

**WAGING ANCIENT WAR:
LIMITS ON PREEMPTIVE FORCE**

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FOREWORD

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, stimulated the most far reaching and deep reassessment of American national security strategy since the late 1940s. All of America's objectives, preferences, and methods were open to evaluation. The outcome of this process will shape U.S. strategy for years to come.

In this study, conducted under the U.S. Army War College's External Research Associates Program, Dr. D. Robert Worley addresses the ways that the age of terrorism is affecting American grand strategy. He contends that terrorism has made many of the basic concepts of international relations and national security obsolete. Declaring war on a tactic—terrorism—erodes the clarity necessary for coherent strategy. Dr. Worley then develops what he calls a "*guerra* strategy" more appropriate for dealing with terrorism and other nonstate threats.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of the ongoing assessment of the challenges and opportunities posed by global terrorism.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

D. ROBERT WORLEY currently serves in the Strategic Operations Group of the Illinois Institute of Technology's Research Institute. His national security analysis career has included positions with the RAND Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. His analytic activities have been concentrated in higher echelon command and control but include wargaming, training, and experimentation at the national command, allied command Europe, unified command, and joint task force levels, as well as at corps and division level through the Army's battle command training program. Prior to becoming a defense analyst, Dr. Worley managed and directed research and development efforts at the Hughes Aircraft Company, National Aeronautical and Space Administration, and University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). He served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1967 to 1971, with one tour in Vietnam. Dr. Worley earned a PhD in Engineering and an Engineer Degree from UCLA, a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of Southern California, a Masters in Government from Johns Hopkins University, a Master of Arts in National Security Studies from Georgetown University, and a Bachelor of Arts with a major in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Washington Center for the Study of American Government and a member of the faculty at the George Washington University Elliot School of International Affairs. He formerly served on the computer science faculties at UCLA and California State University at Northridge.

SUMMARY

For decades, the idea of containment held together a political coalition within the United States that maintained a large, peacetime military for the only time in American history. The same strategic conception held together a multinational military alliance. The strategic debate that followed the Cold War includes hegemonic primacy, classic collective security, cooperative security orienting on preventing the acquisition of power, selective engagement, and restrictive or neo-isolationist alternatives. But no political consensus has yet to form around any of these alternatives, nor does a consensus appear to be forming. The current debate is conducted in the familiar language of international relations and the U.S. position within the system of states.

A major conclusion of this study is that the concepts on the use of force and the well-established language of international relations are inadequate to the current “war on terrorism.” If we cannot ignore our place among the major powers, and if the conceptions appropriate to state-on-state conflict are not germane to conflict with nonstate actors, then we must conclude that separate strategies are necessary. Accordingly, a strategy is proposed for waging war against nonstate actors lacking legitimate standing that is separate from and subordinate to the grand strategy that supports the U.S. role in the system of whatever that grand strategy may be.

Sir Michael Howard characterizes the declared “war on terrorism” as more like a hunt than a war. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies will carry the primary burden internationally, supported by covert operations. The primary overt role of military forces is for short-notice and short-duration raids and strikes against enemy targets as they appear. The largest part of the enemy capability is organized as combat forces that U.S. forces should expect to

encounter during peace operations in failing or failed states with significant Muslim populations. U.S. forces must be prepared for warfare in these asymmetric environments. Finally, consequence management is an ineluctable role for U.S. forces to play domestically.

Great Power War and Grand Strategy.

Great powers are viable states that will coexist with their peers after hostilities subside. This fact tempers their behavior and imposes rules for initiating, conducting, and terminating wars. These limitations do not apply to nonstate actors and certainly not to those that reject the system of states. In great power war, other elements of national power have failed, and there is a greater reliance on an isolated military instrument. Small wars—great power interventions into the affairs of lesser powers—require better integration of all elements of national power. Great power competitors have access to the same technology, setting the conditions for more symmetric warfare, while small wars create an inherently asymmetric environment.

The dominant thinking from the Cold War is about great power conflict even though insurgencies were common throughout the era. Deterrence, coercion, and compellence are the well-understood concepts concerning the use of power. Underlying these uses of force is the idea that a state has people and resources that it values and that the state itself seeks to survive. Active and passive defense, interdiction, and retaliation also constitute uses of force, but are more appropriately seen as elements of a deterrence strategy because they raise the cost and lower the probability of a successful attack. The aggressor has an infinite set of targets and defending them all demands infinite resources. Retaliation and increased defensive measures cannot be the basis of a sustainable strategy. As useful as these concepts are to relations between states, they are largely irrelevant when applied against the current

threat. Many of those that are relevant beyond interstate conflict are exhaustive of resources.

Preventive war, preemptive war, and preemptive strike are different concepts. Preemptive and preventive wars are not types of wars; instead, they describe motives for the timing of war initiation. A preventive war is undertaken when a state sees its relative advantage in decline, sees the inevitability of war, and chooses to initiate the war now while it still has the advantage. History and international law frown upon preventive war, seeing it as a disguise for naked aggression. Preemptive war, on the other hand, involves the initiation of military action because an adversary's attack is believed to be imminent. A preemptive strike is directed against an adversary's capability before it can be used. It is not conducted for purposes of initiating war.

Conception.

As Carl Von Clausewitz said in *On War*, "The first, the grandest, the most decisive act of judgement that statesmen and generals exercise is to understand the war in which they engage." Terrorism is a method, a tactic, not an enemy and not an objective. Declaring war on a tactic makes little sense, and our conception of the war is a critical first step.

The proposed conception of the conflict is as an international guerrilla war waged against the system of states, particularly against those states with large Muslim populations. The area of contention is the area that runs along the north of Africa, through the Middle East and central Asia, and to the easternmost frontiers of Islam in Indonesia and the Philippines. With few exceptions, states along this belt are failing and in the hands of corrupt, unpopular, or tenuous governments. The enemy commonly employs classic insurgency methods within failing or failed Islamic states. It sometimes employs guerrilla tactics against Western military forces present in the Islamic world, and it sometimes employs terrorist methods against

non-combatants in Western or westernizing states to inflict pain and to invoke a disproportionate response against Islam that will drive adherents to its cause.

Today's conflict is an ancient form of warfare, while much of our strategic thinking is the product of a social construction that slowly evolved during the middle ages and that coalesced in the age of enlightenment. Its referents include the Treaty of Westphalia, the just war tradition, Immanuel Kant's *Perpetual Peace*, and David Hume's *On Balance of Power*. Specifically, the secular nation-state is a modern construct that replaced divine-right monarchy and coexisted with the independent city-states in Europe as recently as the early 20th century. It is the European notion of the secular nation-state that is being rejected and attacked by Al-Qa'eda.

Prior to the rise of the European system of secular states, the Romans maintained two distinct forms of warfare, *bellum* and *guerra*. If two states were to coexist peacefully after a war, then war should be subject to rules. Without these rules, only a perpetual cycle of retribution was possible. These pragmatic concerns did not apply to stateless, lawless tribes invading Europe from the Asian steppe. *Bellum* was the form of warfare conducted against another state. *Guerra* was the form of warfare waged against migrating and marauding tribes.

Terrorism involves indiscriminate attacks against noncombatants and is conducted for a variety of different objectives. Guerrillas wage war against an occupying force. Often, guerrilla forces use terrorism. In general, terrorism was commonly used to drive imperial European powers out of their colonies. It has proven to be an effective form of warfare to achieve positive outcomes in much of the Third World. While westerners perceive terrorism as reprehensible and uncivilized, Third World populations see it as the only recourse against oppression.

Al-Qa'eda is "a base" for a variety of organizations that collectively comprise a loose confederation of groups and

individuals lacking sovereignty within the system of states. There are 30 or so organizations with a coincidence of interest. This network constitutes the threat. The largest part of the force, numbering in the tens of thousands, are organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces. Another group, numbering about 10,000, live in Western states and have received combat training of one form or another. Alone, or in small groups, they are capable of discrete, uncoordinated attacks. A third group numbering in the several thousands is capable of commanding these forces. A few hundred individuals populate the top control structure. Terrorism is only a small, albeit dramatic, part of the enemy's repertoire.

Seen as a guerrilla war with a history of battles including attacks on the Marine barracks in Beirut, a Berlin nightclub, Khobar Towers, the first and second attacks on the World Trade Center and on the Pentagon, and the USS *Cole*, there is nothing preemptive about American strikes or raids against enemy capability. They are part of an ongoing counter guerrilla war.

Strategy.

Declaring war on a tactic provides a poor strategic foundation. We must, instead, declare war on specific aggressors, those lacking legitimate status within the international system of states and using destructive force across state boundaries against the United States. Different instruments are available for confronting states and, hence, a different strategy is required.

Four interlocking objectives comprise the *guerra* strategy. The first is to reduce the probability of destructive attacks. A second objective is to reduce the severity of attacks. The third and most important objective is to prevent the conflict from spilling over into a wider war with Islam. Successful actions taken to reduce the probability and severity of attack must be calculated against the likelihood of widening the conflict. Because not all attacks

can be prevented, the fourth objective is to mitigate their effects. Shortsighted policies to reduce the probability and severity of attacks could easily cause the widening of the conflict that, in turn, would increase the probability and severity of attacks.

Guerra must be sustainable indefinitely. The aggressor hopes to initiate an action-reaction cycle, but to be sustainable, we must choose the place and time of action to maximize the effect of the resources expended and to minimize “blowback.” To be sustainable, the strategy must enlist all elements of national and international power rather than imposing the primary burden on the U.S. military instrument. Strategies based on defending everything, against all forms of attack, all of the time, are exhaustive of resources and impossible to implement and sustain. The recent reallocation of domestic resources may allay public fear, but it cannot be the basis of a sustainable strategy.

The *guerra* strategy must be relevant to the nature of the conflict. Strategies based on retaliation will fail because retaliation will not deter martyrs. Terrorist networks have nothing of value equivalent to the damage they can inflict. Strategies based on preventing rogue states from acquiring the means of attack have merit when directed at limiting the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery vehicles; they are irrelevant, however, when the means employed are commercial aircraft or other readily available instruments.

The *guerra* strategy must be rational. Tactical actions must destroy more enemy capability than they create. Strikes and raids should be aimed at discrete targets and then only to decisively destroy meaningful enemy capability. Some targets of opportunity will be bypassed if they conflict with the grand strategy objectives or if target destruction can rationally be expected to create more threat than it destroys.

Nonproliferation treaties, nation-building, and information campaigns conducted for the hearts and minds of Islam can offer promise only in the long term. While those efforts must be undertaken, other courses of action—the hunt—must be pursued for relief in the present. International law enforcement and intelligence agencies enabled by greater information sharing carry the primary burden. The military is in a supporting, on-call role. Strikes and raids attacking the threat capability before it can be employed is the primary use of military force. Consequence management—coping with the effects after an attack—is an indispensable domestic role of U.S. forces in a strategy for *guerra*.

The military should not develop a national strategy for the defeat of terrorism any more than a police SWAT team should develop a strategy to defeat crime in the city. The appropriate military response is to organize, train, and equip to strike quickly and forcefully when and where national authorities so designate, and then return to the ready. Mobilization and strategic deployment of a strike force will be observed and the target will disperse. Maintaining a force permanently forward deployed at the necessarily high level of readiness is an exhaustive proposition. Instead, these forces must be on “strip alert” which, in turn, requires adoption of the rotational readiness model used by the naval services. Forces for strike and raid must be within hours of attack when a target presents, closely linked to intelligence sources and to decision authority. Execution of the *guerra* strategy relies on skillful orchestration of all the elements of national power and, thus, strong centralized direction is required.

Humanitarian interventions in failed and failing states require expeditionary forces designed for peace operations that may evolve into nation-building. These forces will likely encounter al-Qa’eda-trained forces and must be prepared for “asymmetric warfare” against forces lacking legitimate standing. The decision to intervene in a failed or failing state is one for the President to make. U.S. forces

must be prepared strategically, operationally, and tactically to wage counterinsurgency, or counter guerrilla, warfare.

Closing.

America is in an interwar period with respect to great power conflict, but great power conflict will return. Our grand strategy must remain focused on America's role among the great powers in the long term. America's influence in the world will erode if, as Francis Fukuyama suggests, opposing the United States becomes the "chief passion in global politics."

The debate about international intervention being the cause of or solution to threats against American security has not been resolved, nor has the debate changed appreciably, but the consequences are more significant than before. No longer is the ability to attack the United States only in the hands of a few countries that can be deterred. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction puts the means in the hands of many states and even in the hands of small groups, and the potency of the tools at their disposal will only increase. When choosing to intervene, administrations must decide on a case-by-case basis whether foreign policy will favor human rights in foreign lands or American lives at home.

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INTRODUCTION

Declaring war against terrorist methods and those who employ them fails to provide a sound basis for strategy formulation. Viewing the conflict as an international guerrilla war waged against the Western secular system of states provides a better starting point. Familiar strategic concepts are found to be irrelevant, either because they are oriented on interstate conflict or because they are exhaustive of resources and unsustainable over time. Preemptive strike emerges as the dominant use of military force in this conflict.

Assuring a state's security amid the competing interests of other legitimate states is fundamentally different than defending against the use of force by amorphous international networks lacking any legal standing within the international system of states. A comprehensive conception of today's strategic environment must make the critical distinction between wars waged by states (*bellum*) and wars waged against those lacking legitimate status (*guerra*). A national security strategy based primarily on the terrorist threat would be lacking. A separate strategy for *guerra*, subordinate to the grand strategy, is necessary.

While all elements of national power are relevant to both types of conflict, *bellum* leads to a predominantly military response after the other instruments of national power have failed. Decisive engagement and war termination are sought. *Guerra*, on the other hand, argues for a more balanced and orchestrated application of the instruments of national power without end. Strong centralized management of all elements of national power, not within the confines of a single department, is required.

The military should not develop a national strategy for the defeat of terrorism any more than a police special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team should, by itself, develop a strategy to defeat crime in the city. The appropriate military response is to organize, train, and equip to strike quickly and forcefully when and where national authorities so designate, and then return to the ready. Quick response forces provide the military instrument for preemptive strike.

A “war on terrorism” serves poorly as a basis of strategy. The first step is to form an appropriate conception of the conflict by shifting attention away from terrorism to the specific terrorists that threaten the United States, to their objectives, and to the type of war they are waging. Next, we examine modern strategic concepts guiding the use of force for applicability to the conception and are found lacking. Finally, a strategy for *guerra*, subordinate to the grand strategy, is proposed with preemptive strike as the primary use of military force.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONFLICT

The proposed *conception of the conflict* is as an international guerrilla war waged against the system of states, particularly against those states with large Muslim populations. This conception asserts that the states across the north of Africa, through the Middle East and Central Asia, and including Indonesia and the Philippines, are at greatest risk. The United States periodically will be the preferred battleground. Other states will host the battle over time, and an international response will be required.

Three schools of thought have emerged on the meaning of America’s declared war on terrorism:

war against terrorists—those who employ terrorism,

war against the states that enable terrorists, and

war against those terrorists who pose a direct threat to the United States.

Waging a war against terrorists fails to make a variety of important distinctions and leads to a strategic trap. Waging a war against states enabling terrorists, assuming that they are viable states, is best handled by the traditional methods of international relations. Beginning with the conception that we are waging war against those who threaten the United States provides far better focus for strategy formulation, but it falls short by failing to specify the enemy's objectives, and the enemy's objectives are key to understanding the conflict.

Terrorists and Terrorism.

We must begin with an understanding of the word *terrorism*. Typical of modern definitions, United States Code provides the following.

terrorism: Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.¹

In his classic text on just and unjust wars, Michael Walzer says that terrorism's purpose is "to destroy the morale of a nation or a class, to undercut its solidarity; its method is the random murder of innocent people."² There are other definitions to pick from, but they generally agree that terrorism involves:

the use of destructive force by other than conventional military means,

force used indiscriminately against noncombatants, and,

force used principally to induce fear rather than to achieve military victory.

Peter Sederberg makes several useful distinctions that help focus policy thinking.³ The first distinction that must be made is between the action (terrorism), the actor (the terrorist), and the effect (terror).⁴ The effect—inducing fear—distinguishes terrorism from other uses of coercive force.

... terrorism spreads fear in excess of the concrete damage done or the probabilities of being a victim. Terrorism often involves innocuous targets, such as airplanes, railway depots, and department stores, places that people normally consider safe. They undermine the confidence people have in the familiar.⁵

Terrorists' tactics—their actions—have included airplane hijacking, kidnapping and extortion, murder, and the destruction of public property. Their weapons have included booby traps, pipe bombs, car bombs, truck bombs, and all forms of readily available small arms.⁶ Airplane bombs were recently added to the weapons inventory. It is projected that they will soon include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD).⁷

A variety of actors employ terrorist tactics and weapons, including revolutionaries, disaffected psychopaths, and oppressed minorities. Their actions and their desired tactical effects may be the same, but their strategic objectives vary considerably. The breadth of terrorist objectives and the acts of aggression meeting the definition of terrorism are summarized below.

Terrorists Are Distinguished by Their Objectives.

For decades, revolutionaries and anarchists have used terrorist tactics against “the establishment.” An organized ideological movement needs to draw attention and support to its cause. Indiscriminate or catastrophic results would alienate the population that revolutionaries hope to attract. Revolutionaries are more likely to be discriminating in their target selection. Executives or employees of large banks or multinational corporations might be selected both for their

symbolic value relative to the cause and for their potential ransom value. Or revolutionaries might target heads of state and their families. But when discrimination and lethal force are combined, then *assassination* is a more accurate description than is terrorism, regardless of whether the lethal blow is delivered by car bomb, sniper, or precision-guided munitions.

Some terrorists, domestic and international, fit the psychological profile of the extreme active-maladaptive personality. Disaffected and unaligned individuals have practiced terrorism, including Ted Kaczynski, who targeted specific individuals with small package bombs delivered through the mail, and Timothy McVey, who attacked a government building and killed indiscriminately. The perpetrators of these acts are fundamentally different than those who hope to undermine the system of states.⁸

Ralph Peters makes an additional distinction between what he calls practical and apocalyptic terrorists. Practical terrorists have a rational goal in mind, to change the world, not to destroy it, to be seen as a crusader, but certainly not to die. The apocalyptic terrorist, on the other hand, is consumed by hate, blaming his own failings on others. Only his own death can bring peace to the apocalyptic terrorist.⁹ A terrorist organization like Al-Qa'eda can productively employ both types. In general, practical terrorists lead the organizations that employ apocalyptic terrorists as suicidal weapon systems.

Guerrilla Warfare. Terrorist weapons and tactics are commonly employed in *guerrilla warfare*, a term coined in the Napoleonic era to make the distinction between *la grande guerra* and the “small” war waged by the Spaniards against the occupying French. Civilians conduct guerrilla warfare against an occupying force. Often, the weapons and tactics used by guerrilla forces are the same as those used by terrorists.

The term “guerrilla war” was later applied more generally to ideological struggle and wars of liberation.

Governments, good and bad, commonly have a monopoly on conventional military force within their borders. Oppressed civilian populations can choose to acquiesce or to wage a war of liberation. A small minority can use guerrilla tactics to wage a war of liberation in an attempt to force a regime change from within; the Vietcong provide such an example.¹⁰ In wars of liberation, discriminating acts of violence are committed among the civilian population to cause an overreaction by the government aimed at the civilian population. Thus, the action-reaction cycle is designed to shift increasing support to the guerrilla movement and away from government. If the action initiated by the guerrilla is too catastrophic, then the opposite result will obtain. Civilian support is both a critical enabler and an objective of a guerrilla movement.

In general, the coercive use of force we call terrorism was commonly used to drive imperial European powers out of their colonies. It has proven to be an effective form of warfare to achieve positive outcomes in much of the Third World. While terrorism is perceived by Westerners as reprehensible and uncivilized, it is seen by Third World populations as the only recourse against internally or externally applied oppression.

According to Sederberg, many guerrilla acts are not terrorist because they target combatants. The most well-established limits on the conduct of warfare involve the targets selected and the means chosen to attack those targets. Specifically, the targets of attack should be combatants, and the weapons used against these targets should be highly discriminating.

He therefore concludes, “discriminating acts of coercion aimed at combatants are not terrorist.”¹¹ For the same reason, and consistent with the U.S. legal definition, the attacks on the USS *Cole*, Kohbar Towers, and the Marine barracks in Beirut were not terrorism because they specifically targeted uniformed military personnel and were not indiscriminate attacks on civilian noncombatants.¹²

These acts do, however, meet the definition of guerrilla warfare.

The term “guerrilla warfare” has further eroded to include raids by uniformed combatants against military targets to include, for example, Confederate Colonel John Mosby and his Rangers.

Unrestricted Warfare and Wars of Annihilation. Not all attacks on noncombatants are terrorist. Governments can use conventional military force against civilian populations either directly or indirectly. Aerial bombardment of cities, for example, is a direct attack against noncombatants. Sieges, blockades, or embargoes, on the other hand, are indirect attacks on noncombatants. When one state applies conventional force against the noncombatants of another to destroy the enemy state’s ability and will to wage war, then *unrestricted warfare* is the correct term. When destruction of the people, rather than their defeat, is the objective, then *annihilation* is the correct term.

Wars of annihilation were the norm in northern Europe, Asia, and the Levant during significant portions of the first and second millennia. Later in the second millennium, European emigrants escaping religious persecution eventually waged wars of annihilation against indigenous populations in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.¹³ Wars of annihilation continue today in Rwanda, Sudan, and the Balkans, for example, under the more contemporary rubric of *genocide*.

Rogue, Failing, and Failed States. To avoid retaliation or notoriety, rogue states can employ terrorism as a deniable use of force. The rogue state’s relationship to the terrorist can range from direct support, to harboring, to merely turning a blind eye. States that harbor terrorists constitute an entirely different enemy than the terrorists themselves. A war against those rogue states that harbor or enable terrorist threats is properly conducted with the traditional methods of relations between states—deterrence, coercion, and compellence. Failing and failed states are incapable of

meeting their internal and external responsibilities, and these same methods do not apply. Failed states make attractive environments for terrorist bases, and they must not be allowed to become sanctuaries.

Terrorists are a diverse group sharing little more than tactics and a tremendous power disadvantage relative to their opponent.

Implications.

Of the three interpretations of the war on terrorism—against terrorism and terrorists, against states enabling terrorism, and against specific terrorist threats to the United States—conceiving of it as a war against terrorism and terrorists is the least helpful in formulating a response. It fails to make the distinction between the differing objectives of those who practice terrorism and the context surrounding its use. Failing to make the necessary distinctions invites a single, homogeneous policy and strategy.

Thus, at the national level, declaring war on terrorism is disorienting. We must, instead, declare war on specific aggressors, those lacking legitimate status within the international system of states and using destructive force across state boundaries against the United States. Different instruments are available for confronting states and, hence, a different strategy is required.

Identifying the Specific Threat.

Al-Qa'eda is “a base” for a variety of organizations, each of which is a loose confederation of groups and individuals lacking sovereignty within the system of states. There are thirty or so organizations with a coincidence of interest.¹⁴ This network constitutes the threat.

Al-Qa'eda's objective is to replace the secular state system with a medieval caliphate system based on an extreme interpretation of Islam.¹⁵ The focal point is the belt

running along the north of Africa, through the Middle East, across Central Asia, and to the Islamic frontiers of Indonesia and the Philippines—what has been called the “arc of chaos.” With few exceptions, the states along this belt are failing and in the hands of corrupt, unpopular, or tenuous governments.

Terrorism is the aggressor’s chosen means. The conflict will not be determined by decisive engagements between the military forces of states on the field of battle. This is a guerrilla war. Not one waged within a state, but one waged across states. Each guerrilla action is designed to elicit an overreaction that will, in turn, increase the guerrilla’s support within Islam.

Although commonly referred to as a network defying further description, the aggressor has a discernable organization.¹⁶ It has forces organized into combat formations, dispersed individuals with varying degrees of training, field commanders, and senior leadership.

Al-Qa’eda produces fighting forces deployed throughout the Islamic world. The largest part of the force, numbering in the tens of thousands, is organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces. Many fought in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation, guerrilla forces in the original Napoleonic meaning. Many came from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. They fought in Bosnia, and U.S. forces encountered them in Somalia. While not a direct threat to U.S. national security, we can confidently expect to encounter these forces whenever we choose to intervene in peacemaking or peacekeeping operations in a failing state with a substantial Muslim population. Their objective will often be the collapse of the government, while our intervention will often involve propping up that same government.

Another group, numbering about 10,000, live in Western states and have received combat training of one form or another. They are products of failing states with large Muslim populations—e.g., Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—and often fit the extreme active-maladaptive or

apocalyptic terrorist profile mentioned earlier. They are the fodder of war and the pawns of others. Alone, or in small groups, they are capable of discrete, uncoordinated attacks. Planning and synchronization of a 9/11-type attack is beyond their reach without external command and support.

A third group numbering in the several thousands is capable of commanding these forces. Most are dormant, and perhaps a thousand or so have the language and social skills necessary to move freely throughout the Western world. The top control structure is populated by a few hundred individuals that include both heads of known terrorist organizations and officials operating with or without the authority of their state governments.

Al-Qa'eda and its cohort constitute the threat to the United States and the international system, but at greatest risk are the governments of the failing states in the arc of chaos which tenuously balance between the pressures of domestic unrest and international relations. Western states pursue stable oil prices, and great oil wealth supports sometimes-repressive governments that fail to provide services to their poor populations. Sympathetic populations provide varying degrees of sanctuary for Al-Qa'eda training and operations. Representative democracy is often offered as a simplistic cure.¹⁷

STRATEGIC REVIEW

Next, we will review existing strategic thought before a strategy for dealing with this threat is proposed. The review begins with an examination of the various Cold War interpretations of containment and is followed by a review of the post-Cold War strategic debate. Much of the thought extracted from the strategic review is irrelevant because it orients on state-on-state conflict or because it is exhaustive of resources over time and cannot be sustained. However, useful components can be identified and brought to bear. The section closes with a short examination of the post-Cold War administrations' declaratory and employment policies.

Cold War Strategies.

Cold War administrations varied in their interpretations of containment. The pendulum swung between strategies that were sustainable over the long-term competition with the Soviet Union to strategies that led toward overextension and exhaustion. In 1943, Walter Lippmann said that foreign policy “consists in bringing into balance, with a comfortable surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power.”¹⁸ He spoke of periods of strategic *solvency* and *insolvency*. The balance of national commitment and power is the dominant structuring device of the strategic review below.

John Lewis Gaddis provides thorough coverage of containment strategies from Truman to Carter¹⁹ and is complemented by Raymond Garthoff’s treatment of the Reagan years.²⁰ A very short review of Cold War containment strategies follows.

Some of the more prominent shifts are between hegemony and balance of power, differentiation between vital and peripheral interests, viewing communism as a monolith versus differentiating on a state-by-state basis, and a symmetric response to every communist action versus an asymmetric response picking the place and time of the competition. Hegemonic pursuits, failure to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests, and a monolithic view of communism led toward overextension. Pursuing balance of power, differentiating between vital and peripheral interests, and differentiating between the various motives of communist states led to sustainable strategies.

Many of these shifts are noticeable in the differing views of George Kennan and Paul Nitze. George Kennan, who originally formulated the containment strategy, relied heavily on the premise that the Soviets would eventually exhaust themselves in the pursuit of hegemony. Rather than countering them everywhere, he focused on preventing

the great powers of Japan and Germany from falling under Soviet control. Kennan formulated a strong-point defense and advocated fighting only when great power issues were involved and when the terms were favorable to the United States. He specifically ruled out a presence on the Asian land mass. Paul Nitze, Kennan's successor as director of the Policy Planning Staff,²¹ abandoned the strong-point defense in favor of a perimeter defense. Nitze also abandoned threat differentiation, seeing all communist incursions as threats to vital interests. Subsequent administrations embraced the domino theory of undifferentiated threat; any communist expansion was seen as a threat to the balance of power.

One of the most notable shifts in the national security strategy of containment was in the perception of available means. According to Gaddis, those presidents who believed their means were limited tended towards *asymmetric* responses to Soviet encroachments; that is, to select the place, time, magnitude, and method of competition. Presidents who believed the American economy could produce the necessary means on demand tended towards *symmetric* responses, countering Soviet adventurism wherever and whenever it occurred. The belief that government could manage economic expansion without long-term budget deficits, higher taxes, or inflation allowed those presidents so inclined to consider all interests vital, all threats dangerous, and all measures available.²²

Cold War administrations differed in their views of communism as a monolithic threat. Under Truman, Kennan relied on the forces of nationalism to resist Soviet expansion rather than relying on U.S. military force. Truman spoke against totalitarian regimes and was willing to work with communist governments like that in Yugoslavia. The Nixon administration recognized and exploited a split between the Soviet Union and China, putting to rest the myth of communism as monolith.

Cold War administrations varied in their preference for instruments of power. Some heavily favored the military instrument, while others used the mix with greater facility and dexterity. The United States employed diplomatic and economic assistance to anti-communist governments, as in Latin America, with interventions by U.S. forces, as in Vietnam, and by diplomatic and economic assistance, as in Iran.

One of the failings of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, for example, was the inability to establish a truly integrated, interagency response in Vietnam, as the Overseas Internal Defense Policy prescribed, until Ambassador Komer arrived to head the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program in 1967. The Nixon-Ford administrations, attempting to disengage from costly commitments in the Third World, made greater use of other instruments, often favoring economic over military assistance. The Reagan administration put on a full-court press employing all elements of national power but maintained an emphasis on military force.

Cold War presidents responding symmetrically to communist expansion tended to favor the military instrument over the diplomatic and economic; those responding asymmetrically favored diplomatic and economic instruments, reserving military force for those times when vital interests were at stake and the terms were favorable. Those presidents responding symmetrically failed to differentiate between vital and peripheral interests, viewed communism as a monolithic threat, and made large demands on military force structure. National security decisionmaking, centralized in a small circle of policy elite, was also correlated with asymmetric response, while decentralized decisionmaking appears correlated with, perhaps demanded by, symmetric response.

Post-Cold War Strategic Alternatives.

The post-Cold War strategic debate—absent communism and containment—retains the elements of exhaustion and sustainability that characterized alternating strategies of the Cold War.²³ The post-Cold War debate is thoroughly captured by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross²⁴ who identify the major schools of thought, including primacy,²⁵ cooperative security,²⁶ selective engagement,²⁷ and neo-isolationist schools.²⁸ A short summary is provided below.

*Primacy.*²⁹ Advocates of a primacy strategy see the rise of a peer competitor as the greatest threat to international order and, therefore, the greatest risk of war involving the United States.³⁰ Furthermore, proponents believe that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace. They argue that states balance against *threat* and by using force selectively, the United States will be seen as a benign hegemon and, therefore, there will be no need to balance against it. Primacy advocates are skeptical of international institutions, but believe that they can be used as an asset in the pursuit of American interests.

Critics assert that foreign nationalism will brace against even benign U.S. hegemony and cause the problems the strategy was designed to prevent. If states balance against the United States, then it may find itself isolated when confronting rising powers in the long term. Its detractors believe the strategy is unsustainable and will likely result in imperial overreach, destroying what it intended to protect.

*Neo-Isolationist.*³¹ The proponents of a neo-isolationist strategy assert that the United States is an economically powerful nation, with vast protective oceans, and an overwhelming nuclear arsenal. Its security is, thus, largely assured. The neo-isolationist belief system includes the premise that promoting values generates resentment and that intervention is the *cause* of trouble for the United

States. They argue that the risk of attack by WMD is proportional to U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts. Alliances obligate the United States in advance to unimagined future crises around the world. Therefore, the United States should withdraw from entangling alliances and reduce foreign engagement to only those conflicts that threaten vital interests. The United States should not use military force to impose world order, spread democracy or American values, or advance American economic interests that are better left to the private sector.

In the absence of security provided by the United States or U.S.-led coalition, however, other countries might expand their militaries to provide their own security. An expensive and dangerous spiral of militarization could ensue. Regional powers will find only local resistance to their attempts at hegemony. The result could be more war, not less.

*Selective Engagement.*³² There are two major goals of a selective engagement strategy. The first is preventing war between the great powers, including Russia, China, Japan, and the European powers. The second is preventing proliferation of WMD to hostile, ambitious powers, including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

According to selective engagement advocates, the United States must be prepared to act unilaterally if great power peace is threatened. Traditional alliances are viewed as beneficial to the extent that they allow the United States to respond to threats to great power peace.

Proponents of selective engagement share the neo-isolationists' belief that indiscriminate use of force will cause countries to balance against the United States. Engaging selectively means that the United States would lead only when its vital interests are threatened. Its detractors, however, suggest that American leadership would suffer, thus forcing unilateral action when multinational action would have been preferable.

Advocates believe that the public will not support the global police mission. Moreover, forces engaged in peace operations may be difficult to disengage and redeploy to participate in major theater war. Engaging in peace operations, therefore, should be minimal.

*Cooperative Security.*³³ “Cooperative security differs from the traditional idea of collective security as preventive medicine differs from acute care.” A collective security strategy is implemented through a multinational coalition to defeat an aggressor that *uses* force to violate the sovereignty of another state.³⁴ The architects of cooperative security seek to prevent war by preventing any country from *acquiring* the means to aggress against others.

Advocates of cooperative security do not perceive great power conflict and conventional military force as the dominant security problem. A focus on preventing states from assembling aggressive means elevates proliferation of WMD, instead, to the forefront. An important premise is that peace is indivisible. Because wars spread, the United States has an overriding interest in preserving global peace.

Pursuing a cooperative security strategy requires standing international organizations with domestic and international legitimacy. International institutions would take military actions against aggressor states, maintain arms control and confidence-building regimes, and prevent proliferation of WMD. The new international arrangement “must begin with the central principle that the only legitimate purpose of national military forces is the defense of national territory or the participation in multinational forces that enforce United Nations (U.N.) sanctions or maintain peace.”³⁵

Primacy advocates reject the subordination of American interests and forces to an international body, and realists argue that there is no historical reason to believe that a world order based on nations subordinating their own interests is achievable. Advocates rely heavily on arms

control and nonproliferation arrangements even though they lack a clear history of success.

Force Structure Implications. Across the alternative strategies, general agreement on the need for a second strike nuclear capability exists. There is a great deal of difference, however, in the need for forward presence and the willingness to intervene in police missions.

The force underwriting the neo-isolationist strategy would be primarily oriented on defense of the homeland, including a modest air and missile defense and a second strike nuclear capability. A small expeditionary force would be maintained to protect vital interests abroad. The low force level would offer reduced options to the president. To the adherents of this strategy, this is more a blessing than a shortcoming.

Selective engagement's emphasis on great power war requires a force capable of winning two major regional contingencies. One alternative is the maintenance of two Gulf War forces; another alternative is the maintenance of a Gulf War force and a holding force for a second theater. The United States must maintain a strong nuclear deterrent.³⁶

Primacy advocates are unilateralist, thus requiring the force to be sized and shaped without regard for coalition contributions. Some argue for a force that is superior to the combined forces of the next two, three, or four great powers.³⁷ Primacy requires a large overseas presence. Stationing military forces in Europe is seen as an effective means of preventing Germany from forming an independent foreign policy. Forces should remain forward deployed in the Middle East and Southwest Asia to safeguard oil reserves and to discourage India from ambitions of regional hegemony.

Cooperative security also requires a large U.S. overseas presence.³⁸ Cooperative security assumes that other countries will maintain forces sufficient for the defense of their homelands plus a force subordinated to international

institutions. The U.S. contribution would be the reconnaissance strike complex—essentially the DESERT STORM force and its power projection capability. Cooperative security is nearly indiscriminant in its willingness to intervene in ethnic conflict, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, thus creating a significant demand for additional forces.

Underlying Concepts and the Use of Power.

Even though the alternative strategies of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras vary on the use of force, they all are based on a small number of concepts. For example, defense, retaliation, deterrence, coercion, and compellence are well-understood concepts concerning the use of power. As useful as these concepts are to relations between states, they are largely irrelevant when applied against the current threat. Many of those that are relevant beyond interstate conflict are exhaustive of resources in the context of the current conflict.

Deterrence, compellence, and coercion are the three principal uses of force between states. Thomas Schelling's *Arms and Influence* well represents the best modern thinking on these uses of force.³⁹ Each is defined below.⁴⁰

deterrence: Deterrence is “to prevent from action through fear of consequences. . . . Deterrence involves setting the stage—by announcement, by rigging the trip-wire, by incurring the obligation—and by *waiting*. The overt act is up to the opponent.”

compellence: Compellence “usually involves *initiating* an action (or an irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds.”

coercion: “Coercion requires finding a bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want— worse off not doing what we want—when he takes the threatened penalty into account.”

Underlying deterrence, compellence, and coercion is the idea that a state has people and resources that it values and that the state itself seeks to survive. The aggressor terrorist network is without place and property. While the terrorist leadership might wish to survive, it does not so value its followers as long as there is an ample supply. Moreover, they invite and hope for a response that appears to be retaliation against the general Islamic public.

Active and passive defense. A variety of passive and active *defense* mechanisms have been employed in the past. Passive defense measures—like physical security and hardening—mitigate the effect of an attack. Active defense measures—like mines, coastal artillery, and interdiction aircraft—on the other hand, raise the cost of the aggressor’s attack by attriting the force carrying out the attack.

Denying access to the United States, either along its perimeter or at its ports of entry, is exhaustive of resources. Denying access to targets is also exhaustive. Even if it is possible to secure airports, the aggressor will move to attacks at sea, on the highways, sports complexes, shopping malls, or any public place. The aggressor has an infinite set of targets and defending them all demands infinite resources. Retaliation may feel good and increased defensive measures may look good, but they cannot be the basis of a sustainable strategy.

Acts of retaliation and defensive measures are properly seen as elements of a deterrence strategy. One retaliates with brute force to inflict pain for a real or perceived wrong. It is easy to interpret the use of military force in those terms. For example, a terrorist act committed in a Berlin nightclub led to an air attack on Libya.⁴¹ But seen in the larger picture of an ongoing U.S. effort to deter Libya from terrorist activity, the air attack is viewed as an act of deterrence. We should not forget, however, the viscerally guided use of brute force.

Preemptive and preventive wars are not types of wars. Instead, they describe motives for war. Both derive

from the better-now-than-later logic but differ in important ways.

Whereas prevention involves fighting a winnable war now in order to avoid the risk of war later under less favorable circumstances, preemption involves the initiation of military action because it is perceived that an adversary's attack is imminent and that there are advantages in striking first, or at least in preventing the adversary from doing so.⁴²

Secretary of State Daniel Webster provides an often quoted, and perhaps the most restrictive, justification for the preemptive use of force. There must be "a necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."⁴³

preemptive war: initiation of war because an adversary's attack—using *existing* capability—is believed to be imminent.

While preemption is a tactical response to an imminent threat, prevention is a more strategic response to a long-term, developing threat.⁴⁴ "The preventive motivation for war arises from the perception that one's military power and potential are declining relative to that of a rising adversary, and from the fear of the consequences of that decline."⁴⁵ Uneven economic development or technological development favoring the offense may cause the perception of shifting balance.⁴⁶ History and international law have frowned upon preventive war, and it is seen as a disguise for naked aggression.⁴⁷

preventive war: fighting a winnable war now to avoid risk of war later under less favorable conditions.

Both cooperative security and primacy advocates talk of preventing the spread of WMD. The former relies on treaties and the latter relies on the use of force. President Clinton's employment strategy included both preemptive and retaliatory strikes but not preventive war.

Those advocating a cooperative security strategy ascribe special meaning to the word *prevention*. “The central purpose of cooperative security arrangements is to prevent war and to do so primarily by preventing the means for successful aggression from being assembled, thus also obviating the need for states so threatened to make their own counterpreparations.”⁴⁸

prevention: Preventing war by preventing states from assembling the means to aggress against others.

The definition easily generalizes from states to nonstates. Treaties and arms control agreements of the past, however, do not give cause for optimism. To date, the nonstate aggressor has shown a preference for readily available weapons rather than in extensive research and development or capital investment in sophisticated weapons.

The efficacy of prevention by diplomatic means is weak as evidenced by failed efforts against Iraq and North Korea. Preemptive strike, as conducted in 1981 by Israel against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear facility⁴⁹ and by the Clinton administration in 1998 against Iraqi WMD development facilities,⁵⁰ has unarguably taken away capability and set back its development. The successful overthrow of Saddam Hussein and subsequent destruction of capability would also remove threat capability. The strategic difference between preemptive strike to destroy capability and a preventive war to overthrow the Iraqi government is the level of U.S. and international commitment required afterward.

Existing arms sanctions against Iraq and North Korea may retard but not prevent the acquisition of WMD. Preemptive strike against the capability is a complement to diplomatic and economic efforts. The overthrow of a government must be a last resort.

Post-Cold War Administrations.

Given this brief strategic review, it is now possible to better characterize and understand the approaches taken by post-Cold War administrations.

George H. W. Bush (1989-1993). With little time to prepare after the end of the Cold War, the first Bush administration started down the path toward a primacy strategy at the same time that force structure was in rapid decline. The classified *Defense Planning Guidance* spoke of preventing the rise of a competitor, preventing European allies from developing their own foreign policy, and providing global security so that no potential competitor need to aspire to greater power—maintaining hegemony. Some in the Pentagon found the language so disagreeable that they leaked it to the *New York Times*.⁵¹ The administration found that talking primacy was as politically incorrect as talking isolationism.

While the administration's declaratory policy took on the more acceptable language of collective security,⁵² its employment policy was ambivalent. The Gulf War is a classic example of collective security: one state violated the territorial sovereignty of another, and an international coalition returned the situation to the status quo ante. It was a war of limited objectives. The invasion of Panama to remove a head of state, in contrast, is an example of primacy and unilateralism. It was a war of unlimited objectives.

*William J. Clinton (1993-2001).*⁵³ The campaign leading to the 1992 election paid scant attention to foreign policy and national security issues; domestic issues prevailed. Following his election, the president gave speeches apologizing for the Cold War and American preoccupation with power.⁵⁴ The administration explicitly rejected balance of power in favor of Wilsonian internationalism.

The administration's eventual grand strategy has been called selective (but cooperative) primacy.⁵⁵ Each of the administration's four security strategy documents⁵⁶ was

decidedly oriented on cooperative security, assuring world peace and nonproliferation through arms control regimes. An international community that proved far less supportive than hoped for forced the administration to later adopt some of primacy's unilateralism. A desire to intervene internationally and an unwillingness to risk American casualties and popular support for those interventions led to cruise missile diplomacy, the modern equivalent of gunboat diplomacy.⁵⁷ The administration's rhetoric began to stress the need to be selective in its engagement; simultaneously, it expanded its military presence overseas in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and Central America.

In the end, the administration lacked a strategy to guide the use of force. Its employment policy, instead of following a strategy, followed a constructivist path of ad hoc responses. This should not be surprising given that national security advisor Sandy Berger was on record saying "grand strategies were after-the-fact rationales developed to explain successful ad hoc decisions."⁵⁸

George W. Bush (2001-). The Bush administration's national security rhetoric has evolved since the campaign and the 9/11 attacks. A security focus on the rogue states of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—the axis of evil—however, remains a constant. A comparison of Condoleezza Rice's campaign policy statement in *Foreign Affairs*⁵⁹ and the first Bush administration national security strategy is in order.

Rice articulated a lack of urgency with respect to these rogue states by saying that "they were living on borrowed time" and "there need be no sense of panic about them."⁶⁰ She further communicated a veiled threat of nuclear retaliation if any of them employed (not acquired) WMD.

Rice spoke in the language of selective engagement, favoring the use of the military to deter and fight major conflicts. America's military is the only one capable of this deterrence function, and it must not be stretched or diverted into areas that weaken these broader responsibilities.⁶¹ She

went on to say U.S. intervention in “. . . ‘humanitarian’ crises should be, at best, exceedingly rare.”⁶²

Rice invoked the principle of nonintervention by saying that frequent involvement in humanitarian crises through the U.N. will communicate to great powers that the United States “has decided to enforce the notion of ‘limited sovereignty’ worldwide in the name of humanitarianism.” She further hinted at the unilateralism of primacy and selective engagement by suggesting that, by showing too great a reliance on the U.N., we are “implying that we will do so even when our vital interests are involved.”⁶³ An “overly broad definition of America’s national interest is bound to backfire”⁶⁴

The 2002 national security strategy⁶⁵ contains a great deal of language reminiscent of Wilsonian internationalism and the Carter administration’s human rights agenda. “American values are universal.”⁶⁶

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.

The strategy also contains the language of cooperative security. Overall, however, the Bush strategy is dominated by the language of primacy.

The strategy takes an undifferentiated view of terrorism. “The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.” “We make no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.” “Terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide.”⁶⁷

Nowhere is the failure to differentiate more clear than in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both Arab and Jew employed terrorism against British forces occupying the Palestinian Mandate—a classic guerrilla war. Israel later acquired the

conventional forces of statehood and has subsequently used them against indigenous Palestinians. The Palestinian view is that a war of annihilation is being waged against them in their homeland and that they are waging a guerrilla war against an occupying force of European immigrants.⁶⁸ After the September attacks, American declaratory policy called for a strong and unambiguous international response—a war against terrorism. But when Israel seized the opportunity for the next campaign in a war of annihilation against the Palestinians, American support was weak and ambiguous. President Bush has, according to some, waffled in his demands on the Palestinians and Israelis.⁶⁹

Another case in point is the changed American attitude towards the separatist Uighurs in China's Xinjiang province. The Chinese government makes "little distinction between separatists, terrorists, and civil rights activists."⁷⁰ The U.N. identified as human rights abuses Chinese attempts to quell Uighur separatists.⁷¹ Now, the United States and China identify these same separatists as terrorists. The separatist movement does not threaten the United States and does not attack the international system. It seeks self-determination and territorial sovereignty for a Muslim community oppressed by the Chinese.⁷²

The strategy focuses on capability rather than on the intention to attack the United States when it speaks of attacking "leadership of organizations with global reach."⁷³ It employs the language of the system of states to deal with the nonstate threat by speaking of campaigns "to localize the threat to a particular state" and to then "ensure the state has the military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools necessary to finish the task."⁷⁴

A brisk public debate has taken place primarily concerning the invasion of Iraq. Participants tend to focus on a handful of issues: the arguable imminence of the threat; the direct cost of going it alone; the effect on the region, on international order, and on the war on terrorism;

and the wisdom of making preemption a prominent part of declaratory policy.

Iraq has used chemical weapons since the 1980s and there is evidence of a biological weapons program beginning after the Gulf War.⁷⁵ Nuclear weapons are estimated to be 2 to 5 years away.⁷⁶ Thus, the case has not been made for the imminent threat against the United States, and it fails to meet the criteria for preemptive war. The American public shares a distaste for Saddam Hussein, but they do not share the president's sense of imminent threat.⁷⁷

The invasion of Iraq better qualifies as a preventive war—a war initiated before the aggressor can amass WMD on a scale sufficient to shift the balance to the aggressor. Such an act is consistent with declarations made long before 9/11 that the rogue states of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea posed the greatest threat to security,⁷⁸ but inconsistent with the assessment that there was no rush to act against them.⁷⁹ It is only peripherally related to the guerrilla war waged against the system of states. In fact, overthrowing the secular Iraqi government is consistent with the guerrilla's objectives. The axis of evil and the arc of chaos constitute quite different problems and beg different solutions.

The objective of the war is far more important than the motive for waging the war sooner than later. A war to overthrow a government is a war of unlimited objectives. Some suggest that definitions are being deliberately twisted to justify the invasion of Iraq.⁸⁰

James Fallows argues that the direct cost of the invasion may be small but that the cost of what follows—occupation, policing, and rebuilding—will be high.⁸¹ Even if the president could create the sense of urgency, Americans wonder why going it alone is the first option. Building a progressive Arab state after toppling the current regime will take time and international support. Why not contain now and attack when an alliance is more agreeable?⁸²

The cost of the peace that follows war is too high to bear alone. Will overthrow of the other members of the axis of evil follow? One can optimistically imagine an invasion force used serially in a campaign to overthrow one rogue or failing state after another. But because the occupation and nation-building that follows will take years or decades, these activities will impose simultaneous, not serial, demands on resources. How many rogue, failed, or failing states can the international community build? How many can America build alone?

Another focal point is the effect an invasion would have on the region. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt predicts that an overthrow of the Iraqi government will destabilize the region.⁸³ Fears of rising Kurdish nationalism have spawned anti-war sentiment in Turkey.⁸⁴ More generally, the invasion would likely increase anti-Americanism within Arabic and Islamic states whose governments maintain only a tenuous hold on power. Those governments maintaining relations with the United States may come under increased domestic pressure, and local support for terrorist activities could increase.

An invasion of Iraq may in fact increase the probability of more general terrorist attacks while simultaneously reducing the probability of the most severe type of attack with WMD. Former Vice President Al Gore asserts that talk of an attack on Iraq weakens the war on terrorism.⁸⁵ If the hunt for bin Laden depends on cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, then unilaterally waging war on Iraq will weaken the effort against terrorists. Others argue that we can currently deter Hussein, but by making his overthrow imminent, he is most likely to employ WMD against Israel or the Gulf states who support the invasion.

The strongest thread in the debate is about the long-term effect on international order. In particular, some are concerned about the effect on transatlantic relations. Absent the common threat posed by the Warsaw Pact,

American and European interests are more divergent today. The United States spends twice what its 18 NATO allies spend on defense, creating an imbalance in power and influence, while Europeans believe that the United States places too much emphasis on the use of military force and not enough on root causes.⁸⁶ Francis Fukuyama warns against “U.S. versus the world” becoming the chief passion in global politics.⁸⁷

An apparent minority argues that the United States could establish a first strike precedent.⁸⁸ Other states could be prompted to bypass the U.N. and strike unilaterally. Other states, as the argument continues, could be prompted to acquire greater deterrent weapons. In any case, a preemptive strike implies a quick fix rather than a sustained solution.

Finally, the wisdom of making preemption such a prominent part of declaratory policy is questioned. A preemptive strike is accompanied by some secrecy lest the enemy be allowed to make defensive preparations or to launch a preemptive attack of its own. Members of the former Clinton administration argue that preemptive strike has always been an option on the menu, but declaring it as U.S. policy or doctrine⁸⁹ conveys a cowboy image that invites backlash.⁹⁰ Secretary of State Colin Powell, apparently downplaying the significance of a preemptive declaratory policy, stated that preemption has always been available to the president, and that it has only “risen in the hierarchy of options” as a response to stateless terrorists seeking WMD.⁹¹ Powell further clarifies the use of preemption by limiting it to decisive strikes.⁹²

Regardless of the decision to invade Iraq, the United States needs a strategy for the use of force beyond the next crisis.

STRATEGY FOR *GUERRA*

The single most critical question following the end of the bipolar superpower competition is what role the United States should play in the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its alliance left the United States by default as the uncontested superpower. Since then, we have seen extreme swings in strategic declaratory policy—from collective security, to cooperative security, and to primacy. Yet throughout these swings, all three post-Cold War presidents have made prominent use of unilateral force in their declaratory or employment policies. The first Bush administration led a coalition of the willing in the Gulf War, but pursued unilateral action in Panama. Absent the common threat of the Warsaw Pact, subsequent presidents have found it increasingly difficult to form broad-based international coalitions, earlier in Kosovo and more recently against Iraq. Unilateral preemptive strike has been followed by talk of preventive war. U.S. leadership of the Atlantic alliance increasingly resembles U.S. hegemony with America leading an alliance under duress.

Thinking characteristic of great power conflict is not helpful. The war against terrorism will not terminate. There will be no armistice day. The correct conception of the conflict lies at the nexus of military operations and law enforcement. Rather than a war with clear objectives, decisive engagement on the field of battle, and exit strategy, the current conflict is more profitably viewed as sustained international guerrilla war.

This report does not propose a grand strategy. Rather, it proposes a strategy for *guerra*—war waged against those without legitimate standing—subordinated to the grand strategy. The strategy must be sustainable indefinitely. To be sustainable, it must enlist all possible resources, domestic and international, and differentiation of all forms must be made.

In the paragraphs that follow, we first state the objectives (ends) of the *guerra* strategy followed by the methods (ways) of achieving those objectives. Then we evaluate the effectiveness and sustainability of each method and offer criteria for their employment. Finally, we summarize the force structure implications (means).

Objectives.

There are four interlocking *objectives* of the *guerra* strategy. The first is to reduce the *probability* of destructive or disruptive attacks. A second, and perhaps more important, objective is to reduce the *severity* of attacks. The third, and most important, objective is to prevent the conflict from *spilling over* into a wider war with Islam. Successful actions taken to reduce the probability and severity of attack must be calculated against the likelihood of widening the conflict. Because not all attacks can be prevented, the fourth objective is to mitigate the effect of attacks.

The probability of attack is the product of intent and capacity. In dealing with states, aggressive capacity is easier to measure than is intent, and intent is the more important of the two. Intent can be modulated; all measures of international relations are available to deter, coerce, or compel states against their use of force. But that is a matter of grand strategy. The guerrilla, however, is a hostile nonstate aggressor and is the subject of the *guerra* strategy. The enemy has made his intent clear by declaring war. Deterrence, coercion, and compellence do not apply. Under these conditions, the mere possession of destructive capacity is criterion for the destructive use of force.

The potential for increasing severity of attack is a matter of WMD proliferation. Acquisition by states, rogue or otherwise, is a matter of international relations and the U.S. grand strategy. The acquisition or possession by hostile nonstate actors is the subject of the *guerra* strategy.

Efforts to prevent spillover are directed at Islam and are oriented on reducing the root causes. All other counter-guerrilla acts must be measured in terms of their effects on this objective.

To Reduce Offensive Capability.

Sir Michael Howard, Britain's most prominent contemporary strategist, characterizes the conflict as being "more like a hunt" than a war.⁹³ There is increasing consensus that "the hunt" will require greater concert of the many elements of national power, including intelligence agencies, Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Treasury's Financial Center (FINCEN), and Defense's strike capability.⁹⁴

Rather than a uniform policy of employing the many elements of power, separate criteria must be developed that differentiate between those states that are meeting their internal and external responsibilities and those that are failing.

Viable states are capable of meeting their internal and external responsibilities, should they choose to do so. It is in the interests of viable states to employ their own law enforcement methods and capabilities to maintain peace within their own territory and to prevent their territory from being used as a base for international guerrilla operations. For the American strategy to be sustainable, the resources of viable states should be marshaled.

The main effort is conducted through international law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. Large numbers of those who would attack the United States and the system of states are widely distributed and have shown a preference for residency in liberal democracies where they can move and congregate freely. The number of these individuals is small when compared to a mass army, but they do not mass and they must be pursued individually.

In failed and failing states, law enforcement will likely be insufficient. The military will play a more prominent role in the hunt in failed and failing states. The dominant use of military force in *guerra* must be ruthless preemption—destroying the capability to do harm before it can be employed. To do so requires covert direct action, to kill or capture targeted individuals, undertaken by military or other agents. Covert direct action may also be required to destroy manufacturing or other infrastructure. The scale of some targets will require overt action, to include air- or sea-based long-range precision strike and short duration raids by small air-ground units employing a variety of ingress and egress methods. These raids are not punitive, expeditionary raids, nor are they conducted to seize, hold, and occupy terrain. They are not to topple governments.

Failing states are those whose governments have tenuous control over the state. Yemen offers an example; its government has virtually no control over two-thirds of the country. Failing states cannot meet their internal and external responsibilities, even if they choose to do so. These governments have the most to lose. The government's desire to survive and its resources should be marshaled against those waging international guerrilla war. For those governments with the will, but not the ability, to meet their responsibilities, various forms of aid are the appropriate American response. Difficult choices will have to be made. Supporting oppressive governments may provide the best near-term protection of American interests and lives while increasing the oppressed populations' animosity towards America. Until these states become viable, the United States cannot rule out covert and overt actions against threats to American security.

Failed states are those whose governments cannot maintain internal order or meet their external responsibilities to the system of states. Afghanistan is such a case. No amount of force application will compel or coerce these governments to squash terrorist activities, nor can the terrorists be deterred. One alternative is to unilaterally

invade, occupy, and undertake long-term nation-building. Another is to do the same but as a multilateral exercise through international institutions. A third alternative is to destroy threatening capability through strikes and raids. Because of the secrecy required, these military actions will be conducted unilaterally.

Because there are many failing states (perhaps 30),⁹⁵ unilateral invasion, occupation, and nation-building constitute an exhaustive strategy than cannot possibly be sustained. Nation-building through international institutions is more sustainable, but the international community may not agree as to when and where to intervene. Unilateral strikes and raids into failed, and failing states are more sustainable and controllable.

To Reduce the Severity of Attack.

The attacks of 9/11 show that considerable destruction can be inflicted without resort to sophisticated military weapons. The proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons, however, increases the severity potential of attacks. Treaties and agreements for regulating the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems are relevant counters. These diplomatic efforts may retard but not prevent the acquisition of WMD by our declared enemies. Because we cannot prevent the aggressor from amassing these weapons, and we cannot deter him, then we must use preemptive force. The mere possession of WMD by hostile nonstate actors is cause for direct action.

Destroying this class of offensive capability presents unique problems. The 1981 Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osiraq generated widespread criticism and even condemnation. Some of the criticism was directed at the use of offensive force without international sanction. An even greater criticism was due to the nature of the target and the potential for catastrophic effects well beyond target destruction.⁹⁶

To Manage the Consequences of Attack.

Through the methods described earlier, the probability and severity of attack can be reduced, but not eliminated. Defending all domestic targets against all forms of attack all of the time is impossible. Law enforcement and consequence management are the leading requirements in homeland defense. Unlike war, this conflict will not likely come to a definitive end in the foreseeable future. More like law enforcement and emergency services, the United States will have to cope with the effects of future attacks. Consequence management will remain a necessary ingredient of any national capability.

As New York City and Arlington, Virginia showed during the 9/11 attacks, local municipalities will be the first to respond, will stay the course, and will carry the heaviest burden. A national response can only be supportive of the local responders' efforts. Combat service support forces will be the principal military contribution.

To Reduce Offensive Intent.

The source of animosity and of recruits will persist for the foreseeable future. Economic disparity, lack of jobs and opportunities, and high birth rates will continue as conditions of failed and failing states. Impoverished or oppressed Islamic populations will continue to perceive the West supporting their unresponsive governments in pursuit of stable oil prices. Efforts to reduce the intention to attack the United States are primarily diplomatic, economic, and informational, not military. Furthermore, each use of military force, benign or otherwise, has the potential to increase animosity and shift more adherents to the guerrilla movement.

Domestic pressures within the United States may precipitate humanitarian interventions into the Islamic world to deal with manmade or natural disasters. These types of interventions commonly put military forces into

failed states where they must be prepared for asymmetric warfare against hostile civilians and Al-Qa'eda-trained insurgency forces. These forces may be organized, trained, and equipped to wage guerrilla warfare in the classic sense. They are not the forces of a legitimate state and are neither combatant nor noncombatant.

U.S. forces should be used for such interventions on an exceptionally rare basis, to put down insurrections that threaten significant U.S. interests, for example. But presidents will intervene where and when they may. American forces must be prepared to deal with these illegitimate forces. The force must be trained to rules of engagement appropriate to counter this form of illegitimate warfare rather than to the rules that apply to warfare between states. Congress may need to prepare relevant legislation and guidance. International treaties may require revision to define the “rights” of so-called illegal combatants.

Humanitarian interventions may lead to nation-building, as might the intentional overthrow of a corrupt government. Nation-building—addressing the root causes—provides no hope for near-term relief against terrorist attack. Past American attempts at nation-building offer little optimism even in the long term,⁹⁷ and there are too many states for one country to build.

Nation-building attempts under colonialism are not fond memories of the colonial powers or of the colonized populations. It is difficult to imagine the United States or a Western-led coalition of states “building” an Islamic state in anything other than its own image. International organizations are better equipped for nation-building operations, and wealthy Islamic states, through organizations like the Organization of the Islamic Conference,⁹⁸ should be encouraged to provide resources to their support. Tenuous states may gain domestic and international credibility through these efforts. A strategy that relies on rebuilding Islamic states in the arc of chaos

into modern Western states is truly exhaustive of resources and the height of hubris.

Certain conditions must precede attempts at nation-building or post-conflict reconstruction. International bodies must have the ability and the willingness to align the boundaries of states and nations. Many state boundaries derive from convenient administrative districts of the colonial period. The misalignment created still contributes to internal strife and prevents development of viable states that can accept their responsibilities within the system of states. Boundary adjustments must be considered to provide nations the opportunity to develop into states where their own mores can govern the allocation of resources and guide development. Boundary adjustments in the past have been difficult, and establishing autonomous regions may be more practical.

In this context, post-Taliban Afghanistan represents a lost opportunity. Long a land of warring factions divided along ethnic lines, borders with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Iran could have been adjusted to better align nations and states. Instead, a failed government was reinstalled over the existing factions, a return to the conditions that preceded the Taliban takeover.

The aggressor needs an environment in which to operate and survive. A supportive or tolerant population is an enabling condition. The guerrilla's objective is to expand that support environment. Ours must be to reduce that support, making it harder to recruit, survive, acquire, plan, train, and execute. Only Muslim clerics, perhaps, have the moral authority to pursue this information campaign and to assert their leadership over those who have hijacked their religion. Even the most effective campaign to reduce recruiting efforts will take decades or generations and will not likely affect those already committed.

Short-sighted declaratory and employment policies to reduce the probability and severity of attacks could easily cause the widening of the conflict that, in turn, would

increase the probability and severity of attack. Nonproliferation treaties, nation-building, and information campaigns conducted for the hearts and minds of Islam offer no promise in the near term. Other courses of action—the hunt—must be followed to provide relief in the present.

Directing and Sustaining the Effort.

The main and supporting efforts are not independent activities; they require strong centralized direction. No one agency—not the State Department, Defense Department, or Office of Homeland Defense—can lead. The National Security Council, relying on an integrated operations and intelligence center, might provide the appropriate locus of control. Subordinated to the grand strategy, the NSC could orchestrate all elements of national power, including sanctioning direct actions.

Summary of Demands on Military Force Structure.

A counterguerrilla strategy requires tightly integrated intelligence and law enforcement forces for “the hunt,” military strike forces on call for preemption, and military combat service support forces in support to domestic authorities for consequence management.

Humanitarian interventions in failed and failing states require expeditionary forces designed for peacemaking and peacekeeping missions that may evolve into nation-building. These forces will likely encounter al-Qa’eda-trained forces and must be prepared for “asymmetric warfare” against forces lacking legitimate standing.

Forces for preemptive strike and raids must be within hours of attack when a target presents. Mobilization and strategic deployment of a strike force will be observed and the target will disperse. Maintaining a force permanently forward deployed at the necessarily high level of readiness is an exhaustive proposition. Instead, forces relevant to preemptive strike must be on “strip alert” which, in turn,

requires adoption of the rotational readiness model long used by the naval services.

Preventive war and the overthrow of governments require invasion forces on the order of the reconnaissance strike complex. In addition, occupation and civil affairs forces are required for a lengthy period to follow. There will likely be a great deal of commonality between the forces required for occupation and nation-building following regime change and those forces required for consequence management at home. Occupation and nation-building forces that satisfy these requirements are not forces designed for great power conflict. Expeditionary forces engaged in peace operations are not available for great power conflict.

The *guerra* strategy makes sparing use of the reconnaissance strike complex in the counterinsurgency war, preserving it for great power issues of grand strategy. The primacy strategy makes far greater demands on occupation and nation-building forces than does the *guerra* strategy, and it makes greater demands on the reconnaissance strike complex in the war on terrorism. The unilateralism of the primacy strategy is more likely to alienate allies than is the *guerra* strategy. The primacy strategy is more likely to create blowback within Islam than is the *guerra* strategy. The primacy strategy has a greater potential for strategic exhaustion.

SUMMARY AND CLOSING

The United States is in an interwar period with respect to great power conflict, but great power conflict will return. The country's grand strategy must remain focused on America's role among the great powers in the long term. America's influence in the world will erode if, as Francis Fukuyama suggests, opposing the United States becomes the "chief passion in global politics."

The *guerra* strategy must be embedded in and subordinated to the grand strategy. Agencies should not develop their own strategies. There should be no national military strategy to counter terrorism or to counter the international guerrilla war waged against the system of states. Execution of the *guerra* strategy relies on skillful orchestration of all the elements of national power and, thus, strong centralized direction is required. To be effective, the *guerra* strategy must be sustainable indefinitely, relevant to the nonstate actor, and rational.

To be sustainable, the *guerra* strategy must be asymmetric. A symmetric response, characterized by the action-reaction cycle that the aggressor hopes to initiate, allows the attacker to select the time and place of the competition. We must choose the place and time of action to maximize the effect of the resources expended and to minimize “blowback.” To be sustainable, the strategy must enlist all elements of national and international power rather than imposing the primary burden on the U.S. military instrument. Strategies based on *defending* everything, against all forms of attack, all of the time, are exhaustive of resources and impossible to implement and sustain. Strategies based on *interdicting* all forms of attack as they are in progress are exhaustive for the same reasons. The recent reallocation of resources domestically may allay public fear, but it cannot be the basis of a sustainable strategy.

The *guerra* strategy must be relevant to the nature of the conflict. Strategies based on *retaliation* will fail; retaliation may feel good, but it will not *deter* martyrs. Terrorist networks have nothing of value equivalent to the damage they can inflict. Strategies based on *preventing* rogue states from acquiring the means of attack have merit when directed at limiting the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery vehicles; they are irrelevant, however, when the means employed are commercial aircraft or other readily available means.

The *guerra* strategy must be rational. Tactical actions must destroy more enemy capability than they create. Strikes and raids should be aimed at discrete targets and then only to destroy meaningful enemy capability decisively. Some targets of opportunity will be bypassed if they conflict with the grand strategy objectives or if target destruction can rationally be expected to produce a response out of proportion to the damage done.

International law enforcement and intelligence agencies enabled by greater information sharing carry the primary burden. The military is in a supporting, on call, role. *Preemptive strike*—attacking the threat capability before it is used—is the primary use of military force. *Consequence management*—coping with the effects after an attack—is an indispensable component of a national strategy for *guerra*.

The debate about internationalism being the cause of or solution to threats against American security has not been resolved, nor has it changed appreciably, but the consequences are more significant than before. No longer is the ability to attack the United States only in the hands of a few countries that can be deterred. The proliferation of WMD puts the means in the hands of many states and even in the hands of small groups, and the potency of the tools at their disposal will only increase. Administrations must decide on a case-by-case basis whether foreign policy will favor human rights in foreign lands or American lives at home.

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