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Inexcusable Failure

**Progress in Training the Iraqi Army
and Security Forces as of Mid-July 2004**

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The Department of Defense has provided new data on the development of Iraqi military and security forces as of July 13, 2004. The new data provide information on the equipment effort for the first time, and they break the manpower totals out into the new categories of Iraqi military and security forces create since April 2004, and the end of the CPA on June 30, 2004.

These data both confirm long standing problems in the effort to training and equip the Iraqi security forces, and provide details on critical problems in the security program that have never before been made public. They document an inexcusable level of failure on the part of the US, and particularly the CPA and Department of Defense, in developing effective Iraqi capabilities to establish security in Iraq.

One can argue the decision to disband the Iraqi military forces. The Iraqi military had largely disintegrated by mid-April 2003. Most of the regular forces dependent on conscripts had collapsed because of mass desertions; the heavier units in the regular army were largely ineffective and suffered from both desertions and massive looting. The Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units have been defeated in the field and were too political to preserve.

The fact remains, however, that the US-led coalition cannot be excused for its failure to reconstitute effective security forces and police, for trying to restrict the development of Iraqi armed forces to a token force to defend Iraq's borders against external aggression, or for ignoring the repeated warnings from US military advisory teams about problems in the flow of equipment and in creating the necessary facilities. The US failed to treat the Iraqis as partners in the counterinsurgency effort for nearly a year, and did not attempt to seriously train and equip Iraqi forces for proactive security and counterinsurgency mission until April 2004 – nearly a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein and two-thirds of a year after a major insurgency problem began to emerge.

The new data the Department of Defense released on July 13th do, however, have serious weaknesses. They omit critical details on the nature of the training Iraqis receive for the first time, and provide no data on the portion that actually went through academy and proper military training. They provide less data on the flow of US aid to the Iraqi army and security forces, and they use unrealistic and outdated requirements and metrics for measuring how the equipment effort actually meets Iraqi requirements.

Ongoing Developments

The US wasted precious time waiting for its own forces to defeat a threat that it treated as the product of a small number of former regime loyalists (FRLs) and foreign volunteers,

and felt it could solve without creating effective Iraqi forces. For nearly a year, the US acted as if the insurgency was not nationalist in character, and was small and unpopular, and would go away once the US and the rest of the MNF defeated it without serious Iraqi aid.

In many ways, the Administration's senior spokesmen still seem to live in a fantasyland in terms of its public announcements, talking about an insurgent force of 5,000 – when both Iraqi intelligence and US intelligence in Iraq quote figures of from 15,000 to 35,000. It still exaggerates the foreign threat and role of Al Qaida, in spite of the fact only a small fraction of detainees and those killed are foreign and Zarqawi's ties to Al Qaida seem limited to loose affiliation. For example, only 50 men out of the 3,800 the 82nd Airborne apprehended in the Sunni triangle area were foreign.

Far Too Little and Too Late in Getting the Aid Money to the Iraqis

The US Congress must accept a substantial amount of blame for failing to ease procedures for time critical aid expenditures, but the primary blame lies with the Executive Branch. The CPA and CJTF-7 failed dismally to execute their plans in the security sector, and these plans failed to call for treating the Iraqis as full partners in achieving security in Iraq, and for training and equipping them effectively to perform counterinsurgency missions and warfare.

The new reporting system adopted after the end of the CPA disguises serious problems in the security and aid efforts that were revealed in previous reporting. The new reporting no longer distinguishes construction and non-construction expenditures by category, and no longer reports the number of serious incidents occurring by day and week. The final reports coming out of the CPA show how misleading this can be:

- CPA reporting as of June 29, 2004 shows that obligations for non-construction security procurement were about 25% of goal, and commitments were around 50%.) The figures for construction tasks were far more favorable and almost totally misleading. They indicated that the \$749 million was obligated and \$1,003 million was committed, to meet a goal for 1 July 2004 of \$749 million.
- The final CPA status report issued on July 6, 2004 shows that obligations for non-construction security procurement were about 30% of goal on June 30, 2004, and commitments were around 60%. The figures for construction tasks were far more favorable, but almost totally misleading. They indicated that the \$825 million was obligated as of June 30, 2004, and \$985 million was committed, to meet a goal for 1 July 2004 of only \$749 million. Yet, virtually every report on Iraqi security efforts indicates that facilities remain grossly inadequate.
- The CPA went out of business just as the first battalion of the Iraq National Task Force division began to deploy to Baghdad, and having seen the new Iraqi government override its plans to leave the Iraq Civil Defense Corps as a largely passive defense force and having the new Iraqi Prime Minister convert it to a National Guard. The Iraqi police are just beginning to acquire serious

counterinsurgency capability in the form of nine public order battalions and two counterinsurgency battalions as part of an Iraqi Police Service (IPS) civil intervention force.

- As of 18 June 2004, US reporting showed a net average increase in the number of significant insurgent attacks using improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and improvised rockets over the period since September 2003.
- As of 26 June 2004, the US reporting summarized in the final CPA status report showed a net average increase in the number of significant insurgent attacks using improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and improvised rockets over the period since September 2003. They were averaging over 40 per day and the total number of incidents of all kinds was far higher. The US had reported the capture or killing of many Iraqi foreign and domestic insurgents, but no decline in the total number of active insurgent since its first meaningful estimates in July 2003. It could not characterize the leadership or membership of either domestic or foreign insurgent groups with any precision, or the level of actual Al Qaida central influence and control.

As a result, it will be late 2004 at the earliest before the new Iraqi government can take on its share of the counterinsurgency mission, and Iraqis have seen US and British forces as hostile occupiers, rather than partners, in every public opinion poll conducted since September.

The Militia and Disarmament Issues

There is also far more talk about disarming Iraqi civilians than substance. The militias also continue to be a problem, and talk about disarming them is likely to prove to be no more than an administrative fiction, given the vast number of light arms disbursed among Iraq's population. In early June 2004, the CPA reached agreement with nine parties to disband their militias. This agreement covered about 100,000 former resistance fighters, and the CPA estimated that about 90% of these individuals would complete the transition and reintegration process by January 2005, and that all would complete the process by October 2005.

The CPA also estimated that about 60% of these militia members would transition into Iraqi security services—such as the Iraqi Armed Forces, Iraqi Police Service, or the Internal Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The CPA went out of business without agreement on many elements of the broader transition and reintegration process.

No agreement was reached on which entity—whether Iraqi security forces or the multinational force—was responsible for taking action against illegal militias, and many of the programs that were supposed to provide services for militia members participating in the program were not operational. It was also not clear that key militias like the Kurdish militias and Badr forces would really be disbanded, as distinguished from being

renamed, or that smaller militias would not simply reemerge as personal protection forces.

It is also clear that Sadr is now rebuilding his militia in Najaf and possibly in Sadr City.

The HUMINT Problem

Furthermore, the US has tried to carry out the impossible mission of developing effective human intelligence (HUMINT) on its own, rather than in full partnership with the Iraqis. One of the critical lessons of Vietnam was ignored. Rather than see the need for effective Iraqi intelligence collection and analysis -- and to rely on Iraqis for the lack of area and language skills and understanding of local political and tactical conditions -- the US tried to create a network of informers and local contacts and carry out analysis on its own. The US simply does not have the capability in terms of expertise and access to suddenly improvise a largely autonomous HUMINT effort as a substitute for partnership with an intelligence organization run by local allies.

Progress Could Be Real if Adequate Aid Were (Had Been) Provided

Serious training in urban warfare, and efforts to provide proper equipment— including reconnaissance assets and other special equipment— seems to be currently underway. For example, the CPA reported as it went out of business that it had decided to give the new Iraqi air force two Seeker reconnaissance aircraft to conduct surveillance of the borders and oil facilities and was rushing procurement of 14 more.

There also is enough progress to show how productive the aid effort could still be if it was rushed forward, and the US treated the Iraqis as partners in reality and not simply in name:

- Iraqi government announced a new law allowing it to impose emergency security measures to combat terrorism
- The initial battalion of the Iraq Intervention Force (IIF) deployed into Baghdad at the end of Jun
 - The IIF is being established, trained and equipped for urban counterinsurgency operations
 - All three battalions of the first IIF brigade will be ready by end of July.
- At the end of June, 41 of 45 battalions of the Iraqi National Guard (formerly the Iraqi Civil Defense Corp) were manned above 75 percent strength
 - Currently conducting joint patrols throughout Iraq with Coalition and Iraqi Police forces
 - Focus on equipping, training, and reconstituting the force
- Efforts are underway to recruit six additional 400-man public order battalions as part of the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force

- With these additions, the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force will total nine public order battalions and two counterinsurgency battalions
- A total of 5,502 new IPS recruits have completed the eight week training course
 - Five classes, or over 3,411 students, have graduated from the Jordan Academy
 - Four classes, or 2,091 students, have graduated from the Baghdad Public Safety Academy
- Approximately 25,000 IPS personnel who served as police under the former regime have completed a three-week Transitional and Integration Program taught by Coalition
- IPS officers are also being taught basic criminal investigation, criminal intelligence, and dignitary protection by Coalition advisors

Unfortunately, the reporting issued by the Department of Defense confirms the fact that the actual flow of US aid to the Iraqi security effort remains slow and inadequate. As of July 13, the US had only actually spent \$220 million out of the \$2,976 million apportioned under the FY2004 aid program of \$18.4 billion.

Manpower and Training Status

The CPA never standardized its public reporting on the status of Iraqi training, although the data always implied a much higher level of training than actually took place. The training data on the Iraqi security forces were also altered in ways that disguises the level of training in most services in the in CPA reporting issued from April 2004 onwards, by implying that training under the Ba'ath regime, or limited on the job training under the Transition Integration Program (TIP) was adequate.

Training Status Under the CPA

The penultimate status report the CPA issued before its disbandment shows, however, that only 5,857 out of 88,039 Iraqi police had serious academy training, as of 25 June 2004, although another 2,387 were in the training pipeline. The final CPA report issued on 6 July 2004 did not provide the summary training data in previously reports, but did indicate that a total of 3,411 students had graduated from the Jordanian Academy and 1,674 students had graduated from the Baghdad Public Safety Academy. Even these students had courses lasting less than a fifth as long as similar training in the US and Europe. The figures for the Department of Border enforcement showed that 255 had postwar academy training out of a total of 18,248, plus 25 in training.

The CPA went out of business before it provided figures for trained manpower in the new National Guard, but its final reports stated that 2,362 out of 39,128 men were "in training." The same was true of its final report on the status of the Iraqi Army. A total of 10,222 men were said to be in service, of which 2,316 were "in training." The data for the Facilities Protection Service showed an active strength of 74,069. Once again, no data were provided on what portions were regarded as trained and only 77 were reported to be "in training."

Most of the training was little more than at the token level, and a GAO investigation describes the end result as follows:

"State/INL provided the commanders with a temporary curriculum, the Transition Integration Program. The full curriculum is 108 hours long and provides basic police training in such subjects as basic human rights, firearms familiarization, patrol procedures, and search methods. According to a State Department official, the various major subordinate commanders had wide latitude in terms of training police and did not uniformly adopt the Transition Integration Program. They were free to establish their own curriculum and requirements for police, which varied in depth and scope. Training could last between 3 days and 3 weeks. According to a State/INL official, some commanders required trainees to undergo class and field training, while other commanders only required officers to wear a uniform. According to a multinational force interim assessment from May 2004, the Iraq Civil Defense Corps also lacked proper training. It stated that investment into training the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units varied among the multinational divisions and that the units in the western and center south major subordinate commands in particular were the least prepared for combat. Furthermore, the training was not sufficient for high-intensity tasks. One CPA official agreed with this, stating that the training for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps did not prepare it to fight against well-armed insurgents with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades, for example. The assessment also noted that the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units contained too many inexperienced officers and soldiers."

Please note that the new figures for “trained” manpower in the table shown below differ sharply from those issued under the CPA. They now count both manpower fully trained in academies or with full military training, and manpower in the rushed programs that can be a matter of days or a few weeks as being the same. ***The end result is a far less honest reporting system that grossly exaggerates the actual level of training.***

Previous reporting by the CPA shows that the totals for trained manpower are particularly absurd for the Iraqi National Guard, where most men shown as “trained” are actually figures for the token training program conducted for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps – when the force had a different name, role and mission. Today, the total training program for most new recruits to the National Guard lasts all of two weeks, and the first week is largely orientation.

The New Post- CPA Training Data

The new figures for trained manpower also overstate the training levels for the police and for the border service (DBE), and ignore the fact that the facilities protection service-training program is virtually no training at all.

There is nothing unique about this tendency to issue exaggerated statistics by omitting meaningful categories and definitions, and using meaningless measures of success. From the start, the CPA was a model of obfuscation, omission, and false imagery in very aspect of its public status reports. For example, the more comprehensive training data on the Iraqi security forces issued by the CPA were deliberately confused by implying that training under the Ba’ath regime, or limited on the job training was adequate.

- In reality, as of 25 June 2004, only 5,857 out of 88,039 Iraqi police had serious academy training, although another 2,387 were in the training pipeline. No figures were made available for how many could be said to have the necessary equipment, transportation, communications, and facilities. The figures for the Department of Border enforcement showed that 255 had postwar academy training out of a total of 18,248, plus 25 in training.
- No figures were provided for trained manpower in the new National Guard, although 2,362 out of 39,128 were said to be “in training”. The same was true for the Iraqi Army. A total of 10,222 men were said to be in service, of which 2,316 were “in training.” The data for the Facilities Protection Service showed an active strength of 74,069. Once again, no data were provided on what portion was regarded as trained and only 77 were reported to be “in training.”
- Training in urban warfare, providing reconnaissance assets and other special equipment, is only beginning, and the few meaningful details have been made public are not reassuring. For example, the CPA reported as it went out of business that it had decided to give the new Iraqi air force two Seeker reconnaissance aircraft to conduct surveillance of the borders and oil facilities and was rushing procurement of 14 more.

The fact the status reports do even more to disguise the level of true progress is simply unacceptable. No single mission is more important than security, and no Iraqi popular desire is clearer than that this mission be done by Iraqis. The US has been guilty of a gross military, administrative, and moral failure. It seems to be finally taking steps to correct these mistakes, but its past history shows that detailed progress reporting is essential, and that the US military has been reluctant at best to come to grips with the need for an effective effort.

Service	<u>Manning</u>		<u>Training</u>		
	Required	Actual	Untrained	In Training	Trained
Regular Military Forces					
Army					
Conventional	27,000	7,909	0	6,073	1,836
National Guard	41,088	37,371	0	2,193	35,178
Iraqi Intervention Force					
Iraqi Special Ops Forces	6,584	2,741	0	1,361	1,380
Iraqi Special Ops Forces	1,592	569	0	54	515
Air Force	502	146	0	30	116
Coastal Defense Force	409	307	0	120	187
Total	77,175	49,043	0	9,831	39,212
Security Forces and Police					
Police					
Conventional & HQ	89,369	88,352	55,252	2,402	29,688
Civil Intervention Force					
Emergency Response Unit	4,800	0	0	0	0
Unit	270	51	0	40	11
DBE	20,420	18,248	0	25	18,233
Facilities Protection Service	73,992	73,992	0	0	73,992
Total	188,851	180,643	55,262	3,467	121,914

Equipment Holdings

From the start, the Department of Defense and CPA failed to provide any meaningful metric of actual progress in terms of successful aid efforts as perceived by the Iraqis, as distinguish from money spent, buildings contracted for, peak power generation capacity, etc. One of the most glaring failures was the failure to provide any data progress in equipping the Iraqi security forces and giving them proper facilities – a failure matched by what may well be the most incompetent and unforgivable level of success in the US aid effort.

The CPA's public status reports never reported on how many of Iraq's military and security services could be said to have the necessary equipment, transportation, communications, and facilities. However, it was clear from the start that equipment and facilities continued to be a critical problem.

Equipment Status Under the CPA

A GAO study did find, however, that data from the CPA's Provost Marshall's Office showed that the Iraqi Police Service was operating with 41% of its required patrol vehicles, 63% of its required uniforms, 43% of its required pistols, 21% of its required hand radios, 7% of its required vehicle radios, and 9% of its required protective vests as late as 28 March 2004. It also found that equipment provisioning for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps was months behind schedule. According to a CPA official, no Iraqi Civil Defense Corps units possessed body armor, and many were using Saddam-era helmets for protection.

According to a multinational force-planning document, as of 23 April 2004, units were still awaiting the delivery of uniforms, helmets, body armor, vehicles, radios, AK-47 rifles, RPK machine guns, ammunition, and night vision equipment while a CPA official claimed that most, if not all, of this equipment was currently flowing into the region. A multinational force assessment noted that Iraqis within the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps felt the multinational force never took them seriously, as exhibited by what they perceived as the broken promises and the lack of trust of the multinational force. This was true although none of these forces were then planned to be trained or equipped for offensive and active counterinsurgency missions.

This may help explain why the Department of Defense reported the following desertion and manning problems in the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Desertion from 2 April to 16 April: Northeastern Iraq, including the cities of Baqubah and Tikrit - about 9,100 to about 6,100, or 30%; Baghdad and surrounding area-about 6,200 to about 3,200, or 49%; Central-southern Iraq, including Karbala, An Najaf, and Al Kut - about 3,500 to about 2,500, or 30%; Multinational Division-Center South Western Iraq, including Fallujah - about 5,600 to about 1,000, or 82%.

The New Post-CPA Equipment Effort

Unit	1,020	500	58	0	352	0	300	50
DBE		17,153	4,417	3,700	1,298	3,552	1,292	12,626
4,000								
Facilities Protection Service	73,992	49,500	7,396	155	45	1,155	0	8,350
Total	215,217	94,716	19,8109	6,671	60,364	14,016	115,445	32,366

No single mission is more important than security, and no Iraqi popular desire is clearer than that this mission be done by Iraqis. The US has been guilty of a gross military, administrative, and moral failure. It seems to be finally taking steps to correct these mistakes, but its past history shows that detailed progress reporting is essential, and that the US military has been reluctant at best to come to grips with the need for an effective effort.