DoD News Briefing Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Friday, August 3, 2001 - 3:30 p.m. EDT

Rumsfeld: Greetings. I was lonesome, thought I'd stop down and say hello. Let me just make a few comments, and then we'll be happy to respond to questions.

The -- I guess it's been about six months since I've been here, and we've now got 29 people on board out of 45 or -- yeah, about 45 total that we're looking for. A number of them have come in very recently, and it looks like we may have another six later today or tomorrow, which is encouraging.

The concept we've put forward with respect to the service secretaries, working with Pete Aldridge and the deputy, has started functioning and is gaining some traction.

We've had a very good hearing for General Jumper, who's been announced as the next chief of staff of the Air Force, and the Senate is addressing that.

We have some progress on some of the presidential initiatives with respect to quality of life.

We've fashioned an approach for missile defense which is different than had previously been the case, and moving from a deployment pattern to Shemya to a research and development and testing pattern, which is looking at a broader spectrum of approaches, which we think is a -- has been well received. And we've identified a number of challenges for the department and put initiatives in place that are moving forward.

Needless to say, everyone in the Department of Defense wants to be involved in an institution that is interested in excellence. It's a worthwhile goal. It befits this important department, an organization that ought to care for its people and respect the fact that they put their lives at risk voluntarily and are engaged in exceedingly important work for our country, and also an institution that has to be respectful of the taxpayers' dollars.

There's been some talk about the force-sizing mechanism, and I just might make a comment or two about that. As you know, for the better part of a decade, the department has used the so-called "two major regional conflict" approach to size the force. We are looking carefully at an alternative. I've said repeatedly that I think you don't tear down what is unless you have something better, so it is not something that you just divine and then impose; it's something that you fashion and discuss and then test. And that is the process we're in.

It is a force-sizing construct that has these following elements: one, the ability to fight and win decisively in a major regional conflict anywhere in the world and to do so on our terms. Second, to be able to deal with a second major regional conflict somewhere else in the world where you would repel the aggression. And third, to be able to do some of the kinds of things that we have been doing for the past decade, the so-called smaller or lesser contingencies, non-combatant evacuations, the kinds of activities we're engaged in in East Timor and in Kosovo and Bosnia and any number of other countries, Haiti in the past, and have the capability to do those things and to have a force that's structured to do that.

The strategy, as you know, that we've approached is less of a threat-based strategy -- which has been in the past pretty much the thread, the theme -- to a strategy that is threat-based in the near-term, where you can actually identify threats reasonably well but is more capability-based with respect to the mid- to longer-term, where it is not possible to know precisely exactly where a threat might come from, but it is possible to have some sense of the kinds of capabilities our country will need if we're able to deter and defend against and prevail against the kinds of asymmetric threats that could come from any number of locations.

One other thing I might say that is interesting to me. I saw an article in the National Journal on the subject of personnel policy management this week, and you know, one of the things that has to happen in a large institution is you have to try to identify some important issues and then plant a flag way down the road for people to think about, look at, point towards. And obviously, you calibrate your track as you go along, because you don't plant the flag perfectly the first time. But by raising the issues that we did with the studies -- and I'll just take one as an example, the question that we've raised with respect to the number of months that men and women serve in their posts in the military and, second, the number of years they serve in the military overall -- by raising those issues, people are thinking about them, they're discussing them, they're debating them, they're weighing the advantages and disadvantages that accrue to the armed forces by longer periods and, therefore, greater cohesion, greater war-fighting capability, against the advantage of having people move very rapidly and getting a broader set of experiences, more joint experiences, more schools, more shorter terms.

And I must say, I am very pleased that not only is this being looked at in a rigorous way inside the department by David Chu and the folks in that under secretary for Personnel and Readiness Office as well as in the services, but it's being looked at outside of the department, in the Congress and in the thoughtful journals, and that, I think, is a very helpful thing, because it is an enormously important issue.

People tend to focus more on weapons systems and platforms and events, but the heart and soul of this department involves the people. And what environment we create for them, and what those personnel policies are, and they all interrelate is just an enormously important subject, and I'm delighted to see it being elevated.

Last, on the subject of Russia, as you know, there is a team coming over from Russia next week -- Monday, Tuesday, whatever -- and they'll be here meeting with Doug Feith, who will be heading up our team and a group of people from the joint staff, from the policy shop and others. It very likely will be an exchange of information more than an exchange of views. As you know, we left a paper that our national security team had fashioned in Moscow a week or two ago. They have been reviewing that.

They are now coming over and will have a set of questions and we will have a set of briefings so that they will have, one would hope, a much more detailed understanding of the kinds of things we're thinking about with respect to our offensive and defensive capabilities and the various ways that our two countries can cooperate, not just in the security area, but in the political and economic areas as well.

The week -- I guess a week from tomorrow I go to Moscow with a team, and we'll be meeting with my counterpart, and we'll be building on the discussions that have taken place between President Bush and President Putin and my prior meetings with Minister Ivanov and the meetings that will take place this coming week.

I had to make one comment about it. It is -- it is not easy to change one's thinking or how one is arranged and is used to behaving in dealing with people. There is an awful lot of baggage left over in the relationship, the old relationship, the Cold War relationship between the United States 1and the Soviet Union.

And it is baggage that exists in people's minds, it exists in treaties, it exists in the structure of relationships, the degree of formality of them. And it will require, I think, some time to work through those things and see if we can't set the relationship on a different basis, on a basis that is not premised on hostility between the two countries, that is not premised on fear as to the possibility of an attack by the old Soviet Union into Western Europe, that is hopefully premised on the 21st century and the kinds of technologies that exist today and the kinds of relationships we have with other nations in the world that are not hostile relationships.

And that means we've got to go from what was clearly a hostile relationship and a whole set of structures that fit a hostile relationship to something that is much more akin to relationships that are natural and normal and understandable and workable between countries that don't consider themselves hostile to each other.

With that, I'll stop and respond to questions. Sir?

Q: Mr. Secretary, on base closings, are you confident that you can get Congress to close bases, another round of base closings in 2003? And have you decided yet whether, if the commission adds bases, adds bases to a list that you provide for them, will you be able to step in and then knock those bases off if you don't think such bases should be closed?

Rumsfeld: The first portion of the question was, am I confident we can have a base closing -- a successful base closing round? And the answer is no, I'm not. And no one could be. It is a very difficult thing to do. The process had been politicized in the past, and even people who had supported it previously had over the years withdrawn their support.

It is not something that anyone with any sense wants to go and do. I mean, if you get up in the morning and ask yourself how you want to spend pend your time, that is not how you want to spend your time, running around up on Capitol Hill talking about closing bases in people's congressional districts and in their states. I mean, it is much more fun to be Santa Claus than to be denying things.

So it's the last thing in the world I'd like to do, but it's pretty clear we have to do it. I mean, you simply, from a strategic standpoint, from a financial standpoint, you must try to fashion your base structure to fit your force structure. And that's what we'll try to do.

I think in terms of the details of the legislation, with respect to the second part of your question, I really couldn't care less how it's arranged, what the arrangement is, except that it has to be non-political, it has to be seen as not being political. After a great deal of consultation on the Hill, the conclusion by the people who were doing that consulting was that a single round would be better than two or three or five or 10, the latter being akin to cutting a dog's tail off one inch at a time hoping it doesn't hurt so much. It's just we're going to do it once, we're going to try to do it right, and we'll be on with it. But what the -- the details as to who has what right to do what, my hope is that what the Congress will do, will work with us to find a set of arrangements and procedures that they're happy with, that we're all happy have the best prospects of assuring a clearly not -- non-political approach to this, which it must be if it's to be successful.

Q: You mentioned, sir, that you're not particularly confident that it will work out that way. If that --

Rumsfeld: You mean that we'll be successful in closing bases?

Q: Right.

Rumsfeld: You just can't know.

Q: No, but if it doesn't work out, then what do you think of the idea of unilaterally, if that's the right word, mothballing bases?

Rumsfeld: Well, there are a lot of things the commission could propose. The commission could propose that a base be closed and cleaned up and disposed of, either through sale or gift to some nonprofit, the kinds of things that have normally been done. A second thing that could be done is that you could close it, not clean it up, and just hold it and have it in reserve in case at some point down in the future your force structure required the use of that.

Third thing you can do is to do, instead all of a base, a part of a base, with respect to either one of those. A fourth thing you can do is to, as some bases have done, invite people in and lease portions of base and have multiple uses. A fifth thing people have done is they've taken government activities in downtown higher-rent areas and transfer them out to bases. There are any number of gradations that you can do with respect to that.

Q: All of that was in the absence of the authority from Congress to hold the commission, to go through that procedure. If you're left without that option and you're on your own, would you think about doing it on your own, mothballing bases?

Rumsfeld: I have felt that it would be better to do it to the extent it can be done in cooperation with the Congress. I am told that there is a provision that allows the Pentagon to do it, but that it's never been successfully done in the history of that legislation. So that road is not a terribly attractive one.

Q: Mr. Secretary, over the last couple of weeks the Pentagon has detailed Iraq's increasingly aggressive efforts to shoot down a U.S. or British plane over the no-fly zone and, in some cases, even firing outside into the airspace of neighboring countries. What do you intend to do about that?

Rumsfeld: Well, this is, of course, not new. The no-fly zone has been in place for a number of years. Throughout that period the aircraft have been fired at, the coalition aircraft, and we have been enormously fortunate they have not been hit. As you know, very recently we did have an aircraft that had an engine failure and fortunately was able to be outside of the territory of Iraq.

There are any number of response options which have been exercised over the years and, indeed, during my tenure. A number of them are in the hands of the local combatant commander, and he acts on them. Some require him to notify here and others require national command authority approval.

But the answer to your question is we will do about it what we have been doing about it, and that is to, to the best that we can, assure, look to the safety of the pilots and the crews and yet continue to perform the responsibility that has been assigned coalition aircraft to monitor what's taking place on the ground in Iraq, to understand the signals that could indicate a possible breakout by the Iraqis in the event that they decided they wanted to try to impose their will on some of their neighbors or on some of their own populations, both of which they have done.

Q: If I could just follow up quickly. I understand that you met -- the national security team met yesterday on the subject of Iraq policy. Can you give us any hint about whether you're closer to fashioning a new policy or a new approach regarding Iraq?

Rumsfeld: No. (Laughter.)

Q: You can't tell us, or you're not any closer?

Rumsfeld: No, I said I wouldn't give you any hint. (Laughter.)

Q: Mr. Secretary, a follow-up to that --

Rumsfeld: We are -- you're quite right, we do discuss this subject, and there any number of things being looked at, But, of course, the no-fly zone piece is just a small part of an overall Iraqi strategy.


Q: Mr. Secretary, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, on the Sunday talk shows a week ago, mentioned that there should be a more resolute response to these provocations from Iraq. Is that an indication that the Bush administration is prepared to be more aggressive in response to these provocations and not just take out air defenses but go after some of the heart of Saddam Hussein's military?

Rumsfeld: Yeah, I think that's not a subject that I'm inclined to discuss. What we decide to do, we'll decide to do and we'll do it, rather than announcing it.

Q: Base closure follow-up. One savings, can you give us a reality check on what's the earliest the Pentagon can expect net savings, if in fact your Efficient Facilities Initiative goes through somewhat smoothly?

Rumsfeld: We can be sure it won't go through smoothly! (Laughter.) It may go through, but it will be an exciting time! (Laughter.)

This is one interesting aspect of this process that makes it particularly unattractive to do it. There's no question but that the savings basically accrue down the road -- a year, three, four years down the road, and there's up-front costs to doing it. So it is disadvantageous for any administration to undertake it because it just causes angst and anxiety and concern and unhappiness on the Hill and in congressional districts and in the states, and at the same time, you don't benefit from it. (Laughing) So, you know, you have to really be a glutton for punishment to undertake it!

But it's the right thing to do. The military are unanimous that we should do it. The OSD staff is unanimous that we should do it.

Q: But 2007, 2008, though, at the earliest?

Rumsfeld: Let's see, if we go up with this legislation and they pass it and we get commissioners appointed, and they then come out some time after calendar year -- the end of calendar year '02 and begin that process, now you're into '03, and so you start doing things -- deciding things and doing things in that '03 time frame. So you've got to look at -- oh, yeah, you're going to be out into '06 and '07 and '08, I would think, before you got anything net.

It depends on how you do them. And it also depends in part on counting rules at OMB. And to the extent OMB, or whoever is in charge of this, is willing to look at a span of time and average up-front expenses and known savings -- not imagined, but known -- you might be able to come out with a number that is less harmful in the first years and, therefore, less helpful in the later years because it's all going to net out.


Q: Mr. Secretary, have you finished your review of the nuclear forces structure? And do you have a better sense now about how far you can come down in making cuts in the nuclear arsenals?

Rumsfeld: I have not finished it. There's two pieces to it, really. One piece is the piece that I initiated at the president's request earlier this year and we had another session, gosh, this week with Admiral Mies and others. And we're making good progress on it. Simultaneously, the terms of reference for the nuclear posture review have been finished and the nuclear posture review is going on. That has a deadline, I think, at the end of December. But the president clearly would like to have us have completed most of all of that prior to that time. And I don't want to set an artificial deadline, but certainly we ought to be starting to bring the threads up through the needle head in the month or two or three ahead.

Q: Will you be indicating to the Russians how far you can cut in the talks over the next couple of weeks?

Rumsfeld: Oh, I doubt -- no, no. No, certainly not. We'll certainly be discussing that subject and we'll be discussing cuts, but in terms of end-points, we're not there. I mean, we can talk about what we're doing with the Peacekeeper, we can talk about our thoughts with respect to Trident submarines. And as we go along through this period, there will be other elements that we'll be able to discuss.

But if you think about it, it is an enormously important subject. It is something that everyone needs to get comfortable with as you do it. You have to look at -- not only at today, you have to look out five, 10, 15 years, 20 years. You have to look not only at how countries are arranged today but possible combinations of countries that you might be looking at down the road. You have to face that unhappy thought that someday the phone could ring and they could say, "Oh, my goodness, Mr. Secretary, we just looked at a whole category of our weapons, and the issue of safety and reliability that we've been talking about for the past decade is upon us, and this category very likely is no longer safe or reliable, one or the other," in which case you look around and you say, "Gee, how many nuclear weapon makers do we have left?" They have pretty well retired. And you look at what's the start-up time to be able to replace those weapons in a way that would satisfy you.

So it's pretty easy to go down from high numbers to lower numbers. It's quite a different thing to come down to some lowest number and have a high degree of confidence.

So it's in that band that you need to be -- you need to have a high degree of certainty and confidence that you've looked at all the aspects of it, and everyone understand the costs and the risks involved, and then how you might refashion your force. And then you have to go through again all the issues -- well, I won't get into the details, but it is -- we're doing well on it. And I'm quite pleased, and the president was briefed where we were this week, and he's quite pleased, and --

Q: Could you go to below 1,500? Do you even -- do you know that at this point?

Rumsfeld: I'm not going to that question. (Laughter.)

Q: Mr. Secretary.

Rumsfeld: Yes.

Q: There are increasing reports of violence around the installation in Vieques concerning the demonstrations there. There's an allegation today that one or more Molotov cocktails were thrown at personnel standing guard there. Are you concerned about these reports? Are you satisfied with the level of security, and in particular with the assistance that the Puerto Rican police are providing?

Rumsfeld: I am really only aware of the kinds of reports you're talking about. I've been involved in a series of meetings today, and I would not want to opine as to the level of security being provided. There's no question but that nobody like to see Molotov cocktails heaved around and members of the security forces put at risk. It is -- there is live fire taking place there with inert ammunition. But thus far, we've been quite fortunate that during these periods of considerable protest and considerable demonstration and in some cases violence, that no one has been hurt in recent months.


Q: Can I take you back to Iraq for a minute? From this podium, it has been said that Iraq's air defense system has been largely reconstructed since the February 16th attacks. If that is the case, if that is the Pentagon's view, I guess I don't understand why you're not doing something about it this time, when you did do something about it in February.

Rumsfeld: Mmm hmm.

Q: So what's the difference in the thinking now?

Rumsfeld: One of the problems from speaking from this podium obviously is that there are multiple audiences. And so I will try to use measured words and phrases.

It does appear that Iraq has been successful in quantitatively and qualitatively improving their air defense.

Decisions as to what one does about it, of course, one looks at a cost-benefit ratio, and to the extent you can do something about it that's immediate, prompt and effective, you do it. And we have been doing it, and the response options have been seized by the local combatant commander and they have done what has been possible to do.

The longer it goes on, obviously, the better they get at it and -- (pauses) -- let me think how to say this. Fiber-optic cable they've been laying. You've been aware of that. In fact, we've tackled some of their fiber-optic cable. The problem is when you do that, it gets re-laid. And the question is, so if you're going to do something, one question is what's its value and for how long does it last, the effect of what you've done? And one tends to want to do things that will have somewhat more lasting effects.

I guess the -- I guess the answer is that; that the combatant commander is able to respond to things that he feels will be beneficial from his standpoint in terms of the safety of the pilots.

Q: But I guess my --

Rumsfeld: Yes?

Q: Can I follow up for one second?

Q: Oh, excuse me. Yeah, sure.

Q: The part of the equation that still puzzles me is, understanding all of that, is it not the case, then, that U.S. pilots are flying over essentially a very robust or reinvigorated air defense system, and unlike February, you're not doing anything visible that we can see about it at the moment. Are you --

Rumsfeld: I would think that's a mischaracterization in this respect. What happens is the -- you used the word "robust" which I think is probably a reach. What happens is it goes up and then it's degraded, and it goes up and it's degraded. The combatant commander has to look at a host of things, and there are other things that can be done.

Our interest is in understanding what's taking place in that country. And to the extent you can do that by the way you pattern your flights, by the way you pattern the types of platforms you use, by the way you connect the platforms you're using -- if, in the last analysis, you're reasonably comfortable that you have a reasonable understanding of what's taking place on the ground, which gives you a reasonable warning time, then that was what your goal was and it ends up with a not unsatisfactory outcome from the standpoint of the northern and southern no-fly zones.

Q: Are you comfortable?

Rumsfeld: I'm never comfortable when we have a situation where you have people getting shot at, but obviously that's the job of this department, to balance those risks, and that's what's being done.

Q: But Mr. Secretary, how long can that go on? And isn't the Bush administration now confronted with the same frustrations that the previous administration was, that you take out a site, it's rebuilt, and there is really nothing you can do about Saddam Hussein?

Rumsfeld: Well, I wasn't here for the previous administration. There is no question that they had to deal with roughly the same set of facts we have to deal with, and that is that you have an individual in a country in a region where we have a lot of friends who has demonstrated in his past, recent past, that he's perfectly willing to invade a neighbor; he's willing to use weapons of mass destruction on his own people and his neighbors; he's determined to develop weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver them; that he is quite successful in public relations and information operations and in leaving the impression that it is the sanctions, for example, that are harming his people -- and here is a man who is holding his people hostage and, by his behavior, is isolating them from the rest of the world and causing great harm to the Iraqi people, and yet the media in the region consistently leaves the impression that his words convey that in fact it's the West and the United States and those that are involved in the sanctions and those that are involved in the no-fly zones who are, in fact, creating a situation that's harmful to the Iraqi people, which is just flat untrue.

Now, is it an easy thing to deal with a tyrant and a dictator? No, it's not an easy thing to do. Is the goal of not having him invade his neighbor important? Yeah, I think it is. Is having some warning time so that we can take steps that would prevent him from attacking groups in his north or in his south of his own country and having warning time on that? Yes, I think it is a useful thing to do.

Staff: Two more questions. Yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary.

Rumsfeld: Oh.

Staff: Tom first.

Q: Okay.

Rumsfeld: I'm sorry.

Q: I'm just trying to bring some civility back to Washington. (Laughter.)

On strategy, you've all but buried the Two MTW today. But it's --

Rumsfeld: No, I haven't either, really. I'm very sincere when I say that that is -- it is the force-sizing construct. It has been for a decade. You don't kick it away without a great deal of thought and care and attention. We have -- I have openly raised this issue with the Congress. I have raised it with the president. I have -- the defense establishment, uniform and civilian, has been working with it for months now. And when we arrive at the point where we're willing to say that we're satisfied that we believe we have a construct that's better, I will tell you. And I have not gotten to that point.

Q: So on this construct that you think might better --

Rumsfeld: Now you're talking my language. (Laughter.)

Q: -- what is the timing on the second theater? How fast will U.S. forces get there? What's the requirement that's being laid down for the second theater?

And related to that, what are your force structure options on this new, revised strategy?

Rumsfeld: Those are in the mill, as you're well aware, in the Quadrennial Defense Review, timing, of course, is critical. The assumptions can make a more stressful circumstance, the timing assumptions. And until you have taken then force-sizing mechanism, tested it and had to surface those issues -- what would be the assumptions in these hypothetical conflict situations? -- and bring those assumptions up, test them, and then do sensitivities; change them.

The current force-sizing construct of two major regional conflicts near simultaneously, where in each case, you have the assumption that you have to be able to win decisively on your terms, meaning go to capital, occupy the country, is a very demanding, stressful construct. And it is not clear to me precisely yet -- we will know soon -- how demanding and stressful the construct, the alternative construct that I outlined will prove to be from the standpoint of force sizing. Partly, of course, it's a function of, as you say, timing. Partly, it is not -- it cannot be a difference with respect to the capability of repelling and stopping. And it also would be a question of, how many of these other, lesser things do you want to get involved in?

One of the other pieces of that is we simply have got to really answer the question -- let me see how to say this. It's generally put this way: If you have a troop overseas deployed, that there has to be one getting ready to go and one coming back, and then you look at the papers, the charts, and it will say that in total, it's really four or five times the number of people because you have schools, you have vacations and leave and liberty and what have you, and illness and all of these other things. So, to put one person in Kosovo, you will be told that it takes four or five to back up that rotation.

Now, if there were a way to have some lesser multiplier with respect to your force, either because you increased the teeth and reduced the tail, or because you changed these other things that people have to do somehow, or you change the fraction that is stationed overseas as opposed to the rotational base, there are any number of things that can be tweaked that will help end up relieving some of that stress. So it's a long answer for a --

Q: Could I just follow up to this force-sizing concept?

Rumsfeld: I think I promised the gentleman right behind.

Q: Yeah. North Korean --

Rumsfeld: I want to continue the pattern of civility.

Q: Oh. Thank you, sir. North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il is going to meet with Vladimir Putin tomorrow in Moscow, and obviously, they're going to challenge the missile defense ideas. Sir, could you tell us, beyond that, isn't it contradictory to say that the Russia is not enemy anymore while you're calling the North Koreans a rogue state?

Rumsfeld: Well, I would -- the last thing I would do would be to presume to characterize the conversation that's going to take place between those two gentlemen. I don't think it is a contradiction to say that we don't consider Russia an enemy today and yet recognize that Kim Jong Il still has forces poised against South Korea, and we have troops in South Korea.

And he has, on repeated occasion, made threatening statements, and demonstrated, through exercises and through deployments of capabilities, things that threaten our ally, South Korea. He, in addition, and his people, have over a protracted period been actively selling, to people who don't wish us well, ballistic missile capabilities.

And so the fact that they talk together doesn't change the nature of either country, it seems to me. They are what they are, and their relationship with us is distinctly different, one from the other.


Q: Mr. Secretary, you said that Iraq had quantitatively and qualitatively rebuilt its air defenses --

Rumsfeld: Not dramatically, but correct, to some extent.

Q: And this is since the raid you were talking about earlier this year.

Rumsfeld: I guess I am.

Q: And you said they're using fiber optics. Are the Chinese still helping them with fiber optics?

Rumsfeld: I don't know that I care to answer that.

Q: Can you tell us whether this force-sizing mechanism that you're looking at is better than the two-war capability? You must have some general idea whether this will result in a larger U.S. military, a smaller military, or one perhaps about the same size but simply organized differently. Any idea what it's producing as you run the numbers through on this?

Rumsfeld: Well, I'd be surprised if it -- well, I shouldn't say that. Until we work our way through that completely, I shouldn't guess.

It may -- it could -- I would presume it would end up with some differences as to how you're organized and arranged and how you manage the force because of the distinctive differences between the two. And it, I suppose, could end up with more or less of some piece or another piece. But we're not at that stage.

Q: The assumption seems to be -- people seem to be under the assumption that this is an exercise in trying to get at a smaller military to save money.

Rumsfeld: Well, you know -- (chuckles) -- what can I do about what people think? (Laughter.)

Q: Read the transcript!

Rumsfeld: (Laughs.) All we can do is our best!

And we have -- the president, last year, said he wanted to have a review of the Defense Department and the strategy and how we're arranged and what we're doing. The Congress has asked for a Quadrennial Defense Review.

We're doing it, and it would be foolish and foolhardy for me to try to prejudge it as we go along. You asked if we have a deadline date. There is a statutory date, and we will submit something when that date arrives, and as I have indicated previously, there's no doubt in my mind but that out of this QDR will come things that we want to continue to look at or go beyond and may require additional analytical work.

Q: But your review, the president's review, is now the same as the QDR?

Rumsfeld: The studies that we initiated have flowed into the QDR, except for the nuclear posture review, and that has gone into the nuclear posture piece. And, you know, you know those statutory dates as well as I do, and they will be met in one form or another.

Q: Sir, who is going to be your next chairman? Joint Chiefs?

Rumsfeld: Good one. (Laughter.)

Staff: Thank you.

Q: Sorry, sir. We don't have time for any more questions. (Laughter.) Really. We'd like to stay, but we really have to --