The Critical Role of Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces

Necessity, Problems, and Progress

Anthony H. Cordesman

Fourth Revised Draft: October 7, 2004 (3.2)
The Importance of Iraq Public Opinion and its Consistent Hostility and Distrust of Coalition Forces

- There is a consistent history of polls showing that Iraqis do not trust the Coalition forces and do trust Iraqi forces.

The US and Coalition Failure to Take the Mission Seriously for Nearly a Year and Insurgency is Now a Major Problem

- As a result, the US wasted a year (at least May 2003-April 2004) in trying to create effective Iraqi military and security forces.
- As a result, the Interim Iraqi Government faces a serious threat from a complex mix of insurgent groups.

The Effort is Gathering Momentum but Progress is Still Far Too Slow

- Iraqi Army and National Guard forces are active and have combat ready forces active in a number of high threat areas like Samara, Sadr City, and Najaf.
- Multinational Security Transition Command under Petraeus rapidly rising in strength.
- Progress is being made in facilities.
- The Iraqi Interim Government and US are still deciding the size of the Iraqi forces required and how heavy they should be.

Actual Progress in the Armed Forces Under the Minister of Defense as of September, 2004

- Department of Defense weekly progress report provides the following numbers as of September 22, 2004.
- Regular Military Forces.
- The US Embassy report of September 16, 2004 quotes different numbers and sometimes lower strengths.

Actual Progress in the Police and Security Forces Under the Ministry of the Interior as of September, 2004

- Department of Defense weekly product report provides the following numbers for the Iraqi security and Police forces under the Ministry of the Interior as of September 22, 2004.
- 84,950 police on hand versus requirement of 135,000.
- 16,798 in 32,000 man Department of Border Enforcement.

The Iraqi Minister of Defense Raised Additional Points in a Briefing on September 22, 2004

NATO, UN, and Local Forces Only Limited Answer

Corollary is that more US and Coalition troops in Iraq are also Only a Limited Answer.

“Victory” and the Creation of a Government that is Legitimate in Iraqi, Arab, and World Opinion Hinges on the Success of Creating Effective Iraqi Military and Police Forces.

- It is often difficult for Americans to understand what is happening in training Iraqi military, police, and security forces and why this is so important. The following history, statistics, and polls put these issues in context, and show the level of progress involved.
• It should be stressed, however, that the fact there are many problems in creating effective Iraqi military and security forces, and such progress is often exaggerated for political purposes, does not mean that such efforts cannot be successful.

• Iraq forces have already fought well in limited numbers, and various elements of the Iraqi forces have shown considerable leadership skills.

• As one of the most senior coalition advisors in Iraq notes, “It is unrealistic to assume that progress will be smooth and continuous. There will be many more problems and reversals. There are forces that are corrupt and disloyal. At the same time, there is progress and that progress is gathering momentum.”
  
  o Every time put new and inexperienced forces under stress, see cases where desert, don’t fight, join enemy. Are still major problems in knowing whom to recruit.
  
  o Constantly experimenting with new recruiting and training methods, as learn what works best. Often differs by locality and region.
  
  o Will get cases where have to remove senior officials for corruption, failure to act, contacts with insurgents.
  
  o For example, arrested Gen. Talib Abed Ghayib Najm, head of the National Guard in Diyala province on September 25th.
  
  o Expect many more problems as move towards elections.
  
  o Forces will not come fully on line, even at existing authorized strengths, until end first quarter or mid-2005.
  
  o No one can be sure, but Iraqi forces will only be heavy enough to take over most demanding missions in late 2005, early 2006.
  
  o No magic date now to predict when Iraqis can take over fully and Coalition can withdraw.

• Senior US advisors in Iraq feel much of the debate in Washington over how many troops are on the ground, equipped, or trained focuses far too much on future force goals or the total men now in service focuses on the wrong issues and misleading numbers: “The real issue is how many will actually fight, how well they will fight, and who they will fight for.”

• These are questions whose answers can only be determined with time. The training and equipment program is still gathering momentum, Iraqi forces still exist largely in the form of limited cadres of combat ready forces, and the plans for developing military, security, and police forces continue to evolve – both as a result of the plans made by the Iraqi Interim Government and the lessons learned by both Iraqi forces and their Coalition advisors.

• The military training and equipment program faces an insurgent threat that is learning and adapting. Like all such efforts, the issue is whether Iraqi
Interim Government forces grow and learn faster than their insurgent enemies.

- It is also important to stress that the creation of effective Iraqi military, police, and security forces is as much a matter of politics and economics, as one of training and equipment. The best possible effective Iraqi military, police, and security forces will fail unless the vast majority of the Iraqi people come to feel they serve a legitimate government that is not the instrument of US or Coalition “occupiers.” Economic security and hope for the future are critical additional elements.

- Above all, Iraqis must feel that their military, police, and security forces will come to provide both military and personnel security against the full range of insurgent and criminal threats, and that at some point both Coalition and any multilateral forces will leave and Iraq will fully control its own destiny.

The Importance of Iraq Public Opinion and its Consistent Hostility and Distrust of Coalition Forces

- Training effective Iraqi military, police, and security forces is not a luxury or sideshow. It is the only way to ensure Iraqis feel secure and see the effort to create a new government as their own.

- Regardless of how many Iraqis did or did not welcome the fall of Saddam Hussein, one public opinion poll after another shows that Coalition forces quickly came to be seen by many Iraqis as occupiers, and as occupiers that could not bring security.

- While many Iraqi expectations may be unrealistic, and many criticisms may be unfair, the reality is that,
  - The US did not secure the country, key government offices, and key cultural centers.
  - The US did not quickly show it would reconstitute an effective Iraqi government and security structure, and police services and personal security remained at risk.
  - Many Coalition forces had limited training and equipment for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. US operations were initially often of limited effectiveness, often involved detainment of innocent Iraqis and “collateral damage,” and alienated otherwise friendly Iraqis.
  - The US saw the insurgents as a limited force with limited popular support that could be defeated without creating strong and highly effective Iraqi armed forces, and badly underestimated the personal security problem.

- The US and Coalition simply did not see the need to rush the creation of effective Iraqi military, police, and security forces in spite of the
developing scale of the military problem, and in spite of polls showing 2/3 Sunnis and 1/3 Shi’ites oppose war, 33% and 11% support attacks on Coalition.

- US/Oxford polls show 78% of Iraqis had no confidence in Coalition forces in October 03 and 81% in June – and this includes Kurds.
  - First poll conducted in Iraq in August 2003 by Zogby International, revealed that just over 50% of Iraqis felt that the U.S. will “hurt” Iraq over the next five years and that a slightly higher number thought “democracy is a Western way of doing things and it will not work here”. Further precursors: 31.6% felt that Coalition Forces should leave within six months; 34% said within one year; and 25% within two years. In addition, just under 60% felt that Iraq should determine its political future alone and without the help of the Coalition.¹
  - Some of these findings were substantiated by a poll conducted in May 2004 by BBC, ABC News, the German network ARD and NHK in Japan. Among these: while more than half said that life was better a year ago under Saddam, “only 25 per cent expressed confidence in the US/UK occupation forces and 28 per cent in both Iraq’s political parties and the CPA”.²
  - USA Today/CNN/Gallop polls published in April 2004, revealing dramatic developments in Iraqi perceptions of U.S. policy, presence and operations. Among these was that “53% say they would feel less secure without the Coalition in Iraq, but 57% say the foreign troops should leave anyway”, while 71% of the respondents identified Coalition troops as “occupiers”.³
  - 29 April 2004 USA Today poll cited earlier, many Iraqis considered American troops to be arrogant and insensitive:
    - 58% said [Coalition Forces] soldiers conduct themselves badly or very badly;
    - 60% said the troops show disrespect for Iraqi people in searches of their homes, and 42% said U.S. forces have shown disrespect toward mosques;
    - 46% said the soldiers show a lack of respect for Iraqi women; and
    - 11% of Iraqis say Coalition Forces are trying hard to restore basic services such as electricity and clean drinking water.

- There is a consistent history of polls showing that Iraqis do not trust the Coalition forces and do trust Iraqi forces.

All reinforce the thesis that only Iraqi police and security forces can provide the political dimension of victory, no matter how well US and other Coalition forces do at the military and tactical levels.

IiACSS: How much confidence do you have in the [new] Iraqi police to improve the situation in Iraq?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Jan. ’04</th>
<th>Apr.-May ’04</th>
<th>May ’04</th>
</tr>
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IiACSS, Department of State, CPA, “National Poll of Iraq.”

Iraqi Perception

Oxford: How much confidence do you have in the [new Iraqi police]?

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<tbody>
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<td>19.70%</td>
<td>27.60%</td>
<td>33.00%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Based on a slide show provided by Zogby International in March 2004.
Quite a Lot 30.60% 43.30% 39.20% 39%
Not Very Much 33.40% 20.60% 17.60% 20%
None at All 16.30% 8.50% 10.20% 7%

Attitudes Towards Iraqi Army Forces

IIACSS: How much confidence do you have in the [new Iraqi army] to improve the situation in Iraq?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
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<th>Apr.-May ’04</th>
<th>May ’04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Fair Amount</td>
<td>28.40%</td>
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<td>28.50%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.70%</td>
<td>9.90%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17.20%</td>
<td>17.80%</td>
<td>20.10%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

IIACSS, Department of State, CPA, “National Poll of Iraq.”

Oxford: How much confidence do you have in the [new Iraqi army]?

<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>16.00%</td>
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<td>24%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quite a Lot</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Very Much</td>
<td>34.30%</td>
<td>27.50%</td>
<td>17.10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
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<td>None at All</td>
<td>19.50%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>11.80%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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Attitudes Towards US and Coalition Forces

Oxford: How much confidence do you have in the [U.S. and UK occupation forces]?

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<tbody>
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IIACSS: How much confidence do you have in [Coalition forces] to improve the situation in Iraq?

<table>
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<th>Jan. ’04</th>
<th>Apr.-May ’04</th>
<th>May ’04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Great Deal</td>
<td>11.60%</td>
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<td>1.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fair Amount</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td>8.20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not Very Much</td>
<td>13.70%</td>
<td>4.70%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at All</td>
<td>53.30%</td>
<td>83.50%</td>
<td>80.60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Polls consistently showed from June 2003 on that the number one concern of Iraqis is personal security for themselves and their families, with crime as an even larger fear than insurgency.
- Jobs, medical care, and education come next. Politics lags significantly.
  - Effective police for local security and to fight crime are as critical as having Iraqi security forces takeover counterinsurgency missions, and removing or minimizing the signs of the Coalition as “occupiers.”

**The US and Coalition Failure to Take the Mission Seriously for Nearly a Year and Insurgency is Now a Major Problem**

- The US assumed for the first year after the fall of Saddam Hussein that it was dealing with a limited number of insurgents that Coalition forces would defeat well before the election.
  - Even today, some US spokespersons refer to a core insurgent force of only 5,000, while most Coalition experts on the ground see the core as at least 15,000 and some experts go as high as 30,000.
• Such figures, however, are largely meaningless. There are many part-
time insurgents and criminals who work with insurgents.

• The US minimized the insurgent and criminal threat, and exaggerated the
popular support for US and Coalition efforts. Polls as early as the summer
of 2003 showed that at least one-third of Arab Sunnis, and over 15% of
Shi’ites support attacks on Coalition forces. The numbers may now be
substantially higher.

• As a result, the US wasted a year (at least May 2003-April 2004) in trying
to create effective Iraqi military and security forces.
  o CPA did not correct major problems in the contracting process to
    provide equipment, training, and facilities for Iraqi force.
  o The US military gave the mission only limited priority.
  o As a result, the US and Coalition did carry out effective efforts for the
    first year of the occupation.

• The US only began to get truly serious about training and equipping Iraqi
forces after the steady rise in the insurgency and Iraqi hostility from
September 20004 to April 2004 showed the scale of problem the hard way.
  o Petraeus was not appointed till June
  o See 230 of 600 man US training team (Multinational Security
    Transition Command) under Petraeus on hand in September.¹
  o High turbulence and rotations meant many experienced training
    personnel were lost.
  o In-unit training of Iraqis with US and other Coalition forces was
    mixed in quality. Some US units did very well. A few seriously
    alienated Iraqis or got friendly Iraqis killed.

• As a result, the Interim Iraqi Government faces a serious threat from a
  complex mix of insurgent groups:
  o The threat remains largely Iraqi and Sunni dominated:
    ▪ Some 35 Sunni Arab groups have made some kind of public
      announcement or claimed responsibility. See divided into
      complex mix of Sunni nationalists, pro-Ba'ath/ex-regime,
      Sunni Iraqi Islamist, outside Islamic extremist, foreign
      volunteers with no clear alignment, and paid
      volunteer/politically motivated criminal.
    ▪ Some elements of cooperation and central coordination,
      including cooperation with Sadr’s group, but no single
      leadership to attack.
• No meaningful counts of insurgents in any given category; overwhelming majority of those captured or killed are Iraqi Sunnis.

• Views differ sharply over the size of Zarqawi’s group, its alignment and ties to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, and how many of its current “fighters” are Iraqi vs. non-Iraqi. Some press estimates have gone as high as 10,000-15,000. More likely is a series of cells and limited central organization with a total of less than 1,000 full and part time men. Is, however, extremely effective at striking at targets with high media and political impact: Suicide bombings. Illustrates fact that outside threat must be measured in terms of effectiveness and not numbers.

• Syria has supported some of these Sunni groups, and does continue to be a serious source of infiltration.
  o Sadr militia still exists, and are at least two major other Shi’ite militias that now are not actively insurgent.
  o Some Iraqi Interim Government officials see Iran as a direct and immediate threat.
  o The Iraqi Minister of Defense made the following points in a briefing on September 22, 2004
    • See major threat as Iranian intervention and support of Sadr; infiltration across Syria border.
      o Need strong border defense forces. “If doors and windows are empty, no amount of cleaning will ever get rid of the dust.”
      o Serious internal problems in Interim Iraqi Government. Finance Minister pro-Iranian and threatens not to fund defense.
  
• Iran behind Sadr. Uses pilgrims, send arms, money, and drugs across border

• Other Iraqi Ministers and officials do not agree with Minister of Defense, but a number of new Iraqi intelligence service officers do.

• US advisors and officials in Iraq feel such reports of Iranian support for Shi’ite groups seem exaggerated, in part by Interim Government’s effort to claim problems are external, and no rejection of government. Almost certainly, however, is some Iranian presence and activity.
  
  o Kurds retain Barzani and Talibani militias plus train “central” elements. While not insurgents, attacking Coalition. There is armed
violence between Kurds, Arabs, and Turcomans. Struggles over soft ethnic cleansing in North.

- Many small tribal and local elements; numerous “bodyguards.” Most not hostile, but many who could join in if conflict expands.
- No evidence that number of insurgents declining as a result of Coalition and Iraqi attacks to date. Number of incidents consistently high over last two months by not necessarily growing.
- Insurgent cadres are now far more experienced, adapting tactics and methods of attack as fast as Coalition can counter them. Some have networks of some form of central command, planning, and financing.
- Media coverage, particularly Arab satellite television, provides a real time picture of what tactics and weapons work, what strikes have most media and political impact, and often what targets are vulnerable. The “Al Jazira Effect” substitutes for many elements of a C4I system.

- Difficult threat to respond to without a political structure that commands Iraqi loyalties and reliance on Iraqi forces:
  - Many Coalition and Iraqi tactical victories are more symbolic than real. Lead to as many or more new insurgents than kill or capture, many existing insurgents disperse with weapons or bury weapons and supplies.
  - US and Coalition dominated actions seen as actions by “occupier” forces; source of constant propaganda and conspiracy charges. Real and imagined civilian casualties, collateral damage, impact on civilians and shrines a constant problem.
  - Tactical and human intelligence present major problems. Insurgents seem to have good sources in Interim Iraqi Government and sometimes in local US and Coalition commands. Work with criminal for effective looting and sabotage. Understand limits of Coalition ability to cover given areas and vulnerabilities.
  - US human intelligence improving but hurt badly -- as are civil-military and other efforts – by high turnover and rotations. Most Iraqi networks serving the US in hostile areas have serious quality and loyalty problems, others either use their positions to settle scores or misinform use troops.
  - Targeting and “body counts” being issued by US and Coalition are highly suspect. Often unclear how US could possibly be making current estimates. Iraqi reaction is to give local figures or Arab TV more credibility, although many such estimates are clearly made without having facts or waiting for information to come it.

- Focus on threat in “Sunni triangle” and Najaf alone misses the point. See
o 40-60 towns and cities are the scene of attacks each week since late August. Many are outside these areas.
	o Most violent city in terms of number of major incidents is Baghdad, with 20-40 attacks a week.
	o Mosul ranks next with 4-13 major attacks per week.
	o Basra attacks levels are relatively low so far, but peaks of 7 attacks per week.

The Effort is Gathering Momentum but Progress is Still Far Too Slow

- Iraqis now have command and US/Multinational forces exercise operational control. Iraqis clearly sovereign in making key decisions on future shape and size of forces, key military decisions.

- **Iraqi Army and National Guard forces are active and have combat ready forces active in a number of high threat areas like Samara, Sadr City, and Najaf**
  
  o Core force is six army and Intervention Force battalions with authorized strength of 700 men each, three of which now in Najaf (total of 4,200). Are now conducting operations.
  
  o Six more army and Intervention Force battalions supposed to be trained by end of October (8,400 total).
  
  o Six more army and Intervention Force battalions by end of November (12,600 total).
  
  o Nine more army battalions by end January.
  
  o Hope to have 27 battalions ready for elections by end of January (18,900 total).
  
  o One armored brigade is being created. Have 50 T-55 tanks, 48 BMP-1s, 57 MTLBs, 36 Spartans, and 30 BTR-94s already. Hope to have a combat ready armored battalion by the end of January and time of election. Others to follow.
  
  o Iraqis now have own training command, modeled to some extent on lessons of USMC Training Command and US Army TRADOC.
  
  o Now creating effective joint staff college.
  
  o Training and equipping roughly 1,000 a month in all branches of armed services.

- Recent operation in Najaf involved two of main force Iraqi Army battalions, commando battalion, counterterrorist force, and two National Guard Battalions.
• **Multinational Security Transition Command under Petraeus rapidly rising in strength.**
  - Overall US advisory effort now up to around 70%.
  - Key US training teams still deploying, but have important elements on the ground.
  - Key cadres of International Police Trainers (IPTs) and International Police Advisors (IPTs) are active.

• **Progress is being made in facilities.**
  - More than one billion dollars spent or under contract to repair or create proper facilities.
    - Have joint command headquarters operating; seen as high status appointment by Iraqis.
    - Have completed five major bases for brigade-sized forces with division headquarters. Some have extra units like training battalion, special police, etc.
    - Complete 41 border forts in the last 18 months. Have 27 in north. Ultimately will be around 300.
    - Training limited so normally trained forces need 6-8 weeks of working with US forces in local

• **The Iraqi Interim Government and US are still deciding the size of the Iraqi forces required and how heavy they should be.**
  - The Iraqi Interim Governments wants to create heavy Iraqi forces, with more mechanized brigades, and eventually mechanized divisions. Such forces are now part of the program, and US combat experience shows mechanized forces and armor are essential to effective urban counterinsurgency and counter ambush operations.
  - The Interim government also wants to rush training. US advice is that can sometimes do this and experiment with rapidly assembled forces, but must not train in ways that produce low quality forces or forces that will “rush to failure”.
  - Both Iraqi Interim Government and US agree must not rely on forces tied to ethnic, sectarian and tribal loyalties. Must build true national forces.
  - Significant progress has been made since June, and equipment deliveries are coming faster.
  - Major problems remain, however, and the effort will not really bring large, capable forces on line until late-December/Late January at the earliest and this may take until second or third quarter 2005 to get to
the point where Iraqis can take over most missions and/or eliminate the visibility of Coalition forces are occupiers in most missions.

**Actual Progress in the Armed Forces Under the Minister of Defense as of September, 2004**

- Advisors on the scene in Iraq caution about the meaning of statistics on progress to date. They feel the momentum is building and could be bolstered if the Embassy’s reprogramming request is met.
  - Six army and Intervention Force battalions now active.
  - Recent operation in Najaf involved two of main force Iraqi Army battalions, commando battalion, counterterrorist force, and two National Guard Battalions.
- They note such numbers disguise fact Iraqi forces are getting armor, and that requirements are changing to significantly increase load of medium arms in areas like grenade launchers, RPGs, heavy machine guns.
- Communications are substantially better than statistics show because they do not count large numbers of civilian radios bought under CERP program that actually do meet the requirement.
- Vehicle numbers are better than shown and more realistic requirement numbers are being developed.
- Since July 2004 have delivered:
  - 39,000 weapons.
  - 22,000,000 rounds of ammunition.
  - 4,400 vehicles.
  - 16,000 radios.
  - 42,000 sets of body armor.
  - 235,000 uniforms.
**Department of Defense weekly progress report provides the following numbers as of September 22, 2004.**

**Regular Military Forces**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Manning Required</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Untrained</th>
<th>Training In</th>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>15,832</strong></td>
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<table>
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<th>Service</th>
<th>Weapons Required</th>
<th>On-Hand</th>
<th>Vehicles Required</th>
<th>On-Hand</th>
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<th>On-Hand</th>
<th>Body Armor Required</th>
<th>On-Hand</th>
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<td>11,209</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>62,032</td>
<td>23,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Prevention Force</td>
<td>8,850</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>1,789</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>6,584</td>
<td>2,741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Special Ops Forces</td>
<td>1,898</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>605</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense Force</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>103,983</strong></td>
<td><strong>57,653</strong></td>
<td>4,421</td>
<td>2,753</td>
<td>13,764</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td><strong>71,152</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,803</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Total armed forces have requirement of 77,175, with 62,822 warm bodies in actual service.
  - Manpower totals are misleading because some 25-33% of men are on leave or in training at any given time. Major problem because many men are in mixed units, and must still get home to give families pay, deal with family issues.
  - Figures for training are uncertain, since all men are trained or in training, but training is often negligible or totally unsuited for mission.
  - Total armed forces have 55% of weapons authorized for prior force structure, half of authorized total of 4,421 vehicles, 28% of communications, and 46% of body armor.
  - The weapons data shown are for small arms and crew served weapons, and do not reflect Iraqi and US plans to create heavier forces with armor.
  - Some armor is being delivered; including at least 35 reconditioned Iraqi tanks, AFVS, and APC and 50 armored cars from the UAE.
Hope to get armor for more Iraqi mechanized units from Jordan and UAE.

DoD says totals for communications equipment totals are misleading, because: “Some radios are on-hand, but they are interim capability only.” US advisors feel that civilian and other radios bought as part of CERP program are adequate, and communications are much better than statistics show.

- Army has 12,699 actives of 27,000 man authorized force.
  - Of active strength, 4,789 are said to be trained (3 weeks for former military and 8 weeks for new recruits). This total is roughly 18% of authorized strength and 38% of men actually on duty.
  - Equipment holdings, as of mid-September, are 65% of authorized weapons, 77% of vehicles, 29% of communications, and 30% of body armor.
  - Training sufficiently limited so new forces normally need 6-8 weeks of working with US forces. Are exceptions where units were rapidly formed out of experienced army personnel and fought well.
  - Iraqi commandos have proven to be a well training and effective source of manpower.

- Iraqi National Guard is largest force, but most is not a “combat ready” force to fight insurgent battles on is own.
  - See 41,461 actives vs. requirement for 61,904. Claims that 39,272 are trained and 2,189 are in training ignore the fact such training is limited and generally does not prepare forces counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.
  - Are some effective, combat ready elements.
  - 40 of 44 National Guard Battalions operating with Coalition forces throughout country. All except those in Fallujah-Ramadi area carrying out joint operations with Coalition on daily basis.
  - Equipment holdings, as of mid-September, are 55% of authorized weapons, 34% of vehicles, 4% of communications, and 38% of body armor.

- Iraqi Prevention Force has 7,417 men active for a force with an authorized strength of only 6,584.
  - DoD reports that 26% have some training.
  - Equipment is 37% of authorized weapons, 26% of vehicles, 86% of communications, and 41% of body armor.
  - The creation of such specialized counterterrorism/counterinsurgency elements is underway, but the force is anything but “combat ready.”
• Iraqi Special Operations Forces has 651 men active for a force with an authorized strength of 1,967.
  o DoD reports that 88% of actives have some training, but only 29% of authorized force is trained.
  o Equipment is 67% of authorized weapons, 37% of vehicles, 10% of communications, and 37% of body armor.
  o The creation of such specialized counterterrorism/counterinsurgency elements is underway, but the force is anything but “combat ready.”

• Air Force and Coastal Defense Force are only token forces.
  o Air Force has 0% of authorized weapons, 12% of vehicles, 0% of communications, 0% of body armor.

• The US Embassy report of September 16, 2004 quotes different numbers and sometimes lower strengths:iii
  o US Military advisors feel the numbers are dated, and may be inaccurate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned to Duty</th>
<th>Attending Training</th>
<th>To Be Recruited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>6316</td>
<td>13,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Guard</td>
<td>61,904</td>
<td>36,397</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Defense</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• The US Embassy reports substantially lower numbers of actual forces than DoD, particularly in the Army. Only 6,316 men are shown assigned to duty versus a DoD figure of 12,699 on duty.

• The difference is lower for the National Guard. Its authorized strength has been cut from 62,032 to 61,904. Its nominal strength includes 6 divisions, 21 brigade headquarters, and 65 battalions.

• The air force and coastal defense forces are now too small and limited in mission capability for the numbers to matter, but the Embassy still reports much lower active service numbers.

• The US Embassy report does not provide equipment data.

**Actual Progress in the Police and Security Forces Under the Ministry of the Interior as of September, 2004**

• Progress is slower and more uncertain in the police and security forces under the Ministry of the Interior.
  o Are, however, now pushing up to 5,000 police and border force personnel through training each month; most with some military background.
- 1,100 graduated in last week of September from basic policing course and five specialty courses.
- Academies in areas like Jordan are now building up a cadre of well trained leaders.
- Have enough International Police Advisors (IPAs) and International Police Trainers (IPTs) to make training and advisory program more effective.
- Hope by spring 2005 to have 5,000 graduating each month from 8 week course from nine academies in Iraq and one in Jordan.
  - Are beginning to create effective counterterrorism and SWAT-like forces.
    - Have created two special police commando battalions. Have military backgrounds, experienced leaders. One involved in fighting on Haifa Street in Baghdad in week of September 18th.
    - Civil Intervention Force will bring three Public Order Battalions are training and will begin to go into active service shortly: 1,200-1,300 men.
    - Creating two Special Police Regiments with wheeled armored vehicles.
    - Creating force of those with more advanced military backgrounds to act as protection force for police stations.
  - Some elements are performing well.
    - Can recruit even from troubled areas. Now have some 1,000 graduates from greater Najaf area. Serving well.
  - Training is now much better for police. 3 weeks of training for those with military experience; 8 weeks for recruits.
The Department of Defense weekly product report provides the following numbers for the Iraqi security and Police forces under the Ministry of the Interior as of September 22, 2004.

Security Forces and Police: Manpower and Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Manning Required</th>
<th>Men Available</th>
<th>Untrained</th>
<th>Men Training</th>
<th>Trained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional &amp; HQ</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>84,850</td>
<td>46,176</td>
<td>3,479</td>
<td>34,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>16,798</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>14,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172,070</td>
<td>101,831</td>
<td>48,178</td>
<td>3,964</td>
<td>49,691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Weapons Required</th>
<th>Men Available</th>
<th>Vehicles Required</th>
<th>Men Available</th>
<th>Communications Required</th>
<th>Men Available</th>
<th>Body Armor Required</th>
<th>Men Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional &amp; HQ</td>
<td>213,185</td>
<td>93,093</td>
<td>22,395</td>
<td>5,923</td>
<td>67,595</td>
<td>13,245</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>42,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Intervention Force</td>
<td>11,490</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,240</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dept. of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>42,601</td>
<td>16,442</td>
<td>8,271</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>8,271</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>28,626</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>268,296</td>
<td>110,035</td>
<td>31,726</td>
<td>7,721</td>
<td>86,426</td>
<td>15,172</td>
<td>168,696</td>
<td>46,761</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Security and Police forces have total authorized strength of 172,070, with 101,831 in actual service as of September 22.

- Manpower totals are misleading because some 25-33% of men are on leave or in training at any given time.
- Major problem because many men are in mixed units, and must still get home to give families pay, deal with family issues.
- Are still qualitative and morale issues. More problems with disloyalty, desertions/no shows, changing sides than military.
- Corruption is an issue, although senior advisor notes that “corruption is always and issue and always will be; the point is things should get better.”

84,950 police on hand versus requirement of 135,000.

- The 135,000 requirement is relatively new. It used to be 90,000.
DoD reports the total number is dropping, in part because of desertions and purging of low-grade personnel, but that the numbers in training are rising significantly.

- Advisors note that part of the reason is that some recruits are too old and others lied about literacy. Will get money as leave; not simply be left poor and as potential recruits for insurgents.

- Now putting $60 million program into place to use biometric screening and records to ensure do not get recruits with wrong backgrounds, men claiming to be police who are not, manage personnel effectively.

- The 4,800 men Civil Intervention Force is still a concept although, as noted above, this should change over next few months.

- 83 men in the 270 SWAT-like Emergency Response Units. Core of force now in training.

- Reports that nearly half of latest 400 Iraqi police trainees sent to Jordan had to be returned are not correct; did have problem where some senior recruits expected more pay and privileges than got; saw “strikes” and some returned.

- DoD reports that 54% still have no training at all.

- Do get on the job training, and IPAs survey performance and facilities.

- IPTs have steadily improved in experience and quality.

- Equipment of regular police services reported at 44% of weapons, 26% of vehicles, less than 20% of communications, 32% of body armor.

- **16,798 in 32,000 man Department of Border Enforcement.**

- DoD reports 14,313 trained and 485 in training, but most have little real training.

  - Equipment reported at 41% of weapons, 24% of 32,000 vehicles, less than 18% of communications, 14% of body armor.

  - Senior US advisors feel this force is slow to come on-line, does have serious corruption problems, but is improving.

  - New border forts and posts are being built. 44 in service (37 in north). Will build a total of 300.

  - Will be equipped with X-Ray machines, ground sensors, and explosive detectors.

- Total equipment for all police and security services is reported at 41% of weapons, 24% of 32,000 vehicles, less than 18% of communications, 28% of body armor.
• DoD says totals for communications equipment totals are misleading, because: “Some radios are on-hand, but they are interim capability only.” US advisors feel that civilian and other radios bought as part of CERP program are adequate, and communications are much better than statistics show.

• Past reporting for Facilities Protection Service has been deleted from recent DoD reports. US Advisors say this manpower has now been transferred to other Ministries than Defense and Interior and have no accurate count. Do not feel is part of real military and police forces, and in any case ignores other light protection forces like those of Oil Ministry.

• The US Embassy report of September 16, 2004 quotes different numbers and sometimes lower strengths:vi
  - US Military advisors feel the numbers are dated, and may be inaccurate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned to Duty</th>
<th>Attending Training</th>
<th>To Be Recruited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>84,960 (5%)</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Border Enforcement</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>15,688 -</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>73,992</td>
<td>73,992 -</td>
<td>(35%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• The US Embassy Iraqi Police Service figures may be misleading.
  - The US Embassy reports that 34,553 of the 84,960 assigned to duty have some training, and are “equipped and capable.”
  - The remaining 50,937 are assigned to duty but are not trained, equipped and capable.
  - These figures are uncertain since they show no recent change between reporting periods, and substantial numbers of those counted are seen as hostile or corrupt, are phantom hires not on duty, or do not show up for service.
  - The payroll for the police lists 118,000 on duty, but this includes large numbers of pensions and “non-performing” police known not to serve.

• Department of Border Enforcement has 15,688 reported on active duty. The total was 14,313 two weeks earlier. Weapons are vehicles are arriving. More body armor is not.
  - The Iraq Defense Minister stated on September 22 that the force was largely corrupt and incompetent, and would either be integrated back into the police or dismissed.
  - He claimed two new divisions of the armed forces were to be trained to replace this force.
The Facilities Protection Service is shown at 73,992. However, the Embassy warns that, “personnel are hired and paid by the Iraqi Ministries for which they work, visibility on actual on-duty strength is limited.” The real total is tens of thousand lower. Training is negligible to non-existent.

**Equipment Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>Required</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Police Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>5,923</td>
<td>22,395</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>93,093</td>
<td>213,185</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications*</td>
<td>13,245</td>
<td>67,595</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Armor</td>
<td>42,491</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Border</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>8,271</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>16,442</td>
<td>42,601</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications*</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>8,271</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Armor</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>28,626</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities Protection Service</td>
<td>NO DATA PROVIDED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DoD and State Department figures exaggerate some aspects progress:
- There are no data on facilities.
- The weapons and equipment requirements lag behind current plans to make forces heavier, and may understate the number of vehicles actually required.
- Some deployed units are now of uncertain loyalty and capability, and are rated as such at the command level. These may now approach or exceed half of the total manpower actually deployed.

**The Iraqi Minister of Defense Raised Additional Points in a Briefing on September 22, 2004**

- Using tribes for intelligence on border problems but are not equipped to fight.
- Are beginning to use UAVs to cover border. First role of Air Force.
- Now have three army divisions and six National Guard divisions in formation.
- Hope to see “no go” areas eliminated by election; see progress in Samara and Tall Afar.
- Are making progress in many areas, but not train most forces effectively until mid-2005.
• Police and Border Enforcement forces are corrupt, have major loyalty problems, many do not show up, and see claims to active strength that are not real. “70,000 men filled with corruption.”

• Have to purge some elements of National Guard and Army because proved loyal to Sadr, would not fight or would not carry out missions.

• Serious efforts in past gave the training mission too little priority; did too little to screen and ensure loyalty.

• Most current vehicles consist of pool of 3,000 vehicles ordered under Saddam’s regime and transferred from civilian ministries like Agriculture.

• Forces now only have light and medium weapons. Need armor and heavy weapons to fight terrorists and insurgents.
  o Partly CPA decision because of fear weapons would go to hostile forces.
  o Now beginning to get some tanks and armored cars.
  o 50 armored cars from UAE.
  o Military vehicles largely Russian.
  o Now restoring and repairing tanks. See some 40 coming into service. (Go to National Guard?)

• Creating two new light intervention force divisions to cover Iranian border, base in area of Basra and Al Kut.

• Have spent some $1.7 billion of budget on boosting forces.

NATO, UN, and Local Forces Only Limited Answer

• Appeals to NATO may be good domestic politics, but no practical chance of significant numbers of additional European or NATO combat forces. Certainly not enough to have any meaningful impact on requirement for US and Iraqi Interim Government forces.

• NATO can play a more significant role in training:
  o Department of Defense announced on September 22, 2004 that NATO would provide further training to Iraqi security forces, in response to the request of Iraq's Interim Government that largely consists of the creation of a permanent Training Center at Ar Rustamiya to prepare mid-level and senior Iraqi security personnel to meet the challenges facing the new Iraq. NATO has chosen U.S. General David Petreaus to command this mission.

  o This choice will provide unity of command and will ensure NATO avoids duplication and meets the Iraqi security forces' targeted needs.
o This is an important step but it will slowly create a 300-man team in country to create academies in Baghdad and Zaku near Turkey.

o Will strengthen Staff and War Colleges, where elements already exist. Hope to have NATO begin role as early as October.

- Neighboring countries cannot provide the needed forces in a combat ready and sustainable form, and each presents a serious internal political liability – especially Iran (Shiite issue), Saudi Arabia (own counterinsurgency problems), Syria (Ba’ath and Sunni issues), Jordan (already doing what it can and serious internal stability problems if openly deploy in support of US in middle of Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and Turkey (Turcoman vs. Kurd issue)

- Other Arab and Islamic forces cannot deploy in time, lack sustainability, and cannot be visibly seen by their publics are somehow bailing the US out of a war that no public supports.

- UN has no military forces or ability to recruit different forces. No support for such a mission; no readiness to become involved in ongoing insurgency.

- Cannot guard election, or even effective number of UN observers, with foreign forces.
  o Forces could be useful in some roles. One is direct security for UN and election personnel. If the international community does not do this task, the US or Iraqis will have to do it. It could consume up to a brigade in strength and the election period is not one when the US and Iraq will want to pull that size force from either Coalition or Iraqi forces.

  o A second issue is the question of a strategic reserve. The current crisis is causing a diversion of forces and thinning in ways that are problematic. Not having a strategic reserve has created difficulties

  o But, some 20,000 polling areas.

  o Those with any ties to election will simply be another target for insurgents.

  o Most new NATO or outside troops will lack experience and training, sustainability for such operations.

**Corollary is that more US and Coalition troops in Iraq are also Only a Limited Answer.**

- Timing and sensitivity of elections and post election efforts to create a government seen as legitimate in Iraqi eyes require a steady reduction in the role and visibility of US and Coalition forces; clear signs that Iraqi forces are steadily taking over.
• Don’t need more warm bodies in Iraq with no area skills, experience, and specialized skills and training for most roles.

• The more untrained and inexperienced forces on the street or in contact with Iraqis, the greater the Iraqi popular hostility.

• Exploiting timing of rotation to peak strength by up to 40,000 is better approach.

• US has already largely exhausted ability to create, rotate, and retain the skilled forces that actually help in combat and specialized missions.

• May well, however, be a case for a larger pool of worldwide US forces to ease strain of rotations and combat duties on existing number of actives and reservists.

• Strong case for ongoing efforts to reorganize the US army to create more combat units for rapid deployment and for reorganizing all US forces in terms of training and structure to support asymmetric warfare, armed nation building, and stability operations.

“Victory” and the Creation of a Government that is Legitimate in Iraqi, Arab, and World Opinion Hinges on the Success of Creating Effective Iraqi Military and Police Forces

• Many serious problems remain, but this does not mean Iraq is hopeless, Iraq cannot emerge with a much better government, or that the Coalition we will be defeated.

• Does mean that the victory will ultimate by a victory in terms of a government that Iraqis believe is legitimate, security provided by Iraqis, and an economy rebuilt on Iraqi terms.

• US and Coalition can only win on Iraqi terms, and only if accept the complexities involved.
  o Effective Iraqi forces are only one part of answer. Need far more effective economic aid and reconstruction, elections and political settlements, clear picture of US and Coalition intentions to withdraw once stability is achieved.
  o US needs to say at Presidential level will leave once stability established, Iraqis ready. No bases, no economic interests. Will leave if Iraqi government asks. Defuse popular hostility to Coalition forces as much as possible.

• Election security must come as much as possible from Iraqi forces.
  o Will be a race to bring sufficient Iraqi forces on-line.
  o Can count on insurgent attacks continuing into and well beyond election.
o Deferring election for “security” means waiting indefinitely. Will alienate far more Iraqis and make situation far worse.

o This does not mean slipping it a few months is critical, provided Iraqis believe will be fair and open; that candidates and lists can win even if they oppose the Coalition, and is step toward Coalition withdrawal.

- Iraqis must both replace US and Coalition forces in visibility and eventually take over almost all missions.
  
  o Probably talking late-2005 to mid-2006 before enough Iraqi forces could be ready to do this and allow really major US and Coalition reductions.

- Reprogramming of $1,804 billion to support accelerated training and equipment efforts is vital.

- Will not be an end to adjustments in aid program, or new requests.

- US military have also made it clear from start that cannot win military victory without a large and effective aid program. One of most senior offices pointed out as early as mid-2003 that, “Dollars are more effective than bullets. Physical security is only the prelude to economic security.”

- Clear warning about similar adventures in Syria and Iran. Security needs vs. nation building.

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ii http://www.defendamerica.mil/


iv http://www.defendamerica.mil/
