Russian Perspectives On Terrorism

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Russian Perspectives on Terrorism

The Russian leadership is of the view that the threat of terrorism is growing in Russian society, and fighting terrorism within the Russian Federation has become a much higher priority. In 1997, the then director of the Federal Security Service, Nikolay Kovalev, stated that Russia faced three main types of terrorism: social, which aims at political and economic changes; nationalist and ethno-separatist; and religious. However, in practice, the Russian leadership’s struggle against terrorism within the Russian Federation has concentrated on Chechen terrorism, which it sees as a mixture of all three types. The actions have not been exclusively concentrated on Chechnya and other parts of southern Russia, but this region has understandably been the main focus.

Terrorism as a crime was first introduced into the Russian Federation Criminal Code in 1994. In that year in Russia, 18 cases of terrorism were registered. This increased to 327 in 2001, and to 402 in 2002. In November 2002, Vladimir Putin described the struggle against terrorism as a struggle for the preservation of Russian statehood. Terrorism in the Russian Federation has become more visible since 2002, most notably with the Nord-Ost theatre siege in Moscow in October that year, the suicide bombings at a rock concert on Moscow’s outskirts in Tushino in June 2003 and near the Duma building in Moscow in December 2003. In addition suicide bombers destroyed a train in Stavropol kray in December 2003 and the main military hospital in Mozdok in Chechnya in August 2003.

The 1998 Law on Terrorism

Whilst it is accurate to regard the autumn of 1999 as the time when Moscow began to emphasise strongly the threat posed by terrorism both to international security in general, and to Russia’s national security (this was the start of the major 'counter-terrorist' operation in Chechnya), the Russian state had begun to make moves to enhance its capabilities to fight terrorism even before then. In July 1998, Russia’s first law on fighting terrorism came into force. Article Three provided a legal definition of terrorism, and outlined the main forms of terrorist activity; these are reproduced in Appendix 1 of this paper. The law also outlined the main methods by which the state could fight against terrorism.

The government was logically defined as the main agency to protect the individual, society and the state against terrorism. The main government bodies participating in this struggle were listed as: the Federal Security Service (FSB); the Interior Ministry (MVD); the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); The Federal Guard Service; the Ministry of Defence; and the Federal Border Service.

The law went on to outline the legal basis for conducting specific counter-terrorist operations, stating in Article Ten that the government would in such cases set up an operational headquarters, headed either by a representative of the FSB or MVD, depending on which organisation was best suited to head that specific operation.

Article Six of the 1998 law stated that a Federal Anti-terrorist Commission would be set up to coordinate the government’s work. The commission’s task was to work out the fundamentals of state policy in this area, and implement the gathering and analysis of information pertaining to terrorist organisations and activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. The commission was further tasked to
coordinate the actions of all federal bodies of executive power engaging in the fight against terrorism. It would also participate in the preparation of international treaties negotiated by the Russian Federation in the field of countering terrorism, and work out suggestions for improving anti-terrorist legislation.

In November 1998, the federal government issued a resolution (postanovlenie) outlining the formation of the Federal Anti-Terrorist Commission. The Commission replaced the inter-departmental anti-terrorist commission which was set up in May 1997. The new Commission was to rely on the FSB for the gathering and analysis of information. The new Commission held its first meeting in February 1999. It was at that time headed by first deputy prime minister Vadim Gustov. In June 1999, the then prime minister Sergey Stepashin took over as head of the commission. Since then, this body has always been headed by the prime minister, with the head of the FSB and the interior minister as deputy chairman.

In August 1999, President Yel'tsin issued a decree reorganising the FSB. A single department for protecting the constitutional structure and combating terrorism was formed from the department for combating terrorism and the department of constitutional security. In December 1999 the Duma voted to amend the law on the FSB, enhancing its powers to fight terrorism. In the summer of 1999, the FSB and MVD had launched Operation Whirlwind, an anti-terrorist operation throughout the Russian Federation. This operation has been continuing ever since then.

Chechnya - Its Foreign Policy Significance

The Russian military operation in Chechnya that began in autumn 1999 was officially described by the Russian leadership as a counter-terrorist operation. The operation was launched in response to the incursion of Chechen fighters into Dagestan and the apartment bombings that summer. The federal leadership increasingly justified the military operation in Chechnya as part of the struggle against “international terrorism.” In December 1999, President Yel'tsin depicted Russian military action in Chechnya in these terms.

Our country is waging a difficult battle against international terrorism, which has blatantly thrown down the gauntlet before us. This is a fight for the life of the people of Russia, many of whom we lost in Moscow and Dagestan, in Volgodonsk and Buynaksk. This is a fight for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. It is also part of the international community’s effort against international terrorism. I am sure that those in the West who for some reason have still not understood this will be convinced that we are in the right. International terrorism has no borders. It now has the whole world in its sights.

In the same month, foreign minister Igor Ivanov echoed Yel'tsin's sentiments, stating that Chechnya was the front line against international terrorism. Vladimir Putin took the same line when he became president in 2000, commenting in an interview in Paris Match in July 2000 that:

Today we are the witnesses of the creation of an extremist international in the so-called arc of instability beginning in the Philippines and ending in Kosovo. This is in the first instant very dangerous for Europe, as it has a large Moslem population. People who adhere to Islam as a religion to
achieve provocative and terrorist goals compromise Islam. Islam is a religion of peaceable and orderly people. What does the problem consist of? You indeed know that one of the extremist organisations, which is headed by the notorious terrorist no.1 in the world Osman bin Laden, is the International Islamic Front, which, in my opinion, puts as its task the creation of an Islamic khaliphate, a United States of Islam, in which should enter a number of Islamic states, and some Central Asian states and part of the contemporary territory of the Russian Federation. Such are their fascist plans. I call them fascist, as they call for the creation of a united front against the Jews and "crusaders" as they call us. This is indeed a terrorist international. And in this sense Russia stands at the forefront of the struggle against this international terrorism. And Europe should get on its knees and show a large amount of gratitude for the fact that we struggle against it, so far, unfortunately, on our own.

In January 2000, foreign minister Igor Ivanov spoke at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg, and defended the military operation in Chechnya on the grounds that “Russia is essentially protecting the borders of all Europe from a barbaric invasion of international terrorism.”

In 2000, three important documents were released by the Putin leadership on Russian foreign and security policy. These were: the National Security Concept (January 2000); the Military Doctrine (April 2000); the Foreign Policy Concept (June 2000). All three documents emphasised that Moscow saw international terrorism as a major threat. The Foreign Policy Concept saw “the struggle against international terrorism as a most important task, as terrorism could destabilise not just entire countries, but entire regions”. The Military Doctrine saw terrorism as one of the main external and internal threats to the security of the Russian Federation. The National Security Concept stated that “the most important constituent national interests of Russia are the defence of the individual, society and the state from terrorism, including international terrorism”. It also stated that “terrorism is a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. International terrorism has unleashed an open campaign to destabilise the situation in Russia.”

In November 2000, the then defence minister, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, stated that the main threats to Russia’s security were “religious extremism, separatism and international terrorism.” At a round table discussion of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 2000, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov warned that on

the threshold of the third millennium terrorism has become one of the most dangerous global challenges. Not a single state can afford to ignore this problem. Russia gives high priority to international cooperation in the struggle with this evil. We can’t seriously hope to solve it with our own resources only, in conditions when the “terrorist international” has become a real threat to the normal development of international relations and to the security of countries and regions. Our stand, repeatedly set out in the speeches and statements of the leaders of the country, is that there is the need for coordinated actions of the entire world community at global, regional and national levels.

He expressed similar sentiments at a conference in St Petersburg in April 2001, which called for improving the international-legal framework for countering
international terrorism. He argued that the international community had not been able to work out adequate methods of countering terrorism partly because the formation of a new post-Cold War international order had not been completed.

**Recent Structural Realignments**

Just as western states moved to tighten up their homeland security arrangements after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon by Al-Qa'idah in September 2001, so also did Moscow. Two days after the atrocity, President Vladimir Putin and Justice Minister Yuriy Chayka discussed improving Russian legislation in accordance with the European convention on halting terrorism and the UN convention on preventing the financing of terrorist activities. On 24 September Chayka called for the immediate approval of amendments to national legislation to strengthen the legal base of the fight against terrorism. The Justice Ministry drafted a related law and submitted it to the Duma.

The law on extremism was signed into law by Putin in July 2002, and the law on fighting terrorism was amended in November 2002. The amendments mainly restrict media freedom in reporting terrorist incidents, and have been criticised as a threat to press freedom.

In November 2001 President Putin had said that the MVD’s most important task was fighting terrorism, and later that month an anti-terrorist unit was created in the MVD, which gave rise to fears of a possible confusion of roles with the FSB’s department for fighting terrorism. After the Nord-Ost theatre siege in Moscow in October 2002, Secretary of the Security Council Vladimir Rushaylo argued that the approach of law-enforcement bodies and secret services in combating terrorism needed to be reviewed. He said that these agencies should put more emphasis on taking preventive measures at the stage when terrorist acts were being planned. At this time, Putin instructed several ministries and departments to prepare a new national security concept which would outline plans for using the Russian armed forces in anti-terrorist operations within the Russian Federation. Some of the subsequent discussion is outlined below. The suicide bombing in Tushino in July 2003 created further pressure on the federal leadership to tighten up its anti-terrorist legislation. The suicide bombing near the Duma building in Moscow in December 2003 intensified this pressure.

In January 2003, the *Itogi* website published a detailed report on alleged plans to create a special anti-terrorist force within the MVD, as part of the planned reform of the MVD Internal Troops. *Itogi* claimed that the deputy minister of internal affairs Rashid Nurgaliyev had drafted plans to merge MVD OMON units with Special Rapid Reaction Detachments (SOBR), Special Purpose Militia Detachments (OMSN) and Special Militia Detachments (SOM) into a joint structure called the Special Operations Forces (SOF). The *Itogi* article stated that:

> The Special Operations Forces are to become the most combat-capable part of the future federal guard into which it is proposed to reform the current Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops. Aside from three full-blooded operational-purpose divisions (Moscow, Rostov-na-Donu and Novocherkassk) and the 46th Brigade permanently deployed in Chechnya, the Internal Troops will acquire another six special-purpose detachments numbering 3,500 “mottled berets” in the next few months. The plan is that the Internal Troops and accordingly the Russian Special Operations Forces
will be supplemented by a 10,000-strong detachment of special-purpose troops by 2004. This antiterrorist army is to be re-equipped with the newest models of firearms and combat equipment from 2005.

The article also suggested that the Defence Council would be re-created to control the SOF and the military formations of other security structures, and that defence minister Sergey Ivanov would probably head the defence council.

At a widened meeting of the MVD collegium in February 2003, which Putin attended, plans for reforming the MVD internal forces and creating special forces were approved. In August 2003 the six special forces detachments mentioned in the Itogi article were created and added to the ten already existing special forces detachments. Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov said that this was part of the plan for reforming the MVD by 2005. In addition to the formation of these six detachments, Gryzlov said that the MVD reform programme envisaged the creation of SOF consisting of MVD special forces along with a range of operational-tactical units. The SOF would be a mobile component at permanent readiness and the basic rapid reaction force to deal with internal threats to the state. There was however no mention of any plan to re-create the Defence Council.

Also in August 2003, a new anti-terrorist centre was created within the MVD, named the T Centre, headed by Yury Demidov. The T Centre was created on the basis of the Third Operational Investigation Bureau of the Main Administration for Combating Organised Crime (GUBOP). It cooperates closely with the anti-terrorist department within the FSB. Demidov described its main role as the “prevention, detection and discovery of crimes of a terrorist nature committed for material gain, and also, within the limits of our competence, the fight against extremism and abduction of people”. He said that the T Centre is primarily an operational-investigation unit, and that T centres will also be created inside MVD main administrations in federal districts; and that corresponding subdivisions in the MVD’s main and regional administrations will be strengthened.

**Problems with the Legal Base & Functional Demarcation**

In June 2002 the Russian Procurator-General Vladimir Ustinov argued that the existing legislation was imperfect, as it failed to provide adequate definitions of what constituted terrorist crimes, and what constituted a terrorist organisation. He was critical of many aspects of the 1998 law on fighting terrorism. He believed that Russian law defined terrorism too narrowly, which made it difficult to develop an effective national counter-terrorist policy. He was also critical of the sections in the 1998 law that dealt with the carrying out of counter-terrorist operations. He contended that the law treated counter-terrorist operations insufficiently broadly, arguing that the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya included various measures that were not regulated by the 1998 law. Moreover, these measures, such as cleansing operations (zachistka) and the establishment of filtration camps (filtratsiya) directly affected the constitutional rights of Russian citizens and media freedom. Ustinov thus argued that the use of the term “counter-terrorist operation” in the 1998 law was unjustified if one took into account the proper meaning of the concept “operation”.

Ustinov had in mind that a counter-terrorist operation should not merely aim at the military defeat of terrorist forces, but should comprise a whole aggregate of measures aimed at countering terrorism as a social phenomenon. He advocated
that counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya should not just be regulated by the 1998 law on fighting terrorism, but also by the law on states of emergency, as the operation was not just aimed at fighting terrorists, but also other subjects of anti-constitutional activity in the region, such as illegal armed formations and diversionary groups, including foreign ones. He went on to argue that it would be expedient to name certain specific actions in the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya as special operations.

Ustinov argued that the 1998 law only reflected general legal principles and individual organisational aspects of the struggle against terrorism. Ustinov instead advocated a special anti-terrorist law analogous to the USA’s PATRIOT Act of 2001, or the British Terrorism Act of 2000 which would be broader in scope. Much of his discussion is esoteric, and of little practical relevance. It has to be said that the 1998 law is fairly broad in scope, and it does refer to the need to counteract the socio-political roots of terrorism, and not rely solely on force in tackling this problem.

The call for changes in legislation, however, was taken up by others, particularly as it related to the functions and actions of the armed forces. In Voyennaya Mysl’ in September 2003, S A Bogdanov called for amendments to various laws, including Article 3 of the 1998 law on terrorism. Bogdanov argued that the definition of terrorism should also include the possibility of illegal armed formations carrying out large scale operations which threaten constitutional order and territorial integrity. He also suggested that Article 1 of the law on defence be amended. This law contains a list of “foundations of defence”, to which Bogdanov would add a statement (polozheniya) on the need to implement anti-terrorist activity. This law, he believed, should also precisely define the state organ of power responsible for the preparation of the territory of the country, its economy and armed forces for the defence of the state. This may be an echo of the call made by the Itogi article for the creation of the Defence Council, or part of the General Staff’s idea of widening its jurisdiction over other power structures.

Bogdanov also wrote that the law on the armed forces (which is currently still being drafted) should correct the existing legal deficiencies relating to the use of the armed forces in wars and armed conflicts. In February 2003 it was stated that this law would contain an entire section outlining the role of the armed forces in anti-terrorist actions. Furthermore, Bogdanov was of the opinion that the last 10 years of using the armed forces in combating terrorism and acts of extremists in Russia showed that it was necessary to draft a special law entitled “on the use of the armed forces, other forces and organs of the Russian Federation in internal conflicts”. This law should strengthen important principles (polozheniya) such as the legal utilisation of units of the armed forces and other forces and organs for the removal of internal sources of military threat without the introduction of a state of emergency or martial law. It should also strengthen the right of the President of the Russian Federation to use these forces to both prevent and localise internal armed conflicts. This law should define the powers of federal organs of government in neutralising threats to internal security, and the role of the mass media and public organisations in ensuring the information policy of the state’s anti-terrorist actions. The law should additionally be required to indicate which armed formations can carry out large scale counter-terrorist operations.

Bogdanov noted that there is currently no structure which in the event of an internal armed conflict can immediately take full responsibility for its military resolution. He suggested that the internal forces of the interior ministry could...
become the main component of the federal forces in suppressing internal military threats, provided the necessary legal base were created. He also contended that special principles and charters needed to be worked out for military units used to carry out anti-terrorist operations. At present fundamental regulatory documents (уставные документы) of the armed forces are oriented towards fighting a large scale war. There are no normative documents oriented towards anti-terrorist operations. He argued that the experience of fighting the Chechen conflict revealed a need for such documents, that would outline not just the military, but also administrative, diplomatic and other functions that military units should be able to fulfil. Such normative documents would also define the organisational-personnel structure, the system of training and equipping such units, and their material-technical support.

While Bogdanov was of the opinion that the MVD’s internal troops can play the main role in countering internal military threats former Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov, who is currently chairman of the subcommittee on legislation on combating terrorism and transnational crime of the Duma security committee, argued in January 2003 that the army should play a greater role in combating terrorism. He argued that a new national security doctrine should be developed in place of a military doctrine, as the former is broader in scope. He argued that in every military district there should be a brigade specially organised to carry out counter-terrorist operations. There should be training for the leaders of power structures and civilian personnel in the governing structures at both federal and regional levels to deal with emergency situations. He also pointed to the necessity to create in military academies departments of tactics and operational use of forces in special operations.

Kulikov suggested that a special database on terrorism be created in the General Staff of the Armed Forces to be used by all relevant power structures in combating terrorism. He also suggested that the General Staff become the basic organ of administration over all power structures. He underlined that he was not contemplating a change in the basic functions of the armed forces, but rather an addition to these functions.

The Russian leadership has also been thinking about enhancing the role of the armed forces in anti-terrorist operations. In January 2003 Defence minister Sergey Ivanov said that existing laws would not need to be drastically amended to pave the way for the use of the Russian Armed Forces in anti-terrorist operations.

The Armed Forces are functioning in line with a clearly defined legal field that envisions the possible involvement of military units in the eradication of illegal armed formations ... there is no need to review the basis of the armed forces’ functions ... certain details in plans for using the army will be hammered out. The key document on Russia’s security, namely the national security concept, will have to be changed.

He went on to say that constitutional laws on the military and states of emergency might be revised. However Ivanov also warned that it was too “early to speak about specific changes in Russia’s defence priorities and the armed forces’ objectives in light of the threat of international terrorism”, saying that “these issues will have to be thoroughly reviewed by both the executive and legislative branches”.

8
The War on Terrorism: International Aspects

Since September 2001, the USA has been engaged in the War on Terrorism (WOT), which has become a leitmotif of US foreign policy, and to a lesser extent of the foreign policies of other western powers. The WOT has also become a significant feature of internal security policies. However, September 2001 was not really a watershed for the Russian Federation. Moscow had placed strong emphasis on the struggle against “international terrorism” (for which one should read Islamic-inspired terrorism) since at least 1999. Indeed concern about the Taleban regime in Afghanistan predated 1999, and in September 1998, the Russian foreign minister and US Secretary of State at the United Nations General Assembly issued a joint statement condemning terrorism.

Although the events of 9/11 were not as significant for Russian security policy thinking on the problem of terrorism as they were for US and West European policy, they nonetheless had a strong impact on the Russian Federation’s approach in tackling this problem both within Russia and abroad. The Russian leadership was quick to link 9/11 to its own experiences in fighting terrorism, tactfully telling Washington “we told you so”. For example, Putin said on 11 September 2001 that

... what has happened today, once again confirms the topicality of Russia’s proposals to unite the efforts of the international community in the struggle against terror, this monster of the 21st century. Russia knows by experience what such terror is. And therefore we better than all understand the feelings of the American people ...

On 18 September 2001, in an interview with the German newspaper Bild, Putin recalled how he had discussed with the Clinton Administration the threat posed by Osama bin Laden.

I spoke with the former American administration and referred them to the problem of bin Laden. Their reaction surprised me. They helplessly raised their arms and said, “but what can we do? The Talibam will not give him up.” I remember that I was surprised: if they will not give him up, it is necessary to think and do something.

The events of September 2001 were a boon to Moscow, as they vindicated her view of terrorism as a major threat to international security. Igor Ivanov said at the United Nations in September 2001 that:

The whole of the US president’s speech was devoted to combating international terrorism. There is no need to persuade Russia of the need for this. As you know, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was the first of the big world leaders to warn of the looming threat posed by international terrorism and to declare the need to unite international efforts in the fight against this evil of the 21st century. And the fact that today the international community shares this approach by Russia is of fundamental importance. This opportunity must not be allowed to pass us by now. The international community should close ranks in the fight against international terrorism. And I mean everywhere. There should be no double standards. Terrorism should be prevented wherever it emerges and wherever it causes suffering for peaceful citizens.
It also made it easier to justify the military operation in Chechnya to the West, which had often been critical of Russian policy there. Defence minister Sergey Ivanov linked 9/11 directly with Chechnya in September 2001:

*We think that all these are links in a chain. We think that all these are the fruits from one tree, if I am allowed to use the analogy. We think that the rebels were mainly trying to divert our attention from playing an active role in the international fight against terrorism.*

At the same time, Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov claimed to have evidence of a direct link between Chechen terrorists and Osama bin Laden. In October 2001, Presidential aide Sergey Yastrzhembskiy said that the Russian authorities had evidence that four of the suicide pilots who flew the aircraft in the 9/11 attacks took part in combat operations in Chechnya.

After 9/11, fighting international terrorism became one of the central goals of US foreign policy; this dovetailed neatly with Russian foreign policy and gave Russia the opportunity to develop a much closer security relationship with the USA and other western powers. It was at this time that US Ambassador to Russia Alexander Vershbow spoke of the possibility of Russia and the USA becoming allies. He also acknowledged that anti-Moscow Chechen forces were receiving assistance from abroad, so echoing Moscow’s line on the conflict. In October 2001, deputy foreign minister Yevgenny Gusarov attended a European Union (EU) conference in Ghent, where he said that as one of the first states to combat foreign-sponsored terrorism, the Russian Federation considered itself justified in regarding the military operations in Afghanistan as "a continuation of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya."

Fighting terrorism gave Russian foreign policy new opportunities for cooperating with the West, particularly in areas such as intelligence sharing. There was also discussion about coordinating anti-terrorist legislation with other states and cooperation in combating international flows of financial support for terrorism. In October 2002, Russia was removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) list of Non-Cooperating Countries and Territories, in part due to the establishment of a Russian financial intelligence unit, the Financial Monitoring Committee. A functioning financial intelligence unit is central to Russia’s ability to cooperate internationally to combat money laundering, to its participation in the Egmont Group and FATF, and to track and freeze terrorist assets.

The Russian leadership saw its participation in the WOT as an opportunity to reshape its relationship with the West after the nadir of 1999, when NATO disregarded Russian considerations and intervened militarily in Yugoslavia to resolve the Kosovo conflict. This had relegated Russia to being very much a junior partner of the USA and NATO, and a possible irrelevance to the West in determining post-Cold War security arrangements. The USA’s firm embrace of the WOT gave Russia the opportunity to become a more relevant security partner of the USA, and to argue for a new global security system. Putin stated in an interview with German TV channel ARD just a few days after 9/11:

*Terrorism and religious extremism of various denominations today pose the main threat to peace. We are prepared to cooperate with the United States in fighting terrorism in the broadest meaning of this. We have not received yet specific requests to this effect. As for the special services, they have been cooperating for a long time. At issue now is raising this cooperation.*
Bilateral cooperation with the USA in fighting terrorism was stepped up. In February 2002, Vershbow stated that 'Russia was and will remain our most important partner in the anti-terrorist coalition. The fight will last many years. Therefore, we want to cooperate more closely with Russia.' In May 2002, three major developments in Russo-US anti-terrorist cooperation took place:

- The Russian and US governments decided to set up a joint working group to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear substances in order to prevent them from creating a 'dirty bomb'.

- The first session of the Russian-US working group on cooperation in the fight against transnational crime took place in Moscow. The working group was set up in line with an agreement reached between Interior Minister Boris Gryzlov and FBI Director Robert Mueller.

- At the Bush-Putin summit a statement on Russo-US cooperation in the fight against international terrorism was issued. This statement envisaged the transformation of the US-Russian working group on Afghanistan into a working group on the fight against terrorism, dealing with issues relating to the prevention of use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

In July 2002, Ambassador Vershbow acknowledged that Al-Qa'idah was aiding terrorists in Chechnya; a statement that would have been welcomed by the Russian leadership as a major endorsement of their stance in Chechnya.

Much Russian discussion of international terrorism after September 2001 focused on the problems caused by the USA's pre-eminent role in the WOT. In January 2002, Nodari Simoniya and Vladimir Baranovskiy warned that the USA could use the anti-terrorist struggle for geopolitical ends:

... new conceptual and practical foreign political approaches and a new military-political doctrine clothed like an anti-terrorist strategy. In the process of its application the anti-terrorist struggle may become subordinate to much broader aims.

Today we can already detect the desire of the US to address the tasks the solution of which may prove advantageous or indispensable in future. In fact, even within a more moderate trend one can expect pragmatic approaches to reach the aims set by the traditional geopolitical motives: broader influence in the Middle East, presence in Central Asia, penetration into the Caspian region, creation of a foothold against India and China, etc.

In a round table discussion on the WOT Aleksey Pushkov, Konstantin Zatulin and Aleksey Migranyan warned that Russia's cooperation with the USA was unlikely to result in any dilution of US hegemony in the international system and the development of a more equitable Russo-US relationship.
Boris Pyadishev, argued that 9/11 was to a certain extent used by the Bush Administration to assert the USA’s dominance over the international system. Aleksey Arbatov noted in March 2002 that the USA’s quick victory in Afghanistan had resulted in the US moving away from the cooperative relationship it had with Russia immediately after 9/11. Dmitry Trenin argued that Russia would have to accept an unequal partnership with the USA in view of the power disparity between the two nations. He went on to say that an unequal partnership was not necessarily one that is devoid of benefit to the junior partner.

However, it is because of the power disparity that the Russian Federation continues to argue for a global anti-terrorist system based on the UN. Washington’s determination to prosecute vigorously the war on terror raised the danger that US security policy would be more, rather than less, unilateralist and that the international system would become more unipolar, to the detriment of the United Nations. In February 2002, defence minister Sergey Ivanov warned that strikes could only be launched on countries which supported terrorism if there was irrefutable evidence and UN Security Council authorisation. Later in February, when a US Congressional delegation visited Moscow to thank Putin for the support Russia rendered to the USA after the the 9/11 attacks, Security Council secretary Vladimir Rushaylo commented that the anti-terror campaign should not be identified with the solution of geopolitical tasks. This was a coded warning to the USA that it should not use the WOT to build spheres of influence throughout the world, particularly in sensitive and important regions such as the Middle East.

Deputy foreign minister Anatoly Safonov argued in April 2003 that the current international system was characterised by a contradiction between globalisation and international terrorism. The development of a more open global economy makes it easier for terrorist groups to operate across national borders and potentially to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore the negative side effects of globalisation often create the conditions in which terrorism can flourish. The inchoate nature of terrorist organisations such as Al-Qa’idah makes them a difficult target to oppose and complicates the task of developing an anti-terrorist strategy. It is for these reasons that Safonov advocates a UN led anti-terrorist system. He outlined it as follows:

The global anti-terrorist system should rest on a firm foundation of international law and the UN coordinating activities with due account for the Security Council’s powers and responsibilities in the sphere of global peace and security.

There are many factors behind the UN key role in the anti-terrorist struggle: its position and its prestige, its vast experience in many spheres including anti-terrorist struggle. In fact, it is only the UN system of common political will and unified approaches to the problem of all countries of the world that can add efficiency to international anti-terrorist efforts.

It seems that the fight against terrorism will call for correcting or revising many concepts of international law. Here I have in mind such concepts as “war”, “aggression”, “the right of states to justifiable defence”, and, of course, “terrorism”. On the one hand, we should avoid hasty changes in the fundamental concepts; on the other, they need to be developed.
The concept of terrorism within the drafted UN convention on fighting terrorism should be defined. What is also needed is one more fundamental convention on preventing acts of nuclear terrorism.

Success of international anti-terrorist cooperation depends to a great extent on continued unity of the anti-terrorist coalition. It was formed on an informal basis; it is a fluid structure and this is its advantage and shortcoming. Here is an example. There is a rule with the miners to strengthen, as they move forward under the earth, each stretch of the tunnel to prevent its collapse. The anti-terrorist coalition has covered a long stretch of the road - time has come to look back, to access achievements and to formally register them. This will allow it to avoid a split, to protect its basic principles against distortions, and to rule out labelling of sovereign states and the extension of anti-terrorist operation outside the UN mandate.

First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov sees UN Security Council Resolution 1269 passed in October 1999 as the strategic basis for the UN’s anti-terrorist activity, claiming that this resolution was passed as a result of Russian initiative. The UN is also discussing a Russian draft of a Convention on fighting acts of nuclear terrorism. Russia also supports the Indian draft of an all embracing convention on fighting international terrorism. Russia is party to all twelve international conventions on fighting terrorism. Trubnikov would ideally like to see the emergence of a common anti-terrorist front of states operating under the UN umbrella, but considers it premature to speak of such a coalition. He also notes that the international community has not so far been able to agree on a common definition of terrorism, which obviously hinders the development of an international legal basis for fighting it. Since the events of 9/11, the UN Security Council has passed Resolutions 1368, 1373, 1377 (2001), 1438, 1440, 1450, 1452 (2002), 1455, 1465, 1516 (2003) which are all concerned with various aspects of the struggle against international terrorism. Russia has fully supported these resolutions, seeing them as part of the process of creating a UN led anti-terrorist system. In September 2003, at a conference in New York, Igor Ivanov praised the formation of the anti-terrorist coalition with Russia’s active participation, and re-emphasised the need to create a UN led global security system, capable of responding to the new security threats and challenges of the 21st century.

In early 2002, Anatoly Kulikov also argued strongly in favour of a single international structure to combat both international terrorism and transnational crime, which he saw as interconnected phenomena. Kulikov contended that existing international organisations such as the United Nations and law enforcement structures were incapable of dealing with the threat posed by international terrorism and organised crime. He wrote that “despite the reams of conventions, recommendations and resolutions passed by the United Nations, Council of Europe and other international organizations, no single legal infrastructure has been put in place yet to combat crime and national laws have not been brought into line with the international laws currently in effect”. Kulikov was of the opinion that a single world anti-terrorist centre should be created, and considered that Interpol could be such a centre.

The operation of such a centre should not be limited exclusively to matters of combating terrorism. Everyone knows by now that major terrorist attacks are impossible without strong financial backing that, in a vast majority of cases, involves laundering drug money. This signifies that we
Dr Mark A Smith

should talk of creating not merely a world anti-terrorism centre but a world centre for combating international crime.

Furthermore, it is necessary to conceptually change approaches to combating terrorism. It is now mainly the responsibility of special services that are simultaneously in the business of intelligence and counterintelligence. The interests of special services in different countries - even sometimes in one single country - are not the same. Combating terrorism should become a priority function of all the law enforcement departments and power structures. The most efficient cooperation today can be seen between police bodies of different countries.

He suggested that Interpol would have to be reorganised if it were to become an anti-terrorist centre. "It would have to perform, in addition to data exchange, the functions of international investigations and operational investigations. To do this it should have appropriate structures and trained rapid-reaction forces." He also counselled that "force alone cannot solve this problem. There should be a combination of methods including the freezing of assets and accounts of any corporation, private individual or a charity with links to terrorists. Strong-arm actions against terrorists should be preceded by in-depth financial reconnaissance.”

Kulikov suggested that the World Anti-Crime and Anti-Terrorism Forum could facilitate the cooperation of all governmental and nongovernmental structures to reach agreements and design new approaches to combating crime and terrorism, with the aim of establishing a single anti-crime and anti-terrorism front. Russia proposed the creation of this Forum in 1998. 38 other countries supported this initiative, and the first meeting of the Forum’s international organizing committee took place in the UN headquarters in Vienna in December 2001. Kulikov speculated that the Forum “may in the future take the lead in consolidating and broadening interaction between various international and national organizations to produce recommendations on combating crime and terrorism. In 2000, Russia set up a National Anti-Crime and Anti-Terrorism Fund and an organizing committee in support of the Forum.”

Russia also seeks to cooperate in the fight against terrorism through other international forums, such as the G8, NATO, EU, OSCE and the Council of Europe. The NATO-Russia agreement of May 2002 forming the NATO-Russia Council envisaged fighting terrorism as one of the major areas of Russia-NATO cooperation. Cooperation with the EU in this field is also becoming more important. At the Russia-EU summit in November 2002, the EU and Russia reached agreement on a far-reaching framework for the fight against terrorism, which set out the shared values and commitments in the fight against terrorism and identified a series of specific areas for future EU-Russia cooperation. An Annex to the Joint Declaration issued at the Russia-EU summit in Rome in November 2003 stated that the war on terror and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were "the keystone of Russia-EU security cooperation”.

Russia’s two other major international forums for cooperation are the CIS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Fighting terrorism has been a major priority of Russian security policy in the CIS since 1999. Russia has been particularly concerned about the threat posed by Islamic inspired terrorism in Central Asia. This is a concern which she shares with the Central Asian leaderships in particular.
In 1999 the CIS signed treaties on cooperation in fighting terrorism and in 2000, the CIS confirmed a three year anti-terrorist programme, and set up an anti-terrorist centre, based in Moscow, headed by Boris Mylnikov, formerly from the FSB. It has a staff of 60 and half of its costs are met by the Russian Federation. The centre aims to coordinate the anti-terrorist efforts of CIS members. The general leadership of the centre is implemented by the CIS council of heads of security and special services. Both this council and the council of CIS law enforcement organs and special services play a major role in carrying out CIS anti-terrorist policy. The CIS council of interior ministers also has a special bureau for coordinating the struggle against organised crime in the CIS.

The CIS Collective Security Treaty also decided in May 2001 to set up rapid reaction forces to help counter the military threat posed by armed terrorist groups. In recent years the members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty (which became a formal treaty organisation in May 2002) have held several anti-terrorist and military exercises. Southern Shield exercises have been held in Central Asia by Russia and other members since 2000, and in April 2001 the South Anti-Terror exercises took place in Osh in Kyrgyzstan. These were the first specific anti-terrorist exercises held since the break-up of the USSR. In April 2002, the South Anti-Terror exercises took place in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (there do not appear to have been any such exercises in 2003). Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division and Tajik Defence Ministry, Security Ministry and Interior Ministry units practised destroying a 600-man gang that had supposedly invaded Tajikistan from Afghanistan. The exercise involved over 1,000 servicemen, artillery, surface-to-air missile systems and attack aircraft. In June 2003, Russia and Ukraine held exercises named Azov-Antiterror-2003, where anti-terrorist units held a special operation to free hostages and neutralize terrorists at the Kerch sea port.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), known formerly the Shanghai Five, consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, also sees cooperation in fighting terrorism as one of its major objectives. In December 1999 the Shanghai Five signed a memorandum on cooperation between law enforcement agencies. At their summit in Dushanbe in July 2000, it was decided to develop the legal-treaty base for developing cooperation in fighting terrorism and other security threats. The SCO members signed a declaration on fighting terrorism, extremism and separatism in June 2001, and set up a SCO anti-terrorist centre in Bishkek. This centre was moved to Tashkent, and began operating in October 2003.

The fight against terrorism has led to strains in the relationship between Russia and Georgia. In 2002, Moscow argued that Georgia was making insufficient efforts to neutralise the terrorist threat emanating from the Pankisi Gorge, and made veiled threats about intervening in Georgia to deal with it. On 11 September 2002, Putin issued a harsh condemnation of the Georgian leadership's failure to deal with the problem, and warned that Russia might launch retaliatory strikes against terrorist positions in Georgia. The Georgian leadership rejected Moscow's accusations, and accused Russia of launching bombing raids inside Georgian territory. Moscow in turn denied these counter-accusations, although from 29 July to the end of 2002 there had been at least five instances of Russian cross-border aerial bombardment of Georgian territory. During an attack on 23 August - witnessed by OSCE border monitors and confirmed through independent means - Russian bombs claimed the life of a Georgian civilian and wounded seven others. The Russian leadership also asserted that not just Chechens, but Arab fighters were also present in the Pankisi Gorge. In February 2003, Russian Defence
Minister Sergey Ivanov portrayed the threat posed by terrorists in Georgia as being international in scale.

*I want everyone to understand that not everything can be reduced to the Pankisi Gorge problem ... there are areas of Georgia where there are terrorist bases from which repeated attempts have been made to raid Russian territory and where there are laboratories for the makeshift production of toxins, including for subsequent use in the West.*

His remarks came just after the discovery of a group producing the poison ricin in London; and were duly echoed by the Georgian Ministry of State Security.

**Conclusions**

Fighting terrorism is likely to form a significant part (very probably a key part) of both homeland defence and the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation for the foreseeable future. This is a security priority shared by all major powers. As in other states, Russia is tightening up its internal security arrangements in order to enhance the state’s capabilities to counter the threat. In some ways, the threat posed by what the Russian leadership calls terrorism is more serious to the Russian state than the threats facing the USA or most West European states. This is because much domestic Russian terrorism is linked to the Chechen separatist forces. Islamic inspired terrorism does not merge in this way with any separatist movement in the major western states.

The need to counter the threat posed by terrorism runs the risk of weakening the already fragile structures of Russian democracy. The arrest of Yukos head Mikhail Khodorkovsky in October 2003, the investigation into Yukos' affairs, and the organisation of the December 2003 Duma election have raised concerns both within and outside Russia about growing authoritarian tendencies in the Putin leadership, and a strengthening of the state’s power to combat terrorism, no matter how justified, may well increase these concerns.

In the international arena, the struggle against terrorism is likely to remain a central feature of Russian foreign policy, just as it is of the foreign policies of the USA and other NATO powers. Russia has played a major role in initiating moves by the UN to combat terrorism. Her energetic advocacy of a united international front is partly to legitimise her military operation in Chechnya, and to enable her to play a more important role in the international arena. The emphasis on combating terrorism, whilst genuine, also helps reduce the possibility of Russia being marginalised by the USA.

Yet there are limits to cooperation. In November 2003, foreign minister Igor Ivanov was interviewed on Russian TV about the possibility of Russian forces being sent to Iraq:

* [Aleksey Pushkov - interviewer] Here is something our viewers would like to hear. It is still unclear whether or not Russia could send its servicemen to Iraq as part of the international military force. They say that it may become possible under certain circumstances. Could you comment?  

* [Ivanov] At present the question does not arise. The international coalition force, which is in Iraq now, is an occupation force and is defined as such*
by UN resolutions. At the same time, the situation may take on a very
dynamic development, various forms of participation and the presence [of
Russian troops] is possible. If it is a Security Council resolution or a
multinational force, or if it is necessary to render cooperation in mine
clearing or in guarding the border against terrorists [emphasis mine-
MAS], there are other forms as well - it would hardly to be justified to rule
out all options at present. We are prepared to take an active part in Iraq’s
restoration and in sustaining security and stability in Iraq. We can
consider various options if they do not run counter to our national interests
or our law.

[Pushkov] So you do not rule out the possibility of our servicemen
appearing in Iraq?

[Ivanov] Hypothetically everything is possible. I would not rule it out
completely.

Whilst anti-terrorist cooperation with the USA and other western powers has
benefited Russia, there are potential areas of disagreement. As discussed above,
Moscow has been concerned about the USA using the WOT to enhance its position
in the international arena for geo-political gain. The WOT was used by the USA as
partial justification for the attack on Iraq in 2003, and has also enabled the USA to
acquire a significant presence in Central Asia. Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov was
reported in October 2003 as saying that he wanted NATO to withdraw from Central
Asia. Concern was also expressed by the Russian leadership when the USA sent
military advisers to Georgia in February 2002.

The USA and Russia also differ over states that sponsor terrorism. In early 2003,
the US State Department listed seven states as sponsoring terrorism: Cuba, Iran,
Iraq (under Saddam Hussein), Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan. Russia has
fair to good relations with all of these states except Sudan. She has had fairly close
relations with the remaining two members of the “axis of evil”, Iran and North
Korea, and has specifically rejected US claims that these states sponsor terrorism.
These differences make total anti-terrorist cooperation between Russia and the USA
unlikely. However, close cooperation between Russia and the USA and other major
western powers, including the EU, is likely to remain one of the foundations of
Russian foreign policy under Putin, whilst Moscow will continue at the same time to
argue that the WOT would be best served by a multipolar international order with
the UN as its guiding force, rather than a US-led unipolar order.

ENDNOTES

1 See Gordon Bennett, The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, Conflict
Studies Research Centre, UK Defence Academy, C102, March 2000, p18,
http://da.mod.uk/CSRC/Home/.

2 V V Lunev, ‘The strengthening of legality and the struggle with crime. Tendencies of

3 The text of the law appears in Rossiskaya Gazeta, 4 August 1998. An English
language translation can be found at:

4 Igor Korotchenko, ‘Serious organisational changes at the Lubyanka’, Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, 1 September 1999.

5 BBC Monitoring Select, 3 December 1999.
http://archive.monitor.bbc.co.uk/archive/search.
This interview was republished under the title ‘We will reach agreement with the Chechens’, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 8 July 2000.

From a speech made by Igor Ivanov at PACE on 27 January 2000, published in ‘We have nothing to hide’, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 3 February 2000.


[BBC Monitoring, 23 November 2000](http://archive.monitor.bbc.co.uk/archive/search).


[BBC Monitoring Select, 6 January 2003](http://archive.monitor.bbc.co.uk/archive/search).


[BBC Monitoring Select, 4 January 2003](http://archive.monitor.bbc.co.uk/archive/search).


[BBC Monitoring Select, 21 September 2001](http://archive.monitor.bbc.co.uk/archive/search).


[BBC Monitoring Select, 21 September 2001](http://archive.monitor.bbc.co.uk/archive/search).


[BBC Monitoring Select, 22 July 2002](http://archive.monitor.bbc.co.uk/archive/search).


38 A Safonov, ‘The World needs a global anti-terrorist system’, International Affairs, April 2003, pp28-34. Safonov was appointed a deputy foreign minister in October 2001, dealing with terrorism related issues. From 1994 to 1997 he was a first deputy director of the FSB and from 1997-2001 he was chairman of the committee on security questions of the union of Russia and Belarus with the rank of first deputy director of the FSB.

39 For the text of these conventions see http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_conventions.html.


44 For a reference on the relocation of the SCO anti-terrorist centre, see BBC Monitoring Select, Inside Central Asia, 2 November 2003.


APPENDIX 1

Russian Law On Fighting Terrorism 1998

"Article 3. Basic terms"

The following basic terms are used for the purposes of the present federal law:

terrorism is violence or the threat of violence against individuals or organizations, and also the destruction (damaging) of or threat to destroy (damage) property and other material objects, such as threaten to cause loss of life, significant damage to property, or other socially dangerous consequences and are implemented with a view to violating public security, intimidating the population, or influencing the adoption of decisions advantageous to terrorists by organs of power, or satisfying their unlawful material and (or) other interests; attempts on the lives of statesmen or public figures perpetrated with a view to ending their state or other political activity or out of revenge for such activity; attacks on representatives of foreign states or staffs of international organizations enjoying international protection, and also on the official premises or vehicles of persons enjoying international protection if these actions are committed with a view to provoking war or complicating international relations;

terrorist activity is activity including:
• the organization, planning, preparation, and implementation of terrorist action;
• incitement to terrorist action, to violence against individuals or organizations, or to the destruction of material objects for terrorist purposes;
• the organization of an illegal armed formation, criminal association (criminal organization), or organized group in order to perpetrate terrorist action, and also participation in such action;
• the recruitment, armament, training, and use of terrorists;
• the funding of a known terrorist organization or terrorist group or other assistance to them;

international terrorist activity is terrorist activity carried out:
• by a terrorist or terrorist organization on the territory of more than one state or detrimental to the interests of more than one state;
• by citizens of one state against citizens of another state or on the territory of another state;
• in the case where both the terrorist and the victim of terrorism are citizens of the same state or different states but the crime is committed outside the territories of these states;

terrorist action is the direct commission of a terrorist crime in the shape of explosion, arson, or the use of or threat to use nuclear explosive devices or radioactive, chemical, biological, explosive, toxic, noxious [otravlyayushchyi], aggressive [silnodeystvuyushchyi], or poisonous [yadovityy] substances; the destruction, damaging, or seizure of vehicles or other facilities; an attempt on the life of a statesman or public figure or representative of national, ethnic, religious, or other population groups; the seizure of hostages and kidnapping; the creation of a danger of harm to the life, health, or property of a nonspecific range of people by creating the conditions for accidents and man-made disasters or the real threat of

the creation of such a danger; the dissemination of threats in any form and by any means; other actions creating a danger of loss of life, significant damage to property, or other socially dangerous consequences;

terrorist crimes are crimes envisaged by Articles 205-208, 277 and 360 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. Other crimes envisaged by the Russian Federation Criminal Code may be categorized as terrorist crimes if they are committed for terrorist purposes. Penalties for the commission of such crimes are in accordance with the Russian Federation Criminal Code; a terrorist is a person participating in the implementation of terrorist activity in any form;

a terrorist group is a group of persons united with a view to implementing terrorist activity;

a terrorist organization is an organization created with a view to implementing terrorist activity or deeming the use of terrorism possible in its activity. An organization is deemed to be terrorist if even one of its structural components carries out terrorist activity with the knowledge of even one of the organization’s leading organs;

the fight against terrorism is activity to prevent, uncover, stop, and minimize the consequences of terrorist activity;

a counterterrorist operation is special measures aimed at stopping a terrorist action, ensuring the security of individuals, neutralizing terrorists, and also minimizing the consequences of terrorist action; a counterterrorist operation zone is the particular area of land or water, vehicle, building, structure, installation, or premises and the adjoining territory or waters within which the aforementioned operation is carried out;

a hostage is an individual seized and (or) held with a view to compelling the state, an organization, or individuals to carry out an action or refrain from carrying out an action as a condition for the release of the person who is being held."
The UK Definition of Terrorism, in the UK Terrorism Act 2000

"Terrorism: interpretation.

(1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where -

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate
the public or a section of the public, and
(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious
or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it -

(a) involves serious violence against a person,
(b) involves serious damage to property,
(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the
action,
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of
the public, or
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic
system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of
firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.

(4) In this section -

(a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom,
(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to
property, wherever situated,
(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country
other than the United Kingdom, and
(d) "the government" means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part
of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.

(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a
reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation."
Official US Definition of Terrorism, in The United States Code, Title 18 Part I Chapter 113b Sec 2331

"Sec 2331 - Definitions

As used in this chapter -

(1) the term "international terrorism" means activities that -

(a) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(b) appear to be intended -
   (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
   (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
   (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(c) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum;

(2) the term "national of the United States" has the meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act;

(3) the term "person" means any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;

(4) the term "act of war" means any act occurring in the course of -

(a) declared war;
(b) armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, between two or more nations; or
(c) armed conflict between military forces of any origin; and

(5) the term "domestic terrorism" means activities that -

(a) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(b) appear to be intended -
   (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
   (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
   (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(c) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
APPENDIX 2

Terrorist groups listed by the Russian General Procuracy in February 2003 as a threat to the Russian Federation

Supreme Military Majlis Shura of the Joint Mojahedin Forces of the Caucasus, led by Shamil Basayev;

The Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan (Chechnya), led by M Udugov and Shamil Basayev;

Al-Qa'idah, led by Usamah bin Laden;

Isbat al-Ansar (Lebanon);

Jihad (Egypt);

Al-Jama'ah al Islamiyah (Egypt);

The Muslim Brotherhood (an international organization);

The Islamic Liberation Party (an international organization);

Lashkar-i-Toiba (Pakistan);

The Taleban movement (Afghanistan);

The Islamic Party of Turkestan (formerly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan);

The Social Reform Society (Kuwait);

The Islamic Heritage Revival Society (Kuwait);

Al-Haramayn (the Two Holy Sites of Mecca, Saudi Arabia).
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