US Military Operations at Home and Abroad:
Learning from September 11

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"On September 11, America's contract with the Department of Defense was torn up and a new contract is being written." – DoD Transformation “Czar” Arthur K. Cebrowski

Introduction

Learning is often conceived as gaining insight from experience. Focusing events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, generate widespread determination to seek such insight.

On a Tuesday morning that America will not forget, operatives from the Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda network hijacked four commercial passenger aircraft. Armed with box-cutters, these villains did not intend to take hostages, but to use the planes as weapons. This was the impact of the deadliest terrorist attack in history (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002): two planes completely destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, one took out a portion of the Pentagon, and another crash-landed in Pennsylvania. More than three thousand were killed, most of them civilians. No volume of donated blood could save them. Civilian air traffic was shut down completely, so that by afternoon only US military aircraft occupied the skies.

US President George W. Bush observed in the wake of the attacks:

All of us in government are having to adjust our way of thinking about the new war. The military is going to have to adjust. They recognize…that we need to rethink how we configure our military …so that we more

The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Naval Postgraduate School or the United States Government. I owe thanks to the Homeland Security Program at the Naval Postgraduate School for making possible the presentation of this paper.

effectively respond to asymmetrical responses from terrorist organizations. 
(Bush, October 11, 2002)

In this paper, I focus on the lessons available to the US military for its new 
thinking, broadly defining military organizations to include the National Guard with the 
uniformed services. Customary roles and missions for these organizations became subject 
to renegotiation after 9/11. The military has been instructed to protect the homeland while 
waging war on terrorism abroad. There are two fronts in the war on terror and both of 
these are stability operations that make civil affairs of military concern. What insights 
from experience does the US military bring to its thinking about the new war? Did the 
September 11 attacks prompt a new approach to lesson seeking?

Current challenges include operating in sensitive civilian environments, working 
with multiple civilian agencies and international partners, and managing low-intensity 
conflict environments. Logical referents for US military forces today are civil-military 
operations experiences in support of civil authority at home and in multilateral 
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions abroad. However, the US military 
only reluctantly performed those chores. As if in order to emphasize that these are 
ancillary to the military's primary organizational purpose, these have fallen into the 
doctrinal rubric of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The challenges of so-called 
‘non-traditional missions’ are profound enough that scholars of civil-military relations 
cite them as contributing conditions for military organizational change (Moskos et al., 
2000). It is all the more noteworthy, then, to identify military utilization of insight from 
those experiences.

In the first section of the paper, I pick up tools from the literature on 
organizational learning to construct propositions about military learning. The next section
turns specifically to the challenges to the military and its competencies for meeting them. Although the role of doctrine figures prominently in the literature on military change, the post-September 11 experience shows us that the military can -- in very short order -- make changes without new doctrine. It can take new approaches to operations, reconsider its definitions of theaters of operations, and establish new organizational structures, without new doctrine. Although I will argue that doctrine is not enough, it would be wrong to conclude that civil-military operations post-Sept. 11 lack a doctrinal driver. Rather, this analysis shows that the implementation of doctrine presents opportunities for understanding politics that many researchers have missed.

Organizational Learning

Learning is sometimes characterized as a remedial process, "a process of detecting and correcting error" (Argyris, 1977: 116). Certainly detecting and correcting error seems to characterize what many within the US government have been trying to do in the months since September 11. The forensics started shortly after the attacks, to determine how those charged with national security failed to anticipate and prevent them. 'Whistle blowers' came forward at the FBI and elsewhere to identify flaws in US government operations. The intelligence community in particular came under scrutiny, because despite numerous clues that such an attack might occur, strategic analysis failed to 'connect the dots' (Zakaria, 2002).

Discussion of how to apply lessons from experience to international politics is not new. Alexander George, Ole Holsti and others have shown how leaders use analogies in decision-making, but tend to interpret experiences in accordance with their views of the world or operational code. Those seeking to understand the behavior of militaries as they
prepare for and fight wars are understandably interested in the insights of organization theory (Farrell, 1996). The strategic studies literature has sought out organizational determinants of military change in general, and innovation in particular (Avant, 1994; Goldman, 1999; Legro, 1995; Rosen, 1991). Military doctrine figures prominently into these discussions. Doctrine, for Kimberly Zisk is the site of military innovation (Zisk, 1993). If doctrine indicates learning, the latest Army Operations has shown new consideration of civilian issues in its organizational routine. The Army now includes civilians in the METT-T factors fundamental to battle command assessment and visualization is a remarkable indication of learning:

METT-TC refers to factors that are fundamental to assessing and visualizing: Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations. The first five factors are not new. However, the nature of full spectrum operations requires commanders to assess the impact of nonmilitary factors on operations. Because of this added complexity, civil considerations [emphasis original] has been added to the familiar METT-T to form METT-TC. All commanders must use METT-TC to start their visualization. (FM 3-0:5-3)

For Theo Farrell, doctrine is not enough, because doctrine plays different roles in different militaries, and because doctrinal change may not translate into organizational behavior. Farrell defines military change as adoption of new strategies, structures and goals, for example, adopting a new primary mission as in the US Marine Corps interwar shift from light infantry to amphibious warfare (in Farrell & Terriff, 2001, p. 4). Civilian influence, change in enemy strategy and new technologies all potentially cause military change. An external shock, such as an unexpected defeat, can also trigger change. Learning implies something more than change. It implies taking note of the external shock as well as the past routines and orientations that enabled or inhibited coping with that event.
To say that organizations learn, that is, acquire knowledge or know-how, implies a package of assumptions. It assumes that there is learner, there is a process of learning and there is content to learning, or learning 'product' (Argyris and Schon, 1996). The organization as a subject of learning is well established, notwithstanding a couple of problems stemming from the collective nature of organizations. First, learning seems an individual phenomenon and yet we say that organizations learn. But we often do refer to collectivities like a team, a firm, an administration, and "the army" as competing, adopting strategies and in general performing cognitive functions like thinking, deciding and inter-relating. Organizations are systems in which individuals cooperate to perform tasks that arise repeatedly (Bernard, 1938). Organizations embody knowledge in structures and procedures so that members are able to perform within certain parameters. This relationship between the individual and organization is not insignificant in the learning process. For March (1991) organizational codes or shared beliefs are characterized by a dynamic of mutual learning. Individuals should not adjust to the code, March warns, until the code can learn from them. In these terms, the ‘whistle blower’ is noteworthy for at least two reasons: the 'whistle' sounds an alarm to widely recognizable failure; the 'blower' asserts individualism and refuses to adjust to the code.

Second, because organizations are collective enterprises, they tend to emphasize conformity and resist change. And yet organizations do adapt over time (Cyert and March, 1963). The central concern in the literature is not whether but how; that is, what types of adaptive processes improve effectiveness? Learning is so strongly associated with organizational effectiveness that commercial organizations hire learning gurus for advice on becoming a "learning organization." The "consultancy school" tends to work
from case studies of organizations identified as "learning organizations" so that the "best practices" of these serve as models for other organizations (Denton: 1998, 41).

Organization literature provides alternative criteria for identifying learning, articulates tasks necessary for learning, considers the role of events as triggers for learning, and differentiates types of learning. The discussion will consider these issues in turn, leading into development of propositions about military learning.

**Defining Learning**

Some scholars emphasize change in behavior as an indicator of learning (Huber, 1991). However, since it may also be possible to change behavior in response to environmental stimuli, without learning, most scholars treat learning as a cognitive phenomenon. For other scholars, cognitive change, whether or not manifest in behavior, is considered to be sufficient (Friedlander, 1983). Thought and action need not be separated. The notion of gaining "insight" from experience is used by Shaw and Perkins to describe a cognitive process that is then put into action when the organization modifies "the way it functions" according to that insight (1992:175).

It is understandable for research on organizations to focus on cognition, having to do with the manipulation of information, since information is so vital in organizations. As theories of organizational design portray it, information processing is a core task of organizational structure itself (Nadler, 1992:5). Moving information through the organization to coordinate work is fundamental to organizational life.

Organizations, because they are composed of many individuals, require mechanisms for transmitting meaning, interpreting and distributing it. Social communication is vital, according to March (1991), for the development of ground truths
and consensus on meaning. Information storage, retrieval, transmission, interpretation and application are necessary to getting that consensus on meaning.

Memory, storage of information in the mind or in an "artificial form" such as a file or record, is a basic ingredient in human, and administrative rationality (Simon, 1945). March and Simon (1958: 10-11) privileged memory in their early definition of learning as "changes in the memory content" (10-11). It would be difficult to conceive of learning without the ability to hold onto lessons or without a system that triggers retrieval of particular information.

**Critical Incidents**

The discussion so far suggests an important role for history in organizational learning. Organizations experience history, draw inferences from that experience and encode these inferences into routines to guide behavior. However, as March, Sproull and Tamuz observe (1996), history is sometimes stingy with experience. When history provides limited experience, organizations strive to experience history *more richly*. To do so requires attending to more aspects of experience, developing more interpretations of it, and weighing more preferences for evaluating it. Critical incidents or focusing events are of special significance for organizations seeking to learn from limited experience.

What makes an event a critical incident? March et al (1996) identifies three characteristics: it is a turning point in history, it changes beliefs about the world, and it has metaphorical power. The attacks of September 11 seem to fit. For most Americans the world before September 11 was very different from the world after. These attacks changed American beliefs about their security, in particular the vulnerability of American civilians and the place of America in the world. And the metaphorical power of the
attacks is undeniable: the visual symbolism is there in the damaged Pentagon and the collapsed towers of American industry; the allegorical symbolism is there in the attack on America with the aid of America's own infrastructures.

However, a turning point in history, like the invention of the printing press (cited by March et al.) or perhaps the cellular phone or the Internet, creates anticipation of the future. Learning for March et al. (1996; p. 4) would focus on "changed implications for the future rather than about how to predict or control similar occurrences in the future" (emphasis added). US preoccupation with intelligence failures, border security and baggage screening is understandable, but indicates a focus a particular type of event.

Surprising and serious events, the learning and crisis decision-making literatures both suggest, can prompt maladaptive responses. Organizations tend to be reluctant to question the basis of their problems in general. Considerable effort is involved in developing collective interpretations of history. These interpretations are filtered through organizational frames or structures of meaning. These are broadly shared, although not necessarily universally shared, organizational stories or myths. Learning may occur within these frames, but interpretive frameworks are generally resistant to experience.

In response to surprise, the preferred responses may be chosen on the basis of temporal proximity, cognitive availability, and political convenience (Cyert et al., 1958; March et al., 1999). Advocates of a particular policy might interpret failure as evidence that their policy has not been pursued vigorously enough. Focusing events can drive an organizational escalation of commitment to a coarse of action (Ross and Staw, 1986).

The US Immigration and Naturalization Service appears to be more vigorously implementing its policies since it has been criticized for issuing immigration visas to the
9/11 hijackers six months after the attack (Delevett, 2002). A 51-year-old homemaker from New Zealand arrived at the airport in Los Angeles for a visit with in-laws on July 24 and was escorted through the airport in handcuffs because several trips previously, in 1998, she had overstayed her visa for 8 days. She was given no food or drink for the first 12 of the 36 hours she was held and then deported.

**Differentiating Learning**

In general, as critics have noted, there is a pro-learning bias in the literature, an assumption that learning is inherently "good." However, learning might take us from good to better, or in the case of the Nazi regime in World War II Germany, from bad to evil. Scholarship on learning is in danger of value-laden assumptions and danger of outright bias. An author can easily sneak her own preferences into definitions of learning outcomes. For example, US General George Joulwan essentially defined US 'success' in Rwanda as avoiding the mistakes the US made in Somalia.

The "lesson" many drew from the failed US peacekeeping mission in Somalia was to avoid taking on additional tasks, i.e., "mission creep." Joulwan praised the US military performance as "careful not to move beyond its explicit mission" in order to arrest Hutu militia and former government leaders (associated with commission of atrocities) in the Rwanda refugee camps (Joulwan and Shoemaker, 1998: 19). Another view is possible. General William Carter, following his experience in Bosnia, described what he thinks is a more appropriate term: "mission evolution." He insists that it's part of the commander's job to assess and adjust efforts according to political conditions (Carter, 2000). Whereas Joulwan describes an application of past experience to a new context, Carter describes a willingness to reconsider approaches in light of external conditions.
It seems clear that there are different 'types' of learning. Scholars have differentiated learning according to strategy and scope. March (1991) provides a strategic perspective on organizational learning. He distinguishes between learning approaches that affect organizational processes. For March, the organization engaged in application-driven learning picks the low-hanging fruit. It exploits existing competencies, technologies and paradigms for more certain improvements in performance. In discovery-driven learning, the organization explores new alternatives for less-certain gains but with potential pay-off of decisive competitive advantage. A merit of this distinction is its recognition that some forms of information processing are more taxing than others (Suedfeld, 1999). In particular, March's writing recognizes the competitive world many organizations inhabit. Some learning processes take more effort and are risky. According to this framework, the competitive environment influences the organization risk-taking for survival. The competitive international security environment can take some of the credit for highly-developed military mechanisms for learning.

Argyris focuses on the scope of learning in his framework. "Single-loop" learning for Argyris (1983: 116) occurs within a frame of reference "without change in the underlying governing policies or values." That is, the organization may seek to improve the implementation of policies and goal achievement, without questioning those policies or goals.

"Double-loop" learning as described by Argyris (1983) is deep learning in the sense that it involves development of a new frame of reference. In other words, double-loop learning involves a changing definition about what constitutes improvement.
Propositions

While "single-loop" learning processes should be more common generally, we might expect military organizations especially to conform to this pattern. First, the norms of civil-military relations decree that military forces are political instruments and the role of military leaders is to implement but not to develop or change policy. Second, military organizations tend to be highly routine-oriented, emphasizing incremental improvements in those routines over paradigm change. Third, military organizations tend to be highly compartmentalized and secretive, making it difficult to see outside the institutional parameters of one's own service sub-unit, let alone across military services, into the interagency or alliance arena and so on.

We might also expect that high tempo of military operations works against systemic learning. First, military personnel in operations are very much 'on the go,' and have little time to indulge in resource intensive learning. Information technology potentially mitigates the problem of access to information. However, information technology adds to the complexity of military operations (see Demchak, 1991). Information overload may create pressure to focus on immediately available data. Second, high tempo personnel changes make it difficult to exploit individual knowledge for the benefit of the organization.

In addition to these general factors, there is the yet-to-be-determined effect of a critical event. On the one hand, organizational learning theory cautions us that a critical incident can drive an organization deepening of commitment to a course of action. On the other hand, a critical incident might be just the trigger to challenge organizational assumptions, even fundamental assumptions about strategy. These may include the
organizational frames or the system of symbols that makes up the strategic culture. As Johnston describes them, these include assumptions about "the orderliness of the strategic environment, that is, about the role of war in human affairs…the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses…and about the efficacy of the use of force…” (Johnston, p. 46).

The relevance of these propositions depends upon specific features of the military as an organization. The next section takes on the challenge of studying the military as a subject and describes key organizational features of the US military. Finally, it is important when measuring to appreciate the current position in light of a previous one. For this reason, the following discussion also takes stock of learning prior to September 11, that is, mechanisms that may or may not set conditions for the US military to learn effectively about the security environment.

**The Military as a Learning Organization**

The US military is obviously relevant in a war on terror and is in general an obvious responder when national security is attacked or threatened. Military learning in relation to 9/11 thus seems especially significant. Unfortunately, 'the military' as a subject of learning presents some methodological problems. On the one hand, 'the military' as a subject is too narrow, given the complex of organizational interaction within national security structures that include civilian elements in the Department of Defense, the command authority of the US President, and the operations of other structures such as the National Security Council. Even more generally, some refer to "the state" and constraints on its rational behavior due to national style of strategy or strategic culture (for example, Gray, 1981; Johnston, 1995).
On the other hand, this generalization is too broad given the strength of organizations within the military. The need for internal coherence and cooperation is quite high within each service. The incentive structure for military personnel in terms of their careers is tied to their services. Joint operations, in which elements from different services conduct operations together, is more like multi-organizational action. In sum, multiple organizations are simultaneously involved in an ecology of conflict and cooperation (Jones, 2001). One solution is to narrow discussion to one of the uniformed services, such as the army, or further, to an organization within the army, such as the Special Operations Forces or SOF, or even further to a particular entity within the SOF, such as the Special Forces (SF) or green berets, but this seems too limiting.

The US military is aptly described as a complex system in which elements are highly interactive. Axelrod and Cohen (1999) cite officers in military services as examples of "populations of agents" in a "complex adaptive system." In such a system, current events are particularly influential with regard to possible futures. Strategies are the ways participants in the system (called agents) respond to their environment and pursue goals. Selection, the process of strategy change, can be brought about by mechanisms we associate with learning, using trial-and-error, or finding a model of success to imitate. However, selection can also come about when the population of agents changes. Interaction of the parts with the whole is thus significant, as moving the population elements is one way to spread and change strategies.

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2 Even at the highest level, service identities have been influential. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), until 1986 only advised the president as to the views of the Chiefs of Staff. Congressional legislation in the form of the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the CJCS the role of providing independent advice. The most significant organizational struggle of this generation of American military officers has been to develop "jointness," interoperability and cooperation among the various services.
For the purposes of analysis, I am drawing an organizational boundary around 'the military' as distinguished from 'the civilian' realm but will focus on elements within the military that are most relevant in responding to the events of September 11. The first part of this section describes the military as an organization. The second part of this section describes established US military learning mechanisms.

**Military Organization**

Organizational analysis seems well suited to the study of militaries in part because militaries tend to be so well, as it happens, *organized.* Military organization is a collective action, a social activity that empowers by extending "the domain of individual rationality" (Arrow, 1974:16). Cooperation and specialization enable the society at large to benefit from efficiency gains. Individuals who are members of a military organization take part in two sets of specialization that are relevant: a specialization within the larger society and another specialization within the military sphere.

First, these individuals have accepted a particular role in a social division of labor that distinguishes them from civilians and establishes distance between them and "the other" realm, that is, the civilian realm. The Army's primary doctrine, expressed as the field manual 3-0 *Operations* explicitly refers to a contractual relationship, calling the Army's service "the Army's non-negotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation." (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 2001: 1-2).

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Parts of this discussion are drawn from my earlier work on organizational learning and the military presented to a panel "Taking Stock of Organizational Learning in Political Science," at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001.
The collective action solution, to form a special organization for national defense, leads to some cultural differentiation in society between civil and military spheres. Non-governmental organizations working with the military points were advised to pay attention to the organizational basis of cultural differentiation between military personnel and civilians:

Certainly there is a distance, if not a divide, between military personnel and civilians in terms of how they view their jobs. In part, this distinctive outlook is a reflection of the special nature of the military as an institution -- a reflection, that is, of the specific tasks it is expected to accomplish and the manner in which it organizes to accomplish them. In part, it reflects a deeper-seated set of convictions about how the world works, and a set of core values about how people ought to behave. (Miltenberger, 2000:207).

Second, military activity is a social activity in an internal sense, that a high degree of cooperation is required among members of the armed forces in order to perform their roles. Thus, many characteristics that distinguish military personnel, such as our examples of base housing and uniforms, serve internal functional purposes.

The United States military is a long-standing, highly articulated institutional structure with components that possess their own rituals and traditions. Military organization is also very hierarchical. Lines of authority are defined between civilian and military administrative units and within military organization. Civilian control of military forces is established at the apex of US administrative structure, with the president as the commander in chief of the military. The National Command Authority includes the president and the civilian secretary of defense, and these are assisted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the National Security Council (NSC). Control over the military flows in two branches flowing from the secretary of defense, as depicted in Figure 1, below.
Administrative and financial control over military forces is exercised by the secretaries of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Administrative control (ADCON) includes the ability to form, equip and train units. Operational control branches from the secretary of defense through the unified commanders of geographic commands (US Central Command, US European Command, US Pacific Command, US Southern Command) and functional commands (for example, US Special Operations Command and US Space Command). Each of these is led by a top military officer, General or Admiral, identified as a Commander in Chief (CINC) of that command (for example, CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces).

Remembering their position on the operational, as opposed to administrative branch of authority, combatant commanders are notably the "warfighting" or "theater" commanders during a conflict, (Central Command's General Norman Schwartzkopf during the Persian Gulf War, for example). Service components are assigned to the CINCs. Combatant commanders exercise combatant command authority (COCOM) over their assigned forces, including the authority to organize them, give them specific tasks, and also to conduct joint training in preparation for missions. A Joint Task Force (JTF) gives the CINC the option of a flexible organizational structure to pull together a combination of forces from the different services for a specific purpose or mission. The

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4 The Department of the Navy takes responsibility for the Marine Corps, and these two tend to operate together closely.
Joint Task force is led by a Joint Task Force Commander (JFC) who reports to the CINC.  

The nature of military operations is such that many jobs situate troops in a theater, making for a system of troop rotation. This creates a high turnover in personnel even in the midst of an operation. In order to mitigate this problem, the parts are designed to be as interchangeable as possible. There is also, as discussed in more depth below, an organizational system to record experience for the next or future rotation. The coordination works upon an elaborate system of service specialization. Emphasis on specialization creates incentive structures. Promotions depend upon "punching tickets," for example, command experience as a prerequisite to promotion. The promotion paths through combat arms makes some service specialties, like Army Civil Affairs, less attractive to ambitious officers.

The organizational structure of the United States military sets the military apart from the civilian realm, so that civilian generalizations about the military, and military generalizations about civilians, are understandable. However, there are important distinctions within the military, between and within the services, for example, that make for micro-cultures and specific patterns of interaction and communication.

The Army offers a good example. The primary purpose of the US Army is "to fight and win the nation's wars" (United States Army, 2001:1-2). Combat operations, the

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5 Military hierarchy puts more responsibility on high ranking officers. The numbers of personnel become quite large at the higher levels of organization. An Army or Marine Corps squad commanded by a staff sergeant or sergeant might be composed of a dozen personnel; a number of squads together form a platoon commanded by a lieutenant or platoon sergeant; three to five platoons make up a company of 100-300 commanded by a captain or first sergeant; companies form battalions of 250-750 personnel commanded by a lieutenant colonel; a number of battalions make up a brigade or regiment of 750-4000 commanded by a colonel; a division, commanded by a major general will include more than 17,000 and an
primary concern in military training, require a military to confront armed adversaries in order to defend or conquer territory. Civil-military operations, in which military personnel confront needy civilian populations and seemingly alien species of inter-governmental, non-governmental and other stakeholders in order to advance a peace process seems different and perhaps less straightforward (Guttieri & Suedfeld, 1998). The Army's sense of itself does not include nostalgic memories of peacekeeping. However, there is growing recognition that in order to "shape" the current strategic environment, the military must bear a burden. This recognition is in part simply the product of repeated experience.

The bottom line is that the US has to do peace operations and we need to shape the environment. But we do so with mixed feelings. In the military, we don’t want to do so without maintaining fundamental military competencies. (General Wesley Clark, US Army Peacekeeping Institute, 1997).

The US military stands apart from many others because it has specialized civil affairs to deal with the civilian realm.⁶ In US military doctrine, civil affairs and civil-military operations encompass interaction between military forces, civilian authorities and the civilian population in an area of operations. In its earliest days (i.e. George Washington at Valley Forge), civil affairs involved obtaining civilian supplies, labor, information and loyalty (Guttieri, 1999). Since World War II and formalized structures

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Army corps commanded by a lieutenant general involves authority over more than 50,000 troops. All this is to illustrate the scale of military organization, leading to some peculiar characteristics.

⁶ Civil affairs are a command responsibility for all US services, but the bulk of civil-military operations responsibilities fall to the land force, the US Army, and to the US Marine Corps. US Army civil affairs assets today include those not trained primarily for CMO (including for example, military police, medical personnel and combat engineers) and specialized active and reserve civil affairs personnel. The Army holds 95% of its dedicated Civil Affairs (CA) assets in the reserves. The Army’s one active duty Civil Affairs (CA) battalion (the 96th CA Bn) is comprised of fewer than 300 specialists with skills in languages, population and resource control and so on. Many of the skills necessary to civil-military
and schools of military government, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel have been dedicated to
the specialized role of liaison between the military and the civilian realm.

**Military Learning Systems**

The United States military has proven that, although a ponderous machine, it can
shift course when circumstances appear to warrant it. Experience is powerful teacher,
but it can be a deadly one for military organizations. For this reason, other methods of
knowledge acquisition make more sense. These include searching, vicarious learning, and
grafting. All of these have been exploited to the full by the US military as part of a
training revolution that includes incentives for professional military education as well as
training, and training and simulation exercises. All of these play a role in the
development of doctrine. The United States Army has a long tradition of written doctrine,
in contrast to the British, for example. Recently the US military has placed more
emphasis on development of joint doctrine, and today there is a flurry of doctrine writing
at the multilateral level.

Doctrine in the American Army is best described by its old French origins, "what
is taught." The latest Army *Operations* describes its organizational role:

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operations are better and less expensively held in the reserve component. Kenneth H. Pritchard, “The Army

7 The story of a "doctrinal renaissance" in the Army in the 1970s is exemplary (US Army
Combined Arms Center, 1995; Romjue, 1984). An Army demoralized in the wake of Vietnam confronted a
difficult reality in Europe, that it would have to "fight outnumbered and win." The "active defense" doctrine
was developed and put into the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, *Operations* as a reformed battle doctrine
emphasizing reactive mobile armored warfare. General Donn A. Starry took over the US Army Training
and Doctrine Command in 1977 and pushed thinking toward warfare of the future. The new Battlefield
Development Plan conceded initiative to the Soviet but looked beyond the first echelon into the follow-on
forces attack. Integration of elements on the battlefield in doctrine that would become known as "AirLand
Battle" (FM 100-5, 1982) set the stage for the system-of-systems warfare that now gives the US a
technological edge. This doctrine also created requirements for intensive joint training and a training
revolution in the military forces generally (Chapman, 1992).
Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army. It facilitates communication among soldiers no matter where they serve, contributes to a shared professional culture, and serves as the basis for curricula in the Army Education System. Army doctrine provides a common language and a common understanding of how Army forces conduct operations. (FM 3-0: 2001:1-14)

In the language of organization theory, doctrine articulates institutional frames and the relationships between important constructs like combatant command authority and operational control. The story of doctrine development is not, as one might assume in such a hierarchical organization, a story of top-down decree of mission. Instead, doctrine writing tends to be done at field-grade officer level, with repeated iterations of drafting, input and revision before publication.

Doctrine is anchored in a military learning system that is made of four basic elements: schools, exercises, doctrine and field experience. Schools, such as the Joint Special Operations University, are dedicated to education, development of ideas, and/or training. After Action Reviews are a mechanism to move knowledge from both exercises and field experience to the schoolhouses and the field. The precursor to the AAR was the combat interview (Morrison & Meliza, 1999). Just as field manuals contain vignettes of 'lessons learned,' there is AAR reporting doctrine: Joint After-Action Reporting System (Joint Pub 1-03.30, April 1991).

US military organizations self-consciously endeavor to adapt. The United States Army for example, beginning in the 1970s, began an extensive program of training exercises and operational post-mortems, or After Action Reviews (AAR). Peter Senge, widely associated with the concept of a "learning organization," declares,

The Army's After Action Review (AAR) is arguably one of the most successful organizational learning methods yet devised. (Senge, 2001)
On the other hand, more than one AAR participant has reported "We don't learn or read previous 'lessons learned.'" (USEUCOM, 1994: Appendix A, 8-3). A new book on the AAR describes the US Army as creating a culture of learning (Darling & Parry, 2001), even as others claim that its strong organizational culture and ironically, its system of written doctrine, have made the US Army less capable than the British in counterinsurgency, low-intensity and peace operations (Nagl, 1999:161).

In order to capture lessons from field experience, the Army Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) normally sends a team on each operation to document events and make suggestions for improvement (Hardesty and Ellis, 1997). A CALL team does the collection, following social scientific methodology, but others, including outside subject matter experts provide the analysis. Thus there is some form of grafting in as the military solicits outside analysis. This is but one database of lessons learned in the United States or among allies and international organizations, and there is danger in assuming that the process of AAR and lessons learned is more organized than it is. More importantly, one must consider the role of frames that filter the lessons in this process.

The literature on organizational learning emphasizes that "information acquisition depends in many instances on attention, which is directed by previous learning retained in memory" (Huber, 1996:150). In the CALL process, senior managers direct the questioning (Thomas et al., 2001). CALL has no ability to enforce implementation of a recommendation so only lessons that present "strategic opportunity" are sought.

The use of "current frames of senior managers to allocate [learning] resources" (Thomas et al, 2001) has costs as well as benefits in terms of the freedom of the system to exploit serendipitous learning. The wash of After Action Reviews commissioned
elsewhere in the military organization also can generate "vanilla" evaluations. The second of two commissioned Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Reviews (BHAAR II) did not survive the wash. It was published separately in *Parameters*, the US Army War College Quarterly (Manwaring, 1998). The open "learning culture" so lauded by learning organization gurus is not as impressive as it seems. Likewise, civilians have expressed a sense that the military in not incorporating the lessons of exercises. A former director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance had this comment:

…there have been a great many military exercises -- a lot of which I attended, and a lot I have heard of -- but I am not sure that as a result of these exercises there is real transferability of information… I don't know if that is built into the system. I know within the various [military and civilian] communities there is a lot of rotation of people. That is inevitable. But, how do we get around the recognition of the fact of rotation and make what you all spend your time learning something that really gets transferred? (NDU Symposium, 1999)

The US military operates a dynamic organizational learning system, but a system that requires triggers to stimulate the feed forward and feedback learning loops. Military commanders commonly draw upon analogies during operations, but we do not understand well what triggers one analogy as opposed to another. For Major General Thomas Montgomery, the operational environment in Somalia triggered memories of his early military experience, saying, "when I closed my eyes, it seemed I was back in Vietnam." That he had for most of the interim career served in Europe, with little expectation to ever again conduct the kind of civil-military operations typical in Vietnam, made this recollection particularly noteworthy (Montgomery, 2001). With the passage of time, there is likely to be less ease of triggering knowledge, unless there is an environmental anomaly that attracts attention.
September 11 and America's Security Paradigm

"Never did we imagine what would take place on Sept. 11, where people used those airplanes as missiles and as weapons." -- Ari Fleisher (in Zakaria, 2002)

It is not wholly true that no one imagined what would take place on September 11, but it is clear that the airplanes that hit the Pentagon and World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 struck with devastating and surprising effect. The attack ground to a halt activity at major centers of national commerce and transportation, notes Peter Chalk (2001) "shattering an image of American invincibility both at home and abroad."

America's self-image has been shaped in part by geopolitics. Bradley Klein (1988) has described the American strategic culture as a "power projection" culture that emphasizes delivery of tremendous destructive power across great distances. Having the luxury of two oceans and over a century of friendly borders, American strategic culture is suited to a great power that prefers to take its battles to the enemy. It is also very insular. There has been surprisingly little discussion of the applicable lessons from the experiences of other military forces with longer histories responding to terrorism (notable exceptions include Sarafino, 2002). For the most part, American analysts have searched America’s own experiences for lessons.

The United States had been struck by terrorists in the past, (indeed the World Trade Center had been struck in the last decade), but this attack was different. The scale of the devastation was a surprise even to its perpetrators. It was a high-consequence event.
One might note, however, that its likelihood of terrorist success diminished within an hour -- the time it took to communicate to passengers on United Airlines Flight 93 that their hostage scenario was not going to end up in negotiations on a tarmac in Cuba. Civilian and military response to the immediate crisis was swift. Within fifteen minutes of the first attack at 8:46 a.m., when American Airlines Flight 11 hit the north tower of the World Trade Center, the national aviation system stopped all departing planes and then at 9:45 the Federal Aviation Administration ordered all planes to land -- an estimated 4,452 at 9:25 that morning -- as soon as possible (Levin et al., 2002). On September 11, there were 14 US military fighter aircraft ready to take off on 10 minutes' notice. By October there were 100. In addition, military fighters, such as F-15s armed with Sidewinder and AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, began regular combat patrols over American cities (Stern, 2001), prepared to shoot down airliners on notice. The National Guard deployed more than 7,000 members to secure airports (Office of Homeland Security, 2002).

On September 27, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that the US was engaged in “a new kind of war” (Rumsfeld, September 27, 2001). Rumsfeld depicted military force as “one of the many tools we use,” citing “electronic combat” as another tool. Rumsfeld’s speech broke from traditional concepts of the enemy to embrace “a global network.” It was a wide sweeping statement, declaring that “even the vocabulary of this war will be different.”

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This section of the paper focuses on US military operations since September 11, including Operation Noble Eagle, guarding the homeland, and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In addition to operations in Afghanistan, there is the camp at Guantanamo, Cuba that holds detainees from the counter-terrorist operations, and military operations in the Philippines and Georgia. To borrow a sports metaphor, these are the home and away games. These fronts in the war on terrorism are also predominantly stability operations. The home game is more challenging because US military experience at home has been of two general varieties: sporadic or distant. The US military has responded from time to time in the event of natural disasters, civil disturbances and labor riots. More sustained engagements in the post-Civil War era are a distant memory. The away game has a more extensive set of experiences to draw upon, given US military participation in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency efforts since World War II.

The Home Game

Almost immediately September 11 introduced a clever reframing of the problem, modifying the military expression "homeland defense" to the more proactive sounding "homeland security." Institution building characterizes the response from the Bush Administration and the US military. The proposed Department of Homeland Security creates a new institutional configuration of federal civilian agencies. For its part, the Department of Defense established Northern Command to integrate its operation in the domestic theater. Military responders in previous internal operations such as the riots and disaster relief have come to appreciate that civilian agencies have the lead, but do not exercise command and control as they know it.
The proposed Homeland Security Department pulls together federal agencies that the military must engage on issues of border security, terrorism prevention, protection of critical infrastructure, and consequence management. Military officers are likely to welcome the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, given past frustrations dealing with comparatively "disorganized" civilian agencies. However, this mechanism does not remove the continuing need for collaboration and information sharing across numerous jurisdictions. The Department does not include state and local agencies, or the private sector that owns much of America's critical infrastructure.

The US government had made a number of attempts to organize a response to the threat of terrorism at least since the Nixon Administration (see Menarchik, 2001). After the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, there was less complacency about the potential for terrorism in the US but countermeasures were problematic. There were problems in determining what was to be protected and at what cost, and who was to be the lead. Even the Bush team, in May 2001, created an Office of National Preparedness, and promised (but did not deliver) a Dick Cheney-led government review into the consequences of a domestic attack (Calabrese et al., 2002).

Nonetheless, policy makers, military officers, intelligence analysts were not blind to the problems of communication and coordination should a domestic incident occur. Top Off in 2000 was a Congressionally funded effort to bring together top officials including federal, state and local responders to exercise together a response to an event. Top Off, like much of the US counter terrorism efforts, focused on the high-threat, low-probability scenario of a weapon of mass destruction. As Peter Chalk observes, the focus
on "high consequence events" ignored the terrorists proven preference for conventional weapons:

[The events on Sept. 11] exposed gaps in current US terrorist threat and consequence management, much of which has stemmed from the misguided assumption that rudimentary conventional attacks represent a lesser contingency that can be easily dealt with in preparations for high-end WMD assaults.

The Bush Administration has yet to produce a national security strategy but produced its *National Strategy for Homeland Security* in July 2002. One of the federal initiatives it promotes is to review the authority for military assistance in domestic security, prompting Congressional debate on altering roles and missions for the armed forces (Mitchell, 2002). The debate has centered on the National Guard, considered part of the military reserves and funded by the federal government. However, except in circumstances such as the Los Angeles riots in 1992 when they are federalized, the Guard belong to state governors. Although the National Guard currently participate in foreign operations, for example, in the NATO Stabilization Force peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, there has been discussion since September 11 about dedicating the National Guard solely to domestic operations.

The establishment of a Homeland Security Department will constitute some of the most significant changes in the US national security organization since the Truman Administration. Initially, Bush sought simply to create a White House office, headed by Tom Ridge, to deal with domestic security. However, critics charged that the office was toothless, without oversight and budget authority. Meanwhile, the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency came under increasing scrutiny. In June of this year, Bush asked Congress to approve a new cabinet department to coordinate intelligence and to
consolidate American responses to terrorist attack. As proposed, Homeland Security would merge 22 federal agencies, including the US Coast Guard, Secret Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, Transportation Security and the Customs Service (Hsu, 2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). Critics of the proposal argue that reorganization is not enough when "the problems are information flow and collaboration" (Hsu, 2002)

The reorganization signifies a consolidation of power in the executive. In addition, it involves an opportunistic move to break civil-service unions of those falling into the reorganization. Also of interest in the expansion of executive power is the Rumsfeld Pentagon directive that “CINC” titles be removed from the Unified Command Plan and that in place of “National Command Authorities,” reference ought to be made separately to the President or the Secretary of Defense (Barrows, 2002).

The liberal democratic norm is to disperse power in order to prevent abuse. The Allies compelled Germany and Japan to decentralize their defense and intelligence systems after World War II for that reason. Centralization of Homeland Security mechanisms is not typical liberal democratic practice but it is a typical pattern of liberal democratic response to trauma.

Laura Donohue observes that the US had "an extensive array of counterterrorism measures" prior to September 11, including legislation enacted after home-grown villains bombed the federal building in Oklahoma City (Alexander, 2001). The dilemma for liberal democratic states, argues Donohue, is that extant measures are not enough, and government response is not enough: the government must "be seen to be responding."
The visible Pentagon response included a proposal in February to create its own structure, namely a new office, to open October 1, 2002, called Northern Command (Northcom). The New York Times proclaimed, "a new theater of operations is defined as within the nation's borders" (Dao, Feb. 6, 2002). Northcom represents a geographic unified command, and thereby unified command structure, for military operations at home. This is not the first unified command plan shift, but some features of the new command are particularly noteworthy.

Northcom elements based in Colorado Springs will assume control of the air defense arrangement with Canada, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and take charge of military air and coastal patrols for homeland defense. The component responsible for military assistance to civil authorities responding to terrorist attacks or natural disasters will reside with the Joint Forces Headquarters Homeland Security (JFHQ) in Norfolk, VA. Air Force General Ralph Eberhart will have the authority to organize, train and operate units, or 'combatant command' authority, over a number of specialized units, including the Joint Task Force Civil Support trained for response to chemical, biological or nuclear weapons attacks, and JTF-6, DoD's counterdrug support unit established in 1989 (Garamone, 2002). In sum, the new structure is really a superstructure that consumes pre-existing initiatives, such as the JTF-Civil Support established by Joint Forces Command.

According to Eric Schmitt, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers "have said that in a catastrophe, the military might help quarantine disaster victims and deal with the water and sanitation needs of thousands of people" (Schmitt, 2002). Such large-scale military operations will
require adjustment by the military. To provide one micro-illustration, "cover me" in police parlance means "have your weapon ready"; in US Marine Corps parlance it means something else. In Los Angeles in 1992 when police requested US marines to "cover" their response to a domestic dispute, marines fired hundreds of bullets into a house where there were children (Delk, 1995: 221-2). For this reason, legitimate civilian police are preferred responders to domestic disturbances (Rasmussen). Are Americans prepared for more wide-ranging internal roles for its military?

The internal use of military forces is unpleasant for a nation that from its inception feared standing armies. This cultural schism is prominent in current debate about widening the role of the military and revising the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act.

The Posse Comitatus Act, expressed in Title 18, US Code, Section 1385, prohibits "except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress" the willful use of "any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws…" As John Brinkerhoff explains it (2002) the Act responded to a post-Civil War power struggle between Congress and US marshals in the South who were pressing Army troops into their service. The Act intended to keep primary the duty of soldiers to a permanent military body. Many have since oversimplified the meaning of Posse Comitatus as prohibiting the use of active military forces in domestic law enforcement altogether.

The US military has a more extensive internal experience than many might think. According to David Adams (1995), between 1866 and 1990 the US military averaged 18 interventions per year. The average number of troops involved averaged 12,000. These figures do not include disaster relief, but they do include internal war against Native
American societies, suppression of labor movements in 'strike wars,' control of urban riots and anti-war demonstrations, as well as civil rights enforcement, quelling prison disturbances, and so on.

The legal tests to determine the use of military regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory power over civilians provide permission for passive and indirect assistance to law enforcement, such as advising law enforcement on a suspect's location, furnishing equipment and services. (Grove, 1999). Paradoxically, given the origins of the Act, permissions apply when the military is not in charge, i.e., when the law enforcement agency such as the FBI originates and remains in control of operations.

In sum, previous US military engagements at home have been ad hoc deployments in support of civil authority. The creation and configuration of Northcom suggests both renewed recognition of the domestic theater of operations and a concerted effort to manage operations in that theater.

**The Away Game**

"Is there another place on the planet where we could drop in a few hundred special ops guys and topple a government?" -- unnamed US general (in Moran, 2002)

In early January of 2001, Richard Clarke, chair of the interagency Counterterrorism Strategy Group (CSG) presented a plan to take on al-Qaeda to the incoming Bush team (Calabresi, et al., 2002). He had been working on counterterrorism plan since the October 2000 bombing of the US Cole in Yemen. The proposals languished for many reasons, including perhaps the Bush team's reluctance to take on a plan developed under Clinton, and the CIA and Pentagon's reluctance to take on a plan
developed in the White House. The reasons almost certainly included the Bush team’s preoccupation with other issues, such as missile defense, relations with Russia and China.

Clarke's plan called for freezing financial assets of the al-Qaeda network; support to nations such as Uzbekistan, the Philippines and Yemen against terrorism; support to Afghan elements taking on the Taliban regime (this would also engage graduates of terrorism training camps on the front lines alongside their host regime); US military air strikes against al-Qaeda training camps; and introduction of special operations forces.

These proposals, according to a senior Bush Administration official, amount to "everything we've done since 9/11" (Calabrese, et al., p. 31). America's thirst for vengeance after the attacks put American troops into Afghanistan and elsewhere in a global war on terror. There is much about this front that is noteworthy.

George W. Bush in his campaign for the presidency in 2000 belittled the Clinton Administration's use of military forces in "nation-building," and Al Gore's proposed "Marshall Plan" for the Balkans. Bush's position during the presidential debates likely echoed the general sentiment of US military officers:

Mr. Bush – “…I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation building. I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.”

Mr. Gore – “…This idea of nation-building is kind of a pejorative phrase, but think about …World War II.

…[I] in the aftermath of our great victory in World War II, we laid down the Marshall Plan, President Truman did: we got intimately involved in building NATO and other structures there…And what did we do in the 40’s and 50’s and 60’s? We were nation-building. And it was economic. But it was also military.” (“The 2000 Campaign”)

On April 17 2002 in Lexington Virginia, President Bush called for a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan (Bush, April 18, 2002; Dao, April 18, 2002). The President told cadets at the Virginia Military Institute that "true peace" would not be achieved without
reconstruction support to Afghanistan. Warfighting commander General Tommy Franks, although complaining that he would be quoted as discussing nation-building (Rumsfeld, Aug. 15, 2002), said recently that the US was committed to as much: "The real problem, in my view, in Afghanistan is not security. It is rather the challenge of bolstering the new government." Franks admitted that US troops would be in Afghanistan for years (Burns, August 16, 2002). As of August 2002, there were about 8,000 US members of an international coalition in Afghanistan, hunting al-Qaeda, training an Afghan national army, and providing civil services. Not surprisingly, the US has sought to lean upon allies, namely the International Security Assistance Force. By March of 2002 more than half the foreign forces in Afghanistan were non-US (Bush, March 11, 2002). Few foreign troops of any sort were found outside of Kabul.

*Operation Enduring Freedom* includes a number of organizational surprises, like the decision to give the Marine Corps the role of securing an airbase south of Kandahar, "a beachhead a thousand miles from the beach," as an officer described it (Moran, 2002). The USMC typically "kicks open the door" for the regular Army, as the latter has a better tail to teeth ratio for sustained missions. More significant yet is the prominence of Special Operations Forces in the war on terror.

Special Operations Forces differ from conventional units because they are smaller, quickly deployed, self-reliant, and trained with unconventional warfare skills (like deception) and area skills including language ability and cultural sensitivity. According to a study of United States Special Operations Forces, "counterterrorism and unconventional warfare are strictly special operations" (Collins, 1994). Previously, SOF suffered from some neglect in the larger military organizational structure. These forces
constitute a small percentage of the total US military force. SOF refers to five groups (or six, depending upon the status of the supposedly secret Delta Force): Army Rangers, Special Forces (Green Berets), Navy SEALs, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations. The first three SOF are often regarded as elitist by others in their own services, and the last two are considered to be not warfighting enough. Career advancement has not matched that of the regular combat arms.

Congress, observing notable military failures in low intensity conflict operations during the Iran hostage rescue attempt and again in Grenada, and frustrated with the military services siphoning off special operations funding for conventional forces, mandated the creation of the United States Special Operations Command in 1986 (Public Law 99-661, Section 1311, "the Cohen-Nunn Amendment"). Congress deemed more legislation as necessary to move bureaucratic arrangements forward within the Department of Defense for its new Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict unit. A snapshot of SOF activities in 1993 identified 151 missions involving 2517 personnel in 40 countries and 22 states (Collins, 1995: 98-105). A firefight in the fall of 1993 in Somalia that killed 18 SOF and wounded 73 precipitated the US withdrawal from peacekeeping there.

Due to the perceived success of the Afghanistan mission, Richard Melanson at the National War College says, "Being special is all the rage right now…and you can expect every branch to be emphasizing its own 'special' capabilities" (in Moran, 2002). Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seems interested in making the SOF more special yet. Rumsfeld wants Special Operations units to expand their involvement in clandestine activities that have to date been undertaken by the CIA under Congressional scrutiny
(Shanker and Risen, 2002). The CIA and Special Forces on the ground in Afghanistan worked together in a weapons buy-back program to acquire Stinger missiles. In the past, troops have been assigned to CIA-led programs. For example, in Vietnam, Green Berets and the CIA worked closely on foreign army training and unconventional warfare projects. The Green Beret role in Afghanistan recently expanded to include providing personal security for President Hamid Karzai, after the murder of a vice president in Kabul July 6, 2002. The move caused some concern that Karzai would "appear even more in the American pocket" (Gall, 2002), even though the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul announced a program to train bodyguards for cabinet ministers, and a Karzai spokesman emphasized that US Special Forces would be working with Afghan counterparts.

One field reporter has characterized Special Operations as "the vanguard of a novel Pentagon mission" who demonstrate "how much the US military has learned from rocky attempts at keeping the peace in Somalia and the Balkans in the 1990s…how the Pentagon…is embracing a more holistic view of what is necessary to declare victory in modern war." (Peterson, March 1, 2002). Another New York Times correspondent writes that "Just as the intensive use of Special Forces to turn the tide in Afghanistan is rewriting American War-fighting doctrine, so are their current efforts stretching Army Special Forces doctrine" (Shanker, January 7, 2002).

The military reorganization for the fight ought not to be exaggerated. The "high-tech, out-of-harm's-way strategy" that characterizes America's approach to air campaigns ruled the day again in Afghanistan, causing the loss of hundreds of civilian lives (Filkins,
Certainly the civilian casualties resulting from the air war ought to have been anticipated to undermine any efforts to win hearts and minds.

If the air war was more of what would have been predicted, there are nonetheless signs that Central Command has innovated in the Afghanistan mission. As early as October 2001, Centcom invited UN and other civilian groups to headquarters in Tampa for consultation. According to the military these meetings did not get far because civilian agencies, many of them suspicious of military participation in humanitarian projects, requested only military extraction in the event of trouble. Other reports suggest that the civilian input was not effectively integrated into the dominant military planning structures. However, the effort does suggest that the military has learned about the importance of coordination with international agencies and non-governmental organizations.

Surprisingly, US bearded SOF in Afghanistan were seen attired in jeans, boots and scarves, pistols beneath their sweatshirts and radio antennae sticking out from their backpacks. One official explained that military experience has shown the uniform to be "a barrier" to relations with civilian agencies in the Bosnia and Kosovo (Peterson, 2002). American soldiers in civilian clothing caused complaint by European agencies and the NGO CARE International, who did not want military personnel to be confused with relief workers. The Commander of the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (Chickmotif) General David Kratzer argued that civilian dress is the only way to ensure the safety of his troops (Glasser, 2002). The Chickmotif arrived in at the end of December. The “Chicklets” as they are nicknamed, are some of the teams operating outside of Kabul, made up of four to six soldiers. Their pattern of operations is familiar in
US military doctrine; their size is not dissimilar to the military government teams that followed combat forces in the wake of World War II. A frustration expressed by civilian relief workers in March was that the military effort includes continuing violence and seems to be focused both on the short term and on bolstering the interim government (Glasser, 2002).

The away game is notably not isolated to Afghanistan. The front has opened up: the US sent 500 troops to the Philippines, trainers to the Republic of Georgia, and provided training and equipment to Yemen to help prevent that nation from becoming "a haven for terrorists" (Bush, March 11, 2002). Likewise, after September 11, the US approach to its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia changed. Then Bosnia High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch said in late September that after the 9/11 attacks the US commanders of the NATO force in Bosnia "started acting like American generals" (Kaminski, March 15, 2002). American troops raided a number of targets, including the Saudi High Commission in Sarajevo (where they seized a computer with programs about how to fly crop-dusting planes and how to fake US Embassy identification badges). Americans picked up six Algerians and transported them to the detention facility, Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Cuba. September 11 has lessons for peacekeeping, according to Wall Street Journal correspondent Matthew Kaminski: "the good news is that Bosnia, a child of the Clinton era, has now become central to the Bush Doctrine's commitment to make sure weak states don't fall into terrorist hands again." (Kaminski, 2002). The US quickly led the drive for Bosnians to set up a border security service.

The new energy in American military operations follows a series of military frustrations with peacekeeping missions. From the military perspective, peacekeeping
requires dealing with multiple civilian authorities. Civilian direction has been criticized for its lack of clarity; or alternatively, for its micromanagement (which implies the reverse). Peacekeeping requires restrictive rules of engagement and an appearance of impartiality. Security building in Afghanistan did not come with these restrictions. Blatant self-interest is a powerful motivator. Michael Ignatieff declares, “America’s entire war on terror is an exercise in imperialism,” asking, “what else can you call America’s legions of soldiers, spooks and Special Forces straddling the globe?” (Ignatieff, 2002). Although the term has more restrictive definitions, Ignatieff’s use refers to a broader definition of imperialism as a “practice by which powerful nations or peoples seek to extend and maintain control or influence over weaker nations or peoples” (Mastanduno, 2002). At the same time that the scope of American military intervention seems objectionable in Ignatieff’s critique, his greater objection seems to be the lack of depth of the nation-building: “…the Bush Administration wants to do this on the cheap, at the lowest level of investment and risk. In Washington they call this nation-building lite” (Ignatieff, 2002, p. 28). The US has failed to learn the lesson from the Balkans, he argues, that the rule of law must be built in from the beginning, or international aid becomes fodder for locals to skim, fueling cycles of corruption and waste. That is, supposing that the humanitarian mission in Afghanistan is more than window-dressing on America’s effort to rout terrorism suspects.

In sum, the military has largely used existing assets and methods in its war on terror abroad. The use of SOF in Afghanistan is not far removed from anything described in Special Operations doctrine (JP 3-05, 1998). The Chickmotif in Afghanistan is simply a new name for an old form of Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC) mechanism as established in other stability operations. Whether their use is “rewriting war-fighting doctrine” (Shanker, January 7, 2002) is another question. The application of extant doctrine is in this case more interesting than the writing of new doctrine.

**Conclusion**

The challenge of learning from September 11 seems in part to have been a challenge of learning for those events. Based upon my survey, I must conclude that the attack on September 11 was a critical incident that triggered efforts within the US military to dig into previous experiences for insights relevant to the new war. Despite an alleged cultural proclivity toward power projection, the military adjusted its focus to consider domestic requirements and sent lighter more specialized forces into key foreign operations.

The past offered a mixed bag of lessons for the war on terror. Internal military operations in the past had been sporadic or long ago, and left the US military seeking to avoid commitments at home. Peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations were more recent but also left the military seeking to avoid commitment to stability operations. However unpalatable these experiences, they were vital to US military recognition of some key civil-military relationships in stability operations at home and abroad, with US civilian agencies, intergovernmental, non-governmental, and foreign governmental actors.

The organizational learning literature anticipates that "single-loop" learning processes should be more common. A more fundamental change, like reconsideration of the efficacy of the use of force, did not seem to make the agenda. The long-term potential
of the war against terror was hardly questioned as the US military was deployed to retaliate for the September 11 attacks. A reconsideration of “the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses” (Johnston, p. 46) seemed at first to be a substantive cultural consequence of the attacks, except that the consolidation of power and the hardening of infrastructure at home, and the application of force abroad to bolster friendly regimes seems such familiar strategy.

The pattern of military behavior since September 11 in general is better described as exploitation of existing competencies rather than exploration for new strategic advantages (March, 1991). The US military has appeared to be responding, by creating the structure of Northern Command, for example, but whether this action reflects a bold step forward in light of a reconstructed sense of purpose in not evident.

Politics and an external shock seem to have created an opportunity for application of streams of thought within the US military about the potential of special operations forces. Here the personnel changes within the military, and the emergence of a generation that has for the most part experienced stability operations might be part of the explanation. The effort to uncover military organizational learning is a good exercise for identifying a number of ways in which the military as an organization is a system in which parts interact with the whole. In the story of learning and September 11, it is difficult to sort out just who did what sort of learning. For some elements, the change was simply incremental improvement in established routines. The paradigm change, if there was one, was in the activation of those routines.
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Figure 1

US National Command Authority