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Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement

SUMMARY

For about a decade, Congress has expressed reservations about many complex and intertwined peacekeeping issues. The Bush Administration's decision to reduce the commitment of U.S. troops to international peacekeeping parallels the major concerns of recent Congresses: that peacekeeping duties are detrimental to military "readiness," i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the nations. Critics, however, view peacekeeping and related stability operations as a necessary feature of the United States' current and possible future U.S. military activities. With the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a "stabilization and reconstruction" operation (which manifests some characteristics of a peace operation), concerns about whether U.S. forces are large enough and appropriately configured to carry out that operation over several years dominate that debate. These concerns were heightened by the 9/11 Commission report, which cited Afghanistan, where the Administration has limited U.S. involvement in peacekeeping and nation-building, as a sanctuary for terrorists and pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist.

Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping operations. The number of troops serving in U.N. operations has decreased dramatically since the mid-1990s. About 20 U.S. servicemembers are serving in four operations under U.N. control. About 3,000 are serving full-time in the Balkans with some 1,000 in the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and some 2,000 with the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). About 37,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping operations in South Korea, and roughly 850 serve in the Sinai. A few of the 2,000 serving in a U.S.-led multinational operation in Haiti

remained after the U.N. has taken over command of the operation on June 1, 2004. In Iraq, an ambiguous situation, U.S. troops are performing tasks that have been undertaken in some peacekeeping operations, as are a few hundred U.S. troops in Afghanistan. DOD refers to the latter two as "stabilization" or "stability" operations.

The military "readiness" issue has factored heavily into the debate over peacekeeping from the mid-1990s. Some policymakers worry that peacekeeping costs drain funds that DOD uses to prepare its forces to defend against a threat to U.S. vital interests, that peacekeeping deployments stress a force whose size is inadequate to handle such operations, and that deployed troops lose their facility for performing combat tasks.

In the 108th Congress, the readiness issue has morphed into a capabilities issue, which has dominated the debate. With some policymakers and analysts arguing that the uncertainties of the post-September 11 world demand a greater U.S. commitment to curbing ethnic instability, a major issue Congress continues to face is whether to maintain troops abroad in peacekeeping and related roles, and if so, what, if any, adjustments should be made in order for the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and stability missions — in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less strain on the force, particularly the reserves. Of particular interest is whether the size and configuration of U.S. forces, especially the Army, should be further modified to meet the requirements of peacekeeping and related stability operations. Additional issues are whether to augment civilian and international capabilities in order to take over some of the tasks currently performed by U.S. troops.

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

On July 22, the 9/11 Commission issued its report, warning of the dangers of allowing actually and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist, and naming Afghanistan as a current sanctuary.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping. These have ranged from the basic question of definition (what is “peacekeeping” and, more recently, how does it relate to “stabilization,” “peace enforcement,” “reconstruction” and “nation-building”?) to the broad strategic question (how and when does it serve U.S. interests?) to related practical questions (which tasks, if any, must be performed by the U.S. military and which can be delegated to other entities?).

Currently, Congressional attention regarding U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping focuses on three issues. For many Members, the salient issue is whether there is a need for the U.S. military to maintain a long-term peacekeeping, or “stabilization and reconstruction” presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans. The second is the suitability and desirability of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping and related missions in general, and if so, what is the appropriate role for the military in those situation and what roles should be taken on by U.S. civilian or international forces? The third is a two-sided capabilities issue: to what extent do peacekeeping and related operations impair the U.S. military’s warfighting capability (“readiness”), and, conversely, to what extent should the U.S. armed forces be reorganized to perform peacekeeping effectively so as to alleviate undue stress on the forces?

Although the costs of peacekeeping per se are not as salient an issue as they were several years ago, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military assistance to several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs (i.e., the costs over and above the cost of maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime) of the larger contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. Cost issues are not addressed in this issue brief. For more information on incremental costs, supplemental appropriations and on attempts to create more efficient methods of funding contingency operations, see CRS Report 98-823, *Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers*, and CRS Report RL32141, *Funding for Military and Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents*. Also see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress*, for information on the costs of U.N. operations and its capability to handle them.

The Definitional Problem

“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many activities that the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes *ad hoc* coalitions of nations or individual nations, undertake to promote, maintain, enforce, or

enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from providing election observers, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new governments of those countries, organizing and providing security for humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and enforcing cease-fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.

The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in use can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations. Use of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are without risk, when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war. To further complicate the problem of definition, as the concept of peacekeeping has become discredited in the United States, the terminology has shifted. For DOD and many analyses aimed at a DOD audiences, many of these same activities are now encompassed under the rubrics of “stabilization” and “reconstruction” operations.

The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United Nations peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition: providing an “interpositional” force to supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had signed. In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe the different types of peacekeeping activities. In particular, it created the term “peace enforcement” to describe operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety. (For some military analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations and low-intensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has some degree of local consent.) Subsequently, U.S. executive branch agencies substituted the term “peace operations” for “peacekeeping.” Since the early 2000s, the Department of Defense more often uses the term “stability” operations to refer to peace operations (although the term also encompasses other non-combat operations, such as counterdrug operations), and undertakes some peace tasks in the context of reconstruction assistance. Congress has tended to use the term “peacekeeping,” as does this issue brief.

Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping

The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from the 1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most endorsed by the United Nations. Very few U.S. military personnel currently serve under U.N. command. As of April 30, 2004, 26 U.S. military personnel were serving in five U.N. peacekeeping or related operations. These operations are located in the Middle East (3 U.S. military observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs), Kosovo (2 milobs), Ethiopia/Eritrea (7 milobs and 3 troops), and Liberia (7 milobs and 2 troops). Other U.S. forces are deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken with U.N. authority. As of mid-2004, roughly 3,000 U.S. troops were serving in the two NATO operations in the Balkans, with others supporting one of them from Macedonia. (Numbers have fluctuated by the hundreds with troop rotations.) Roughly 800-900 serve in the Sinai-based coalition Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N. affiliation. Additional troops are involved with the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Haiti, which took over the three-month U.S.-led coalition force on June 1, 2004.

The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but not counted as, peacekeeping. Some 37,000 U.S. troops serve in South Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. (Although technically “peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a standard U.S. forward presence mission.) On June 7, South Korean officials announced that the United States intended to withdraw about a third of those troops by the end of 2005. No U.S. troops serve in the coalition international peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan although some 10,000 U.S. troops are present there in other roles (see section on Afghanistan, below), including a few hundred involved in nation-building activities. As of June 2004, some 140,000 U.S. troops were involved in the Iraq occupation, often referred to as a “stability operation.”

The Bush Administration Policy

Despite President Bush’s expressed dislike for open-ended “nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces during his presidential campaign, as president he has been willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the extent he deems necessary. (For a discussion of candidate and president Bush’s statements on peacekeeping, see CRS Report RL31109, *NATO: Issues for Congress*, by Paul E. Gallis.) During his Administration, Bush has sought and achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has resisted calls to provide U.S. troops for the international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.

In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role for the United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has again moved to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of Iraq falls in a gray area that defies easy definition, with a level of instability that some would define as low-intensity conflict rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the U.S. military has undertaken there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping operations. Critics of the Bush Administration have charged that its disdain for peacekeeping has led it to ignore the lessons of past operations and to err in its judgment of the number and type of forces necessary in Iraq, putting the United States and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.

Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Bush Administration actions in the Balkans have been consistent with President-elect Bush’s remarks in early 2001 that he was “in consultation with our allies” concerning his desire to reduce the U.S. peacekeeping presence in the Balkans. The Bush Administration quietly sought to minimize forces in the two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through negotiations with U.S. allies, following established NATO procedures. The U.S. presence in Bosnia has dropped steadily during the Bush Administration from some 4,200 participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of 2001 to about 1,000. (U.S. participation may terminate for the most part at the end of 2004 if, as planned, the European Union assumes responsibility for the operation. See CRS Report RS21774, *Bosnia and International Security Forces: Transition from NATO to the European Union in 2004*.) Similarly, the U.S. presence in Kosovo has dropped from some 5,600 involved in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early 2001 to about 2,000. (These numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to rotations.) In both cases, these reductions have taken place in the context of an overall reduction of forces serving in the NATO peacekeeping missions.

NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan. For some time, the Bush Administration has maintained that no U.S. troops would participate in peacekeeping operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), despite calls by some analysts for a U.S. role. With about 5,500 troops contributed by some 31 countries as of October 2003 (according to the latest figures on the ISAF website), ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas under a U.N. Chapter VII authorization. NATO assumed command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, over a year and a half after it was formed in January 2002 as an *ad hoc* coalition operation of 18 nations under British command.

The United States has some 10,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan, according to DOD, most in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda), but others in support, training, and reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provide some assistance to the ISAF, i.e., logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support, but they do not engage in ISAF peacekeeping. U.S. troops do, however, provide training and assistance for the formation of an Afghan national military force, an activity which some analysts label “nation-building” and which is expected to continue through at least mid-2004. In addition, a few hundred U.S. troops have been involved since December 2002 in the establishment and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were designed to create a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. Each team includes 60-100 U.S. military personnel (Special Forces and civil affairs reservists) and civilians. (As of January 2004, eight PRTs are operating throughout Afghanistan, five of which are U.S. operations. DOD plans to start up another four by the spring of 2004.) Although the military role in PRTs is not identified as “peacekeeping,” its objectives — enhancing security, extending the reach of the central government, and facilitating reconstruction — are similar to those of peacekeeping operations. Some analysts would consider it “nation-building.” Thus far, the PRTs have not proven controversial in Congress, although some humanitarian organizations have taken issue with them. (For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588, *Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy*, and the section on nation-building below.)

In the face of a deteriorating security situation in the countryside, in early 2003 the Bush Administration dropped its objections to repeated calls to increase the size of ISAF and to expand its operations to areas outside Kabul. Although ISAF appears to have incrementally increased somewhat in size (by about 900) between the fall of 2002 and the fall of 2003, it was not until October 13, 2003, that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510 authorized ISAF to expand its operations beyond Kabul and its environs. On January 6, 2004, ISAF marked the beginning of its operations outside Kabul when it took over the German-led PRT. (Great Britain and New Zealand are in charge of the other two non-U.S. PRTs.) The total foreign military presence in Afghanistan still falls short of what some analysts have judged would be desirable, although NATO has agreed to increase ISAF personnel, at least for the October 2004 elections.

Issues Regarding an Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq. Although the Bush Administration appears determined to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq as soon as possible, it has yet to offer a definitive assessment of the number of troops needed in post-war Iraq and the length of their stay. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on January 28, 2004, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, said that he envisions a U.S. military presence in Iraq for another four years. (See CRS Report RL31701, *Iraq: U.S. Military Operations*, for more information on the U.S. military presence there.)

In the face of what many analysts perceive as a continuing climate of general lawlessness and insecurity, some critics argue that the United States should deploy a greater number of troops, particularly military police, to provide greater stability. (According to news reports, some 135,000 U.S. troops are deployed in Iraq as of spring 2004.) Many argue that an extensive force will be needed for several years to perform a wide spectrum of tasks, particularly providing continuing peacekeeping duties such as providing basic security while Iraqi police and military forces are reconstituted. The deployment is straining U.S. forces, however, as the June 2, 2004 “stop loss” announcement that soldiers would not be allowed to retire within 90 days of deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan, and the subsequent announcement to withdraw a third of U.S. soldiers from Korea, are attributed to difficulties in maintaining a sufficient number of troops in Iraq. Although the Bush Administration has hoped that NATO would take over Iraq, news reports indicate that the earliest this might occur would be after elections that may occur at the end of 2004 or early 2005.

The U.S.-Led Multilateral Force in Haiti. After international efforts to resolve a political crisis in Haiti failed, the United Nations Security Council authorized a multilateral force to provide assistance to the Haitian police in establishing a secure environment and to facilitate humanitarian assistance for a period of three months. Some 200 U.S. Marines, the first contingent of a U.S.-led four-member coalition force, landed in Haiti on February 29, 2004. By early April, the force had grown to 3,700 troops, of which 2,000 were Americans. Of those roughly 1,600 were Marines, with additional troops from the Army providing communications and headquarters (HQ) support, Coast Guard personnel patrolling the waters off Haiti, and a number of Special Operations Forces. (Information provided by the U.S. Marine Corps, April 8, 2004.) Some U.S. forces remained after the U.N. took command of the operation on June 1, 2004: the State Department reports that four are under U.N. control.

Apportioning Responsibilities

Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission

Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping operations, and by extension, the related “stabilization” and “reconstruction” tasks of other post-combat environments. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts and skills to be fighters, while the instincts and skills needed for peacekeeping are those inculcated by law enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the military’s training to work in highly-disciplined units and employ higher levels of force are seen as inculcating skills necessary for effective performance.) Another reason is that peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations. Many senior U.S. military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force. U.S. troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy. Most peacekeeping tasks, however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” use of force.

As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a good soldier. (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states the

Army field manual on peace operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.) In part this argument is based on the recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that the most credible deterrent to those “spoilers” who would disrupt the peace is a soldier well-trained for combat. U.S. military participation in peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by military officers who have found that although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”), peace operations can enhance other non-combat skills necessary for combat operations. A recent Heritage Foundation report, *Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq* by James Jay Carafano, published in July 2004, argues that the armed services should create schools designed to teach concepts and practices needed for post-conflict missions.

Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces. On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,” U.S. troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by those who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S. forces. On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces if the United States does not.

Debate over U.S. Military Involvement in Nation-Building. In the wake of U.S. military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S. military involvement has been framed in terms of whether the U.S. military should do “nation-building.” Like peacekeeping, nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept and a variety of activities. On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept of creating (or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict situation. The term is also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that militaries or civilians undertake to advance that goal. (A recent RAND report, *America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq*, uses the term to encompass the full range of activities undertaken by the United States, including by its military forces, in operations that have been variously known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction.)

As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to a range of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid in emergency situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance, or construction of economic infrastructure, such as roads, schools, electric grids, and heavy industrial facilities, and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals, and water and sewage facilities. They can also include the provision of a variety of services, such as medical services to refugee and impoverished populations, and training and assistance to police, the military, the judiciary, and prison officials as well as other civil administrators.

During the early to mid-1990s, the U.S. military was involved in several peacekeeping operations with significant nation-building components, especially Somalia and Haiti. In Somalia, besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the U.S. led-UNITAF was engaged in road and bridge building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and hospitals. In Haiti, in the absence of civilian personnel, the U.S. military became involved in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems as part of their primary task of establishing security. These two experiences, which are often regarded as failed or at best inconclusive experiments, stigmatized peacekeeping and nation-building for many Members as an inefficient use of military resources.

Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts continue to assert the need for military involvement in such tasks, particularly in the absence of other personnel able to undertake such in the immediate aftermath of major combat. Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential elements in stabilizing post-conflict situations because they provide the physical and organizations infrastructure populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such activities are also viewed as enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of weak central governments as they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local populations of the friendly intent of foreign military forces. Sometimes, involvement in such activities may enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security situation in an area. Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the 9/11 Commission's recommendation (p. 367) to use all elements of national power "to keep possible terrorists insecure and on the run..."

In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments, military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks. In hostile environments, armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers providing such assistance. (A Heritage Foundation analyst argues that basic post-conflict tasks, such as providing security and related logistics for the reestablishment of civilian government and authority, must be done by the military, although he argues against the use of the U.S. military for peacekeeping, and broader "nation-building" tasks. See *Post Conflict and Culture: Changing America's Military for 21st Century Missions*, October 22, 2003, available through [<http://www.heritage.org>].)

In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue that the use of the military for such tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and reconstruction tasks. Such critics feel that the use of troops for such purposes can detract from a sense of returning normality and establishment of civilian control. Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in the same areas, some civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and makes them targets of armed opponents. In Afghanistan, humanitarian groups have charged that U.S. soldiers were endangering their workers by wearing civilian dress while undertaking humanitarian activities; some have viewed the U.S. military as "inadequately prepared" for its rural reconstruction efforts there. (*Combat role strains relations between America's military and its NGOs*. Humanitarian Affairs Review. Summer 2003, p. 29). Many have urged that the U.S. military not undertake such projects in Iraq.

Proposals to Improve Civilian Capabilities

Several proposals to build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks, especially rule of law tasks, in peacekeeping operations have been advanced. Among the arguments made in their favor are that they could relieve stress on military forces. Three such bills have been introduced in the second session of the 108th Congress: the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004, S. 2127, introduced on February 25, 2004, by Senators Lugar and Biden; and its companion measure, H.R. 3996, introduced on March 18, 2004, by Representative Schiff; and the International Security Enhancement Act of 2004, H.R. 4185, introduced on April 21, 2004, by Representative Dreier. S. 2127/H.R. 3996 and H.R. 4185 each propose changes in the structure of the National Security Council (NSC) and the State Department to enhance planning and coordination of stabilization and other contingency operations, the creation of a corps of permanent civilian employees and contractors to deploy rapidly to such operations, enhanced training, and new funding

mechanisms. A related bill, the United States Assistance for Civilians Affected by Conflict Act of 2004, H.R. 4058, with proposals to improve contingency planning and coordination, was introduced on March 30, 2004, by Representative Hyde. The Bush Administration is studying possible changes to the structure of government to improve civilian capabilities and some officials expect a plan to be presented by the end of the year.

There are four key differences between S. 2127/H.R. 3996 and H.R. 4185, although the difference on a key component of both proposals, a civilian overseas emergency response capability, may have little practical effect. S. 2127/H.R. 3996 has a more specific proposal for such a capability, proposing a Readiness Response Corps of up to 250 new permanent personnel, and a Response Readiness Reserve roster of at least 500 people (from active or retired federal, state, or local government service ranks, non-governmental organizations, contractor firms) trained and available as needed to support the Corps. H.R. 4185 provides for a Civilian Overseas Contingency Force of paid volunteers for pre-conflict stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction, but does not specify a number.

Two significant differences concern the creation of new government offices, one with a new function. For one, H.R. 4185 proposed more extensive structural changes, i.e, the creation of a new office of an Undersecretary of Overseas Contingencies and Stabilization with three bureaus headed by Assistant Secretaries. Because the number of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries is fixed by law (the State Department Basic Authorities Act (P.L. 84-885) as amended, Title 1, Section 1), the law would have to be amended or current posts eliminated in order for this proposal to take effect. H.R. 4185 assigns a new function to one of the three bureaus: the monitoring of weak and failing states in order to take preventive measures to deter conflict. In addition, H.R. 4185 provides for the establishment of a new International Contingency Training Center, while S. 2127/H.R. 3996 calls only for the establishment of a stabilization and reconstruction curriculum.

A last difference regards funding. While S. 2127/H.R. 3996 proposes less extensive changes than H.R. 4185, S. 2127/H.R. 3996 authorizes \$80 million for personnel, education, training, equipment and travel costs to carry out the act, as well as an initial \$100 million (in no-year monies) for stabilization and reconstruction activities and authorizes replenishments as needed. While H.R. 4185 establishes a new State Department Emergency Operations Support Fund to provide emergency contingency funding, it specifies no funding and is intended to be carried out within existing budgets, according a Dreier staffer.

Proposals to Improve Other Nations' Capabilities

The Bush Administration has proposed a five-year, \$661 million Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) to assist other, largely African, nations to train and equip some 75,000 military forces to participate in peacekeeping operation. Some funds would be provided to develop European constabulary (i.e. police with military skills) capabilities for deployment. The House version of the FY2005 DOD authorization bill, H.R. 4200, as passed May 20, 2004, contains no funding for GPOI, but Section 1213 requests a Presidential report on it. The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) report, H.Rept. 108-491, on the bill notes that the President's FY2005 budget request did not contain GPOI funding (of which 80% would be from DOD and the rest from the Department of State). The HASC expressed concern that providing authority would divert funds from U.S. troops. It also stated that the Administration requested authority to exempt GPOI from Title 22 U.S.C.

human rights and foreign policy constraints that restrict the countries eligible for such training and types of training that can be provided. The Senate Armed Services Committee version, S. 2400, contains no funding and an amendment (S.Amdt. 3200) submitted by Senator Inhofe was not acted upon during floor action in June. The amendment sought to authorize \$100 million for FY2005 to enhance other nations' capability to participate in international peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. In their summit meeting of June 2004, the G-8 countries adopted proposals for the enhancement of international peacekeeping capabilities that resemble the GPOI proposals. The Bush Administration is seeking funds to contribute to this initiative, especially to a constabulary school being established in Italy.

Military Capabilities Issue: Readiness vs. Adequacy

Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations has taken two different forms. During the 1990s, critics of the commitment of U.S. military personnel to peacekeeping operations drove the readiness debate. As the U.S. military was increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the same time as it was downsized significantly — many Members questioned whether U.S. military forces could perform their “core” war-fighting mission to protect U.S. vital interests if they engaged extensively in other activities. Opponents of such commitments, particularly in areas they regarded as irrelevant to key U.S. interests, argued that they impaired the military's capability or “readiness” to defend the nation. Today, those who view peacekeeping operations as a necessary, albeit not primary, role for U.S. armed forces, particularly the army, have reframed the debate, arguing that the U.S. military should be adequately structured and sized to perform such operations without putting undue stress on individual soldiers and units.

The Readiness Debate

There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of the readiness, which was always a subjective and ambiguous concept. Peacekeeping (and all other operations other than war) is directly related to the readiness problem, if viewed strictly in terms of the readiness ratings that are calculated periodically. That is because the standards that are used to measure “readiness” only measure the military's combat preparedness; that is, its ability to fight and win wars. These standards measure the availability of a unit's personnel, the state of a unit's equipment, and the performance of a unit's members on tests of their wartime skills. When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping operations, scores on these measures can decline, as they did in the latter half of the 1990s.

There were a variety of reasons for such declines, some of were addressed by changes in military practices. First, military personnel cannot continue to practice all their combat skills when participating in peace operations; second, the U.S. military has been deployed for peacekeeping operations at the same time that the size of the force, particularly the army, has been reduced substantially; third, funds for training and equipment have been diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations; and fourth, units were disrupted by the deployment of an individual or a small number of individuals to a peacekeeping operation.

Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends on one’s perspective on the utility of readiness measures, which measure only readiness for combat. Those who believe that peacekeeping and related operations are significant missions and important to U.S. national security have argued that readiness standards should also measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks.

If one looked at the larger “readiness” problem, that is the perception that U.S. military personnel was in general overworked and underpaid, that military equipment was in poor shape, that there were rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military forces could not recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness was less pronounced, according to some analysts. Some have argued that the readiness problem was exaggerated or non-existent, given the successful combat performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003. Others have argued that peacekeeping was responsible to some extent for this larger readiness problem, but there were many other contributing factors, such as the strong economy and the advanced age of equipment and spare parts. The area in which peacekeeping most affected readiness is the stress that frequent deployments placed on certain troops — the so-called increase in operational tempo (optempo), i.e., the pace of a unit’s activities and personnel tempo (perstempo), i.e., the rate of deployments away from home station.

Assessing and Adjusting for the Effects of Peacekeeping and Related Operations on Military Forces

The military’s ability to perform peacekeeping operations while retaining its preparedness to fight wars depends on several factors. Most salient among them are the size of the force, the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the size, length, and frequency of deployments (operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat skills while deployed on peacekeeping and related operations.

Deployment Strains. The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful life of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army. For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment. In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses, in March 1995 the GAO reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to peacekeeping together with reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units, and “heavily”stressed certain Army support forces (such as quartermaster and transportation units) and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of a major regional contingency (MRC) to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to an MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully-trained and available Air Force AWACS aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.

The Army has taken steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and better management of its resources, as has the Air Force. In recent years, the army has addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to six months (although this was

overridden by deployments to Iraq), and including national guard and reserve units among those on the roster to serve in Bosnia, thus attempting to reduce the tempo of combat duty units. The Air Force, since 1999, has established Air Expeditionary Units that deploy under a predictable rotation system in an attempt to reduce the stresses of deployment to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and to meet other disaster and humanitarian assistance demands as they arise. In some cases, however, these solutions may generate other problems. For instance, the Army's attempts to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments on its active forces by instead deploying reservists may have, some analysts worry, affected Guard and Reserve personnel recruitment and retention. (See section on the use of reserves, below.) Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements in resource management could ease stresses. Others prefer to change force size or structure.

Force Adjustments for Peacekeeping and Related Operations

The appropriate size and structure for the military depends largely on the types of wars that it is expected to fight and the range of missions that it is expected to perform. A decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, U.S. policymakers are still debating how best to define the future threats to U.S. security and the appropriate configuration of U.S. military force to counter them. Since the early 1990s, many defense analysts, military officers, and policymakers have questioned whether the military, especially the Army, is appropriately sized and structured to perform all the tasks assigned to it. As the deployment strains, noted in the GAO reports cited above, became evident, many Members have argued that the U.S. military is too small and too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. In response, some urged that the United States reduce or eliminate such missions, others urged changes in the force to better accommodate peacekeeping missions. The Iraq occupation has intensified this debate. (See the Heritage Foundation's *Reducing the Stress on an Overstretched Force* by Jack Spencer, August 1, 2003, arguing for the more effective use of uniformed personnel and a reduction of peacekeeping commitments before increasing the number of U.S. troops.)

Increasing Use of Reserves in Peacekeeping and Related Operations.

Over the past decade, but especially since September 11, 2001, the U.S. military has increasingly called upon Army, Air Force, and Navy reserve forces and National Guardsmen for peacekeeping and related stability operations. (These forces are known collectively as "the reserve," "reservists," and "the reserve component.") For many, these deployments raise issues regarding the appropriate division of labor between the active and reserve forces, and the extent to which reserve forces can be used without jeopardizing their ability to recruit and retain qualified personnel.

Until recently, the increasing use of involuntary call-ups of reservists for peacekeeping operations was considered a desirable trend by many analysts. These call-ups were necessary to deploy adequate numbers of personnel with specialized skills required in post-conflict operations, and to relieve over-taxed active duty combat personnel. In 2000, the Reserve Component began taking over operations in the Balkans; since then National Guardsmen have assumed leadership roles in U.S. contingents, and Army reservists and guardsmen have comprised a large part of those contingents. (National Guard generals have commanded the U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent since October 2000, and a National Guard general was appointed commander of the U.S. KFOR contingent in March 2003.) A December 2002 report from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, recommended that reserve

components could “assume a larger role in peacekeeping operations” and “shoulder a greater load” in the transitional and final stages of “smaller-scale contingency” operations. The National Guard also provides the battalions that perform peacekeeping duties in the Sinai. With the call-ups in 2003 for duty in Iraq, on top of the post-September 11, 2001 call-ups for homeland defense, many policymakers perceive that the reserves have been too stretched to remain viable if they continued to be deployed at current rates.

The potential effect of repeated mobilizations on recruitment and retention has been a longstanding area of concern, even before the post-September 11, 2001 call-ups. The call-ups for duty related to homeland security, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and the extension of the tours of reservists in Iraq to one year, announced in the fall of 2003, has intensified concerns. In July 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld directed a “rebalancing” of active and reserve forces in order to reduce reliance on the reserve component during the first 15 days of a “rapid response operation” and to limit reserve mobilization, especially for high demand units, to once every six years. (See section on Current Army Restructuring, below. Plans for further restructuring reserve forces are being developed and are expected to be announced in July 2004.) Although DOD officials have stated that reserve recruitment has held steady, on January 20, 2004, Lt. General James R. Helmly said that a decision prohibiting the resignation or retirement of reservists while their units are deployed to Iraq was “masking” problems that must be addressed “to prevent a recruiting-retention crisis.” (*Washington Post*, January 21, 2004)

Debate Over Force Size. Concerns that the United States does not have sufficient military forces to maintain a presence in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next year has given new prominence to the issue of force size. The size of the U.S. military is controversial in large part because the basic cost of each additional soldier is high, averaging some \$100,000 per year for an active duty troop, according to a recent CBO estimate. Since the mid-1990s, some policymakers and military experts have suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be an appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two major theater wars which was then the standard for sizing force structure and also to engage in peacekeeping missions. (For the 14 years after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 through the year of the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army had averaged some 778,000, with fluctuations. As of February 29, 2004, there were 492,882 active-duty Army personnel, almost 13,000 more than the 480,000 authorized level because of provisions allowing for temporary increases in special circumstances.) Other policymakers would prefer further cuts in personnel in order to conserve funds for modernizing equipment and weapons systems.

On November 6, 2003, retired Lt. Gen. Theodore G. Stoup Jr., a vice president of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the active army force should be increased by some 40,000 over the next few years. In the November 2003 edition of AUSA’s *Army Magazine*, retired General Frederick J. Kroesen argued that the Army should add 100,000 troops: 50,000 “to spell the overworked, overcommitted aviation, military police, engineer, signal, medical, special operations forces and other high demand units,” and 50,000 to train replacements. On January 28, 2004, Secretary of State Rumsfeld invoked emergency powers to authorize the Army to increase temporarily by 30,000. (For more information on the current debate and legislation on force size, see CRS Report RS21754, *Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?*) On June 3, 2004, presidential candidate John Kerry said that he would expand the active duty Army by 40,000 troops.

Debate over Army Force Structure and Restructuring Proposals. Size is not the only consideration, and some would argue it is but a secondary consideration, for providing the capabilities needed for military operations and relieving stress on the armed forces. For several years, analysts have advanced proposals to restructure U.S. Army forces to increase capabilities for peacekeeping. Despite the “small-scale contingency missions” that became a staple of the 1990s and many argue will constitute a sizable proportion of future missions, the Army has retained its traditional structure. This structure has been built around warfighting divisions of 9,000 - 17,000 (although the number of active duty Army divisions was cut from 18 to ten during the 1990s). Divisions are currently divided into three brigades of combat forces, and separate units of support personnel. (Support personnel include “combat support” such as artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, military police, signal, and military intelligence, and “combat service support” such as supply, maintenance, transportation, health.) Other support forces are found “above” the division level in the Army’s four corps or elsewhere in the active or reserve force.

For the most part, proposals for reform have centered on an increase in the number of personnel in “low-density, high-demand” units, i.e., those most heavily taxed by peacekeeping, which are now stressed by “stability” operations in Iraq, and which to this point have been concentrated in the reserve component. For several years, many military analysts have suggested that the overall force might be restructured to include more of the specialities needed for peacekeeping (which some also regard as in short supply for warfighting or war termination periods), and in units sized for peace operations. Civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military police units have been frequently mentioned as specialties that are particularly needed in peace operations, but are in short supply in the active military. As the Army performed increasing numbers of small-scale contingency missions, analysts noticed that such operations were built around one or two maneuver brigades (of 2,000+ to 3,000+ troops) with command and support elements drawn from divisional HQ and elsewhere in the Army. As a result, some analysts recommended that the development of “maneuver brigades that are prepared for rapid deployment and autonomous operations.” (RAND, *Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, and Disaster Relief*, 1998, accessible through [<http://www.rand.org>] pp 133-134).

Current Army Restructuring. Beginning in mid-2003, the Army has undertaken a restructuring of the Army’s active force and a “rebalancing” of positions between the Army active and reserve forces that eventually will involve some 100,000 positions. (Testimony of the Army Chief of Staff, General Schoomaker, before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), January 28, 2004.) Of these, some 10,000 positions were shifted in 2003, another 20,000 are to be shifted in 2004, and 20,000 more changes are scheduled for FY2005. (Testimony of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld before the HASC, February 4, 2004.) The primary reason stated for these changes is to improve the Army’s warfighting capacity on the current and future battlefields. Nevertheless, the changes are also viewed as enhancing the Army’s ability to carry out a broader range of missions — including peacekeeping and related stability operations, as well as homeland defense — with less stress on both the active and reserve force. Three elements of the current restructuring reflect changes that have been proposed to make forces more adept at such operations, and have implications for their conduct. These are:

— The internal restructuring of divisions to make the Army more mobile (i.e., rapidly deployable or “expeditionary”) and versatile. The Army has begun to reconfigure the first

of its ten divisions in order to make the brigade, instead of the division or corps, the Army's primary unit of organization for conducting combat operations. This reconfiguration will incorporate into combat brigades many or all of the support services necessary to make the brigade more self-sufficient on the battlefield. At the same time, the number of combat brigades in each division will increase from three to four. (The newly configured brigades are referred to as "units of action.") Some divisions may maintain additional support personnel in separate brigades to be used for "stabilization" tasks in immediate post-conflict situations. The formation of these brigades seems similar to RAND's 1998 recommendation for rapidly deployable and autonomous maneuver brigades for peacekeeping (see above).

— The increase in the active Army of high demand/low intensity support personnel in order to support this restructuring and to reduce reliance on and use of the reserve component (as discussed in the section on reserves, above). This increase involves the relocation of such positions from the reserves to the active force, as well as a reshuffling of positions within the active force. For instance, at the start of the restructuring, only one of the Army's 25 civil affairs (CA) battalions was in the active force, while the others were in the Army Reserve. (Combat battalions range in size from 600 to 900 troops, while civil affairs units are somewhat smaller.) Many CA battalions are now being moved to the active force, although the primary capability will still reside in the Reserve. Besides CA, specialties being increased in the active forces that are especially relevant to peacekeeping and related operations are military police, special operations forces, and certain engineer and transportation capabilities. (General Schoemaker, January 28, 2004 HASC testimony.) The Army is attempting to do this without increasing force size by converting certain combat positions (such as heavy artillery) and other low-demand specialties into support positions.

— Plans also call for the creation of a few thousand new reserve positions, including positions needed for peacekeeping and related operations, especially military police.

The effect of these changes on the Army's ability to perform functions from combat to peacekeeping and other stability operations is open to interpretation and debate. While some criticize the reforms as short-term measures primarily geared to deal with the demands of several more years in Iraq rather than with the combat realities of future battlefields, others might look at them as insufficient if the Army is to possess the types of forces necessary to carry out peacekeeping and related stability operations as an inevitable component of its future missions. Following are a number of proposals intended specifically to enhance capabilities for peacekeeping and related operations.

NDU 2003 Proposal: New Stabilization and Reconstruction Commands.

The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University (NDU) released, in November 2003, a proposal to redesign the U.S. government's structures for planning, organizing, and carrying out stability and reconstruction operations. A major focus of *Transforming for Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations* (accessible through [<http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/home.html>]), is a proposal for greater integration of civilian and military capabilities. On the military side, this would require the creation of two new joint (i.e., composed of members from all military services) "Stabilization and Reconstruction" commands, one with two permanent HQ units located in the active-duty force, the other located in the reserves but with an active duty HQ unit. Battalion-sized units would be assigned on a rotating basis to the commands, and would be maintained at a readiness level for immediate deployment. (The study estimates the number of troops necessary for a small

stabilization and reconstruction contingency operation at 5,000; for a medium-sized operation at 15,000; and for a large operation at 30,000.) The study also proposed a reorganization of military forces to consolidate specialized high demand personnel needed for such operations and to transfer some of them from reserve to active duty status. The high demand specialties the report mentioned were military police, civil affairs, construction engineering, medical, and psychological operations (psyops) personnel.

Dedicated Force Proposals Examined by CBO and the Heritage Foundation. Options which call for dedicating troops solely to peacekeeping missions have long been considered problematic for a variety of reasons. The U.S. military has resisted the concept of dedicated peacekeeping units, fearing that they might divert resources from the rest of the force and might well become substandard as good soldiers would not choose to make a career of secondary missions. Nevertheless, the idea of creating dedicated forces within the U.S. military was examined by the CBO in 1999, and recently been revived by some who argue that the United States must remain committed for several years to peacekeeping in the Balkans and Iraq, and eventually in Afghanistan. The July 2004 Heritage Foundation report, *Post-Conflict Operations from Europe to Iraq*, argues that the United States should not only reorganize and retrain existing combat forces to better equip them to perform occupation tasks and assist other nations in improving post-conflict capabilities, but also “build organizations and supporting programs [within the armed forces] specifically designed to conduct post-conflict duties. (p. 8) Another option would be to establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the current military service branches, although this might prove quite costly.

In a 1999 study that some analysts find still relevant to today’s choices, the Congressional Budget Office examined four hypothetical options for restructuring U.S. forces to perform peace operations with less stress. (*Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of U.S. Military Participation in Peace Operations*, December 1999, accessible through [<http://www.cbo.gov>].) Three examined dedicating forces to such operations, at current or increased force levels. The fourth proposal, increasing the number of support personnel essential to such operations by converting an existing active-duty division into support units, resembles part of current Army restructuring. (CBO judged that this option would increase the Army’s readiness for peace operations without relying on reservists and enhance the Army’s capability and readiness to conduct conventional war by alleviating a shortage of support units in the active Army force. CBO calculated that while this would be costly to implement, it would save money over the long run.) Although the precise number of personnel that the Army eventually will shift into support services as part of current restructuring is not known, it may eventually equal or exceed the size of a division.

DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005

(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)

Operation	FY1991- FY1994	FY1995	FY1996	FY1997	FY1998	FY1999	FY2000	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	TOTALS	FY2004 (est.)	FY2005 Request
AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS													
Southwest Asia/Iraq													
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)										38,322.0	38,322.0	50,188.3	NA
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch	634.9	138.2	88.9	93.1	136.0	156.4	143.7	148.6	1,372.4	626.2	11,023.3	—	—
Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force	1,048.9	468.4	576.3	597.3	1,497.2	954.8	755.4	963.5					
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring	—	—	—	102.7	5.6	13.8	239.8	261.6					
Vigilant Warrior	—	257.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	257.7	—	—
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup 11/98)	—	—	—	—	—	43.5	—	—	—	—	43.5	—	—
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98)	—	—	—	—	—	92.9	—	—	—	—	92.9	—	—
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group)	32.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	32.4	—	—
Total Southwest Asia/Iraq	1,716.2	864.3	665.2	793.1	1,638.8	1,261.4	1,138.9	1,373.5	1,372.4	38,948.2	49,771.8	50,188.3	NA
Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF)										15,788.1	15,788.1	7,980.0	436.9
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)													
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge			2,231.7	2,087.5	1,792.8	1,431.2	1,381.8	1,213.4	932.9	742.2	13,586.8	868.7	768.4
Other Former Yugoslavia Operations*	436.6	347.4	288.3	195.0	169.9	155.4	101.3	79.4					
Total Bosnia	436.6	347.4	2,520.0	2,282.5	1,962.7	1,586.6	1,483.1	1,292.6					
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)													
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War)						34.6	—	—	—	—	34.6	—	—
Eagle Eye (Air Verification, 10/98-03/99)						20.3	—	—	—	—	20.3	—	—
Noble Anvil (Air War)						1,891.4	—	—	—	—	1,891.4	—	—
Joint Guardian (KFOR)						1,044.5	1,803.1	1,383.9	938.2	590.4	4,886.2	726.1	669.7
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance)						141.6	—	—	—	—	141.6	—	—
Total Kosovo						3,132.4	1,803.1	1,383.9	938.2	590.4	7,848.0	726.1	669.7
Korea Readiness*	69.7	90.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	160.6	—	—
COMPLETED OPERATIONS (Includes Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, Western Sahara, East Timor, and Liberia)													
Subtotal Completed Operations	1,867.0	591.2	86.9	—	—	1.5	56.8	—	—	3.1	2,606.5	4.9	—
GRAND TOTALS	4,089.5	1,893.8	3,272.1	3,075.6	3,601.5	5,981.9	4,481.8	4,050.0	3,243.5	56,072.0	89,761.8	59,768.0	NA

Source: Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates: Justification for Component Contingency Operations and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003, FY2004, and FY2005.

Notes: This chart consists of DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations (including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted. Some totals do not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise (humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there as incremental costs. NA=Not Available.