Beyond Preemption and Preventive War
Increasing US Budget Emphasis on Conflict Prevention

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Policy Recommendations

Within the nation’s toolkit of statecraft and security, the United States should increase its relative emphasis on the nonmilitary international tools that offer the hope of genuine prevention of conflict and terrorist attacks.

1. Following the lead of other major donor nations, the United States should double its spending for nonmilitary foreign aid.

2. Among its foreign aid programs, the United States should place more emphasis on poverty reduction and other measures in the world’s poorest countries. Such states are the most at risk for failure and, like Afghanistan at the turn of the century, can become a haven for terrorists.

3. To enhance American prestige in the world, improve the chances of early warning of conflict or terrorist attacks, and secure the cooperation of allies in the fight against terrorism, the United States should continue to improve the capacity of the State Department by investing more in personnel, improving communications and information systems, and upgrading embassies.

4. In general, the US government should be more explicit about the tradeoffs between military and nonmilitary security expenditures. Moreover, within the defense budget, it should purposefully pursue integrated tradeoffs among offensive, defensive, and preventive defense expenditures, moving steadily toward a more sensible balance between warfighting and conflict prevention.

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has stood as the world’s sole superpower. Economically, it is the strongest nation in the world—with a gross domestic product (GDP) more than twice that of any other country and nearly double the combined GDPs of all the countries in Europe. The United States also has the most powerful, best-equipped, and arguably best-trained military in the world.

In its 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the Bush White House embraced a policy that it calls preemption, but that experts generally call preventive war. The new policy calls for the United States to go on the offensive when it believes that an enemy is gathering the capability to attack, even though the time, place, or even likelihood of an enemy move is unknown and perhaps far in the future. Unlike past (and internationally sanctioned) policies of preemption based on the existence...
of an imminent threat (such as enemy forces mobilizing for attack), the new policy of preventive war without imminent threat is one aspect of a wider offensive strategy of “taking the war to the enemy” that has included the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003.

Clearly, the Bush administration embraces the notion that the best defense is a good offense. But in truth, the best defense may instead be the prevention of attacks on the United States and prevention of conflict around the globe. Such a policy would be pursued through increasingly nonmilitary means and through a stronger emphasis within the defense establishment itself on countering the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials, participating in stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction, and cooperating with allies.

The tragic events of September 11 and the grinding insurgency in Iraq demonstrate that America’s enormous military advantages do not always translate into security at home or gaining what the United States wants as a leader on the world stage. With 13 active-duty ground force divisions, 12 active tactical fighter wings, and 12 aircraft carriers, US forces today are well equipped to fight traditional wars against powerful regional militaries. Minuteman missiles and Ohio-class submarines equipped with thousands of nuclear warheads deter attacks by states. But the 9/11 terrorists hijacked four commercial airplanes and carried out their attacks on New York and Washington without any military equipment, and none of the aforementioned capabilities could have stopped them. Reducing the threat of terrorism requires a shift in the nation’s investment strategy.

Similarly, America’s tremendous advantages in traditional military capability could not pacify Iraq in the months after the US invasion in the spring of 2003. Certain that US forces would be welcomed as liberators, the Bush administration failed to plan for the sizeable multiyear stability and reconstruction effort required to exploit the successful invasion. State Department plans and lessons learned from previous post-conflict operations were ignored. Troops trained for high-intensity conventional warfare against Iraq’s conventional ground forces were unprepared for post-invasion operations, and the number of troops was insufficient to stabilize a population the size of Iraq’s. As a result, what looked like a military victory to President Bush in May 2003 has instead turned into policy failure.

What these examples show is that the achievement of national security and protecting US interests in the world will require the orchestrated use of all the tools of statecraft and security....
Even within the military, some tools are particularly effective in preventing conflict and averting catastrophic terrorist attacks on the United States. These include the gathering and analysis of intelligence, ensuring that nuclear material and expertise in the United States and other countries are kept under control, participating in stability and post-conflict operations in so-called “weak and failing states” in the developing world, and preparing to operate with allies in future conflict scenarios.

Preventing conflict can save countless civilian and military lives. Moreover, conflict prevention through both military and nonmilitary means is a financial bargain. Comparing nonmilitary and military options, the State Department’s entire 2006 budget will amount to less than two months of spending for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Prevention through nonmilitary means may also cost less than rebuilding a country after war. In 2004, Congress appropriated some $20 billion for reconstruction in Iraq, substantially more than the United States spent that year on economic assistance to all the other countries of the world combined. Other countries and international organizations have pledged another $13.5 billion, and experts say much more will be needed.

Looking at military forms of prevention, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of international terrorists may be the gravest threat the United States faces. The most likely location from which terrorists could acquire a nuclear warhead would be the poorly guarded stockpiles of the former Soviet Union, and the experts most likely to become disgruntled and disclose nuclear weapons information are Russian scientists. The departments of Defense and Energy together spend about a billion dollars every year to keep Soviet nuclear material and secrets under wraps—a remarkable bargain compared to the nearly $8 billion that will be spent this year on missile defenses. These defense systems are meant to stop nuclear missiles from hitting the United States but have failed most of their tests to this point.

In speeches and strategy documents, President Bush expresses a commitment to use every tool in the nation’s arsenal to keep the nation secure and improve prospects for peace in the world. Like his predecessors, President Bush says that military force should be the choice of last resort in securing US interests. Yet recent military operations and a look at federal budgets both reveal an overwhelming preference for the military option. Furthermore, the overriding emphasis within the set of military options is still on forces and equipment designed to fight the Cold War—as opposed to military capabilities and operations that help to keep dangerous weapons out of the hands of terrorists, help war-torn nations, or work effectively with allies.

Setting strategic priorities among the competing demands of military and nonmilitary tools—and between traditional military options and the ones needed to meet today’s challenges—is critically important if the nation is to get the most from the enormous financial investment it makes in its global posture. Thus it is crucial that the United States formally integrate its efforts across these categories rather than add money at the last minute through emergency appropriations or by making ad hoc tradeoffs during last-minute budget battles on Capitol Hill.
This policy analysis brief looks through the budget lens at US policy related to national security and global engagement. It recommends a shift in dollars and policy toward nonmilitary forms of leadership on the world stage.

The Failure to Prevent Conflict, Part I
The Imbalance Between Military and Nonmilitary Tools

US Spending for Global Engagement
Within the federal budget, two broad categories (called “budget functions” in budget parlance) pay for America’s role on the world stage. The first is the national defense account, which includes funding for the Department of Defense, the nuclear programs of the Department of Energy, and smaller military-related programs in other agencies. The national defense budget pays to raise, equip, train, and maintain the military; to conduct wars and other military operations; and to deter attacks on the United States and its allies. It also pays most of the nation’s bills for the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence. Including a $50 billion down payment on this year’s costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the national defense budget for fiscal year 2006 is about $492 billion (see Table 1).

US spending for national defense comes to about half of all the world’s military spending and greatly exceeds that of any other nation on earth. The United States also devotes a greater share of its economy—currently more than 3.5 percent—to the military than most of its allies. Within NATO, only Turkey and Greece devote a larger share of their GDPs to defense. On average, America’s NATO partners spend about 2 percent of their GDPs for defense.

The second budget function related to international engagement is international affairs. This category includes funds for economic and military assistance to other

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1 Spending for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan came to about $100 billion in FY2005. Absent a major withdrawal of troops early in the year, the FY2006 costs are likely to come in at about $100 billion as well, bringing the total budget for national defense in FY2006 to some $524 billion. The FY2006 budget also includes approximately $40 billion for homeland security spent outside the Department of Defense.
countries, the conduct of foreign affairs and diplomacy by the State Department, contributions to international organizations like the United Nations, and foreign information programs like the Voice of America. The international affairs category represents spending for nonmilitary global engagement—international efforts that offer the prospect of security through conflict prevention. The president’s budget request for international affairs for FY2006 comes to $32 billion, only one-fifteenth the size of the national defense budget.

No simple formula can tell US leaders how spending should be divided between the two categories. US global engagement serves multiple objectives: protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity and sustaining a suitable level of relative power in the world, supporting alliances, ensuring the safe conduct of international commerce, keeping citizens and infrastructure safe from the threat of direct attack, helping other countries become more capable partners in the global economy, and lending a helping hand to those that need it. To those ends, the United States wants and needs both a strong military and robust nonmilitary programs of international engagement.

Achieving American objectives on the world stage in the future will require continued substantial investment in both categories. Nevertheless, US resources are not inexhaustible. Setting strategic priorities among the competing demands of military and nonmilitary international measures is critically important if the United States is to get the most from the enormous financial investment it makes in its global posture. Thus it is crucial that the United States integrate its efforts across the two categories and be more explicit about considering the tradeoffs between them.

US International Affairs Programs
US leaders have a wide range of tools at their disposal to engage the world without the use of military force. Within the federal budget, spending for these tools is organized into five categories (see Table 2).

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<td>International development and humanitarian assistance</td>
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International Development and Humanitarian Assistance. The president’s FY2006 budget request for international development and humanitarian assistance is $14.2 billion. This category provides bilateral aid to individual countries as well as multilateral aid through international organizations like UNICEF and the World Bank. Spending is aimed at improving economic growth and development, reducing poverty and alleviating human suffering, feeding the world’s poor, and providing emergency relief for countries struck by natural or manmade disasters. Taken together, this category and the second category, international security assistance, make up what is commonly called “foreign aid.”

Foreign aid is not a panacea for averting internal or regional conflict or making America safe from terrorism. Most of the individuals involved in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 came from wealthy Saudi Arabia, and history shows that even well-to-do countries sometimes end up in civil wars and international conflicts.

Nevertheless, to the extent that poverty and the unequal distribution of wealth weaken governments, undermine the delivery of basic services to citizens, or contribute to wars over basic resources, helping more nations to become economically self-sufficient may lead to a more peaceful world. Even more important today, widespread poverty, economic disenfranchisement, and faulty governance of the sort seen in Afghanistan during the 1990s may create conditions that allow international terrorists to gain a foothold within a population. Thus poverty reduction coupled with sound governance and favorable economic policies may offer real hope for conflict prevention. In addition, foreign assistance programs help to project a positive image of Americans as generous and concerned about the rest of the world.

The United States has a history of generosity toward populations in need. In dollar terms, US spending for foreign aid is currently substantially higher than that of any other donor nation. The American economy is also substantially larger than that of other nations, however, so the United States should be able to afford more than others. Yet when viewed as a share of the economy, US spending for nonmilitary foreign aid—what the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) calls official development assistance, or ODA—is less than half the average for European donors and nearly at the bottom of the world’s major donors (see Figure 1).

American spending for international development and humanitarian assistance has always served a variety of purposes: to advance strategic goals by contributing financially to countries deemed important to the nation’s security or position in the world, to help developing nations improve their capacity for economic growth, and to lend a helping hand to those in need.

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2 This section’s focus on the FY2006 budget request ignores substantial spending in recent years for reconstruction in Iraq. Emergency supplemental appropriations in FY2003 and FY2004 included more than $23 billion for reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Of the $8.6 billion of that money actually spent as of September 2005, more than half went toward improving the capabilities of Iraqi military and police forces.
During the Cold War, aid given for strategic purposes helped to secure the cooperation of nations in Africa, Latin America, and other regions in the fight against communism. Today such strategic aid goes to allies in the war against terrorism, including Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Central Asian republics. Strategic aid also helps to support the Andean governments engaged in the fight against drug trafficking. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, this category has provided significant sums to help countries in Central and Eastern Europe establish democratic institutions and undertake market-based reforms.

In recent years, the United States has greatly increased spending for global health. In 2004 the Bush administration instituted the Global AIDS initiative, a major program to combat AIDS/HIV. Infectious diseases know no borders. Investments to cure them and control or prevent their spread can help to avert health disasters both at home and abroad.
To help developing nations improve their capacity for economic growth, President Bush vowed in March 2002 to increase development spending substantially over a period of three years through a new program, the Millennium Challenge Fund. The new fund is meant to help developing nations get their economic houses in order by adopting sound economic and trade policies, improve governance by strengthening institutions like the justice system, and put an end to corrupt practices. If funded and properly implemented, the new initiative could become an important tool in the nation’s preventive arsenal.

Unfortunately, Millennium Challenge got off to a slow start. Staffing the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the office charged with implementing the program, took far longer than anticipated. Arguments over how to measure the soundness of a country’s economic policies are still not fully resolved. Most importantly, congressional funding of the effort has fallen far short of the president’s request each year.

Some experts also worry that the Millennium Challenge Fund will aid only those countries that are least in need of help: those whose sound economic systems already make them less dependent on the charity of other nations. Indeed, money from Millennium Challenge is unlikely to go to the world’s poorest nations.

The United States spends only .04 percent of its gross national income on aid to the world’s least developed countries. In contrast, European countries, on average, spend about .12 percent—three times as great a share of their economies as the United States. Yet the least developed countries may be the very ones most at risk of state failure. And to terrorist groups, failed states can look like a ready source of hopeless young people to serve as recruits, a good place to set up training camps, and in some cases a store of natural resources or tradable commodities. Thus providing more help to the least developed countries could be important from a strategic point of view as well as a generous expression of charity.

Finally, the United States has a tradition of generosity with food aid and in humanitarian crises. In 2003 the United States contributed about 70 percent of all the food aid—and nearly half of all the emergency relief funds—provided by major donor nations to countries in need, and US giving in response to the tsunami disaster late in 2004 was particularly openhanded.

**Conduct of Foreign Affairs.** US diplomacy can help to shape the international environment, avert or temper international crises, promote US interests, and enhance American prestige. In particular, diplomacy can be of enormous importance to US security. Diplomats can help to secure the cooperation of allies in identifying and disrupting terrorist networks. Diplomatic staffs may also receive early intelligence of terrorist activity, and may get early warning of state failure or internal or regional violence, before it has a chance to erupt in full force. In addition, diplomats can help to steer foreign states toward the development of market economies and sound institutions of government.
Toward these ends, the State Department has an extensive worldwide presence, with more than 260 facilities in countries around the globe. Simply put, the State Department is the civilian face of the US government abroad.

However, the State Department’s capacity to conduct diplomacy and represent the nation to foreign governments and populations has been badly eroded by inattention, budget cutbacks, and inadequate infrastructure over a period of decades. Compared with the military, the State Department is small, with fewer than 20,000 Americans in the foreign and civil service. (The Department of Defense, in contrast, has some 1.4 million active-duty service members, 850,000 paid reservists, and 650,000 civilian workers.) Reflecting this huge imbalance, the president’s budget for FY2006 includes only $8.7 billion for the conduct of foreign affairs, which pays not only for the State Department and its multitude of embassies around the world but also contributions to a host of international organizations.

The large size and political clout of the Department of Defense can make it seem easier to exercise American diplomacy through the military than through civilian diplomats. In recent years, the military’s regional combatant commanders have become increasingly powerful voices in their regions, and State Department diplomacy often takes a backseat to military diplomacy. The resulting militarization of America’s face to the world may be expedient, but it reinforces an international image of the United States as preferring military solutions as a first choice rather than a last resort.

The share of US GDP devoted to the conduct of foreign affairs has risen slightly since the end of the Cold War, but so have the responsibilities. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the United States opened embassies and consulates in the newly independent states. To offset the costs of new offices, the department closed some existing ones and reduced staff in others.

Partly as a result, the State Department is understaffed, with numerous jobs unfilled and many staffed by employees who lack the proper experience. In addition, the State Department has suffered from a failure to invest in infrastructure and modern information systems. Until recently, security at embassies was lacking or weak. Information and communications systems seemed locked in the dark ages. In recent years, money has been added to improve the security of the department’s facilities at home and abroad, and some progress has been made in modernizing its information and communications systems. Continued progress in these areas is crucial to keeping diplomats and foreign employees safe and sustaining US leadership and prestige around the world.

Foreign Information and Exchange Activities. Foreign information and exchange activities include educational and cultural exchange programs and broadcasting by the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and similar venues. Such programs, budgeted at $1.2 billion in FY2006, have gained in importance since 9/11, as American leaders search for ways to win the hearts and minds of people in the Arab world and elsewhere.
These functions are especially valuable in an era in which the most pressing security threats come from the developing world rather than from a divided Europe, as during the Cold War. Despite the real prospect of catastrophic conventional and nuclear war on the Eurasian continent from 1945 to 1990—and despite the stark ideological rift between capitalist democracy and totalitarian communism—it is arguable that the United States and Russia shared a roughly similar diplomatic vocabulary, having been influenced on both sides by past interactions with Western Europe. Indeed, the communist ideology that defined Leninism and Stalinism was born in Germany and Central Europe, and Russian elites for centuries looked to the West for cultural norms and rules of conduct in foreign policy.

In marked contrast, the United States faces a fairly large cultural chasm when it deals with the Middle East and greater Asia, whether one is referring to India, China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Iran, Central Asian states, or Africa. While this does not automatically signify a “clash of civilizations,” it does imply that conflict prevention in the developing world will require new, strengthened efforts to reach across cultural and historical divides in order to arrive at mutual understandings in politics, economics, and military affairs that could help prevent new conflicts from arising.

**The Failure to Prevent Conflict, Part II**

**Cold War Vs. Preventive Military Capabilities**

The departments of Defense and Energy will spend tens of billions of dollars in FY2006 on programs suited to the Cold War. Such programs will do virtually nothing to prevent conflicts or international terrorism. They will not help to protect the United States from mass-casualty terrorism or weapons of mass destruction in the hands of radical extremists. At the same time, the nation is shortchanging programs within those two departments that could prevent dangerous weapons and materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, strengthen security in states at risk of becoming havens for terrorists, help other countries secure their borders, operate effectively with allies, and contribute to stability operations or post-conflict reconstruction.

**Military Programs Suited to the Cold War**

The continuation of programs suited to the Cold War is extremely expensive. In addition, it makes the United States less secure in today’s world because such programs steal resources from other national security activities that offer more hope for preventing or responding to terrorist threats and other more likely conflicts.

Advocates of the anachronistic programs argue that the United States should continue to invest in weapons suited to the Cold War, because they could be useful in a war against China or another rising competitor. A better choice is to prevent China or other rising powers from becoming enemies by engaging with them economically and managing relations for sustained peace. Even if such engagement fails to produce a lasting peace, the anachronistic weapons currently in development or production are likely to be outdated before they would be used in a conventional war with a rising power. This section considers a few examples.
The most expensive of the Cold War programs are those for missile defense, especially those meant to protect the United States from long-range missiles. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Department of Defense’s current plans for missile defense would cost nearly $14 billion a year—in other words, as much as the nation’s total bill for international development and humanitarian assistance—between 2007 and 2011, and would rise to a peak annual cost of some $19 billion in 2013.

Building global missile defenses is notoriously difficult from a technical point of view; the system deployed in recent years in Alaska failed most of its tests. More troubling, dangerous weapons seem far more likely to arrive in shipping containers or even to be assembled within the United States than to be born atop long-range missiles. By reducing the programs meant to defend the United States against long-range ballistic missiles to technological research and development, the Department of Defense could save between $8 billion and $10 billion a year during this decade and more thereafter.

The Air Force’s stealth F-22 air-to-air fighter was conceived during the Cold War for dogfights against Soviet airplanes that were never built. The F-22 has increased in cost from its initially advertised price of a few tens of millions of dollars to today’s price of $160 million per airplane (excluding the enormous sunk costs of research and development). Moreover, its costs continue to rise despite a substantial cutback this year in its expected capability to strike targets on the ground—a mission the Air Force agreed to only grudgingly after coming under intense criticism for shirking the only job the plane is likely to have in the foreseeable future. Spending to develop and purchase these anachronistic planes will come to $4.3 billion in 2006—three and one-half times what the United States will pay for foreign information and cultural exchange programs.

The F-22 is the Air Force’s most prized program. To protect it in the face of budget pressures, the Air Force offered this year to retire the F-117, the only stealth attack plane currently in its arsenal; eliminate the venerable U-2 spy plane, which reportedly flew only 19 percent of the reconnaissance missions in the Iraq war but still was able to provide more than 60 percent of the signals intelligence and 88 percent of the imagery; and drop some 60,000 active-duty and reserve personnel from its ranks. Canceling the F-22 program would free up approximately $3 billion a year for the remainder of this decade to invest in programs that are more relevant to today’s threats.

The Marine Corps’ technically troubled V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft was also conceived during the Cold War. The aircraft was built to deliver marines from ship to shore in an amphibious assault. Unfortunately, the system is accident-prone. Moreover, it appears increasingly that tilt-rotors, which take off like a helicopter but then fly like a fixed-wing airplane, will be vulnerable to the same threats that inflicted severe damage on US helicopter fleets in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus the V-22 will likely be a poor performer in wars of the future.
Canceling this troubled and vulnerable system would save about $1.5 billion a year for the rest of this decade.

The DD(X) destroyer is a new class of ships being developed by the Navy to strike at land targets in support of Marine Corps units fighting ashore. The ship is meant to carry tactical missiles and two new long-range guns that can target enemy positions from a longer distance than is possible today. If built, it will be the largest destroyer the Navy has ever had. The ship would incorporate innovative new technologies and would require fewer people to operate it. Unfortunately, however, it is being designed to fight in large, conventional wars and has no place in preventing or fighting terrorism, interdicting the flow of illegal drugs or arms, or assisting in other naval missions that make sense in the modern world. Moreover, the ship is extremely expensive. The Navy says the first DD(X) will cost $3.3 billion, but hopes to trim the cost by cutting back on expectations for new capabilities. The CBO, in contrast, says $4.7 billion is a more realistic estimate. Canceling the ship would save more than $3 billion a year between 2007 and 2010.

The Navy is still converting its Trident submarines to carry more potent D-5 missiles in place of the older C-4s. With the Cold War almost two decades behind us, continuing the Trident conversions and purchasing additional D-5s for the reworked submarines makes no sense. The Department of Defense now hopes to make the nuclear-armed Tridents more relevant to today’s missions by adding non-nuclear long-range missiles that could strike targets around the globe with less than an hour’s notice. Once in flight, however, such missiles could easily be mistaken by other countries for nuclear weapons. As a result, the new plan raises serious concerns for nuclear stability and arms control.

Keeping 14 of the Cold War nuclear-armed Tridents is unrealistic in a world without a serious great power strategic competitor. Keeping 14 of the Cold War nuclear-armed Tridents is unrealistic in a world without a serious great power strategic competitor. Despite their existing arsenals, neither Russia nor China are threatening the United States with large numbers of super-accurate ICBMs—as the Soviets did during the Cold War—and more importantly, neither considers the United States an existential threat. Nor does either view itself as being in an all-out ideological Cold War with America (despite disagreements over Taiwan, for example, in the case of China). Thus retiring the two submarines slated for conversion and foregoing the purchase of 48 D-5 missiles would save about $200 million per year between 2008 and 2010, according to CBO.

Military Programs Suited to Prevention
In contrast to the programs highlighted in the previous section, some other programs funded by the national defense budget are well suited to future realities and offer promise for prevention. This section offers some examples.

Perhaps the most important preventive effort is cooperative threat reduction, a collection of programs in the departments of Defense, Energy, and State aimed at securing dangerous warheads, materials, and expertise from the former Soviet Union and other foreign countries. Despite proclamations that weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of terrorists are a grave threat to the nation, the Bush administration spends only about $1 billion annually on such efforts.

Today’s programs in this area suffer from nonbudgetary obstacles such as slow contracting procedures and limits on access to other countries’ nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, an accelerated program would be possible if funds were available. Doubling the funds for such programs would allow departments of Defense and Energy to accelerate research into important technologies—for example, to help determine the origin of interdicted materials or weapons used against the United States, to continue dismantlement of Russian nuclear submarines, or to continue dismantlement of Russia’s stockpile of chemical weapons.

As recent events in Iraq have shown, solid planning for post-conflict reconstruction is crucial to prevention of hostilities in the aftermath of war. In 2004 the Bush administration established a new Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction within the State Department. This office was tasked with leading federal civilian efforts to prevent or prepare for post-conflict problems and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies following internal conflicts or other wars. For 2006 the Department of Defense agreed to provide $100 million to the new office. Given the importance of post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Iraq and for future prevention, the Department of Defense should continue to contribute substantially to the office.

The 1990s found the Army ill-structured for the Balkan wars and for peacekeeping and stabilization missions. For example, the military police and civil affairs units essential to such missions resided largely in the reserve component rather than in the active-duty Army. In addition, the active-duty Army was configured with large operations in mind rather than medium-sized peacekeeping missions. Medium-sized operations that called for one or two brigades caused substantial turbulence for units and troops because the brigades lacked essential capabilities that were available only at higher echelons.

The Army’s modularity program will fix those problems, making the Army better prepared for a preventive role. Because it involves the purchase of new equipment as well as training people in new skills, the program is expensive, costing some $6 billion annually between now and 2011. In 2006 the Department of Defense chose not to include the program in its regular budget, but to request funds for it through the emergency supplemental appropriation meant to pay for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Treating this transformative program as an emergency is illogical. The Department of Defense should provide full funding for it within its regular budgets.

Other Department of Defense activities favorable to prevention include:

- Participating with allies in military exercises.

- Improving language and cultural training of service members, particularly in those areas of the developing world where military operations have a high probability of occurring and which may be very different in culture from the United States.
• Advising or assisting other countries in securing their borders, which would directly support the global fight against terrorism through a decrease in illicit trafficking in drugs, arms, and people.

• Improving US capabilities for accurate and timely human intelligence.

Such activities can and should be expanded with only modest increases in their budgets—increases that could be offset through small cutbacks in the programs discussed in the previous section.

**Conclusion**

The US arsenal of statecraft and security includes both military and nonmilitary tools. Promoting US interests in the world and keeping America secure in the future requires attention to both types of tools. But currently, the United States spends far less on nonmilitary international tools than on the military. While going on the offensive with military force may sound to some like the best defense, preventing war and terrorist attacks through diplomacy and other nonmilitary international tools can save money and has the potential to save lives. The nation would be well served by a more integrated strategy of global engagement that shifts budgets and actions toward the nonmilitary side of the ledger.

Foreign aid is not merely charity. Foreign aid advances US strategic goals by enlist- ing the support of other nations in the fight against international terrorism, curbing the narcotics trade, and helping other countries build democratic institutions and market-based economies. In addition, foreign aid improves health and stems the spread of infectious disease, supports the militaries of important allies, boosts the capacity of fragile states to provide for their people, and provides humanitarian relief to refugees and other populations harmed by war or natural disaster.

The United States spends more in absolute terms on foreign aid than other nations, but its spending is not consistent with the scale of the national economy. European donor nations on average spend more than twice as large a share of their national incomes on nonmilitary foreign aid as the United States. This stands in stark contrast with military spending, to which the United States devotes about 80 percent more of its economy than European countries on average. The United States should heed the lesson of its European allies and double spending for nonmilitary foreign aid.

Among its foreign aid programs, the United States places relatively little emphasis on poverty reduction and other measures in the world’s poorest countries. Yet such states may be the most at risk for failure and, like Afghanistan at the turn of the century, can become a haven for terrorists. America’s European allies devote about three times as large a share of their economies to programs in those countries. The United States should strive to come closer to that mark, at least doubling its spending in the least developed countries.
State Department diplomats and civil servants are the civilian face of US diplomacy. Yet increasingly in recent years, the US armed forces are the face foreigners see. The State Department’s capacity to conduct diplomacy and represent the nation to foreign governments and populations has been badly eroded by inattention, budget cutbacks, and inadequate infrastructure over a period of decades. To enhance American prestige in the world, promote US aims, improve the chances of early warning of conflict or terrorist attacks, and secure the cooperation of allies in the fight against terrorism, a properly staffed and equipped State Department is crucial. The United States should continue to improve the capacity of the State Department by investing more in personnel, improving communications and information systems, and upgrading embassies.

Further, on the military side of the ledger, the United States should also shift some defense funding away from anachronistic warfighting programs into more preventive forms of military training, operations, doctrine, and procurement, recognizing the rise in “small-scale contingencies”—stability and post-conflict reconstruction operations—in the post-Cold War world. While such activities are not at the core of national interest traditionally defined, the simple fact is that since the end of the Cold War, both Republican and Democratic leaders have regularly and increasingly undertaken smaller-scale contingencies in an attempt to stop humanitarian catastrophes and stabilize regions and states whose conflicts could expand or that could become havens for terrorists, drug runners, arms smugglers, and crime, thereby threatening US security in the long-run.

Within the national defense budget, there is substantial room to reallocate resources from programs suited to the Cold War toward those more appropriate for prevention. Cutting back on Cold War-type programs like missile defense and the F-22, V-22, DD(X) and ballistic missile-carrying submarines could free up tens of billions of dollars that could be reinvested in preventive efforts within the departments of Defense and Energy—including cooperative threat reduction, improved capacity for post-conflict reconstruction, and Army transformation—or shifted toward the nonmilitary international efforts discussed earlier in this brief.
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