ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is part of a new “measures of progress” model that is being adopted at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Post-Conflict Reconstruction project.

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The report authors and project directors are entirely responsible for the content and judgments in this report.

ABOUT THE POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

In the fall of 2001, in recognition of the U.S. government’s inability to respond to the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction, CSIS President John Hamre and U.S. Army General Gordon Sullivan (retired) established the Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project. Initially a collaboration between CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA), the project has since become the leading source of authoritative recommendations and information on post-conflict reconstruction. The PCR Project continues to pursue reforms within the government to improve U.S. effectiveness in rebuilding post-conflict areas.

Last year, PCR Project experts traveled to Kosovo, Iraq, Sudan, and Sri Lanka to conduct research for several influential reports. The project also published a major paper on the reconstruction of Afghanistan this spring. Currently, the project is undertaking a comprehensive study to measure progress in post-Saddam Iraq. For more information on these and other PCR studies, please contact Morgan Courtney (mcourtney@csis.org) and Rebecca Linder (rlinder@csis.org).
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Cities Covered Through Interviews

Number of Interviews

Erbil [23]
Sulaimaniah [33]
Kirkuk [20]
Mosul [33]
Falluja [45]
Baghdad [68]
Al-Kufa [5]
Al Najaf [40]
Al Hera/Al-Manathera [13]

Total
Approximately 400 Interviews
Over 700 Iraqis Interviewed
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is developing a new model to measure progress in post-war Iraq from the perspective of the Iraqi people. As part of that model, the Project hired and trained seven Iraqi researchers, who conducted approximately 400 interviews/structured conversations with over 700 Iraqis in 15 cities from June 12-27, 2004. Their interview results serve as an integral piece of the new model. The final results and the report will be released in early September, 2004. Following are some broad conclusions from the interviews, the results of which are discussed in significant detail in this initial report.

- Iraqis are hopeful about events improving, have not yet realized significant gains in their personal lives, and have not crossed the tipping point in terms of their own ability to sustain a positive future, reflecting a sense of “skeptical optimism.”

- Iraqis have modest expectations about the reconstruction process.

- Iraqi public opinion continues to be dynamic, with a wide range of responses throughout the country.

- Iraqis are feeling modest progress in three areas: security, economic opportunity, and social wellbeing. Their concern is greatest in the areas of governance and services.

- In spite of continuing violence, Iraqis see light at the end of the tunnel, with significant regional variations regarding the threats, whether from terrorism and crime or the occupying forces and the rule of law.

- Iraqis are noticing some increase in economic activity, although they remain impatient about the pace of reconstruction funds entering Iraq and express some regional fears about favoritism on the part of the government.

- There are tangible signs of improvement in education and health care.

- Iraqis remain intensely frustrated with the state of electrical power.

- Nationwide, Iraqis express concern about their ownership of the interim government; there are significant regional differences with respect to the primary governance issues.
PROJECT BACKGROUND

When we began this project, we wondered whether the transfer of sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to an interim Iraqi government on June 30 would be seen as a success story in and of itself. Some sources presented a picture of success in many sectors in Iraq, while others contradicted those stories. We wanted to develop a more credible model to measure progress in Iraq and felt that a rich blend of qualitative and quantitative data would make that possible.

At its core, our model focuses on the individual. Its frame of reference is the perspective of Iraqi citizens. We wanted to measure the state of reconstruction in Iraq through the impact it has had on people’s lives. Inputs, polls, individual media stories, and official accounts all matter, but what is most important is the attitude and impressions of local people.

This initial report is drawn from one important part of our work: a series of conversations with Iraqi people. Because of the timeliness of the June interviews, we are releasing the results of this piece of work in advance of the larger report, which will be completed and released in early September.

The model we have developed will not only help in assessing progress in Iraq’s post-conflict reconstruction but in other cases around the world. While the model is rigorous, it is not burdensome. The conclusions drawn are sensible and designed to provide a baseline measurement that can serve as an indicator of conditions on the ground, from which future progress can also be judged.

METHODOLOGY

The project began with an effort to brainstorm a successful end state for Iraq. We set out to draft simple statements we believed Iraqis should be able to make if the reconstruction effort could be considered a success. The aim was to draw up a list of specific conditions that would be present in a stable and peaceful Iraq, each of which could serve as a barometer of progress.1 We initially described eight statements that spanned various sectors and ultimately whittled those statements down to the five studied here:

1. I feel secure in my home and in my daily activities. (Security)
2. I have a say in how Iraq is run. (Governance and Participation)
3. I have a means of income. (Economic Opportunity)
4. I have access to basic services such as water, power, and sanitation. (Services)
5. My family and I have access to health care and education. (Social Well-Being)

We focused on trends rather than particular events or inputs because we wanted to move away from the idea of nation building, in favor of nation jumpstarting. While it is essential to define end state goals, for at least a notional sense of where one is headed, we approach reconstruction as a catalytic process, centered on developing local trust and public confidence and creating the capacity to allow local actors to shape their own future.

Within each of the five core sector statements, we created a hierarchy pyramid of human needs. The triangular tables at the beginning of each sector in this report identify the end-state in order to establish a clear direction for reconstruction work. They also establish a “tipping point”: an achievable state that, once

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reached, provides Iraqis with a real opportunity to make it on their own.

The hierarchies are designed as five separate levels of satisfaction for each statement, determined on the basis of Iraqis’ needs and goals as they define them. The satisfaction levels run from zero (least satisfaction) to four (highest satisfaction). As an example, the pyramid scale for economic opportunity looks like this:

**Economic Opportunity**

I have a means of income
Developing the pyramids for each statement required extensive reflection, and they were tested as part of the interviewing process in Iraq.

The hierarchy statements represented by the pyramids became the vertical (y) axis in our data mapping construct. In addition to the scale of Iraqis’ satisfaction levels, we developed another scale, the horizontal (x) axis, to measure the positive or negative effect a particular event or poll or interview result actually has on the reconstruction of Iraq, as opposed to how that event might be perceived by Iraqis in terms of their satisfaction level. This scale runs from -50 (signifying an extremely negative event) to +50 (signifying an extremely positive event), with zero representing an entirely neutral event. Thus each data point we reviewed as part of our research is plotted on a two-axis graph, with the vertical axis representing a point’s effect from the perspective of Iraqis (their satisfaction level) and the horizontal axis representing the impact of the event on efforts to reconstruct Iraq. Taken together, they provide a picture of the trend-lines in Iraq according to multiple data points and sources and create a four quadrant grid that looks like this, with security as the example:

**SECURITY**

I feel secure in my home and in my daily activities

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- I engage in daily activities outside the home with a manageable level of concern.
- I go out for my normal activities, but avoid potentially targeted areas and do not leave after dark.
- I leave home only for immediate necessities, such as food and urgent medical care and my job.
- I do not leave home at all.
Creating graphical representations for the data adds numerous analytical multipliers: we can more readily describe the trends in any particular sector, including according to the various indicators studied in each sector, we can do a trend analysis for time, which can ultimately be used for indices, and we can distill all of the rich data collected into a concise, digestible format.

**INTERVIEWS**

During the project’s research period, June 2003-July 2004, all available polls, focus groups, and surveys were integrated into our data sets and subsequent graphs. While this data undoubtedly represented many Iraqi voices, we wanted to add our own field research to this mix by conducting in-country interviews.

**DRAWING ON BOTH QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE DATA**

The method chosen for this field research was face-to-face interviews. Most interviews were individual, but some were conducted with small groups of people that shared particular demographic qualities such as age or education level. The interviews were organized in a manner designed to produce data with both quantitative and qualitative value.

The quantitative value was provided by a number of interviews conducted in a representative sample of most urban centers across Iraq. About 400 interviews were conducted with over 700 Iraqis over the course of two weeks. They were conducted in eight governorates. Al-Anbar and Nineva governorates are predominantly Sunni, while al-Wasit and al-Najaf are traditionally Shi’a areas. Erbil and Suleimaniya are Kurdish areas, while the remaining two governorates of Baghdad and al-Tamim include cities through which the fault-lines of post-war Iraqi politics lie: the capital itself, and the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Both cities have ethnically and religiously mixed populations.

The qualitative value of the interviews was provided by the interview technique employed by researchers. Rather than run through structured questionnaires based on an outside understanding of the key issues in Iraq’s reconstruction, researchers used an informal conversational style designed to elicit the narratives of their Iraqi interviewees, a “structured conversation.” In this sense, interviews were conducted in an iterative fashion, with each conversation building on the one before it. This model combined the quantitative advantages of polling and the qualitative advantages of focus groups.

**CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEWS**

In the beginning, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) had agreed to conduct the interviews using a foreign national. As the security situation in Iraq deteriorated through the spring of 2004 and the kidnapping of foreign civilians become rampant, this plan had to be revised.

CSIS chose instead to hire Iraqi researchers. Seven men were chosen with the help of partner organizations that offered employees they had identified as exceptional. Most had roots in the cities identified as priorities for interviews. In the end, this approach allowed CSIS to gather data from areas that are largely off-limits for foreigners in the current security environment, including the front-line cities of Falluja, Najaf and Sadr City in Baghdad.

At a relatively safe location in the north of Iraq, NDI offered the researchers training on the project methodology, selection of interviewees, and interview techniques.

Interviews were conducted from June 12 to 27, 2004. The primary criterion used for selecting interviewees was demographic balance. Researchers therefore targeted institutions such as schools or factories, for example, to identify students or working class interviewees. Special efforts were made to
interview young Iraqis, as 50 percent of the country is under 20 years of age.

Security and an increasingly conservative social environment render it very difficult for women to travel freely and conduct interviews with strangers in Iraq. The subsequent choice of male researchers thus limited the number of interviews conducted with women. Most women interviewed were identified through trusted acquaintances.

**ANALYZING THE RESULTS**

During each interview, researchers managed the conversation to ensure it provided enough information to judge how the interviewee's life is affected by the status of the five areas of reconstruction we are studying as part of this project. After the interview, researchers filled out one grid for each sector. The vertical axis indicates the statement that comes closest to describing the interviewee’s current situation, and the horizontal axis describes his level of optimism or pessimism.

Our Iraqi researchers weighted and averaged the grid ratings to produce aggregate results for each of the fifteen municipal areas in which interviews were conducted. These aggregate results were analyzed in conjunction with accompanying quotes recorded from each interviewee to define trends, assess dominant narratives in each center, and identify any regional divergence.

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3 Grids used by the interviewers were identical to the four-quadrant model used to rate points in Washington, D.C.

4 After average interview scores were determined for each sector in each city, national averages— for both events and perception in each sector— were calculated in three separate operations. First, a simple mean of all cities’ scores was taken. In this average, each city carried equal weight, regardless of the size of its actual population or sample population (the number of people surveyed there). In the second average, each city’s score was weighted according to the city’s sample size, such that a sample of size n would have carried twice as much weight as sample of n/2. This meant that all individuals in the national sample, regardless of their survey locations, were given equal weight. In the third average, each city’s score was weighted according to the city’s actual population size. In other words, a city of size N would have carried twice as much weight as a city of N/2, regardless of how many people were interviewed in each place. Ultimately, the three averages were themselves merged, yielding a final score for interviews that could be averaged in turn with the scores from other source types.

10 CSIS Post Conflict Reconstruction Project
"I LEAVE MY HOUSE TO DO NECESSARY THINGS LIKE BUYING FOOD AND MEDICINE, AND TO GO TO WORK."

-32 YEAR-OLD HOUSEWIFE, AL-KUT
Security: Definition
I feel secure in my home and in my daily activities

I do not leave home at all

I leave the house, but avoid places that I do not know intimately

I leave home at any hour, but avoid potentially targeted areas

I go about my daily activities with a manageable level of concern

End State
Tipping Point
I feel secure in my home and in my daily activities

Security

I go about my daily activities with a manageable level of concern

I leave home at any hour, but avoid potentially targeted areas

I travel throughout my community, avoiding only areas that are known to be dangerous

I leave the house, but avoid places I do not know intimately

I do not leave home at all

14   CSIS Post Conflict Reconstruction Project
Security

I FEEL SECURE IN MY HOME AND IN MY DAILY ACTIVITIES

- On a national basis, Iraqis are hopeful about security, but do not yet travel freely throughout their communities.

- The average Iraqi has not yet entered the comfort of the quadrant above the tipping point on the graph, or “functional society,” with the circumstances in Baghdad bringing the national average down.

- Kurdish controlled and influenced areas are above the tipping point, with Erbil and Sulaimaniah near the top and Kirkuk on the cusp.

- Public perception is most negative in Baghdad, with continued insecurity limiting citizen movements.

- Of the cities in the Shiite area of the country where interviews were conducted, Al Hera/Al-Manathera are in the “functional” quadrant, while Najaf, Al-Kufa and the northwest town of Ana are near the tipping point.

- The other seven cities remain below the break-even point of self-sufficiency. Al-Kut shows the widest range in terms of difference between personal assessments and attitudes.
GENERAL OVERVIEW

The security sector provided the most dramatic regional variation of any of the five areas of reconstruction. From the highest ratings in Erbil and Sulaimaniah in the north to the low ratings for Baghdad, there was a wide range of interviewee responses.

The findings reflected a range of concerns. Violent conflict was clearly a factor in all regions surveyed, particularly in Baghdad. Crime rated highly in Mosul and Sadr City, where organized gangs operate with impunity. In Najaf, concerns related mostly to the arbitrary ways in which Muqtada al-Sadr’s followers exercise their control over the city. In al-Anbar province, insecurity was linked as much to the lawlessness of a region where justice is dispensed according to tribal customs as it was to any fighting between American forces and insurgents.

Across the country, respondents demonstrated a reluctance to base their assessments of the security situation on their personal circumstances. While our approach was to ascertain the sentiment of Iraqis based on their personal experiences, we learned that Iraqis tend to base their level of comfort in daily activities on a reading of what they hear in the news, not on what they observe in their daily lives.

Others, particularly in al-Kut, felt free to criticize the Americans and the new government, but would not talk about Muqtada al-Sadr, for fear that their houses would be attacked at night. With regard to the statements that we employed, one of our interviewers pointed out that Iraqi men will always leave their homes, even in the middle of live battle.

IRAQI KURDISTAN REGION

Erbil, Sulaimaniah

Interviews in the northern, Kurdish region generally reveal a higher sense of security than in all other regions. In Erbil, police presence is high, backed up by many checkpoints provided by the peshmerga, the armed forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government, which has operated autonomously from the rest of Iraq since 1991. The major security concern is infiltration by Arab extremist groups intent on destabilizing an area known for its secularism and its close relations with the United States. In Sulaimaniah, the security situation is stable, but residents are slightly less optimistic than those of Erbil. This may be due to apprehension that increasing Kurdish-Arab tensions may lead to armed conflict.

NORTH

Kirkuk and Mosul

Security in Mosul and Kirkuk is rated higher than some other areas, with Kirkuk actually at the tipping point. In Mosul, despite the fact that residents are able to move about freely in most areas, crime remains a predominant concern, and drug gangs operate with impunity, sometimes within eyesight of police stations. In response, billboards have been erected, urging citizens to cooperate with local police forces. That has led to the prevention of several IED attacks. Mosul residents remain less optimistic than others in Iraq, as a result of simmering political discontent and joblessness. One former army officer said, “If I cannot find a job I will have to join the resistance.” In Kirkuk, Iraqis are hesitant about the future as tensions between Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs are heating up. This was the only city where researchers felt that people had a significant fear of civil war. One interviewee said, “Kirkuk would be safer if it didn’t have any oil.” Security is at the tipping point level because people feel that the police are visible and are doing their work. Levels of optimism and pessimism in Kirkuk varied widely by ethnic group, with Turkmen and Arabs feeling relatively pessimistic, and Kurds optimistic. The optimism of the Kurds was so strong that it overbalanced the apprehension of the other communities. This may be fed by the fact that they are “in the driver’s seat,” so to speak, for the first time in generations.
Security

I feel secure in my home and in my daily activities
CENTRAL

Baghdad
The lowest rating for security was in Baghdad, which has been the scene of daily fighting even after the uprisings of April and May have somewhat died down. Bombings remain a regular occurrence in the capital, and kidnapping has become endemic, with many rich doctors and lawyers (especially Christians) remaining at home to avoid being taken hostage. In Sadr City, organized gangs are operating with impunity. There was, nevertheless, optimism among Baghdadis as the al-Sadr uprising appears to be heading toward resolution, and the presence of police and Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) is growing rapidly. Our interviewer reported that at least 3,000 residents of Sadr City have joined the ranks of these two institutions.

WEST

Falluja, Ramadi, Ana, Heet, Haditha, Kobaisa

In Ana, the people appeared to be so relaxed that our interviewer expected that residents would give security a higher rating than they did. Instead, the average rating was at the tipping point, which reflected fear due to the lack of electric light at night. Heet and Haditha are run by tribal law; each family takes the law into their own hands. This has created an uncertain security environment in these areas. Kobaisa’s security rating is similar to that of Baghdad, which can be attributed to the fact that many commute to the capital for work, thus influencing their perception. In Falluja, combat with the United States and the loss of sons has lowered the ratings in a town that its residents consider peaceful, so long as the U.S. forces are not in the city.

Our interviewer worried that the establishment of a Marine base near Falluja would bring security down significantly. For the time being, however, most residents are optimistic that the security situation will improve with the installation of the new government. In Ramadi, the people were slightly more satisfied with security than those in Falluja. While the situation is roughly similar, tribal leaders appear to have firmer control of Ramadi.

SOUTH

Najaf, Kufa, Al-Hera, al-Kut

The security situation in Najaf governorate was quite good until April, when the al-Sadr uprising began. Al-Kut rated rather low, which our interviewer felt reflected the legacy of the city’s devastation at the hands of the Ba’ath regime rather than a condemnation of the reconstruction effort. The population of Al-Kut allegedly fell by 20 percent over the time of Saddam Hussein’s rule, as the regime assassinated, exiled or imprisoned its men and women. Al-Hera remains more secure than the other cities only because the al-Sadr movement is not as strong there. Even with the presence of the Mahdi army, security is at the tipping point because residents of the city know how to avoid trouble with spoiler elements when they need to. The residents are optimistic that security will improve, as few expect that the al-Sadr movement will remain in control for long, and residents see the presence of the police and the ICDC increasing.
SECURITY
INTERVIEW QUOTES

“This country will never be stable. I wish we could return to the sixties, when I could walk in the middle of the night along the Tigris in the middle of the city.”
-60 year-old male, Al-Kut

“Terrorism will never end in Iraq. Once it has taken root, it is very difficult to uproot them, since the groups find the political and social climate favorable and a solid base of people believe in their ideals.”
-35 year-old male mechanic, Falluja

“Police are heroes, and they are working day in and day out and are not afraid of getting killed.”
-14 year-old male student and restaurant worker, Mosul

“I adore the new Iraqi police. They sacrifice for citizens’ security.”
-3rd year female student in computer science, Mosul

“It may seem okay in Kurdistan right now, but deep down, we don’t feel secure. All our suffering has made us dictators at heart, ready to oppress others to keep ourselves safe. Expect the worst to happen.”
-26 year-old male university student, Erbil

“I don’t feel safe at home because of constant explosions and random attacks, and on the streets, I feel any moment an explosive will go off.”
-20 year-old female, Baghdad

“Shi’a, Sunni and Kurds can live in peace with each other, as they are bounded by ties of blood relations.”
-Anonymous, Falluja

“The police and Civil Defense Forces should not serve in the areas where they live. Police that take bribes from people should be punished like criminals.”
-30 year-old male college graduate, Al-Kut
GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

“I AM NOW FREE TO VOTE, WHICH I COULDN’T DO BEFORE. BUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS APPOINTED BY THE AMERICANS, NOT ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE OF IRAQ. I LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING A GOVERNMENT ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE.”

-36 YEAR-OLD MALE, AL KUT
I have a say in how Iraq is run

End State

Iraq has a responsive and pluralistic system of government

Tipping Point

I am able to make a difference in the political process and my government is capable of action and respectful of rights

I am free to vote

I have little influence over my government but it is somewhat credible

I have no public voice because there is no Iraqi government
Governance and Participation

I have a say in how Iraq is run

- Iraq has a responsive and pluralistic system of government
- I am free to vote
- I am able to make a difference in the political process and my government is capable of action and respectful of rights
- I have little influence over my government but it is somewhat credible
- I have no public voice because there is no Iraqi government

-50 - 0 - 50

0 - 2 - 4
Governance

I Have a Say in How Iraq is Run

- Of the five subject areas of this study, governance is the lowest rated. Not one of the 15 cities and towns has crossed the tipping point, with the national average suggesting that people feel they have moderate influence over a moderately credible government.

- The Shiite cities are looking forward to their increased national role, but remain concerned about extremists in their midst.

- Mosul showed the most negative governance, reflecting that Sunnis feel squeezed by their loss of power at the center.

- The Kurds are voicing a high level of dissatisfaction.
GENERAL OVERVIEW

Governance is the area of poorest performance in our interviews. It is the only area in which not one average rating for any city hit the tipping point. Uniquely, significant numbers of results remain at the worst-case scenario in terms of Iraqis’ perception.

The tipping point for governance is a free and fair election. Since Iraq is still at least six months from an election, it is understandable that all results would be below this. Even so, findings remained far from the tipping point in most areas, which may reflect Iraqis’ opposition to the Coalition’s continued influence in Iraq. The hierarchy of statements devised for governance incorporated many factors, including the legitimacy of public institutions, the degree of citizenship participation, and the ability and capacity of the government to guarantee individual rights.

The regional distribution of governance findings shows some unexpected results. Najaf, scene of the recent al-Sadr uprising, shows high marks. Kirkuk, whose communal tensions and history of ethnic cleansing make it a possible front line of any future civil war, also reports general satisfaction with the state of governance in Iraq. Even Ramadi, in the heart of the Sunni Triangle, boasts a degree of satisfaction relative to the rest of this restive country.

This is certainly not the case in other Sunni-dominated areas. Al-Anbar governorate is predictably skeptical of the new interim government and angry at the presence of American forces. Mosul, however, is the scene of the greatest fury. Our interviewer was taken aback by the overwhelming hostility of his interviewees. Just as angry as the Sunnis, however, are the Kurds of Erbil and Sulaimaniah, who are losing hope for a formal recognition of their rights within the new constitution and adequate representation in the interim government and worry about corruption in their own region.

Mosul, Sulaimaniah, al-Ana and Falluja all fall on the pessimistic side, and al-Kufa, Erbil and Haditha fall in the middle. Our interviewer in Baghdad reported an openness to any government that can restore public order in Baghdad, yet noted that those he interviewed do not yet feel that they have real influence in the current government.

Our interviews were conducted midway between the announcement of the new President and Prime Minister and the transfer of sovereignty, and our researchers felt that, in general, Iraqis are giving their new government a chance. Interviewees in al-Anbar and Mosul dismissed the government as a stooge of the United States, while the Shi’a south gave the new government high marks, because it was more representative of their interests than Saddam’s regime. President Ghazi Mashal Ajil Al-Yawer’s tribal background seems popular in areas like Kirkuk that identify with a tribal way of life. Scores in al-Kut and al-Anbar were lowered due to apprehensions about respect for the rule of law because of al-Sadr and tribal feuds, respectively.

IRAQI KURDISTAN REGION
Erbil, Sulaimaniah

Kurds are disillusioned at the regional level and apprehensive at the national level. After thirteen years of one-party rule in the respective administrations of the KDP and the PUK and with little voice in those administrations, Kurds are tired of their regional governments. Few see any prospects for change.

They are also at the point of losing hope for an adequate recognition of their rights in the constitutional negotiations that will soon begin with their Arab counterparts in designing the institutions of the new Iraq. Anti-Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) rhetoric from major Shi’a partners such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani and the denial of both the Presidency and the Prime Ministership to any Kurdish candidate have served to remind Kurds that Iraq is an Arab state in which their interests will continue to be marginalized.
Governance and Participation

I have a say in how Iraq is run

Overall Weighed Average

Governance and Participation

I have a say in how Iraq is run

Overall Weighed Average
As the only part of Iraq with any experience in democracy, the low results come as a surprise. The common wisdom is that Kurds have sacrificed their dreams of independence by agreeing to reintegrate their region into Iraq, and that the Arabs have taken this for granted.

**NORTH**

Kirkuk and Mosul

Kirkuk and Mosul varied significantly in this area. The people of Kirkuk had one of the highest approval ratings of any city in Iraq on the current state of governance. This is attributable both to the gains of the Kurds, who control the city for the first time in decades, and to the more conciliatory mood of the younger generation, which feels less beholden by the intercommunal rivalries of their elders.

In Mosul, the people were extremely angry about the way Iraq has been governed since the fall of the Ba'ath regime, which, in part, is likely the result of the loss of preferential treatment since the former regime's overthrow. More than half of the 36 interviewees in Mosul had views that could only be associated with the “zero” statement for governance, “I have no public voice because Iraq has no government.” Even with a local man, Ghazi al Yawer, as President, most residents of Mosul seem to consider the interim government in Baghdad to be a stooge of the United States.

**CENTRAL**

Baghdad

Baghdadis’ positive outlook on ongoing events is tied to the removal of Saddam’s government, support for the tough early rhetoric of new Prime Minister Allawi, and a belief in the potential returns from an alliance with the United States. If the United States is determined to make a model out of Iraq and if its credibility is invested in making Iraq stable, residents of Baghdad seem to believe U.S. pressure and support should help to guarantee that the elections will be relatively free.

The Shi’a political scene is also at a sensitive stage; rival parties such as al-Da’wa and SCIRI, as well as the al-Sadr movement and al-Hawza (the religious hierarchy based in Najaf) are keeping their powder dry, unwilling to challenge each other this early on.

**WEST**

Falluja, Ramadi, Ana, Heet, Haditha, Kobaisa

The broader political climate has left residents of this region in a critical mode. Our interviewer in Ana was surprised by the level of negativity. In the army town of Haditha, residents seem influenced by the alienation and discontent of the former members of Iraq’s armed forces. Those two cities were the second and third-lowest rated of those we interviewed in Iraq.

Heet has traditionally been a Communist stronghold. While residents rated governance relatively high, they chafed at the newly Islamist political atmosphere in their part of Iraq. Their resentment at new restrictions brought their scores down. Without the mullahs, the residents of Heet might have been the only town surveyed that found governance to be close to the tipping point.

The people of Ramadi were a bit more favorable to the post-war order than Falluja; while most of the interviewees found that the state of governance in Iraq was slightly better than under the Ba’ath regime. Our interviewer in Falluja, however, believes that residents there would not trust any government. They approach the interim government with tremendous suspicion, viewing it as an American implant that will rig their own reelection, ensuring that Iraqis have no free choice. One Fallujan is quoted as saying, “like father, like son,” when describing the Allawi government; he felt that it would result in a regime similar to that of Saddam Hussein.
SOUTH
Najaf, Kufa, Al-Hera, al-Kut

Among all the cities in Iraq, Najaf scored the highest and most optimistic in governance. Its residents think the elections of 2005 will be free and that they will lead to majority rule. Our interviewer was left with the impression that only two political issues matter in Najaf: the freedom to worship according to Shi’a religious practice and open trade. Satisfaction on both issues moves Najaf close to the tipping point. The al-Sadr uprising has undermined the rule of law in Najaf, bringing down results. Most Najafis, however, expect the al-Sadr phenomenon to fade soon.

Our interviewer found that residents of Kufa were less informed of political developments. In Al-Hera, the people were apolitical, to the point of indifference. The residents of al-Kut were pleased with the new government, because they perceive that it is “well-educated,” with expertise and experience in fields ranging from law, to engineering, to medicine. They also believe it reflects the sectarian balance of Iraq accurately, thus fairly representing various religious groups.
"The stomach is the key to the heart: If the government takes care of the people and improves their situation, all problems will be under control."

- 24 year-old male graduate and worker, Ramadi

"We were content to see an end to the dictatorship, as the Iraqis’ only hope is the freedom to behave as they wish, not as they are told. So, I’m optimistic that we’re on our way to freedom and security."

- 24 year-old female, Baghdad

"We can’t conclude and be judgmental in such a short period. We have to give the government an opportunity to prove whether it can do the job or not."

- 22 year-old female at a Kurdish youth organization, Kirkuk

"We’ll be content to have an Iraqi government, whatever the background, Arabic or Kurdish. The important point will be responding to citizens’ rights and living peacefully with the world community."

- 24 year-old male, works with his spouse at a Kurdish cultural organization, Kirkuk

"The current Iraqi government isn’t trustworthy. The future Iraq will be an Arabic Iraq, so I’m pessimistic for the future of the Kurds. Arabs in the new Iraq have taken advantage of all that we Kurds did to get rid of Saddam, and are now taking power for themselves."

- 23 year-old male clerk, Erbil

"My dad nominated himself for the city council and had to withdraw because we were afraid of terrorists."

- 17 year-old male who works at his father’s electric shop, Mosul

"A federal Iraq is my dream."

- Anonymous, Falluja

"I have little effect on the government, but it is not credible anyway."

- 26 year-old female evening student, Al Kut

"The American government wants Iraq’s government to be modeled on their style, but this will never fit us. It’s a big mistake."

- 34 year-old male journalist, Falluja
SERVICES

“CONSIDERING HOW MUCH MONEY THE GOVERNMENT HAS, WE GET TERRIBLE SERVICES. ELECTRICITY IS ONLY AVAILABLE FOR TEN HOURS A DAY.”

-29 YEAR-OLD FEMALE UNIVERSITY STUDENT, ERBIL
A wide range of services is available to me

I have dependable access to services such as communications and transportation

I have sufficient access to basic services

My access to water, power, and sanitation is limited

I have no access to basic services

Tipping Point

End State

I have access to basic services, such as water, power, and sanitation
I have access to basic services, such as water, power, and sanitation

- A wide range of services is available to me
- I have dependable access to services such as communications and transportation
- I have sufficient access to basic services
- My access to water, power, and sanitation is limited
- I have no access to basic services
Overall, Iraqis’ access to services is between limited and sufficient levels, but Iraqis are fairly hopeful that service provision will improve. The average Iraqi’s services are not yet past the tipping point.

Najaf, Kirkuk, Ana, and Sulaimaniah are close to passing the tipping point, with sufficient access to basic services.

The Kurdish city of Sulaimaniah is performing the best of the fifteen cities where interviews were conducted, with residents optimistic about improvement and satisfied with service provision. This contrasts with Erbil, the other Kurdish city examined, where residents are comparatively less optimistic and less satisfied with their services.

In terms of both events and public perception, Mosul was most negative, with little access, if any, to water, power, and sanitation. The citizens of Heet, on average, were neither overwhelmingly optimistic nor pessimistic about the improvement of services. Residents in Kobaisa, Falluja, and al-Kut, who experience relatively similar service provision, were more hopeful than those in Heet.

Baghdad’s citizens judged that they had insufficient services, but are more optimistic than all other towns surveyed that their service provision will improve.
General Overview

The poor level of basic services remains one of the most visible signs of the slow pace of reconstruction in Iraq. In fact, because Iraqis understand the term “reconstruction” in a narrower, more restrictive sense than the broader concept favored by the international donor community, basic services come to mind first when Iraqis are asked about the state of reconstruction.

More narrowly, when Iraqis think of reconstruction, they think of electricity provision. When asked their opinion on the state of reconstruction, many Iraqis replied, “it has not yet started.” To Iraqis, the Coalition has not yet developed a functioning electrical system, and the people have had to swelter in 130 degree-heat, leading to their belief that Iraq has clearly not been “reconstructed.”

Iraqis are much more concerned with electricity than with water or sanitation, though it is difficult to ascertain whether this reflects the absence of the service more than its intrinsic importance. In any case, 15 months since Saddam’s fall, its absence is striking for a country with as many resources as Iraq. One hopeful note sounded by at least three researchers was the visible presence of public works projects aimed at improving basic services. This played a role in the optimistic ratings, except in Mosul and some of the marginal rural areas in al-Anbar and Najaf governorates.

Iraqi Kurdistan Region

Erbil, Sulaimaniah

Power, water, and sanitation are all functional in Erbil and Sulaimaniah. In Erbil, however, residents still purchase generators, as electricity provision is not reliable enough. Water is also a particular problem in Erbil. Sulaimaniah residents perceive their service provision more positively.

North

Kirkuk and Mosul

The people of Mosul rated their city lowest in the entire country in the area of services. The electricity infrastructure is in total shambles, and the water quality is so bad that it can no longer be considered potable. Many interviewees attributed the outbreak of new diseases to poor water quality and to sewage that runs openly in the streets. In Kirkuk, services have taken a recent turn for the worse after a period of gradual improvement, which may be attributed to rising electricity usage during the hot summer temperatures. The people of Kirkuk are a bit more optimistic that services will improve.

Central

Baghdad

There is a high level of optimism in Baghdad, because it is the capital and its residents thus expect to receive more services accordingly. Water provision was rated as satisfactory, but electricity is on only about 50 percent of the time. Open sewers in Sadr City have been cited as a problem, but work is underway to improve the situation.

West

Falluja, Ramadi, Ana, Heet, Haditha, Kobaisa

Al-Ana’s ratings were among the highest in Iraq, rating at the tipping point. This could be due to the fact that it is a new town, built in 1988 by a French engineering firm. Its infrastructure is, therefore, in very good shape, particularly its new electrical grid, which provides residents with 23 hours of electricity a day. Conversely, in Haditha, Heet, and Kobaisa, respondents found their services limited; as rural towns, they are marginal to Iraq’s economy and political life and traditionally receive fewer services than the major cities. Falluja and Ramadi’s services are poor; in Falluja, electricity is on for two hours and off for eight. The water supply is so poor that residents have begun to draw water directly from the Euphrates River, which is having a direct effect on the health of the residents.
I have access to basic services, such as water, power, and sanitation.
Services in the city of Najaf are relatively good, averaging a rating at the tipping point. The influx of pilgrims has added considerable resources to a city that already thrived as a regional hub. In Kufa and al-Hera, the level of services is considerably lower than in Najaf, but the availability of electricity is still much better than it was under Saddam, since the Shi’a-dominated governorate was a politically-disadvantaged area. The river water on which rural communities depend is so heavily polluted that it is discolored, but major projects are underway to improve water quality. Services in al-Kut have improved since the former regime: electricity, for example, is available for approximately 16 hours per day, whereas it was only available for six hours during the Ba’ath regime. Electricity remains the main problem in al-Kut, but water is plentiful and road transportation is satisfactory.
SERVICES

INTERVIEW QUOTES

“By and large, we rely on generators.”
-35 year-old vendor, Najaf

“Electricity has improved. In Saddam’s time, we had only four hours a day. Now we get 14.”
-23 year-old male college student, al-Kut

“As security improves with an increased police presence and having guards around, services will be better.”
-26 year-old female, Baghdad

“Rich and poor states have these services, so it should be expected that Iraq’s should be held to a high standard. Iraq is full of oil.”
-33 year-old male, Baghdad

“We have been deprived a water supply and electricity since the Saddam era, and the trend continues. The sewage system has gone to the dogs, even in the most prestigious areas in Mosul, including some main streets near the university.”
-37 year-old female music shop owner, Mosul
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

“I DON’T HAVE A FIXED INCOME, BUT I GET SOMETHING TO COVER MY NEEDS.”
-MALE JOURNALIST, SULAIMANIAH
Economic Opportunity
I have a means of income

- End State
  - My income exceeds my needs
- Tipping Point
  - I have enough money to meet only my basic needs
- I don’t have enough money to meet my basic needs
- I have no income
Economic Opportunity
I have a means of income

My income exceeds my needs

I earn a consistent and sufficient income

I have enough money to meet only my basic needs

I don’t have enough to meet my basic needs

I have no income

My income exc...
Economic Opportunity
I have a Source of Income

- On average across Iraq, Iraqis do not have enough income to meet their basic needs, but remain fairly optimistic that conditions will improve.

- Among the cities surveyed, Mosul, al-Kut, and Baghdad were rated the worst. While a majority of the cities that we examined scored above the tipping point, the large populations of those three cities brought down the national average.

- Residents of Mosul do not have enough income to meet their basic needs, and, along with al-Kufa, are among the least optimistic that the situation will improve.

- Falluja, Najaf, and Ramadi are above the tipping point, while Kufa, Ana, Heet, Sulaimaniah, Kirkuk and Erbil are on the cusp.

- None of the cities surveyed are in the “danger zone.”
GENERAL OVERVIEW

Ratings in the area of income were second-highest after “Social Well-Being,” with a national average slightly below the tipping point. Al-Kut, Mosul, and Baghdad rated lowest; al-Kut was the poorest area surveyed.

In a country where massive state resources produced regional economies built on patronage, the shift in government preferences has had a dramatic effect. The situation in Mosul demonstrated the effect of regime change in Iraq, because it was a favored area during the Ba’ath regime. Najaf, however, is now thriving, since it is no longer shunned as a Shi’a area.

Our interviewers found Iraqis to be generally optimistic in the area of income. One statement that appeared repeatedly was confidence that foreign investment would begin to produce economic returns for Iraq.

Our interviewers found that this area of reconstruction was the most difficult to survey, as, in accordance with Islamic principle, many Iraqis skirted the question to avoid making judgments about the life that God has given them so as to not appear ungrateful.

IRAQI KURDISTAN AREA

Erbil, Sulaimaniah

The Kurdish area of Iraq is almost certainly better off than the rest of the country, as the sanctions they had to endure from the Arab part of Iraq paled in comparison to the U.N. sanctions imposed on the Arab part. Yet the findings place both Erbil and Sulaimaniah right at the tipping point, or “I have enough money only to meet my basic needs.” Our interviewer attributes this to having spoken with far more youth and students. Our interviewer believes that the situation for adults is actually much closer to “I earn a consistent and sufficient income.” As with the security situation, the people of Erbil were more optimistic than those of Sulaimaniah.

NORTH
Kirkuk and Mosul

Our interviewer found the situation in Mosul particularly bad in the area of income, which demonstrates the very visible economic impact that accompanies changing political fortunes. Mosul had been a stronghold of the Ba’ath regime, and is suffering in the new Iraq as government largesse has dried up. There was surprising poverty in many neighborhoods, and unemployment is high. Residents of Mosul have little hope that their economic situation will improve. They have enough money to cover some of their basic needs. In contrast, on average, Kirkuk residents have enough money to meet their basic needs, and are among the most hopeful that the situation will improve. Our interviewer believes that this may also be attributed to Kirkuk’s vast oil and gas reserves.

CENTRAL
Baghdad

Baghdad rated among the lowest in the area of income, reflecting a considerable income gap. Our interviewer made a significant effort to visit rich neighborhoods such as al-Mansour and al-Karada, and poor neighborhoods such as Sha’ila, Hay al-Saha, and Sadr City. About 40 percent of Baghdad respondents said that they earned a consistent and sufficient income, or even that their income exceeded their needs, the “end-state” described for this sector. However, 60 percent fall well below the tipping point, which ultimately showed that, on average, residents of Baghdad have enough income to cover some of their basic needs. According to the responses, our interviewer was concerned about the recruitment base that those poor 60 percent of Baghdadis provides for extremist groups.
Economic Opportunity

I have a means of income
WEST
Falluja, Ramadi, Ana, Heet, Haditha, Kobaisa

Heet and Ana were at the tipping point for income, while Haditha and Kobaisa fell a bit short. In Ramadi and Falluja, there have been considerable job losses since the fall of the Ba’ath regime. In both cities, there was a stark income gap between the two levels of society: the rich merchant class and the poor working class. It is the latter that have borne the brunt of the declining economic situation of the region, as the loss of a single salary can send an entire family into poverty.

SOUTH AND SOUTH-CENTRAL
Najaf, Kufa, Al-Hera, al-Kut

Najaf has blossomed since the fall of the Ba’ath regime, with pilgrims coming from all over the Middle East, and with the end of Najaf’s political marginalization. However, Muqtada al-Sadr’s uprising had a devastating impact on Najaf’s income. Our interviewer believes that the average rating for Najaf could have been as high as the third statement (“I earn a consistent and sufficient income”) or even the fourth (“My income exceeds my needs”), had it not been for the disruptive effect the Mahdi Army has had on the local economy. The city-dwellers of al-Kut live off trade and are relatively well-off, at or above the tipping point, but the outlying villages are predominantly agricultural, which brought al-Kut’s average down to “I don’t have enough income to meet my basic needs.” Al-Hera is also agricultural, unlike the shrine cities of Najaf and Kufa. Therefore, the residents of this area are a bit poorer, but have a more stable income.
“We do not need American money and gifts; Iraq is a rich country, with all its oil and resources.”
- 26 year-old female, Baghdad

“I have been in the Army my whole life, and I don’t know anything else.”
- 30 year-old male, al-Kut

“The economy will improve when foreign companies begin working in Iraq.”
- 32 year-old male graduate of veterinary college, al-Kut

“I sell some of my monthly food ration to get by.”
- 23 year-old male former student, al-Kut

“From what I’ve read in the newspapers, I’ll have a source of income from the government after the handover.”
- 25 year-old male, Baghdad

“I have a cellular phone... which wasn’t allowed during Saddam’s regime.”
- 25 year-old female visual arts graduate and housewife, Mosul

“The decrease in prices of basic commodities and the salary increase have given hope to the people that life’s going to be easier and better.”
- 26 year-old female, Baghdad
SOCIAL WELL-BEING

“OUR HEALTH AND EDUCATION SYSTEMS WILL BE EXCELLENT, AND WILL COMPETE WITH THOSE OF INDUSTRIAL AND CAPITALIST NATIONS.”
-29 YEAR-OLD MALE, BAGHDAD
A wide range of social services is available to us

We have access to higher education and routine health care

Our access to health care and education is limited

We have no access to social services, such as health care and education

End State

Tipping Point

My family and I have access to health care and education
My family and I have access to health care and education

A wide range of social services is available to us

We have access to higher education and routine health care

We have sufficient access to primary education and basic health care

Our access to health care and education is limited

We have no access to social services, such as health care and education
SOCIAL WELL-BEING

MY FAMILY AND I HAVE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION

- Across Iraq, this sector is performing the best. The average Iraqi citizen has sufficient access to primary education and health care and is hopeful for improvement.

- Of the cities surveyed, the residents of Baghdad are the most hopeful that health care and education services will improve. Baghdad is almost above the tipping point.

- Erbil’s residents feel that their health care and education services exceed sufficiency and are receiving some access to higher education and routine health care. While not at the same level as Erbil, the cities of Sulaimania, Najaf, and Falluja have surpassed the tipping point. Sulaimania was neither overwhelmingly optimistic nor pessimistic about the potential improvement of health care and education. Heet, Kirkuk, and Ana are on the cusp of moving past the tipping point.

- Al-Kut, a Shi’a area neglected during the Ba’ath regime, is optimistic about improvements, but is the worst off in terms of services provided.

- Of all of the sectors examined, this sector received Mosul’s most positive rating. While residents have limited access to health care and education, they were fairly optimistic that conditions would improve.
GENERAL OVERVIEW

Results for this area of reconstruction were the best of all the sectors examined, with a national average that borders on the tipping point. The end of a sanctions regime that had a devastating impact on health care in particular certainly produced high expectations for quick improvement. While many of those have not been met, all researchers reported that access to both health care and education are improving, and anecdotal horror stories of a medical system in complete disrepair are fading.

It appears that foreign aid has had the greatest visibility to date in this area. Reports of the beneficial impact of particular programs came up in several places, from a foreign clinic providing health care for street children in Mosul, to a new college in Falluja, to literacy campaigns in Kirkuk.

Not all results were positive, of course, and the poor state of reconstruction in other areas occasionally impacts this area. For example, there has been a rash of doctor kidnappings in Baghdad, which has had an adverse effect on the provision of specialized health care, and poor sewage treatment and management has led to increased sickness across the country.

IRAQI KURDISTAN REGION

Erbil, Sulaimaniah

Interviews from Erbil reflected the highest social well-being rating in the country, with the average surpassing the tipping point, and approaching the third statement, “We have access to higher education and routine health care.” There remain some concerns about both health care and education, with two to three-month waiting periods for some types of surgery and growing class sizes due to an increase in population relative to a static infrastructure. These appear to be problems more like those of a developed, not a post-war, society. Sulaimaniah was less hopeful than Erbil, for reasons unknown to our interviewer. He reported that the lack of access to education and health care was only a problem in rural areas.

NORTH

Kirkuk and Mosul

The state of health care and education was right at the tipping point for both Mosul and Kirkuk. In Mosul, this is the only sector that was rated anywhere remotely near the tipping point. New hospitals are under construction in the city, and the availability of health care in rural areas has increased since the end of the war. Our interviewer spoke with a number of teachers who were more concerned with their low salaries than about any impediments affecting the education they offer to their children, which he interpreted to mean that impediments are not too grave. In Kirkuk, our interviewer noticed banners for a literacy campaign and a push by local NGOs to address problems related to maternal health. There is still a notable gap, however, in the number of hospitals needed to service a city its size.
Social Well-Being

My family and I have access to health care and education
Access to health care and education is good in Baghdad, and residents are confident that further improvements are on the way. Our interviewer said that his neighbors feel that Iraq’s resource wealth should translate into better health care and education services than those available in most neighboring countries. Levels of education are already quite high, a finding he substantiated by experience participating in a literacy campaign. The campaign found that Baghdad’s literacy rate was over 95 percent, even in poor neighborhoods in Baghdad. Overall, however, most individual answers in Baghdad suggested that access to health care and education was limited. For example, in recent months, access to health care has dropped considerably, since Baghdad’s rich doctors have become a favorite target for kidnapping.

As in the area of basic services, Ana benefits from its status as a relatively new town with better quality infrastructure in the area of social well-being. Its education and health care systems are in good shape. Our interviewer remarked that the people, including women, are well-educated. In Haditha, the education system is satisfactory, but health care is not; there is no hospital in the town. Foreign aid has resulted in a number of new clinics in Heet, which have improved the quality of health care there. Kobaisa has few clinics or schools of its own, and has to rely on Heet for many education and health care needs. In Ramadi, expectations for a post-sanctions improvement in health care have actually been met. Ramadi is also a university town, which has had a positive impact on education at all levels. Surprisingly, Falluja rates above the tipping point in health services due to the massive influx of international relief organizations in the aftermath of the April siege of the city.

As a town famed for its seminaries, the level of education in Najaf tends to be quite high. This applies for women as well, to the extent that there are more female teachers in Najaf than male. This has not been restricted by the growing influence of political Islam in Najaf, whose impact for women so far has been the more conservative clothing they are now expected to wear to class. The presence of the Mahdi Army has had a negative impact on health care. The militia now insists that its wounded be given precedence in any hospital, thus delaying and sometimes depriving other citizens of access to health care. The smaller cities of Kufa and al-Hera have not yet received the improvements that have benefited Najaf. Poor water and sanitation in Kufa has started to produce higher rates of infection. In al-Hera, the problem is simply one of low income, which, in a country that knows no public health insurance, translates into reduced access to health care. Health care and education are in bad shape in al-Kut; there is only one hospital for a city with close to one million people. Despite this, its residents are witnessing some improvements, as wheelchairs and ambulances are visible in the streets for the first time in ten years, and there are a few X-ray machines in medical clinics. The education system, however, is crippled by poverty, and our interviewer estimates that between 40 and 50 percent of children drop out in order to support their families.
Social Well-Being

Interview Quotes

“We have schools, but due to economic insecurity, I had to force my two kids to drop out of school and work.”
- 66 year-old male seed vendor, Erbil

“Due to the deterioration of the electricity network, health services are unavailable.”
- 23 year-old male, Baghdad

“Medical services are available, but you need a lot of money.”
- 22 year-old female engineering student, Erbil

“My kids are in university, thanks be to God.”
- 53 year-old male electronics shop owner, Erbil

“Obtaining an education or medical services is the simplest right, but one we do not have.”
- Mother in her late twenties, Najaf

“I went to the hospital to get medication, to no avail.”
- 60 year-old female, Haditha

“For emergency services, I must travel to Baghdad, two hours away.”
- 25 year-old male food vendor, al-Kut

“Health and education services will be excellent, and they will be available free of charge.”
- 22 year-old male, Baghdad