"Finance" in the Nineties

"And all the King's horses and all the King's men couldn't put Humpty together again." This line might well be the epitaph for the economy of the 1990s. We have had tax rebates, tax cuts, and the lowest interest rates in 40 years, but the economy continues to lag. An era of little or no growth looms before us.

Current developments are always a product of past developments; therefore it is incumbent upon us to examine those past developments. In the case of the nineties this means developments in the credit markets.

The first notable aspect of debt growth in the nineties is its sheer size. In the twelve year period 1990-2002, total debt grew $16.9 trillion or 125.0 percent. Outstanding debt grew more in 12 years than in the preceding 112 years! This averaged $1.4 trillion per year of consumption financed by credit.

Another notable development in the nineties is the disparity between the growth rates of nonfinancial and financial debt. Financial debt grew 283.9 percent whereas nonfinancial debt grew 86.2 percent. One factor slowing the growth of nonfinancial debt was the federal budget surplus from 1998-2001. The major factor swelling the growth of financial debt was the amazing growth of government-sponsored enterprises, federally related mortgage pools, asset backed securities, and finance companies. As a group, these four entities accounted for 85.6 percent of the increase in financial debt and 36.8 percent of the increase in total debt. Since these entities came into prominence during the nineties, they merit considerable attention.

Government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) consist of entities such as the:
• Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae)
• The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
• The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mae)
• Institutions supervised by the Farm Credit Administration
• The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Association
• The Federal Home Loan Bank

Federally related mortgage pools
"Mortgage securities represent an ownership interest in mortgage loans made by financial institutions (savings & loans, commercial banks or mortgage companies} to finance the borrower's purchase of a home or other real estate. Mortgage securities are created when these loans are packaged, or 'pooled', by issuers or servicers for sale to investors. As the underlying loans are paid off by the homeowners, the investors receive payments of interest and principal." (The Bond Market Association)

The debt owed by GSEs and federally related mortgage pools is reported separately in the Federal Reserve L3 Credit Market Debt Owed by Financial Sectors, but there is obviously an overlap. This reflects the divers activities in which these agencies engage from direct lending to investing in pools of mortgages, issuing securities backed by these pools, and guaranteeing residential mortgage securities. Economically, by providing a secondary market for mortgages, they expand the supply of money available for the purchase of real estate.

"Asset backed securities, called ABS, are bonds or notes backed by financial assets. Typically these assets consist of receivables other than mortgage loans, such as credit card receivables, auto loans, manufactured-housing contracts, and home equity loans. ABS differ from most other kinds of bonds in that their creditworthiness (which is at the triple A level for more than 90% of outstanding issues) derives from sources other than the paying ability of the originator of the underlying assets.

Financial institutions that originate loans - including banks, credit card providers, and finance companies and consumer finance companies - turn their loans into marketable securities through a process known as securitization." This process is complex and involves "credit enhancement" with one or more forms of extra protection - whether internal, external or both. (The Bond Market Association)

Finance companies are private companies, often subsidiaries of banking institutions and other business firms, that provide financing for consumers, real estate, and business. They raise funds in capital markets such as commercial paper, and, in turn, they securitize pools of assets for sale to investors. These companies are involved in almost every phase of lending, from motor vehicle sales and leases to home loans, to business equipment loans and leases.

There are complex market risks involved with the forgoing types of securities. Mortgage securities' prices fluctuate in response to changing interest rates: when interest rates rise, prices fall and vice-versa. Interest rate movements may also affect mortgage securities because they affect prepayment rates (by borrowers), which in turn affect yields. The price of ABS also fluctuate in response to changes in interest rates in the general economy, and ABS face a prepayment risk as well, but not to the level of mortgage securities. ABS have an additional risk called "early amortization" that may be triggered by a number of developments such as a rise in the default rate on the underlying security or a drop in available credit enhancements below a specified level. These events trigger an early return of principle and interest to investors.

Investors in GSE-ABS include virtually the whole spectrum of the securities markets - corporations, commercial banks, life insurance firms, pension funds, mutual funds, trust funds, charitable endowments, and individuals. And most of this vast market has developed since 1990!

One of the more intriguing aspects of the GSE-ABS phenomenon is the shift in direction from traditional bond investing. Historically, bonds were issued for corporate purposes - to expand productive capacity, facilitate acquisitions, eliminate short-term debt, etc. The thrust was to boost production. GSE-ABS issues, by contrast, underwrite consumption. They represent another technique to drive the economy higher through debt-created consumer demand, and may well be the principal vehicle responsible for the surge in consumer credit and mortgage debt through the nineties. This shift of investment focus from production to consumption is not a healthy one, but, for the moment, the housing and consumer credit sectors are flourishing because of it (a connection that popular comment fails to make).

Due to the numerous parties involved in structured mortgage and asset backed securities and the complexity of their instruments, there are many risks inherent in the market that have never been tested. There are widely differing views regarding these markets. To Alan Greenspan:

"Improved risk management and technology have also facilitated, of course, the growth of markets for securitized assets and the emergence of entirely new instruments - such as credit default swaps and collateralized debt obligations. These instruments have been used to disperse risk to those willing and presumably able to bear it. Indeed, credit decisions as a result are often made contingent on the ability to lay off significant parts of the risk. Such dispersal of risk has contributed greatly to the ability of banks - indeed of the financial system - to weather recent stresses. More generally, the development of these instruments and techniques have led to greater credit availability, to more efficient allocation of risk and resources, and to stronger financial markets."

To which Doug Nolan (Prudent Bear.com) counters:

"There are many flaws in this line of reasoning. A key issue to ponder today is that if this system of structured finance leads to 'greater credit availability' during the boom, what are the consequences to the financial system and the economy if this untested new age system that has come to absolutely dominate credit creation falters? If it becomes more profitable for the speculators to sell securities, while the dynamic hedgers are forced to short securities to hedge their exposure, who will be the buyers? What if a preponderance of performance-chasing speculators and dynamic hedgers turn sellers instead of buyers? Doesn't this feed a vicious spiral of faltering liquidity and debt collapse? Will the economy not be strangled from a systemic credit crunch?.....At the minimum, isn't this a complete breakdown of the capital allocation process?"

Well, for that we will have to wait and see.

As noted by Alan Greenspan "The development of these instruments and techniques have led to greater credit availability....." The question is whether the accumulation of ever more debt contributes to stability or instability. The process should be thought of as a layering of one debt on top of another. At the bottom we have a borrower (buying a home, car, computer, etc.) who owes money to a lender. The lender then sells his loans to an issuer of securities who packages the loans in a variety of ways and sells securities backed by the loans. These securities are bought by investors (mutual funds, insurance companies, endowments, etc.) These [institutional] investors, in turn, raise money by selling their products to the public. Thus, the original income stream is divided in half a dozen different ways, and the resulting risks are both spread and magnified.

Most of us have been struck by the volume of credit card solicitations we receive and the soaring generous credit terms now offered (zero financing, etc.) The "structured finance" we are discussing is the basis for them. Consider a bank making home or home equity loans. The bank has every incentive to make as many loans as possible since they generate fees in several forms. Risk is not of too much concern since the bank is going to sell the loans to an issuer of mortgage-backed securities (and there are buyers even for sub-par loans). Thus, the bank quickly regains the capital it loaned and is ready to make more loans. This same process applies to consumer credit card debt, auto loans, furniture, boats, etc. So we have to ask the question - What have we found - a magic elixir or a deadly trap?

The Income Side

Debt obviously must be serviced from income. A larger burden of debt requires a larger income. Therefore, to assess the ability of debtors to service and repay debt we must compare the two. This can be done on two levels - a macro and a sector, as follows:
Sources: Economic Indicators, Flow of Funds, FRB

Nonfinancial debt as a percent of national income has risen steadily. In 1980 it was 129.7 percent of income, in 1990 233.7 percent, and in 2002 240.0 percent (despite federal government surpluses 1998-2001).

Household debt as a percent of disposable personal income has risen more sharply. In 1980 it was 73.6 percent of d.p.i., in 1990 it was 83.8 percent, and in 2002 103.9 percent. Thus, debt quality has been declining for an extended period.

Of the two measures of debt shown above, the household sector may be the more significant. Personal consumption expenditures constitute two-thirds of GDP. Sustaining the "consumer" has therefore become a preoccupation of popular analysts. But, disposable personal income grew 80.0 percent 1990-2002 whereas household debt grew 123.2 percent. During the first half of 2002 it was still growing at a 5.4 percent annual rate whereas household debt was growing 9.1 percent. Something has to give.

The household sector is doubly important because, as we have seen, several additional layers of creditors now are exposed to it along with the original creditor: the asset-backed security issuer, the guarantors of those securities, the mutual funds and other purchasers of the securities, and the ultimate investor in all of those vehicles. The party can go on for an indeterminate time, but it will surely come to an end.