in four months and that the leaders were ready to enter in to negotiations with the Iraqi government and the US. The Iraqi government had not been contacted by Alsammarae and neither had the MNF-I forces. It is clear, however, that progress was slow and limited.

**The New Force Evaluation Matrix**

The fact that virtually all active Iraqi units could take over some kind of useful mission by the summer of 2005 did not mean they had the readiness to take over most missions, or that more than a small portion could perform demanding missions. The vast majority of Iraqi military, security, and police units only had, the readiness to perform limited security missions.

Iraq’s evolving structure was still a very mixed force. Some units performed well. Others were evolving the leadership and sense of unit cohesion and integrity needed to become effective -- although often only with a major stiffening of US advisors and by a replacement policy that constantly fed in new officers and other ranks until the unit actually held together. However, there were still many cases where new -- and sometimes previously effective -- police and other units refused to fight, huddled in defensive positions, or had serious desertion rates. Corruption, nepotism and political favoritism, false manpower reports, and false activity reports continued to be serious problems – something that was inevitable in trying to develop security and police forces in a foreign culture and in a country that was governed in a corrupt manner for decades.

Iraqi forces had, however, advanced to the point where readiness could be judged in terms of unit mission capability, and not broad factors like “trained and equipped.” The Iraqi Army and National Guard, security services, and police were now being rated at a battalion or other individual level by a new evaluation matrix developed by the MNSTC-I. This matrix was developed by a combination of Iraqi brigade and battalion
commanders, and their US advisors, and looked at factors like manning levels, equipment levels, training, command and control, leadership, and logistics.

As has been touched upon earlier, this matrix was called the Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA). The assessment of operational units conducted through Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Coalition Military Transition Teams embedded at the battalion, brigade, and division level units for the Iraqi Army; Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) with MOI’s Special Police Commando battalions and Civil Intervention Forces; and partnership at the provincial levels with the Iraqi police forces.\(^\text{184}\)

As Figure 27 shows, the TRAs rated Iraqi units as having one of four levels of mission capability. This ranking system different by force type and evolved over time. For example, in July 2005, the assessments of military units took into account a variety of criteria similar to -- but not identical to -- the criteria U.S. Army used to evaluate its units’ operational readiness. They focused on factors like personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership. Overall, operational Iraqi Army units were categories assessed as follows:\(^\text{185}\)

- Level 1: Capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations independent of Coalition forces;
- Level 2: Capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition enablers (Level 2); or
- Level 3: Capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations only when operating alongside Coalition units (Level 3).
- Level 4: Incapable of operations.

The results of this readiness system are classified because MNF-I feels that too much detail would effectively target the less ready units for insurgent attack, and deprive them of some of their value as a deterrent and in performing less demanding missions. This is a major consideration since Level 1, 2, and 3 units can and are all perform some useful mission, even if most units cannot stand alone.

Reports on its outcome have, however, been issued in various “blogs” and press reports. According to some press reports, the Iraqi Army and National Guard had a total of 81 battalions by late May 2005, but a new evaluation matrix developed by the MNSTC-I only rated three battalions at the top level of readiness and capability, and this did not mean they were capable of independent operations. Only one of 26 brigade headquarters had such a rating.

If one included all of the special police battalions, the press reported that the total force rose from 81 battalions to 101, but the number rated in the top category only rose from three to five. The US had concluded that it needed to make further major increases in the number of US advisory or "transition teams" embedded in Iraqi units and was seeking to rapidly deploy 2,500 more men by mid-June.\(^\text{186}\)

For reasons touched upon earlier, the new rating system found that Iraqi units were particularly weak in logistics, because they were being rushed into combat readiness, and lack support personnel like truck drivers, supply clerks, medics and engineers. Instead of the nearly 50-50 tooth-to-tail ratio in US forces, only 4,000 of the 75,800 men in rated units were performing support function.
As a result, equipment still tended to mysteriously disappear, the manpower rolls sometimes had phantom soldiers, and maintenance and support were provided largely by US forces. This helps explain why the Iraqi government and MNF-I planned to convert one out of five companies in each Iraqi battalion -- some 140 men each -- into service support units; to create separate transportation regiments and an brigade, and set up 10 maintenance and supply bases across Iraq. 

MNSTC-I experts summarized the status of Iraqi forces in mid-June as follows: No special police units were rated “fully capable” and less than a handful of Army units. Some 40 percent of the special police units were rated “capable” and 20 percent of Army units. Some 40 percent of the special police units were rated “partially capable” and 45 percent of Army units. Less than 10 percent of the special police units were rated “incapable” and less than 20 percent of Army units.

Once again, the system was slower in ranking the regular police than the military and security forces. Only a small fraction of Iraq’s 940 police stations had been assessed using the new system as of May 1, 2005. The new readiness system was, however, being steadily expanded to cover the police, and the MNF-I described the effort as follows in late July 2005.

MOI Civil Intervention Forces (CIF), Emergency Response Units (ERU), and Special Police Commando Battalions are evaluated using a Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) process that is similar to that used for MOD forces. MNC-I Special Police Transition Teams (SPTTs) are embedded with the MOI’s Special Police Commando battalions and CIF. The SPTT criteria are similar to those of the MOD forces. Police Partnership Program (P3) teams are partnered at the provincial levels with the police to help identify areas of progress and shortcomings to determine when these forces will be able to assume independent control of their area of responsibility. In lieu of the TRA, police partnership assessments look at factors that are more tailored to the tasks of a police force. More than half of provincial police headquarters currently are assessed to have control in their province.

Progress in reaching the highest levels of readiness continued to be slow through the fall of 2005, but more than 60 Army/National Guard combat battalions could perform some role as “partially capable” forces by early August 2005, and more than 20 combat battalions were “capable.” In the case of special police forces -- which included the Public Order Battalions, Mechanized Battalions, Special Police Commando Battalions, and Emergency Response Units, there were roughly 28 battalion equivalents authorized and 21 actually operational. Some 10 each of these 21 battalions were “partially capable” or “fully capable.” A long way from a perfect force, but a much longer way from the strength of a single active battalion in July 2004.

US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace, spoke-as follows about the ability of Iraqi security forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations on their own. At a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing in June 2005, Gen. Pace stated:

Only a small number of Iraqi Security Forces are taking on the insurgents and terrorists by themselves. Approximately one-third of their army battalions are capable of planning, executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with coalition support. Approximately two-thirds of their army battalions and one half of their police battalions are partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with coalition units. Approximately one half of their police battalions are forming and not yet capable of conducting operations. The majority of Iraqi Security Forces are engaged in operations against the insurgency with varying degrees of cooperation and support from coalition forces. Many of these units have performed superbly in
conducting operations against the enemy, and their operational capability is continuing to improve.

The focus of Iraqi and MNF efforts had, however, shifted from force formation to force effectiveness, and by mid-2005, MNSTC-I's goal was to “graduate” most remaining units from basic/small unit training at Level 3 (“Fighting Alongside” coalition forces) by the end of 2005 through mid-2006. Their progression to Level 2 or Level 1 will follow on varying timelines. Some “graduated” units may still be assessed as Level 4 (Forming), but they should be the exception. Figure 27 details the evaluation metrics used by MNF-I for qualifying ISF readiness levels, as of June 2005.

**Figure 27**

**Iraqi Transition Readiness Assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1</strong></td>
<td>Fully Capable: A Level 1 unit is fully capable of planning, executing, and sustaining independent counterinsurgency operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2</strong></td>
<td>Capable: A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 3</strong></td>
<td>Partially Capable: A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations in conjunction with Coalition units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 4</strong></td>
<td>Incapable: A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNF-I, June 2005

**Manpower Relative to Force Structure as Another Measure of the Readiness of Iraqi Forces**

Other forms of MNF reporting provide additional insights into Iraqi progress in achieving readiness. Figure 28 shows the manpower in the Iraqi military force structure as of the end of June 2005. Three things are striking about the data in this figure. The first is the clear emergence of a 10-division Iraqi force structure in the Army, and of clearly defined unit elements in the Air Force and Navy. Readiness is not simply a matter of unit capability; it is a matter of developing a force structure that is large enough to be effective.

The second is the high manning levels in many units. There were many battalion and other force elements still badly understrength, but other units were overmanned. Iraqi forces were slowly coming together.

Third, while some 10-20 percent of Iraqi manpower was still on leave/pass status, the percentages that were actually absent without leave (AWOL) were now relatively low. In short, the basic structure to bring Iraqi military forces to a higher level of readiness was now in place.

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## Figure 28

### Iraqi Military Force Structure and Manpower Readiness

As of June 24, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force/Unit Element and Location</th>
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<th>Actual Assigned</th>
<th>Manned</th>
<th>Percent AWOL</th>
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**Iraqi Special Operations Forces**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOF HQ</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>829</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi C Task Force</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recce Company</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPT</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**III. Iraqi Navy**

**Iraqi Navy Force Structure**

<p>| | | | | |</p>
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<tr>
<td>Iraqi Navy HQ</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
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<td>191</td>
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<td>Iraqi Navy (Infantry)</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>192</td>
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**IV. Iraqi Air Force**

**Iraqi Air Force Structure**

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<td>Air Force HQ</td>
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<td>3rd Squadron VIP</td>
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<td>23rd Squadron Transport</td>
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<td>70th Squadron Recce</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>12th Squadron Jet Ranger</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Squadron Helo</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Squadron Helo</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th Squadron Recce</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNF-I
Problems and Progress in the Iraqi Police

For reasons discussed throughout this analysis, reports on the progress of the Iraqi police continued to be considerably more mixed than reports on the Iraqi Army and Security Forces, and varied sharply according to unit and the specific mission involved. The largely Iraqi-created Special Police Commandos, for example, got high praise for their aggressiveness, effectiveness, and discipline. The 5,000-man force was formed by former Minister of Interior Falah al-Nqib, with the help of his senior US advisor, Steve Casteel, a former DEA official with extensive experience with narcoterrorism in Latin America. It was led by Adnan Thabit, a former "Ba'athist," and performed well in Mosul, Ramadi, Baghdad, and Samarra, and acquired a reputation for its toughness, although not for its gentleness and respect for human rights.

In Baghdad, special police commandos under the command of Brig. Gen. Rashid Flaieh became embroiled in a controversy surrounding the deaths of 10 Sunni suspects in July 2005. Flaieh’s commandos received fire from insurgents near Amariya. Though several of the commandos were injured, they returned fire and then pursued the fleeing gunmen. When General Flaieh took his wounded to the Noor Hospital, close to Abu Ghraib, an area known for its support of the insurgency, he was informed that several militants were being treated inside. According to General Flaieh, his men recognized 10 of those who had attacked them, restrained them, and put them into an “armored van.”

It remains unclear whether the commandos were from the First Brigade as alleged by doctors or whether they were members of a paramilitary force called the Special Security force as General Flaieh maintains. The suspects were locked in the van for two hours according to the general, while witnesses said it was more like 12 hours. When the van was opened up, all 10 Sunnis, all members of the Zobaas and Dulaimi tribes known to be involved in the insurgency, had suffocated. According to doctors who examined the bodies, the victims’ bodies indicated that they had been subjected to electrical shock and cable beatings. General Flaieh denied that the suspects had been tortured an asserted that they had suffocated in the van due to a faulty air conditioner. Virtually all of the details of the encounter were disputed by doctors, witnesses, and other policemen.

Doctors at the al Yarmouk hospital went on strike in July 2005 in protest over rough treatment at the hands of the Iraqi Army. According to medical staff, soldiers entered the hospital with their weapons, actions forbidden by a government order signed by Barham Saleh, pulled blankets off of women patients, and insulted the overnight doctor. The doctors demanded that the soldiers apologize to the doctor, that security be provided for all of the hospital’s doctors, and that the MOD and MOI should rigidly enforce the prohibition of weapons in hospitals.

Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabr responded to charges of detainee abuse by Iraqi soldiers in July by reiterating the fact that he had strengthened the office of the Inspector General. Jabr stated that he had empowered the Inspector General to investigate human rights abuses and allegations of corruption. The Inspector General was given the ability to bring charges against individuals involved in human rights abuses and instances of corruption. Lastly, the IG was instructed to inform the interior minister of all such cases. Jabr pointed out that the ministry had arrested individuals within the ministry who were found to have been involved in such instances.

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The danger, however, is that if such incidents are repeated, the MOI and MOD forces, largely composed of Shi’ites and some Saddam-era soldiers, will fail to attract Sunni support and rather be seen as an instrument of oppression rather than an example of the rule of law. The goal is to create a force that reinforces the law and elicits respect from the Iraqi people, not an apparatus reminiscent of Saddam’s police state.

There were also reports of the slow rebuilding of Iraqi police units in Mosul, and in its approaches like the town of Qayyarah on the Tigris and along the main Mosul to Baghdad highway. The area had become a major trouble spot after insurgents fled the battle of Fallujah, and police in the area had suddenly deserted in numbers that cut their strength from 2,000 to 50. By April 2005, however, many units were up to strength and the police were actively patrolling the area.\(^{194}\)

General Abizaid and four other high ranking US officers gave briefings in late May 2005 that made it clear that they felt the police had fallen behind the regular military forces, and this meant Army units and elite units had to be used for security duties, rather than replacing Coalition forces in combat. They took an unusually public stance on the issue, and some warned that it would “take years” to make such Iraqi forces effective and deal with the insurgency. They also stated that these problems with the police were a key reason why Iraqi forces could not participate actively in Operation Matador in April, the largest Marine offensive since Fallujah and a key effort to secure main routes in from Syria and the Syrian border area. They claimed the lack of troops was also a reason so many insurgents were able to disperse.\(^{195}\)

At the same time, some of these problems had occurred because the police took the brunt of insurgent attacks, largely because they were more exposed and more vulnerable. According to Pentagon sources, the police took the vast majority of the 1,850 casualties in Iraqi forces that Department of Defense sources had counted as of mid-May 2005.\(^{196}\) Given the lack of training, equipment, facilities and leadership they began with, it is not surprising that there were many cases where police units had high desertion rates, huddled in their headquarters, or did not perform their duties. There were also cases where they performed actions like torturing three Shi’ite militiamen in their custody to death.\(^{197}\)

The problems in the police were compounded by the lack of a retirement system under Saddam Hussein's government that meant older police, and even their widows, were carried as active to give them some income. Selection and promotion by favoritism, and bribe taking had become part of the police culture, as had passively waiting for complaints from victims, and then taking money from both the accused and complainant. The lack of a fully staffed financial management, manpower, and planning, and financial control structure in the Minister of the Interior also added to these problems.

By the early fall of 2005, however, things had made some limited improvements. The Ministry of Defense was now gradually beginning to take shape as a functioning ministry, and with key staff elements like an inspector general. As has been shown earlier, most serious equipment problems had been corrected, although problems existed in the way the inventory was distributed. Figures 23, 24, and 25 have already shown the improvement in training, and "trained and equipped" manpower exceed 91,000 in the early summer (including 58,764 police, 5,136 in the civil intervention force, 8131 police

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commando, 205 in the central Emergency Response Unit, 1,118 highway patrol, and 500 dignitary protection), and a tentative force goal of 135,000 men had been established. These figures did not include any men from the older Civil Defense Force, or any of the 74,400 men still assigned to the remnants of the relatively low grade Facilities Protection Service.

The Iraqi Special Police Force had made progress toward reaching a strength of some 56,000 men, although serious questions remained about how broadly-based its leadership and manpower were, and how many Sunnis were included:

- As of October 1, 2004, there were three Police Commando Battalions, no Public Order Battalions, and no Mechanized Police Battalions; this gave the Iraqi Special Police a total strength of only three battalions, none of which were rated as operational. All were deployed at Ar Rustamayiah in the greater Baghdad area. All were deployed at Ar Rustamayiah in the greater Baghdad area.

- As of May 30, 2004, the operational strength of the Iraqi Special police included nine Police Commando Battalions, 12 Public Order Battalions, 2 Mechanized Police Battalions and 4 Special Border Forces; this gave the Iraqi Special Police a total operational strength of 27 battalions. In addition, four more battalions were in training, including three Police Commando Battalions and 1 Mechanized Police Battalion. There were also 27 SWAT teams with an average of 27 men each. Forces were now deployed in the Mosul area, active in the greater Baghdad area, operating in Fallujah and Ar Ramadi, deployed at An Numaniyah and Scania, and beginning to deploy in the west in Al Anbar.

These efforts were backed by the same new "top down" approach to embedding trainers and partners in both the Ministry of the Interior and active regular police operations that was now being used in the military and special police. The previous training effort had been restructured to create both a Police Partnership Program (Ministry of the Interior), and an integrated Police Partnership Program (Provincial), called the P3(P), to work with the force in each province.

The teams in the MOI provide a core of trainers to help the Minister become more functional. The provincial or P3(P) teams were designed to give the police in each province a steadily higher degree of independence and eventually create the conditions for the disengagement of provincial Coalition forces. P3 teams with a nominal strength of ten men, covering the full range of necessary expertise in an integrated team, were being deployed to assist senior Iraqi police, and act as partners in staffing provincial headquarters. A total of 19 teams had been set up by June 2005, although the majority were still in the process of acquiring all the necessary manpower.

These teams operated from forward operating bases near the headquarters and helped police leaders to deal with key problems such as logistics, intelligence, financial accounting and contracts, budget planning and management, special police operations, counter-insurgency, and communications. By June 2005, there were over 480 such advisors active in the field. The goal was to maintain 500 posts and build toward 600, while developing an effective liaison between their efforts and the work of Coalition forces.

This improvement in training was accompanied by some improvement in leadership. Much of the old order at the top was gone, and many new leaders were men who had
come from the army and who had strongly opposed the old system. By June 2005, 17 of the 18 provincial chiefs were ex-military.

A major crimes unit was being established that actually investigated, rather than simply put people in jail. Police elements were slowly being rebuilt in cities like Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, and Bajji using manpower that was taken from outside the region and less subject to influence and intimidation. Efforts were underway to reduce favoritism, provide proper pay, eliminate corruption, and provide the kind of entry and lower level training that had been totally missing in the regular police force under Saddam Hussein. While illiteracy had not been eliminated, it was being reduced.

The Iraqi people were coming into stations in larger numbers, providing more intelligence, and using telephone tiplines. The result was a major improvement in regular police capabilities in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces.

The CPATT and Ministry of Interior also had developed reporting systems designed to measure the readiness of the regular police, and their levels of Manning and equipment, similar to those used for military units. These included detailed monthly police station reports, which covered Manning, training, readiness, and equipment. Personnel quality was surveyed in depth, including activities like prisoner rights and human rights, and property accountability.

These were used to develop summaries of police activity by province. For example, the May report on police stations in Baghdad Province for May 2005 scored leadership at 51 percent, station Manning at 72 percent, personnel status at 92 percent, training at 75 percent, effectiveness at 74 percent, force protection at 74 percent, equipment at 86 percent, and facilities at 86 percent. Detailed assessments were made within each category, and the reports include data on crime rates and detainees. There had been 86 insurgent attacks on stations in Baghdad Province in May; 102 police were killed in action and 257 were wounded, and the stations held 689 detainees, 56 percent of which were rated as non-violent.

These provincial reports include detailed equipment counts and comparisons against authorized holdings, analysis of force protection systems, percentage data on the adequacy of training by rank, analyses of intelligence capabilities, and analysis of financial management capabilities. There was also an independent assessment by the provincial chief of police. Each province was then rated according to the same four levels of readiness used for the military and special police units.

This system was still in the process of implementation in the early summer of 2005, but it again showed that major progress had been made, and that a serious attempt to establish real-world readiness standards was underway.

**The Iraqi Border Forces**

The Iraqi Border Police were still a largely hollow force as of the early summer of 2005, but serious efforts were underway to increase their numbers, improve their training and equipments, give them better facilities, and create a new chain of forts along the Iraqi-Syrian border. A tentative force goal of some 40,000 men was shown on their organization charts, but the border enforcement forces only had 15,583 actives, and the Iraqi BDP only had 500 men assigned for an authorized strength of 2,760.
While Muhammed Sabr in the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement called his men "desert wolves," this scarcely seemed to be the case. Interviews and Press reports indicated their performance was weak on the Jordanian, Saudi, and Iranian borders, and very weak on the Syrian border. One press report indicated that some Border forts had lost some 80 percent of their manning, lacked weapons, furniture, and even uniforms. Some had been looted and others destroyed by insurgents. Of the 32 border forts originally planned for Al Anbar Province, many had not been completed, others abandoned, and many were badly understaffed. Trucks (and men) routinely entered Iraqi illegally for small bribes.

The Department of Defense touched on some of these problems in its July 2005 reporting on the force:

To date, more than 15,500 Border Police have been trained. The Border Police receive training in small unit patrolling, vehicle search, personnel search, rights of the individual, life saving, Iraqi Border Law, handling of detainees, and weapons. Border police equipment includes Chevy Luv pick-up trucks, mid-size SUVs, Nissan pick-up trucks, AK 47s, PKC machine guns, Glock pistols, HF radios, and body armor.

Currently, the ISF do not have a system in place to track the Border Police’s readiness and capabilities. The goal is for each member and station to be equipped with mission-essential equipment. No estimate exists on the percentage of desertion and absenteeism, although we know that the Border Police has experienced a significant rate of attrition. The extent of insurgent infiltration varies by province. In some areas of the border, there appears to be a high level of insurgent infiltration.

The effectiveness of the Border Police officer cadres and the chain of command varies widely but is generally moderate to low. An effort has been ongoing to energize the Border Police leadership and recruit for the Border Police Academy.

The border forces were, however, beginning to get the training they needed. Border forts and facilities were largely complete in the eastern border area with Iran, and facilities and equipment were being improved in the north and south. While any such plans had to be tentative, the strength of the Border Defense Force Battalions had already risen sharply and plans for further expansion were under way. These plans are shown in Figure 29. Iraq was increasing the number of regional headquarters from 5 to 8, and planned to establish 16 regional brigade headquarters to provide better coordination and direction. It had created a central headquarters and training academy and three regional training academies.

The MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and MOD were working to help Iraq regain control of its borders in the tough spots (primarily the border with Syria) as soon as possible. This effort was in its early stages, but reconstruction of the border forts in those areas, generation of additional border guards, generation of additional Iraqi Army units, and support for the Ports of Entry (where Department of Homeland Security Border Support Teams now provided some support) were all underway.

Iraq’s First Special Border Force Battalion was operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar Province by the summer of 2005. The Second Battalion completed training in early February and has begun its deployments, and a third completed training in March. Construction on new facilities in the West was underway.
Border Transition Teams were to begin linking up with Iraqi Border Guard units in August and September, and were already in Iraq and completing their final preparations. This too was a large and complex effort, but was at least underway and may help reduce the number of foreign suicide bombers and movement of funds/leaders. It will also have an impact on smuggling, which saps some of Iraq’s economic power. It will, however, require additional equipment and technology, such as backscatter X-ray machines (already finding contraband at the Ports of Entry) and the PISCES system (which requires significant database development to be effective in the mid-term).

In short, the border forces still had a long way to go, but the situation was getting better.

### Figure 29

**Iraq Border Defense Battalion Deployments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Border Defense Battalions by Region</th>
<th>Actual March 05</th>
<th>Planned Additional Units</th>
<th>July 05</th>
<th>Jan 06</th>
<th>August 06</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Border</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Border</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Border</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwaiti Border</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian Border</td>
<td>12-13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Border</td>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Additional</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Active at Time Shown</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Construction on new facilities in the West was underway. The border forces had a long, long way to go, but the situation was getting better.

**The Issue of Financing**

By the summer of 2005, Iraqi forces had grown to the point where financing was beginning to be a major issue, particularly to those Iraqi officials who were concerned with how the Iraq forces should be shaped and self-financed once the insurgency was largely over.

By mid-May of 2005, some $6.21 billion had already been made available for Iraqi force development, of which only $1.0 billion had come from Iraqi funding and $5.21 billion from US appropriated funds. Some $5.41 billion of this funding was to be executed in programs run by MNSTC-L. The accounting for these funds was anything but neat, but Figure 30 shows where the money went in broad terms and what the key priorities were during the initial stages of Iraqi force development.
In terms of ongoing funding priorities, money had to be allocated to projects like creating a standardized battalion table of organization and equipment (TO&E), fielding a mechanized division and motorized division, creating a fourth Special Police Commando brigade, and enabling Iraqi Army units to occupy uncovered Coalition bases. The MNF had also worked with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to identified some $5.7 billion in proposed funding, including $2.6 billion for the MOD, $1.4 billion for the MOI, $1.1 billion for construction, and $180 million for quick reaction forces. In addition, $409 million was to be diverted to such projects as the Jordan Training Center ($99 million), improving Army operations and maintenance ($210 million), and Tier 1 personal security detachments ($100 million).

Key Ministry of Defense proposals included 39 projects. These included completing the 1st Mechanized Division, add a motorized division, adding sustainment including seven base units and a vehicle maintenance contract, buying more tactical communications equipment, and funding branch schools. They also included funding for more support units such as 3 division-level signal companies, 3 IS&R companies, 9 MP companies, and 5 motorized rifle regiments. It is notable that at this point funds were limited enough so that they could not buy five divisions worth of tactical communications equipment, support companies for some battalions, 18 oil security Battalions, and an additional Motor Transport Regiment.

Key Ministry of Defense proposals included 43 projects. These included life support systems, equipping and training 6 Police Commando Battalions, equipment and training for more personnel for Public Order Battalions, secure communications for major headquarters, training funding, and maintenance contracts for a variety of system. Funds were too limited to buy full equipment and training for the Department of Border Enforcement, an IT systems architecture for the Ministry, equipment to expand the Highway Patrol, equipment for two more Public Order Brigades, equipment and training for 15 Police Commando Battalions, UHF/HF radios, and expansion of the Mosul Academy.

In addition, there were some 50 detailed construction projects for various elements of the military, security, and police forces.

Such detail may seem relatively mundane until it is realized how important it is in creating balanced force quality in both the military and police services, and the capability to transition from Coalition to Iraqi forces over time. The very fact that such financing plans existed, and were prioritized within each Ministry, also represented a major advance over the previous year.

At the same time, the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior still faced major problems in terms of planning and managing their resources. Both Ministries had several problems in common. The overall structure of financial planning and management in each Ministry was weak, and the departments designed to control the flow of money had limited effectiveness. Coordination with the MNF-I and MNSTC-I was poor, and in critical areas like equipment purchases, there was little coordination. MNSTC-I could placed one set of orders based on its force plans, and various elements of the MoD and MoI placed orders for different force plans on their own. The Ministry of Finance exercised little control, and there was little coordination of the Coalition aid effort and the
Iraqi budget at the planning level and at any detailed level of fiscal control and responsibility.

The July 2005 report of the Inspector General of the Department of State and Department of Defense illustrate the practical impact of some of these problems on the Iraqi police services, but such problems affected both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and every element of the Iraqi forces:

On the resource front, an immediate issue is the MOI budget. For FY05 (January 1–December 31, 2005), the MOI budget is adequate to fund salaries of 128,000 employees. Some time before this fieldwork, then IIG Prime Minister Allawi approved funding for 156,000. The Council of Ministers did not ratify this decision; hence, the Minister of Finance did not fund MOI’s increased requirement. Meanwhile, present MOI personnel (both IPs and staff, the latter predominantly at MOI headquarters in Baghdad) number about 170,000. By training additional IPs, CPATT effectively exacerbates the budget shortfall.

A factor in the MOI’s financial capability to sustain the growing IPS force is the considerable, though undetermined, number of ‘ghost’ employees on the ministry’s roster. Although not productively engaged in the MOI’s structure, these persons are, nonetheless, on the payroll. Some encumber sinecures for family or tribal members. Others are retired personnel who draw salaries in a socio-economic system without adequate—or any—pensions.

It is conceivable that the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) may allocate additional FY05 funds to the MOI. Absent such action, some Coalition officials opine that capital development funds could be shifted within the MOI budget to cover salary shortfalls, although the MOI Deputy Minister states categorically that shifting resources between funding ‘chapters’ is not possible. One senior Coalition official posits that, contingent on Congress approval of the DoD supplemental legislation and the requested $5.7 billion additional training fund, the U.S. may be able to cover the prospective MOI budget deficit relative to IPS salaries. At best, this would be a stopgap measure. More importantly, the IG Team believes any such action would establish an unfortunate financial and political precedent.

…The Coalition IPS training program is capital intensive. Thus far, the U.S. Government has spent about $190 million in building or renovating training facilities both at JIPTC and inside Iraq. By and large, the Coalition created the facilities. The MOI will inherit them. The Deputy Minister of Interior (Finance) told the IG Team that the “MOI has no funding in the Ministry’s FY05 budget for police academies.” Thus, the Coalition will bear the full cost of operating and maintaining these facilities. Yet to be determined are the costs for out-year operation and maintenance (O&M) and the MOI’s determination and ability to shoulder those costs.

Corruption remained a major problem, particularly in the equipment and purchasing sections of the MoD, although the new government had made a major effort to clean up this aspect of the Ministry’s operations and find more honest officials. The hiring of manpower within the services and the Ministries often far exceeded authorized levels, a problem compounded by phantom appointments, favoritism, and nepotism. In short, the progress in force development outpaced the ability to plan and allocate resources—a problem that promised to be far more serious in the future as MoD and MoI expenditures put more and more strain on the budget, and the Coalition spent available aid funds.

It was also clear that these problems would create problems for the Iraqi government as it took over full responsibility from the MNF and MNSTC-I. The Iraqi government would have to exercise far tighter control over planning, costs, and expenditures to keep the cost of Iraqi forces within its budget. Aid would almost certainly diminish, while competing civil needs would take on higher priority as security improved. Iraq would also have to make hard choices in funding forces capable of defending its borders against potential
foreign threat, as distinguished from forces focused on counterinsurgency. As was the case in virtually every aspect of Iraqi force development, “progress” was very different from “success” or “victory.”

**Figure 30**

**Allocation of US Aid Funding to Iraqi Forces**

(Millions of $US Funded as of May 15, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Initial IRRF: $3.2 billion in FY04 Supplemental</th>
<th>IRRF Reallocation $1.8 billion In Reprogramming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army Forces</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi National Guard</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Training, International Police Advisors</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Police Training, Adnon Palace</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized Police infrastructure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public training and facilities</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP/ERU expansion; addition 45,000 IPS officers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Enforcement (DBE)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBE Border Forts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional 20,000 DBE officers</td>
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<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service (FPS)</td>
<td>73</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

X. Iraqi Military and Security Forces after the October 15, 2005 Constitutional Referendum

On October 31, 2006, Iraq asked the United Nations Security Council to let the US-led multinational force remain in Iraq for another year, acknowledging that its own troops could not yet assure national security. Just a day later, Donald Rumsfeld, speaking at a Pentagon briefing, did not rule out the possibility of increasing U.S. presence in Iraq as the December election drew near. While progress continued to be made in the effort to recruit, train, and equip Iraqi forces -- by steps rather than leaps -- both sides understood that the effort to stand up a self-sufficient ISF remained very much a work in progress and would take at least several years.

The Effort to Create an Independent ISF

As of October 1, 2005, MNSTC-I took operational control of the former Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRM0) MOI and MOD missions. Those two groups, formerly under the control of the US State Department, then became know as P3 MOI and MOD-AST, respectively.

Following the October 15 election, MNSTC-I began to place more emphasis on filling out the capabilities needed not only for combat operability but for enabling a more independent ISF. Key to this effort was the creation of a competent officer corps, which is given greater attention later in this chapter. Also key to the ISF’s ability to stand on its own was the creation of working combat support and combat service support capabilities, as well as the attendant logistical training. Figure 32 provides data on the numbers of ISF personnel who had received or were receiving CS and CSS training as of November 2005.

Increasing Deployment and Activity

According General Casey, Iraqi Security Forces had conducted about 160 combined or independent operations at the company level and above in May 2005. By September, that number was up to 1,300. Casey further stated that some 60,000 to 70,000 more Iraqi forces would be available to provide security during the October 15 referendum than were available during the January 2005 elections. This number will have increased to 100,000 more Iraqi security force personnel by the time of the next parliamentary election on December 15, 2005. The growth was so significant, he said, that he’s only had to ask for an additional 2,000 troops to help protect the 2005 referendum and election progress, compared to 12,000 in January for the first election.

In October 3, 2005, the U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq officially handed over military control of parts of central Baghdad to the Iraqi Army's Sixth Division. The move transferred control of security responsibilities for the Karkh and Rasafa districts. The Coalition had also begun transferring control of bases to Iraqi command. On September 6, 2005, the US Army handed over its base in Najaf, giving Iraqis full control of the city. On September 28, 2005, the US handed over its base in Karbala, south of Baghdad, giving Iraqis full control of the city. Figure 31 shows Iraqi National Force deployments by location between July 1, 2004 and October 19, 2005.
Ongoing Force Developments

The following developments were taking place in the forces under the command of the different ministries.

○ Ministry of Defense

- In September of 2005, the Ministry of Defense continued to take over more training functions from the Coalition, including three Regional Training Centers. By this time, the MOD was in charge of the Iraqi Army Service and Support Institute (formerly the Combat Service and Support School), the Military Intelligence School, the Military Police School, and the Engineering School. These Iraqi-led schools and training centers were meant to better enable Iraqis to continue improvements in their ability to provide tactical logistical support and combat enablers to the combat battalions.

○ Ministry of Interior

- By the fall of 2005, that force had grown to nearly 10,000 commandos trained and equipped, with 2,000 coming online between July and September of 2005. This placed MNSTC-I ahead of its projection to train and equip 9,800 Commandos by the October 15 referendum. The Government of Iraq had authorized a total force of more than 11,800 Commandos, which MNSTC-I planned to train and equip by May 2006.

- By September 2005, a total of 67,500 Iraqi Police Service IPS members had been trained and equipped, an increase of 5,500 since July 2005. This fell behind due course for 75,000 IPS trained and equipped by the time of the October 15, projected by MNSTC-I. However, MNSTC-I maintained that it would still reach its full-authorized complement of 135,000 IPS by February 2007.

- By September 2005 more than 44,400 police recruits had completed the eight-week basic police training at the Jordan International Police Training Center and the Baghdad Police College, as well as seven smaller regional academies. The police training curriculum was increased between July and September 2005, and new police academy graduates were receiving informal mentoring from veteran Iraqi police. Some IPS station commanders still question the adequacy of initial training, but they are continuing training at the station level.

- As of September 2005, there were 28 Special Police Force battalions capable of combat operations, an increase of 13 since July 2005. Along with the Iraqi Army, the Special Police Commandos and the Public Order Police contributed to operations in Tal Afar, and the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade was assigned to provide route security to reduce the incidence of insurgent attacks along the highway from the International Zone to Baghdad International Airport.

- The Government of Iraq had authorized a total force of more than 28,300 Border Police, which MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by May 2006. These forces are organized into 36 battalions that will man the 258 border forts around Iraq. As of September 20, 152 forts had been completed, with a total of 250 projected to be reconstructed or renovated by November 30, 2005; all border fort construction is scheduled to be complete by January 2006. To stem the flow of foreign fighters from Syria, priority was given to work on the Iraqi-Syrian border in the summer of 2005.

○ Other

- NTM-I completed instructor training for 24 Iraqis in July 2005. The class included nine Iraqi colonels and 15 lieutenant colonels. Eighty-eight Iraqi students started pilot Joint Staff College courses on September 25.
On September 27, 2005 Dr Ibrahim Jaafari, Prime Minister of Iraq, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, opened a new staff college for the Iraqi army, in Rustimiyah in southeast Baghdad. They were accompanied by the Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jaber, the head of the Iraqi armed forces, Gen Babiker Zebari and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, US Marine General James Jones. The College began courses that day for 90 trainees drawn from the rank of major and lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi army. The courses were being given by Iraqi trainers supported by NATO trainers.

Overall force strength trends from 7/27/05 to 10/5/05 are detailed in Figure 36 and Figure 37, for the ministries of Defense and Interior, respectively.

**Progress in the Force Evaluation Matrix**

During a September 30, 2005 press briefing, Gen. Casey explained that the three Level 1 units were actually one brigade and two battalions, and that they failed to meet these re-adjusted standards upon re-evaluation. Upon re-evaluation, it was found that only one battalion out of 110 met standards for the top tier of readiness. In terms of troops, this means that no more than 750 troops out of some 200,000 were rated at Level 1. 214

Casey further explained that units rated Level 2 and 3 were functioning units, and that there was no fixed number of Level 1 units needed as a gauge for handing over the mission and withdrawing US troops. He cited the example of the September 2005 Tall Afar strike, which consisted of one US brigade, three Iraqi brigades, and an Iraqi infantry division.

None of the Iraqi units, according to Casey, were Level 1; they all rated either Level 2 or Level 3. 215

Figure 27 illustrates the various levels of ISF readiness that have been assessed since October 2003. It shows that at the time of the Casey press briefing, slightly more than three dozen battalions here rated as capable of taking the lead in counterinsurgency operations, provided that the US providing advisory support, attacks helicopters, logistics and medical support, as well as combat troops. 216 At the briefing, Donald Rumsfeld stressed that overall ISF growth was more important than trying to gauge success by shifting readiness assessments.

The effectiveness of battalions rated Levels 2 and 3 was significant. At Level 2, battalions were capable of planning and successfully executing counterinsurgency operations, with minimal support of coalition forces. Since 2004, the number of Army combat battalions had risen from zero to 88. Figure 41 shows a total of fully 36 were now taking the lead in operations or are fully independent, while 52 more were engaged in side-by-side fighting with Coalition forces. Projected end-strength, according to an October 2005 Executive report to Congress, was 131,000, with force generation to be completed by 2006.

Casey said that MNSTC-I was now focusing on combat enablers and logistic support, so as to increase the independence of MOD forces from Coalition assistance. Development of complementary combat support and combat service support continued at the tactical and operational levels. A multi-layered logistics system had been designed, was approved by the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in early 2005, and was being built. The system consisted of national-level supply contracts, regional and
local base support units, motor transport regiments in each division, and headquarters and services companies in each combat battalion. Because MOD does not yet have organic maintenance capability, MNSTC-I had implemented an interim national maintenance contract.  

- Figure 39 shows the level at which MOD Iraqi battalions were participating in counterinsurgency operations as of 9/19/05.
- Figure 40 shows the estimated MOI special police force capabilities as of 9/19/05.
- Figure 41 shows MOD combat force capabilities by number of battalions taking the lead or operating independently in counterinsurgency operations.

**The State of Iraqi Intelligence Capabilities**

Iraqi intelligence was also improving. An example of a success that was partly based on Iraqi intelligence was seen in the joint Coalition-Iraqi strike on Tall Afar in mid-September 2005. In a videoteleconference with reporters on September 13, Third Armored Cavalry Regiment Commander Col. H.R. McMasters told reporters that the involvement of Iraqi troops played a key role in the success of the operation. About 5,000 Iraqi security forces and around 3,500 U.S. troops participated in Tall Afar operations during the first two weeks of September, the colonel said.  

McMasters credited the integration of Iraqi troops into operations for having been able to collect good intelligence on the whereabouts and identities of insurgents operating in and around the city. To date, Coalition and Iraqi forces had killed 118 terrorists and captured 137, while suffering one US killed and 11 wounded and eight Iraqis killed and 19 wounded, according to McMasters.

At a September 29 hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, Donald Rumsfeld pointed to a sharp increase in tips coming into Coalition or Iraqi authorities, which he said had increased from 480 tips in March 2005 to over 3,300 in August 2005. Figure 33 depicts the number of tips recorded from the Iraqi population from March 2005 through August 2005, as recorded by MNC-I.

**Creating an Officer Corps**

New efforts were also made to include Sunni and former Ba’athist officers and create truly national forces. At the end of major combat operations in 2003, some 400,000 to 500,000 Iraqi soldiers, who had served Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath party, were relieved of their duties in the disbanding of the Iraqi Army. After more than two years of the insurgency that followed, the Iraqi Army invited former Ba’athists to return to the ranks. On November 2, the Iraqi Army invited junior Iraqi officers who had served under Saddam Hussein to serve in the ISF.

The move was meant not only to assist the filling out of the nascent officer corps, but to re-enfranchise the predominantly Sunni Arab cadre of soldiers who had lost their jobs when the erstwhile Iraqi Army was disband ed in 2003. Recruits to the Iraqi Army have been largely Shi’ite in nature, yet fighting primarily in Sunni areas. The potentially negative cultural impact of a force which could appear sectarian was another concern which the move to re-incorporate Sunni elements into the ISF seeks to allay.
Senior officers were not invited back, although some former senior officers under Saddam had already been selectively recruited back to senior positions in the new Army. A statement by the Ministry of Defense indicated that all returning ex-Ba’athist soldiers would undergo a screening process, including interviews designed to screen out potential insurgent elements.\textsuperscript{221}

Progress also occurred in the broader officer training effort. As of November 2005, MNSTC-I reported the following progress in terms of ISF personnel matriculating through professional development and education programs:

- Joint Staff College Instructors: 24
- Joint Staff College Students (Junior/Senior Courses): 88 in training
- Military Academy Graduates (IMAR and Zakho): 377
- Military Academy Cadets (IMAR and Zakho): 657 in training
- Squad Leader and Platoon Sergeant Courses: 441
- Contracting Capacity Course: 170

\textbf{Problems and Progress in the Iraqi Police}

By September 2005, a total of 67,500 Iraqi Police Service IPS members had been trained and equipped, an increase of 5,500 since July 2005. This fell behind due course for 75,000 IPS trained and equipped by the time of the October 15, projected by MNSTC-I. However, MNSTC-I maintained that it would still reach its full-authorized complement of 135,000 IPS by February 2007.

More than 44,400 police recruits had completed the eight-week basic police training at the Jordan International Police Training Center and the Baghdad Police College, as well as seven smaller regional academies. The police training curriculum was increased between July and September 2005, and new police academy graduates were receiving informal mentoring from veteran Iraqi police. Some IPS station commanders still question the adequacy of initial training, but they are continuing training at the station level.\textsuperscript{222}

By November, MNSTC-I said that 111,226 Iraqi MOI forces had been trained. The following is a list of MOI training academies in Iraq as of November 2005: \textsuperscript{223}

- Mosul Regional
- 1st Mechanized Academy (Tadji)
- Tadji IHP
- CMP Dublin DPS Academy (Baghdad)
- Special Police Commando Basic
- Al Hillah Regional
- Irbil Police College
- AS SULAYMANIAH DBE
- AS SULAYMANIAH Regional
- Baghdad Police College

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The time running up to and following the October 15 referendum saw a change in the MNSTC-I approach to training MOI forces. The initial approach had entailed a traditional Western-style classroom setting, with a curriculum focused on post-conflict environments and an emphasis on policing in a democracy. Seventy-five percent of the trainees’ time was spent in classroom lectures, and filed training was conducted only with 9mm pistols. There were no Iraqi instructors.

MNSTC-I reported that a more hands-on approach had been developed by November 2005, including five days of training in an anti-terrorism module, 15 days of training on practical survival skills and scenario-based training, and weapons training with 9mm and AK-47s. MNSTC-I also reported that 41 Iraqi instructors were on staff, with expectations for that number to grow to 100.\textsuperscript{224} Figure 43 gives the MNSTC-I training definitions for MOI forces as of November 2005.

**Special Police Forces**

The Special Police included three separate organizations: the Special Police Commandos (providing light infantry for counter-insurgency operations), the Mechanized Police (providing light armor for counter-insurgency operations), and the Public Order Police (specializing in re-establishing order in high-risk environments). By the summer of 2005, the Special Police Forces had developed a clear command structure under Major General Adnan Thabit, and the mechanized battalions were being organized into the 8th Mechanized Police Brigade. Police training was now supported by regional academies in Iraq, in addition to the training center in Jordan. Regional academies now existed in Adnon, Mosul and Sulaymaniah in the north; As Asad, Taji, Baghdad, Hillah, and Kut in the Center, and Basrah in the south.

As of September 2005, there were 28 Special Police Force battalions capable of combat operations, an increase of 13 since July 2005. Along with the Iraqi Army, the Special Police Commandos and the Public Order Police contributed to operations in Tal Afar, and the 1st Special Police Mechanized Brigade was assigned to provide route security to reduce the incident of insurgent attacks along the highway from the International Zone to Baghdad International Airport.\textsuperscript{225}

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) forces now consisted of the Iraq Police Service (IPS), Special Police (Police Commandos, Public Order Police, and the Mechanized Police), the Emergency Response Unit, Border Forces, the Highway Patrol, and Dignitary Protection. Current projections, according to an October 2005 Executive report to Congress project that MOI force generation would be complete by August 2007. Projected end strength was set at approximately 195,000.

Two major problems that still affected MOI force development were the infiltration of forces by insurgents and continuing equipment delivery shortfalls. Because the police are...
often recruited by local police chiefs with little Coalition oversight, infiltration tends to be somewhat higher in the police than in the military and paramilitary forces. Infiltration of the forces by insurgent elements becomes a factor, anecdotally, when equipping these forces. Equipping of MOI forces remained slow into the fall of 2005; assets delivered through October 8, 2005 are shown in Figure 22.

New recruits to the Special Police Commandos, who were typically seasoned military veterans, underwent six weeks of intense training at the Special Police Commando academy in northern Baghdad. Each training cycle was designed to accommodate 300 to 500 students. The syllabus spans weapons qualification, urban patrolling techniques, unarmed combat apprehension, use of force, human rights and ethics in policing, introduction to Iraqi law, vehicle check points, and improvised explosive device characteristics and recognition.

By the fall of 2005, that force had grown to nearly 10,000 commandos trained and equipped, with 2,000 coming online between July and September of 2005. This placed MNSTC-I ahead of its projection to train and equip 9,800 Commandos by the October 15 referendum. The Government of Iraq had authorized a total force of more than 11,800 Commandos, which MNSTC-I planned to train and equip by May 2006.²²⁶

- Figure 42 shows Iraqi Special Police deployments between July 1, 2004 and October 19, 2005.
- Figure 44 provides numbers of Special Police personnel who had attended the various listed courses as of November 2005.

**The Iraqi Border Forces**

The Government of Iraq had authorized a total force of more than 28,300 Border Police, which MNSTC-I plans to train and equip by May 2006. These forces are organized into 36 battalions that will man the 258 border forts around Iraq. A total of 250 forts were projected to be reconstructed or renovated by November 30, 2005; all border fort construction is scheduled to be complete by January 2006. To stem the flow of foreign fighters from Syria, priority was given to work on the Iraqi-Syrian border in the summer of 2005.²²⁷ Figure 38 shows progress in border fort development as of October 18, 2005.

By September of 2005, approximately 17,000 Border Police had been trained and equipped. This number lagged the projection of 21,000 border forces by the October 15 referendum.²²⁸

**Force Development by Force Element**

Following the October 15 constitutional referendum, Iraqi forces continued to show mixed results in terms of training and equipment. The following is a summary of progress, by service.

**The Army**

As of September 2005, the Iraqi Army had 88 combat battalions conducting counterinsurgency operations. As is noted in Figure 39, 36 of these battalions were in the lead on operations, either with Coalition support or fully independent, while 52 engaged in side-by-side fighting with Coalition forces. The 88 brigades present as of October 2005 were created in 18 months’ time. The battalions included almost 75,000 trained and
equipped soldiers organized into nine infantry divisions and one mechanized division, with an additional 12,000 troops to provide support, training and special security functions.\(^{229}\)

**Iraqi Special Operations Forces**

Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) included approximately 1,300 trained and equipped soldiers organized into a single brigade with two battalion-sized operational units: the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force and the Iraqi Commandos. A Special Operations Support Battalion and Special Operations training organization have also been activated. The latter two were assessed at “Initial Operating Capability,” providing only limited capabilities as of September of 2005.

The Commandos and the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Task Force had conducted frequent reconnaissance and direct action missions including Operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar in the fall of 2005, as well as several precision raids conducted in and around Baghdad. The ISOF operated primarily with U.S. equipment to enhance interoperability with U.S. Special Forces, sustainability, and the long-term bilateral working relationship. This equipment included the M4 carbine, M240 machine gun, M2 .50 caliber heavy machine gun, and High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). Fielding of individual equipment continued during the past quarter, as did fielding of eight M113 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). Although the ISOF is fully equipped for combat operations, they still lack the organic ground and air mobility assets necessary for rapid deployment throughout the country.\(^{230}\)

**Air Force**

The Iraqi air force was once a formidable force in the region, but Iraqi air power crumbled under the strain of two Gulf wars, with its fighter inventory having been particularly decimated. Many fighters were destroyed on the ground or in the air by Coalition forces, while more advanced types, such as MiG-29s were flown to Iran for safekeeping, most likely not to be returned.\(^{231}\)

Data regarding Iraq’s inventory before the start of major military operations in 2003 are not precise, as various intelligence figures differ. It is clear, however, that Saddam’s air force assets were greatly reduced during Desert Storm. When assessing existing inventories, post-Saddam, it is helpful to understand the state of Iraq’s air force assets leading up to 2003 combat.\(^{232}\)

By the summer of 1990, the IQAF constituted the sixth largest air force in the world, with 750 fighter, bomber, and armed trainer aircraft, supported by 200 miscellaneous types, including an Iraqi-built airborne early warning aircraft derived from the Soviet IL-76 transport. Iraq’s air force included the modern MiG-29 Fulcrum interceptor and air superiority fighter, the MiG-27 Flogger strike fighter, the MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor, the MiG-23 Flogger fighter-bomber, the MiG-21 Fishbed fighter, the Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack airplane, the Sukhoi Su-24 Fencer strike aircraft, the Sukhoi Su -7, -20 and -22 Fitter family of fighter-bombers, and the Tupolev Tu-16 Badger and Tu-22 Blinder bombers. Additionally, it had Chinese-made H-6 and J-7 aircraft, the Czech L-39 armed trainer, and French Mirage F-1 fighters. These carried a variety of Soviet and European air-to-air missiles, bombs, bomblet dispensers, and smart weapons such as the French-built AS-30L laser-guided weapon…
During Operation Desert Storm the Iraqi Air Force did not seek to challenge Coalition air forces, and nearly half the Iraqi Air Force fled to Iran to escape destruction. Why the IQAF fled to Iran is not precisely known, and the answer may never be fully known. In any case, Iraqi fighters and support aircraft fled for the border -- more than 120 left. Over 200 aircraft were destroyed on Iraqi airfields, and hardened laser-guided bombs devastated Iraq's hardened aircraft shelters. Eventually day-and-night air strikes destroyed or seriously damaged 375 shelters out of a total of 594.

According to the US Department of Defense, Iraq lost 90 aircraft of all types [including helicopters] to coalition air forces during Operation Desert Storm. Of these, 39 were shot down in air-to-air combat [the details remain somewhat obscure, since a total of as many as 42 aircraft were claimed to have been destroyed in action]. Another six were lost in accidents and 16 were captured or destroyed by coalition ground forces. Additionally, another 122-137 were flown to Iran [estimates range from 115 to 140], bringing the total confirmed loss to at least 234 aircraft. In addition to confirmed losses, of Iraq's 594 hardened aircraft shelters, 375 were damaged or destroyed by coalition bombing. According to one estimated as many as 141 aircraft were destroyed in these shelters. By another estimate, 81 aircraft had been destroyed on the ground.

Following Desert Storm, by one estimate the Iraqi Air Force included:

- 15 MiG-29 ground-attack aircraft
- 30 Mirage F1 ground-attack aircraft
- 50 MiG-23 multi-role fighters
- 20 Su-25 ground-attack aircraft
- 30 Su-20/-22 ground-attack aircraft
- 7 Tu-16 and B-6D bombers
- 10 Tu-22 supersonic bombers

Iran retained the 15 Il-76, 40 Su-20/22, 24 Mirage F1, 7-12 MiG-23, seven MiG-25 and four MiG-29 combat aircraft that fled Iraq to escape the Coalition air campaign in 1991. As of early 2000 Iraq claimed it flew more than 100 military planes and 33 civilian airliners to Iran, though the Iranians said the numbers are lower.

Figure 35 provides a more detailed look at the Iraqi air force inventory from 1990 to 2005.

Problems also existed with the Iraqi air force’s existing assets. In early September 2005, the service ground six of the eight surveillance aircraft that it acquired in September 2004. The planes were Jordan Aerospace Industries SAMA CH2000s, equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors. The squadron was left with just two FLIR-equipped Seeker aircraft, acquired in 2004 from Jordan-based Seabird Aviation. The grounding, according to a U.S. military adviser to the squadron, involves a contract dispute. While the adviser declines to give specifics on the nature of the dispute, the performance of the aircraft seemed to be in question, with an industry expert citing possible problems related to the CH2000’s ability to operate effectively in the heat of the Iraqi summer.233

The disputed SAMA surveillance craft were purchased as part of a U.S. assistance package aimed at building up the Iraqi air force. In October 2005, Brig. Gen. Allen Peck,
commander of Coalition air operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, spoke to increased efforts to stand up the Iraqi air force. Iraq now operates three Lockheed Martin C-130 transports donated from surplus US stocks, plus small numbers of Aerocomp Comp Air 7SLs, Sama CH2000s, and Seabird SB7L-360 Seekers, Bell UH-1 Hueys, and 206 JetRangers. This inventory, however, only allows for basic airlift capabilities and surveillance, as well as the transport of government officials and other VIPs. Close air support and air attack capabilities are still provided by Coalition forces.

The planning staff at South Carolina-based Central Air Forces Command were assessing what the Iraqi air force would need to fill out its portfolio of air assets. According to Peck, an enhanced yet still-limited package would include counterinsurgency, intelligence, reconnaissance, and increased surveillance and airlift capabilities. A light attack aircraft such as the Raytheon T-6A/B Texan II has been discussed as one option.

**Navy/Coast Guard**

The Iraqi Navy was just becoming a light coastal defense force in the fall of 2005. Its naval infantry battalion was being trained for point defense of oil platforms -- a key mission in securing oil exports. In a Defense Department Briefing on September 22, 2005, Vice Admiral David Nichols reported on the state of the Iraqi Navy. VADM Nichols was the Commander of US Naval Forces Central Command out of Bahrain:

The Iraqi navy, though small, is already integrated into our maritime security ops in the northern Gulf as well as Iraqi navy marines aboard the Iraqi oil platforms in the northern Gulf... the Iraqi navy, as I said, is fairly small -- about six patrol boats, a total of about 700 sailors, and there are around 400 marines or so. But they have pretty much continuous patrol boat presence in -- again, in our Northern Gulf Maritime Security Ops. Because the Iraqis know the lay of the land and understand what they're looking at out there a lot better than we do. They've been very helpful there. The Iraqi navy marines, as I mentioned, we have them aboard the oil platforms now. And in the not-too-distant future -- and I'm calling that about November -- most of the security effects aboard the oil platforms will be Iraqi navy marines.

So, on the one hand, there's good progress there by the Iraqi navy, as I think there is overall in Iraq in terms of building the security capability. On the other hand, there is plenty of work to be done there to continue to help the Iraqi navy build, particularly the sustainment, logistics support, other kind of capacity it's going to need to be operationally effective.

When asked about what platforms the Iraqi Navy would need in the future -- be that planes, ships, increased capabilities of whatever variety -- VADM Nichols replied as follows:

Well, you know, I think there's good news there. One of the tendencies when you're -- is to go for big ships and big airplanes, kind of blue-water navy sort of capability. But the Iraqis, again, with the help of this U.K.-led team that's part of MNSTC-I -- the Multinational Security Transition Command -- I think they've got their requirements in the right quadrant. They know that they need things like small patrol boats that give them the ability to enforce sovereignty inside their territorial waters, and in the waterways Shatt al-Arab and Khor Abdullah, which are the key to the re-establishment of legitimate commercial activity in southern Iraq.

I would say the biggest -- the most important thing is not in terms of their requirements in terms of platforms. But again, I'll go back to my last point. It's about building the ability to sustain, and again, MNSTC-I and others, including us, are working hard with them to help them on that. I mean, it's going to be a gradual and an iterative process, and I believe that we're going to be involved in maritime security ops in the northern Gulf for a while.
By September of 2005, the Iraqi Navy was operating five Predator Class Patrol Boats (PB), 24 Fast Aluminum Boats (Dual Outboard Engines), and ten Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats. The naval forces were further equipped with various small arms and Night Vision Devices. Plans called for the Iraqi Navy to be equipped with three al-Faw class patrol boats by December 2005 and with an additional three by September 2006. However, design deficiencies (e.g., seawater strainers below the waterline) and construction shortcomings (e.g., poor welding) of the one Al Faw boat delivered to date caused delays in fielding the patrol boats.

**Equipment**

Iraqi forces were finally beginning to get significant armor. Under a $5 million contract with Iraq’s Ministry of Defense, Washington-based Defense Solutions was refurbishing 77 T-72M1 tanks and four BT-55 recovery vehicles to be delivered to the Iraq Army. The tanks had originally been built in Poland and the Czech Republic, and were mothballed in Hungary, one of the few countries authorized by the US government to do business in Iraq. The refurbishing is part of the effort to stand up the Iraqi Army’s first armored division by December.

Designated the 9th Motorized Rifle Division, the new Iraqi heavy division will be made up of two mechanized brigades comprising nine maneuver battalions, and will include two battalions of T-72 tanks, two of T-55 tanks, and five BMP-1 armored personnel carriers. Figure 34 shows equipment delivered to MOD and MOI since June 2004 through November 3, 2005.

**Operational Readiness**

In the summer and fall of 2005, Coalition forces began turning over key areas and cities to Iraqi control:

- On June 1, the Multinational Force officially transferred full responsibility for security at a base in Dibbis to the Iraqi Army.
- On August 21, the Multinational Force turned over Camp Zulu in As Suwayrah, Iraq, in the Central South sector, to the Iraqi Army.
- On August 31, the Iraqi Base Support Unit assumed control of all perimeter force protection in a sector in Kirkuk.
- On September 6, the MNF handed over security responsibility in Najaf.
- Iraqi Army units continue to assume security responsibility in the western region. They currently are conducting independent security and offensive operations in Rawah and combined zone reconnaissance near the Syrian border.
- September 6, 2005-- The U.S. Army handed over its base in Najaf, giving Iraqis full control of the city. Najaf, 100 miles south of Baghdad, is the holiest city in Iraq for Shiite Muslims and was the scene of heavy fighting last year between the U.S. Army and the militia of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
- September 28, 2005—The US Army handed over its base in Karbala, south of Baghdad, giving Iraqis full control of the city.
September 29, 2005—British forces handed over their main base in the city of Basra to the Iraqi military to allow it to take over the main security duties there.

October 3, 2005—The U.S.-led multinational force in Iraq officially handed over military control of parts of central Baghdad to the Iraqi Army's Sixth Division. The move transferred control of security responsibilities for the Karkh and Rasafa districts.

On October 12, 2005, an article on Jim Dunnigan’s Strategypage.com described the efforts to turn the security mission over to Iraqi forces as follows:

Despite the controversy over independent operations certification, that has been in the news recently, the Iraqi military has clearly been coming into their own. Iraqi combat divisions have taken over security work in several parts of the country. On October 3, the 6th Iraqi Division assumed formal authority over Baghdad's central and northern districts, where it has been operating for several months. Also operating in the Baghdad area is the Ninth Iraqi Division (Mechanized), which has been teamed up with the U.S. 1st Armor in raiding operations over the major road networks. The Iraqi 4th Division has been conducting raids and cordon and searches along the Tigris River Valley north of Baghdad, up to Tikrit. The Iraqi 2nd Division has been operating with good success in extending control in and around Mosul out to Tal Afar. A battalion of the Iraqi 2nd Division was moved to Tal Afar at the end of August by the Iraqi 23rd Air Transport Squadron (operating C-130 airplanes). This was the first report of the new Iraqi Army supported by the new Iraqi Air Force.

The on-going Anbar (central Iraq) province campaign has been firmly anchored by the 1st Iraqi Division, which is also called the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF). This Iraqi Division has and continues to conduct operations in and around the gateway cities of the Euphrates River Valley – Fallujah, Ar Ramadi, Rawah, and Al Khalidiyah. Units of this Division have a year or more of combat experience. The Division consists of 4 brigades (each with 3 battalions). The IIF has received intense training for urban operations including the art of street fighting and building clearing. In addition to the Intervention force, the Iraqi Army has two elite battalions. The Commando Battalion is a Ranger-type strike force. The Iraqi Counter-terrorism Battalion is trained for insertion and extraction to conduct hostage rescue or leadership raids. These elite forces are selected for experience and undergo extensive screening and background checks. The operations by their nature are more elusive to track.

The Iraqi 5th Iraqi Division has been undergoing training exercises in and near Kirkuk including raids and mass casualty training. The training includes actual operations. At the end of August, elements of the Iraqi 5th Iraqi Division performed six-day combined operations involving elite Iraqi Special Operations Forces. The 8th Iraqi Division operates and trains on the road network between the two rivers south of Baghdad. Several battalions of this Division have completed initial certification toward independent operations. The training is focused on counter-insurgency operations, cordon and search, check points, and patrolling. The training for independent brigade and division operations is continuing. Like all training beyond basic in the new Iraqi army, “live” action is involved, since Iraqi 8th Iraqi Division units have reportedly conducted over 100 operations capturing weapon's caches and apprehending suspected terrorists.

While the Iraqi performance in operations was more reassuring, it was also clear that it would be well into 2006, and probably well into 2007, before Iraq had all of the security capabilities it needs in these areas, and their effectiveness would continue to depend on both substantial Coalition support and upon the success and inclusiveness of Iraqi politics.

The following chronology records operational progress and setbacks for the Iraqi security forces during this period:

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October 15, 2005—In Baghdad, a suicide car bomber drives his vehicle into a truck carrying Oil Ministry staff, killing at least 6 people and wounding 14. Two of those killed were policemen and most of the remaining victims were from the Oil Ministry. Unconfirmed incidents were also reported in Basra and Ramadi. A roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi military convoy east of Baquba kills 3 soldiers and wounds 3. In Latifiyah, mortars land on a checkpoint overnight, killing 3 Iraqi soldiers and wounding 2. Two police units open fire on each other outside a polling station in the Amil district of Baghdad. Four civilians are wounded by the gunfire. In the Ghazaliya district of Baghdad, police injure 1 woman and 1 man in separate incidents in which police suspected insurgent activity. One policeman is wounded when 3 roadside bombs targeting a police patrol are detonated in the Amiriya district of Baghdad. In Hilla, police defuse a car bomb with 12 mortar rounds. Joint U.S. and Iraqi troops engage in clashes with insurgents using mortars, rockets, and machine guns in the Ramadi province.

October 16, 2005—In Fallujah, gunmen throw grenades into a market, resulting in the deaths of 2 Iraqi soldiers. Three additional soldiers are wounded by the attack. U.S. and Iraqi army troops conduct a joint operation in Mahmudiyah, killing 11 insurgents and arresting 57. Militants assassinate Colonel Saad Abbas Fahil, a security advisor at the Iraqi Interior Ministry, in front of his home in the Saydiya district of Baghdad. His son, who was also present at the time of the attack, was wounded.

October 17, 2005—In Kirkuk, gunmen kill two Iraqi police officers. In Baiji, a roadside bomb strikes a joint U.S.-Iraqi army patrol, killing 2 Iraqi soldiers and wounding 7. Police discover the bodies of 8 men who appeared to have died from gunshot wounds to head. All of the men are believed to be Iraqi soldiers.

October 18, 2005—In the al-Wasiti district of Kirkuk, militants ambush a group of Iraqi army soldiers, killing 1 soldier and wounding 3. Talib al-Dulaimi, Deputy Governor of the Anbar province, is killed along with his bodyguard in Ramadi.

October 19, 2005: In Baghdad, militants kill Muhsin Chitheer, a former Iraqi Army lieutenant colonel under Saddam Hussein. Elsewhere in Baghdad, gunmen fire upon a police checkpoint near the Hai Al-Adil highway, killing 4 police officers and wounding 11. Differing reports on the same incident indicated that there had been 3 police deaths and 2 policemen wounded. A firefight lasting several hours ensued. In the Ghazaliya district of Baghdad, 2 Iraqi police commandos die and 3 are wounded in clashes between security forces and insurgents. A roadside bomb in Fallujah kills 2 Iraqi soldiers and injures 2. Iraqi security forces set up checkpoints in Dujail ahead of the trial of Saddam Hussein. A member of the Kurdish Peshmerga militia is wounded, along with 2 other unidentified individuals, by a car bomb in Kirkuk. Iraqi security forces arrest Yasser Sabawi Ibrahim, an ousted nephew of Saddam Hussein, on suspicion of helping to finance the insurgency in Iraq by channeling funds from family members abroad. The arrest comes several days after he was forced back into Iraq from Syria by Syrian authorities. Iraqi police arrest a car bomb maker in Kirkuk, after discovering a wired vehicle containing 2 mortar rounds, 2 Katusha rockets, and TNT. Militants open fire on a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol in Hit. Iraqi police subsequently arrest 9 men who all tested positive for explosives residue.

October 20, 2005: In Baquba, a policeman is wounded when a suicide car bomb detonates his explosives in front of a government building. The incident also causes 3 civilian deaths and 13 injuries, as well as damage to the government building, 10 nearby shops, and a parked car. Elsewhere in Baquba, a second suicide bomber targets a police checkpoint; however, no casualties are reported. British Army chief General Sir Mike Jackson gives a statement to the BBC, indicating that militia elements have infiltrated the police force in Basra, and implicates some degree of involvement on the part of Iran. Gunmen shoot and kill 1 Iraqi soldier in Baiji. In the Dora district of Baghdad, insurgents kill an Iraqi intelligence officer on his way to work. Three of his guards are wounded. Also in Baghdad, a mortar round lands on a school, killing a child and 2 guards, and wounding 4 children. Armed men in Iraqi army uniforms kill a man and his 2 sons in an attack on a house in Iskandariya. Other gunmen dressed as policemen kidnap the head of a concrete company in the al-Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad. In Khalis, a suicide car bomber driving an old military fuel truck detonates his explosives near the base for Iraqi rapid reaction forces, killing 1 Iraqi police officer and wounding 8. Another suicide car bomber targets a coalition convoy in Diyala traveling to a nearby compound. Four Iraqi civilians die from the attack, and 13 Iraqis are wounded, including 3 policemen. Firefights between insurgents and Iraqi Army and U.S. forces break out in the streets of several different districts in Ramadi, killing at least 1 civilian and wounding 1. Militants kill 5 policemen in a drive-by shooting in Karmah. In Abayachi, an Iraqi
Army patrol confiscates a roadside IED consisting of a 130 mm round with a radio-controlled ignition device.

- **October 21, 2005**: In northern Baghdad, gunmen open fire on a minibus, killing 3 Iraqi army soldiers and wounding 4 Iraqi police commandos.

- **October 22, 2005**: In southern Baghdad, a roadside bomb targets an Iraqi police patrol in the Al-Madaan area, killing 1 policeman. Also in southern Baghdad, a roadside bomb kills a second policeman in an unrelated attack. Mortar fire in the western Al-Yarmouk area of Baghdad injures a third Iraqi policeman. Ansar al-Sunnah announces the slaying of 6 Iraqis, including 4 contractors working for the U.S. and 2 members of the National Guard—one in Ramadi and 1 in Mosul. On Jaffa Street in central Baghdad, Iraqi security forces engage in a confrontation with militants, and subsequently arrest 6 of the insurgent fighters. Two Iraqi soldiers are wounded during the clash. Iraqi soldiers in Ramadi seize and detonate a car wired with bombs.

- **October 23, 2005**: In central Baghdad, a car bomb targets an Iraqi police patrol, killing 4 people, at least 2 of which were policemen, and injuring 13, including at least 1 policeman. In Tahrir Square in downtown Baghdad, a suicide bomber drives his vehicle into 2 police vehicles, killing 2 policemen and 2 civilians, and wounding 11 others. In Tikrit, a bomb kills a police colonel and his 4 children in front of their house. The explosion sparks a fire in nearby oil tankers, destroying the colonel’s house as well. East of Tikrit, near Baquba, a series of drive-by shootings results in the deaths of 1 police colonel, 3 civilians, and a Shi’ite student-cleric. The Iraqi police find a potential IED in Al Bayaa. The device contained a 120 mm shell with TNT and small bottles of gas with nails.

- **October 24, 2005**: In the Al Shabab neighborhood of Baghdad, a car bomber targeting an Iraqi police patrol kills 2 Iraqis and wounds 5. Elsewhere in Baghdad, gunmen kill an Iraqi soldier and a girl standing in front of her nearby house in an attack on an Iraqi army checkpoint in the western part of the city. Two other Baghdad attacks include a drive-by shooting that kills a policeman, and a roadside bomb that fatally wounds 2 policemen. In Kirkuk, a roadside bomb detonates near the convoy of Ibrahim Zangana, a senior member of the Kurdish Democratic Party. The blast seriously wounds Zangana, as well as killing 1 of his bodyguards and injuring another. Also in Kirkuk, an Iraqi policeman dies after a car bomb explodes near his patrol. One policeman is fatally shot in a drive-by incident in Mosul. In eastern Baghdad, a car bomb targeting a police patrol destroys the targeted patrol car and wounds 5 Iraqis. A suicide car bomber detonates his explosives near a police checkpoint in Mussayib. The blast wounds 1 police officer and 1 civilian. A triple bomb series in Baghdad targets the Palestine Hotel, which houses many foreign reporters. The attack was partially foiled by Iraqi security forces, as the drivers of the third car bomb did not make it all the way to the hotel before their explosives were detonated; however, several passers-by were killed. Police reported that all 3 explosions stemmed from car bombs, but a journalist claimed that the first 2 were rockets. Casualty reports also differed, with the U.S. announcing 6 civilian deaths and 15 wounded, and Iraqi national security advisor Mouwafak al-Rubaie reporting at least 20 deaths (including 4 or 5 police officers) and 40 wounded. Al-Rubaie also announced his belief that the attack was an attempt to take over the hotel and claim hostages, although Deputy Interior Minister Hussein Kamal disputed this theory.

- **October 25, 2005**: In Baghdad, a policeman is killed in a drive-by shooting. This incident was the only one specifically described in Baghdad, although reports indicated that a series of 3 bombs and 5 shootings killed a total of 2 people (the policeman and a young boy) and wounded 34 Iraqis, most of whom were police officers. A drive-by shooting in Mosul results in the death of 1 policewoman. A suicide car bomber detonates his explosives in Sulaimaniyah near the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. Six Peshmerga and 3 civilians are killed, 2 Peshmerga and 2 civilians are wounded. Elsewhere in Sulaimaniyah, a suicide car bomber crashes into the 7-car convoy of Mullah Bakhtiyar, a senior Kurdish official in President Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party, killing 1 guard, wounding 2 guards, and damaging 2 cars in the convoy. A suicide car bomber targets an Iraqi army checkpoint in Baquba; however, the only deaths reported were those of the driver and a companion. A second companion of the driver was injured. In Ramadi, 3 dead bodies of Iraqi army soldiers in plainclothes are discovered. They all appeared to have died from gunshot wounds to the head. In the Ghazaliya district of Baghdad, 2 policemen are killed and 7 wounded when gunmen ambush a vehicle transferring prisoners. There were no reports of prisoner casualties. The Iraqi Prime Minister’s office releases a statement announcing the capture of Monem Shaked al-Qubaisi, the alleged “main terrorist financier in Fallujah.” Police announce the discovery of 8 corpses of Iraqi border guards near the Saudi border in western Iraq, 155 miles from Kerbala. All of the border guards were blindfolded with their hands tied behind their backs.

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October 26, 2005: In Fallujah, 3 Iraqi soldiers are killed and 2 wounded from a roadside bomb explosion. Four Iraqi soldiers are brought to a hospital in northeastern Haditha after being tied up, blindfolded, and shot by insurgents. Reports did not indicate the day in which these soldiers in Haditha were actually shot. Iraqi security forces conduct raids in Hurriya neighborhood of Baghdad and take into custody 20 suspected terrorists, along with quantities of ammunition. Elsewhere in Baghdad, gunmen open fire on several cars of guards for Financial Resources Minister Abdullatif Rasheed, although no casualties were reported. Two Iraqi policemen die in an insurgent attack on their police station in Ramadi. In Baghdad, gunmen kill Nabil Moussawwi, an official at the Iraqi Ministry of Culture, and seriously wound one of his guards. Also in Baghdad, militants fire upon a convoy of guards for the Iraqi minister of water resources and subsequently wound 2 people. The Minister was not present at the time of the attack.

October 27, 2005: Southeast of Baghdad in Nahrawan, clashes between the Shi’ite Mahdi Army and Sunni insurgents result in the deaths of 14 Mahdi Army militiamen and a policeman. Fourteen people were wounded, including 2 policemen and 12 members of the Shi’ite militia and civilians. Later reports varied considerably, saying that the clash occurred between villagers and policemen in civilian clothes, and that casualties included 25 police and 2 civilian deaths. Four villagers were arrested in the battle. Police Lt. Colonel Mahdi Hussein is killed in a drive-by shooting in Dora. In Kirkuk, a police Lt. Colonel Ardijman Abdullah dies from a drive-by shooting. Elsewhere in Kirkuk, 2 bombing target police patrols, killing 1 policeman and wounding 6. Insurgents fire a mortar round at the Iraqi Army headquarters in Fallujah, sparking return fire by Iraqi forces that mistakenly hit a car carrying teachers to a school. One teacher is killed and 2 are wounded. The bodies of 3 engineers working at an Iraqi army base are discovered in Baquba. Elsewhere in Baquba, 1 policeman is killed and 5 others are wounded in clashes between police and insurgents. Another policeman in Baquba is found dead in his car. Three Iraqi soldiers are killed and 4 soldiers and 7 civilians are wounded when insurgent throw a grenade at an Iraqi army checkpoint south of Baghdad in al-Madain. The body of police officer Ali Jassin is found in Tuz Khurmatu, following his abduction from Tikrit on Wednesday, October 26th. A remote control car bomb targeting an Iraqi army patrol in Hawija kills 1 soldier and 3 other Iraqis. In a southern Baghdad district, gunmen shoot and kill a police major. Iraqi security forces and Task Force Baghdad troops detain 19 men in the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad following an explosion near the soldiers’ location.

October 28, 2005: In Fallujah, 1 Iraqi soldier is killed and 1 wounded from after a roadside bomb explodes near their patrol. Iraqi Rapid Reaction Forces kill 2 gunmen during an operation in Khamisli to free approximately 24 hostages. Five of the hostages are found dead of gunshot wounds. Iraqi security forces and Coalition forces discover a weapons cache at a mosque east of Al Asad. Iraqi Border Patrol forces detain 4 people suspected terrorists at a checkpoint near the Syrian border. Basra police confirm the seizure of evidence implicating the Iranian intelligence agency in the recent violence in Basra, after Iraqi security forces conduct a raid on Yusif al-Musawi’s Tha’rallah Movement in the city. Police note that documents confiscated prove Iran’s involvement in plots to assassinate political officials, financial and logistical support, and participation in military and other armed operations. Majid al-Sari, Defense Advisor for the southern region confirms actions taken by the Iraqi security forces on the Iran-Iraq border to prevent infiltration by insurgents. He notes the arrest of an Afghani affiliated with Al Qaeda while he was attempting to cross the border. The Diyala Police Directorate confirms the 25 October arrest of 9 Iranians attempting to cross into Iraq and the confiscation of a quantity of drugs, which was in the possession of one of the detainees.

October 29, 2005: Abu Mahmoud, a suspected member of Al Qaeda of Saudi Arabian descent who was believed to be planning attacks on Iraqi security forces and Coalition representatives is killed in U.S. air strikes in Huseiba. Iraqi police arrest 9 Iranians attempting to cross the border illegally. Reports indicate that Iraqi security forces in Basra have developed a new strategy for securing the border between Iraq and Iran. Iraqi troops arrest a suspected terrorist and seize a large cache of weapons and ammunition. Gunmen attack the northern Baghdad residence of a police colonel, killing the colonel and his bodyguard, and wounding his wife and nephew. Elsewhere in Baghdad, gunmen open fire on an Iraqi Army checkpoint, killing 3 Iraqi soldiers and wounding 7. Three militants are killed in return fire by Iraqi troops. In Kirkuk, 5 Iraqi policemen die from an explosion targeting an Iraqi police patrol. An Iraqi soldier and the brother of a policeman and shot and killed in Baghdad.

October 30, 2005: In Fallujah, a roadside bomb kills 2 Iraqi soldiers. Other Iraqi soldiers retaliate with gunfire, and mistakenly kill a woman and boy who are passing by the scene. Gunmen open
In Baghdad, Sunni insurgents attack a police checkpoint, killing 6 Iraqi police officers. Insurgents fire mortar rounds at an Iraqi police checkpoint in Buhriz, and then 8 cars of insurgents arrive and open fire on the checkpoint. At least 6 policemen are killed and 10 wounded. Militants kill Tarij Hasan, a former colonel in the Iraqi Air Force, while he was driving in a suburb of Baghdad.

In Bagh dad, Su nni in surgents at tack a police c heckp oint, killing 6 Iraqi police offi cers. Insurgents fire mortar rounds at an Iraqi police checkpoint in Buhriz, and then 8 cars of insurgents arrive and open fire on the checkpoint. At least 6 policemen are killed and 10 wounded. Militants kill Tarij Hasan, a former colonel in the Iraqi Air Force, while he was driving in a suburb of Baghdad.

In southeastern Baghdad, 9 Iraqi soldiers are killed and 9 more wounded in 2 separate attacks on their Army patrol. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi police patrol in the southern area of the city kills 5 Iraqi civilians. The Iraqi Defense Minister invites some officers of Saddam Hussein’s former army to enlist in the new Iraqi security forces as part of an effort to reach out to Sunnis. One Iraqi soldier dies and 4 are wounded when a roadside bomb targets their patrol in Fallujah. Gunfire after the explosion kills 2 civilians. Militants fire upon an Iraqi police patrol in western Baghdad, wounding one policeman. Gunmen attack the Ninevah chief of police in northern Baghdad, wounding 2 of his guards but leaving the chief himself unharmed. Iraqi police drag a corpse from a river in Khasim, and identify the dead as a senior member of the city council of Khasim who had been abducted 3 days prior. Army soldiers and U.S. troops engage in a gun battle with 15 armed insurgents northeast of Ramadi, and subsequently discover a cache of weapons and 3 Iraqi Army uniforms in the vicinity. Iraqi police detain 3 suspected terrorists in Jamessia.

In southeastern Baghdad, police find 11 bodies, including some who died by gunshot wounds and others who had been beheaded. Iraqi police have been unable to identify the victims. Iraqi Army soldiers detain a suspected terrorist during a raid in eastern Mosul.

In southeastern Baghdad, police find 11 bodies, including some who died by gunshot wounds and others who had been beheaded. Iraqi police have been unable to identify the victims. Iraqi Army soldiers detain a suspected terrorist during a raid in eastern Mosul.

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Baghdad. In Tuz Khormato, a roadside bomb strikes an Iraqi convoy, killing 5 police commandoes with the Iraqi Interior Ministry, and wounding 4 others. Iraqi police detain 11 suspected terrorists in Tal Afar. Iraqi police and military police detain 9 suspected terrorists in Mosul.

- **November 5, 2005:** A total of 3,500 U.S. and Iraqi troops launch “Operation Steel Curtain,” a joint attack on the insurgent-held town of Husaybah near the Syrian border. The stated aim of the mission is to secure the Syrian border region of the Anbar province ahead of the Parliamentary election scheduled for December 15. The new offensive is part of the wider Operation Hunter, which aims to secure the Euphrates River Valley region from terrorists and establish a permanent security presence along the Iraqi-Syrian border. Al Qaeda releases a statement claiming responsibility for the 3 November abduction and subsequent killing of 14 members of the Iraqi security forces. The authenticity of the statement was not confirmed. In northern Baghdad, a roadside bomb detonates, killing 5 Iraqi police commandos and wounding 3.

- **November 6, 2005:** A roadside bomb targets an Iraqi police patrol in Mahawil, killing 1 policeman and injuring 3. Iraqi police respond to a tip about an IED at a school in Adhamiyah that was found to be wired for detonation when the children exited the school. The police Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team safely disposes of the grenade, as well as another found in the same area. Members of the Iraqi 3rd Public Order Brigade find a group of insurgents placing a bomb on a road east of Salman Pak. A firefight between police and militants ensues, ending in 1 insurgent death and another insurgent evading capture. Iraqi police safely dispose of the bomb.

- **November 7, 2005:** Operation Steel Curtain continues, with the U.S. military announcing that 36 suspected insurgents have been killed in the past 2 days, including 17 killed from air strikes. Neither the U.S. nor the Iraqi government has reported any civilian casualties, although Al Qaeda in Iraq has warned that it will increase insurgent violence unless the offensive is abandoned within 24 hours. The Al Qaeda statement threatened to destroy the homes of all Iraqi soldiers and government workers in retaliation for comments by the Iraqi Defense Minister that individuals who sheltered terrorists should consider their homes targeted by the offensive. Iraqi soldiers shoot and kill 3 suspected terrorists dressed in women’s clothing and carrying weapons near the entrance to the safety zone for displaced persons. Iraqi troops identified them as foreign fighters. A car bomb attack at sundown targets a police patrol in the Doura district of Baghdad. Six police officers are killed as well as 3 civilians, and 10 people are injured, including a number of policemen. In Kirkuk, 2 soldiers are killed and 14 wounded when a suicide car bomber detonates his explosives near a checkpoint. Elsewhere in Kirkuk, a policeman is shot and killed by insurgents. At least 2 Iraqi soldiers are killed and 13 injured in a suicide car bombing targeting Iraqi soldiers guarding oil pipelines in Thibban.

- **November 8, 2005:** In Dali Abbas, a roadside bomb explodes near an Iraqi patrol car, killing 4 soldiers and critically injuring 1. Iraqi police uncover 5 decomposed corpses in Rustumiyah. The identities of the dead are not yet clear. A roadside bomb targets an Iraqi police patrol south of Kirkuk in Daqqq, killing 2 policemen and wounding 3. In southern Basra, a colonel in the Iraqi security forces is killed along with his brother when a roadside bomb strikes their vehicle as they are driving. Insurgents kill 1 policeman and injure 5 in an ambush on an Iraqi police patrol in Baquba. Gunmen attack an Iraqi army patrol in Ameriyat al-Fallujah, killing 2 soldiers and wounding 5. The U.S. military announces that Husaybah has been secured and that members of Al Qaeda have been neutralized there. The completed Operation Steel Curtain reportedly achieved in the arrest of 180 suspected insurgents—including some Africans and Asians—and the killing of 36 additional militants.

- **November 9, 2005:** In Baquba, a suicide bomber detonates his explosives near an Iraqi police patrol, killing 7 policemen and wounding 9 others, most of whom were civilians.

- **November 10, 2005:** In Baghdad, 2 suicide bombers target a restaurant frequented by Iraqi police, killing at least 35 people and injuring 25 upon detonation of their explosives. One report estimated that at least 7 of the dead were police officers, while the rest were civilians. Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attack. Iraqi troops uncover 27 corpses near Jassan. All of the dead were blindfolded, had their hands bound, and appeared to have died from gunshot wounds. Gunmen fatally shoot 2 police officers in Mosul. In Tikrit, a car bomb detonates outside of an Army recruiting center, killing 10 people and wounding 20. A car bomb wounds 2 policemen after exploding near an Iraqi police patrol in eastern Baghdad. Militants ambush a group of policemen in southern Baghdad, injuring 4. Gunmen shoot and kill an intelligence officer in Basra. Iraqi officials announce the arrest of Hatem al-Hassani, the brother of Iraqi Parliament speaker Hajim al-Hassani.
November 11, 2005: Gunmen open fire on the Embassy of Oman in the Mansour district of western Baghdad, killing an Iraqi police officer and an embassy employee, and wounding 2 additional police officers. Elsewhere in Baghdad, clashes between insurgents and police in the Ghazaliya district end in 1 insurgent death and 1 police wounding. Hospital sources reported 5 police deaths from the incident. In central Baghdad, a makeshift bomb injures 3 Iraqi policemen after it explodes near their patrol. Militants ambush an Iraqi police vehicle near Baquba, and subsequently kill 3 Iraqi policemen and a baby. Insurgents target an Iraqi police patrol in Qamishli, killing 1 policeman and wounding 3. Joint U.S.-Iraqi forces discover 2 corpses that appeared to have died from gunshot wounds in the Ghazaliya district of Baghdad. Also in Baghdad, gunmen attack an Iraqi police patrol, killing 1 policeman and wounding another. The U.S. military announces that a new joint U.S.-Iraqi operation to root out terrorists in the town of Karabilah near the Syrian border was begun on 9 November. The offensive is an extension of Operation Steel Curtain, and is intended to target terrorists who escaped the Husaybah offensive.

November 12, 2005: An Iraqi Red Crescent doctor reports to have found 54 bodies, some of women and children, in the rubble left in Husaybah by the U.S.-Iraqi Operation Steel Curtain. There was no immediate response from U.S. or Iraqi sources regarding the finding. In Kirkuk, 1 Iraqi policeman dies and another is seriously wounded after an insurgent attack on their patrol. Iraqi police detain 360 suspects in a major operation in the Diyala province. A judge and several politicians were among those arrested. Clashes between Iraqi police commandos and insurgents end in 1 insurgent death.

November 13, 2005: Iraqi forces discover 10 civilian corpses near the Iraq-Iran border close to Badra town. All of the bodies had been blindfolded and had their hands bound, showed signs of torture, and were riddled with bullet wounds. Iraqi police in Mosul find the dead body of Colonel Mohamed Sheit who appeared to have been shot multiple times in the head and chest. The colonel had originally been abducted on 11 November. In the Jarf El-Sakhr area south of Baghdad, Iraqi security forces kill a suspected insurgent and detain another after they were found planting a bomb. The militant was killed during an exchange of fire. A roadside bomb explodes near an Iraqi military patrol, wounding 5 soldiers. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense announces the donation of 77 tanks and 36 troop carriers by NATO and the Hungarian government. The Iraqi government is spending $3 million to update and develop the tanks. A car bomb is detonated near a police station in the Dora district of Baghdad. No casualties were reported.

November 14, 2005: A booby trapped car detonates near the entrance to the Green Zone in Baghdad, killing 1 Iraqi police officer, 2 South African contractors from Dyncorps and another foreign contractor, and 4 civilians. The attack appeared to target the contractors’ convoy. An explosion in the Dora district of Baghdad causes the death of 1 Iraqi policeman. On the Al-Khayzaran road in western Baghdad, a bomb is detonated near the patrol of the Karkh emergency squad, killing 1 Iraqi and 3 others. Five hundred Iraqi troops and 1,500 American soldiers storm the town of Ubaydi, near the Syrian border, in a continuous effort to eradicate foreign fighters in the western Anbar province under Operation Steel Curtain. At least 1 Iraqi soldier is injured, along with 2 civilians. Throughout the day, more than 70 militants are killed and 100 detained as part of the offensive. Reports indicate that a roadside bomb targeting an Iraqi Army patrol killed 3 civilians and injured 4, although the location of the bombing was not immediately available. A roadside bomb strikes an Iraqi police commando patrol in the Sadiyah district of Baghdad, killing 1 commando and wounding 3. Elsewhere in Baghdad, a roadside bomb in the Camp Sarah area explodes after the passage of an Iraqi Army convoy. Three people are killed and 4 wounded, and a civilian car is destroyed.

November 15, 2005: In eastern Kirkuk, gunmen kill 4 Iraqi police officers in an ambush. Elsewhere in Kirkuk, a roadside bomb detonates, killing 3 police officers and wounding 3. A car bomb planted near a restaurant in eastern Baghdad explodes, causing the deaths of 2 policemen. Six policemen were injured in the same incident. The Iraqi Defense Ministry announces that Iraqi forces have arrested 70 insurgents in a variety of operations throughout the day. Five of those arrested were suspected of planning to assassinate an unnamed ambassador in Iraq. A suicide car bomber detonates his explosives near an Iraqi Army checkpoint in Mahmudiyah, killing 3 soldiers and wounding 7 other people, 3 of whom were civilians. One policeman is killed in a clash between police and insurgents in Mosul. Seven others are injured during the firefight. Elsewhere in Mosul, 2 civilians and 4 policemen, including 1 ranking officer, die in another clash between a police patrol and ins...
and militants. U.S. and Iraqi forces release Hatem al-Hassani, the brother of Iraqi Parliament speaker Hajim al-Hassani, after he was cleared of all charges against him.

- **November 16, 2005:** In Mikaithfa, Iraqi police discover 3 corpses, all of whom appeared to have died by gunshot wounds. Gunmen in Mosul kill 3 Iraqi policemen from the Facility Protection Service, a government-run security force. Elsewhere in Mosul, militants kill an Iraqi traffic policeman. A roadside bomb detonates near the motorcade of the head of police in Baiji, seriously wounding the officer along with 5 of his bodyguards.
## Figure 31

**Iraqi National Force Deployment: 1 July 2004 vs. 19 October 2005**

(in Numbers of Combat and Support Battalions)

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<th>19 October 2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad (Greater Area)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baquba (CE)</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Al Kasik (NW)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMTB (CE)</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul (NC)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numaniyah (CS)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ramadi (CW)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5</td>
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**Figure 32**  
Number of ISF Personnel Who Received CS/CSS Training as of November 2005

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<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>Bomb Disposal</td>
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<td>Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Officer</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor Training</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNSTC-I, November 2005
Figure 33
Number of Intelligence Tips Received from the Iraqi Population

![Bar Graph showing number of intelligence tips received from the Iraqi population from March to August 2005. The data is as follows:

- **March 2005 (5-Mar):** 483 tips
- **April 2005 (5-Apr):** 1591 tips
- **May 2005 (5-May):** 1740 tips
- **June 2005 (5-Jun):** 2519 tips
- **July 2005 (5-Jul):** 3303 tips
- **August 2005 (5-Aug):** 2241 tips

**Figure 34**

**Equipment Issued Since June 2004**

(Includes US & Ministry purchases, and NATO deliveries, through November 3, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Ministry of Defense Forces</th>
<th>Ministry of Interior Forces</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms</td>
<td>436,337</td>
<td>335,880</td>
<td>772,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmets</td>
<td>119,532</td>
<td>27,020</td>
<td>146,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Armor</td>
<td>95,153</td>
<td>132,232</td>
<td>227,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>15,868</td>
<td>14,513</td>
<td>30,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK-47s</td>
<td>94,883</td>
<td>95,874</td>
<td>190,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>17,028</td>
<td>149,292</td>
<td>166,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns</td>
<td>8,310</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>203,265,978</td>
<td>137,462,093</td>
<td>340,728,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>12,123</td>
<td>8,306</td>
<td>20,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNSTC-I, November 2005
### Figure 35

**Iraqi Air Force Equipment: Historical Figures 1990 to 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bomber</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>~6</td>
<td>~6</td>
<td>~6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu-16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-6D (PRC)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighter/Attack</strong></td>
<td>390</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-6 (PRC MiG-19)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-23</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirage F-1 EQ/BQ</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-20/Su22</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-25</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighter</strong></td>
<td>245</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-7 (PRC MiG-21)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RECON</strong></td>
<td>~12</td>
<td>~5</td>
<td>~5</td>
<td>~5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB7L-260</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp Air SL7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-25</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AEW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-76 Adnan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TANKER</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-76</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSPORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130E</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>An-24</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>An-26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II-76</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRAINING</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS-202</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB-312</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>L-39</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>MB-233</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yak-11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The figures for 1990 and 1995 reflect estimated total aircraft inventory, and during this timeframe most of these aircraft could be assumed to be operable. From 2000 on, the figures reflect operational aircraft only. Thus, the change from 1995 to 2000 reflects a reduction in the estimated number of operable aircraft, rather than the total number of extant airframes, which is probably largely unchanged. Data taken from GlobalSecurity.org, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/air-force-equipment.htm*
Figure 36:
Ministry of Defense Force Levels: 7/27/05 to 10/5/05

Source: Data drawn from Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Iraq Weekly Status Reports, US Department of State
Figure 37:
Ministry of Interior Force Levels: 7/27/05 to 10/5/05

Source: Data drawn from Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Iraq Weekly Status Reports, US Department of State. Note: Unauthorized absences personnel are included in these numbers
**Figure 38**

**Iraqi Border Fort Development**

(as of October 18, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>MND-NC Turkey &amp; N. Iran</th>
<th>MND-CS Iran Cent</th>
<th>MND –SE Kuwait &amp; S. Iran</th>
<th>MND-W Saudi</th>
<th>MND NW Syria &amp; Jordan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Construction</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNSTC-I, November 2005

---

**Figure 39**

**Estimated MOD Forces Capabilities as of 9/19/05**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Iraqi Units Actively Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations</th>
<th>Iraqi Units Actively Supporting Counterinsurgency Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battalions Fighting Side by Side with Coalition Forces</td>
<td>Battalions in the Lead with Coalition Support or Fully Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army &amp; Special Operation Combat Forces</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and Training Units</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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## Figure 40

### Estimated MOI Special Police Forces Capabilities as of 9/19/05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Iraqi Units Actively Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations</th>
<th>Battalions in the Lead with Coalition Support or Fully Independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battalions Figting Side by Side with Coalition Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order Battalions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized Battalions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commando</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 41

MOD Combat Forces Capability: Battalions in the Lead or Fully Independent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug-04</th>
<th>Feb-05</th>
<th>Jun-05</th>
<th>Sep-05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Army and Spec Ops Battalions in the Fight</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions in Lead or Fully Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Includes Special Operations Forces but does not include combat support or combat service support units.
Source: Adapted from “Measuring Stability in Iraq,” October 2005, pp. 30 & 31
Figure 42

**Iraqi Special Police Deployments: 1 July 2004 vs. 19 October 2005**

*(in Numbers of Combat and Support Battalions)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1 July 2004</th>
<th>19 October 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad (Greater Area)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallujah</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habbaniyah (CS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillah (CS)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaski (N)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosul</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numaniyah (CE)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quaim</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramadi</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutbah area</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samarra</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajir (CN)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talil (SE)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umm Qasr (SE)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahko (N)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubayr (SE)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 43

**MNSTC-I Training Definitions for MOI Forces as of November 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPONENT</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
<td>New Recruits: 10-Week Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serving, Academy Graduates: 3-Week Transition Integration Program;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specialized Training: Refresher Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order &amp; Mechanized Police</td>
<td>6-Week and 5-Week Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Police Commandos</td>
<td>6-Week Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>4-Week Basic; 4-Week Advanced Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>4-Week Academy and Specialized Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highway Patrol</td>
<td>3-Week Academy Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Dignitary Protection</td>
<td>3-Week Initial Training, 2-3-Week Advanced Training; Follow-on Mentoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by US Contractors and Navy SEALs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNSTC-I, November 2005
### Figure 44

**Special Police Courses/Personnel Attended as of November 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Police Courses</th>
<th>Personnel Attended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Criminal Investigation</td>
<td>2,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Controls</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Crimes and Kidnapping</td>
<td>1,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior, Mid-Level, and Senior Management and Leadership</td>
<td>1,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Crime, Drug Enforcement, and Criminal Intelligence</td>
<td>859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews and Interrogations</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Hazard Awareness and Post-Blast Investigation</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Investigations</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Incident Management and Incident Command System</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAT (28 Provincial Teams)</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignitary Protection, Motorcade Escorts, and Site Security</td>
<td>1,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Security</td>
<td>828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MNSTC-I, November 2005
XI. Progress in the Fall and Winter of 2005: Referendum to Election (Initial Working Notes)

On September 21, 2005, Anne Patterson, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, gave a statement on the Situation in Iraq Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1546, in the Security Council September 21, 2005. She addressed the current status of Iraqi Security Forces as follows:

Mr. President, as previously reported, the goal of the MNF is to assist Iraqis to provide for their own security. The capacity of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is increasing, reducing the influence and effectiveness of insurgents, and strengthening Iraqi rule of law capabilities. MNF and the coalition, in close coordination with the Iraqi government, are assisting to strengthen Iraqi law enforcement, justice, and corrections systems as well.

In addition, the Multinational Force works with the Iraqi government and security forces, international donors, and national and international NGOs to complete critical infrastructure projects ranging from water purification facilities and electrical power stations to educational infrastructure, medical facilities and administrative buildings. During July and August alone, the Multinational Force in the Central-South sector completed approximately 100 reconstruction projects.

Mr. President, turning to progress in training the Iraqi Security Forces, the Iraqi Government, working with the Multinational Force, has identified a force structure to meet Iraq's needs for internal and external security. The majority of these personnel have completed individual entry training and been equipped.

As of September 19, there were a total of 193,200 trained and equipped Iraqi Security Forces. This included 104,200 police, highway patrol, and other forces under the Ministry of Interior, as well as 89,000 in the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Even as the Multinational Force helps build and train the ISF, Iraqi forces are employed in active combat operations. A key indicator of progress is the ISF's role in the recent counter-insurgency campaign in Tall Afar. Eleven Iraqi combat units were employed as independent maneuver elements during that operation.

Iraqi Security Forces, in partnership with the Multinational Force, increasingly conduct the full-spectrum of counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists. Special Border forces consisting of over 17,000 trained and equipped personnel are arrayed into 36 battalions that man 258 border forts around Iraq. To stem the flow of foreign fighters, priority has been placed on securing the Iraq-Syrian border.

To further advance Iraqi capacity for independent operations, the Multinational Force has implemented, in partnership with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, a program to embed Military Transition Teams at the battalion, brigade, and division level. These teams provide Transition Readiness Assessments, identifying areas of progress and shortcomings, ultimately preparing individual units to assume independent control of their area of responsibility.

Mr. President, while the Multinational Force's work is far from complete, it has already been able to transfer some security responsibilities. The following are some examples:

- On June 1, the Multinational Force officially transferred full responsibility for security at a base in Dibbis to the Iraqi Army.

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○ On August 21, the Multinational Force turned over Camp Zulu in As Suwayrah, Iraq, in the Central South sector, to the Iraqi Army.

○ On August 31, the Iraqi Base Support Unit assumed control of all perimeter force protection in a sector in Kirkuk.

○ On September 6, the MNF handed over security responsibility in Najaf.

○ Iraqi Army units continue to assume security responsibility in the western region. They currently are conducting independent security and offensive operations in Rawah and combined zone reconnaissance near the Syrian border.

The Multinational Force and the Iraqi Government are developing a conditions-based security plan to define the environment necessary for further and greater transfers of responsibility from MNF-I to Iraqi Security Forces.239
XII. The Iraqi View of Iraq’s Emerging Forces

Iraqi officials and officers provide an important additional perspective on the development of Iraqi forces. While there is no way to conduct a systematic survey of Iraqi officials and officers, e-mails, visits, and discussions from late 2004 through the fall of 2005 showed that such officials and officers had a good picture of the problems involved, readily acknowledged that Iraqi forces still had a long way to go, and accepted the seriousness of the challenges they had to meet.

With some exceptions, Senior Iraqi officials and officers understood the risks imposed by Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions; and the election of a new, inexperienced, and Shi’ite dominated government; the uncertainties in being dependent on a US-dominated MNSTC-I aid program, and the problems of having to persuade the US to provide the aid and equipment necessary to create truly independent Iraqi forces that could stand on their own.

Furthermore, top officials in the new interim government elected on January 30, 2005 made these positions public from the point they first took office, and consistently supported these positions through the summer of 2005 in spite of a series of bloody bombings designed to drive Iraq towards ethnic and sectarian conflict.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafafari gave a speech at the end of May in which he expressed what he considered to be ‘Iraq’s Three Pivots to Security.’ First, Jafari stated that Iraq would seek to improve the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces through training, delivery of equipment, and improving readiness. Second, the prime minister stated that preventing terrorists from infiltrating Iraq, and the necessary coordination with bordering states, was another priority. Thirdly, Jafari stated that many attacks had been stopped by tips provided by Iraqi citizens and he encouraged them to continue to report such activity.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari went before the United Nations Security Council to formally ask that the MNF remain in Iraq. He stated, “We look forward to the day when our forces are able to assume full responsibility for maintaining our national security at which time there will be no need for the engagement of the MNF. Until then, we need the continued presence of the MNF in Iraq.”

Both the Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior continued to stress the importance of developing forces that would maintain a rule of law, and respect for human rights – even in the face of a major counterinsurgency campaign. They also stressed the need to fight corruption, and change the past culture of Iraq’s military and police forces to stress professionalism and promotion by merit.

One example of such efforts is the statement that Minister of Defense, Dr. Sadoun Al-Dulaimi, made to an international forum in Brussels in July 2005:

…it is not sufficient just to have successful and effective law enforcement Forces. These Forces must also be truly representative of all the peoples of Iraq. For Iraq to succeed in moving forward its law enforcement staff: Police, military and civilian, must put aside their sectarian and ethnic prejudices and work for the best interests of Iraq as a whole. In this regard, I am determined to work with the new Government to keep politics out of defence and security matters. Moreover, law enforcement more than anywhere else needs expertise from all quarters. There are many,
including some Police and Military officers from the former regime whose hands are not stained with blood, who are already working against the terrorists and who, as individuals, have an important role to play in the new Iraq. We welcome them with open arms. There is, however, no room for tribal militia or special units in the modern, professional security Forces that we are now building.

Senior Iraqi officials also continued to pursue policies of restraint and inclusiveness throughout the summer, not only in the face of continued provocation from Islamist extremist terrorist, but all of the problems in creating a constitutional process and effective governance in the face of great Sunni uncertainty and sometimes resistance to a political process that they had failed to join before the election.

**Force Development Principles and Strategy**

Iraqi officers stressed that Iraqi forces had to develop in ways that were both inclusive of all the sectarian and ethnic factions in Iraq, and compatible with the emergence of an Iraqi democracy. The official position was that this meant force development on the basis of the following six principles:

- Democracy
- Civilian control of the military
- Transparency
- Rule of law
- Responsibility and accountability
- Equality and justice among religions

The reality was that Iraqis fully understood how difficult this would be – particularly in the middle of a major counterinsurgency campaign, and with many ethnic and sectarian differences. Many also privately added three other principles: unity, anti-corruption, and effectiveness.

**Developing Effective Ministries and “Governance”**

Iraqi officials at many levels made it clear that Iraq was still in the process of developing an effective Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and lacked anything approaching a coordinated national security structure at the top. The development of effective structures to manage police and internal security forces at the governorate and local level was seen as even more of a work in progress. They estimated that it would take all of 2005, and most of 2006, to evolve a stable and more comprehensive overall structure for handling the “governance” aspects of Iraq’s military, security, and police forces.

Some of these concerns were resolved by the spring and summer of 2005. Iraqi officials and officers generally gave good marks to the new Ministers of Defense and Interior. They felt both were more concerned with “hands-on” efforts to make their Ministries more effective and eliminate corruption. However, some were now deeply concerned about the risk that the tensions between Sunni and Shi’ite; and the desire of the new Shi’ite dominated government to “purge” even officials and officers with low level ties to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein’s government; could potentially cripple Iraqi force
The seriousness of such concerns was confirmed by warnings against such purges by top US officials, and a sudden visit to Baghdad by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to talk to Iraq’s new president, Jalal Talibani, Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari, and other top officials.

Iraqi officials and officers also felt, however, that the three months of transition it took to form a new government between January 30, 2005 and April–May 2005 was a warning about what would happen in late 2005 and early 2006. The post-election transition had created much the same turbulence and uncertainty as had occurred when ministers had changed with the return to sovereignty in June 2004, although many were pleased with the choices of new ministers and saw them as improvements over their predecessors. They also felt that the effort to create a new constitution, and the transition to yet another new Iraqi government in late 2005 or early 2006 would create further turbulence within each ministry under the best of circumstances.

The three-month delay in forming a new government after the January 30, 2005 election left the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior without fully effective direction during this period, and worried that ethnic and sectarian divisions within the new elected government might create a series of problems indefinitely into the future. The new government to be elected on December 15, 2005 – and take office in January 2006 – might well take three to four months to fully organize and faced a host of major constitutional issues including federalism and redefining many of the roles of the central government. Even Iraqis actively involved in the process of Iraqi politics, governance, and force building made it clear they could not predict how new governments would behave over the course of 2005-2006, or how the constitutional process and the success or failure of efforts at political inclusion will change Iraqi security policy.

**Moving Towards Iraqi Control of the Force Development Effort**

Iraqi officials and officers acknowledged the limits to their ability to plan and manage Iraq’s force development in any orderly way under the CPA and Interim Iraqi Government. As of October 2005, Iraqi officials and officers still operated in Ministries of Defense and Interior that were understaffed, weakly organized, lacking expertise, and lacking adequate staffs of advisers. Iraqi planners had never had a clear basis for force planning that could be tied to a real-world budget, and no way to predict the level and flow of US and other MNSTC-I aid. They also understood that even if the course of the insurgency was predictable, Iraqi military and security developments would have to be very much a matter of improvisation and uncertainty.

At the same time, they stated that cooperation among the Ministries had improved since the January 30th election, and felt this would continue if there were no purges of existing staffs on sectarian and ethnic lines. They noted that communications were somewhat better, and there was more experience in day-to-day coordination. They felt Iraqi government relations with the US and other MNF-I elements were good, and noted that the Iraqi government now had a national security coordination committee that is scheduled to meet twice a week as well as a higher level Joint Coordination Group at the Minister-Deputy Minister level. They also felt that the key ministries involved in national security were gradually acquiring experienced civilian personnel, adequate facilities and equipment, and adequate communications.
The key uncertainty was what would happen in and after the December 15, 2005 election. Even those Sunnis taking part in the constitutional process remained dissatisfied as of the fall of 2005, as Shiite and Kurdish representatives to the drafting committee attempted to push through a version of the document that the Sunnis objected to on several grounds. On August 28, 2005, Sunni Arab negotiators, in a joint statement by the 15-member Sunni panel, rejected the Iraqi draft constitution and asked the Arab League and the United Nations to intervene.

Chief among Sunni objections to the document were the issue of a federal Iraq, which Sunnis believe would deprive the West of oil revenues, and exclusionary references to the Baath party, which many Sunnis see as an attempt to codify their political disenfranchisement. Another issue was the document’s failure to enshrine Iraq’s identity as ‘Arab.’ However, as of September 14, 2005, Shiites and Kurds agreed to amend the Constitution as it goes to UN print to cite Iraq as a founding member of Arab League, a nod to Sunni demands for national ethnic identity. Federalism clauses, however, were not removed, thus preserving Shiite and Kurds regional options. It was all too clear to the Iraqis involved that the future was “up for grabs.”

**Developing an Iraqi Force Plan**

Iraqi officials stated that the Interim Iraqi Government had developed the outline of a national strategy for the next 5-7 years during the period between June 2004 and the January 2005 election. This strategy was based on the following elements:

- Threat analysis.
- Analysis of the interests of neighboring states, other nations, and the international community and the resulting diplomatic and security requirements.
- The strategy needed to develop armed forces and security forces, and the resulting requirements in terms of force size and equipment.
- Economic and social strategy.

The details of this plan underwent major changes after the new government took office in April 2005. Many of the detailed force goals that the new government worked out with the MNF-I and MNSTC-I have been described in the previous chapter, and the Iraqi Minister of Defense described the following major challenges in July 2005:

- Corruption and growing criminality.
- Foreign insurgents and anti-Iraqi terrorists that are trying to destabilize our country.
- Intelligence, particularly overcoming poor analysis and assessment capability.
- Institutional capacity, including leadership and professional skills.
- Filling out the force structure with Combat Support and Combat Service Support units.
- Strengthening our border security—with a total of 3,631 kilometers of external borders.
- Undertaking the infrastructure security mission.
- The whole issue of logistics and sustainment, particularly in the medium and long-term is a source of major concern.
Rebuild the Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces

Continuous Iraqi Armed Forces transition, particularly the issue of the full integration of former National Guard units into the regular Army, the issue of militias…and the whole issue of establishing a sustainable cycle of training and exercises on our own.

Discussions with top level officials and officers made it clear that they were well aware of the force development problems described in previous chapters, and they showed a great deal of frankness and objectivity in discussing the difficulties they faced.

The Minister of the Interior focused heavily on corruption, changing the culture of the police, the need to training forces in human rights and the rule of law, and the need to provide more training in the field for forces already in service. He was particularly concerned with the regular police service and the additional forces recruited at the local level that had not been through MNSTC-I training.

At the same time, Iraqi officials and officers were aware that sectarian and ethnic tensions could still tear the government apart, that nothing was stable in terms of current force plans, and that they had little ability to plan in terms of known budgets, and levels of aid. They also realized they remained dependent on the US and MNSTC-I for many aspects of funding and support.

On the one hand, they saw the need for longer term planning, and realized that the new government still had to develop the staffs and capability to make its own force development plans, deal with budget and resource issues, and plan and conduct operations. On the other hand, many felt that dependence on the Coalition, the uncertainties of Iraqi politics, and the changing dynamics of the insurgency placed severe limits on what the government could do before a new government was elected in late 2005 or early 2006.

**Iraqi Intelligence**

Iraqis understood that their present intelligence capabilities were still limited, and they remained dependent on the US and MNF-I except at the local level or in the case of small unit operations in areas where units developed HUMINT contacts of their own. They acknowledged that they were penetrated by hostile agents and that this was likely to continue until the new government acquired far more popular legitimacy and Sunnis and Iraqi Islamists gave it more support – a matter that might well take years.

They acknowledged that current Iraqi counterintelligence capabilities were inadequate, and that vetting was often cursory and uncertain. Like senior US officers in Iraq, they acknowledged that the government and all elements of Iraqi forces were heavily penetrated by supporters of various insurgent groups, and that insurgent HUMINT was still much better than that of either Coalition or Iraqi forces.

Iraqi officers and officials did feel, however, that Iraq was beginning to develop effective human intelligence capabilities. These intelligence capabilities were divided into three major groups: Military intelligence in the Ministry of Defense, the Police Intelligence Directorate in the Ministry of the Interior, and the Iraqi National Intelligence Services in the Prime Minister’s office.
Military Intelligence was headed by the Director General – Intelligence and Security. This office was being developed as a key priority, and the Minister of Defense acknowledged in July 2005 that it, “is still in its early stages of formation. It needs to better focus its efforts on ‘hot spots’ to achieve best effect. But it also needs secure nationwide communications and better training and equipment. There is a particular need for short-term improvements in its analytical and assessment staff and, in the longer-term, for bilateral arrangements to enable the exchange of intelligence products with our friends and allies.”

Iraq hoped for extensive further training help from the intelligence sections of NATO countries. More broadly, both actionable operational intelligence and counterintelligence were seen as key priorities at every level, and Iraqi officers and officials make it clear that “good intelligence is more important than good weapons.” The MOI had also created a special intelligence section to support “quick intervention” operations and was attempting to improve intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in the field at the level of the security and police services.

There was, however, considerable debate within the new Iraqi government over one aspect of Iraqi intelligence. While military and counterinsurgency intelligence flowed to Iraqi forces from the US and MNF-I, and they received human intelligence at the tactical level in return, Iraqi national intelligence had been formed with the support of the CIA, which attempted to keep its operations compartmented away from the newly elected government.

According to press reports, the CIA refused to hand over control of this part of Iraq's intelligence service and the head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service that the CIA had chosen at the time of the CPA continued to report to the CIA.

The history of this problem began when the CPA transferred sovereignty in June 2004. According to the press report, what was then the CMAD--the Collection, Management and Analysis Directorate--was split, with roughly half the agents going to the new interior ministry and the rest to work on military intelligence in the defense ministry. Both of these intelligence departments were led by Kurds, with pro-US backgrounds, that now reported to the Iraqi prime minister.

However, a key group of CMAD operatives was recruited into a third Iraqi intelligence agency, which became the secret police force or Mukhabarat. Its Iraqi director was Mohammed Abdullah Shahwani, a Sunni general whose sons had been executed after his involvement in a failed coup against Saddam in the mid-1990s. Reports indicate that Shahwani’s top deputy was a Kurd, and Shi’ites made up only 12 percent of the force.

Moreover, the CIA took the national intelligence archives of the past year and kept them in their headquarters in Baghdad where they could not be accessed by the new government.

CIA officials stated on background that they did so because it had evidence of Iranian attempts to penetrate Iraqi intelligence using the two strongest Shi’ite parties in the new government: SCIRI and Dawa, the party head by Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari. Members of those parties claimed the real reason was that the CIA was preventing them from knowing US intelligence collection on them before the election.
Hadi al Amiri, the commander of the Badr Brigade, formerly the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, echoed such claims. SCIRI, claimed that Iraqi intelligence service "is not working for the Iraqi government - it's working for the CIA...I prefer to call it the American Intelligence of Iraq, not the Iraqi Intelligence Service...If they insist on keeping it to themselves, we'll have to form another one."

Laith Kubba, Jafari's adviser and spokesman, was reported as saying that the prime minister wanted to take on a bigger role in anti-terrorism efforts, but was impaired by the lack of a reliable, skilled Iraqi police force and military:

"The prime minister is very clear in his philosophy on governmental sovereignty and the will of the Iraqi people," Kubba said. "He knows all these institutions must be brought under Iraqi law and the Iraqi parliament ... But he's a realist and he is also aware that Iraq today faces a huge challenge with these attacks ... In the interim period, he has to make do with whatever he has at his disposal."

These press reports seem to be generally accurate and illustrated both the continuing problems Iraqis have with ethnic and sectarian divisions and the inevitable tensions between a truly sovereign Iraqi government and the US or any other power operating on its soil.

**Manpower Issues Affecting Force Development**

In spite of calls for further purges by some Shi’ite groups, Iraq officers and officials felt that the problems of De-Ba'athification had been largely overcome and that the Ministry of Defense and armed forces were now open to all except hardliners and extremists.

Although there were still problems with ethnic or sectarian differences, many Iraqi officers and officials felt that that a deliberate effort should continue to be made to create a “national force” that included Shi’ites, Sunnis, Kurds, and other minorities. They also stated that De-Ba'athification should not be applied in ways that prevented the recruitment of qualified Sunni officers and other ranks, or men from military and other forces who were not directly involved in the repressive and violent acts of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

The Shi’ites and Kurds who commented on Iraqi force developments generally accepted the fact ex-Ba'athist officers and NCOs should play a critical role in every branch of the military, security, and police services; that many should be Sunni, and that the MoD and MoI had to recruit as many experienced personnel as possible which were also essential to creating effective Iraqi forces on anything approaching a timely basis. Only a few Shi’ites and Kurds talked about revenge or taking new steps to exclude Sunnis.250

Sunnis were generally more worried about the future, and purges of the armed forces and government. Few, however, felt this would halt progress, or divide the country. Many felt that more secular and more national governments and political parties were needed, but serving Sunni officers and officials were not pessimistic.

At the same time, Iraqis made it clear that no one really knew what the mix of different sects and ethnic groups existed in each force element, and how much of the evolving Iraqi force had been truly “national” in the sense of mixing such groups. The goal seems to consistently have been to limit the creation of tribal, sectarian, and ethnic forces in the
regular military and elite security forces, but many units still became largely ethnic, particularly in the police and National Guard.

Iraqi officers and officials understood that they still had to deal with many other serious problems in the composition of some existing forces. Recruiting and composition of National Guard and police units had been local in the past, sometimes with little vetting other than the support of some local chief or political figure. This had often led to politically appointed leaders with little real capability and forces lacking the will, physical condition and/or literacy to be effective.

Iraqi officials and officers clearly wanted this situation to change, and noted that Iraq’s various forces are being purged of low grade and suspect manpower, which is being retired or paid to leave. This process was still underway, however, and Iraqis noted that there was still a strong tendency to politicize senior appointments and to fail to remove incompetent and corrupt officials and officers for political reasons or because of family and ethnic ties.

Some Iraqi officers pointed out that force development had constantly been affected by the lack of security and Iraq’s lack of economic development. One noted that personnel from other areas did not know the ground and local condition, stood out in Iraq’s highly localized society, and were vulnerable for this reason. At the same time, local personnel had been subject to pressure or attacks on their families from local insurgents who immediately learned their functions and either attacked them or sought to use them for intelligence and infiltration. The fact that many Iraqis had been driven to volunteer out of economic pressure and desperation often produced recruits with little real motive to fight.

Pay and leave presented additional problems. Bases and casernes generally did not provide family housing, and this left families vulnerable. Many felt Iraqi personnel had to visit their families for social reasons and provide their pay in cash, and this meant that a high percentage of forces were constantly on leave. They were also worried that recruits and actives that go on leave have been vulnerable to pressure and intimidation. The lack of protected vehicles, uncertain discipline in taking leave, and a lack of experience made new volunteers especially vulnerable.

One Iraqi official noted that even though he was senior enough so that his family could be housed safely in a government area, he had reservations about what would happen to the rest of his extended family. He left his family in place, and concealed his duties from everyone in his hometown except family members and close friends.

Iraqi officials and officers did, however, seem to feel that many of these conditions would be temporary, and such threats would ease in late 2005 and during 2006. Like US officers, they noted the value of “critical mass:” As more and more trained and equipped Iraqi forces come on line, they felt the government would be able to establish a steadily better structure for force protection and a steadily better overall climate of security.

Many also felt that if currently hostile Iraqi Sunnis could be included in the government, the remaining native insurgents and all outside insurgents would become more isolated, and the areas in which they can operate would become steadily more limited. In short, they are optimistic enough to feel that time was on their side, and the insurgents will be
much less effective in attacking Iraqi forces once they reach the numbers, quality, and experience planned for late 2005 and 2006.

Creating an Effective Iraqi Training Structure

Iraqi officers and officials often said that they were proud of what had been accomplished to date, but acknowledged that training, equipment, and creating combat ready forces remained serious problems that would take years to fully solve. In interviews early in 2005, they cited the fact that serious training efforts are “only 10 months old,” and noted that even when trainees complete their training, they still need leadership, experience, unit cohesion, and the support of experienced personnel.

These conditions were only beginning to exist in the various Iraqi forces in late-2005. Iraqi officers also understood that current training periods were generally too short. Those involved in Iraqi force development were also far less likely to praise the competence of the men trained under Saddam’s regime than Iraqis with no practical experience. They had seen how serious the training problem really was even with Iraqis that had had years of service under the Ba’ath regime.

The Minister of Defense noted some of these points in a formal speech in July 2005:

In training and equipping Battalions to meet the imperative of counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism operations, we must not forget the need to build Armed Forces that can, in the long run, sustain themselves. This means that we have to start to turn our attention to a whole range of issues from institution building, particularly leadership and command, to specialist skills such as personnel, finance, acquisition and contracting.

… The current training and equipment plan for our Armed Forces addresses only our short-term needs. As part of the longer-term objective to build a sustainable Force that meets the whole of the Defence requirement there is a need for an on-going program of continuous training and exercises. The Staff College at Al-Rustamaiyah will, with NATO’s much appreciated support, provide a superb environment for young Officers to learn their trade. It will serve our needs for many years to come. There is, however, a similar need with regard to a continuous program of all-arms training for soldiers and NCOs and, in due course, for more advanced training and for an annual program of exercises (including joint and combined exercises).

Iraqi officials and officers noted, however, that Iraq did not have time to train its military, security, and police forces under ideal conditions in wartime, and that in-unit training could be more useful in any case. They felt that basic training was useful largely in instilling discipline and fundamentals, but that Iraqi military, security, and police forces in the field were constantly being forced to adapt to changes in insurgent and criminal behavior and found that this required them to “learn and relearn” from field experience and to meet real-world local conditions.

One officer commented that “our tactical conditions and training need to change constantly in terms of detailed requirements, sometimes in ways that mean training has to be revised on a monthly basis. One real problem that we all have is that much of our training – under Saddam and now – is for fighting conventional forces. We are only gradually developing effective training for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.”

Iraqi recognition of the need for experienced cadres of leaders was a key reason Iraqi officers generally welcomed having experienced US and MNSTC-I officers embedded in new Iraqi units until such units developed the leadership and experience to act on their
own (Iraqi officers did, however, express concern that US officers and personnel who lack area skills and experience in working with Iraqis are often impatient and over-demanding, and tend to bully the Iraqis they are supposed to inspire and train).

Facilities and equipment were seen as continuing problems, although more so by the officers and officials in the forces under the Ministry of the Interior. Effective forces require training, leadership, and unit cohesion, but they also require adequate equipment, secure facilities, and facilities in the right areas. Improvements were taking place in the three latter areas, but Iraqis felt such progress laged badly behind requirements, and cautioned that all of the elements of force quality had to be brought into balance for each element of the military, security, and police services training efforts to be effective.

At the same time, Iraqi officials believed that real progress had been made in creating the kind of training organization and facilities that Iraqis needed. They felt the facilities for effective basic training were now in place, and that training time, and training in more advanced skills, could be expanded as force levels became more adequate and the immediate demand for personnel was less critical.

Iraqi officers pointed out that academies for more advanced training existed at the Joint Headquarters level. Past academies in Irbil and Sulaymania were back on line and had been modernized, and a new academy in Baghdad was coming on line. A former-regime training center in Tikrit had been reopened, initially with MNSTC-I support, but then with Iraqi training cadres. Iraq was beginning to create the kind of high-level training facilities it needed at the Ministry level, and planned to create a staff college, war college, and center for National Security Studies. Much depended, however, on getting MNSTC-I, NATO countries’, and other outside support. “It will be at least several years before we have the skills to take over advanced training on our own.”

Iraqi officers and officials were not in a rush to eliminate all outside training and advisors – in fact they welcomed most offers of training from new countries and most signs of outside support. They welcomed the help they have had from Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan in addition to the MNSTC-I countries, and hoped for new training contributions from Germany, Italy, Norway, and France. MSTC-I reported, “NATO provides a valuable function in screening (with their Iraqi counterparts) offers of training and donations of equipment. Some training offers have been refused, primarily for political reasons.”

They felt such multinational contributions were highly useful – in spite of the potential problems in different training methods and interoperability. They did, however, recognize the need for standardization and coordination of training efforts over time, and wanted to take over the overall leadership and organization of training as soon as possible.

While Iraqis did not use the term as such, they also noted that as Iraqi forces expanded to reach significant levels of capability, they would acquire the “critical mass” necessary to provide a far more effective overall training and leadership structure, less pressure and more time for training, and be able to take over far more of the mission from the US and MNSTC-I. Iraqi officials and officers hoped for such “full capability” in 2006, and President Talibani talked about 2007 early in his time in office, but Iraqis acknowledge they will need MNSTC-I aid and support in training, equipment, and other areas through 2010.
**The Iraqi View of Force Development**

Iraqi officials and officers discussed Iraqi force developments in general terms and did not provide detailed numbers or force descriptions. They saw Iraqi forces as in a constant state of development. They felt that it is unfair to judge such forces and their progress at this time, given the history of problems in Iraqi force development, but that many past problems were being rapidly overcome and most of the remaining problems will be overcome during the course of the coming year.

They questioned the value of the search in the US for the exact total manpower in “effective” Iraqi forces, and for exactly how many Iraqi forces were properly trained and equipped and could engage the insurgents. They pointed out that no Iraqi forces as yet had all of the strength in terms of armor, firepower, and support necessary to engage in main force combat without US support. They pointed out that Iraqi forces differed sharply in capability not only by force element, but also in terms of experience, capability, and leadership at the battalion level within each different branch of the Iraqi military, security, and police forces.

At the same time, they pointed out that virtually every established element of the military, security, and police forces could already perform some useful function in terms of improving security, although often in ways subject to very sharp limits. They felt that the situation was improving steadily as new and better trained/equipped Iraqi forces come on line; as Iraqi forces become better organized and manpower is better selected, and as Iraqi officers and other ranks gain experience. From their perspective, the issue was not whether the glass is two-thirds empty or one-third full, it was how rapidly it is filling.

They also pointed out that fully effective Iraqi forces with enough armor and/or counterinsurgency equipment to operate offensively against insurgent forces without extensive MNSTC-I support were just coming on line. As one Iraqi put it, “What do you want to count and what tasks do you want to judge it by? Why do you want to count what we are rather than what we are becoming?”

Iraqi officials and officers felt that they could not form stable force plans at this point in time. They felt that their force goals had to be in flux, and that equipment, deployment, and facility plans were almost certain to change. They understood the volatility of the Iraqi political climate, as well as the inability to predict their budgets and the level of MNSTC-I aid.

Iraqis also believed that some of the major challenges they faced at the Ministry, service, and unit level were to create an effective and cohesive C4I system (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence); to create an effective intelligence system that could properly be integrated into Iraq’s developing command, control, communications, and computer capabilities; and to provide the combat, service, and logistic support necessary to allow Iraqi forces to operate as full independent forces.

**The Army**

Iraqis felt that the Iraqi Army had advanced to the point where the Chief of Staff’s office had an operating formal structure with Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations, Administration, and Training. Iraqi officers saw a number of major challenges in the development of the Army. One was to give it the training and equipment necessary to
operate as a fully independent force and eventually replace MNF-I forces. A second was
the need to redeploy Army units away from casernes and locations chosen for MNF-I
convenience and security so the Iraqi armed forces can meet Iraqi government priorities
and needs. The third was to create a more stable plan for force expansion, and one that
takes into account the problems created by the merger of the Army and National Guard.

They also noted in July 2005 that the Ministry of Defense intended to create the
command, control, communications, and combat support, and service support forces to
allow Iraqi military forces to operate as fully independent forces. This means creating the
following additional forces over the coming 18 months:

- Three division-level signal companies.
- 10 engineer companies.
- 3 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance companies.
- 10 military police companies.
- 5 Motor Transport Regiments.
- Support Company for each battalion (Administration, Maintenance, Stores & Supplies,
  and Medical).

Strategic Infrastructure Battalions

In early 2005, the Iraqi Transitional Government directed the formation of four Strategic
Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) to protect critical oil pipelines and eventually to protect
parallel electrical transmission lines. During the summer and fall of 2005, the SIBs were
integrated into the Ministry of Defense (MOD) force generation plan and built on the
standard Table of Organization and Equipment for an Iraqi infantry battalion. Training of
these battalions utilizes a “train the trainer” model: Iraqi instructors are first trained; these
instructors are then responsible for training of their individual companies.

The first four SIBs were manned and set to complete unit training in mid-October.
MNSTC-I was providing mission-essential equipment to the SIBs, such as AK-47s,
vehicles, Individual Body Armor, helmets and uniforms. The Iraqi government had begun
fielding up to seven more SIBs as of September 2005, bringing the total authorized to
eleven with a possible end-state total of 17 or more SIBs, but they are minimally
equipped and untrained. MNSTC-I has agreed to match MOD-provided funding up to
$35 million to fund start-up costs for the first four SIBs. Training for all SIBs will follow
the same model. The SIBs are being assessed using the Transition Readiness Assessment
system.

The new battalions were meant to offset a system of asset protection in which the
ministries that own critical infrastructure are responsible for providing security for their
facilities. As of the fall of 2005, the ministries were using a mix of their own ministerial
guard forces and contracts with local tribal forces to carry out this function. Coalition
forces provided security in some instances as well.

Merging the National Guard into the Army

Iraqis understood that merging the National Guard into the Army in early 2005 had
presented serious problems. The National Guard was the successor to a low-grade force
called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which was recruited and vetted largely on a local level for glorified security guard duty. Training and equipment was limited; leadership often owed more to politics and regional needs than effectiveness, and much of the Guard’s manpower lacked the necessary physical condition, education, and loyalty.

They noted that the National Guard had had six divisions of three brigades each, with three battalions of 3-4 companies each – most only had light infantry weapons. There were no mortars, though the Guard was authorized to maintain 32 heavy machine guns per battalion, an increase in authorization by 24 guns in 24. However, it is still not clear how many heavy machine guns are actually in the field. This made the Guard a large force on paper, but most of which had serious – if not crippling -- force quality problems if it had to be used in offensive operations.

Iraqis commented that the ICDC/Guard was created on the basis that each of the five MNC-I commands or regions essentially created a separate force, largely on the basis of recruiting by local leaders. Each MNC-I originally created National Guard companies at the MNC-I brigade level without any headquarters, and with very limited basic training. This produced rapid force expansion but without force quality.

Iraqis noted, however, that the National Guard was slowly being purged of its low quality leadership and manpower – which has been retired or paid to leave. Changes had also begun to take place in equipment, selection, training, and organization. It was initially organized largely at the company level. This was later expanded to battalions that became very large, sometimes reaching 1,000 men; A size too large to be effective.

Iraqis understood that the Guard would need major reorganization, more training, and better equipment. Iraqi officers could not, however, provide a clear plan for what the Guard would become as it is merged with the Army. Nevertheless, as one Iraqi Army officer put it, even the weakest Guard units could still be used for a wide range of security duties like manning checkpoints and providing area security in low to medium threat areas until their manning, equipment, and training improved.

**The Air Force**

Two years after the war ended, Iraq was just beginning to develop a new air force, and Iraqis were fully aware of the limits to its effectiveness. The Minister of Defense noted in July that, “The Iraqi Air Force is woefully inadequate to support a highly mobile modern army. There is an urgent need for (i) helicopter lift capability to enable rapid ground force deployment in support of the counter-terrorism mission, (ii) medium transport flight, including for safe transport of VIPs, senior officers, and journalists across Iraq, (iii) airborne reconnaissance and surveillance capability to support a range of missions including counterinsurgency, border security, and infrastructure security, and (iv) specialist staff training.”

He also warned that, “The maintenance and long-term sustainment costs of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft can be very substantial and must form a part of any donation or (in the longer-term) assisted purchase if we are to make effective use of such capability. There is a real danger that inappropriate donations will either bankrupt the Ministry of Defense, or sit unused.”
The Air Forces did, however, now have a Major General in Command and a functioning headquarters and staff. It is acquiring C-130s for “strategic mobility,” and helicopters for transport, support, reconnaissance, and combat support missions. Helicopter gunships will be its initial combat weapon. It does not yet have clear force plans or plans to acquire modern fixed-wing combat aircraft.

**Ministry of the Interior Forces**

In general, Ministry of Interior officials and officers expressed much the same concerns about the quality of the Iraqi security forces and police discussed in previous chapters. While things were improving, they felt locally recruited police still had low overall recruiting and training standards, was often corrupt, and could do little more than passively man police stations and carry out minimal police duties in relatively secure areas. The regular police were seen as slowly improving in such areas, but generally ineffective in dealing with levels of crime that are a major security problem in the areas where insurgents have little capability and impact. They acknowledged that local and sectarian or ethnic militias were often the de facto police in high crime areas.

They also noted, however, that the Ministry of the Interior had created elite units that were carefully selected and trained, mobile, had adequate communications, and were working directly under the Ministry of the Interior. They claimed such forces had elements in Baghdad and every governorate by the spring of 2005.

They felt the Iraqi Special Police Commandos, Public Order Battalions, Police Mechanized Brigade and Emergency Response Unit were all emerging as effective paramilitary units, with the training, leadership, and equipment to provide security in medium to high threat areas. Iraqi traffic, immigration, and civil defense police were also felt to be getting better selection, leadership, training, and equipment.

Opinions were divided about the Border Police. Some felt they were slowly improving and now had better facilities, protection, and equipment. Other Iraqis felt they were still very weak and prone to desert or become inactive under limited pressure, and that it would be at least several years before the force could correct its leadership, selection, training, and equipment problems.

**Iraqis Do not See the Past as the Defining Prologue to the Future**

In spite of all the problems and uncertainties they faced, Iraqi officials and officers remained relatively optimistic about the future. Iraqi officials and officers felt that progress is now certain to be made if the new Iraqi government shows suitable leadership, cohesion, and inclusiveness, and did not purge the developing Iraqi force structure.

All wanted Iraq to take over planning and management of the Iraqi force development effort as soon as possible, but they exhibited little belief in the kind of conspiracy theories that blamed the US and MNSTC-I for deliberately keeping Iraqi forces weak and seeking a permanent occupation. If anything, Iraqi officials and officers were more worried that the US and MNF-I might not provide the continuing support they need. While some felt Iraqi forces might be able to largely stand on their own against the insurgents by the end

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of 2006, they also felt that they would still need support from US armor, artillery, air, special forces, and intelligence. Some felt that a major US and MNSTC-I advisory, training, equipment, and aid effort will be needed through 2010.

Iraqi officials and officers had considerable confidence in the US, British, and other MNSTC-I officers involved in helping Iraq to train and organize Iraqi forces. Iraqi officials and officers felt that most of the MNF-I and MNSTC-I teams they work with did have Iraqi interests at heart, and they felt the training effort was getting steadily better. None expected to get Western standards of advanced equipment and technology versus the kind of equipment better suited to Iraq. They also welcomed the recommendation of the Luck mission to insert US officers and NCOs into Iraqi units to provide leadership and unit cohesion and combat training as an essential next step in creating a transition to effective and independent Iraqi forces.

This does not mean that Iraqi officials and officers did not feel that changes were needed in the current MNF-I and MNSTC-I plans for Iraqi force development. There were serious criticisms of the MNF-I MNSTC-I effort. Iraqis were particularly critical at the level of equipment they are getting and do see Iraqis as being treated by a “dual standard” that left Iraqi forces much more vulnerable than US and MNF-I forces.

Several saw the following seven changes as necessary:

- First, developing and implementing plans to create Iraqi forces more quickly that are equipped and deployed to stand on their own.
- Second, developing common plans with the US and MNSTC-I to phase down the role of MNF-I forces according to common criteria and in ways where both sides have the same expectations, allowing Iraqis to predict the future level of MNSTC-I aid and remaining capability.
- Third, developing mid-term plans to create forces with enough support and heavy land and air weapons to eventually replace all MNF-I forces other than those remaining in an advisory and training role.
- Fourth, taking over the planning and command and control of operations at the local, then provincial, and then national level.
- Fifth, taking over the planning and management of the way in which aid funds and assistance were used so that Iraqis could integrate the aid and advisory effort into the overall operations of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and Iraqi national budget.
- Sixth, shifting the planning and management of the overall training effort into Iraqi hands, and relying on Iraqi trainers and Iraqi-developed course plans.
- Seventh, taking over the planning and management of the procurement and facility development effort, and having the MNF-I and MNSTC-I respond to Iraqi plans, rather than develop plans for Iraq.

Iraqis also noted that some of US and MNF-I combat forces they worked with had inadequate training for working with foreign forces. They felt some of their advisors rotated too quickly to acquire and exploit the expertise they need to work with Iraqis in the field, lacked adequate indoctrination into the current strengths and weaknesses of Iraqi forces, and sometimes treated them unfairly and not as partners -- and as partners who had to take over the lead role as soon as possible. 253

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XIII. Building the Future

There is no easy conclusion to this analysis, and the situation is very much in flux. Iraq is making progress in creating effective forces and it has strong MNF-I and MNSTC-I support. The Coalition continues to strengthen such efforts, and groups like NATO are making important new contributions. The fact remains, however, that Iraq, the U.S., and other members of the Coalition, face serious challenges in overcoming the legacy of past neglect and failure.

The steady evolution of the insurgency is a major threat, and one that presents a serious challenge to the effort to create effective Iraqi forces. Iraq’s political process could fail and lead to intense sectarian conflict between Iraqi Arab Shi’ite and Iraqi Arab Sunni. It faces a serious threat from outside Sunni Islamists, and remains divided between Arab, Kurd, and other minorities. There is a real risk that such tensions and clashes can escalate to a serious civil war.

Political, economic, and social progress present equally important challenges. Iraq is at best “a work in progress,” and it is unclear when, if ever, it can meet the five tests of "victory" outlined at the beginning of this analysis:

- Establishing a pluralistic Iraqi government capable of both governing and providing security to the people of Iraq, and finding a new balance of political power acceptable to Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, the Kurds, Turcomans, and other minorities. This means effective governance at the local, regional, and national level.
- Creating effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces capable of bringing security to the entire country, of eventually replacing all Coalition forces, and capable of conducting effective operations while winning the support of the vast majority of the Iraqi people.
- Providing effective aid, debt and reparations relief, and Iraqi economic reform efforts that – coupled with effective security – move the nation onto the path to stable economic development where wealth and economic growth are distributed in ways that meet the needs of all of Iraq’s people.
- Developing a new national consensus that legitimizes Iraq’s post Saddam government and social structure, and that can find a “golden mean” between the different goals and expectations of its different ethnic and religious elements.
- Finding a new balance of relationships with Iraq’s neighbors that will ensure that they do not threaten Iraq, or interfere in its affairs, while making it clear that Iraq no longer poses a threat to any neighboring state.

Defining "Victory" and "Defeat"

This analysis documents positive trends, but also shows that Iraq, the U.S. and its allies, and the world can “lose” the struggle in Iraq as well as win it. Such a defeat is not probable, but it is possible. There is no one variable that could produce such a “defeat,” and there is no agreed definition of what “victory” or “defeat” mean. The previous chapters have shown, however, that a “defeat” could take the following forms: A war of attrition whose cost and casualties eventually meant the Bush Administration lost the public and Congressional support necessary to go on fighting.

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The open failure of US efforts to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces and any ability to phase down the US and MNF presence at an acceptable rate.

A large-scale Iraqi civil war -- where some combination of Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite, Arab versus Kurd, secularist versus theocrat, or struggle for authoritarian rule made continuing the Coalition presence purposeless or untenable.

The collapse of effective Iraqi governance because of divisions between Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurd.

The creation of a religious state without the pluralism and tolerance critical to a US definition of victory.

The creation of open or de facto divisions in Iraq that allied the Iraqi Shiites with Iran and created the equivalent of a Shi’ite crescent divided from the Sunni part of the Arab and Islamic world.

The continued failure of US aid and Iraqi economic development to meet the needs and expectations of the people and the destabilizing impact of long-term, large-scale unemployment.

The failure to meet popular expectations regarding personal security, reductions in crime, availability of key services like water and electricity, and education and medical care.

Demands by an Iraqi government that US forces leave on less than friendly terms.

Domestic US political conditions that lead to the enforcement of some “exit strategy” that made the US leave before a stable Iraq can be created.

The isolation of the US from its regional and other allies, most remaining members of the Coalition and the support or tolerance of the UN.

The variables in this list are interactive and can combine in a wide range of ways to produce different real-world scenarios for “defeat.” Furthermore, the cases on this list are simply the key candidates; there are many more scenarios that might possibly occur.

"Winning" is equally hard to define. Iraq will be unstable for at least the next 5-10 years, and what appears to be "victory" could become a "defeat" if later political and economic upheavals created a hostile regime, chaotic country, or state with a theocratic or strong man regime so far from democracy that it made our current fight futile. The most likely “best case” outcome is now the kind of "victory" that produces an unstable, partially dependent state, with a unified and pluralistic regime but one that is scarcely an American client.

In any case, Iraq, the Coalition, and friendly outside states can only succeed if they recognize that the level of progress required to produce any meaningful definition of "success" or “victory” in all of the necessary areas will be a matter of years, if not a decade. No matter how impatient policymakers may be, history still takes time. It is certain that there will be reversals, even if the ultimate result is success.

The Broader Context of Success: A Nation for Iraqis and by Iraqis

Nation building in Iraq involves a mix of requirements and risks that progress in each area and which is interactive with progress in the others. This has particular importance for an assessment of Iraqi military, security, and police forces. Even the most effective
defeat of terrorists, insurgents, and large-scale criminal violence cannot be a substitute for pluralist government, a new national consensus, economic progress and development, and stable foreign relations. At the same time, no combination of successes in these other areas of progress will be adequate without security. Indeed, security is the precondition for most other forms of success.

No analysis of Iraqi force developments can ignore the fact that there is a long list of political, military, and economic uncertainties beyond the process of Iraqi force development that will shape the outcome of the insurgency and the success of the force building effort. Iraqi internal politics are a major uncertainty, and it is too soon to predict how well Iraqi forces can or cannot supplement and eventually replace Coalition forces. The nation building aspects of the "war after the war" remain a struggle in progress, and there still is no way to know whether the light at the end of the tunnel is daylight or an oncoming train.

Victory or defeat will ultimately be determined by the Iraqi political process and has become an Iraqi responsibility. Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency require political and economic, as well as military, solutions. At least as much depends on Iraqi capability to build on the foundation provided by outside aid, and to create the right kind of political and economic context for military success. Serious problems have emerged from the inability of the Iraqi Government to follow up on US and Iraqi military and security efforts and to establish effective governance at both the central government level and in the field.

Iraqis must work out a form of power sharing that can include Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, Kurds, Turcomans, and Iraq’s smaller minorities. The politics of ethnic and sectarian tension and rivalry cannot be resolved by force in any stable or lasting way. Only the Iraqis can bridge the gaps between Sunni and Shi’ite, Arab and Kurd, and various Shi’ite factions. Only Iraqis can find the proper way of sharing the nation’s oil wealth, and find the right balance between a secular and religious state.

Economic progress is now slow, unemployment is extremely high, and this affects security as well. Dollars can have as much impact on this kind of struggle as bullets. The reprogramming of US aid to serve military and security interests in 2004 has made a vital start, but it is still unclear that a broader plan exists to recast the US economic aid effort to achieve the security and stability that is a critical precondition to longer term aid efforts. As was noted in Chapter III, the increase in the insurgency raised the security costs of USAID funded aid projects from 4.2 percent of the total cost from March 2003 to February 2004, to 22 percent during the final nine months of 2004, and the total "security surcharge reached 50 percent in some areas by April 2005.231

**Iraqi Sovereignty Means Iraqi Responsibility**

Much of the burden of success will, and must, fall on the new Iraqi government. Many key challenges are already clearly the province of Iraqis and the new Iraqi government. It is the Iraqis who must now come to grips with the following broad challenges in nation-building:

- Deal with the transition to yet another new government between late 2005 and mid-2006, with possibly new sets of Ministers of Defense and Interior, plus different political leaderships and goals.

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Adapt to any new laws, mandates, federalism, and sharing of national revenue growing out of the creation of a new constitution.

- Cope with ethnic and religious tensions.
- Find ways to integrate militia elements into the regular forces/police forces, and have the rest go back to civilian life; implement the now largely abandoned CPA plan.
- Find some way to get stable and predictable budgets and levels of aid; negotiate at least a predictable level of medium-term aid.
- Create fully effective ministries, limit corruption, and purge low quality and passive leaders, officials, and officers.

**Iraqi Responsibility for Taking Over the Security Mission**

Outside powers can only do so much. Iraqi ability to create an inclusive political structure, find an Iraqi solution to pluralism and “federalism,” and establish effective governance is now up to the Iraqis. The most the US, other nations, the UN, and the international community can do is to provide aid and advice. At the same time, the ability of Iraqi forces to replace US and other Coalition forces will be an increasing test of the perceived legitimacy of the Iraqi government.

One key measure of the progress Iraqis must make towards the establishment of a constitutional and democratic government in Iraq is the timeline and political process set forth in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of March 2004 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (June 8, 2004), shown in Figure 45.

At the same time, day-to-day security and governance are essential to survival. Accordingly, the ability and willingness of Iraqi forces to increasingly stand on their own in meeting these latter challenges is a *sine qua non* for success in nation building.

Iraqis must take over responsibility for meeting the following challenges in the security dimension:

- Cope with aggressive insurgent and extremist attacks, and efforts to split Arab Sunni, Arab Shi’ite, Kurds, and other minorities.
- Implement a force development plan for the armed forces and manage the integration of the Army and National Guard.
- Create effective intelligence, counterintelligence, and C’I capabilities.
- Develop and implement plans to acquire more adequate equipment, force protection, and facilities.
- Begin a systematic transition to forces that can operate without MNSTC-I support.
- Redeploy Iraqi forces to meet Iraqi, rather than MNF, needs.
- Restructure, train/retrain, and purge the police forces to make them both effective crime fighters and an aid in counterinsurgency and counter terrorism.

According to MNSTC-I, Iraqis have begun to do so. A report by an MNSTC-I expert states:

> At least since the Iraqi government assumed sovereignty late last June, they have exercised as much influence in the decision to use Iraqi forces in the counter-insurgency as has been exercised...
On September 6, 2005, the U.S. military pulled hundreds of troops out of the southern city of Najaf, transferring control to the Iraqi military. The city was the site of classes between US forces and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Shiite Mehdi Army in August 2004. And in August 2005, tensions surged again when clashes erupted between Sadr's men and Iraqi Interior Ministry forces seen as loyal to a rival Shiite bloc, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. Nineteen died in those battles. The Iraqi force replacing the departing US troops is composed primarily of Shiite Muslims.256

On September 15, 2005, Muaffak al-Rubbaie, who chairs the committee responsible for security transfers to Iraqi forces, said that Iraqi troops were soon expected to take control of Karbala, Samawa, and Nasiriyah as well. He further suggested that the gradual process of handing over such urban areas to Iraqi control would allow for US troops to begin exiting the country.257

In a White House press conference on September 28, 2005, President Bush praised the increasing effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces. Bush cited that increasingly Iraqi forces were being left behind to secure cities after Coalition assaults. Bush continued:

At this moment, more than a dozen Iraqi battalions have completed training and are conducting anti-terrorist operations in Ramadi and Fallujah. More than 20 battalions are operating in Baghdad. And some have taken the lead in operations in major sectors of the city.

In total, more than 100 battalions are operating throughout Iraq. Our commanders report that the Iraqi forces are operating with increasing effectiveness. As Iraqi forces show they're capable of keeping the terrorists out, they're earning the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people, which ensures the success of a free and democratic Iraq.258

Creating Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces

Even if Iraq can deal with all of its other problems, there is no promise that efforts to create effective Iraqi forces will succeed. Serious problems remain in every aspect of the Iraqi force development program, and the effort to create effective Iraqi forces may well fail -- particularly if Iraq's Sunnis cannot be integrated successfully into its government, economy, and forces; if major friction takes place between Shi'ite and Kurd; or if the Shi'ites should divide and armed factions like Sadr's militia again become active.

Yet, the more one considers the history of the efforts to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces described in this report; the more it is clear that pursuing the right program consistently and with the right resources that the Coalition can still succeed in solving the security aspects of the nation building problem in Iraq.

The previous analysis shows that the US has corrected many aspects of its initial mistakes. The key questions from a policy viewpoint are now whether the United States and its allies are moving quickly enough to create forces that can provide real security and deal with the insurgency problem in time to meet the needs and expectations of the Iraqi people. Iraqi forces will remain a fraction of what is needed through at least mid-2005 and probably deep into 2006. Many critical elements of Iraqi army, security forces, and police development may not be complete by the end of 2007—and this assumes a high degree of continuity and consistency in Iraqi force development efforts, and a move...
towards united national forces, rather than ethnic and sectarian divisions. Iraqi forces
will not have airpower, significant armor, or modern IS&R support for years to come.
Creating Iraqi forces that can be fully effective in both dealing with continued insurgency
and terrorism, and capable of defending Iraq against any active threat from its neighbors,
will not be a matter of sudden "tipping points," it will be a process involving "tipping
years."

All of these points reinforce the need to create larger, more effective, and “National”
Iraqi forces than mix ethnic and sectarian manpower as soon as possible, and to give
them full force protection and counterinsurgency capability. Yet, there will be serious
tradeoffs in Iraqi force quality if the training, force building, and equipment effort is
rushed. The end result could be a failed force.

Both the Coalition and Iraqis must continue to find ways to work together to find the
fastest pace at which new Iraqi forces can be developed without losing their effectiveness
in the process. At the same time, the US and its allies must work out longer-term plans
and force goals with the new Iraqi government to scale up a larger training and
equipment program that can both give Iraq the forces it needs to stand alone as a truly
sovereign nation and also be affordable and self-financed in future years.

The Future Role of the US and Coalition, and of US and Coalition Forces

Allied support for a long Coalition presence has never been strong, and US popular
support and Congressional support is waning. According to a poll conducted by
Newsweek in early August 2005, only 26 percent of Americans said they supported
keeping large numbers of U.S. military personnel in Iraq for as long as it takes to achieve
US goals there; 38 percent said they would support keeping troops there less than a year;
13 percent said one to two years; and 12 percent said that troops should be brought home
now.259 This type of political pressure at home forced the issue of troop withdrawal to the
fore.

Any US plans for troop reductions are, however, anything but concrete. In a classified
briefing to senior Pentagon officials in July, top American Middle East commander Gen.
John Abizaid outlined a plan that would gradually reduce American forces in Iraq by
perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 troops by spring 2005. However, Gen. Abizaid also warned that
it is possible the Pentagon might have to keep the current levels of about 138,000
American soldiers in Iraq throughout 2006 if security and political trends are unfavorable
for a withdrawal.

Plans called for an increase of US troop presence to 160,000, up from 138,000 during the
period before the December 15, 2005 elections. This would be a temporary measure to
secure the elections. That number would gradually decline back down to 138,000 troops
initially, and then by another 20,000 or 30,000 troops by late spring of 2006, according to
senior Pentagon officials.260 However, no set timetable for withdrawal had yet been
established.261

On August 20, 2005, US Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker indicated that the US
may have to keep over 100,000 troops in Iraq into 2009. On September 12, 2005, Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani said that the United States could withdraw 40,000 to 50,000
troops by the end of the year, declaring there were enough Iraqi forces trained and ready to begin assuming control in cities throughout the country. Talabani said the number of “well-trained” Iraqi security forces stood at 60,000 and would reach 100,000 by the end of the year. All told, there about 190,000 Iraqis enlisted in the military or local security forces.\textsuperscript{262}

Meanwhile, the air mission in Iraq has become a study in contrast between the heft of US support and the meager reality of Iraqi air capabilities. In September 2005, Iraq’s air force consisted of 38 aircraft, including three C-130E transports, 16 UH-1 Huey helicopters, and two Australian SB7L-360 Seeker propeller aircraft. At this time, the US Air Force was doing all of the reconnaissance, all of the close air and light attack support, and is using its C-17 and C-130s to transport Iraqi troops.

CENTCOM tactical air commander Lt-Gen Walter Buchanan – who commands about 330 Air Force, Navy, and Coalition aircraft in the Persian Gulf – predicted in September that the US could continue to fly missions against insurgents in Iraq for another five years. His inside estimate for a viable Iraqi Air Force was three years, with the caveat that five was more likely. The Air Force has more than 205 aircraft in the region, including more than 35 F-16 fighters, more than 20 B-52 bombers and A-10 Warthog ground attack craft, over 35 reconnaissance and intelligence craft, and over 55 transports. The Navy supplies an additional 127 aircraft.\textsuperscript{263}

Whatever the US and its allies do, they must not ignore the fact that Iraq must take over responsibility for Iraq in no way means that that US and its allies are free of future responsibility to Iraq and to the Iraqi people. This is particularly true of the US. Regardless of how well the US can maintain the Coalition, or broaden the international effort to support Iraq through the UN and measures like contact groups, the US-led invasion has left it with a deep moral and ethical responsibility, and it still has much to do.

Iraqi success will depend on US and Coalition willingness to provide sustained military support and a broad-based aid program for at least several more years. The US also cannot plan now for withdrawal or some fixed ceiling to its military effort. There may be periods like the elections scheduled for the end of 2005 when new surges of US and other Coalition troops are necessary.

\textit{Foreign Troops and Iraqi Legitimacy}

The answer cannot be adding more US and other coalition troops as a substitute for effective Iraqi forces. Temporary surges and reinforcements to US and British forces may be necessary, but they are at best a short-term expedient, and one that inevitably will have political costs that offset their military impact.

There are no clear sources of significant forces from other countries, it would take very large forces to make a difference, and foreign countries will be reluctant to deploy troops to remote areas. Moreover, small, isolated deployments would rapidly become targets, while staying in large bases would be pointless. As various Coalition partners end their role in Iraq, some say they will be willing to turn their forces from combat to training. It may be realistic to preserve some contributions that are now planned to decline, but it is unrealistic to assume that any such forces would not go to “hot” like the border.

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The nature of both the insurgency in Iraq and Iraqi politics make it all too clear that only Iraqi forces can minimize the anger and resentment at US forces, give the emerging Iraqi government legitimacy, and support efforts to make that government and the Iraqi political system more inclusive. Even the segments of Iraqi society that tolerate Coalition forces as a necessity today want them out as quickly as is practical.

Even the best possible new elections, restructuring of the government, and efforts to create a constitution cannot by themselves make the new Iraqi government legitimate in Iraqi eyes unless that government provides security with Iraqi forces. Iraqis need to be seen as steadily taking over the security role by their countryman, the region, and the world. Poll after poll has shown that Iraqis see physical security as one of the most important single issues in their lives, generally followed by economic and educational security. The same polls show that they want Coalition forces to leave as soon as possible -- and often long before Iraqi forces can be ready.

The visible presence of US and Coalition forces must decrease over time, not increase, and any sustained deployment of thousands of additional US or other foreign troops can only make the Iraqi government less legitimate. At the same time, no amount of improvement in US intelligence and area expertise can substitute for effective Iraqi support. As one US Major General noted in March 2005, “The real things that are so absolutely critical in the fight we’re in today on the streets of Baghdad is an understanding of the city, an understanding of the culture and the ability to speak the language, and Iraqi forces bring that to the street.”

General George W. Casey Jr., the top US commander in Iraq, spoke to this point in late January 2005. He stated:

> Can I sit here and look you in the eye and say that the Iraqi security forces, guaranteed 100 percent, are going to be able to defeat this insurgency themselves? Of course not….[But] we cannot stay here forever in the numbers that we are here now; I firmly believe that. The Iraqis have to take ownership of this.

The presence of more US and other Coalition military personnel in Iraq without the consummate area skills, experience, specialized abilities, and ability to provide effective training can only be counterproductive. The more untrained and inexperienced forces on the street or in contact with Iraqis, the greater the hostility of the Iraqi people and the greater the likelihood of a tactical error that inflames the populace.

**NATO, UN, and Regional Forces Are At Best a Temporary Expedient**

The search to broaden international support for Iraqi nation building is important both to meet Iraq’s needs and establish the legitimacy of Iraq’s new government. It is not a way to achieve a successful "exit strategy" for either Iraq or the United States. It is all too easy to try to shift the burden of creating effective Iraqi forces, and creating security in Iraq, to other nations or to international organizations.

It is certainly desirable to seek such aid to supplement the role that the US and other MNSTC-I states must play, and to "internationalize" the nation building effort in Iraq at the political and economic level. The fact that more US forces are not a substitute for
Iraqi forces, however, does not mean that the US can find substitutes for the US forces that Iraq still needs.

The Role of NATO and European States

The NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) is helping to build the Iraqi Security Forces with training and advisory support to middle- and senior-level leaders at locations such as the National Joint Operations Center, Ministry of Defense Headquarters Joint Operations Center, and the Iraqi Staff College. A key role of the NTM-I is to assist in the development of the new Staff College. NTM-I completed instructor training for 24 Iraqis in July 2005. The class included nine Iraqi colonels and 15 lieutenant colonels. Eighty-eight Iraqi students started pilot Joint Staff College courses on September 25.266

The effort to create effective Iraqi forces is one that the US can only delegate in limited ways. NATO can play a significant role in some critical aspects of training and has already begun to do so. There is no practical chance, however, of significant numbers of additional European or NATO combat forces being added to the equation despite French concerns that the presence of NATO military trainers would open the door to combat troops.

The US Department of Defense announced on September 22, 2004, that NATO would provide further training to Iraqi security forces at the request of the Iraqi Interim Government. The training began with the creation of a permanent training center at Ar Rustamiya to train mid-level and senior security personnel. NATO dual-hatted US General David Petraeus to lead this effort, as well as the MNSTC-I, and there has since been real progress:

NATO began its first eight-week training program for Iraqi security personnel on October 2, 2004. The course took place at the Joint Warfare Center in Norway and currently involves the training of 19 mid and upper-level Iraqi officials from the military, Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior.

○ On October 4, General James Jones, NATO’s top commander, announced that up to 3,000 NATO troops could be involved in the training of the Iraqi security forces. The trainers, however, are unlikely to arrive prior to the Iraqi elections. Five days later, NATO committed to sending 300 trainers but not until the end of the year.

○ This agreement was formalized on December 9, 2004, with Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands agreeing to send military trainers. France, Belgium, Greece, Spain, and Luxembourg refused to send any trainers to Iraq. This 300-man team will slowly create academies in Baghdad and Zahko near Turkey. This effort should strengthen the inchoate Staff and War Colleges. The Staff College instructors were scheduled to begin training in late April 2005.

○ On February 22, 2005, each NATO member country pledged to contribute to the training effort. At this point, 16 NATO countries had troops on the ground in Iraq and almost all of them had senior officers involved at the NATO training mission in Baghdad. France agreed to provide money for one of the trust funds being established for the Iraqi military and security forces. The NATO Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger Norway also had begun to train Iraqi leaders and the second course began in March 2005.267

○ Overall, NATO announced its intention to train 1,000 Iraqi officers by the end of 2005. NATO also renewed its pledge to open a military training academy at Ar Rustamiya, on the outskirts of Baghdad. NATO indicated that it would continue its training efforts in

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Norway and at the NATO Defence College outside of Rome. NATO seemed responsive to a call earlier in February for more trainers and more funds, particularly for the creation of the Training, Education and Doctrine Center, by Lt. Gen. Petraeus.

Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, and Greece continued to refuse to train Iraqi soldiers in Iraq, but agreed to do so elsewhere. Belgium already trains Iraqis at a facility in the UAE while France agreed to train troops in France. Lt. Gen. Petraeus indicated in early February 2005 that NATO equipment contributions had been significant and were important to the continuing effort.

NATO delivered some 9,000 weapons in time for the January 30th elections. Hungary agreed to donate 77 T-72 tanks to the Iraqi military, though the details concerning shipment, who would pay for the shipment, and the date of delivery all remain unclear.268 Such donations do, however, often create the problem that countries willing to donate equipment will not provide support or sustainment, and that donations of different types of equipment force the creation of separate maintenance and support cycles.

NATO’s most serious contribution, however, may be the creation of Iraqi staff colleges and advanced training efforts for Iraqi officers in Iraq. MNSTC-I described these contributions by NATO as follows in mid-2005:269

Although currently composed of only 116 personnel, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) provides significant contributions to the mission of training and equipping the Iraqi Armed Forces. Perhaps because so many of its personnel are senior officers, their contribution is far beyond that expected from such a small organization. One of its most valuable is helping with development of the institutional capacity – the professional military education underpinnings – of the Iraqi armed forces. Both junior and senior staff college classes will start this fall in Ar Rustimiyah because of NTM-I leadership.

Iraqi officers manning the national, military and MOI operations centers have received the benefit of NATO-provided information technology education, other training and mentorship in actual operations. In the longer term, NTM-I will start War College classes next year, will probably take over assistance at the military academy and will eventually produce something roughly equivalent to U.S. TRADOC [US Army Training and Doctrine Command]. Another important line of operation for NTM-I is coordination of foreign equipment donations and out-of-country training offers, a task that is of great consequence to the overall training and equipping effort.

On September 27, 2005 Dr Ibrahim Jaafari, Prime Minister of Iraq, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, opened a new staff college for the Iraqi army, in Rustimiyah in southeast Baghdad. They were accompanied by the Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jaber, the head of the Iraqi armed forces, Gen Babiker Zebari and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, US Marine General James Jones. The College began courses that day for 90 trainees drawn from the rank of major and lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi army. The courses were being given by Iraqi trainers supported by NATO trainers.

NATO is now in the process of creating a full National Defense College, and such an effort will be critical to creating the kind of modern military elite Iraq will need in the future.

In a February 2005 meeting of NATO, all 26 Allies agreed to contribute to NATO’s training of the ISF, either in Iraq, outside of Iraq, through financial contributions, and/or by donations of equipment. NATO has declared that the NATO Training Mission-Iraq
(NTM-I) has reached initial operating capability. But there are also limits to the amount of training Iraqis require outside Iraq. As of August 2005, Iraq had at least 10 major training facilities, the better part of a training brigade, special skill training elements/schools, and countless ranges, shooting houses, and other training facilities – and they prefer to train their troops at home, as it’s cheaper, done by Iraqis, and avoids expensive/dangerous movements.

There already were typically well over 3,200 Iraqis out of country in training at any given time. Iraqis are taking advantage of training offers that are fully funded and provide the training they really want and can’t do for themselves yet (such as the German training of Iraqi engineer unit cadre and trainers – which now train Iraqis at Tadjí – in the UAE). They have other individuals all over the world in short and long courses. But the movement of large elements is costly, difficult and time-consuming to the Iraqis.

Limited additional increases might be possible, but the result might outweigh any benefits in terms of problems in interoperability and men simply seeking good foreign assignments. Any apparent cost savings would probably be mythical in the case of Egypt or Jordan; they would end up being paid for by other aspects of US foreign aid.

The United Nations and International Community

The world would be a better place if commentators and analysts stopped talking in vague terms about the "international community." In practice, the real world "international community" that can participate in nation building consists of a relatively small number of organizations and NGOs with limited and overcommitted resources. Calling for the "international community" to substitute for US action, or the action of any other country, is meaningless unless that call can be tied to the identification of specific organizations and specific resources that can credibly be allocated to a given task or mission.

In the case of Iraqi security, the United Nations has no military forces, and is unable to recruit new forces at a scale that could begin to replace US and British forces. The United Nations as a whole lacks the support needed for such a mission and it has no readiness to become involved in a counterinsurgency campaign. Moreover, Iraqis do not want to replace one set of "occupiers" with another.

The United Nations could, however, perform missions that do not fall within the core competencies of Coalition military forces like delivering humanitarian aid. These could include missions affecting aspects of civilian life varying from providing electricity and water to basic education. Incorporating the United Nations in humanitarian settlement and assistance would also minimize the friction between Iraqi citizens who require the provision of basic services, and the Coalition forces who lack the expertise, time and resources to create and maintain them. The United Nations and international organizations did play an important role from May to August 2003, when significant humanitarian activity by international organizations in Iraq took place.

The key problem is security. Insurgents have already driven the UN and most NGOs out of Iraq once. Other recent experiences in international operations indicate that the vulnerability of UN workers to attacks is an obstacle that will have to be resolved if the UN and NGOs are to function in environments where there is a significant terrorist threat or any faction that feels it can gain from attacking such “easy” targets.

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The question is whether any “Blue Helmet” approach to security is practical and/or the US military structure can be made more interoperable with non-military international actors in conflict zones. The contributions of international organizations to post conflict settlements should not be abandoned in Iraq or any other troubled region. Their experience and efficiency in humanitarian aid makes them a significant asset that should be seen as a supplement to military operations, and not as an additional weight on them.

General John M. Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized the need for good cooperation as he said, “What’s the relationship between a just arrived military force and the NGO and PVO that might have been working in a crisis torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”

The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia, The Civil Military Operations Centre for Rwanda and NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR - Operation Joint Endeavour) also provide examples of constructive cooperation between international armed forces and the UN. The most relevant and recent case for such cooperation is the joint effort under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF witnessed substantial collaboration between the UN and military forces, both at strategic and operational levels.

Clearly there are differences between these UN mandated military operations and the US led Coalition operations in Iraq. However, if the goal is to maximize the utility of military forces and achieve the highest level of consequence management and humanitarian assistance, then the US military should develop ways to integrate interoperability with international aid organizations into military strategy. Efforts such as NGO and military sponsored seminars and military training exercises such as Prairie Warrior at the Command and General Staff College and Purple Hope at the Joint Forces Staff College should be expanded in number and content. More joint training is essential for improved mutual understanding between these two entities to increase effectiveness of complex military interventions.

**The Potential Role of Regional Forces**

Neighbouring countries are not a solution. They cannot provide the necessary combat-ready forces in a sustainable form. The presence of neighbouring countries’ troops would present serious internal political liabilities. Troops from Iran could inflame the Shi’ite issue, Saudi Arabia is dealing with its own bout of insurgents, Syria would present Sunni and Ba’ath Party conflicts, Turkey would be problematic due to the Kurdish question, and Jordan is already doing what it can without openly supporting the US and inviting internal turmoil given the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Even if the Iraqi political repercussions were less severe, other Arab and Islamic forces cannot deploy with the necessary speed and also lack the ability to sustain their forces in the field. Once more, such efforts would inevitably be seen as efforts to bail the US out of a war that had no public supporters. The domestic outcry within these countries would be intense, to say the least.

**Ongoing Changes in US Force Development Strategy**

Any effort to address the future changes that need to be made in the US effort to create effective Iraqi forces must take account of the progress MNSTC-I has already made and
the ongoing changes the US is already considering. For all its initial mistakes, the US-led effort has steadily improved and adapted, and further improvements seem to be underway.

One of these changes is the growing emphasis on creating effective Iraqi forces, rather than direct Coalition defeat of the insurgents, touched upon in previous chapters. MNSTC-I envisions that the Iraqi security forces will gradually be weaned off direct US support. According to MNSTC-I,271

Through coalition mentorship and assistance, the ISF eventually get to the point where they only need support from coalition forces, then to the point where they can conduct operations independent of coalition forces. MNF-I’s training and readiness system will measure just where ISF units fall on that readiness spectrum.

Another change is the understanding that no training program, no matter how good, can make up for a lack of experienced leaders and proven units and combat teams. Training, equipment, and facilities are vital; they also are not enough.

**Seeking Success Rather than an "Exit Strategy:" Changing the Main Mission of US Forces**

It can be dangerous to talk of "exit strategies." The term "exit strategy" has become a synonym for finding some reason for withdrawal, rather than a strategy for some form of victory. Far too often, it is tied to calendar deadlines that have nothing to do with whether the time is right for withdrawal, and to a political effort to disguise defeat. At this writing, the conditions in Iraq not only do not justify such an approach, they would be a betrayal of Iraqis who still have the chance to create the conditions for a far better Iraq than existed under Saddam Hussein.

It is clear, however, that the US has changed its strategy to focus on creating effective Iraqi forces as both a key to some form of "victory" and to eventually reducing the US and Coalition presence in Iraq as Iraqi forces take over the security mission. Lieutenant General John R. Vines, the commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, made this point shortly after he assumed command of US ground forces in Iraq in February 2005. In an interview, Vines asserted that the main mission for the US military following the January 30th elections is to train Iraqi military and security forces. To this end, Vines suggested that up to 10,000 US military advisers could be assigned to Iraqi military and police units.272 It is important to note that the number of advisers suggested by Vines is higher than what was previously reported.273

The commander of US forces in northern Iraq, Brig. Gen. Carter Ham, stated that, “The shifting of emphasis to developing Iraqi security forces as the first priority seems right. Shifting primary responsibility for conduct of counter-insurgency operations to Iraqi forces is necessary and proper.”274

It has since become all too clear, however, that no valid timetable can be established for reductions in Coalition forces until Iraqi forces are available in much larger numbers, and the trends in their performance is clear. In fact, reports of such timetables have led to a wide range of contradictory reports, and to more speculation than insight.

For example, Secretary Rumsfeld noted in March 2005 that the US presence in Iraq was dropping from a peak of 152,000 at the time of the election to around 135,000, and Iraqi
forces were expected to rise from 145,000 to around 200,000 by the end of 2005 --
though he was careful to note that US forces might have to build up to over 150,000
again to secure Iraq's next election, which was then scheduled for December 2005.  

US officers gave lower numbers in April 2005, stating that US strength might drop from
elements of 17 brigades, and 142,000 personnel that month to 13 brigades and 105,000
personnel by early 2006.  At the same time, Jane's Defense Weekly reported that the US
had adopted a three-phase strategy developed by General George Casey, the commander
of MNF-I, to pave the way for major drawdowns in US force by the end of 2005. While
many of the details and deadlines in the Jane’s article are as suspect as most media
reporting on such plans, the broad outlines of the article are still of interest:

- Phase One, which was said to have begun on April 15, 2005, and which was to be
  completed by August, was said to focus on manning, training, and equipping individual
  Iraqi Army units at the individual and platoon level to create Iraqi units capable of
  independent platoon with minimal US supervision, and transition to having the Ministry
  of Defense pay Iraqi troops.

- Phase Two was to partner each Iraqi Army battalion with two company-sized US Army
  units to give Iraqi Army battalions the capability to operate independently at the battalion
  level by October 2005.

- Phase Three involved having Iraqi Army battalions certified by their partnered US
  advisors as being capable of battalion-sized operations and being assigned specific battle
  spaces occupied by US units. US company-sized units were to provide a quick response
  force through December 2005. Each battalion was to have a US Military Transition
  Team of roughly 60 men, with a major or senior captain and experienced NCOs, to help
  prepare the Iraqi unit.

New reports about such plans also emerged during the summer of 2005. In early July
2005, a British newspaper printed a classified British government study signed by
Defense Secretary John Reid on the feasibility of drawing down British troop strength
from 8,500 to 3,000 by the middle of 2006. The memo stated that the British perceived
that the US military was hoping that they could reduce their troop presence and hand over
security responsibilities for 14 of the 18 provinces to the Iraqis by early 2006.

President Bush continued to reiterate that the US had a “success strategy” and not an
“exit strategy,” would not set a timetable for withdrawal, and that US soldiers would
'stand down as Iraqi soldiers stood up.'

On July 27, 2005, General Casey stated that. "I do believe that if the political process
continues to go positively and if the development of the security forces continues to go as
it is going, we'll still be able to take some very substantial reductions in the spring and
summer of next year." Casey also said that while car bomb attacks had reached a pack of
143 in May, that they had since declined and that. "The level of attacks they've been able
to generate has not increased substantially here over what we've seen in the last
year...This insurgency is not progressing...what you are seeing is a change in tactics to
more violent, more visible attacks against civilians and that is a no-win strategy for the
insurgency."

That same day, Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari said that the departure of U.S. forces
should take place as quickly as possible, but that while "we desire speed, "this should
depends on how quickly Iraq could train, equip and field its own soldiers and police to take over security duties. "We do not want to be surprised."

It is important to note that such statements do not attempt to set deadlines or specify the rate and level of Coalition withdrawal. This reflects the reality that any such “plans” should depend on how quickly Iraqi forces become effective and how quickly the insurgency fades. US officers in the field also tend to be less optimistic about such deadlines than politicians and reports in the media, and cite problems in the Iraqi police training effort, and delays in deploying Iraqi forces into combat, when they feel are likely to lead to delays in any such transition.

Regardless of the form it takes, the transition will not be easy. In addition to Iraqi politics and military success, much depends on the future quality of the advisors the Coalition embeds in Iraqi troops, security, and police units—the latter of which still had shortages of advisors in mid-2005. There is a need for better language and area skills and providing advisors with the proper training and combat background, has proved to be a serious problem. It is unclear how many advisers will come from forces not yet deployed in Iraq. Some of the estimated 10,000 soldiers could be part of an increase in US personnel levels, although a substantial part of US forces in Iraq could be shifted to take on the training and support role within US forces.

**The Search for "Critical Mass"**

One key uncertainty is when Iraqi forces will achieve “critical mass” in terms of their ability to take over key missions and replace MNF-I forces. As of early 2005, the Iraqis took part in about 1,200 patrols with US forces a week, while US-led Coalition forces lead 12,000 patrols a week. These figures are changing because the US Department of Defense wants the Iraqis to assume the bulk of those patrols as quickly as possible, but Iraqi forces continue to have major problems with leadership, desertions, and effectiveness.

General Petraeus gave the following assessment of Iraqi forces in early May 2005:

> With hindsight, we apparently reached the “critical mass” point (i.e. the point at which the combination of rebuilt infrastructure – especially for training and bases, equipment, Iraqi trainers, Iraqi leaders, and life support, etc. all supported generation/training of forces at multiple locations simultaneously) in late January, it appears, and the chain reaction since then has been substantial.

> As an example, three divisions that were struggling in terms of strength back in November due to casualties, intimidation, etc., are now at 88 percent, 102 percent, and 102 percent respectively, with the former headed to 100 percent in the next couple of weeks (based on recruits/former soldiers already completing training) and the latter two headed to 110 percent in the week ahead (based on former soldiers/recruits that have already completed training). And the one at 88 percent would be over 100 percent had the authorization not changed (from 3 line companies per battalion to 4).

> There is still a huge amount of work to be done and daily drama in a host of areas, but the ISF is hanging tough and steadily getting stronger. Have scrubbed numbers hard by the way, taking some 8,000 out of the police trained/equipped numbers (in provinces hit hardest during tough times in Oct – Jan) over the past 4 months (since we ID’d to the GAO the challenges in personnel accountability with regular police), and still the numbers of MOI trained/equipped have grown steadily.
It will be mid-2006 at the earliest, however, before it is really clear whether Iraqi forces can reach the level of “critical mass” where they become effective enough to take over virtually all of the missions in dealing with the insurgency. Serious problems may remained in the quality of the police force in our dependence on largely Shiite or Kurdish unites, and in the existence of independent militias and local forces. Much will depend on the economic and political situation, and the speed at which Iraqi forces are given the armor, airpower, firepower, and sustainability to operate without American support.

**Maintaining an Emphasis on Force Quality**

The Coalition must continue to focus on the quality of the Iraqi troops as opposed to just the pure numbers of Iraq i troops in uniform. While it is important for the Iraqi forces to continue to grow in size, the soldiers must be able and willing to effectively stand and fight. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld highlighted this focus in his testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee on February 17, 2005. He stated, “Beyond numbers, it seems to me the capability is what really is important. And capability is a function … partly of numbers, to be sure, but it’s also of training, equipment, leadership, mobility, sustainability, access to intelligence, experience.”

The Coalition has given more priority to developing new ways to better determine the capabilities of the Iraqi units in development, and initial efforts have now been implemented. Lt. Gen. Petraeus made this point in an interview in February 2005, “We are going to have to move to a way where we can start tracking the capability.” Far more needs to be done, however, and suggestions like developing the equivalent of the US Mission Essential Tasks Lists (METLs) -- a common measurement used in the US to judge performance and identify key tasks for training -- had not been implemented as of June 2005.

**Keeping the Police Effort in Balance**

As the previous chapters have shown, the Coalition and Iraqi government must give a high priority to the development of both military forces, and effective security and police forces. It is tempting to focus on the insurgents, but the present effort is the correct one. Effective police and security forces are critical to day-to-day security against both insurgents and criminals, and to giving the Iraqi government the public face of legitimacy -- something that extended deployments of Iraqi military forces simply cannot accomplish. The MSTC-I advisory effort has also been limited in this area. As of May 2005, MNCSTC-I J-5 (Future Plans) had a staff of 15, but only one person detailed to work with the police force. Many elements of the Iraqi police also needed more expert civilian advisors and civilian agencies like the Department of Homeland Security, which often gave such efforts low priority and left key training elements undermanned.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that senior officers like General Abizaid warned during a speech in Washington on May 18, 2005 that Iraqi police units were not cohesive enough to mount an effective challenge to insurgents which would allow American forces to begin phasing out of the fighting. Abizaid warned that the Iraqi forces had fallen “behind” in developing the capability to shoulder a major role in combat, and blamed a tendency among Iraqi police to operate as individuals rather than in cohesive units as both a major part of the problem, and as a factor making them more vulnerable to intimidation.  

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The police and the Ministry of the Interior…are…behind in terms of sophistication, chain of command, cohesion of leadership…It delays the Ministry of Defense forces going out and doing the internal security mission and that keeps American embedded trainers and embedded transition teams in the field longer.

These problems can easily become much more severe in late 2005, and during 2006, as Iraq struggles to decide on a constitution, elects yet another new government, and then actually try to govern on the face of sectarian and ethnic differences, and insurgent efforts to provoke civil war. This is also an area where Coalition and other foreign forces are even less able to substitute for Iraqi forces than in the case of the military. Effective training and advisory efforts are critical, particularly in ensuring that the police become a competent proactive and investigative force, rather than a passive presence. Outside aid and advice is necessary to create effective command and communication links, reduce corruption, and train the kind of gendarmerie forces that can deal with insurgent attacks without repeating the violence and repression used by Saddam’s security forces.

CPATT has made major progress, and has developed plans to provide the support Iraqi police forces need. Yet, it is still unclear that a similar program to embed Coalition advisors and forces in the Iraqi police in the field will be put fully in place. This is a significant problem as the Iraq police are under constant harassment and intimidation and units have completely dissolved in Samarra and Mosul when put under pressure.

**The Need to Provide All the Necessary Support and Resources**

The US has every possible incentive to create effective Iraqi military, security, and police forces. This is the only practical way to “win” in Iraq, cut the size of US commitments, and establish a government the Iraqis see as legitimate. The US certainly understands this at the command level in Iraq and in MNSTC-I, and seems to now understand it at the policy and command level in Washington as well.

What is not clear is whether all the necessary resources are really being provided, and whether a comprehensive and realistic plan exists in Washington to ensure that Iraqi military, security, and police forces develop as they should. General Luck’s plan to strengthen Iraqi forces with American advisors is a useful step, but only if it leads to Iraqi forces that become fully independent and which can replace US and other Coalition forces.

As yet, there is no public plan that shows the US will give Iraqi forces the heavier equipment they need to fight and survive, the facilities they need to be protected, the communications required, or any of the other essential tools that will create truly independent and self-sufficient forces. Experts may argue over how much armor and heavy weapons are needed, and their priority relative to improvement in support and logistics capabilities. There is also the risk the coalition could end up arming forces that will fight each other in a civil war. However, such a plan is critical to an effective Coalition strategy and plan for Iraq, and to maintaining Iraqi confidence in the Coalition.

Problems still exist in the coordination of the Department of State and Department of Defense efforts, particularly in their operations in Washington, and these problems are compounded by uncertain support from other civilian agencies. These problems have had a particularly important impact on the development of the police force, both in terms of trainer and mentors and field advisors. There has been an excessive emphasis on
coordination, reporting, and committee meetings in Washington to handle functions that should be under a clear single line of authority in the US country team in Iraq, with equally clear lines of authority for other Coalition partners and the Iraq government. By and large, this exists at the military level, but it is significantly less effective at the level of regular and elite police forces.

**The Problem of Affordability, National Defense, and Transfer to the Iraqi Government**

In an ideal world, the US, Coalition, and Iraqi government would not have to look beyond the immediate need to defeat the insurgency. Wars don’t occur in ideal worlds, however, and mid and long-term force development issues cannot be ignored. Unless the US is prepared to provide a series of massive new aid programs and maintain a major presence in Iraq for far longer than either Iraqis or Americans want, there is an immediate need for much more detailed plans and programs to eventually turn all of the force development and training effort over to the Iraqi government. In practice, this means having the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior take over as many present MNF-I and MNFSTC-I efforts as quickly as possible, and letting Iraqi take over responsibility for longer term planning even before it can manage such programs.

Near, mid, and long-term affordability are already major issues. Iraq does not have the income to pay for the force posture that it and the Coalition are creating. Investment for counterinsurgency equipment and forces must come at the cost of not investing in the kind of military forces needed to defend Iraq’s borders, and the kind of police and security forces best suited to peacetime. This means hard trade-offs have to be made between existing and future missions, and cost-containment and affordability are already major issues for every aspect of force development.

More generally, the Iraqi people and Iraqi politicians need to understand that security too has become an Iraqi responsibility. The US and its allies may still provide advisory teams and aid for years to come, and the US and Britain may offer some kind of “over-the-horizon” guarantees, but Iraq stability and inclusiveness depend heavily on the perception that Iraq will be truly sovereign, foreign combat troops will leave, there will be no permanent bases, and that Iraqi forces will eventually be able to deal with threats or military pressure from nations like Syria, Turkey, and Iran.

**The Need for An Integrated Strategy**

Iraq, the Coalition, and the US not only need a workable strategy and plan for the development of Iraqi forces that can operate independently and replace US and other Coalition forces as soon as is feasible, but they need one that is integrated into an overall plan for every aspect of military, advisory, and aid activity in Iraq.

This need for a coherent stability and nation building strategy, and detailed plans to implement it, is a key lesson of the US experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq. No one can ignore the ad hoc nature of dealing with the day-to-day changes imposed by the reality of war, but this is no rationale for failing to tie all US government efforts together around some common Interagency effort and maintain a focus on a common plan and strategy.
It is interesting to note in this light that some of those working at the MNF and MNSTC-I contrast the fact that detailed transition and force development plans were created for Afghanistan, against the fact that the MNF was slow to create a detailed plan and strategy. One former MNSTC-I staff officer put it this way--though it is important to note his impressions are dated and MNSTC-I now has such plans:

There is no plan at MNSTC-I for the development of Iraqi security forces. While training and equipping are ongoing, they are ad hoc in a sense. We have timelines for how quickly we expect forces to be ready, we have PowerPoint briefings galore, we have ideas being implemented, but those are not based on any sort of plan. At no point has MNSTC-I sat down and identified a desired end state, a basic set of assumptions, possible complications and constraints, or any of the other things that happen during a planning process....MNSTC-I J-5 (Future Plans) was overmanned and it would not have taken any additional resources to develop a plan for the command.... LTG Petraeus was aware that a plan would be helpful, as he told the director of J-5...in December 04 to “get out of the weeds” and start thinking long-term (J-5’s primary function was instead preparing briefings).

In January 05, three days before GEN Luck, arrived, (we were) told to start developing a plan for the command... (and) started on a “mission analysis,” which is the first step in planning. In February, … another team start(ed) again using a different methodology… a third mission analysis was done and was presented to … in April, but nothing had been done with it yet. Bare in mind, this is only the first step.

Of course, ... having a plan on the shelf (does not) guarantee success, (and no) military command will be able to strictly follow a plan. However, going through the planning process allows you to ask the questions you need to ask and identify potential pitfalls in advance so you can find ways to work around them. When things change and you have to adjust, at least you have something to adjust rather than shooting from the hip every time something unexpected happens. Also, a command plan would help get all of the J-sections, as well as CMATT, CPATT, and JHQ-AST, onto the same sheet of music instead of each going in their own direction. MNSTC-I does not have any sort of common vision regarding its mission.

**Integrating a Political, Economic, and Security Strategy**

At the same time, an integrated strategy cannot simply be a US or Coalition strategy. A successful US and Coalition strategy must be tied to a strategy that either is developed in coordination with the Iraqi government or developed by it. The time has passed when, if ever, the US and MNSTC-I could impose order on Iraq. Iraqi decisions will now determine Iraq's fate, and only Iraqis can forge political unity or federalism, establish effective governance, establish effective Iraqi forces and security, and move Iraq back towards economic development.

It is again critical to note that mid and long-term success in creating effective Iraqi forces requires integrated economic, political, and security development. Any data on the Iraqi economy are extremely uncertain, and virtually impossible to relate to different parts of the country and given age groups, and ethnic and sectarian factions. Some data are heavily biased by wartime profiteering and the flood of aid money. Others are almost certainly far too pessimistic.

A survey for the UN Development Program, "Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004,” does, however, provide some important insights. The document is based on questioning more than 21,600 households in May 2004. While some of the methodology was uncertain, it found that some 24,000 Iraqis had died as a result of the invasion and its aftermath,
although the total could have been between 18,000 and 29,000. About 12 percent of those were under 18.

Some 85 percent of households complained of electricity cuts and 29 percent relied on generators. Only 54 percent of Iraqi families had clean water. Only 37 percent were connected to a sewage network, compared with 75 percent in the 1980s. These figures were very similar to estimates provided by Iraqi officials in February 2005, although many felt the situation had deteriorated during the course of the year, and the data in these areas in Chapter III supports their views.

The report also claimed that the number of Iraqi mothers who die in labor had reached 93 in every 100,000 births, compared with 14 in Jordan and 32 in Saudi Arabia -- although much of this problem and the others the survey found were the result of previous wars and the actions of the previous regime. The survey also found that 6 percent of Iraqis lived in war-damaged homes. It found the average annual per capita household income was only $255 in 2003 and dropped to $144 in the first half of 2004. Some 23 percent of Iraqi children were said to be chronically malnourished, and there was only 79 percent enrolment in primary schools.

The UNDP estimates that Iraq has a very young population. Nearly 40 percent of the 27 million Iraqis are under the age of 15 years and the mean age in Iraq is an incredible low of 23.8 years. The UNDP Iraq Living Conditions Survey carried out in 2004 also indicated that average dependency ratio in Iraq was 73.97 percent. This meant that seven out of ten Iraqis are dependent on the earnings of the other three, who are overwhelmingly young Iraqi men. While young Iraqi men are the population who are mostly depended upon, unemployment rate among them is officially 33.4 percent. The figure reaches “an astonishing level of 37.2 percent for young men with secondary or higher education”. This could be increasingly alarming when one factors in the underestimation of official figures.

The frustration caused by increasing levels of national unemployment was compounded by the CPA’s decision to lay off a considerable number of government workers in 2003-2004. According to analysts at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, the Authority fired 500,000 Iraqis who were state employees, and an additional 25,000 to 30,000 who were former Ba’athists. This indicates that during its time, CPA laid off 8 percent of the active Iraqi workforce. Number of Iraqis it employed, on the other hand is ambiguous, yet the fact remains that none of the employment targets set by the US administration or the CPA were actually fulfilled. Therefore, there is broad consensus that the Coalition policies were not effective at reducing the overall level of unemployment in the country, and some experts argue that it even worsened the situation.

A new, less sweeping UNDP survey, conducted in May 2005, found the following key results:

- 78 per cent of households in the country had an unreliable electricity supply; in Baghdad, the figure rises to 92 per cent.
- 37 per cent of urban households and only 4 per cent of rural ones had a sewage connection.
61 per cent of Iraqi households have access to a safe and stable drinking water supply, but 28 per cent of these experienced daily problems with that supply.

5 per cent of households had been damaged by military activity; the figure rises to 8 per cent in the north of the country.

Only 52 per cent of urban households were accessible by paved road; the figure dropped to one in 10 in rural areas.

31 per cent of males over 15 were unemployed.

Almost a quarter of children between the ages of six months and five years suffered from malnutrition.

More young people today were illiterate in Iraq than in previous generations.

Just 83 per cent of boys and 79 per cent of girls of school age are enrolled in primary school.

While no reliable unemployment figures exist in Iraq, it seems almost certain that real and disguised unemployment was above 30 percent for young men in Shi'ite areas in the summer of 2005, and 40-60 percent in most Sunni urban areas and towns.

Iraqi water system was at an unacceptable level at the time of the US led coalition’s invasion, and that level has deteriorated by an additional 50 percent in most governorates across Iraq as of July 2005. Sanitation infrastructure is at a considerably worse status than that of water. Only 9 percent of the urban population outside of Baghdad is served by a sewage system, while the rural areas and the north do not have piped sewage systems at all. Lack of sanitation system is becoming a serious environmental and health concern.

According to the UN/World Bank Needs Assessment report of October 2003, none of the sewage treatment plans were operational, and 50 percent of the generated wastewater i.e. raw sewage in Iraq was being discharged to rivers and waterways, which was consequently used as drinking water by overwhelming majority of Iraqis who do not have access to potable water. The status as of July 2005 remained largely unchanged, as USAID reports on the progress of the sewage system indicated: “[USAID is] expanding and rehabilitating one water treatment plant and constructing another to increase capacity by approximately 120 million gallons per day; rehabilitating sewage treatment plants. The sewage treatment system in Baghdad […] will be restored to almost 100% percent capacity, serving 80 percent of Baghdad’s population”2

There is no date for the completion of the only sewage treatment project in progress.

These economic problems are reinforced by the mismanagement of Iraq’s economic development. Direct subsidies for the Public Distribution System (formerly known as the Food Baskets), refined oil products i.e. fuel, kerosene, diesel and gas, and the indirect subsidies for electricity, water and agricultural inputs incur heavy burdens on the economy. The cost of direct subsidies is more than 10.2 billion Iraqi dinars (ID) in the public budget in 2005, its share in GDP being more than 37 percent.295 Lack of refinery capacity causes Iraq to import 80 percent of its liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), 74 percent of its gasoline, 49 percent of its kerosene and 46 percent of its diesel, same as prewar

2 http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/watsan.html

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levels. These imports and the subsidies associated cause the Iraqi economy hundreds of millions of dollars, yet US reconstruction efforts have largely bypassed the development of refineries and hence not decreased the amount of imports.

Lack of strategic planning is all too evident. A July 2005 State Department report stated that projects on “facility assessment” of oil and gas fields have been awarded. The fact such projects were still just beginning in mid-2005 indicates that the actual conditions of Iraq’s biggest oil fields were still unknown, and assessments had yet to be conducted in spite of the fact Iraq’s economy was in urgent need of major oil field rehabilitation to reach the planned level of exports.

The oil sector is also a critical example of the need to integrate Iraqi political development, force development, and economic development. Oil revenues will constitute more than 90 percent of Iraq’s national income for 2005, 2006, 2007 and possibly the foreseeable future. The current Iraqi budgets fiscal projections are based on the treating Iraqi oil revenues as national income. Yet, the Shi’ite majority and Kurdish minority are both seeking to decentralize the allocation of oil revenues, and reduce the central government’s role and authority over oil money.

No US, Coalition, or Iraqi strategy and approach to nation building or security can survive Iraq dividing along ethnic and sectarian lines, or continued economic failures and a lack of day-to-day personal security. It cannot survive mistakes like failing to create an inclusive government or purging the Iraqi forces and civil service of everyone suspect of being a "Ba'athist." Iraq cannot survive on the basis of a foreign vision of the future; it can only survive if Iraqis have the vision to create the future they need.

The Economic Aid Dimension

Iraq can only deal with these problems over the next 3-5 years if it gets large amounts of continuing economic aid. The many failures in the US and Coalition effort to create effective Iraqi forces documented in the earlier chapters of this book have at least been largely overcome. The same cannot be said of the aid effort. The initial ideological bias of the CPA, and the illusion that the US had the competence to create a new Iraqi economy out of the mess left by Saddam Hussein in a country his wars had effectively bankrupted in 1984 is only part of the story.

In broad terms, the US simply did not know what to do, and how to go beyond classic project aid to dealing with insurgency. The reprogramming of aid to meet short term goals – adding dollars to bullets – had to be forced on the system largely by the US Embassy team in Baghdad and the US military. A State Department report showed that as of June 29, 2005, $ 13.6 billion (74% of the 18.4 billion provided in the IRRF) had been obligated, and $ 6.35 billion had been disbursed. This level of US funding for Iraq represents America’s largest assistance effort in a single country since the Marshall Plan that helped transform Europe following World War II.

Yet USAID and the Department of Defense proved incapable of conducting effective surveys of requirements, establishing valid contracts, administering contracts, ensuring that projects could be carried out in threatened areas, and assessing success and failure with any objectivity. The CPA Inspector General’s Audit Report dated July 2004 states that “Project and Contracting Office (PCO) faces challenges in ensuring that tasks
performed under these contracts fully meet the US Government’s requirements and are economically and efficiently executed.” Inspector General Bowen’s report states the “detailed systemic management failings, lax or nonexistent oversight and apparent fraud and embezzlement on the part of the US officials charged with administering the rebuilding efforts”.

As Figure 46 shows, spending lagged far behind the rates needed to have an impact. Reprogramming has led to accelerated spending in the security and law enforcement areas, and the initial spend-out rate on the electricity sector, oil infrastructure, justice and civil society, democracy, education and governance, health care, transportation, and water resources was dismal. Despite the more than $6 billion disbursed out as of June 2005, the country’s electricity supply is far from meeting demand, oil production is below prewar levels and barely half of Iraqis report having access to safe, stable supplies of potable water. Unemployment remains between the 25 to 50% margin and food and fuel subsidies have resulted in a significant budget deficit.

While the reprogramming of aid to meet short-term security needs has served a vital purpose in substituting dollars for bullets, and some projects have been successful, far too much money has been spent and is being spent on US-conceived efforts that pour money into US and foreign contracts, spend that money outside Iraq or on overhead and security, and do not lead Iraq towards effective economic development. Brig. Gen. Bill McCoy, for instance, stated that the security costs were initially factored in at 9% level during budgeting of most infrastructure projects. He maintained that the increase in the cost of security, sometimes up to 25% caused downsizing in most projects. As of August 11, 2005 $3 billion was taken out of water and $500 million out electricity construction he said. James Jeffrey, senior advisor on Iraq for the State Department, stated during a House Appropriations subcommittee on foreign operations hearing that “we [the US] scaled back out projects in many areas, we do not have the money”.

This spending has failed to create jobs and investment activity that has a meaningful macroeconomic scale or that will act to meet the needs of key sectors and governorates. The USAID and Department of Defense aid planning and contracting effort is a self-inflicted wound that needs to be replaced by Iraqi planning and management as soon as possible. The US aid picture seems to be one where reconstruction is almost entirely under the control of USAID, IRMO, DoD and PCO whose employees are exclusively confined to the Green Zone and do not speak Arabic. Almost all Iraqis are excluded from the economic development of their country. There are many competent Iraqis at the central and local level who can participate in determining the type of project their country needs, numerous Iraqi companies that can be hired to carry out reconstruction projects, and millions of Iraqi young men and women who can provide the labor for the foundations of new Iraq.

Reliance on US contractors, and non-Iraq contractors also compounded the security problems as well as wasting vast amounts of money on expenses that never reached Iraqis or improved their lives. While some contractors showed courage and dedication, many simply took the money and “hid” in secure areas, and corruption was endemic in many aspects of the aid effort.
At this point in time, it is too late to fix the US management and planning structure that has wasted so much of the past aid effort, and there is no meaningful chance of the level of outside aid from other donors necessary to substitute for US funds. What is needed is the same kind of effort for aid that has gone into creating effective Iraqi forces. It is to let the Iraqi government make its own plans, manage its own efforts on Iraqi terms, and spend the money in Iraq. The US Embassy team should certainly vet each project, insist on suitable reporting and accounting, and blow the whistle on corruption. It is brutally clear, however, that the talent to plan and manage an effective effort simply does not exist in Washington, and outsiders may be able to advise in transforming the kind of “command kleptocracy” that existed under Saddam Hussein, but do not have the skills necessary to run that transformation themselves.
Figure 45

Progress Toward a Democratic Iraq: TAL and UNSC Resolution 1546 Timeline

Figure 46

The Flow of US IRRF I and II Aid to Iraq

As of June 22, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2207 Report</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>5,035.6</td>
<td>4,913.9</td>
<td>4,434.8</td>
<td>2,690.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity Sector</td>
<td>4,308.2</td>
<td>3,700.4</td>
<td>2,666.8</td>
<td>1,241.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>1,723.0</td>
<td>1,609.4</td>
<td>1,101.0</td>
<td>347.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, Public Safety and Civil Society</td>
<td>1,224.2</td>
<td>1,105.1</td>
<td>902.1</td>
<td>337.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>905.4</td>
<td>886.0</td>
<td>852.0</td>
<td>442.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Refugees, Human Rights,</td>
<td>363.0</td>
<td>306.8</td>
<td>285.2</td>
<td>103.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, Bridges and Construction</td>
<td>355.2</td>
<td>329.3</td>
<td>193.7</td>
<td>104.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>786.0</td>
<td>717.9</td>
<td>570.2</td>
<td>123.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Communications</td>
<td>509.0</td>
<td>479.8</td>
<td>379.1</td>
<td>104.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources and Sanitation</td>
<td>2,156.7</td>
<td>1,753.9</td>
<td>1,293.9</td>
<td>203.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>860.3</td>
<td>833.5</td>
<td>817.4</td>
<td>460.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Expense (USAID, State)</td>
<td>213.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>18,439.5</td>
<td>16,665.0</td>
<td>13,525.2</td>
<td>6,186.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF 2 Construction</td>
<td>10,409.9</td>
<td>9,798.6</td>
<td>7,482.1</td>
<td>2,822.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Figure 47
The Flow of US IRRF I and II Aid to Iraq

As of November 2, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$Millions</th>
<th>Apportioned</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Obligated</th>
<th>Disbursed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>2007 Report</td>
<td>Apportion</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>5017.6000</td>
<td>5017.6</td>
<td>4962.3</td>
<td>4692.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity Sector</td>
<td>4314.8168</td>
<td>4067.2</td>
<td>3782.1</td>
<td>2814.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Infrastructure</td>
<td>1723.0000</td>
<td>1723.0</td>
<td>1674.3</td>
<td>1280.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, Public Safety and Civil Society</td>
<td>1247.1840</td>
<td>1247.2</td>
<td>1177.9</td>
<td>1070.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>945.3160</td>
<td>945.3</td>
<td>931.8</td>
<td>931.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance</td>
<td>363.0000</td>
<td>363.0</td>
<td>339.6</td>
<td>332.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, Bridges and Construction</td>
<td>333.7143</td>
<td>333.7</td>
<td>276.6</td>
<td>245.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care</td>
<td>786.0000</td>
<td>786.0</td>
<td>744.3</td>
<td>619.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Communications</td>
<td>508.5081</td>
<td>508.5</td>
<td>490.6</td>
<td>420.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iraq Weekly Status Report, June 24, 2005, Figure 4.0.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water Resources and Sanitation</th>
<th>2146.5832</th>
<th>1819.1</th>
<th>1811.5</th>
<th>1495.5</th>
<th>527.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>840.2776</td>
<td>840.3</td>
<td>793.5</td>
<td>782.3</td>
<td>525.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Expense (USAID, State)</td>
<td>213.0000</td>
<td>213.0</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>144.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>18,439.0000</td>
<td>17,863.9</td>
<td>17,128.9</td>
<td>14,829.0</td>
<td>9,102.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF 2 Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td>9960.2</td>
<td>8115.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4472.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF 2 Non-Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td>6236.9</td>
<td>5782.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4051.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF 2 Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>931.8</td>
<td>931.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>578.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF 1 Subtotal</td>
<td>2473.3000</td>
<td>2473.3</td>
<td>2473.30</td>
<td>2473.3</td>
<td>2406.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total IRRF 1 &amp; 2</td>
<td>20,912.3000</td>
<td>20,337.2</td>
<td>19,602.2</td>
<td>17,302.3</td>
<td>11,508.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iraq Weekly Status Report, November 2, 2005, Figure 4.0.
6 For descriptions of these efforts, consult the weekly archives of the weekly MNSTC-I publication, The Advisor. Also the press releases of US units. For example, see Spc. Erin Robicheaux, “1st Iraqi Army Brigade Receives Human Rights Training,” HQ-MND Baghdad, Release 20050426-03, April 26, 2005.
8 Based on a slide show provided by Zogby International in March 2004.

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23 These comments again rely heavily on the work by Perito, with some additional points based on interviews.
24 Again full credit should be given to the research and analysis by Robert M. Perito.

30 Presentation by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Transcript, February 3, 2005.
31 Presentation to CG CJTF-7 on 07 Mar 2004
33 Interview, June 2, 2004.
38 CPA report “Working Papers: Iraq Status,” July 13, 2004, p. 15. The budget data imply, but do not explicitly state, that such “projects” are actually operating expenses.
Whatever the mistakes of the CPA, the status of the effort to create effective Iraqi forces became progressively more uncertain after the transfer of sovereignty. The totals issued by the US government as of 13 July 2004 suddenly began to count both manpower fully trained in academies or with full military training, and manpower in the rushed programs that can be a matter of days or a few weeks as being part of the same total.

The US stopped issuing meaningful public information on the equipment and training effort, and cut the content of the Iraq Weekly Status Report to the point where it had limited value without providing meaningful data at the MNSTC-I web site (http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil). The end result is that there is no way to relate what was happening to a meaningful picture of actual requirements and the measures of accomplishment that were provided became the kind of empty, self-congratulatory statements typical of public relations exercises.

As for total manning and equipment levels, the US initially provided reasonably detailed data on progress in training and equipping Iraqi forces. As time went on, however, such breakouts were eliminated from public US reporting from the Embassy, Department of Defense, and Department of State. The only heading in the Weekly Status Report became “Trained/On-Hand,” a heading that seems almost deliberately misleading since it is really just total active strength without the slightest regard to training.

The new figures for trained manpower overstated the training levels for the police and for the border service (DBE), and ignored the fact that the facilities protection service-training program has virtually no training at all. At the end of the day, a far less honest reporting system was established, and one that exaggerated the actual level of training.


51 E-mail to the author by a US official, July 27, 2005.


57 Based on detailed delivery data as of April 23, 2004.

58 Figures take from the Iraq Weekly Status Report for this period, and from an interview with an official in OSD(Public Affairs).


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This history and text is based on materials provided in interviews, and modified from GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues, Washington, General Accounting Office, June 2004, GAO-04-902R, pp. 63-71


http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/mission


The money allocated to total obligations had only put $2,325 million into the start of the pipeline. Office of the Inspector General, Coalition Provisional Authority, Report to Congress, October 30, 2004, p. 59.

The Deputy DoD OIG for Inspections and Policy is about to being a joint project with the DoS OIG to cover all phases of the training effort for the Iraqi police forces. This should be extended to cover Iraqi military and security forces.


Department of Defense, Iraq Weekly Status Report, November 3, 2004 and information provided from MNSTC-I.


http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/press.htm, 5-12-04


See http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/middle_east_north_africa/new_iraq.html

Iraq Weekly Status Report, Department of Defense, Iraq Weekly Update-20041208.pdf

MNSTC-I response to inquiry.


Ibid.

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89 Statement by the Minister of State for National Security Affairs Dr. Qassim Dawood on December 2, 2004 and conveyed by the Government Communications Directorate.
92 Interview, May 12, 2005.
99 Data found in MNSTC-I/State Department Iraq Year in Review 2004 Fact Sheet.
105 Ibid.
108 Interview, May 12, 2005.
120 Iraq Weekly Status Report, 9 February 2005, released by the US Department of State and available at www.defendamerica.mil; Additional data provided by MNSTC-I and US Embassy in Baghdad.
122 MNSTC-I planners understood that the December total might lower due to the extension of the police basic course from eight to ten weeks, one of several initiatives to raise the quality of the police and military forces.
125 Interview, May 12, 2005.
132 MNSTC-I response to inquiry.
134 Interview, May 12, 2005.
136 Report by the Offices of Inspector General of Departments of State and Defense, July 25, 2005, http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/50145.pdf. This series of excerpts takes key points from the entire 96-page report, and rearranges them to provide a clear picture of the key problems the report mentions.
both in judging Iraq's future progress and as lessons for any future options involving the creation of large-scale police and security operations in nations where insurgency and terrorism present serious problems:

**Recommendation 1:** Coalition authorities should plan and implement training focused on qualitative standards rather than on the numbers of trained IPs. This redefinition of objectives should be made explicit in a revised mission statement for CPATT. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 2:** Coalition and Mission Iraq officials should support and encourage efforts by the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to strengthen MOI control over the IPS through re-centralization of administrative processes and development of relevant SOPs. (Action: MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 3:** A working group of qualified instructors, specifically to include Iraqi representation, should design a range of courses suitable to the training needs of inservice IPS personnel. Mutually established parameters for candidate selection should be integral to this process. Changes in curricula for IP training must be negotiated in advance with the MOI and be implemented only after prior agreement to such changes. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.)

**Recommendation 4:** Coalition authorities should pursue agreement with the MOI to incorporate the existing Emergency Response Unit, Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and provincial SWAT units into the Public Order Battalions, Special Police Commando Units, and Mechanized Brigades. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 5:** Appropriate parties need to explore the merits, feasibility and conceivable sources of any U.S. Government funding to cover MOI salary shortfall during the current fiscal year. This determination should take into account possible outyear implications for such support. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 6:** A joint Coalition/MOI assessment should be conducted to determine operation and maintenance costs of Coalition-built and/or renovated training facilities and to determine how and whether those costs can be sustained. (Action: MNSTC–I in collaboration with Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 7:** Coalition and MOI leaders/trainers should identify a mutually agreeable target number or percentage of IPS trainees who demonstrate ambition and talent for subsequent leadership training. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 8:** A joint committee of Coalition and MOI officials should screen and select officers for advanced training based on mutually established qualification standards. (Action: MNSTC–I in conjunction with MOI.)

**Recommendation 9:** The Coalition recruiting program should be placed under the direction of the MOI, with MNC–I and CPATT providing assistance. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNC–I, MNSTC–I, and Embassy Baghdad.)

**Recommendation 10:** Coalition authorities should assess the extent and quality of Iraqi Ministry of Interior’s records relevant to the vetting process, and then conclude a nonbinding memorandum of agreement with the Ministry on access to and utilization of such material. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and consultation with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 11:** Coalition and Iraqi authorities should establish a non-binding agreement that states the MOI is responsible for vetting candidates for Coalition-sponsored police training. (Action: MNF–I in consultation with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad and in collaboration with MOI.)

**Recommendation 12:** Coalition planners, in coordination with the MOI, should require that cadets first graduate from one of the police academies prior to entering Public Order Brigade (POB) or Emergency Response Unit (ERU) training. An in-service police training program should be developed for “currently serving” POB and ERU members who are not graduates of a police academy. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with the MOI.)

**Recommendation 13:** Contractual arrangements with expatriate instructors should specify that individually devised training courses will be submitted in advance for consideration and possible approval by MNSTC–I. (Action: MNSTC–I.)

**Recommendation 14:** A non-binding agreement should be negotiated by the U.S. Government with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior that specifies that only applicants in possession of MOI-issued identification cards, explicitly stating that the bearer is a member of the IPS, will be accepted for training by the Coalition. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)
Recommendation 15: Tables of Organization and Equipment should be developed for police stations and deployable police units throughout the country. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with MOI)

Recommendation 16: Coalition authorities should establish internal controls to track transfer and accountability of equipment to the IPS. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and MNC–I and in consultation with MOI)

Recommendation 17: Coalition resources, in close coordination with counterparts in the MOI and IPS, should develop an operational IPS Readiness Reporting System for the MOI. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with MOI)

Recommendation 18: Coalition commanders should conduct a requirements analysis to determine the number of International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) who can be gainfully engaged under prevailing circumstances and adjust the number of these mentors accordingly. (MNSTC–I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)

Recommendation 19: Standard operating procedures should be developed for the IPLOs, to define the relationships and responsibilities among the police liaison officers and military police. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with Embassy Baghdad and INL.)

Recommendation 20: The Department of State must keep Coalition governments apprised of developments at JIPTC, specifically those that relate to provision of training staff at that facility. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.)

Recommendation 21: The Department of State should decide whether and where an ILEA should be established in the Middle East. If Jordan is selected as a venue, negotiations for such a transformation of JIPTC should proceed quickly. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs in consultation with INL.) Recommendation 22: Coalition commanders should obtain from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior a written commitment to assume responsibility for direct payment of the salaries of Iraqis trained by the Coalition at JIPTC. (Action: MNF–I in coordination with MNSTC–I and Embassy Baghdad and in consultation with MOI)

Recommendation 23: Embassy Baghdad should work with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to define areas in which Coalition advisors can play useful roles. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in collaboration with IRMO and MOI and in consultation with MNSTC–I.) Recommendation 24: Top priority should be given to recruiting ‘3161’ personnel qualified to fill positions as defined jointly by Embassy Baghdad and the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, then to assigning a full complement of such advisors to the Ministry of Interior. (Action: Embassy Baghdad through IRMO.)

Recommendation 25: Embassy Baghdad should obtain from the MOI a written commitment to assure Coalition authorities can access data relevant to tracking and mentoring IPS personnel trained in U.S. Government-funded programs. (Action: Embassy Baghdad in consultation with MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 26: Coalition and MOI officials should develop standard operating procedures for personnel administration of the Iraqi Police Service. (Action: MNSTC–I in coordination with Embassy Baghdad.)

Recommendation 27: The Department of State should assign one or more INL officers to work directly within CPATT to ensure INL perspectives are considered in the development of the IPS. (Action: Department of State in coordination with Embassy Baghdad and MNSTC–I.)

Recommendation 28: MNSTC–I should perform an assessment of security and IPS infrastructure development by province to identify opportunities where additional responsibility for IPS training can be transferred to Provincial Police. (Action: MNSTC–I in consultation with the MOI)

Recommendation 29: The Department of State should propose that the National Security Council establish an inter-agency working group with representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. The working group should identify issues to be addressed for the transfer of police training responsibilities from DoD to DoS. (Action: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, in consultation with Embassy Baghdad, MNF–I, MNSTC–I, and INL.)

Recommendation 30: The Departments of State and Defense, in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), should prepare a memorandum of agreement (MOA) to define funding arrangements for future U.S. involvement in Iraqi Police Service-related programs. (Action: Department of State’s Bureau of Resource Management (RM) and Department of Defense’s Office of the Under Secretary for Policy in consultation with OMB.)

143 Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing for the position of Secretary of State, January 18, 2005, time code 3:25 to 3:37 p.m.
144 Condoleezza Rice, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Confirmation Hearing for the position of Secretary of State, January 18, 2005, time code 3:25 to 3:37 p.m.
146 Interview, May 12, 2005.
147 Jim Garamone, “Multinational Security Command Trains, Equips Iraqi Forces,” American Forces Press Service, January 21, 2005. The 98th will be replaced by the 80th Division in the fall of 2005. The 100th Division is due to replace the 80th a year later, by the 100th is so undermanned that members of the 98th were asked in the spring of 2005 if they would volunteer to return and serve in the 100th.
151 Even at the top of these Ministries, a single Coalition advisor might have to deal with four offices, when the advisor effectively had a full time job dealing with just one.
153 For an independent verification of the value of such efforts in operational practice, see Mike Dörning, "Trainer Leads from the Front," Chicago Tribune, April 8, 2005, C1.
157 Interview, May 12, 2005.
159 The text of the UN report was forwarded to the author by ABC News. The MNSTC data are taken from http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm, as accessed on May 14, 2005.


165 MNSTC-I response to inquiry.

166 Adapted from briefing on MNI-I priorities of the commanding general, May 15, 2005.


168 To review the press archives by day, see http://www.mnstc.iraq.centcom.mil/advisor.htm.


170 Interview, May 12, 2005.

171 “Commander Gives His Take,” Houston Chronicle, January 29, 2005, pg. 29. This is a print version of questions presented to Abizaid by the editorial board of the Chronicle.


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General Pace in response to a question posed by Senator Carl Levin before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 29, 2005. Question #40.


CPATT Briefing, "Police Partnership Program (P3)," June 2003.

CPATT Briefing, June 2005.

Source: CPATT, June 2005.


MNSTC-I briefing current as of May 23, 2005.


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For a detailed example of such a statement, see the text of the speech by Minister of Defense, Dr. Sadoun Al-Dulime, Brussels, June 22, 2005.

Speech by Minister of Defense, Dr. Sadoun Al-Dulime, Brussels, June 22, 2005.


Excerpt from the text of the speech by Minister of Defense, Dr. Sadoun Al-Dulime, Brussels, June 22, 2005.


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Excerpt from the text of the speech by Minister of Defense, Dr. Sadoun Al-Dulime, Brussels, June 22, 2005.

Interview, May 12, 2005. The breakout of Iraqi forces by sectarian and ethnic group within the army, security forces, and police uncertain; the MNF-I and MNSTC-I did not collect such data.

Excerpt from the text of the speech by Minister of Defense, Dr. Sadoun Al-Dulime, Brussels, June 22, 2005.

Excerpt from the text of the speech by Minister of Defense, Dr. Sadoun Al-Dulime, Brussels, June 22, 2005.


MNSTC-I response to inquiry.


Statement by the President on the War on Terror, 10:26 a.m. Press Conference in the Rose Garden, September 28, 2005.


MNSTC-I response to inquiry.


MNSTC-I response to inquiry.


Ibid.


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283 E-mail to the author of May 5, 2005.
286 Interview, May 12, 2005.
288 The fieldwork for the survey was carried out by a team from the Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology in Baghdad (COSIT). The team was trained by researchers from the Norwegian NGO Fafo-AIS, which also carried out the solid analysis of the data compiled. The survey was funded by the Government of Norway and UNDP. The three volumes of the report, including the Tabulation Report, Analytical Report and Socio-Economic Atlas, are available in Arabic and English at http://www.iq.undp.org/ilcs.htm.

289 The results of the survey appear in three volumes: a “Tabulation Report”, which presents the main results of the survey in tabular form; an “Analytical Report”, and a “Socio-Economic Atlas” which depicts the situation in Iraq using maps and diagrams. See http://www.iq.undp.org/ilcs.htm and
294 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/iraq.html
295 Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, July 2005, p. 57
296 Section 2207 Report on Iraq Relief and Reconstruction, July 2005,
299 Dan Murphy, Christian Science Monitor, “Iraqis Thirst for Water and Power”, August 11, 2005

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