the pace is likely to slow, especially if the government senses that the rising power of mainstream Islamists is serving as a cover for radical Islamism.

Such reforms are unlikely to produce fully competitive democratic regimes. What we have in much of the Arab world are semiauthoritarian "liberalized autocracies." Such regimes allow for a measure of pluralism and political competition that they then use to prevent a wholesale democratization of the political system. Even if a Jeffersonian democracy emerges in Baghdad, Arab rulers will not forgo the benefits of such mixed regimes any time soon.

For Arab states to contemplate moving beyond the old "liberalization game" would require a climate of regional stability that discredits Islamist extremism. Success in Iraq will help, but real political reform hinges on a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict that allows for an independent Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. The Bush administration has endorsed the Middle East road map for peace—a document that envisions the establishment of an independent Palestinian state by 2005. But will Bush take the kinds of domestic political risks for Palestinian-Israeli peace that he was ready to run for Iraqi freedom and democracy? If he doesn't, even the sweetest political victory in Iraq won't inspire the kinds of political changes in the wider Middle East for which the president and his advisors have hoped.

Daniel Brumberg is the author of Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran *(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001) and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment.*

Can Preventive War Cure Proliferation?

BY JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

DAN CHUNG/AP

What happens if they come up empty? British divers inspect an underwater bunker in Basra.

The Iraq war was the first application of the new theory that preventive war can be an effective instrument against the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. "Prevention" invites a medical metaphor. And, indeed, observers often imagine an epidemic when they think of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Yet the best metaphor for proliferation is a cancer that results from environmental causes and metastasizes in predictable patterns from cell to neighboring cell. China gets nuclear weapons, India responds to China, and then Pakistan to India. Israel builds nuclear weapons, then Iraq tries, along with Iran, even as the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by other states adds to the region-wide malignancy. North Korea's nuclear weapons program prompts worries of proliferation to Japan and South Korea, and so on.

For the Bush administration, the danger from this disease in Iraq was too great to risk further delay. Days before the war began, Vice President Richard Cheney told Tim Russert of NBC News that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein "has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons." U.S. officials warned that Iraq had imported key elements for new nuclear weapons, improved its facilities to produce thousands of chemical weapons, and expanded its biological weapons program to pre-1991 levels. President George W. Bush said that Iraq had hundreds of tons

chemical weapons and thousands of liters of biological weapons that could kill millions and a hidden fleet of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver them. Worse, Saddam's "long-standing, direct, and continuing ties to terrorists networks," the president said, meant that "trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option."

The United States and the United Kingdom successfully excised Saddam's regime. Yet the ultimate effectiveness of this radical surgery will not be determined for some time. History does postmortems; contemporary analysis is less certain.

As of this writing, U.S. teams have found scant evidence supporting the prewar diagnosis. Possibly the weapons of mass destruction were destroyed before the war. Possibly some were sent abroad. Possibly they exist undiscovered in the vast quantities claimed by the U.S. and British intelligence services. If so, these arsenals would pose an urgent international security and proliferation threat. Whoever does know their location might hoard them for future use against U.S. forces or steal them out of the country for sale to the highest bidder.

What the United States and Britain Said Iraq Had...

Nuclear Program	Biological Program	Chemical Program	Missile Program
● Has or soon could have nuclear weapons	● Biological weapons program far larger than before 1991 war	● Between 100 and 500 tons of chemical agents, enough to fill 16,000 rockets	● Several dozen Scud-type missiles and launchers
● Sought to import uranium and equipment for centrifuges to enrich it	● Materials to produce thousands of liters of weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, and other biological agents, enough to kill millions	● Rebuilt and expanded facilities capable of producing chemical weapons	● Programs and test stands to develop longer range missiles
● Rebuilt facilities at sites that were previously part of its nuclear program	● Large-scale, redundant, and concealed biological weapons agent production capability	● Civilian facilities embedded in weapons program	● A variety of unmanned aerial vehicles, linked to devices for delivering weapons of mass destruction
● Active cadre of Iraqi nuclear scientists	● Expanded and improved facilities for weapons production	● 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical and biological agents	
	● Civilian plants that could be and may have been rapidly converted for weapons	● Weapons ready for launch in 45 minutes	
	● At least seven mobile weapons factories		

Note: Sources for these statements can be found at www.foreignpolicy.com.

A Dangerous Neighborhood

Country	Nuclear Weapons	Biological Weapons	Chemical Weapons
Egypt		♦	♦
Iran	●	♦	♦
Israel	♦	♦	♦
Libya		●	♦
Sudan		●	●
Syria		●	♦

KEY: ♦ Probable weapons or weapons agents ● Possible research programs/capabilities

Source: *Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2002)

Another possibility is that the weapons programs did not exist on the scale that the United States asserted before the war. Three weeks after the fall of Baghdad, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice spoke of "pieces hidden here and there," marking perhaps the beginning of efforts to lower expectations. Of course, discovering any banned weapons would be evidence of noncompliance with the 1991 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 and last year's Resolution 1441.

KEEP YOUR EYES ON

What the United States ultimately discovers about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction

WHAT TO EXPECT

Other countries will be less likely to back the United States or support the concept of preventive war if the U.S. search comes up empty.

The majority of the American public, proud of the military victory over Saddam's evil regime, may not care that the Iraqi arsenal was not what the Bush administration had alleged. International opinion, however, might be less forgiving. If the United States does not produce evidence of large, ongoing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs in prewar Iraq, the publics and governments in many nations may feel that the United States acted in bad faith. In that case, states whose cooperation or endorsement the United States needs on future international security issues may be less inclined to accept U.S. threat assessments or go along with its recommended actions.

Moreover, to be an effective treatment for proliferation, preventive war must not only remove the direct threat, it must also dissuade would-be proliferators. The United States and other concerned states may yet try to use the Iraq treatment as an object lesson to induce states such as North Korea and Iran to change their behavior. But the early signs are that these regimes have drawn an opposite conclusion. As of late May, U.S. officials were reporting that North Korea is accelerating its nuclear program, not abandoning it. Iran, too, has consciously raised the public profile of its ostensibly civilian nuclear program and insisted that it would acquire full nuclear fuel-cycle capability, thus enabling it to enrich uranium to weapon-grade levels and reprocess plutonium from reactor fuel. Like India's army chief of staff after the first Iraq war, officials in Pyongyang and Tehran may believe that if one day you find yourself opposed by the United States, you'd better have a nuclear weapon.

Some favor limited military strikes against North Korea's facilities for reprocessing fuel rods into plutonium or against the nuclear fuel plants now under construction in Iran. Yet even the most aggressive advocates of military surgery acknowledge real problems here. Every good strike depends on great intelligence. Intelligence officials caution that locations of key facilities in North Korea and Iran remain unknown. If you don't get the whole tumor, the cancer remains. There is minimal—perhaps no—international support for even limited strikes. South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun warns that a strike against North Korea's Yongbyon reactor would be unthinkable, calling it "very, very dangerous." Iran is too big and too politically dynamic for the United States to attack without creating widespread instability and jeopardizing the prospect for normalizing relations for decades.

Preventive war is therefore no miracle cure. It cannot begin to replace the range of treatments necessary to make those who acquire these weapons give them up, or to prevent states or terrorists from seeking these deadly arsenals in the first place. Any effort to stop proliferation must not only rely on the implementation and enforcement of effective legal and inspection regimes; it must offer states that seek weapons of mass destruction a set of constructive alternatives for redressing insecurities and achieving status and international recognition. Consider the case of Iraq and Iran. Even if democratic transformations sweep the Middle East, a new Iraq and a new Iran might still want nuclear weapons as long as Israel has them and as long as such weapons are seen as the currency of great powers. The Iranian nuclear program began under the shah, when the United States sold that nation its first reactor; that program will likely continue under future governments unless regional dynamics change fundamentally.

TO BE EFFECTIVE AGAINST PROLIFERATION, PREVENTIVE WAR MUST REMOVE THE DIRECT THREAT AND DISSUADE WOULD-BE PROLIFERATORS.

The end of Saddam's regime could be just such a fundamental shift. Iraq posed a serious threat to Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the international security system. The removal of that threat

could spur important counterproliferation gains and lead to a safer regional security environment. After all, a truly effective antiproliferation strategy must also seek to bring a region back to health.

Some may feel this possibility is more hope than prognosis. Yet in past decades, Israel, Egypt, and other states in the region endorsed U.N. resolutions to make the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Those resolutions remain in limbo, but U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell reaffirmed this objective in May: "It has always been a United States goal that conditions could be created in this part of the world where no nation would have a need for any weapons of mass destruction." The necessary conditions do not yet exist; the question is whether relevant governments will now purposefully and energetically use Iraq's defeat as a basis for creating them.

Joseph Cirincione is author of Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction *(Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2002) and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.*

Terror's Undiminished Threat | *By Vincent Cannistraro*

Though the war on Iraq was called a major battle in the war on terrorism, the removal of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from power will not dramatically reduce the direct threat to the United States from terrorists. Saddam and his regime were not a major influence on international terrorism. The Iraqi government had tenuous, if any, links to the only international terrorist group that has been targeting and killing Americans in the past several years: al Qaeda. (Ironically, northeastern Iraq, which had been an autonomous area protected by U.S. air patrols and outside Baath control, was the only part of Iraq known to harbor an al Qaeda presence. However, the war has denied al Qaeda a new staging area there.) Baghdad certainly harbored some known terrorists, primarily in the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestinian Liberation Front, but neither of these groups has recently promoted anti-American violence. The Iraqi regime also gave refuge to Saudi dissidents plotting against the Saudi monarchy and provided financial assistance to Palestinian families of suicide bombers.

More than reducing direct terrorist threats to the United States, the removal of Saddam's government and the establishment of a large U.S. military presence in the region are likely to lessen the resistance of local governments to broader U.S. foreign policy goals, particularly the protection of Israel against terrorism. Syria, which has not harbored groups targeting Americans, recognizes the changed strategic balance in the Middle East and may do more to help U.S. intelligence monitor al Qaeda and track down fugitive Iraqi officials. Damascus will continue to provide political support to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, but it may be less likely to stimulate Hezbollah military action in southern Lebanon. Iran, the major patron of Hezbollah, is unlikely to abandon the organization but will probably advise caution to avoid antagonizing the United States. Iran also accommodates some al Qaeda leaders within its territory and will face greater internal pressure to expel them in order to deflect American demands. Saudi Arabia may now seriously curtail support of fundamentalist religious terrorists. Of course, ungovernable havens for terrorists such as Pakistan's Northwest Frontier or Georgia's Pankisi Gorge will be harder to affect.

If the dynamic U.S. military presence on Muslim soil intimidates governments from confronting the United States, it also may substantially increase grassroots hostility and, potentially, terrorist recruitment against the U.S. government and Israel. Postwar animosity has provoked attacks on a McDonald's restaurant in Beirut, as well as Coca-Cola and Pizza Hut facilities in Cairo and boycotts of American products throughout Indonesia and other southern Asian countries. The festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict will feed this resentment and draw new recruits to groups that engage in asymmetrical armed struggle against the United States.

Despite popular resentment and official pique among U.S. allies over the war in Iraq, international cooperation on antiterrorism measures has continued. Law enforcement and intelligence collaboration between the United States and allied countries has been central in detecting al Qaeda cells in France, Germany, and Western Europe as well as in Pakistan, Malaysia, and Central Asia. Where there is a marked difference between the United States and allies is in their opposing views of Hamas, Hezbollah, and some other groups: The United States characterizes them as terrorist units, while several allies believe they are resistance groups, opposing illegal occupation by the Israelis. It is in this area that intelligence sharing tends to be less than fulsome.

Vincent Cannistraro, a former chief of CIA counterterrorism operation and analysis, is currently a consultant for corporate and U.S. government clients.