Total Army Analysis (TAA)

Use this primer in conjunction with AR 71-11 (Total Army Analysis), the Army War College text “How the Army Runs”, Chapter 5 and FM 100-11 Force Integration.
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I. Force Development Process (overview)

1. The focus of this primer is the Total Army Analysis process. In order to understand the TAA process, it is imperative that a person understand of where TAA fits into the larger process which is called Force Development.

2. Use this primer to supplement information provided in the Army War College text “How the Army Runs”, FM 100-11 Force Integration, and Army Regulation 71-11 Total Army Analysis.

3. Force development is the start point, rationale and underlying basis for defining the Army’s force structure. The Force Development Process consists of defining military capabilities, designing force structures to provide these capabilities, and translating organizational concepts based on the threat, doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army. The five phases are:
   a. Develop Capabilities
   b. Design Organizations
   c. Develop Organizational Models
   d. Determine Organizational Authorizations
   e. Document Organizational Authorizations

4. The five phases of the force development process are displayed at figure 1. This model reflects a sequence of events and how these functions relate to each other. The resulting products of force development provide the basis for acquiring and distributing materiel and acquiring, training, and distributing personnel in the Army. It is useful to use the Army Force Development Process to visualize how each step relates to the other steps and contributes to the accomplishment of each task.

Figure 1
Acronym list for figure 1:

- ARSTRUC: Army Structure Message
- ASCC: Army Service Component Command
- BOIP: Basis of Issue Plan
- BOIPFD: BOIP Feeder Data
- CCP: Concept Capability Plan
- CDD: Capability Development Document
- DLMP: Doctrine & Literature Master Plan
- DRU: Direct Reporting Unit
- FDU: Force Design Update
- FMS: Force Management System
- G-37(FM): Force Management
- IPL: Integrated Priority List
- LOGSACS: Logistics SACS
- MDEP: Management Decision Package System
- OI: Organization Integrator
- OPFAC: Operational Facilities
- PBG: Program Budget Guidance
- PERSACS: Personnel SACS
- SACS: Structure and Composition System
- SAT: Systems Approach to Training
- TAADS: The Army Authorization Documentation System
- TOE: Table of Organization and Equipment
- TRAS: Training Requirements Analysis System
- UIC: Unit Identification Code
- URS: Unit Reference Sheet
- USAFMSA: United States Army Force Management Support Agency
- USASOC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command
- USAR: Unit Reference Sheet
- USAFMSA: United States Army Force Management Support Agency
- USAFMSA: United States Army Force Management Support Agency
- USASOC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command
- USAFMSA: United States Army Force Management Support Agency
- USASOC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command

a. Develop capabilities.

1) The force development process has its roots in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). A separate primer (Capabilities Development and Systems Acquisition Management), discussing the JCIDS process, can be found on the Army Force Management School web site: www.afms1.army.mil. JCIDS identifies the desired operational capability in terms of personnel, equipment, and unit structure. This process begins with the receipt of strategic / national-level guidance [National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), and guidance from the Army’s senior leadership (The Army Plan (TAP))], joint warfighting concepts (such as rapid decisive operations and peace enforcement operations), and/or new materiel capabilities evolving from research, development, and acquisition (RDA) processes.

2) The focus of JCIDS is to resolve identified capabilities gaps, perceived deficiencies and/or shortcomings in the joint force. The objective of JCIDS is to develop solutions that are affordable, militarily useful, and supportable to the combatant commanders. JCIDS develops integrated, joint capable solutions within the domains of DOTMLPF (doctrine, organizational structure, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities). The process examines where we are, where we want to be, what risks we may face and what it might cost.

3) The analysis process is composed of a structured, three-phased capabilities-based assessment (CBA) methodology that identifies tasks, determines capability gaps and redundancies, and proposed DOTMLPF approaches to resolve or mitigate validated capability gaps. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) assesses the future warfighting concepts through a series of analyses, tests, experiments and studies to gain insights across DOTMLPF. Using the integrated capabilities development teams (ICDT) management technique, TRADOC pursues timely involvement of appropriate agencies/expertise to aggressively identify and work issues. TRADOC establishes force operating capabilities (FOCs) as the foundation upon which to base the assessment process. These critical, force-level, measurable statements of operational capability frame how the Army will realize advanced full spectrum operations as stated in the approved capstone concept. The FOCs focus the Army’s Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP)
and warfighting experimentation. As the transformation process unfolds, these force-level objective concepts give rise to supporting proponent/branch future FOCs included within subordinate concepts. This assessment process leads to a recommendation by the Commanding General (CG), TRADOC to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) on how to best fulfill the warfighting requirement. If the capability requires a change in doctrine, training, or leader development, TRADOC begins action to meet the requirement upon validation by the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 and approval by the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA). If the solution set results in a need for change in soldier occupational specialty structure, the recommendation goes forward to HQDA DCS, G-1 for action. If the required capability needs a materiel solution, TRADOC prepares the initial capabilities document (ICD) and a capability development document (CDD). TRADOC forwards the ICD and CDD to HQDA DCS, G-3/5/7 for approval of the requirement through the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) validation/approval process. HQDA DCS, G-8 is responsible for materiel solutions and DOTMLPF integration throughout the program life cycle. Warfighting concepts requiring organizational solutions move to the next phase of force development.

b. Design organizations.

1) The **DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS PHASE** provides the “organizational” solution to DOTMLPF. This Phase analyzes the proposed organization or change to an organization for **doctrinal correctness**. This phase provides a forum for the entire Army to review the issue while linking the **Capability, Materiel, Training and Document Developers** together. Organizational requirements flowing from the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA), determine whether a **new** or **modified** organization is required on tomorrow’s battlefield to satisfy the capability gap identified in the **DEVELOP CAPABILITIES PHASE**. Organizational requirements are documented through a series of connected and related organizational development processes: Unit Reference Sheet (**URS**) development; Force Design Update (**FDU**) process; Table of Organization and Equipment (**TOE**) development; and Basis-Of-Issue Plan (**BOIP**) development.

2) When a DOTMLPF analysis is performed, and a new or improved organization is selected as the best solution, the capability development communities in TRADOC or the other proponents document proposed organizations or modifications to existing organizations on a unit reference sheet (**URS**). The URS specifies the organization’s mission and functions as well as outlining required personnel and equipment. TRADOC’s Force Design Division (FDD) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas receives the URS from the proponents. FDD tracks the action through the staffing and approval process called the force design update (**FDU**) process. Within the FDU process, good ideas are taken from a variety of sources, and developed through an Army-wide consensus, staffed and forwarded through HQ, TRADOC to HQDA. The CSA or VCSA approves the design and simultaneously provides their Army-wide implementation instructions. The URS contains sufficient details (unit title, design description, mission, assignment, tasks, assumptions, limitations, mobility
requirements, and concept of operations), to support Army force design initiatives and related studies and analyses. Once approved, the URS is further refined into an organizational model known as a table of organization and equipment (TOE).

c. **Develop organizational models.**

1) The U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) applies rules, standards, and guidance to the doctrinally correct design producing the organizational model (TOE). Other organizations such as the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and MEDCOM develop organizational designs as well.

2) The TOE is a **requirements document**. The TOE is the definition of a fully mission-capable organization. It prescribes an organization’s doctrinal wartime mission, its organizational structure and detailed personnel and equipment requirements.

3) When DOTMLPF analysis mandates a materiel solution, the proponents form an integrated capabilities development team (ICDT), and the materiel developer forwards data on the new equipment to USAFMSA for basis of issue plan feeder data (BOIPFD) submission. USAFMSA develops the data into a Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP). Also the BOIP is a requirements document, which is applied to appropriate TOEs and MTOEs to add or modify equipment and/or personnel requirements.

d. **Determine organizational authorizations.** The Total Army Analysis (TAA) process is used by HQDA to determine organizational authorizations. TAA is discussed in detail in Sections III through VIII of this primer. TAA develops the total requirements and then the authorizations defining the force structure the Army must build, raise, provision, sustain, maintain, train and resource to meet OSD / Army guidance, combatant commanders’ requirements and force structure initiatives. The HQDA approved TOEs compete for authorizations – the “coin of the realm” in the force structure business – broken out in Officer / Warrant Officer / Enlisted spaces. TAA first determines the **total requirements** (the number of units, by type – 100% manned and equipped). The TAA process then determines the force **resourced** based on priorities, budgetary constraints and guidance. The resulting force structure is the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force, the force that is recommended for resourcing to OSD in the Army’s POM submission. TAA takes into account force guidance and resource availability to produce a balanced and affordable force structure. It determines and/or verifies the affordability, supportability, and executability of the organizational model.

TAA is the process that takes us from the Army of today to the Army of the future. It requires a **doctrinal basis** and **analysis**; is based upon **strategic guidance** from above the Army; and involves **threat analysis, specific scenarios**, and an **Army “constrained” force**.

**TAA process has the potential of changing every facet of the Army.**

e. **Document organizational authorizations.** After approval of the resourced force structure by the Army leadership, USAFMSA manages the process of documenting the decision(s). This process results in organizational authorizations documented as
modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA).

II. TAA – Phase IV of the Force Development Process

The focus of this primer is the fourth phase of the Force Development Process (TAA). This phase, determining organizational authorizations, provides the mix of organizations that comprise a balanced and affordable force structure for the Army. Force structuring is an integral part of the OSD Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process (PPBE) and the Joint Staff Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). It develops force structure in support of joint, strategic, and operational planning and Army planning, programming and budgeting. The development of a force is based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, threats, and the dynamics of externally and internally imposed constraints (i.e., dollars, end strength, roles, and missions).

The mix of unit models that make up a balanced and affordable force structure must support Joint and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

III. Total Army Analysis (TAA) Overview

1. TAA is an evolving process. The DOD and Army transformation requires more agile, responsive, concise processes to provide the Army leadership more timely and flexible force structure options. The ARSTAF continues refining the TAA process, shortening the process time, and initiation of selected analyses (Modular Support Force Analysis, Force Management Review, Institutional Army Requirements Review and Operational Availability Study 2008). The TAA process is being reviewed through the Lean Six Sigma process and during the conduct of the Force Management Review (FMR) 09-13 and TAA 10-15 iterations. Based on guidance from Army leadership, the process was modified to take only ten (10) months instead of the Army regulatory requirement of two years; develops and analyzes force structure options versus a single force structure recommendation; incorporated video teleconferencing (VTC) as a communication means into the process; and a collective review within the HQDA Executive Office of the Headquarters.

Major Changes to the TAA Process – by TAA iteration:

- **TAA-03** calculated only the MTOE “warfighting” requirements.
- **TAA-05** incorporated the Base Generating Force Requirements.
- **TAA-07** calculated all Army requirements (MTOE/ITOE & TDA, all COMPOs) and SBCT as a doctrinal, organizational and materiel solution to eliminate existing capability gaps.
- **TAA-09** incorporated Homeland Security as the first priority of the “Simultaneity Stack”.
TAA-11 initiated MODULARITY as the basic Army structure (Unit of Action/Unit of Employment).

MSFA 07-11 captured FDU and leadership decisions not incorporated in TAA-11.

TAA 08-13 incorporates MODULARITY and used the SPG / JPG as OSD guidance. TAA 08-13 was informed by QDR 2006 for force structure guidance and force sizing construct.

FMR 09-13 captures modular design FDU and leadership decisions post TAA 08-13, while addressing some of the QDR 2006 decisions, operational surge-expedite-accelerate conversions of BCTs, total strength growth in all compos & increase 5 AC BCTs, AC/RC rebalancing, and BRAC impacts.

TAA 10-15 will inform QDR 2009, model for the Total Force Requirements over the next 7 years, fix the imbalance in force structure.

2. TAA is the acknowledged and proven mechanism for explaining and defending Army force structure. The TAA process takes us from the Army of today to the Army of the future. It requires a doctrinal basis and analysis, flowing from strategic guidance and joint force requirements. By regulation, TAA is a biennial process initiated during even-numbered years. HQDA, G-3/5/7 initiates the formal TAA process upon receipt of OSD/Joint Staff guidance (GDF/JPG), scenarios, and draft TAP. Based on these documents and guidance, the routine TAA cycle occurs.

3. The DOD and Army transformation processes caused the TAA process to evolve over the last 5 years.
   a. TAAs were renamed to include the full POM years. Example: TAA 11 became TAA 06-11.
   b. The major change in philosophy began in late 2003 with the introduction of the Modular Force Design.
      1) The process needed to become more agile, timely and flexible.
      2) The process needed to develop options instead of a single solution for the POM force.
      3) The forums needed to leverage technology.
   c. Modular Support Force Analysis (MSFA):
      1) The Army’s force structure position needed to be established for the negotiations of QDR 2006 and TAA 08-13, including the Brigade Combat Team organizational design.
      2) The Force structure needed to be established prior to the next OSD driven POM cycle. MSFA was conducted in 13 weeks.
      3) MSFA 07-11 established the impact of the BCT’s modular design on the combat support and combat service support force structure.
   d. TAA 08-13:
      1) Was conducted in 10 months in support of POM 08-13.
      2) Initiated video teleconferencing in the Army Campaign Plan format replacing the in place of Council of Colonels and General Officer Steering Committee meetings.
3) Initiated the Executive Office of the Headquarters (EOH) format for briefing the Army leadership to provide information and gain approval by the CSA.

e. Force Management Review (FMR):

1) FMR 09-13 was planned for a 10 month window from start to finish. Initial time line scheduled for completion by December 2006. Note: was not completed until August 2008.

2) Programmed to include all FDU decisions not incorporated into TAA 08-13.

3) Focus to update the POM submission 09-13.

   a) A significant change in Presidential guidance directed an increase in total strength by 74.2K (all COMPOs) by FY 2013; and the number of BCTs to 76 (plus 5 AC BCTs).
   b) G-3/7 (FM) extended the FMR 09-13 window to incorporate the “Grow the Army Plan”.
   c) Integrate the Institutional Army End Strength strategy.
   d) Incorporate Stability Operations.
   e) Continue AC/RC rebalance initiatives.
   f) FMR 09-13+ incorporated evolving requirements.
      (1) Surge and Expedite. The President directed a surge in BCTs deployed to Iraq. Resourcing those BCTs impacted existing modernization and conversion efforts for AC/RC units. Additionally, the Army was directed to expedite the conversion of two BCTs.
      (2) Accelerate. The President directed the increase of the total strength for the AC to be completed by 2013. The CSA obtained approval to complete the increase by 2010.
      (3) Incorporate second generation MTOE process to update the POM build.
   g) FMR 09-13 provides the POM force data for POM 10-15.
   h) TAA 10-15, re-initiated in August 2007, will provide the POM force data for POM 11-15 update.

f. Institutional Army TAA Goals:

1) Determine the right size and composition of the Institutional Army to support GTA plan.

2) Link the Institutional Army into the TAA process

3) Provide senior leaders the opportunity to prioritize capabilities and capacity.

4) Provide a forum for senior leaders to assess feasibility and risk and to make trades in structure and dollar resources.

5) Focus:
   a) Institutional Army.
   b) Grow the Army requirements.
c) Potential military to civilian conversions.
d) USAR IMA support.
g. TAA 10-15 key objectives:
1) Be informed by Operational Availability (OA) 08.
3) Develop the Concept of Logistics Support. Address BCT mix and support brigade requirements.
4) Incorporate Stability Operations Study.
5) Review “Early Deployers” criteria.
6) Incorporate approved FDUs.
7) Review rotational methodology and metrics; integrate ARFORGEN.

4. The TAA is the basis for the Army’s POM development and establishment of the POM Force. The Army develops the POM force to achieve an affordable and competent force capable of best supporting national objectives and Combatant Commanders’ warfighting needs. This force supports the joint strategic planning conducted by the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and the Services at the transition between planning and programming.

5. TAA determines the total requirements to meet the NMS, GDF/JPG, TAP and other guidance. TAA resources the requirements based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis, and input from the combatant commanders day-to-day requirements. The resulting force structure is the POM force, forwarded to OSD with recommendations for approval. When Congress approves the budget, all approved units are programmed in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented in The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), in phase V of the Force Development Process (figure 1 on page 2).

6. The purpose of TAA is to determine the required “operating and generating” forces necessary to support and sustain the “operating force”. Echelon above brigade (EAB) support force structure needed to make the brigades of the “operating force” successful in the MCOs and define the required “generating” forces necessary to support and sustain the “operating forces”. The specified combat forces and the EAB support forces determined during the TAA process are referred to as “operating forces”. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process. The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force, the force recommended and supported by resource requests in the Army POM, as part of the future years defense program (FYDP), are developed during the TAA process. TAA determines the force for each program year. It has Army wide participation, culminating in Executive Office of the Headquarters (EOH) for decision and approval.
a. The TAA **principal products** are the (figure 2):
   
   - Army’s total warfighting requirements;
   - Required support forces (EAB);
   - Force resourced against requirements and budgetary constraints;
   - Army structure (ARSTRUC) message; and
   - Initial POM force.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What Does TAA Accomplish?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Captures the Army’s Combat</strong> warfighting requirements <em>(MTOE/ITOE)</em></td>
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<td><strong>Generates the Army’s Support Force</strong> warfighting requirements <em>(MTOE)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Captures the Army’s Generating Force</strong> warfighting requirements <em>(TDA)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Resources</strong> the Force <em>(MTOE &amp; TDA / ALL COMPOS)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Decisions captured in the Army structure message</strong> <em>(ARSTRUC)</em></td>
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<td><strong>Provides the Force Structure foundation for the next POM</strong></td>
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| *MSFA 07-11 ➔ POM 07-11 update*
| *TAA 08-13 ➔ POM 08-13*
| *FMR 09-13 ➔ POM 10-15*
| *TAA 10-15 ➔ POM 11-15 update* |

TAA is the acknowledged and proven mechanism for wisely using resources to meet the NMS and SPG / JPG and explaining Army force structure

**Figure 2**

b. TAA **objectives** are to:
   
   - Develop, analyze, determine and justify a POM force, aligned with the GDF/JPG and TAP. The POM force is that force projected to be raised, provisioned, sustained, and maintained within resources available during the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
   - Provide analytical underpinnings for the POM force for use in dialogue among Congress, OSD, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and the Army.
   - Assess the impacts of plans and potential alternatives for materiel acquisition, the production base, and equipment distribution programs on the projected force structure.
- Assure continuity of force structure requirements within the PPBE process.
- Provide program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel requirements and projected authorizations.

**IV. The TAA process**

1. TAA is the resource sensitive process that executes the decisions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Department of Defense (DOD) PPBE, directives and initiatives of the Joint Staff, and the Army planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. The Army’s strategic roles must support the NMS. These roles have a major impact on the shaping of the Army. Therefore, TAA develops a force that meets the NMS, defeats the threat within the defined scenarios and under the established dollar constraints; and fulfills all the roles and missions listed, within the parameters of congressional oversight and guidance.

2. TAA serves as the bridge between OSD/Joint Staff guidance and the Army’s planning and program building processes, balancing the Army’s force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) against available and planned resources. Decisions, as a result of the TAA process, will shape the future size and composition of the Army and are senior leadership sensitive and made in the best interest of the Army.

3. Additionally, the TAA process is the means to transition from the planning phase to the programming phase within the Army’s PPBE process, assisting in determining, verifying and justifying Army requirements, while assessing force capabilities. The TAA process is flexible and responsive to dynamic changes. The process involves external inputs from the President, Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Joint Staff, OSD, and Combatant Commanders’ priorities (for example: anticipated threats, scenarios, end-strengths, and assumptions). The process flows from internal Army actions, decisions and guidance from the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, Combatant Commanders (for example: allocations rules, resource assumptions, warfighting capabilities, and infrastructure priorities); and the commands (Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands and Direct Reporting Units), in the decision-making process for both requirement and resource decisions. The end result of the TAA process is the right mix of unit models (MTOEs) that make up a balanced and affordable force structure to support Joint and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

4. TAA is a multi-phased force structuring process. It consists of both qualitative and quantitative analyses designed to develop the “operating and generating forces” (MTOE and TDA) necessary to sustain and support the combat forces delineated in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF), Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), scenarios, and The Army Plan (TAP).
The purpose of TAA is to define the required support forces to make the combat forces successful.

TAA determines the correct mix of organizations required and resourced that comprise a balanced and affordable force to meet the guidance.

Remember – Until modularity is completely implemented, the Army will continue to have combat force structure based on Army of Excellence (AOE), Power Projection, and Force XXI designs. Therefore, the support forces will be varied and changing over time as “transformation” continues. The QDR 06 established the directed force (combat) as 76 BCTs, which make up one portion of the “Operating Force”.

TAA, through CAA modeling, determines the remainder of the “operating force”. The combat service (CS and combat service support (CSS) comprise the other portion of the “operating force”. During the transition to modularity, the support forces transition from echelons above division (EAD) and echelons above corps (EAC) to echelons above brigade (EAB).

Finally, CAA determines the “generating forces” necessary to support and sustain the operating forces.
5. TAA is a two-phased analytical and subjective process consisting of Requirements Determination (force guidance and quantitative analysis) and Resource Determination (qualitative analysis and leadership review). Figure 5 depicts the sequence of activities for the TAA process.

**TAA Highlights:**

A two-phased force development process.
Primarily a force structuring process (all Components / MTOE/ITOE & TDA).
Specifies force structure requirements for each year of the POM.
Incorporates resource / program constraints.
A computer-assisted process.
Has Army-wide participation including Executive Office of the Headquarters (EOH) review, CSA decision and SECARMY approval.

a. Phase I of the TAA process, captures the Army’s combat requirements (MTOE), generates the Army’s support requirements (MTOE), and develops the Army’s generating force.
requirements (TDA). TAA develops the echelons above brigade in the modular design support forces of the “operating forces” [i.e., combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS)], and TDA force structure, referred to as the “generating forces” (required to support both portions of the “operating force” structure). In the past, there has been a clear delineation of Operating Force (MTOE) and Generating Force (TDA). When the Institutional Army TAA is complete, an updated definition is expected.

b. Phase II of the TAA process, resources the requirements (MTOE & TDA; all components) based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis, and input from the combatant commanders (day-to-day requirements). The resulting force structure is the POM force, forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with a recommendation for approval. When congress approves the budget, all approved units are programmed in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented in The Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS).

V. TAA Phase I. Requirements Determination. Requirements determination, the more critical of the two phases, is made up of two separate events: force guidance and quantitative analysis. Accurate planning, consumption and workload factors, threat data, and allocation rules ensure accurate computer developed requirements.

1. **Force guidance.** Force guidance consists of data inputs and guidance from various sources. Guidance from the President, Congress, OSD, JCS, the ARSEC, and ARSTAF is included. Threat data, other Service data, coalition force data, and weapons effectiveness are included. Finally, previous leadership decisions and current guidance from the SA, CSA, VCSA, G-3/5/7 and G-8 are addressed. The guidance addresses objectives, threat data, and resource assumptions and priorities.

a. **External Army Guidance.** The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process, not all of which is exclusively within the realm of the Army. The National Military Strategy (NMS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Guidance for Development of the Force (GFD) / Joint programming Guidance (JPG) constitute the major JCS/DOD directives and constraints imposed upon Army force structure.

1) The NMS describes the strategic environment, develops national military objectives, and describes the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The NMS also addresses the force structure requirements for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Special Operations Command and Reserve Components.

2) QDR:

a) Congress mandates that the QDR is conducted every four years.

b) The QDR report addresses the total force required to implement the President’s national security strategy and the supporting NMS at prudent military risk.
c) QDR 2001 provided a “capabilities based” strategy and a new force planning construct.

d) QDR 2006 adjusted the capabilities based strategy, the force sizing construct and the number of combat brigades within the Army (set at 70 brigades).

e) QDR 2006 has generated changes in the SPG/JPG documents. Continued analysis of the QDR should generate additional changes in the JPG (next sub-paragraph down). Additionally, the QDR should have an influence on and generate a change to the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Guidance and the Army Plan (TAP).

f) QDR 2009 will provide the strategic guidance for the next administration. The ARSTAF has begun preparations with the ARSEC and DOD.

3) GDF / JPG.

a) The Guidance for Development of the Force (GDF) provides unified, resource-informed strategic objectives, key assumptions, priorities, fiscal projections, and acceptable risks. The GDF focuses on “what” needs to be done, not the “how”.

b) The Joint Programming Guidance (JPG) provides fiscally constrained programming guidance, directing the services to program towards the strategic objectives. The JPG focuses on the “how” and the “how well to do it”.

c) Based on the GDF/JPG, the Services prepare their POM. For the Army, the GDF/JPG provides the strategy, and capabilities needed, across the range of military operations.

4) The President of the United States provided additional guidance post QDR 2006 to the Army. The President increased the Army’s total strength by approximately 74.2K, with increases within each component. The guidance increased the “directed force” from 70 to 76 BCTs.

5) Scenarios or vignettes:

a) Previous modeling vignettes were called major combat operations (MCO).

b) Current OSD scenarios are provided within a format called the “Analytic Agenda”. Scenarios are developed at OSD for joint/combined warfighting at the theater level. OSD has executed several Operational Availability (OA) Studies to determine mid-term (end of program) warfighting scenarios. Each OA study leverages previous efforts (tools, data, and personnel) against the large pool of capabilities. OA Studies have focuses on “Multiple Theaters and Swiftly Defeat concepts”; “Single theaters and assessing overlapping regime changes, and post-hostilities operations”; and incorporate QDR 2006 guidance and the President’s total strength increase.

c) Defense Planning Scenario-Multi Service Force Deployment (MSFD) is the current source of scenarios for the TAA modeling. The MSFD provides the scenarios, a broad set of challenges and military options, projected threat across a wide spectrum and an approximation of the Army capabilities and contribution to
the joint forces. DAMO-SSW produces war plans and war gaming from the OSD generated scenarios/vignettes, all related to the updated QDR strategy.

b. **Internal Army Guidance.**

1) **The Army Plan (TAP),** the principal Army guidance for development of the Army program objective memorandum (POM) submission, articulates the SA and CSA translation of the JCS/DOD guidance to all Services into specific direction to the ARSTAF and commands for the development of the Army POM, and the initiation of the TAA process.

2) The TAP, a HQDA, DCS, G-3/5/7 document, establishes the specific types, sizes, composition and quantities of the “operating forces”.

3) The TAP provides the force and resource guidance. This constitutes the start point for force structuring activities for HQDA, DCS, G-3/5 DAMO-SSW (War Plans) and G-3/7 DAMO-FMF (Force Management).

5) DAMO-SSW and DAMO-FMF of the DCS, G-3/5/7 and the **Center for Army Analysis (CAA),** a Field Operating Agency of the G-8, use the GDF/J PG and OSD provided scenarios to prepare the combat force apportionment that drives the operating and generating force requirements for that POM cycle. The combat force apportionment dictates the maneuver force needed for the various combat operations and is vetted with the combatant commanders prior to receiving the HQDA DCS, G-3/5/7 approval.

6) **Leadership Guidance:**
   a) CSA directed the ARSTAF to develop a balanced force within the approved end strength.

7) Examples of the variety of sources of inputs and guidance are listed here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>OSD and above</strong></th>
<th><strong>ARMY</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
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<td>GDF /JPG</td>
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<td>QDR scenarios</td>
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<td>Homeland Security Reqt’s</td>
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<td>Combatant Command Reqt’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget Decisions</td>
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<td>RDA / Procurement Decisions</td>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Stationing studies</td>
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<td>Treaties</td>
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**BRAC:** Base Realignment and Closure  
**COMPO:** Component  
**GDF:** Guidance for Development of the Force  
**JPG:** Joint Programming Guidance  
**NMS:** National Military Strategy  
**NSS:** National Security Strategy  
**POE:** Posture of Engagement  
**POM:** Program Objective Memorandum  
**QDR:** Quadrennial Defense Review  
**RDA:** Research Development & Acquisition  
**SBCT:** Stryker Brigade Combat Team  
**SDTE:** Swiftly Defeat the Efforts  
**TAAD:** Total Army Analysis
c. **Data inputs and force requirement tasks.**

1) **Homeland Defense (HLD).** NORTHCOM / PACOM establish Army force structure requirements for HLD and Army Support to Civil Authorities (ASCA). NORTHCOM / PACOM provide plans and assessments for force structure requirements to meet HLD missions, threats and areas of responsibility. Taskings generate future force structure requirements. These force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements.

2) **Mission Task Organized Force (MTOF).**
   
a) The NMS assigns future missions to the Services, which generate future requirements. These missions and requirements, drive the development of MTOFs, a ready structured force(s) possessing balanced capabilities adaptable for missions against one or more multi-faceted threat(s). MTOFs are linked to the National Military Strategy (NMS). These MTOF requirements are developed using a “strategy-to-task” process. The tasks in this process are, for the most part, based on the universal joint task list (UJTL). Other MTOFs are generated from specific combatant commander requirements, working groups, workshops and other relevant documents. DCS, G-3/5 War Plans (DAMO-SSW) has staff responsibility for MTOF development and recording.

b) Future force structure requirements will be generated through a strategy influenced by QDR 2010.

c) These force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements.

3) **Army Support to Other Services (ASOS).** Force structure requirements are generated from approximately 113 DoD directives (i.e., Army is responsible for all Veterinary Services, locomotive services, mail delivery services, etc); from requirements generated from Combatant Commander’s Operational Plans (OPLANs); Inter-Service Support Agreements (ISSA) and other operational requirements (i.e., Combatant Commander’s Daily Operational Requirements - CCDOR). These force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements.

4) **Deter -Postures of Engagement (POE).** Postures of engagement include force deployments such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and MFO. They include all of the rotational force structure currently deployed and projected. These force structure requirements are added to the TAA warfight modeling requirements.

5) Parameters, planning and consumption factors, and assumptions.
   
a) HQDA, G-4, TRADOC, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the theater Army Service Component Command (ASCC) and other elements of the HQDA staff (G-1, G-3/5/7 and G-8), provide specific guidance, accurate and detailed consumption factors, planning factors, doctrinal requirements, unit rules of allocation, weapons and munitions data, and deployment assumptions. The parameters, factors and assumptions are needed to conduct the series of
modeling and simulation iterations to develop and define the total logistical support requirements necessary to sustain the combat force(s) in each HLD, ASOS, Deter-POE, MTOF or MCO.

b) The parameters, factors and assumptions contain theater-specific information concerning logistics and personnel planning, consumption and workload factors, host-nation support offsets and other planning factors crucial to theater force development. A critical step in the Force Guidance development is the update and revision of the planning and consumption factors, and assumptions.

6) Rules of Allocation (ROA).

a) Another critical step during the force guidance development is the review and updating of support force unit allocation rules used by the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA), during the modeling process (quantitative analysis).

b) TRADOC and the functional area proponents develop the ROAs for HQDA, G-3/5/7 approval.

c) The ROA represent a quantitative statement of each type of CBT/CS/CSS unit’s capability, mission, and doctrinal employment.

d) The ROA are machine-readable; normally an arithmetic statement that incorporates the appropriate planning factors.

e) There are three basic types of ROA or Allocation Rules:

• Direct input (manual) rules are stand-alone requirements for a unit in a theater. The requirement maybe designated as an operating force structure (combat, combat support, combat service support) or generating force. The Area Support Groups in Europe are an example. These organizations are not doctrinally required in the warfight. They are required to support the warfight and the military community. Area Support Groups require people, equipment, facilities and money.

• Existence rules tie a requirement from one unit to another. Allocation of units based on the existence of other units, or a function of a theater’s physical or organizational structure. An example is the force required to operate one large
general purpose port is 1ea Harborcraft Company. The existence of the Harborcraft Company requires 1ea Military Police Company in support.

- Workload rules tie unit requirements to a measurable logistical workload or administrative services in proportion to the volume of those services. Each unit’s allocation is affected by a set of data items (i.e., 1ea DS Maintenance Company per 375 daily man-hours of automotive maintenance or 1ea POL Supply Company per 2200 tons of bulk POL consumed per day).

f) The ROA are adjusted as necessary to incorporate new/modified unit TOEs, changes in scenarios, modification of assumptions, adjustment to logistical support plans, additions / deletions / modifications in doctrinal employment concepts, and changes to theater-specific planning factors. Figure 6 is an example of an allocation rule recommending change.

g) Council of Colonels and General Officer Level Reviews, attended by Army Staff (ARSTAF), support agencies, Army Commands, ASCC, DRU and proponent representatives, ensure all ROA are appropriate and approved for use in the current scenarios (see example – figure 6). TRADOC Force Design Division (FDD) has posted all Rules of Allocation on AKO (www.us.army.mil/suite/portal/index.jsp). Figure 6 represents one page of several providing data, information, design, etc. The current format enables action officers to clearly understand the allocation rule and advise his/her leadership on approval/disapproval recommendation(s).
d. **Review and Approval Forums.** This paragraph provides a general overview of the forums.

1) **Council of Colonels / General Officer Forums.** There are two levels of reviews: Council of Colonels (CoC) and General Officer (GO) forums, which includes Senior Executive Service (SES) participants.

   a) The CoC / GO forums focus on two types of forums: “REVIEWS” (in Phase I) approve inputs to the TAA process and outputs from the modeling; and “CONFERENCES” (Phase II) determining the resourcing levels for the requirements determined in Phase I.

   b) The forums are evolving in duration, time, composition and medium. The TAA process has adapted the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) VTC (video teleconferencing) format to replace the large gathering in the Military District of Washington (MDW). In preparation for the VTCs, AOs conduct extensive e-mail staffing of issue development, issue resolution, recommendations for leadership consideration and briefings. This is one of the significant changes implemented as the TAA process evolves.

   c) CoC/GO Level Reviews are decision forums where all the parameters, constraints, data inputs and guidance are identified and approved for inclusion in the current TAA cycle and CAA models; **AND** where the forums review and approve the total force requirements (HLD, ASOS, Deter-POE, MTOF and Analytic Agenda force structure requirements). The TAA process is evolving and the review forums are in transition. Each of these forums “meet” several times during the TAA process. The forums meet:

   (1) during phase I to approve data input, guidance, scenarios, and ROA appropriate for inclusion in the TAA process.

   (2) at the end of phase I to review and approve the warfighting force structure requirements developed through the CAA modeling. It focuses on reviewing and approving the “required force” file prior to the VCSA reviewing and approving the “required force”. The required force is prioritized in accordance with the guidance provided in the QDR, GDF/JPG and TAP. The prioritization was previously referred to as the “**Simultaneity Stack**”.

   (3) during phase II to resolve resourcing issues. The resourcing conference CoC provides the initial qualitative analysis and review of the CAA developed force. The resourcing conference CoC provides the opportunity for the ARSTAF, commands, proponent representatives and staff support agencies to provide input, propose changes, and surface issues. The qualitative phase culminates with the resourcing conference GO forum. The GO Level Review approves the decisions of the resourcing conference CoC and addresses remaining unresolved issues. The resourcing conference GO Level Review approves the force that is distributed by the G-37 (FM) for the Army-wide force feasibility.
review (FFR). The results of the FFRs are forwarded as options to the Executive Office of the Headquarters (EOH) for review and decision.

2) The Force Program Review (FPR) is the process where the leadership reviews and approves the POM force for inclusion in the Army’s POM submission. The forum is the EOH, consisting of the SA, USA, CSA and VCSA. The recommended force structure options are briefed through the Director, Force Management, through the G-3/5/7 to the EOH. At the conclusion of the brief to the EOH, the CSA decides the force structure recommended for inclusion in the Army’s submission to OSD. This is one of the significant changes to the TAA process during the last three years. This modification reduced the FPR timeline significantly.

3) ARSTAF, commands, TRADOC schools, Army Service Component Commands, and field operating agencies (FOAs) participate in the CoC forums. The CoC level review ensures all data input and guidance is appropriate and approved for use in the current scenario(s).

4) The senior leadership of the Army participates in the GO level forums. The GO level review addresses those issues that were unresolved at the CoC forum and approves all assumptions, planning factors, allocation rules and guidance as inputs for the second part of Phase I, the CAA modeling.

5) CoC /GO Level Reviews recommend adjustments and approve inputs and parameters for the modeling conducted by CAA. These forums are scheduled to approve the specific data inputs to the CAA computer models and review the warfighting force structure requirements (outputs) developed through CAA computer modeling. Inputs include the combat modeling, approving the priority of flow, requirements versus capabilities, and the campaign plan (warfight and support concept). The format and content of the reviews are subject to change. However, the forums should approve the related items in these general categories:

a) **Deployment models.** This category focuses on how we deploy. Inputs include Air Force and Navy assets available for movement of equipment and personnel. This category focuses on how we model and constrain the force. Inputs include: the general parameters; modeling for all U.S., allied, and threat forces; deployment assumptions; and all weapons, characteristics, rates of fire, munitions available, and lethality.

b) **Combat modeling.** This category focuses on how we fight the force. Currently, the Joint Integrated Combat Model (JICM) is used to determine the intensities, distances traveled, battle casualties, non-battle casualties, major end items replaced, repair parts used and classes of supplies expended (in tons).

c) **Force Generator (FORGE).** This category focuses on how we support and sustain the force (figure 7). This forum terminates the guidance determination when all assumptions, planning factors and guidance inputs are approved for the current TAA cycle. Inputs considered for approval are fuel, ammunition, host
nation support (HNS), coalition support, stockage levels, casualty rates, evacuation policy and rules of allocation.

**How We Build Support Requirements**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Integrated Combat Modeling</th>
<th>FORGE</th>
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<th>ALLOCATION RULES <em>(G3/5/7 Approval)</em></th>
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**Figure 7**

d) CoC/GO Level Reviews are currently working within the Army Campaign Plan (ACP) teleconferencing forum format.

e. **Setting the stage for quantitative analysis.** During the early stages of Phase I, CAA makes several model runs of the Global Deployment Analysis System (GDAS) and Joint Integrated Combat Model (JICM) to set the stage for the second part of Phase I, Quantitative Analysis.

2. **Quantitative analysis.** The total warfighting requirements are determined in this phase. CAA, through computer modeling, generates the total requirements for types of units needed to ensure success of the directed force (BCTs) in the various scenarios. CAA uses the apportioned force provided in the OSD and Army guidance for employment from the Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD). The MSFD provides the scenarios, a broad set of challenges and military options, projected threat across a wide spectrum and an approximation of the Army capabilities and contribution to the joint forces. The computer models generate resources (units or classes of supply) needed in each scenario. Based on the allocation rules and the requirements generated for units or classes of supply, CAA modeling develops the “support forces” required to ensure success of the deployed BCTs in the warfight, given the assumptions and guidance approved in the CoC/GO Level Reviews. The TAP directed force structure and the newly determined “support force” is known as the “operating force”. The TAA process then determines the “generating force” which is currently a predominately TDA
set organizations. CAA develops the generating force structure required to support the “operating force” comprised of BCTs and EAB (CS/CSS) units.

a. **CAA modeling**. CAA accomplishes the modeling of TAA through a series of analytical efforts and associated computer simulations. Improved modeling, accurate consumption factors, proper allocation rules, and application of the rules develop the most accurate definition of the total force requirements to support the directed MCOs, HLD, Deter-POE, ASOS and the Analytic Agenda. There are approximately 33 models used by CAA to determine total requirements. The sequence is shown at **Figure 8**.

![Quantitative Analysis Diagram](image)

**Figure 8**

1) **GDAS** - Global Deployment Analysis System. A strategic deployment analysis, GDAS, is accomplished for each scenario. CAA models have as their major inputs the available strategic mobility (lift) forces, the joint force(s) requiring movement, the required mobilization and training times for RC forces, and the capability desired to deliver the “operating force” in the theater of operations. The major output is the achievable movement of units to the mobilization station, through the port-of-embarkation, to the port-of-debarkation, and finally to the tactical assembly area achieving the employment schedule for all units (CBT/CS/CSS). This becomes one input into the theater combat operations analysis, JICM.

2) **JICM** - Joint Integrated Combat Model. A theater combat operations analysis is accomplished at both tactical and operational levels for each scenario, using the additional major inputs of friendly and enemy weapons’ quantities and effectiveness data, friendly and enemy tactical and operational doctrines, projected resupply
capabilities, and available joint and combined forces. Major outputs, which become inputs to the theater logistical analyses, Force Generator (FORGE), include forward line of own troops (FLOT) movement over time, personnel casualties and equipment damage or loss to the “operating force”, ammunition expenditures, and brigade combat intensities.

3) **FORGE**- Force Generator. A theater logistical analysis for each scenario utilizes the outputs of JICM as inputs, along with such logistical data as in-place stocks, existing infrastructure and transportation network, available host-nation support, projected consumption rates, field level and depot level maintenance requirement factors, and supply, medical, and construction policies to determine time-phased personnel replacement, medical, material, maintenance, construction, and transportation workloads. In combination with the allocation rules approved by the review forums, these workloads generate the CS/CSS support force requirements and a time-phased required troop deployment list for that scenario.

b. **Total Force requirements.** The total force requirements include the force requirements identified to successfully conduct Homeland Security/Homeland Defense (HLS/HLD), Army support to other services (ASOS), Deter- Posture of Engagements (POE), Combatant Commander’s daily operational requirements (CCDOR), and the warfighting models modeled by the Center for Army Analysis (CAA). The warfighting models are based on illustrative planning scenarios generated by OSD within the Analytic Agenda process. Guidance (GDF, JPG or QDR) provides the directed force (number of BCTs), the threat, coalition forces, the area of operations and the strategy. The TAA process generates the force structure required to support the combat force (BCTs). Support force includes combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS) and the generating force (GF) required to support the major combat operations (MCO), HLD, POE, ASOS and CCDOR. The total force requirements include changes to the force, over time, for modernization. Modernization is projected through the use of Intermediate Tables of Organizations and Equipment (ITOE).

1) The total MTOE/ITOE and TDA requirements file include units required/generated for Homeland Security. NORTHCOM and USARPAC provide guidance, threat, force structure requirements and mission directives.

2) Army Support to Other Services (ASOS) force structure requirements are generated from DOD directives, where the Army is the executive agent for approximately 113 tasks; combatant command’s operational plans (OPLANs); combatant command’s daily operational requirements (CCDOR); and inter-service support agreements (ISSA).

3) Deter & Postures of Engagement (POE) force structure requirements are determined from the tasks included in the GDF/JPG. The mission tasked organized force (MTOF), provide approximately 125 different scenarios and required force structure to accomplish the tasks. Examples of Deter-POE: peacekeeping, peace enforcement such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and nation building efforts. Examples of “what if drills”: hurricanes, floods and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
4) The two directed Major Combat Operations (MCO). The MCO(s) produce a "Time-Phased" force that includes the “operating” forces and "doctrinal" echelon above Brigade Combat Team force structure requirements (fully structured and totally optimized – meaning ALO 1), that sustain the combat forces based on the GDF/JPG and scenarios, doctrine, allocation rules and the conduct of the warfight. DOD provides the defense planning scenarios through the Multi-Service Force Deployment (MSFD). The MSFD provides the scenarios, a broad set of challenges and military options, projected threat across a wide spectrum and an approximation of the Army capabilities and contribution to the joint forces.

c. The force sizing construct.

1) The required force is prioritized in accordance with the guidance provided in the QDR, GDF/JPG and TAP. The prioritization is referred to as the force sizing construct. The prioritization was formerly known as “the Simultaneity Stack”.

2) From 2001 through 2005 the force sizing construct was know as “1-4-2-1”. The simultaneity stack reflected those priorities. The required force determined through CAA modeling is arrayed against the categories of the stack for planning purposes. Type units within the required force may be arrayed against multiple areas of the stack based on force match guidance (i.e., a transportation company may be aligned in the MCO as part of the warfight and also dual-matched against a HLD requirement). The “1-4-2-1” force sizing construct produced a Simultaneity Stack (resourcing priorities) in six major categories (bins):

a) Homeland Security: The NORTHCOM Commander (new Unified Command) and PACOM staffs will develop the METL for this arena. The Homeland Security force structure requirements are developed from this METL and the missions developed by the NORTHCOM /PACOM Commander and staff.

b) Deter Aggression: This is the force structure required to meet a mix of enduring commitments over time. Combat Commanders must deter aggression in SWA, NEA, Europe and the South East Asian Littorals. The force structure needs to deter state and non-state actors in the region. Force structure includes requirements generated for the combatant commander’s daily requirements. Modeling and negotiations will determine the end results.

c) MCOs: Combat, combat support and combat service support units directed, generated and verified, through CAA modeling, to successfully defeat or decisively win the MCOs. The force structure requirements are based on the scenarios, allocation rules, doctrinal employment of combat and combat support/combat service support determined by CAA.

d) SSC (NCR). Operating and generating forces developed to support the “worse case” simultaneous stacking of SSCs (Non-Critical Region) – based on the likelihood and impact on the U.S. CAA develops the force structure requirements for the SSC – NCR from the approved MTOFs.
e) Transformation: Army units undergoing Transformation are not available for deployment. The force structure must be accounted for, including support force structure and generating force structure.

f) Generating Force Structure: Generating Force Structure includes the required non-combat organizations (i.e., TRADOC, HQDA, AMC, USMA, etc.) supporting the warfight (MCOs), Homeland Security, Deter Aggression (SSC), Transformation and Strategic Reserve.

3) Starting in February 2006 the force sizing construct is directed from QDR 2006.

4) The force sizing construct continues to mature through the efforts of OSD and the development of the Operational Availability Studies. TAA 10-15 force sizing guidance is based on Persistent Conflict Demands and the Rotational Requirements of ARFORGEN.
d. **Review and approval.** Phase I (Requirements Determination) is complete after the COC/GO level forums review the CAA computer generated output (total warfighting MTOE/ITOE and TDA requirements).

1) The total warfighting requirements, portrayed by FORGE, are a fully structured and resourced force at authorized level of organization (ALO) 1.

2) Additionally, the COC/GO Level Review approves the force structure requirements supporting Homeland Security/Homeland Defense, Deter-POE, all of the approved MTOFs, units conducting transformation, and the Generating Force. The GO Level Review recommends approval of the force to the VCSA.

3) The VCSA reviews and approves the "total force requirements" generated through the computer models, which provide the doctrinally required units from CAA (provided by FORGE), and recognized within the “Simultaneity Stack”. The VCSA’s review and approval is the transition to Phase II of TAA (Resource Determination).

4) **MATCH MODEL.** After the VCSA reviews and approves the total force requirements, a comparison of data files (MATCH report) is made between the VCSA approved total force requirements (CAA developed) and the current program force [Master Force (MFORCE)], from the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS). SAMAS contains the planned, programmed and budgeted subsets for each approved organization over the POM years.

   a) The MATCH (not an acronym) report provides the “delta” between the new CAA modeling developed requirements and the programmed force (SAMAS file). The MATCH is accomplished through a computer comparison program (Figure 11). CAA produces the “required MTOE and TDA” force file by combining the troop lists of required forces for the various scenarios, in accordance with guidance provided from DCS, G-3/7.

![Resource Allocation Model (RAM) Army Flow Model MATCH Process](image-url)

Figure 11
Figure 12 demonstrates the relationship of the MATCH model between the CAA force file and the SAMAS data base; the methodology and the resolution of the issues.

b) A computer program compares the VCSA approved, doctrinally required, force file provided from CAA with a current list of on-hand and programmed units (MFORCE from SAMAS) to determine the “delta” for future programming discussions and issue formulation. The MATCH report and required force files are provided to DCS, G-3/7 (FM) for dissemination to the commands for review and issue formulation in preparation for the Resource Determination phase.

c) The MATCH compares Standard Requirement Code (SRC), Authorized Level of Organization (ALO), component (COMPO) and location. If the CAA developed and VCSA approved requirement is greater than the programmed quantity, that SRC is a “claimant”. If the approved requirement is less than the programmed quantity, that SRC is a potential “billpayer”.

VI. TAA Phase II. Resource Determination.
Resource Determination consists of two separate activities: Qualitative Analysis and Leadership Review. The qualitative analysis is the most emotional facet of the TAA process because the
results impact every aspect of the Army. Therefore, this phase requires extensive preparation by participants to ensure the best warfighting force structure is developed.

1. **Qualitative analysis.** Qualitative analysis is conducted to develop the initial POM force, within total strength guidance, for use in the development of the POM. A series of resourcing forums, analyses, panel reviews, and conferences consider and validate the FORGE model generated requirements and the analysis of those requirements. The qualitative analysis is conducted during the resourcing conference. The resourcing conference is conducted in two separate sessions: Council of Colonels (CoC) and General Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). In September of 2003, the Army leadership directed the Director, Force management (G-37) to modify the TAA process in order to develop options versus a single force structure solution. The resourcing conferences provided the forum to develop the flexibility the CSA desired. The evaluation of the options were conducted through the Force Feasibility Review forum. The Director, Force Management, directed multiple Force Feasibility Reviews (FFR) be conducted to evaluate each of the force structure options developed and recommended for review by the EOH (Executive Office of the Headquarters).

   a. **Resourcing conference CoC.**

      1) The resourcing conference CoC provides the initial qualitative analysis and review of the CAA product by ARSTAF, proponents, commands and staff support agency representatives to provide input, propose changes, and surface issues. *The issues focus on component (COMPO) and center on resolving claimant versus billpayer resourcing issues, while voicing concerns about priorities versus risks.* The AC/RC mix and end-strength concerns are key recommendation outputs of this conference. This forum allows combatant commander representatives (Army component commanders), to verify that theater specific requirements are satisfied by Army force structure assigned/apportioned to their commands to meet current combatant commander operation plan (OPLAN)/concept plan (CONPLAN) warfighting requirements and theater day-to-day requirements (CCDOR).

      2) HQDA action officers and their counterparts enter an intense round of preparations for the upcoming resourcing conference. Since the quantitative analysis only determined requirements for doctrinally correct, fully resourced (ALO 1) CBT/CS/CSS units deployed into the theater(s) of operations, the determination of a need for additional non-deploying units, the acceptance of risk through the reduction in ALO of units, and the allocation of resourced units to components (Active Army, ARNG, or USAR), must be accomplished during the resourcing conferences.

      3) **This is the first point at which the COMPO becomes a factor.** Currently, several AC/RC force structure issues are being conducted: AC/RC rebalance directed by the Secretary of Defense, AC/RC Force Structure Mix, support for modular units (BCT), Homeland Security force structure requirements, growth in the components and state mission requirements in the ARNG are the major issues.
4) HQDA bases force structuring options on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, the threat and the constraints. The primary differences among various options are the extent to which risk, constraints and time are forecast.

5) The resourcing conference forums are transitioning. The format, length of time, issue development and presentation are under review. Successes in MSFA 07-11, TAA 08-13 and MFR 09-13 will solidify the timing, location, and focus of each resourcing conference meeting.

6) The focus of the resourcing conference is to identify and develop potential solutions for the myriad of issues brought to TAA. The OIs and force integrators (FIs) are key individuals in this forum. The OIs and FIs have the responsibility to pull together the sometimes diverse guidance and opinions developed during the conference, add insight from a branch perspective, and establish whether the changes in the building blocks for the design case were in fact the best course of action. The OIs pull all the relevant information together for presentation to the CoC. During these presentations, the OI reviews each standard requirements code (SRC) that falls under his/her area of responsibility, and presents recommendations on how to solve the various issues. The FI has the responsibility to provide a macro view of issues across the functional branches. Other major players are staff officers in the G-8, G-1, G-4 and PA&E.

7) The resourcing conference CoC integrates TDA / MTOE issues. The CoC reviews the issues and requirements, resolving issues based upon sound military judgment and experience.


1) By regulation, the CoC submits their product to the Force Feasibility Review (FFR) process for review by the ARSTAF. By regulation, the CoC forwards their recommendations and unresolved issues, after the FFR process is completed, to the resourcing conference GOSC. In 2003, the CSA directed the Director, Force Management (G-3/7) to modify the TAA process in order to develop options instead of a single force structure solution. The resourcing conferences provided the forum to develop the flexibility the CSA desired. The Director, FM used the FFR format and forum to evaluate the options. Currently the FFR has moved from between the CoC and GOSC conferences to after the GOSC resourcing conference.

2) The ARSTAF conducts a series of modified FFRs during the resource determination phase. The ARSTAF further analyzes the force, initially approved by the CoC and the GOSC, via the FFR. The FFR process uses the results of the TAA resourcing conference as input, conducting a review and proposing adjustments to the options prior to presenting the options to the EOH.

3) The FFRs answer the questions (Figure 13) to ensure the options are affordable and supportable. At the MACRO level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FFR determines if the option can be manned, trained, equipped, sustained and stationed. The FFR process identifies problems with any option and provides alternatives, based on prior TAA initiatives, previous decisions from the
Army leadership, or program budget decisions (PBD), to the EOH for determining the most capable force within constraints.

FRR Focus Areas

- The Force Feasibility Review provides a rapid HODA review and assessment of executability, supportability, and affordability of the force by answering such questions as:

  --- Can We Equip?
  --- Can We Man?
  --- Can We Train?
  --- Can We Sustain?
  --- Can We Provide Facilities?
  --- Can We Afford?

2. **Leadership review.** The leadership review is initiated through the force program review (FPR) process. The Force Program Review (FPR) is the process where the leadership reviews and approves the POM force for inclusion in the Army’s POM submission. The forum is the Executive Office of the Headquarters (EOH), consisting of the SA, USA, CSA and VCSA. The EOH resolves any issues forwarded from the resourcing conference forums. The recommended force structure options are briefed by the Director, Force Management, G-3/7, to the EOH. The EOH analyzes, reviews and evaluates the options. At the conclusion

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**Figure 13**

c. **Resourcing conference GOSC.** The qualitative phase culminates with the resourcing conference: General Officer Steering committee (GOSC). The GOSC reviews/approves the decisions of the resourcing conference COC, reviews the output from the FFR process and addresses remaining unresolved issues. Currently the GOSC is using the Army Campaign Plan forum to bring the recommendation to the GOSC. Additionally, the GOSC forum has been expanded from a single GOSC chaired by the G-3/5/7 into a two star and a three star forum. The resourcing conference GOSC approves the force that is forwarded to the EOH for review and ultimately the CSA’s decision and Secretary of the Army’s approval.
of the presentations to the EOH, the CSA decides the force structure recommended for inclusion in the Army’s POM submission to OSD. *This is the second most significant change in the TAA process during the last five years. This modification reduced the FPR time line significantly.*

3. **Army structure (ARSTRUC) message**

The ARSTRUC message provides a historical record of the Army’s Senior Leadership final decisions made during the TAA process. The ARSTRUC message, produced by DCS, G-3/7 (FM), is directive in nature, providing the commands results at the standard requirements code (SRC) level of detail. The ARSTRUC message marks the end of the TAA process. **Figure 14** reflects processes and products used after the completion of the TAA process. The ARSTRUC message directs the commands to make appropriate adjustments to their force structure at the unit identification code (UIC) level of detail during the next command plan. Command Plan (CPLAN) changes are recorded in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), the official database of record for the Army force structure. SAMAS, along with the basis of issue plans (BOIP) and table of organization and equipment (TOE), provides the basis for Army authorization documentations (MTOE and TDA).

![Figure 14](image)

**Actions Subsequent to TAA**

- Publish ARSTRUC Message
- Update the Army M-Force (SAMAS)
- Conduct Force Builder (FB) Models
  - SACS (Structure and Composition System)
  - AAO (Army Acquisition Objective)
  - TAEDP (Total Army Equipment Distribution Program)
  - PMAD (Personnel Management Authorization Document)
VII. The product of TAA

The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved and funded force structure for America’s Army.

1. The resourced TAA force represents the force structure for POM development, capturing all components (Active, Reserve, host nation) and Type Unit Code (TYPCO: MTOE, Augmentation TDA or TDA) requirements through the end of the POM years (MFORCE). The POM force meets the projected mission requirements within anticipated end strength and equipment levels. The final output should result in an executable POM Force. The Army forwards the POM force to OSD with a recommendation for approval.

2. The product of the TAA and POM is the approved force structure for the Army, which has been divided for resource management purposes into components: the Active Army (COMPO 1), the ARNG (COMPO 2), and the USAR (COMPO 3). Three other components — direct host-nation support (COMPO 7), indirect host-nation support (COMPO 8), and logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9) — comprise force structure offsets. COMPO 7 and 8 are guaranteed by host-nation support agreements. COMPO 9 is an augmentation, not an offset and represents contracts for additional support and services to be provided by domestic and foreign firms augmenting existing force structure. COMPO 4 represented the unresourced units in SAMAS. COMPO 4 units, mostly CSS units, are a part of the Army’s required force structure, but were deliberately not resourced so that available resources could be applied to higher priority peacetime force structure initiatives and other Army programs.

3. Another method of apportioning the limited resources against the larger force structure requirements is through the reduction in Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) of specified units (deployment at a later date), thereby accepting some risk for having a diminished capability in the programmed force.

VIII TAA 10-15 Information.

1. TAA process is evolving.

   a. Since September 2003, the TAA process has been evolving based on leadership guidance, changes in strategic guidance and the impacts of Lean Six Sigma and other process reviews.

   b. The need to capture Force Design Update (FDU) decisions, operational needs such as surge and expedite, increases in total strength; and Army leadership decisions to bring about force structure changes and modernization, has impacted the TAA formats, forums, time sequence and suspense dates.
2. **Timeline**: The timeline for TAA 10-15 was delayed while the ARSTAF addressed the significant increase in Total Strength authorized by the President of the United States in January 2007. The timelines for FMR 09-13 and TAA 10-15 are at Figure 15.

   a. **TAA 08-13** was completed in December 2005. To incorporate the FDU decisions, force structure decisions made after the start of TAA 08-13 and preparation for TAA 10-15, DAMO-FM initiated the Force Manage Review (**FMR** 09-13). The process was scheduled from January to December 2006, supporting the updated POM position for 09-13.

   b. The **FMR 09-13** process was almost completed when the Army leadership was made aware that the President might increase the total strength of the Army. Once the guidance was obtained, the Director, Force Management, developed the “Grow the Army Plan” (**G-TAP**) and incorporated the increase in total strength (74.2K: 65K for AC, 8.2K for ARNG and 1K for USAR) and an increase in Active Component BCTs from 42 to 48 into the program by **FY 2013**.

![Figure 15](image-url)
c. GEN Casey (CSA) decided to accelerate the suspense date to 2010 for personnel increases; and 2011 for equipping. The Army leadership then extended the FMR 09-13 process into the summer of 2007 to capture the CSA’s guidance. Timing and significant coordination resulted in the use of the results of FMR 09-13 as the basis for the POM Force for POM 10-15.

d. The Director, Force Management, initiated TAA 10-15 in January 2007, and re-initiated the process again in August 2007, with a completion date of December 2008. TAA 10-15 will produce the POM force, an ARSTRUC and the POM update for 2011-15.

e. This sequence incorporates all Presidential, DoD and Army force structure guidance and decisions. Additionally it sets the force in preparation for QDR 2009 and POM 12-17.