

A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences

With the attacks of September 11, 2001, in mind, the United States has begun to transform its security strategy—radically altering its postulates but imprecisely reforming its doctrine and operations. As both friends and foes assess the consequences of the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, it is prudent to remember that this strategic revision remains a work in progress. In particular, the semantics at play—notably the wide use of the words “preemption” and “prevention” interchangeably to summarize this new strategy—require a careful examination, and indeed clarification, of the strategy itself. Such a clarification is needed to attempt to reconcile the new U.S. vision with the strategic choices of allied countries.

First Impressions

The president’s State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, conveyed the gist of the new U.S. defense strategy in two concise sentences: “We must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world. ... I will not wait on events, while dangers gather.” Elsewhere in his speech, President George W. Bush singled out Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as constituting an “axis of evil.”¹ Later, on June 1, 2002, Bush clarified the implications of the strategic shift in his West Point commencement speech, where he compared today’s security situation to the Cold War: “For much of the last century, America’s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, these strategies still apply. ... If we wait for threats

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to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. ... We must take the battle to the enemy ... and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” Even more explicit language was used in Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on December 2, 2002: “[T]he notion that we can wait to prepare assumes that we know when the threat is imminent. ... When were the attacks of September 11 imminent? Certainly they were imminent on September 10, although we didn’t know it. ... Anyone who believes that we can wait until we have certain knowledge that attacks are imminent has failed to connect the dots that led to September 11.”²

What is an ‘imminent threat’ today?

Despite an abundance of similar wording in the president’s, vice president’s, and secretary of state’s various speeches, the Bush doctrine has yet to be translated into specific new policies. The call for regime change in Iraq, for instance, has been heard before; Bush made it a campaign commitment in 2000, after it had already been put into law during the Clinton administration

in the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.³ There has been no official word on what the new doctrine means for force postures or for the actual conduct of military operations (at least not yet) beyond those undertaken against Al Qaeda in response to the September 11 attacks.

Alongside such rhetorically radical presentations, it is worth noting that the language contained in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), presented to Congress on January 8, 2002,⁴ does not appear to depart significantly from a similar report issued in 1995 during the Clinton administration. The 2002 NPR generated controversy throughout domestic and foreign media, however, because of Bush’s emphasis on preventive action—not because of the actual content of the publicly available parts of the document. To a large extent, the same can be said about the NSS, issued by the White House on September 17, 2002. Under previous administrations, the very existence of a national security strategy went largely unnoticed by the general public.

The significance of the 2002 NSS document is contained in chapter 5, entitled “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” which fleshes out the concept of preemptive and anticipatory action. Here, force posture and structure implications remain sketchy at best; the document is limited to statements such as building “better, more integrated intelligence capabilities” and continuing “to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”⁵

Preemption, on the other hand, is developed in great detail but in a way that both downplays the novelty of the doctrine and appears to set limits on

the kind of preemptive action it advocates. Specifically, the document states that the United States has entertained the option of preemption in the past and emphasizes the role that determining an imminent threat plays in the decision to use preemptive force. It calls for a reconsideration of what constitutes such a threat in today's world while never dictating a new definition. Beyond the militant promotion of freedom, democracy, and free enterprise in the president's cover letter, the strategy itself makes no other mention of the anticipatory use of force except to combat imminent and emerging threats:

For centuries international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against ... an imminent danger of attack. ... [I]nternational jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat. ... We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. ... The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. ... The United States will not use force in all cases to preempt threats nor should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression.⁶

It is difficult for U.S. partners and allies, and even for an analyst, to equate this classical approach with the one developed, among others, in Wolfowitz's speech.

You Say Preemption, I Say Prevention

Bush has brought the concepts of prevention, preemption, and anticipatory action to the fore. Although each word has its own semantic meaning reflected in general-purpose dictionaries, the public discussion of the new national security strategy uses them, more or less, interchangeably. For example, chapter 5, intended to define and outline the concept of preemption uses the verb "prevent" in its heading to summarize the chapter's contents. By using both terms, the Bush doctrine can be interpreted in many different ways with the potential to lead to substantial policy adjustments by U.S. foes, partners, and allies. Because Bush's speeches, in general, tend to lend themselves to such broad interpretation as well, potential U.S. adversaries may be led to make worst-case assumptions as they shape their own responses.

Prevention and preemption are rooted in the Latin verbs *praevenire* (to forestall) and *praemere* (to buy before others). According to the *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, two of the meanings of the verb "prevent," relevant to this discussion, are "to deprive of power or hope of acting or succeeding" and "to keep from happening or existing."⁷

This broad set of definitions has had extraordinarily diverse implications in the strategic arena. Until recently, “prevention” was widely used in strategic discourse to refer to crisis prevention or preventive deployment—as an alternative to the use of lethal force. Hence, the widely and accurately hailed deployment of United Nations peacekeepers in Macedonia during the 1990s was an effective measure to prevent (until their withdrawal in 2000) the emergence of an armed conflict in that part of the Balkans. Presumably, this concept of prevention is not what Bush has in mind; in fact, it is the polar opposite of the prevalent interpretation of the Bush doctrine, which assumes that the United States may use lethal force in cold blood to accomplish its objectives. Simultaneously, however, some analysts have invoked the notion of prevention to combat the root causes of terrorism through economic, social, and political means.

The potential for confusion is even greater when it comes to preemption. Although the noun comes from the original Latin word meaning “the right of purchasing before others,” its derived meanings are much broader, spanning even well beyond the derived principle of imminence (as in imminent threat) that largely defines the concept of preemption in international law. “Preemptive” has been taken to mean “marked by the seizing of the initiative: initiated by oneself” (as in, preemptive attack).⁸ This broad interpretation has allowed prevention and preemption to be used interchangeably in numerous strategic situations, long before the inception of the Bush doctrine.

For example, the Israeli attack in 1981 against the Osirak reactor, built by the French near Baghdad, has been indiscriminately portrayed as preventive and/or preemptive. An Internet search conducted on November 19, 2002, yielded 145 entries for “Osirak + strike + preventive” and 441 entries for “Osirak + strike + preemptive.” The fact that this strike against the Osirak reactor could not be justified as an imminent threat, as described in the NSS, make the results of this search all the more illuminating. The Israelis were not trying to preempt an Iraqi attack but were conducting a preventive operation, designed to keep an Iraqi nuclear weapons capability “from happening or existing” a number of years down the road. Regardless of the extent to which the Israeli strike was justified and successful (and in this author’s opinion, the Israelis had ample cause for concern about the military use or misuse of the Osirak facility), the UN Security Council (including the United States) roundly rejected Israel’s invocation of the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify its anticipatory action.

Conversely, the Six-Day War of 1967 was, in the purest sense, a preemptive attack as described in chapter 5 of the new NSS, based on “an imminent threat—most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air

forces preparing to attack.” Israel’s objective case for striking first in this instance was sufficiently obvious to keep the Security Council from disavowing it at the time. Yet, because the verb “to prevent” can mean “to deprive of power,” which the preemptive attack against the Arab states did supremely, the June 1967 war is more often than not portrayed as an act of prevention. An Internet search using “six + day + war + prevention” yielded 301,000 entries, as opposed to only 5,570 entries when “preemption” was substituted for “prevention.”

This semantic analysis is more than a purely academic exercise. In strategic debate, a number of practical consequences result from the use and misuse of prevention and preemption. First, an essential distinction in current international law is blurred. If the Bush doctrine strictly boiled down to preemption—in turn, tied to the concept of imminent threat—then the new U.S.

national security strategy would not necessarily involve upsetting basic principles governing the use of force in international relations. Conversely, when preemption is used interchangeably with prevention and both are subject to wide interpretation, the legitimization of the use of force may be revolutionized.

Another consequence of misusing the two terms is to confuse the public debate in the international arena, inviting a confluence of strategic worst-case analysis and political anti-U.S. sentiment by both U.S. allies and adversaries. Such confusion can undermine mutual confidence and trust among U.S. allies and partners while also increasing the domestic and international margin for political maneuvering by U.S. adversaries when contemplating radical countermeasures, thus easing the way for all states with which the United States interacts to make dangerous and destabilizing decisions.

At the political and strategic level, the Bush doctrine’s loose language may hinder a convergence between the new U.S. national security strategy and those of U.S. allies, which are being redefined at varying rates in the wake of September 11. Combined with questionable characterizations of the security landscape (e.g., the alliance-splitting “axis of evil” formula), such ambiguous language could accelerate, for better or worse, a reshuffling of the U.S. partner network, as old allies such as Germany keep their distance while new partners such as Russia fill the void, forming a would-be “axis of good.”

Similarly, unfixed terminology forces U.S. adversaries to make potentially flawed assumptions about the actual scope of the new policy. This is not to say

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that uncertainty of a strategy's actual scope is necessarily bad; for example, it was the former Soviet Union's strategic uncertainty of what circumstances would lead the United States, Great Britain, or France actually to contemplate the use of nuclear force that largely kept the Cold War cold. Such uncertainty, however, should be the product of a deliberate evaluation of likely outcomes. According to the Cold War theory of deterrence (expressed as "mutually assured destruction" by the United States, "flexible response" by NATO, and "dissuasion du faible au fort" by France), such uncertainty was intended to foster prudence, based on the accurate prediction that Moscow would use worst-case analysis and act cautiously as a consequence. Given today's complex and unstable strategic reality, the question becomes, Will uncertainty lead to worst-case conclusions; and if it does, will such conclusions prove stabilizing or destabilizing in practice, particularly as others are considering the acquisition or the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?

The current ambiguity of the U.S. national security strategy does, however, have at least the saving grace of keeping options open. Semantic confusion leaves room for strategic convergence on military and security implications, particularly since prevention has also, as previously discussed, been invoked to address root causes in a nonmilitary manner and to stop crises from developing.

Responses from Friends

As U.S. allies attempt to adapt their own national strategies to the challenges presented by the September 11 attacks and the broader reshuffling of America's network of global partnerships, the affirmation of preemption/prevention as the new centerpiece of U.S. defense strategy significantly affects, either positively or negatively, allied political, strategic, and defense interests in at least three ways:

- the international rules and organizations legitimizing the use of force;
- the harmonization of U.S. and allied strategy; and
- the responses to countermeasures taken by targeted states.

BREAKING OR REMAKING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE?

International affirmation of the Bush doctrine could directly challenge the existing rules pertaining to the use of force in the world—how those rules are made as well as what they entail. With respect to how, Europeans have

largely maintained their vigorous defense of multilateralism. Bush's pledges to take the battle to the enemy with no mention of international support, therefore, has made the Bush doctrine a contributing if not an essential element of the European perception of U.S. unilateralism (collectively shaped by the Bush administration's approaches to the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and so forth). Furthermore, this reassertion of multilateralism is not exclusively European, as evidenced by Mexico's role in the Security Council negotiations leading to Resolution 1441 concerning Iraq.

The net result of this hardening of the multilateralist impulse among U.S. allies has been the creation of a more polarized situation than was the case, for instance, during the mission in Kosovo. In 1999 the Europeans found it possible to initiate the NATO air campaign alongside U.S. forces without a direct and explicit mandate from the Security Council. They tolerated this exception to global multilateralism precisely because it was understood that it was an exception and therefore would not compromise the more general European tendency toward global action.

In the case of Iraq's WMD acquisition and development, acting with UN authorization was deemed necessary by nearly all U.S. allies, despite the fact that the Security Council had found Iraq in material breach of Resolution 688 more than a decade ago. The legal basis for military action against Iraq without a new UN resolution was arguably as good as, if not better than, that during the Kosovo crisis. In other words, it is precisely because the United States has been asserting a unilateralist posture that the international community has pressed the Bush administration to operate within the constraints of a Security Council compromise or face the political consequences of the kind of unilateral behavior most U.S. allies and partners have traditionally disavowed.

How international rules are made significantly affects what those rules contain. As the NSS accurately states, preemption based on imminent threat has an established place in international law, specifically in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Furthermore, by adopting Resolution 1368 the day after the September 11 attacks (at the initiative of the French), the Security Council's interpretation of Article 51 officially and for the first time made the UN responsive to threats from nonstate actors.

The ambiguities in the language used by the Bush administration could actually hinder further legal innovations and new interpretations of existing international laws, while a perfectly good case might be made for preemp-

Such ambiguous language could accelerate a reshuffling of the U.S. partner network.

tion and, with qualifications, for prevention in existing international legal terms. For example, if faced with a challenge such as the ongoing nuclear and ballistic-missile trade between Pakistan and North Korea, the international community may have to consider taking some degree of preventive action; otherwise, immediately or eventually, the existing multilateral non-proliferation regime might collapse.

Action might be required even though nuclear material and missile trade between North Korea and Pakistan appears to be legal, strictly speaking. Because Pakistan did not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is not prohibited from selling or transferring nuclear technology and material to North Korea. No legal constraints on North Korea's missile transfers to Pakistan exist; and although as an NPT signatory North Korea is acting illegally by "going nuclear," the NPT does not prohibit Pyongyang from buying nuclear technology from third parties.

Yet, the threat posed to the current nonproliferation regime by trade that might facilitate further North Korean nuclear development would make a strong case for the Security Council to adopt a set of measures (including sanctions and embargoes and, if need be, interdiction) to prevent North Korea from pursuing its nefarious nuclear and missile activity. The question remains, however: Is the Security Council more or less likely to adopt such measures in an environment where the United States is promoting an ill-defined and open-ended strategy of forceful prevention? Suspicion of the United States and its intentions might make it more difficult for U.S. allies and partners in the UN to consider such measures.

CONVERGENT OR CONFLICTING STRATEGIES?

By its very existence, the Bush doctrine affects U.S. allies' strategic interests. By moving prevention and preemption to the fore while pushing deterrence and containment to the sidelines, the United States has, ipso facto, departed from its allies' strategies—whether expressed collectively (as in the case of NATO's strategic concept adopted in April 1999) or individually. Diverging from the strategy of one's allies is nothing novel; in several instances during the Cold War, the United States initiated a national strategy that NATO and most allies only subsequently adopted with varying degrees of tension and difficulty. Massive reprisals (eventually encased in NATO Document MC 14/2) and flexible response (Document MC 14/3) were one example (although France did not endorse NATO's flexible response as a national strategy and withdrew its forces from the integrated NATO commands when the alliance adopted the concept as its official strategy in the 1960s). Putting the United States first, allies second was not necessarily painless, but it has proved effective.

U.S. strategy could still converge with individual allies. Because of the uncertainties about the scope of prevention and preemption, however, such a process could prove intensely problematic. For instance, Germany's public and political debate, exemplified by the success of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's campaign promise to keep out of military operations in Iraq, does not bode well for incorporating prevention into Germany's national defense strategy. Furthermore, in contrast to Cold War and early post-Cold War precedents, the strong possibility exists that convergence may never be officially established as collective NATO strategy because of the marginalization of NATO's war-fighting role.

Nonetheless, there are signs that preemption and prevention can and have already begun to be incorporated into other countries' national defense strategies. Most prominent in this respect is the new French six-year defense bill, adopted in November 2002. The bill redefines French strategy post-September 11 and lists its four foundations as deterrence (in its traditional mode directed toward other states), prevention, force projection, and protection (including the military aspects of homeland defense). For the French:

[Prevention] is the first step in the implementation of our defense strategy. ... It is a permanent necessity against the reappearance of large direct or indirect threats, [or] the development of crisis situations or of conflicts liable to involve our security and interests and those of our partners in the [European Union] and Atlantic Alliance. Through intelligence it must have the capability to anticipate and assess any situation autonomously. ... The capacity for surveillance and alert must be coordinated ... at a European level but also at an international level. ... Prevention relies also on maintaining a joint system of permanently or temporarily pre-positioned forces, thus facilitating situation analysis [and an] immediate response.¹⁰

Moreover, action in response to an imminent threat is today, as in the past, an option that French forces have officially been able to exercise. The French defense bill states that "preemptive action is not out of the question where explicit and confirmed threats have been recognized."¹¹ The concept of preemption, therefore, as related to "imminent threat," is part of declared French strategy. The contrasts with the Bush doctrine are clear enough but so are elements that have the potential to overlap, at least if one takes the 2002 NSS at face value.

Preemption and prevention have already crept into other countries' defense strategies.

ALLIED RESPONSES TO ADVERSARIES' COUNTERMEASURES

U.S. allies, like the United States itself, will be affected by any countermeasures (which will be discussed shortly) potentially adopted by those countries that consider themselves threatened by the Bush doctrine. The interests of U.S. Atlantic and Pacific allies would be adversely affected if adversaries are not deterred from developing WMD as anticipated but actually accelerate proliferation, particularly if this in turn leads to a chain reaction of deteriorating confidence in the nonproliferation regime. Such a prospect should lead U.S. allies to engage the United States in substantive discussion to clarify the definitions and implications of the Bush doctrine and to make U.S. strategy congruent with a multilateral approach to prevention and preemption. In a sense, the Security Council's negotiation of Resolution 1441 on Iraq in November 2002 may have served as a successful example of such a process. A case-specific resolution, however, cannot sufficiently substitute for bilateral or multilateral deliberations among the United States and its allies on the terms of the new U.S. national security strategy and their implications.

In military terms, WMD proliferation into Europe's "near abroad" (the Middle East) and East Asia would impose substantial burdens on defense spending, notably homeland defense costs. Strategically, extended proliferation may also affect the very alliance relationships with the United States themselves, depending on the circumstances under which such new proliferation might arise. For instance, if more Asian governments acquired nuclear capabilities, would Japan continue to maintain its security under the U.S. umbrella or would it seek national solutions, either by obtaining a nuclear capability of its own for deterrence or by opting out of its bilateral defense treaty with the United States to appease its adversaries?

Responses from Actual or Potential Foes

Those countries that are potential or actual targets of the Bush doctrine—most explicitly Iraq; Iran; North Korea; and earlier, Taliban-governed Afghanistan—cannot be expected to remain passive in the face of this new challenge posed by the United States. The countries that comprise Bush's "axis of evil," however, are not alone in this sense; states such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan may also have cause to fear their potential transfer to the "foe" category. Post-September 11 conditions combined with acts perceived as unfriendly to the United States (such as noncooperation in a war against Iraq) could catalyze such a shift for Saudi Arabia; as for Pakistan, WMD-proliferation misconduct coupled with unchecked Islamic militancy could have the same effect.

ACCELERATED WMD PROLIFERATION

Such states might be tempted to accelerate their WMD acquisition as well as the means to deliver them. If a country—Iran particularly comes to mind—becomes convinced that it will be the next object of U.S. attempts at regime change, for example, it is possible that it might hasten what is currently a partially developed WMD-acquisition or -development program. In the case of Iran, it is still too early to provide convincing empirical evidence of such moves following Bush's 2002 State of the Union address. North Korea's October 2002 public acknowledgment of unpublicized U.S. accusations that it has been pursuing the production of weapons-grade enriched uranium, however, might be interpreted as an explicit attempt by an adversary to reinforce the deterrent effect of the actual or imminent possession of nuclear weapons.

U.S. strategy could still converge with individual allies.

Indeed, one of the lessons that an overtly targeted country such as Iran might draw from the North Korean case is that possession of a nuclear deterrent precludes the United States from considering military action. Iraq can be attacked precisely because it lacks an existent nuclear deterrent whereas North Korea remains safe by virtue of a combination of geography (10 million South Koreans are within easy range of North Korean artillery) and the possibility of a North Korean nuclear (and/or other WMD) response.

The North Korean case raises another potential response: countries with existing WMD capabilities can implicitly or explicitly threaten to spread proliferation further to deter, or in response to, U.S. military operations. North Korea, which sent missile technology to Pakistan and other states, might be willing to conduct similar transfers to other players in the Middle East. In the end, lessons may be drawn that a target state with WMD capability is safer than one without it.

The conclusion to be drawn from these possibilities is not to “go soft” on potential proliferants. Simply, countries that have not yet crossed the nuclear or WMD threshold—and even more so, those currently uncertain about their future WMD policies—need to know that they are not irreversibly “marked” as irredeemably evil. Although the adoption of Resolution 1441 was useful in this regard, Bush's “axis of evil” formula did just the opposite.

PRECAUTIONARY PROLIFERATION

Countries not yet there, but that fear finding themselves on the list of targets for U.S. preventive action might also quietly prepare to prevent this

prospect. Under certain circumstances, such an option might prove tempting for a country such as Saudi Arabia, which already possesses large medium-range Chinese CSS-2 rockets. Although this idea is currently speculative, such a scenario could be prompted by warfare aimed at regime change throughout the Middle East—in the wake of intervention in Iraq, for instance. Neoconservative discourse on democratizing the Middle East

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helps fuel such fears. Here again, the United States would do well to clarify the limits of prevention and preemption.

It is worthwhile recalling that covert moves toward proliferation can go a long way without being detected: two years elapsed between the sale of the sizable Chinese CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia and its detection by U.S. intelligence. Similarly, it took several years for U.S. intelligence to discover the transfer of uranium enrichment technology

from Pakistan to North Korea, and this was despite the close attention paid to North Korean's nuclear ambitions.

COMPLIANCE

Naturally, the most desirable consequence of international affirmation of the Bush doctrine would be to convince potential aspiring foes to continue to renounce WMD or persuade existing proliferators to change their ways. Although this possibility may yet come to pass, insufficient time has passed to find evidence of this best-case scenario. If anything, Pakistan's continued missile tests in 2002—after its nuclear trafficking with North Korea had been discovered—bodes ill for potential target states' willingness to forgo proliferation.

Shaping Preemption and Prevention

Notwithstanding the enormous amount of controversy caused by the Bush doctrine and the corresponding disagreements among U.S. allies, the potential for convergence among the United States and its allies on preemption and prevention is potentially quite high. To converge national security strategies, the Bush doctrine will need to meet several conditions, as will U.S. public diplomacy within and between the allied countries of Europe, Asia, and North America.

First and most important, the U.S. president's public statements need to clarify the definition and scope of preemption—linking it to and defining

the terms of an imminent threat in light of the September 11 attacks—and, even more so, the U.S. understanding of prevention. Such clarification must be manifest to friend and foe alike. The Cold War brand of strategic uncertainty had virtues in its time, but not under existing circumstances.

Second, preemption and prevention need to be managed as tools that can (and should, as a Kantian European would say) be assembled and wielded multilaterally. It is doubtful that the Bush doctrine will be naturally implemented multilaterally in present-day Washington. Yet, the drafting and adoption of Resolution 1441 demonstrates that U.S. partners can exercise substantial influence, with the *quid pro quo* that allies of the United States understand that some action must be taken.

Finally, intensive consultation is in order between the United States and its allies on the entire range of issues involved in preemption and prevention. Legal, political, diplomatic, strategic, and military consequences should be the object of open discussion, primarily in a bilateral context but also, if possible, within the framework of NATO and the Group of Eight.

If the United States and its allies can accomplish these tasks and together redefine “imminent threat” in the post–September 11 world while consulting to flesh out the doctrinal and operational implications of new strategic approaches, then international law, norms, organizations (including the nonproliferation regime), and alliances can evolve and be preserved to face new challenges rather than be discarded haphazardly.

Notes

1. This and all quotes by Bush cited in this article have been excerpted from the official White House website, located at www.whitehouse.gov.
2. See www.dod.gov/speeches/2002/s2002/s.20021202.depsecdef.html (accessed January 10, 2003).
3. A war against Iraq on the basis of Security Council Resolution 1441 would belong to the realm of enforcement, not prevention or preemption.
4. See Vice President Dick Cheney, speech to the Veterans of the Korean War, San Antonio, August 29, 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident (accessed January 10, 2003).
5. “Nuclear Posture Review Report to Congress” January 8, 2002, as reproduced by John Pikes, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (accessed January 10, 2003).
6. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002 (released September 20, 2002) (excerpted from chapter 5).
7. See www.merriamwebster.com (accessed November 19, 2002).
8. *Ibid.*
9. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002 (released September 20, 2002) (excerpted from chapter 5).

10. Government of France, Defense Ministry, "Loi de Programmation Militaire 2003–2008," September 11, 2002, pp. 24–25, www.defense.gouv.fr/english/files/d140/inde.htm.
11. Ibid.