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11 September 2001 is a day we will never forget. The unprovoked attacks on New York and Washington resulted in the loss of thousands of innocent lives.

Following these attacks, and the potential they demonstrated for the use by our adversaries of asymmetric action to achieve strategic effect, I announced that we would look again at the United Kingdom’s defence posture and plans.

The work I set in hand was not designed to look at all aspects of Defence: the attacks last September did not require that. It has not, for example looked closely at the full range of personnel issues. That was why I said from the outset that the work would be a New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review and not a new review. We have undertaken to publish a full Defence White Paper in the course of each Parliament and intend to publish such a paper in 2003 which will cover more comprehensively the range of Defence issues.

Whilst the work has examined some fundamental issues, we have not been starting from a blank sheet. The Strategic Defence Review, published in 1998, set us firmly on the right track, as borne out by operations since then in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor and in and around Afghanistan. The emphasis on expeditionary operations, usually working with our allies, has enabled the UK to have a key role in shaping the international security environment.

The New Chapter, and the actions undertaken by our Armed Forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere following the attacks on 11 September are, of course, just a part of the Government’s efforts to eliminate terrorism as a force in international affairs. The Government has launched a range of initiatives involving political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement, as well as military, measures. And we have worked closely with a wide range of other countries and international organisations, as part of the overall international response.

Through the extensive involvement of other Government Departments – for example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Cabinet Office (including the Civil Contingencies Secretariat), the Treasury, the Department for International Development, the Department for Transport and the intelligence agencies – we have sought to ensure that our New Chapter conclusions take into account, and inform, cross-government thinking and initiatives.

The Strategic Defence Review was praised for its openness and inclusivity. It was important that we carried this approach through to the New Chapter. In February we published a discussion paper and sought contributions to our thinking from the public and a wide range of other interested
parties. I am grateful to the many who responded and for the largely supportive nature of their contributions. I can assure them that their ideas have informed our thinking.

Our proposals on the role of the Reserves in home defence and security – published on 12 June – are an example of this. We developed these proposals in close consultation with the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers to best determine what types of capabilities they might request in the future from the Armed Forces in an impending or actual crisis.

These proposals will also assist in preventing terrorists from tying down our Regular forces at home. We must retain the ability rapidly to deploy significant, credible forces overseas. It is much better to engage our enemies in their backyard than in ours, at a time and place of our choosing and not theirs. But opportunities to engage terrorist groups may be only fleeting, so we need the kind of rapidly deployable intervention forces which were the key feature of the SDR.

Our Armed Forces have shown particular strengths in these types of operations in high risk environments - as recently demonstrated in Macedonia and Afghanistan. Such operations will require the controlled, precise and rapid delivery of military effect particularly through what is called “network-centric capability”, bringing together sensors and strike assets. The outcome of Spending Review 2002, with the biggest sustained real increase in Defence spending plans for 20 years, will enable us to make the investment necessary to acquire these sorts of capabilities. And we have particular strengths in providing assistance to other countries to build their own capabilities, through defence diplomacy activities.

Experience since 1998, and since the 11 September attacks, suggests that we may need to deploy forces further afield than Europe, the Gulf and the Mediterranean (which the SDR identified as the primary focus of our interests) more often than we had envisaged. The international response to the attacks does not require the UK to undertake or participate in all operations, but we need to take our share of the tasks and responsibilities which may present themselves. In particular, 11 September and its aftermath underlined the importance of the transatlantic relationship. From the outset, we demonstrated by our actions our wish to work closely with our most important ally, the US. Our ability to operate alongside the US (and with other partners, particularly in Europe but also elsewhere) will be key to future success.

This White Paper is by no means the end of the story. Our work to date has been conducted against a changing strategic and operational backdrop. The world changed on 11 September, but there are no doubt more twists and turns to come to which we must be ready to respond.
1.1 Why a New Chapter?

1. In the wake of the shocking attacks in New York and Washington last September, the Secretary of State for Defence announced that work would be undertaken on a New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) published in 1998. This work would look again at our defence posture and plans to ensure that we have the right concepts, the right capabilities and the right forces to meet the additional challenges we now face.

2. We were clear from the outset that the SDR provided a firm foundation on which to build and that the direction which it had set for Defence, together with lessons learnt subsequently from, for example, the Kosovo campaign in 1999, continued to be broadly right. That was why the work was deliberately designed as a New Chapter rather than a new review.

3. The SDR focussed on capabilities and structures for expeditionary operations, and the need to enhance them. Experience since — in the Balkans, in Sierra Leone, in East Timor and in and around Afghanistan — demonstrates how right that was.

4. The SDR recognised the existence of asymmetric threats.
(defined as the threat of an attack by unconventional methods which would have a disproportionate effect). It pointed out that “there are also new risks which threaten our security by attacking our way of life … we have seen new and horrifying forms of terrorism … there is an increasing danger from the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical technologies”. But, whereas the SDR saw these potential asymmetric threats as one of a range of tactics that an adversary might use, the attacks on the US on 11 September have shown that such action has the potential for strategic effect. It is this development that has prompted the work we are now undertaking.

1.2 Cross-Government and International Framework

5. Our work is one part of a much wider effort across Government in the aftermath of 11 September, with the overall goal of eliminating terrorism as a force for change in international affairs. And the UK’s efforts are part of a wider international response. The Government and, within that, the Ministry of Defence, have already taken a wide range of steps, some of which are set out in Section 3 of the Supporting Information and Analysis published with this White Paper. Political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, financial, intelligence and law enforcement, as well as military, measures have been and will continue to be deployed.

1.3 Questions the New Chapter Has Addressed/
Responses to Discussion Paper

6. In February, we published a discussion paper which posed a set of questions, such as:

- how should we strike a balance between the defence role in helping to protect the UK, and contributing to overseas operations?

- in the medium to long term, what balance should the UK seek to strike between contributing Armed Forces, on the one hand, to help address the symptoms of terrorism and, on the other, to assist in efforts to address the causes of terrorism?

- are there ways in which military support to the civil authorities could be improved?

- in terms of operations overseas, what is the right balance between operations to disrupt potential threats, find-and-strike operations and stabilisation operations?

- do we need to be able to deploy more of our forces more rapidly to counter terrorism worldwide?

- should the UK aim to specialise in particular forms of capability or operations as a contribution to operations with allies or concentrate on particular geographic areas?

- What are the roles of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union in tackling international terrorism?

7. The discussion paper sought responses to these questions from the public and a wide range of other interested parties. The responses we have received are summarised in more detail in Section 8 of the Supporting Information and Analysis, but some of the key themes running through them were:

- support for the Strategic Defence Review and the work on the New Chapter;

- support for the Armed Forces’ focus on operating abroad, and a view that rapid effect and high readiness are crucial;
• support for the Armed Forces playing a role in preventing terrorist attacks in the UK and the
correction that the Reserves could make to home defence and security;

• the importance of cross-Government co-ordination;

• and the role that international organisations such as the UN, NATO and the EU have in
combating international terrorism.

8. This White Paper gives some answers to the questions we posed, which fit with many of the
views and concerns expressed in response to the discussion paper.
9. Experience shows that it is better where possible, to engage an enemy at longer range, before they get the opportunity to mount an assault on the UK. Not only is this more effective than waiting to be attacked at a point and timing of an enemy’s choosing, but it can have a deterrent effect. We must therefore continue to be ready and willing to deploy significant forces overseas and, when legally justified, to act against terrorists and those who harbour them.

10. Before looking at whether there are changes we need to make to the posture and capabilities of our forces, we have sought to understand better what our Armed Forces can achieve in countering threats abroad, and what sort of operations they might be engaged in. In assessing potential roles, we recognise that we have a range of powerful non-military tools which will often be the first choice to help achieve our aims, but that there will be circumstances where we need to back these up with military forces.

11. Key conclusions from our analysis include:

• we must aim for "knowledge superiority" over international terrorists to anticipate their plans and ensure the most effective combination of effects to counter their attacks;

• the main sorts of military effect we can bring to bear are to prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt or destroy our opponents. These effects are described in more detail in Section 6 of the Supporting Information and Analysis;

• these effects may be applied both against international terrorist organisations directly, and, where necessary, against state regimes that support or sponsor them;

• we must now be ready to counter terrorists who acquire chemical, biological, radiological and perhaps nuclear devices.

2.1 Where Should We Focus Our Efforts in Countering Terrorism Abroad?

12. Of course, whatever action we take in response to a particular threat will depend on the nature of that threat. Not all cases will require military or defence activity. In some of those that do, defence diplomacy or peace support might be enough. In others, robust military action will be required. We want to be able to contribute to the range of actions in the framework of effects we have identified - prevent (including stabilise), deter, coerce, disrupt, destroy. But we are very conscious of the need not to place unsustainable demands on the members of the Armed Forces and their families, and we have considered where our particular strengths lie, and therefore where we should place particular emphasis.

13. We have strengths in both find-and-strike operations (ie, in terms of the framework of effects, operations to coerce, disrupt and, potentially, destroy) and prevention/stabilisation operations. Although British forces must be ready for combat in a wide range of situations (including,
potentially, in prevention/stabilisation operations), find-and-strike operations in particular require high intensity and integrated warfighting capacity, and the intelligence and politico-military decision-making capacity to act with speed and decisiveness. Only a few countries have this capacity at present. In the case of stabilisation operations, our particular strength is perhaps in the early and more demanding phases as seen in Kabul this year and Macedonia in 2001, although our other Balkans commitments indicate clearly that – when it is called for – we are far from being short-term operators.

14. Recent US and UK operations in Afghanistan illustrate the kind of operations we may face in the future. They have occasionally presented opportunities for direct attack, but the cordoning and searching of terrain, and the destruction of hiding places and military equipment, also help deny terrorists the opportunity to organise and operate in Afghanistan. The phasing, scale and tempo may all differ from those of operations against a more conventional opponent. And the success of such operations may be measured more by our success in exploiting fleeting opportunities and deterring and disrupting future terrorist activity than by any decisive pitched battle.

15. Section 2.4 below examines in more detail the demands of operations abroad to coerce, disrupt and destroy potential opponents, and some of the types of capability that operations of this kind may call for. But first we consider how the Armed Forces can contribute to prevention and deterrence.

2.2 Prevention

16. Countering terrorism is usually a long term business requiring the roots and causes to be addressed as well as the symptoms. The Government is well placed to help less capable states build a society in which terrorism is less likely to emerge, through our conflict prevention (including defence diplomacy) activities. By undertaking peace support operations, usually in coalition with others, we can prevent instability or assist in stabilisation. And by training other states’ armed forces, we can transfer our military skills so that they can eventually do the job themselves. Where prevention has failed and we have engaged in coercive or destructive activities, we should be prepared to assist in post-conflict recovery, to help create the conditions for stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of the state supporting or harbouring terrorists in the future.

17. The Government has committed significant additional resources to improved conflict prevention, management and resolution, and has established cross-Departmental budgets to enable a more joined-up approach. Within this framework, the Government is developing strategies to cover many of the key trouble spots or potential trouble spots in the world, and to support measures such as security sector reform and promoting post-conflict recovery which will help address some of the key underlying causes of international terrorism in regions such as the Middle East, South Asia and Afghanistan.
18. For example, in 2002 the Government is funding a major programme of initiatives of security sector reform in Afghanistan. The MOD will offer its expertise for a wide range of activities to be carried out with Afghan and international partners, and in co-ordination with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

19. Our defence diplomacy activities have a key role to play. For example, our provision of training to other countries has already proved its worth in terms of improving the effectiveness and interoperability of other nations’ forces – including the forces of countries at risk from terrorism – and is also a highly effective component in contributing to building long term relationships. In future, in determining our relative priorities in defence relations with other countries, we will want to give higher priority than hitherto to the potential demands of operations to counter terrorism, and the potential for particular countries to be partners, and to provide support.
Deterrence

20. Recent events have emphasised that attacks resulting in severe casualties or grave damage may come from many directions and use many methods. We must seek to deter any use of weapons of mass destruction against us, our interests, or our Allies, but also any other attacks that cause (or intend) mass casualties or grave damage to the economy, the environment, government or the fabric of society.

21. The UK’s nuclear weapons have a continuing use as a means of deterring major strategic military threats, and they have a continuing role in guaranteeing the ultimate security of the UK. But we also want it to be clear, particularly to the leaders of states of concern and terrorist organisations, that all our forces play a part in deterrence, and that we have a broad range of responses available. We must influence leaderships by showing that we are prepared to take all necessary measures to defend ourselves. Where necessary, military and other action will be taken to disrupt the political, economic, military and technical means by which aggression is pursued. We want it to be clear that the UK, along with our partners, can reach into the way they operate, and that they could lose their power, and see their organisations closed down.

22. We have made clear that our responses will be proportionate and in accordance with our international legal obligations. But we will not let the less scrupulous think we do not mean business, or simplify an aggressor’s calculations by announcing how we would respond in particular circumstances. The only certainty we should offer is that we shall respond appropriately if we need to, using any of the wide range of options open to us. It should be clear that legally the right to self defence includes the possibility of action in the face of an imminent attack.

23. We must therefore maintain a wide and flexible range of military options, including conventional weapons with a capacity for precision and penetration so as to minimise incidental damage. We should focus too on more specialised capabilities, including, where legally justified, the scope to detain persons and bring them to justice.

24. But, crucially, our deterrent extends well beyond the military dimension to a response co-ordinated across Government and with friends and allies. We should ensure that our preparedness to deal with terrorism is understood and, more widely, be able to institute effective political, financial, economic and legal sanctions on states and individuals. Creating the right international climate will be important, fostering the view in all cultures that certain actions are to be condemned as criminal acts. This will often mean acting through the UN Security Council, the European Union or other appropriate international organisations.

25. The UK has a wide range of capabilities at home and abroad, including excellent military forces. We will use all our resources to thwart the activities of aggressors, reduce their chances of success, and make sure that the UK can take action to defend itself effectively against attacks on us, our Overseas Territories, or our allies. The international community will co-operate in pursuing aggressors, and bringing them to justice. Aggression against us will not secure political or military advantage, but invite a proportionately serious response. Those, at every level, responsible for any breach of international law relating to the use of weapons of mass destruction will be held personally accountable.

2.3 Operations Abroad: Some Planning Considerations

(i) Geography

26. It is likely that, if anything, the trend (which we recognized and planned for in the SDR) towards expeditionary operations – such as those in recent years in the Balkans, in Sierra Leone, in East Timor and in and around Afghanistan – will become even more pronounced. While the core regions identified in the SDR of Europe, the Gulf and the Mediterranean are likely to remain the
primary focus of our interests, it is increasingly clear that a coherent and effective campaign against international terrorism – and indeed other contingencies – may require engagement further afield more often than perhaps we had previously assumed.

27. We need to assess what share of the task we should take on. When we decide to be involved, we will generally be operating alongside coalition partners, with the US often in the lead. But, in other cases, our friends and partners in the region concerned will undertake operations, and there will not be UK military involvement.

(ii) Local Infrastructure Support

28. Our analysis suggests that, while operating at greater range may have some implications for our planning and expeditionary logistics capabilities, the availability and quality of local infrastructure, and the speed of response needed, are more important factors than simple distance. The future may see us engaged in a greater range of situations often with – at best – limited local infrastructure.

29. Our ability to operate in a particular theatre rests on a variety of factors:

- whether the theatre is close to the UK, or to UK Overseas Territories, or to allied countries, from which we might be able to launch operations;
- the probability of securing the necessary infrastructure support in strategically positioned countries within or near the theatre. This in turn is likely to rest on a number of factors, including:
  - the defence relationship we have built up, over the long term, with the country or countries in question;
  - the political context for possible military action;
- whether there is ready access to the theatre by sea.
30. Diplomacy (including defence diplomacy) has a potentially important role here both in terms of building and sustaining long term strategic relationships which increase the likelihood of countries providing supporting infrastructure for our forces and those of allies in a crisis; and in terms of increasing the numbers of allies and partners who are willing to make military contributions to the resolution of crises, and in some cases to take a lead. Operations in and around Afghanistan have demonstrated the practical military value of long-standing, as well as more recent, international military relationships.

(iii) Concurrency and Scale

31. The capability of our forces is strained not just by the scale of operations, but by the number of simultaneous or near-simultaneous operations. Since the SDR we have assumed that we should plan to be able to undertake either a single major operation (of a similar scale and duration to our contribution to the Gulf War in 1990-91), or undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale (as in the mid-1990s in Bosnia), while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment – which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces – if this were made necessary by a second crisis. We would not, however, expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than 6 months.

32. But our analysis suggests that, in some respects – particularly for enabling assets like deployable headquarters, communications and deployed logistical support – several smaller scale operations are potentially more demanding than one or two more substantial operations. And there are now signs that frequent, smaller operations are becoming the pattern. It may well be (as has been the case in Afghanistan) that we will need to undertake find-and-strike operations at the same time as prevention or stabilisation operations, and these operations may be (unlike in Afghanistan) in widely geographically separated locations. So we need to take account of that, and ensure that we have sufficient critical enabling assets to support anticipated levels of concurrency.

2.4 Operations Abroad: Capabilities

33. We have analysed a set of plausible and realistic scenarios, to assess the demands we may face in countering terrorism overseas. This has not been a dry academic exercise: we have borne in mind the lessons being learned “in real time” from operations in Afghanistan, and other recent operations. The specific implications of particular scenarios can be highly case-dependent and are unlikely to be replicated precisely in real life. But we can draw general conclusions about the capabilities that may be particularly important. These are generally capabilities with wider utility for other operations as well. So, even if international terrorism turns out not to be an enduring challenge, we will not be taking our forces and capabilities up a strategic “dead end”.

34. Our conclusions show that the SDR was generally taking our Armed Forces in the right direction but reinforce the growing importance we already attach to what is called “network-centric capability”. This concept (see Box below) emerged substantially in the 1991 Gulf conflict, which demonstrated how precision weapons and shared information technologies could be linked together to produce devastating military effects with unparalleled speed and accuracy. The pace of change, led by the US, has continued to accelerate.
Network-Centric Capability

35. Network-centric capability encompasses the elements required to deliver controlled and precise military effect rapidly and reliably. At its heart are three elements: sensors (to gather information); a network (to fuse, communicate and exploit the information); and strike assets to deliver military effect. The key is the ability to collect, fuse and disseminate accurate, timely and relevant information with much greater rapidity (sometimes in a matter of only minutes, or even in "real time") to help provide a common understanding among commanders at all levels.

36. The benefits include:

- greater precision in the control of operations;
- greater precision in the application of force, resulting from better targeting information and the ability to update and disseminate it in near real time;
- greater rapidity of effect, through shortening the time required to assimilate information, take decisions, and act upon them;
- greater force protection, resulting from better "situational awareness" as well as from specific defensive measures.

37. Each of these aspects has particular salience in the context of operations to counter terrorism overseas, and our thinking on each, including on how we might enhance and develop our capabilities, is set out in further detail below.

38. Our capabilities, strongly supported by our science and technology programmes, are moving in the right direction, but we will accelerate and want to increase our investment in network-centric capabilities. We are already investing in a range of sensors, including airborne stand-off surveillance (for example, Nimrod MRA4, ASTOR and RAPTOR); battlefield unmanned air vehicles; and battlefield electronic warfare capabilities (SOOTHSAYER).

39. Similarly, we are already investing in the network, both in terms of communications assets (including BOWMAN, FALCON, and tacticaldatalinks) and in terms of information processing. We have, and are developing, information systems applications which collate, fuse, analyse and control the distribution of information, and it is in this area that some of the most important advances can be made.

40. The final pieces of a networked capability are those assets and capabilities that deliver the desired effect. These may be precision attack capabilities (eg Tomahawk land attack missiles fired from submarines, precision bombs from aircraft, Storm Shadow cruise missiles and further precision air-launched and artillery weapons due to come into service in the near future) or troop on the ground. However, they may also, for example, be information operations (designed to influence an adversary’s decision-making in a favourable direction), which now play an increasingly important role in achieving the effect traditionally delivered by force.

41. This means that, in future, it will be less useful to try to measure combat power in crude terms of numbers of platforms and people than in terms of our ability to deliver specific effects, with a robust network at the core, linking key capabilities and enabling force multipliers.

The FIST (Future Integrated Soldier Technology) programme aims to transform the capabilities of the individual infantryman.
(i) 

**Precision of Control**

42. Terrorist organisations are very difficult to identify, locate, quantify, monitor and target. Whereas there is a considerable amount of reliable data on the armed forces of nation states, this information about terrorists is much more difficult to acquire and evaluate. This presents particular challenges in the management of operations at all levels – for those providing political and strategic direction no less than for tactical commanders on the ground.

43. There is no magic solution to this problem. But it does reinforce the importance of maximising our ability to acquire, process and disseminate information. Our capacity to absorb and exploit large quantities of raw data and transform it rapidly into the direction of military action is a key advantage that we hold over any terrorist group. We will therefore seek continuing improvements in this area, in close co-operation with other Departments and agencies. We want to ensure that we fully exploit the opportunities for synergy between different information collection systems, and look for scope to accelerate the process of converting raw data into actionable intelligence that can be relayed quickly to inform the decision makers and to commanders in theatre.

*The highly capable new Apache attack helicopter*
(ii) Precision in the Application of Force

44. In post-Cold War conventional military operations there has been an increased emphasis on the need for precision in the use of force, to minimise unintended casualties and accidental damage. Counter-terrorist operations are likely to pose particular problems in this respect. Our opponents may be few in number, and highly mobile, presenting difficult and fleeting targets. They may be intermingled with a non-combatant population, possibly in areas of high population density; or they may be holed up in inaccessible locations which make conventional military assaults especially risky. In future they may have chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices. Equally, there may be no clear “front lines” separating our opponents from our own forces or those of coalition partners.

45. In these circumstances, the ability to conduct covert stand-off reconnaissance and surveillance, the accurate pin-pointing of targets, the updating and communication of targeting information in near real time, and the ability to strike hard with a high degree of precision, will all be important. We are now evaluating additional enhancements to our target acquisition and strike capabilities. Although it is not our practice to comment in detail on Special Forces’ capabilities, we can confirm that we are also planning to enhance the capabilities of our Special Forces and their enablers to maximise their utility and flexibility. We also plan accelerated investment in unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) as set out in the Box below. And, while detailed techniques will have to remain secret, the challenge posed by potential acquisition of CBRN devices by terrorists is now reflected in our planning.

Unmanned Air Vehicles

46. A key element in network-centric capability involves the use of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), equipped with appropriate payloads and data links. The US demonstrated in Afghanistan how effective such systems can be in providing persistent surveillance of the battlefield or theatre of operations, without putting aircrew lives at risk. Our own Watchkeeper project has the same purpose; and we intend to accelerate the programme.

47. UAVs offer huge potential for improving operational effectiveness, in a range of different situations and environments. We cannot anticipate all their capabilities and uses — or indeed limitations — ahead of putting them in the operators’ hands. Our own experience of the Phoenix system in the Balkans was instructive. Designed and deployed as an observation system for artillery, it rapidly proved its utility in a much broader surveillance role.

48. Accordingly, we have decided to establish a joint-Service UAV operational development unit, in which personnel from all three Services will acquire early experience of exploiting such systems, in different configurations and conditions and with different payloads. Details of the composition and location of the unit are still being developed, but we expect to select next month the two consortia to work with us on the next phase of the Watchkeeper project, and we shall invite each of them to provide us with an appropriate prototype system in short order, to enable practical experimentation to begin in the first part of next year. Lessons and experience can then be fed back into refining our requirements and understanding of UAVs’ potential as the Watchkeeper programme develops.
49. We must expect terrorist groups to avoid pitched battles against modern armed forces, and operations against them may often last months or years rather than days and weeks. Such operations may often consist primarily of the harrying and disruption of our opponents without producing a clear-cut outcome, in the form of a recognisable military defeat or surrender.

50. This does not mean, however, that we should resign ourselves to a strategy of containment. The successful engagement of terrorists, even if only on a small scale, and the destruction of their infrastructure, may weaken and demoralise the opposition. Tactical successes may also be important in bolstering the confidence and resolve of local populations or neighbouring states.

The challenge, therefore, is to be able to seize the fleeting and infrequent opportunities that may arise for this sort of engagement. In part, this depends upon capabilities already discussed above – the acquisition and rapid dissemination of information which can be used to cue precision strike attacks.

51. But it also requires the ability to deploy and redeploy rapidly, and it has potential implications for the mix of forces that are used. For instance, some theatres and scenarios, like Afghanistan, may point towards the use of rapidly deployable light forces rather than armoured or mechanised forces and artillery: and we are examining ways of providing such forces with improved mobility and firepower. Operations in Afghanistan have again demonstrated the key role played by support helicopters. And, as part of our move towards more rapidly deployable forces, we are also pursuing the concept of a Future Rapid Effect System, a family of air-transportable medium-weight armoured vehicles. We will also be accelerating the introduction of additional temporary deployed accommodation for our troops, and further improving its hot weather capability.

52. We have also looked at how to improve the flexibility and responsiveness of support to naval forces and are now establishing the Maritime Afloat Reach and Sustainability project. Current thinking includes a fleet of new design ships, that are faster and more able to adapt to a number of different roles than our current single role supporting shipping.

(iv) Force Protection

53. Since the capabilities of terrorist groups are often difficult to assess and quantify, there will be some uncertainty about the types of threat that such groups may pose to our forces when they deploy. Hand-held anti-air weapons may be a particular threat. So improvements to the defensive aids available to our aircraft and helicopters are a high priority.

54. We also need to consider less conventional forms of threat. For instance, improvised bombs have obvious advantages for hostile groups who cannot hope to prevail in an outright military confrontation. We will examine how to enhance our ability to provide bomb disposal support to deployed forces whilst maintaining the level of capability that we continue to require in the UK itself. Similarly, we will want to ensure that deployed forces have the ability to maintain their freedom of operation in environments where some form of CBRN threat cannot be ruled out.
55. In doing the New Chapter work, we have been very aware of the impact of operations on our Armed Forces – and their families – and that we cannot ask or expect them to operate at an excessive tempo. We need to ensure that we do not place unmanageable demands on our people, many of whom are faced with very demanding commitments.

56. The availability of suitably trained and motivated personnel is key to operational success. A vital element of the SDR itself was the ‘Policy for People’, which recognised that our defence depends on our Armed Forces personnel, and their families, as well as the civil servants and others who work alongside them. People are at the centre of our plans. In particular we are delivering, through the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy, real and sustainable improvements to the quality of life of our Service personnel and their families. We are also updating our civilian personnel policies to ensure that, over the long term, Defence will continue to have the skilled and committed civil servants it needs.

57. We have to accept, though, that we still face considerable challenges in this area. Most importantly, despite significant efforts and some notable successes in the area of recruiting and retention, fully manned and sustainable manpower structures are proving elusive. It is not simply a
matter of just improving recruiting or just improving retention – we need to work hard at both. And in neither area does substantial improvement come easily.

58. On recruitment, we have to contend with the fact that too many young people simply do not contemplate a Service career. The emphasis we place on recruiting people who wish to make a career of the Services is also at odds with a workforce which moves increasingly quickly from employer to employer. We face strong competition for the best, in the face of high levels of employment, and increasing numbers of young people in higher and further education.

59. The challenge for us is to become “employers of first choice”. This means that we need to continue to work hard to educate young people about what the Services have to offer and make the Armed Forces an attractive proposition to them. We also need terms and conditions of service that meet modern aspirations, together with employment patterns that allow us to retain experienced personnel.

60. Evidence suggests that high operational tempo, high levels of separation and repeated deployments to the same location have a cumulative effect on morale and are ultimately retention-negative for many Service personnel, especially those with young families.

61. We recognise that many of our Servicemen and women have been working at or near, and in some cases beyond, the boundaries of what was planned in the SDR for some considerable time now. So, in our work on the New Chapter, we have been careful to avoid any suggestion that our existing personnel might simply be required to do more.

62. In the normal course of events we need to ensure that our people have time both to attend to their family and personal needs and to meet their own training and development needs between one deployment and the next, although our plans recognise that there may be particularly demanding short term circumstances which do not allow for this. But, over the long term, getting the balance right between time at home and time away on operations is critical to ensuring that life in the Services is sufficiently attractive to encourage our people to stay with us for as long as we can employ them.

63. All of this means that, in the short to medium term, in considering how to respond to the challenge of the new strategic context, we have to be realistic about the numbers we can recruit and retain. We will need to continue to ensure that our operational commitments do not become unsustainable in the long term. Also, in considering the right mix of front line and enabling forces for the future, we need to take account of the pressures on individuals, particularly those in the most heavily used specialisms.

64. Success in operations will also continue to depend on the contribution of civilians working for the Ministry of Defence, and contractors providing support. This key role – with civilians both increasingly being deployed to operational areas, and also performing a range of essential tasks in the UK and elsewhere – has become more important as the Armed Forces have become more heavily engaged in a range of expeditionary operations. This trend is set to continue.
65. Success in the campaign against international terrorism will require extensive multinational cooperation, to which a large part of the UK’s diplomatic efforts are devoted. An important component of this will be work in the key international organisations. For the UK three central organisations are the United Nations, NATO and the European Union (although of course there are others, like The G8, The Commonwealth and The OSCE). Each performs a different role, and within that role each has acted vigorously in recent months. Their actions to date are briefly summarised in Section 3 of the Supporting Information and Analysis. Each organisation will have important roles in future.

4.1 UN

66. The UN has a number of roles in the campaign against international terrorism:

67. Establishing a basis for action in international law; the UN Security Council can authorise action itself under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. Article 51 of the Charter also recognises the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

68. Promoting international consensus; measures taken on a national, regional or global basis are more likely to succeed when there is an international consensus behind them.

69. Countering terrorism abroad; the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, chaired by the UK, is assessing all countries’ compliance with UNSCR 1373, which imposes obligations on all states to suppress terrorist financing and deny terrorists safe havens in which to operate.
70. Addressing the breeding grounds of terrorism abroad: the UN plays a key role in international development, particularly through the development of more effective conflict prevention and resolution activities, thus helping to prevent the growth of failed-state havens for terrorists. The UN and its specialised agencies can help stabilise volatile situations, as the UN Assistance Mission is doing in Afghanistan.

4.2 NATO

71. The Spring 2002 meetings of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers confirmed NATO’s key role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security, including from the threat of international terrorism. NATO has already taken a range of actions, and further work is now underway in NATO to define more clearly its role in combating terrorism. This is looking in particular at: NATO’s capacity to deal with new threats including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction from wherever the Alliance’s members are threatened; how NATO can enhance home defence; and co-operation with other organisations, states and agencies. The work will form an important part of NATO’s wider agenda for the Prague Summit in November 2002, designed to underpin the continued effectiveness of the Alliance in the new security environment.

72. Key to success will be the continued development of modern and effective Alliance military capabilities, the creation of more flexible command structures (with the focus on deployable headquarters) and the implementation of a new force structure capable of generating, deploying and sustaining NATO forces wherever they are needed. Also important will be the exploitation of NATO’s strategic partnerships, particularly with the EU and Russia – but also through Partnership for Peace and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.

4.3 EU

73. The UK approach in the EU is to work to exploit the EU’s ability to co-ordinate across all its areas of competence (including civil protection, the European arrest warrant, co-operation on external border control, and measures against terrorist financing). The EU could act also by using its political leverage with third states.
74. The European Security and Defence Policy encompasses stabilisation tasks, which are key to the overall campaign against international terrorism. A wide spectrum of relevant military capability improvements are being pursued as part of the EU’s Headline Goal work, for example airlift, sealift, air-to-air refuelling, unmanned air vehicles and precision guided munitions. Some, such as nuclear, biological and chemical self-protection capabilities, may need enhancing so that forces can operate in more demanding environments.
75. We assessed in the SDR that, while there was no direct military threat to the UK, there were new risks to our security and way of life, including unconventional terrorist attacks, the threat of which continues to grow. We need to readjust some of our priorities in response.

76. In the UK, the Home Office is responsible for counter-terrorism policy, and the lead for domestic security lies with the civil agencies — and particularly with the police. The Government’s policy is to seek intelligence on terrorist groups and to disrupt their activities, where possible, through prosecutions, by the intelligence and security agencies working closely with the law enforcement agencies. Any support provided by the Armed Forces, and especially the use of force, must be at the specific request of the civil authorities. Our work has been and will continue to be undertaken firmly within the framework of that principle.

77. Providing properly for the defence and security of the UK (and its Overseas Territories) is a key responsibility of Government, and a properly secure home base is a prerequisite for successful operations overseas. When deploying forces overseas, we ensure that military capability remains available to the civil authorities in responding to a terrorist incident in the UK. But we have made clear that we are not going to allow threats at home to tie up significant numbers of our high readiness Armed Forces and prevent us from acting abroad. If we did so, those who threaten us would have won. And, in any case, all our analysis shows that tackling the problem where possible at a distance is preferable to waiting for problems to come to us: in that sense operations overseas are often the best form of home defence.

78. Our work in this area has sought to build on the particular strengths of the Armed Forces: their planning and co-ordination of operations; their command and control of forces; their nation-wide footprint of people, infrastructure and communications; and their specialist capabilities. Some of our initial proposals were outlined in a discussion document published on 12 June, and they are summarised at Sections 5.1-5.3 below.

5.1 Command and Control

79. We intend to develop further the machinery whereby the civil authorities can request appropriate support from the Armed Forces, whether Regular or Reserves. In particular, there will be:

- a clearer role for the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Land Forces, as the principal focus for the provision of military assistance to civil authorities in a wide range of operations;

- Joint Regional Liaison Officers within each region to provide a single focal point representing all three Services. They will liaise between regional commanders and both local civil authorities and Devolved Administrations, and will also co-ordinate Armed Forces’ participation in local and regional civil emergency control centres during crises;

- more staff available in regional Brigade headquarters, both for contingency planning purposes and in emergencies.
5.2 Communications

80. 2 Signal Brigade, a predominantly Territorial Army formation, already provides the deployable element of a national communications infrastructure; thus the Volunteer Reserves can provide communications support to military forces and other Ministry of Defence personnel engaged in the response to home defence incidents. We propose to formalise 2 Signal Brigade’s role in supporting operational continuity and equip them with modern communications equipment compatible with that coming into service with the civil police and emergency services.

5.3 Enhanced Roles for the Reserves

81. To provide the “force elements” that may be required to provide assistance to the civil authorities for home defence and security purposes, we have looked in particular at the Reserve Forces. Our work so far has led us to judge that there is a greater role for the Reserves to play.

82. The Reserve Forces, both Volunteer Reservists and Regular Reservists (former servicemen and women with a continuing liability to be called into full time service) have contributed significantly to operations at home and overseas in recent years. For example, they have consistently provided volunteers to make up around 10% of personnel for our forces undertaking peace support operations in the Balkans. In addition, we have recently called out Territorial Army and Royal Auxiliary Air Force personnel in order to provide specialist intelligence, medical and movements staff in the UK and overseas to support current operations in response to the threat of international terrorism, and in the Balkans. This is in keeping with the main role for the Reserves set out in the SDR: that they should be an essential reinforcement for the Regular Armed Forces when deployed on operations.

83. We have now developed some proposals (summarised in the Box below and set out in more detail in the discussion document we published on 12 June) to form Reaction Forces from the Volunteer Reserves for home defence and security purposes. The discussion document sought views on these proposals from the Reserves, their employers and others with an interest, by 13 September. Once we have gathered these views, we will refine our proposals as necessary and begin implementation as quickly as possible. We aim to have an initial Reaction Force capability in place before the end of the year and then to build up to full capability as soon as possible thereafter, as we purchase the necessary equipment and provided the additional training.

Experts from 101 (London) Engineer Regiment (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) (Volunteers), practice dealing with an unexploded bomb
Reaction Forces

- A Reaction Force of, on average, some 500 Volunteer Reserves would be established in each region – in principle giving a total of some 6,000 or so Volunteer Reserves in Reaction Forces nation-wide.

- We would use the Army’s regional brigade areas for this purpose, since this corresponds to the system of Government Offices for the Regions and to the Devolved Administration structure.

- Reaction Forces would comprise only individuals who agree to take on this additional commitment, drawn from all Volunteer Reserve units within the regional brigade area.

- The organisational framework for Reaction Forces would be provided by an existing major Volunteer Reserve unit in each region – most probably a Territorial Army infantry battalion.

- The decision to deploy a Reaction Force would follow a request from the civil authorities for military assistance. A recommendation to deploy a Reaction Force would then be made by the regional military commander with responsibility for home defence and security, who would exercise his judgement as to which of the forces at his disposal, including the Reaction Force but also Regular Forces, best match the requirements of the situation.

- To avoid holding up the deployment of Reaction Forces pending the issue of an appropriate mobilisation order, initial reporting would be on a voluntary basis. To give the Volunteer Reservist the necessary employment protection, the Government would expect to initiate mobilisation procedures after 36 hours, under the Reserve Forces Act 1996.

5.4 Training and Education

84. Many of the skills required for the successful conduct of military operations are also applicable to civil crises. But, to participate effectively in civil emergencies, the Armed Forces also require some additional knowledge of civil structures and practices. Similarly, the civil authorities need to be able to understand how the Armed Forces operate and to draw on their operational experience.

85. We have therefore built on existing links to form a partnership between the Defence Academy, the Government’s Emergency Planning College and the Government’s Centre for Management and Policy Studies to share experiences and teaching resources. This partnership will improve the quality of the training and education available to both the Armed Forces and the civil authorities for civil crisis management.

5.5 Air Defence and Maritime Integrity

86. The events of 11 September have caused us to look again at some aspects of our air defence. For many years the RAF has had measures in place to detect, deter and, if necessary, destroy aircraft which threatened the UK. Like many countries, we have Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft at high readiness to undertake these tasks. We made very clear, immediately after the attacks on the US, that we would use this capability, if necessary, against rogue aircraft.

87. We will continue to refine our air defence arrangements as necessary. In particular, further enhancements to our radar systems are in hand. We are also investing in the ability of airfields across the UK (RAF Marham in Norfolk, RAF St Mawgan in Cornwall and RNAS Yeovilton in Somerset) to support QRA aircraft when needed. These are in addition to the bases already able to operate QRA aircraft and will give us greater flexibility in our air defence arrangements. We expect most of the work to be completed within the next twelve months, although work to enhance facilities at RNAS Yeovilton will take longer. There will be occasional increases in fast jet flights into and out of these bases.
88. For maritime integrity we act in support of the civil authorities, in particular the police, HM Customs and Excise and the port authorities. We do contribute certain specialist capabilities, in the role of maritime counter terrorism. We will continue to keep under close review and, where appropriate, make adjustments to, our arrangements to counter ship-borne threats.
SECTION 6
Resources and Next Steps

89. As a result of Spending Review 2002, the Defence Budget will rise by £3.5 billion between 2002/3 and 2005/6, representing 1.2% average annual real growth over the next three years. Within this is some £1 billion of new capital and £1½ billion of new resources for the equipment and capabilities needed to respond to the additional challenges described in this paper.

90. The conclusions we have reached so far are not the end of the story. For example, there will continue to be further lessons to be drawn from continuing operations (which we will gather through our well established operational audit process), and further refinement of our strategies and techniques to defeat international terrorism and other asymmetric threats will be needed. And, while the strategic context has obviously changed since 11 September, there will doubtless be more developments to come. In the light of this changing context, policy work in various areas, including missile defence has continued alongside the New Chapter work. Our policies, concepts, capabilities and structures will need to continue to be agile and flexible and best suited to cope with the unexpected.

91. Our conclusions also need to be seen against the changing strategic and operational backdrop. On the strategic side, since the SDR was published in 1998 the risk of large scale conflict in Europe has further reduced, and relations with Russia have seen a step change improvement. On the operational side, we have routinely deployed our Armed Forces on more operations concurrently than we envisaged in the SDR. That has created risks of overburdening particular units such as the key “enablers” who are essential for all expeditionary deployments (for example, communicators, engineers and movements personnel). But the scale of these deployments has been in some respects smaller than we envisaged at the time of the SDR. We now need to factor these changes in the strategic and operational environment more fully into our planning.

92. The capability priorities which have emerged from our work on countering international terrorism are entirely consistent with the requirements generated by other likely demands on our forces. They reinforce the thrust of our existing plans. Extra strategic lift and communications, for example, have much wider utility across a range of operations beyond counter terrorism. So it makes sense to think of these as components of all rapid reaction forces, rather than as dedicated counter-terrorism capabilities.

93. While some enhancements to SDR military capabilities are needed, the scale of operations to counter terrorism is unlikely to be large, so only relatively small quantities of the new specialised equipment are likely to be needed. There is still further work to do to refine precise capability options and choices, and we will be working closely with industry to translate our requirements into equipment solutions.

94. In further work we shall need to look in detail at how our overall priorities might give additional emphasis to rapid reaction. We need to consider how we might increase the deployability of some units, while maintaining capability for combat. And, given the wider changes in the strategic and operational environment outlined above, we need to continue the evolution of our force structures away from the legacy systems more suited to the Cold War and towards the capabilities that are optimised to meet the new threats and challenges.
95. Whilst the 1998 Strategic Defence Review recognised the existence of asymmetric threats, it did not fully cater for threats on the scale which materialised on 11 September, and we therefore looked again at our defence posture and plans. The Armed Forces can play a role as part of a cross-Government and international effort to counter the threat from international terrorism at home and to engage it overseas. Much of the capacity needed for key operations – such as operations to stabilise, coerce or find-and-strike – will come from the new force structure the SDR put in train.

96. But new elements and capabilities are needed to seize what may be fleeting opportunities to engage terrorists, to deal with them in remote areas and cater for their possible acquisition of CBRN devices. We need to look further into how we should allocate the investment which is needed, including, for example, to intelligence gathering, network-centric capability (including enhanced strike and Special Forces capabilities and unmanned air vehicles), improved mobility and fire power for more rapidly deployable lighter forces, temporary deployed accommodation for troops, and night operations. The significant additional resources made available to Defence in Spending Review 2002 will enable us to take this forward with the urgency that the 11 September demands.